Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
REVIEW
Case Digests Atty. Marlon Manuel
Amsheryl
PART I
RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION
Concept and Scope
Arts. 243, 246, 277 (c), 212 (e, f)
Omnibus Rules, Book V, Rule I-Rule II, as amended by D.O. 40, series of 2001
NUWHRAIN-MPHC v Secretary of Labor and Employment, July 31, 2009
Labor Organizations and Registration of Unions
Labor Code: Arts. 212 (g, h), 231, 234-242, 277 (a)
Omnibus Rules, Book V, Rule I, Sec. I (a, h-p, w, cc, ee, ff, jj, kk, zz, ccc), Rule III-V, XIV-XV, as amended by
D.O. 40-03, as further amended by D.O. 40-B.
R.A. No. 9481, Sec. 1-9
Department Order No. 40-F-03, series of 2008.
(Implementing Rules for R.A. 9481 amendments)
San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (SMCEUPTGWO) v. San Miguel Packaging Products Employees Union-Pambansang Diwa Ng Manggagawang Pilipino
(SMPPEU-PDMP), September 12, 2007
The Heritage Hotel Manila (Owned and Operated By Grand Plaza Hotel Corporation) v. Pinag-Isang Galing at Lakas
Ng Mga Manggagawa sa Heritage Manila (Piglas-Heritage), October 30, 2009
Eagle Ridge Golf and Country Club v. CA, March 18, 2010
Samahang Manggagawa sa Charter Chemical (SMCC-SUPER) v. Charter Chemical and Coating Corp, March 16,
2011
Yokohama Tire Phils. v. Yokohama Employees Union, March 10, 2010
Eligibility for Membership; Special Groups of Employees
Labor Code: Arts. 245, 212 (m)
R.A. No. 9481, Sec. 8-9
Department Order No. 40-F-03, series of 2008
Omnibus Rules, Book V, Rule I, Sec. I (hh), (nn), (xx), as amended by D.O. 40
Cathay Pacific Steel Corp. v. CA, August 2006
San Miguel Corp. Supervisors and Exempt Union v. Laguesma, August 15, 1997
Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union (SCBEU-NUBE) v. Standard Chartered Bank, April 22, 2008
Coastal Subic Bay Terminal v. DOLE, November 20, 2006
Tunay na Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa sa Asia Brewery v. Asia Brewery, August 3, 2010
San Miguel Foods v SMC supervisors and Exempt Union, August 1, 2011
Union Security Clause
BPI v BPI Employees Union, August 10, 2010 (Main Decision and Dissenting Opinion), October 19, 2011
General Milling Corp v Casio, March 10, 2010
PICOP Resources v Taneca, August 9, 2010
Victoriano v Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54
Kapatiran sa Meat and Canning Division v Ferrer-Calleja, 162 SCRA 367
Conditions of Membership and Rights of Members
Labor Code: Arts. 241, 274, 222 (b)
Omnibus Rules, Book V, Rule XI, XII, XIII, XVIII, XX, as amended by D.O. 40
NOTE: Compare the original provisions of the Labor Code with the amended provisions of R.A. No. 9481.
For reference:
Atlas Litographic Services v. Laguesma, 205 SCRA 12
De La Salle University Medical Center v. Laguesma, 294 SCRA 141
Tagaytay Highlands v. Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union- PTGWO, January 22, 2003
PART II
BARGAINING UNIT
Omnibus Rules, Book V, Rule I, Sec. 1 (d, t), as amended by D.O. 40-03
De La Salle v. De La Salle University Employees Association, 330 SCRA 363
San Miguel Foods v. San Miguel Corp. Supervisors and Exempt Union, August 1, 2011
Holy Child Catholic School v. HCCS-TELU-PIGLAS, July 23, 2013
BARGAINING AGENT, CERTIFICATION ELECTION PROCEEDINGS
Labor Code:
Arts. 255-259, 258-A (Note: Arts. 256 & 257 had been amended by R.A. 9481)
Omnibus Rules, Book V , Rule I, Sec. 1 (d, h, j, o, p, q, t, ll, ss, bbb),
Rules VI-X, as amended by D.O. 40, and further amended by D.O. 40-F-03, series of 2008
Republic of the Philippines, represented by DOLE, v. Kawashima Textile, July
23, 2008
St. James School of Quezon City v. Samahang Manggagawa sa St. James, November 23, 2005
DHL Phils. United Rank and File Association v. Buklod ng Manggagawa ng
DHL Phils., July 22, 2004
Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation v. Hon. Secretary Of Labor, August 14,
2009
Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa SammaLakas Sa Industriya Ng
Kapatirang Haligi Ng Alyansa (SammaLikha) v. Samma Corporation, March 13, 2009
Chris Garments Corporation v. Hon. Patricia A. Sto. Tomas and Chris Garments Workers UnionPTGWO, January 12, 2009
National Union Of Workers In Hotels, Restaurants And Allied Industries- Manila
Pavilion Hotel Chapter v. Secretary of Labor, July 31, 2009
Eagle Ridge Golf and Country Club v. CA, March 18, 2010
PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Taeca, August 9, 2010
Legend International Resorts v. Kilusang Manggagawa ng Legend, February 23, 2011
Samahang Manggagawa Sa Charter Chemical (SMCC-SUPER) v. Charter Chemical and Coating Corp., March 16,
2011
Voluntary Recognition
Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation v. Hon. Secretary Of Labor, August 14, 2009
For reference: Coastal Subic Bay Terminal v. DOLE, November 20, 2006
PART III
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Labor Code: Arts. 250-254, 247-249, 261
Omnibus Rules, Book V, Rule I, Sec. 1 (d, h, j, t, bbb), Rules XVI-XVII, as amended by D.O. 40-03
Art. 231, 212 (n), 260-262 (b), 277 (f,g,h)
Omnibus Rules, Book V, Rule XIX, XXI, as amended by D.O. 40-03
Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Phils., March 3, 2008
PAL v. PALEA, March 12, 2008
San Miguel Foods v. San Miguel Corporation Employees Union, October 5, 2007
Capitol Medical Center v. Trajano, June 30, 2005
Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union v. Confesor, June 16, 2004
General Milling Corporation v. CA, February 11, 2004
FVC Labor Union-Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (FVCLU-PTGWO) v. Sama-Samang
Nagkakaisang Manggagawa Sa FVC-Solidarity Of Independent And General Labor Organizations (SANAMA-FVCSIGLO), November 27, 2009
RFM Corporation v. KAMPI-NAFLU-KMU, February 4, 2009
Fulache v. ABS-CBN, GR No. 183810, January 21, 2010
Employees Union of Bayer v. Bayer Phils., December 6, 2010
General Milling Corp. Independent Labor Union v. General Milling, June 15, 2011
Malayan Employees Association v. Malayan Insurance Co., February 2, 2010
Santuyo v. Remerco Garments, March 22, 2010
Insular Hotel Employees Union v. Waterfront Insular Hotel, September 22, 2010
Cirtek Employees Labor Union v. Cirtek Electronics, November 15, 2010
Eastern Telecoms v. Eastern Telecoms Employees Union, February 8, 2012
PNCC Skyway Traffic Management & Security Division Workers Organization v. PNCC Skyway Corp., February
17, 2010
Supreme Steel v. Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa Supreme, March 28, 2011
For reference:
Halaguea, et al., and other flight attendants of Philippine Airlines v Philippine
Airlines, October 2, 2009
PASSI v. Boclot, September 28, 2007
PART IV
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Labor Code:
SAN
MIGUEL
CORPORATION
EMPLOYEES
UNIONPHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL
WORKERS ORGANIZATION (SMCEUPTGWO),
petitioner,
vs.
SAN
MIGUEL
PACKAGING
PRODUCTS EMPLOYEES UNIONPAMBANSANG
DIWA NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (SMPPEU
PDMP), respondent
G.R. No. 171153, September 12, 2007
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the five votes of the probationary
employees should be opened.
2. Whether HIMPHLU should be certified as the
exclusive bargaining unit.
HELD:
FACTS:
San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-Philippine
Transport and General Workers Organization
(SMCEU-PTGWO) is the incumbent bargaining agent
for the bargaining unit comprised of the regular
monthly-paid rank and file employees of the three
divisions of San Miguel Corporation (SMC), namely,
the San Miguel Corporate Staff Unit (SMCSU), San
Miguel Brewing Philippines (SMBP), and the San
Miguel Packaging Products (SMPP), in all offices and
plants of SMC while San Miguel Packaging Products
Employees
UnionPambansang
Diwa
ng
Manggagawang
Pilipino
(SMPPEUPDMP)
is
registered as a chapter of Pambansang Diwa ng
Manggagawang Pilipino (PDMP). SMCEU-PTGWO
filed a petition for the cancellation of SMPPEUs
registration and its dropping from the rolls of legitimate
labor organizations alleging that SMPPEU committed
fraud and falsification in obtaining its certificate of
registration and that PDMP does not have the power to
create a local or a chapter since it is a trade union
center. It was also found by the regional director that
SMPPEU failed to comply with the 20% %
membership requirement under the Labor Code.
ISSUES:
(1) Is SMPPEU, a chapter, required to comply
with the 20% membership requirement under
the Labor Code?
(2) May PDMP, a trade union center, validly
create local and chapters?
HELD:
(1) No. The creation of a branch, local or chapter
is treated differently. The Court, in the
landmark case of Progressive Development
Corporation v. Secretary, Department of Labor
and Employment, declared that when an
unregistered union becomes a branch, local or
chapter, some of the aforementioned
requirements for registration are no longer
necessary or compulsory. Whereas an
applicant for registration of an independent
union is mandated to submit, among other
things, the number of employees and names
of all its members comprising at least 20% of
the employees in the bargaining unit where it
seeks to operate, as provided under Article
234 of the Labor Code and Section 2 of Rule
III, Book V of the Implementing Rules, the
same is no longer required of a branch, local
or chapter. The intent of the law in imposing
less requirements in the case of a branch or
local of a registered federation or national
union is to encourage the affiliation of a local
union with a federation or national union in
order to increase the local union's bargaining
powers respecting terms and conditions of
labor.
FACTS
Med-Arbiters Ruling
Dismissed the petition for certification election. It held
that the list of membership of petitioner union
consisted of 12 batchman, mill operator and leadman
who performed supervisory functions. Under Article
245 of the Labor Code, said supervisory employees
are prohibited from joining petitioner union which
seeks to represent the rank-and-file employees of
respondent company. As a result, not being a
legitimate labor organization, petitioner union has no
right to file a petition for certification election for the
purpose of collective bargaining.
ISSUE
Whether or not the separation of members from the
Union can detrimentally affect the registration of the
Union.
HELD
No. The fact that six union members, indeed,
expressed the desire to withdraw their membership
through their affidavits of retraction will not cause the
cancellation of registration on the ground of violation of
Art. 234(c) of the Labor Code requiring the mandatory
minimum 20% membership of rank-and-file employees
in the employees' union.
RULING
No. The CA found that petitioner union has for its
membership both rank-and-file and supervisory
employees. However, petitioner union sought to
represent the bargaining unit consisting of rank-andfile employees. Under Article 245 of the Labor Code,
supervisory employees are not eligible for membership
in a labor organization of rank-and-file employees.
Thus, the appellate court ruled that petitioner union
cannot be considered a legitimate labor organization
pursuant to Toyota Motor Philippines v. Toyota Motor
Philippines Corporation Labor Union (hereinafter
Toyota).
INC.
v.
FACTS
On October 7, 1999, respondent Yokohama
Employees Union (Union) filed a petition for
certification election among the rank-and-file
employees of Yokohama. Upon appeal from the MedArbiters order dismissing the petition, the Secretary of
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
ordered an election with (1) Yokohama Employees
Union and (2) No Union as choices.[3] The election
held on November 23, 2001 yielded the following
result:
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY
ERRED
IN
ALLOWING
THE
APPRECIATION OF VOTES OF ALL OF ITS
EMPLOYEES
WHO
WERE
PREVIOUSLY
DISMISSED FOR SERIOUS MISCONDUCT AND
ABANDONMENT OF WORK WHICH ARE CAUSES
UNRELATED TO THE CERTIFICATION ELECTION.
Was it proper to appreciate the votes of the dismissed
employees
The new rule has explicitly stated that without a final
judgment declaring the legality of dismissal, dismissed
employees are eligible or qualified voters. Thus,
xxxx
Thus, we find no reversible error on the part of the
DOLE Acting Secretary and the Court of Appeals in
ordering the appreciation of the votes of the dismissed
employees.
Finally, we need not resolve the other issues for being
moot. The 68 votes of the newly regularized rank-andfile employees, even if counted in favor of No Union,
will not materially alter the result. There would still be
208 votes in favor of respondent and 189 votes in
favor
of
No
Union.
We also note that the certification election is already a
fait accompli, and clearly petitioners rank-and-file
employees had chosen respondent as their bargaining
representative.
CATHAY PACIFIC STEEL CORPORATION
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 18065116456, August 30, 2006
Chico-Nazario, J.
VS
FACTS:
Enrique
Tamandong
III
was
a
Personnel
Superintendent in Cathay Pacific. His position has
fixed daily working hours or 8am to 12nn an 1pm to
5pm. Among his functions was issuing memos on
company rules and regulations, imposing disciplinary
sanctions such as warnings (with irregular attendance
and unauthorized leave of absences) and
suspensions, and executing the same which was
noted by the company Vice President.
FACTS:
Petitioner Union filed before the DOLE a Petition for
District Certification or Certification Election among the
supervisors and exempt employees of the SMC
Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San
Fernando and Otis. The Med-Arbiter issued an Order
to conduct certification among the supervisors and
exempt employees of the SMC Magnolia Poultry
Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis as one
bargaining unit.
ISSUE:
Is Enrique Tamandong III a supervisory employee
eligible to join a union of supervisory employees?
HELD:
Yes.
Tamondong does not possess the power to hire,
transfer, terminate, or discipline erring employees of
the company. At the most, the record merely showed
that he informed and warned rank-and-file employees
with respect to their violations of Cathay Pacific's rules
and regulations. Also, the functions performed by
Tamandong such as issuance of warning to
employees with irregular attendance and unauthorized
leave of absences and requiring employees to explain
regarding charges of abandonment of work, are
normally performed by a mere supervisor, and not by a
manager.
ISSUE:
1. Are supervisory employees and exempt
employees of the company considered
confidential employees, hence ineligible to join
a union?
2. If they are not confidential employees, do the
employees of the three plants constitute an
appropriate bargaining unit?
HELD:
1. NO. It is the contention of SMC that
supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the
exempt employees come within the meaning
of the term confidential employees primarily
because they answered in the affirmative
when asked Do you handle confidential data
or documents? in Position Questionnaires
submitted by the Union. In the same
questionnaire, however, it was also stated that
the confidential information handled by
questioned employees relate to product
formulation, product standards and product
specification which by no means relate to labor
relations. Granting arguendo that an employee
has access to confidential labor relations
information but such is merely incidental to his
duties and knowledge thereof is not necessary
in the performance of such duties, said access
does not render the employee a confidential
employee. If access to confidential labor
relations information is to be a factor in the
determination of an employees confidential
status, such information must relate to the
employers labor relations policies.
ISSUE
Are ALU, a rank-and-file union and APSOTEU, a
supervisory union one and the same because of the
commonalities between them? Are they commingled?
HELD
Yes. First, as earlier discoursed, once a labor union
attains the status of a legitimate labor organization, it
continues as such until its certificate of registration is
cancelled or revoked in an independent action for
cancellation.23 In addition, the legal personality of a
labor organization cannot be collaterally attacked.24
Thus, when the personality of the labor organization is
questioned in the same manner the veil of corporate
fiction is pierced, the action partakes the nature of a
collateral attack. Hence, in the absence of any
independent action for cancellation of registration
against either APSOTEU or ALU, and unless and until
their registrations are cancelled, each continues to
possess a separate legal personality. The CSBTI-RFU
and CSBTI-SU are therefore affiliated with distinct and
separate federations, despite the commonalities of
APSOTEU and ALU.
ISSUE
Whether or not workers were confidential employees
RULING
No. Secretaries or clerks, numbering about forty, are
rank and file employees and confidential employees.
Although Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the
ineligibility to join, form and assist any labor
organization to managerial employees, jurisprudence
has extended this prohibition to confidential employees
or those who by reason of their positions or nature of
work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner
to managerial employees and hence, are likewise privy
to sensitive and highly confidential records.
Confidential employees are thus excluded from the
rank-and-file bargaining unit. The rationale for their
separate category and disqualification to join any labor
organization is similar to the inhibition for managerial
employees because if allowed to be affiliated with a
Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty in
view of evident conflict of interests and the Union can
also become company-denominated with the presence
of managerial employees in the Union membership.
Having access to confidential information, confidential
employees may also become the source of undue
advantage. Said employees may act as a spy or spies
of either party to a collective bargaining agreement. In
the present case, the CBA expressly excluded
Confidential and Executive Secretaries from the rankand-file bargaining unit, for which reason ABI seeks
their disaffiliation from petitioner. As can be gleaned
from the above listing, it is rather curious that there
would be several secretaries/clerks for just one (1)
department/division performing tasks which are mostly
routine and clerical. Respondent insisted they fall
under the Confidential and Executive Secretaries
expressly excluded by the CBA from the rank-and-file
bargaining unit. However, perusal of the job
descriptions of these secretaries/clerks reveals that
their assigned duties and responsibilities involve
routine activities of recording and monitoring, and
other paper works for their respective departments
while secretarial tasks such as receiving telephone
ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA erred in not excluding the position
of Payroll Master in the definition of a confidential
employee
2. Whether the CA erred in ruling that the positions of
Human Resource Assistant and Personnel Assistant
belong to the category of confidential employees
RULING:
1. Confidential employees are defined as those who
(1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, in regard (2)
to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate
10
ISSUE:
Is
the
dismissal
illegal?
HELD:
YES.
There is no question that in the present case, the CBA
between GMC and IBM-Local 31 included a
maintenance of membership and closed shop clause
as can be gleaned from Sections 3 and 6 of Article II.
IBM-Local 31, by written request, can ask GMC to
terminate the employment of the employee/worker who
failed to maintain its good standing as a union
member.
Union security clauses are recognized and explicitly
allowed under Article 248(e) of the Labor Code
11
VICTORIANO
UNION
59 SCRA 54
ELIZALDE
ROPE
WORKERS
12
HELD: No
Republic Act No. 3350 is constitutional. The Act
classifies employees and workers, as to the effect and
coverage of union shop security agreements, into
those who by reason of their religious beliefs and
convictions cannot sign up with a labor union, and
those whose religion does not prohibit membership in
labor unions. The classification introduced by said Act
is also germane to its purpose. The purpose of the law
is precisely to avoid those who cannot, because of
their religious belief, join labor unions, from being
deprived of their right to work and from being
dismissed from their work because of union shop
security agreements. The act also applies equally to
all members of said religious sects; this is evident from
its provision. The fact that the law grants a privilege to
members of said religious sects cannot by itself render
the Act unconstitutional.
ISSUE
Whether or not INC members, who deliberately and
previously refused to affiliate with a union, may
organize by themselves.
For Reference:
RULING
Yes! This Court's decision inVictoriano vs. Elizalde
Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54, upholding the
right of members of the IGLESIA NI KRISTO sect not
to join a labor union for being contrary to their religious
beliefs, does not bar the members of that sect from
forming their own union. The public respondent
correctly observed that the "recognition of the tenets of
the sect ... should not infringe on the basic right of selforganization granted by the constitution to workers,
regardless of religious affiliation."
ATLAS V. LAGUESMA
Doctrine: Union of supervisory employees cannot be
merged and represented with the union of the rank and
file employees even through a national federation.
FACTS
Respondent is a supervisory union of petitioner and an
affiliate of the national federation representing the rank
and file employees of the same petitioner. Said
national federation sough for certification election for
the supervisors unit. However, petitioner opposed the
certification election on the ground that conflict of
interest would arise since same federation would
represent two adverse and distinct units, that of the
rank and file and supersisors.
BARGAINING UNIT
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER
AND COLLEGE OF MEDICINE VS. LAGUESMA
G.R. No. 102084, August 12, 1998
ISSUE
whether or not the union of rank and file employees
and union of supervisory employees can be members
of the same federation.
FACTS:
Petitioner De La Salle University Medical Center and
College of Medicine (DLSUMCCM) is a hospital and
medical school at Dasmarias, Cavite. Private
respondent Federation of Free Workers-De La Salle
University Medical Center and College of Medicine
Supervisory Union Chapter (FFW-DLSUMCCMSUC),
RULING
NO. We agree with the petitioner's contention that a
conflict of interest may arise in the areas of discipline,
collective bargaining and strikes.
13
ISSUE:
Whether or not supervisory union and rank-and-file
union can affiliate in the same federation
RULING:
YES. Supervisory employees have the right to selforganization as do other classes of employees save
only managerial ones. Conformably with the
constitutional mandate, Art. 245 of the Labor Code
now provides for the right of supervisory employees to
self-organization, subject to the limitation that they
cannot join an organization of rank-and-file employees.
The reason for the segregation of supervisory and
rank-and-file employees of a company with respect to
the exercise of the right to self-organization is the
difference in their interests. Supervisory employees
are more closely identified with the employer than with
the rank-and-file employees. If supervisory and rankand-file employees in a company are allowed to form a
single union, the conflicting interests of these groups
impair their relationship and adversely affect discipline,
collective bargaining and strikes. 10 These
consequences can obtain not only in cases where
supervisory and rank-and-file employees in the same
company belong to a single union but also where
unions formed independently by supervisory and rankand-file employees of a company are allowed to
affiliate with the same national federation. As we
explained in the case of Atlas vs. Laguesma, however,
such a situation would obtain only where two
conditions concur: First, the rank-and-file employees
are directly under the authority of supervisory
employees and second, the national federation is
actively involved in union activities in the company.
Although private respondent FFW-DLSUMCCMSUC
and another union composed of rank-and-file
ISSUE:
Whether the certificate of registration of the union
should be cancelled
RULING:
After a certificate of registration is issued to a union,
the legal personality cannot be subject to collateral
attack. it may be questioned only in an independent
petition for cancellation. the inclusion in a union of
disqualified employees is not among the grounds for
cancellation unless such inclusion is due to
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the
circumstances mentioned in sections a and c Article
239 of the Labor Code. THEU, having been validly
issued a certificate of registration, should be
14
FACTS:
Petitioner is questioning the eligibility to vote by some
of its employees on the ground that some employees
do not belong to the bargaining unit.
ISSUES:
1. Should there be a separate bargaining unit for those
engaged in dressed chicken processing, i.e.,
handling and packaging of chicken meat and those
engaged in live chicken operations, i.e., those who
breed chicks and grow chickens? NO.
2. Are payroll masters confidential employees and
must be excluded from the bargaining unit? NO.
3. Are those holding the positions of Human
Resource Assistant and Personnel Assistant
excluded from the bargaining unit? YES.
RULING:
1. There should be only one bargaining unit for the
employees involved in dressed chicken processing
and those engaged in live chicken operations. Certain
factors, such as specific line of work, working
conditions, location of work, mode of compensation,
and other relevant conditions do not affect or impede
their commonality of interest. Although they seem
separate and distinct from each other, the specific
tasks of each division are actually interrelated and
there exists mutuality of interests which warrants the
formation of a single bargaining unit.
ISSUE:
Are computer operators and discipline officers (which
were previously excluded) confidential employees?
NO.
RULING:
The express exclusion of the computer operators and
discipline officers from the bargaining unit of rank-andfile employees in the 1986 collective bargaining
agreement does not bar any re-negotiation for the
future inclusion of the said employees in the
bargaining unit. During the freedom period, the parties
may not only renew the existing collective bargaining
agreement but may also propose and discuss
modifications or amendments thereto.
15
ISSUE:
WON the commingling of non-academic and academic
rank-and-file employees in one labor organization
affect the latter's legitimacy and its right to file a
petition for certification election.
HELD:
[Petitioner] appears to have confused the concepts of
membership in a bargaining unit and membership in a
union. In emphasizing the phrase to the exclusion of
academic employees stated in U.P. v. Ferrer-Calleja,
[petitioner] believed that the petitioning union could not
admit academic employees of the university to its
membership. But such was not the intention of the
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court ordered the non-academic rankand-file employees of U.P. to constitute a bargaining
unit to the exclusion of the academic employees of the
institution, but did not order them to organize a
separate labor organization.
The Supreme Court ruled that the CA did not act with
grave abuse of discretion. The ruling of SOLE is
AFFIRMED.
DOCTRINE:
1. The legal personality of the Union, cannot be
collaterally attacked in certification election
proceedings by petitioner school which, as
employer, is generally a by stander in the
proceedings.
2. The commingling of non-academic and
academic rank-and-file employees in one labor
organization does not affect the latter's
legitimacy and its right to file a petition for
certification election.
FACTS:
Petitioner (School) has 98 teaching personnel, 25 nonteaching academic employees and 33 non-teaching
and non-academic employees. These 156 employees
supported the petition for certification election filed by
Private Respondent (Union). The School assails the
legitimacy of the Union and its right to file a petition for
certificate election due to the commingling of academic
and non-academic rank-and-file employees.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT:
The SOLE erred in interpreting the decision of the
Supreme Court in U.P. v. Ferrer-Calleja1. According to
Petitioner, the Court (in U.P. v. Ferrer-Calleja) sought
the creation of separate bargaining units, namely: (1)
16
ISSUE:
(1) whether a mixed membership of rank-and-file and
supervisory employees in a union is a ground for the
dismissal of a petition for certification election in view
of the amendment brought about by D.O. 9, series of
1997, which deleted the phraseology in the old rule
that [t]he appropriate bargaining unit of the rank-andfile employee shall not include the supervisory
employees and/or security guards; and
HELD:
17
Issue:
Are the formation of the labor union and the
certification election valid?
Ruling:
The petition has no merit.
The Validity of the Formation of the Labor Union
The issue on the employer-employee relationship
between St. James and majority of the members of
Samahang Manggagawa has already been resolved in
a previous case.
Prior to the holding of the certification election, St.
James filed a petition for cancellation of Samahang
Manggagawas union registration for lack of employeremployee relationship between St. James and
Samahang Manggagawas members. This case
reached the Court of Appeals, which held that the
construction workers are actually St. James regular
employees in its motor pool, construction and
transportation departments, and eventually the
Supreme Court which, in a Resolution dated 10
October 2001, closed any issue on the validity of the
formation of the labor union.
Facts:
A petition for certification election was file by the
Samahang Manggagawa sa St. James School of
Quezon City ("Samahang Manggagawa") on behalf of
the motor pool, construction and transportation
employees of St. James School of Quezon City ("St.
James"). On 26 June 1999, the certification election
was held at the DOLE office in Intramuros, Manila. 84
out of the 149 eligible voters cast their votes. A protest
was filed by petitioners on the grounds that the total
number of rank and file employees was 179, and that
those who voted were mere construction workers of an
independent contractor, Architect Conrado Bacoy
("Architect Bacoy").
18
Facts:
A certification election was conducted among the
regular rank and file employees in the main office and
the regional branches of DHL Philippines Corporation
on November 25, 1997. The contending choices were
petitioner and "no union."
However, on December 19, 1997, a petition for the
nullification for the certification election was filed by the
respondent Buklod ng Manggagawa ng DHL
Philippines Corporation (BUKLOD) with the Industrial
Relations Division of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) on the ground of fraud and
deceit, particularly by misrepresenting to the
employees that it was an independent union even if it
was an affiliate of the Federation of Free Workers
(FFW).
Petition denied.
Issue:
Is the certification election valid?
Ruling:
The Petition lacks merit.
The petitioner hinges the validity of the decision of the
election officer on the fact that no protest for the
misrepresentation was filed during the election or
within 5 days from the close thereof. However, the
Court held that when the med-arbiter admitted and
gave due course to respondents Petition for
Facts:
On 2001, Confederated Labor Union of the Philippines
(CLUP) instituted a petition for certification election
19
Issue:
Whether THE CORPORATIONs voluntary recognition
of SMSLEC was validly done while a legitimate labor
organization was in existence in the bargaining unit.
Held:
NO. The fundamental factors in determining the
appropriate collective bargaining unit are: (1) the will of
the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity
of the employees interest, such as substantial
similarity of work and duties, or similarity of
compensation and working conditions (Substantial
Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining
history; and (4) similarity of employment status.
20
certificate
of
registration
of
CLUP-THE
CORPORATION and its Affiliates Workers Union and
not to immediately commence voluntary recognition
proceedings with SMSLEC.
CAs Ruling
CA reversed SOLs decision. CA held that
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 which required the
filing of a certificate of non-forum shopping applied to
petitions for certification election. It also ruled that the
Secretary of Labor erred in granting the appeal despite
the lack of proof of service on respondent. Lastly, it
found that petitioner had no legal standing to file the
petition for certification election because its members
were a mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file
employees.
Issues:
1. Whether a certificate for non-forum shopping
is required in a petition for certification
election. NO
2. Whether SAMMA LIKHA had the legal
personality to file the petition for certification
election. NO.
1. REQUIREMENT OF CERTIFICATE OF NONFORUM SHOPPING IS NOT REQUIRED IN A
PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION.
Med-Arbiters Ruling
Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition on the following
grounds: (1) lack of legal personality for failure to
attach the certificate of registration purporting to show
its legal personality; (2) prohibited mixture of rank-andfile and supervisory employees and (3) failure to
submit a certificate of non-forum shopping.
21
HELD: NO.
The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final
judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies in all later suits on points and
matters determined in the former suit. The elements
of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the
new action must be final; (2) the decision must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of
the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4)
there must be as between the first and second action,
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action.
A FINAL NOTE
Respondent, as employer, had been the one opposing
the holding of a certification election among its rankand-file employees. This should not be the case. We
have already declared that, in certification elections,
the employer is a bystander; it has no right or material
interest to assail the certification election.
22
Ruling:
Facts:
The Eagle Ridge Employees Union (EREU) filed a
petition for certification election in Eagle Ridge Golf &
Country Club, docketed as Case No. RO400-0601-RU002. Eagle Ridge opposed this petition,11 followed by
its filing of a petition for the cancellation of EREU's
certificate of registration ascribing misrepresentation,
false statement, or fraud to EREU in connection with
the adoption of its constitution and by-laws, the
23
LEGEND
INTERNATIONAL
RESORTS
KILUSANG MANGGAGAWA NG LEGEND
February 23, 2011
24
V.
25
26
STANDARD CHARTERED
UNION V. CONFESOR
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
BANK
EMPLOYEES
FACTS:
Standard Chartered Bank (the Bank, for brevity) is a
foreign banking corporation doing business in the
Philippines. The exclusive bargaining agent of the rank
and file employees of the Bank is the Standard
Chartered Bank Employees Union (the Union, for
brevity).
27
RULING: NO
The circumstances that occurred during the
negotiation do not show that the suggestion made by
Diokno to Divinagracia is an anti-union conduct from
which it can be inferred that the Bank consciously
adopted such act to yield adverse effects on the free
exercise of the right to self-organization and collective
bargaining of the employees, especially considering
that such was undertaken previous to the
commencement of the negotiation and simultaneously
with Divinagracias suggestion that the bank lawyers be
excluded from its negotiating panel.
The Union has not been able to show that the Bank
had done acts, both at and away from the bargaining
table, which tend to show that it did not want to reach
an agreement with the Union or to settle the
differences between it and the Union. Admittedly, the
parties were not able to agree and reached a
deadlock. However, it is herein emphasized that the
duty to bargain does not compel either party to
agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession.[53] Hence, the parties failure to agree
did not amount to ULP under Article 248(g) for
violation of the duty to bargain.
28
Issue:
W/N the extension of the life of the CBA also extended
the exclusive bargaining status as well
Ruling:
NO. By express provision of Article 253-A, the
exclusive bargaining status cannot go beyond 5 years
and the representation status is a legal matter not for
the parties to agree upon. Despite the agreement to
extend the life of the CBA beyond the 5-yr period, the
exclusive bargaining status is effective only for five
years and hence, it can be challenged within the 60day period prior to the expiration of the CBAs first five
years.
RFM CORPORATION V. KAMPI-NAFLU-KMU
G.R. No. 162324, February 4, 2009
Carpio-Morales, J.
Issue:
W/N GMC is guilty for ULP for violating the duty to
bargain
DOCTRINE:
If the terms of a CBA are clear and have no doubt
upon the intention of the contracting parties, as in the
herein questioned provision, the literal meaning thereof
shall prevail.
Ruling:
YES. The law mandates that the representation
provision of a CBA should last for five years.The
relation between labor and management should be
undisturbed until the last 60 days of the fifth year. It is
indisputable that when the union requested for a
renegotiation of the economic terms of the CBA on
November 29, 1991, it was still the certified collective
bargaining agent of the workers. The withdrawal of
some union members from the union will not affect the
majority status of the union as the exclusive bargaining
agent. GMC should have responded and kept its duty
to bargain collectively.
FACTS:
Petitioner RFM Corporation (RFM) is a domestic
corporation engaged in flour-milling and animal feeds
manufacturing. Sometime in 2000, its Flour Division
and SFI Feeds Division entered into collective
bargaining agreements (CBAs) with their respective
labor unions, the Kasapian ng Manggagawang
Pinagkaisa-RFM (KAMPI-NAFLU-KMU) for the Flour
Division,
and
Sandigan
at
Ugnayan
ng
Manggagawang Pinagkaisa-SFI (SUMAPI-NAFLUKMU) for the Feeds Division (respondents). The CBAs,
which contained similar provisions, were effective for
five years, from July 1, 2000 up to June 30, 2005. A
section of the CBAs provides that the company should
make payment if Black Saturday, November 1, and
December 31 were declared as special holidays by the
National Government.
29
ISSUE:
Whether or not the employees are entitled to the
questioned salary according to the provision of the
CBA.
HELD:
Yes. If the terms of a CBA are clear and have no doubt
upon the intention of the contracting parties, as in the
herein questioned provision, the literal meaning thereof
shall prevail. That is settled.5 As such, the daily-paid
employees must be paid their regular salaries on the
holidays which are so declared by the national
government, regardless of whether they fall on rest
days. The CBA is the law between the parties, hence,
they are obliged to comply with its provisions.7 Indeed,
if petitioner and respondents intended the provision in
question to cover payment only during holidays falling
on work or weekdays, it should have been so
incorporated therein.
Petitioner maintains, however, that the parties failed to
foresee a situation where the special holiday would fall
on a rest day. The Court is not persuaded. The Labor
Code specifically enjoins that in case of doubt in the
interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, it
should be interpreted in favor of labor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the
benefits under the CBA.
HELD:
Yes. Under the terms of the CBA, the petitioners are
members of the appropriate bargaining unit because
they are regular rank-and-file employees and do not
belong to any of the excluded categories. Specifically,
nothing in the records shows that they are supervisory
or confidential employees; neither are they casual nor
probationary employees.
The Supreme Court sees no merit in ABS-CBNs
arguments that the petitioners are not entitled to CBA
benefits because: (1) they did not claim these benefits
in their position paper; (2) the NLRC did not
categorically rule that the petitioners were members of
the bargaining unit; and (3) there was no evidence of
this membership. CBA coverage is not only a question
of fact, but of law and contract. The factual issue is
whether the petitioners are regular rank-and-file
employees of ABS-CBN. The tribunals below uniformly
answered this question in the affirmative.
FULACHE
V.
ABS-CBN
BROADCASTING
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 183810, January 21, 2010
Brion, J.
DOCTRINE:
CBA coverage is not only a question of fact, but of law
and contract.
EMPLOYEES UNION
PHILIPPINES
December 6, 2010
FACTS:
OF
BAYER
V.
BAYER
FACTS:
Employees Union of Bayer Philippines is the exclusive
bargaining agent of all rank-and-file employees of
Bayer Philippines (Bayer). In 1997, its president
Juanito S. Facundo, negotiated with Bayer for the
signing of a CBA. During the negotiations, EUBP
rejected Bayers wage-increase proposal resulting in a
bargaining deadlock.
30
HELD: YES
Considering that no new CBA had been, in the
meantime, agreed upon by GMC and the Union, we
find, pursuant to Article 253 of the Labor Code, the
provisions of the imposed CBA continues to have full
force and effect until a new CBA has been entered into
by the parties. Article 253 mandates the parties to
keep the status quo and to continue in full force
and effect the terms and conditions of the existing
agreement during the 60-day period prior to the
expiration of the old CBA and/or until a new
agreement is reached by the parties. In the same
manner that it does not provide for any exception
nor qualification on which economic provisions of
the existing agreement are to retain its force and
effect, the law does not distinguish between a CBA
duly agreed upon by the parties and an imposed
CBA like the one under consideration.
MALAYAN
EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION
MALAYAN INSURANCE CO.,
G.R. No. 181357,February 2, 2010
FACTS:
General Milling Corporation and the Union entered into
a collective bargaining agreement which provided,
among other terms, the latters representation of the
collective bargaining unit for a three-year term made to
retroact to 1 December 1988. On 29 November 1991
or one day before the expiration of the subject CBA,
the Union sent a draft CBA proposal to GMC, with a
request for counter-proposals from the latter, for the
purpose of renegotiating the existing CBA between the
parties. In view of GMCs failure to comply with said
request, the Union commenced the complaint for unfair
labor practice.
V.
Facts:
Rodolfo Mangalino, who is a union member of
Malayan Employees Associations was suspended for
taking a union leave without the prior authority of his
department head and despite a previous disapproval
of the requested leave. A provision in the unions
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the
company allows union officials to avail of union leaves
with pay for a total of ninety-man days per year for the
purpose of attending grievance meetings, LaborManagement Committee meetings, annual National
Labor Management Conferences, labor education
programs and seminars, and other union activities.
ISSUE:
31
Issue:
Whether or not the suspension is invalid and violated
the CBA?
Held:
No. While it is true that the union and its members
have been granted union leave privileges under the
CBA, the grant cannot be considered separately from
the other provisions of the CBA, particularly the
provision on management prerogatives where the CBA
reserved for the company the full and complete
authority in managing and running its business.
The prior approval policy fully supported the validity of
the suspensions the company imposed on Mangalino.
We point out additionally that as an employee,
Mangalino had the clear obligation to comply with the
management disapproval of his requested leave while
at the same time registering his objection to the
company regulation and action. That he still went on
leave, in open disregard of his superiors orders,
rendered Mangalino open to the charge of
insubordination, separately from his absence without
official leave.
32
Issue:
Whether or not the MOA entered into by the petitioner
and the respondent constitutes CBA between them
and thus restricts the Secretarys leeway in deciding
matters before it
Held:
No. It is well-settled that the Secretary of Labor, in the
exercise of his power to assume jurisdiction under Art.
263 (g)[11] of the Labor Code, may resolve all issues
involved in the controversy including the award of
wage increases and benefits. While an arbitral award
cannot per se be categorized as an agreement
voluntarily entered into by the parties because it
requires the intervention and imposing power of the
State thru the Secretary of Labor when he assumes
jurisdiction, the arbitral award can be considered an
approximation
of
a
collective
bargaining
agreement which would otherwise have been entered
into by the parties, hence, it has the force and effect of
a valid contract obligation. Since the filing and
submission of the MOA did not have the effect of
divesting the Secretary of his jurisdiction, or of
automatically disposing the controversy, then neither
should the provisions of the MOA restrict the
Secretarys leeway in deciding the matters before him.
33
34
35
RULING
Yes. The subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation, exclusively cognizable by the RTC,
pursuant to Section 19 (1) of BP 129, as amended.
Being an ordinary civil action, the same is beyond the
jurisdiction of labor tribunals. The said issue cannot be
resolved solely by applying the Labor Code. Rather, it
requires the application of the Constitution, labor
statutes, law on contracts and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, and the power to apply and interpret the
constitution and CEDAW is within the jurisdiction of
trial courts, a court of general jurisdiction. Here, the
employer-employee relationship between the parties is
merely incidental and the cause of action ultimately
arose from different sources of obligation, i.e., the
Constitution and CEDAW.
FACTS
Petitioners are members of the Flight Attendants and
Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP), a
labor organization certified as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of the flight attendants, flight
stewards and pursers of PAL. In 2011, PAL and
FASAP entered into a CBA, a provision of which
provides that compulsory retirement for cabin
attendants hired before November 1996 shall be 55
(years old) for females and 60 for males. Petitioners
manifested that the aforementioned CBA provision is
discriminatory, and demanded for an equal treatment
with their male counterparts. Petitioners filed a Special
Civil Action for Declaratory Relief with the Makati RTC
seeking to invalidate the said CBA provision. The RTC
upheld its jurisdiction over the case, reasoning that the
allegations do not make out a labor dispute arising
from employer-employee relationship nor does it
involve a claim against PAL.
ISSUE
Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the petitioners
action challenging the legality or constitutionality of the
provisions on the compulsory retirement age contained
in the CBA?
36
Issue:
1) WON respondent in this case is a casual employee
2) WON the nature of the work of a reliever in this case
is
covered
by
the
CBA
2.1) WON respondent became a regular employee
Ruling:
1) Yes, he is a casual employee but the basis of this is
not because of the 1st paragraph of article 280.. But
under the 2nd paragraph because he does not fall
under any kinds of employee in article 280, however,
to be a regular employee under the 2nd paragraph the
employee must have rendered at least 1 year of
service whether or not it is continous or broken, the
total work time of the respondent is only 228.5 days.
Therefore he is not a regular employee UNDER THE
LABOR CODE ALONE.
On the CBA:
1) there is a stipulation that casual/probationary
employees shall become regular employees after the
accumulation of 6 months of employment from their
hiring.;
37
38
ISSUE
39
ISSUE
Whether or not the act of BPI to outsource the
cashiering, distribution and bookkeeping functions to
BOMC is in conformity with the law and the existing
CBA
RULING
No. The rule now is covered by Article 261 of the
Labor Code, which took effect on November 1,
1974.25 Article 261 provides: Accordingly, violations
of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those
which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated
as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as
grievances
under
the
Collective
Bargaining
Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross
violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall
40
HELD
NO. Under Article 276(c) of the Labor Code, there is
union busting when the existence of the union is
threatened by the employers act of dismissing the
formers officers who have been duly-elected in
accordance with its constitution and by-laws.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court has held that management is
free to regulate, according to its own discretion and
judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring,
work assignments, working methods, time, place, and
manner of work, processes to be followed, supervision
of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees,
work supervision, layoff of workers, and discipline,
dismissal and recall of workers. The exercise of
management prerogative, however, is not absolute as
it must be exercised in good faith and with due regard
to the rights of labor.
ISSUE
41
efficiently.
The
chairs
were
not
removed
indiscriminately. They were carefully studied with due
regard to the welfare of the members of the Union. The
removal of the chairs was compensated by a) a
reduction of the operating hours of the bottling
operators from 2.5-hour rotation period to a 1.5-hour
rotation period; and b) an increase of the break period
from 15 to 30 minutes between rotations.
SA
42
ISSUE
Whether or not the so called picket of the petitioner
union constituted an illegal strike.
HELD
Yes. A strike is any temporary stoppage of work by the
concerted action of employees as a result of an
industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute includes any
controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions
of employment or the association or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or
arranging the terms and conditions of employment,
regardless of whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee.
The allegation that there can be no work stoppage
because the operation in the Dyeing and Finishing
Division had been shutdown is of no consequence. It
bears stressing that the other divisions were fully
operational. There is nothing on record showing that
the union members and the supporters who formed a
picket line in front of the respondents compound were
assigned to the finishing department. As can be clearly
inferred from the spot reports, employees from the
knitting department also joined in picket. The blockade
of the delivery of trucks and the attendance of
employees from the other departments of the
respondent meant work stoppage. The placards that
the picketers caused to be displayed arose from
matters concerning terms or conditions of employment
as well as the association or representation of persons
in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or
arranging the terms and conditions of employment.
ISSUE
Whether or not the strike held by the respondents is
illegal
RULING
YES. The strike is a legitimate weapon in the human
struggle for a decent existence. It is considered as the
most effective weapon in protecting the rights of the
employees to improve the terms and conditions of their
employment. But to be valid, a strike must be pursued
within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means for
the attainment of social justice is never meant to
oppress or destroy the employer. The law provides
limits for its exercise. In the instant case, the strike
undertaken by the officers of respondent union is
patently illegal for the following reasons: (1) it is a
union-recognition-strike which is not sanctioned by
labor laws; (2) it was undertaken after the dispute had
been certified for compulsory arbitration; and (3) it was
in violation of the Secretary's return-to-work order.
Respondent's notices of strike were founded on
petitioner's continued refusal to bargain with it. It thus
43
&
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners were validly terminated for
(1) allegedly participating in an illegal strike and/or (2)
gross insubordination to the order to stop wearing
armbands and putting up placards.
(2) No. If there was illegal lockout, why, indeed, did not
petitioners file a protest with the management or a
complaint therefor against respondents? As the Labor
Arbiter observed, [t]he inaction of [petitioners] betrays
the weakness of their contention for normally a lockedout union will immediately bring management before
the bar of justice.
HELD
(1) NO. In this case, it was found that petitioners actual
participation in the illegal strike was limited to wearing
armbands and putting up placards. There was no
finding that the armbands or the placards contained
offensive words or symbols. Thus, neither such
wearing of armbands nor said putting up of placards
can be construed as an illegal act. In fact, per se, they
are within the mantle of constitutional protection under
freedom of speech.
44
45
ISSUES
(1) Whether the mass actions committed by the Union
on different occasions are illegal strikes; and
(2) Whether separation pay should be awarded to the
Union members who participated in the illegal strikes.
46
RULING
The Union contends that the NLRC violated its right to
due process when it disregarded its position paper in
deciding Toyotas petition to declare the strike illegal. It
is entirely the Unions fault that its position paper was
not considered by the NLRC. Records readily reveal
that the NLRC was even too generous in affording due
process to the Union. It issued no less than three (3)
orders for the parties to submit its position papers,
which the Union ignored until the last minute. No
sufficient justification was offered why the Union
belatedly filed its position paper.
47
48
49
The next day, the Union filed with the NCMB a second
Notice of Strike on the ground of unfair labor practice
and violation of Article 248(a) of the Labor Code on
illegal lockout, which was docketed as NCMB-NCRNS-01-019-02. In the meantime, the Union officers and
members submitted their explanations to the charges
alleged by the Hotel, while they continued to stage a
picket just inside the Hotel's compound.
ISSUES
1. May the Secretary order payroll reinstatement rather
than actual reinstatement? - YES
2. Did the union stage an illegal strike? YES
- May Hotel Nikko legally prevent employees from
reporting for work for alleged violation of the hotel's
grooming standards? YES
- Was there an illegal lock-out committed by Hotel
Nikko? - NO
RULING:
1. YES. Article 263(g) of the Labor Code states that
all workers must immediately return to work and
all employers must readmit all of them under the
same terms and conditions prevailing before the
strike or lockout. The phrase "under the same
terms and conditions" makes it clear that the norm
is actual reinstatement. This is consistent with the
idea that any work stoppage or slowdown in that
particular industry can be detrimental to the
national interest.
50
51
TRANS-ASIA
SHIPPING
LINES,
INC.
UNLICENSED
CREWS
EMPLOYEES
UNION
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (TASLI-ALU) et. al.
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TRANS-ASIA
SHIPPING LINES, INC.
G.R. No. 145428, July 7, 2004, Callejo
ISSUE
Is the strike illegal?
HELD
YES. Respondent Union failed to comply with the
mandatory twenty-four (24) hour notice to the NCMB
for the conduct of a strike vote.
ISSUE
Whether or not the striking employees may be
reinstated in their former assignments by virtue of the
phrase "for the company to accept them back under
the same terms and conditions prevailing before the
strike" in the Order issued by the SOLE?
HELD
52
ISSUE
WON the Secretary properly took cognizance of the
issue on the alleged illegal strike even though it was
not properly submitted to the Secretary for resolution?
HELD
53
FEU-NRMF v. FEU-NRMFEA-AFW
G.R. No. 168362, October 16, 2006, Chico-Nazario
FEU-NRMF and respondent union (a legitimate labor
organization and is the duly recognized representative
of the rank and file employees of petitioner), entered
into a CBA that will expire on 30 April 1996. In view of
the forthcoming expiry, respondent union sent a letter
proposal to petitioner FEU-NRMF stating their
economic and non-economic proposals for the
negotiation of the new CBA. FEU-NRMF rejected
respondent unions demands. Respondent union then
filed a Notice of Strike before NCMB on the ground of
bargaining deadlock, then it staged a strike. FEUNRMF filed a Petition for the Assumption of
Jurisdiction (AJO) or for Certification of Labor Dispute
with the NLRC, underscoring the fact that it is a
medical institution engaged in the business of
providing health care for its patients. Secretary of
Labor granted the petition and an Order assuming
jurisdiction over the labor dispute was issued, thereby
prohibiting any strike. The copy of the AJO was not
served to the respondent because there no union
officer was around. Instead the copy was posted in
several conspicuous places within the premises of the
hospital. Striking employees continued to strike
claiming that they did not know about the AJO order.
FEU-NRMF filed a case before the NLRC, contending
that respondent union staged the strike in defiance of
the AJO, hence, it was illegal.
ISSUE
Whether the service of the AJO was validly effected by
the process server so as to bindthe respondent union
and hold them liable for the acts committed
subsequent to the issuance ofthe said Order.
RULING
The process server resorted to posting the Order when
personal service was renderedimpossible since the
striking employees were not present at the strike area.
This mode ofservice, however, is not sanctioned by
either the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure or the
ISSUES:
54
HELD:
(1) NO. There was no union busting which would
warrant the non-observance of the cooling-off period.
To constitute union busting under Article 263 of the
Labor Code, there must be: 1) a dismissal from
employment of union officers duly elected in
accordance with the union constitution and by-laws;
and 2) the existence of the union must be threatened
by such dismissal. In the case at bar, the second
notice of strike filed by the Union merely assailed the
"mass promotion" of its officers and members during
the CBA negotiations. Surely, promotion is different
from dismissal.
55
ISSUE
Whether or not the strike staged by the respondent is
illegal.
HELD
YES. The Union members repeated name-calling,
harassment and threats of bodily harm directed
against company officers and non-striking employees
and, more significantly, the putting up of placards,
banners and streamers with vulgar statements
imputing criminal negligence to the company, which
put to doubt reliability of its operations, come within the
purview of illegal acts under Art. 264 and
jurisprudence.
ISSUES
1. Whether or the strike conducted is illegal?
2. Whether or not the union members should
also be terminated?
HELD
ISSUE
56
RULING
No. Although the strike was illegal, PHIMCO violated
the requirements of due process of the Labor Code
when it dismissed the respondents.
Under Article 277b of the Labor Code, the employer
must send the employee, who is about to be
terminated, a written notice stating the cause/s for
termination and must give the employee the
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.
To meet the requirements of due process in the
dismissal of an employee, an employer must furnish
him or her with two (2) written notices: (1) a written
notice specifying the grounds for termination
and giving the employee a reasonable opportunity to
explain his side and (2) another written notice
indicating that, upon due consideration of all
circumstances, grounds have been established to
justify the employer's decision to dismiss the
employee.
In the present case, PHIMCO sent a letter, on June 23,
1995, to thirty-six (36) union members, generally
directing them to explain within twenty-four (24) hours
why they should not be dismissed for the illegal acts
they committed during the strike; three days later, or
on June 26, 1995, the thirty-six (36) union members
were informed of their dismissal from employment.
SOLIDBANK CORPORATION V. GAMIER
G.R. Nos. 159460 159461, November 15, 2010,
Villarama
Petitioner Solidbank and respondent Solidbank
Employees Union (Union) were set to renegotiate the
economic provisions of their 1997-2001 CBA to cover
the remaining two years thereof. Seeing that an
agreement was unlikely, the Union declared a
deadlock on and filed a Notice of Strike. In view of the
impending actual strike, then Secretary of Labor and
Employment BienvenidoE. Laguesma assumed
jurisdiction. The assumption order dated directed the
parties to cease and desist from committing any and
all acts that might exacerbate the situation. Secretary
Laguesma resolved all economic and non-economic
issues submitted by the parties. Dissatisfied with the
Secretarys ruling, the Union officers and members
decided to protest the same by holding a rally infront of
the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment
in Intramuros, Manila, simultaneous with the filing of
their motion for reconsideration.The union members
also picketed the banks Head Office in Binondo and
Paseo de Roxas. As a result of the employees
concerted actions, Solidbanks business operations
were paralyzed. The herein 129 individual respondents
were among the 199 employees who were terminated
for their participation in the three-day work boycott and
protest action.
ISSUES
57
RULING
(1) The Court has consistently ruled that once the
Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor
dispute, such jurisdiction should not be interfered with
by the application of the coercive processes of a strike
or lockout. A strike that is undertaken despite the
issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption
order and/or certification is a prohibited activity and
thus illegal.
Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, also
considers it a prohibited activity to declare a strike
during the pendency of cases involving the same
grounds for the same strike.There is no dispute that
when respondents conducted their mass actions on
April 3 to 6, 2000, the proceedings before the
Secretary of Labor were still pending as both parties
filed motions for reconsideration of the March 24, 2000
Order. Clearly, respondents knowingly violated the
aforesaid provision by holding a strike in the guise of
mass demonstration simultaneous with concerted work
abandonment/boycott.
ESCARIO v. NLRC
G.R. No. 160302, September 27, 2010, Bersamin
Officers and members of Malayang Samahan ng mga
Manggagawasa Balanced Foods walked out of the
premises of Pinakamasarap Corporation (PINA) and
proceeded to the barangay office to show support for
an officer of the Union charged with oral defamation by
PINAs personnel manager. As a result of the walkout,
PINA preventively suspended all officers of the Union
and terminated the officers of the Union after a month.
The Union later conducted a strike but the same was
declared to be an illegal strike by the Labor Arbiter.
The NLRC sustained the finding of the illegality of the
strike, but ruled that the union members should not be
considered to have abandoned their employment on
the ground that mere participation of a union member
in an illegal strike does not mean loss of employment.
ISSUE
Are the union members entitled to full backwages due
to their not being found to have abandoned their jobs?
RULING
No. Conformably with the long honored principle
of a fair days wage for a fair days labor, employees
dismissed for joining an illegal strike are not entitled to
backwages for the period of the strike even if they are
reinstated by virtue of their being merely members of
the striking union who did not commit any illegal act
during the strike.
58
HELD
(1) Yes. No strike shall be declared after the Secretary
of Labor has assumed jurisdiction over a labor dispute.
A strike conducted after such assumption is illegal and
any union officer who knowingly participates in the
same may be declared as having lost his employment.
Here, what is involved is a slowdown strike. Unlike
other forms of strike, the employees involved in a
slowdown do not walk out of their jobs to hurt the
company. They need only to stop work or reduce the
rate of their work while generally remaining in their
assigned post.
ISSUE
WON the Sec of Labor has jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases of illegal dismissal arising out from a
strike/lock-out
RULING
Yes. First: Jurisdiction of Secretary of Labor - As the
term assume jurisdiction connotes, the intent of the law
is to give the Labor Secretary full authority to resolve
all matters within the dispute that gave rise to or which
arose out of the strike or lockout; it includes and
extends to all questions and controversies arising from
or related to the dispute, including cases over which
the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction.
FADRIQUELAN
V.
MONTEREY
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 178409, June 8, 2011, Abad
FOODS
59
ISSUE
Whether or not the drug testing was valid
RULING
AERs fault is obvious from the fact that a day after the
union filed a petition for certification election before the
DOLE, it hit back by requiring all its employees to
undergo a compulsory drug test. Although AER argues
that the drug test was applied to all its employees, it
was silent as to whether the drug test was a regular
company policy and practice in their 35 years in the
automotive engine repair and rebuilding business. As
the Court sees it, it was AERs first ever drug test of its
employees immediately implemented after the workers
manifested their desire to organize themselves into a
union. Indeed, the timing of the drug test was
suspicious. Moreover, AER failed to show proof that
the drug test conducted on its employees was
performed by an authorized drug testing center. It did
not mention how the tests were conducted and
whether the proper procedure was employed.
60
ISSUES
1. Did the petitioners engage in an illegal strike?
2. Were the petitioners illegal dismissed?
HELD
1. NO. Petitioners did not go on strike. The Labor
Code defines a strike as any temporary
stoppage of work by the concerted action of
employees as a result of any industrial or labor
61
ISSUE
W/N union members who were illegally dismissed for
mere participation in an illegal strike are entitled to
separation pay?
HELD
YES, they are entitled to separation pay but not
backwages.
With respect to backwages, the principle of a "fair
days wage for a fair days labor" remains as the basic
factor in determining the award thereof. If there is no
work performed by the employee there can be no
wage or pay unless, of course, the laborer was able,
willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out,
suspended or dismissed or otherwise illegally
prevented from working.
ISSUE
Whether Respondent Roberto C. Servaa was a
regular employee
RULING
Yes.
[Selection] Respondent was first connected with AgroCommercial Security Agency, which assigned him to
assist TAPE in its live productions. When the security
agencys contract with RPN-9 expired in 1995,
respondent was absorbed by TAPE or, in the latters
language, "retained as talent." Clearly, respondent was
hired by TAPE. Respondent presented his
identification card to prove that he is indeed an
employee of TAPE. It has been in held that in a
business establishment, an identification card is
usually provided not just as a security measure but to
mainly identify the holder thereof as a bona
fide employee of the firm who issues it.
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE
RELATIONSHIP
62
different duties under the control and direction of ABSCBN executives and supervisors.
In this case, it is undisputed that respondents had
continuously performed the same activities for an
average of five years. Their assigned tasks are
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade
of the petitioner. The persisting need for their services
is sufficient evidence of the necessity and
indispensability of such services to petitioners
business or trade.40 While length of time may not be a
sole controlling test for project employment, it can be a
strong factor to determine whether the employee was
hired for a specific undertaking or in fact tasked to
perform functions which are vital, necessary and
indispensable to the usual trade or business of the
employer
ISSUE
Are Nazareno et. al employees of ABS-CBN?
HELD
We agree with respondents contention that where a
person has rendered at least one year of service,
regardless of the nature of the activity performed, or
where the work is continuous or intermittent, the
employment is considered regular as long as the
activity exists, the reason being that a customary
appointment is not indispensable before one may be
formally declared as having attained regular status.
It is of no moment that petitioner hired respondents as
"talents." The fact that respondents received preagreed "talent fees" instead of salaries, that they did
not observe the required office hours, and that they
were permitted to join other productions during their
free time are not conclusive of the nature of their
employment. Respondents cannot be considered
"talents" because they are not actors or actresses or
radio specialists or mere clerks or utility employees.
They are regular employees who perform several
63
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioners are covered by the CBA
and therefore entitled to its benefits.
HELD
YES. They are ABS-CBNs regular employees entitled
to the benefits and privileges of regular employees.
These benefits and privileges arise from entitlements
under the law (specifically, the Labor Code and its
related laws), and from their employment contract as
regular ABS-CBN employees, part of which is the CBA
if they fall within the coverage of this agreement. Thus,
what only needs to be resolved as an issue for
purposes of implementation of the decision is whether
the petitioners fall within CBA coverage.
The petitioners are members of the appropriate
bargaining unit because they are regular rank-and-file
employees and do not belong to any of the excluded
categories. Specifically, nothing in the records shows
that they are supervisory or confidential employees;
neither are they casual nor probationary employees.
Most importantly, the labor arbiters decision of January
17, 2002 affirmed all the way up to the CA level ruled
against ABS-CBNs submission that they are
independent contractors. Thus, as regular rank-and-file
employees, they fall within CBA coverage under the
CBAs express terms and are entitled to its benefits.
Labor Arbiter Rendoque upheld the validity of ABSCBN's contracting out of certain work or services in its
operations.He awarded them separation pay of one (1)
months salary for every year of service.Again, ABSCBN appealed to the NLRC which rendered on
December 15, 2004 a joint decision on the
regularization and illegal dismissal cases. The NLRC
ruled that there was an employer-employee
relationship between the petitioners and ABS-CBN as
the company exercised control over the petitioners in
the performance of their work; the petitioners were
regular employees because they were engaged to
perform activities usually necessary or desirable in
ABS-CBN's trade or business; they cannot be
considered contractual employees since they were not
paid for the result of their work, but on a monthly basis
and were required to do their work in accordance with
the companys schedule.The NLRC reversed the labor
arbiters ruling in the illegal dismissal case; it found that
petitioners Fulache, Jabonero, Castillo, Lagunzad and
Atinen had been illegally dismissed and awarded
thembackwages and separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement. Under both cases, the petitioners were
awarded CBA benefits and privileges from the time
they became regular employees up to the time of their
dismissal.
64
for the first year and P317,000 for the second and third
year of the Agreement.
BERNARTE v. PBA
G.R. Nos. 192084, September 14, 2011, Carpio
ISSUE
Whether or not there is an employer-employee
relationship between the respondent and petitioner
RULING
No. To determine the existence of an employeremployee relationship, case law has consistently
applied the four-fold test, to wit: (a) the selection and
engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of
wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the
employer's power to control the employee on the
means and methods by which the work is
accomplished. The so-called "control test" is the most
important indicator of the presence or absence of an
employer-employee relationship. In this case, PBA
admits repeatedly engaging petitioner's services, as
shown in the retainer contracts. PBA pays petitioner a
retainer fee, exclusive of per diem or allowances, as
stipulated in the retainer contract. PBA can terminate
the retainer contract for petitioner's violation of its
terms and conditions.
HELD
There is no employer-employee relationship. Applying
the four-fold test, petitioner Sonza was considered by
the Court as an independent contractor.
Selection and engagement of employee: The specific
selection and hiring of SONZA, because of his unique
skills, talent and celebrity status not possessed by
ordinary employees, is a circumstance indicative, but
not conclusive, of an independent contractual
relationship.
Payment of wages: The power to bargain talent fees
way above the salary scales of ordinary employees is
a circumstance indicative, but not conclusive, of an
independent contractual relationship.
65
ABELLA V. PLDT
G.R. No. 159469, June 8, 2005, Chico-Nazario
ISSUE
Whether Consulta was an employee of Pamana
RULING
Yes.Applying the four-fold test :(1) the power to hire;
(2) the payment of wages; (3) the power to dismiss;
and (4) the power to control. The power to control is
the most important of the four elements. The power to
control is explained as: x xx It should, however, be
obvious that not every form of control that the hiring
party reserves to himself over the conduct of the party
hired in relation to the services rendered may be
accorded the effect of establishing an employeremployee relationship between them in the legal or
technical sense of the term. A line must be drawn
somewhere, if the recognized distinction between an
employee and an individual contractor is not to vanish
altogether. Realistically, it would be a rare contract of
CONSULTA V. CA
GR 145443, March 18, 2005, Carpio
Pamana Philippines, Inc. ("Pamana") is engaged in
health care business. Raquel P. Consulta ("Consulta")
was a Managing Associate of Pamana. Consultas
appointment dated 1 December 1987 states: We are
pleased to formally confirm your appointment and
confer upon you the authority as MANAGING
ASSOCIATE (MA) effective on December 1, 1987 up
to January 2, 1988. In this capacity, your principal
responsibility is to organize, develop, manage, and
maintain a sales division and a full complement of
agencies and Health Consultants and to submit such
number of enrollments and revenue attainments as
66
AND
ISSUES
WON the existence of a boundary-hulog agreement
negates the employer-employee relationship between
the vendor and vendee
HELD
NO. Under the boundary-hulog scheme, a dual
juridical relationship is created; that of employeremployee and vendor-vendee. The Kasanduan did not
extinguish the employer employee relationship of the
parties existing before the execution of said deed.
a. Under this system the owner/operator exercises
control and supervision over the driver. It is unlike in
lease of chattels where the lessor loses complete
control over the chattel leased but the lessee is still
ultimately responsible for the consequences of its use.
The management of the business is still in the hands
of the owner/operator, who, being the holder of the
certificate of public convenience, must see to it that the
driver follows the route prescribed by the franchising
67
ISSUE
WON an employer-employee relationship
between Stanfilco and its owner-members
exists
HELD
YES. An owner-member of a cooperative can be an
employee of the latter and an employer-employee
relationship can exist between them. a cooperative
acquires juridical personality upon its registration with
the Cooperative Development Authority. It has its
Board of Directors, which directs and supervises its
business; meaning, its Board of Directors is the one in
charge in the conduct and management of its affairs.
With that, a cooperative can be likened to a
corporation with a personality separate and distinct
from its owners-members. It is true that the Service
Contracts executed between the respondent
cooperative and Stanfilco expressly provide that there
shall be no employer-employee relationship between
the respondent cooperative and its owners-members.
However, the existence of an employer-employee
relationship cannot be negated by expressly
repudiating it in a contract, when the terms and
surrounding circumstances show otherwise. The
employment status of a person is defined and
prescribed by law and not by what the parties say it
should be. It is settled that the contracting parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they want, and their agreement would
have the force of law between them. However, the
agreed terms and conditions must not be contrary to
law, morals, customs, public policy or public order. The
Service Contract provision in question must be struck
down for being contrary to law and public policy since
it is apparently being used by the respondent
cooperative merely to circumvent the compulsory
coverage of its employees, who are also its ownersmembers, by the Social Security Law. The four
elements in determining the existence of an employeremployee relationship are all present in this case.
First. It is expressly provided in the Service Contracts
that it is the respondent cooperative which has the
exclusive discretion in the selection and engagement
of the owners-members as well as its team leaders
who will be assigned at Stanfilco. Second. the weekly
stipends or the so-called shares in the service surplus
given by the respondent cooperative to its ownersmembers were in reality wages, as the same were
equivalent to an amount not lower than that prescribed
by existing labor laws, rules and regulations, including
the wage order applicable to the area and industry,
they are also given to the owners-members as
compensation in rendering services to respondent
cooperatives client, Stanfilco. Third .it is the
respondent cooperative which has the power to
investigate, discipline and remove the ownersmembers and its team leaders who were rendering
68
ISSUE
Whether an employer-employee relationship exists
between petitioner and respondent
HELD
69
ISSUE
Whether or not there existed an employer-employee
relationship between the respondent company and the
petitioner
RULING
No. The Court, in determining the existence of an
employer-employee relationship, has invariably
adhered to the four-fold test: (1) the selection and
engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of
wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to
control the employees conduct, or the so-called
"control test," considered to be the most important
element.
RULING
YES. The elements to determine the existence of an
employment relationship are: (1) the selection and
engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of
wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the
employers power to control the employees conduct.
The most important element is the employers control
of the employees conduct, not only as to the result of
the work to be done, but also as to the means and
methods to accomplish it.All the four elements are
present in this case. As earlier opined, of the four
elements of the employer-employee relationship, the
control test is the most important. Although the
respondents denied that they exercised control over
the manner and methods by which the petitioner
accomplished his work, a careful review of the records
shows that the latter performed his work as truck driver
under the respondents supervision and control. Their
right of control was manifested by the following
attendant circumstances:
1. The truck driven by the petitioner belonged to
respondent company;
2. There was an express instruction from the
respondents that the truck shall be used exclusively to
deliver respondent companys goods;
3. Respondents directed the petitioner, after
completion of each delivery, to park the truck in either
of two specific places only, to wit: at its office in Metro
Manila at 2320 Osmea Street, Makati City or at BEPZ,
Mariveles, Bataan; and
4. Respondents determined how, where and when the
petitioner would perform his task by issuing to him gate
passes and routing slips.
70
ISSUE
Was there an employer-employee relationship
between petitioner and private respondent Kasei
Corporation?
HELD
Yes. In certain cases the control test is not sufficient to
give a complete picture of the relationship between the
parties, owing to the complexity of such a relationship
where several positions have been held by the worker.
FACTS
Taking from the November 2008 decision, the facts are
as follows:
Manufacturers Life Insurance, Co. is a domestic
corporation engaged in life insurance business. De
Dios was its President and Chief Executive Officer.
Petitioner Tongko started his relationship with Manulife
in 1977 by virtue of a Career Agent's Agreement.
Pertinent provisions of the agreement state that: (this
part is essential to determine relationship between Pet.
and Res.)
It is understood and agreed that the Agent is an
independent contractor and nothing contained herein
shall be construed or interpreted as creating an
employer-employee relationship between the
Company
and
the
Agent.
a) The Agent shall canvass for applications for Life
Insurance, Annuities, Group policies and other
products offered by the Company, and collect, in
exchange for provisional receipts issued by the
Agent, money due or to become due to the
Company in respect of applications or policies
obtained by or through the Agent or from
policyholders allotted by the Company to the Agent
for servicing, subject to subsequent confirmation of
71
ISSUE
Whether there is an employer-employee relationship
HELD
No Employer-Employee Relationship.The Supreme
Court ruled petitioners Motion against his favor since
he failed to show that the control Manulife exercised
over him was the control required to exist in an
employer-employee relationship; Manulifes control fell
short of this norm and carried only the characteristic of
the relationship between an insurance company and
its agents, as defined by the Insurance Code and by
the law of agency under the Civil Code.
On August 18, 2009, Cabiles filed a complaint for nonpayment of retirement benefits and for moral and
exemplary damages with the NLRC Regional
Arbitration Branch-IV. He insisted that he was
employed by Intel for 10 years and 5 months from April
1997 to September 2007 a period which included his
seven (7) month stint with Intel HK. Thus, he believed
he was qualified to avail of the benefits under the
companys retirement policy allowing an employee
who served for 10 years or more to receive retirement
benefits.
72
ISSUE
WON Cabiles had completed the required 10 year
continuous service21 with Intel Phil., thus, qualifying
him for retirement benefits.
RULING
Resignation is the formal relinquishment of an
office,24 the overt act of which is coupled with an intent
to renounce. This intent could be inferred from the acts
of the employee before and after the alleged
resignation.25 In this case, Cabiles, while still on a
temporary assignment in Intel Chengdu, was offered
by Intel HK the job of a Finance Manager. In
contemplating whether to accept the offer, Cabiles
wrote Intel Phil. providing details and asked about the
retirement benefits. Despite a non-favorable reply as to
his retirement concerns, Cabiles still accepted the offer
of Intel HK.
MATLING
INDUSTRIAL
&
COMMERCIAL
CORPORATION V. RICARDO COROS
G.R. No. 157802, October 1, 2010
73
FACTS
After respondent Ricardo Coros dismissal by Matling
as its Vice President for Finance and Administration,
he filed on August 10, 2000 a complaint for illegal
suspension and illegal dismissal against Matling and
some of its corporate officers in the NLRC, SubRegional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent was a corporate officer of
Matling Industrial and Commercial Corporation. - NO
RULING
Conformably with Section 25 of the Corporation Code,
a position must be expressly mentioned inthe by-laws
in order to be considered as a corporate office.
Thus, the creation of anoffice pursuant to or under a
by-law enabling provision is not enough to make
aposition a corporate office. Guerrea vs Lezama, the
first ruling on the matter, heldthat the only officers of a
74
ISSUE
Was Petitioner constructively dismissed?
HELD
YES.
The test of constructive dismissal is whether a
reasonable person in the employees position would
have felt compelled to give up his position under the
circumstances. It is an act amounting to dismissal but
is made to appear as if it were not. Constructive
dismissal is therefore a dismissal in disguise. The law
recognizes and resolves this situation in favor of
employees in order to protect their rights and interests
from the coercive acts of the employer.
It is clear from the cited circumstances that the
respondents already rejected Cosares continued
involvement with the company. Even their refusal to
accept the explanation which Cosare tried to tender on
April 2, 2009 further evidenced the resolve to deny
Cosare of the opportunity to be heard prior to any
decision on the termination of his employment. The
respondents allegedly refused acceptance of the
explanation as it was filed beyond the mere 48-hour
75
76
ISSUE
Whether or not there is an employer-employee
relationship between [respondent cooperative] and its
[owners-members].
HELD
Yes. In determining the existence of an employeremployee relationship, the following elements are
considered: (1) the selection and engagement of the
workers; (2) the payment of wages by whatever
means; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power
to control the workers conduct, with the latter
assuming primacy in the overall consideration.The
most important element is the employers control of the
employees conduct, not only as to the result of the
work to be done, but also as to the means and
methods to accomplish. The power of control refers to
the existence of the power and not necessarily to the
actual exercise thereof. It is not essential for the
employer to actually supervise the performance of
duties of the employee; it is enough that the employer
has the right to wield that power. All the aforesaid
elements are present in this case. First. It is expressly
provided in the Service Contracts that it is the
respondent cooperative which has the exclusive
discretion in the selection and engagement of the
owners-members as well as its team leaders who will
be assigned at Stanfilco. Second. Wages are defined
as remuneration or earnings, however designated,
capable of being expressed in terms of money,
whether fixed or ascertained, on a time, task, piece or
commission basis, or other method of calculating the
same, which is payable by an employer to an
employee under a written or unwritten contract of
employment for work done or to be done, or for service
rendered or to be rendered. In this case,
the weekly stipends or the so-called shares in the
service surplus given by the respondent cooperative to
its owners-members were in reality wages, as the
same were equivalent to an amount not lower than that
prescribed by existing labor laws, rules and
regulations, including the wage order applicable to the
area and industry; or the same shall not be lower than
the prevailing rates of wages. It cannot be doubted
then that those stipends or shares in the service
surplus are indeed wages, because these are given to
the owners-members as compensation in rendering
services
to
respondent
cooperatives
client,
Stanfilco. Third. It is also stated in the abovementioned Service Contracts that it is the respondent
cooperative which has the power to investigate,
discipline and remove the owners-members and its
team leaders who were rendering services at
Stanfilco.Fourth. As earlier opined, of the four
elements of the employer-employee relationship, the
77
ISSUE
Does direct control and supervision of the Principal
Contractee convert Job Contractng into LO
contracting?
78
ISSUE
Whether Meralco should be liable for the payment of
the dismissed laborers separation pay
HELD
(1) NO. The individual respondents cannot be
considered as regular employees of the MERALCO
for, although security services are necessary and
desirable to the business of MERALCO, it is not
directly related to its principal business and may even
be considered unnecessary in the conduct of
MERALCOs principal business, which is the
distribution of electricity.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the individual respondents are
regular employees of MERALCO
2. Whether or not MERALCO is their employer
3. Whether or not MERALCO can be held solidarily
liable with AFSISI
RULING
The CA used Art. 109 of the Labor Code to
holdMeralcosolidarily liable with the private respondent
as regard tothe payment of separation pay. However,
the SC ruled that Art.109 should be read in relation to
Art. 106 and 107 of the LC.Thus, an indirect employer
can only be held liable with theindependent contractor
or subcontractor in the event that thelatter fails to pay
the wages of its employees. While it is true thatthe
petitioner was the indirect employer of the
complainants, itcannot be held liable in the same way
as the employer in everyrespect. Meralco may be
considered an indirect employer onlyfor purposes of
unpaid wages.
79
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent is the employer of the
petitioner.
HELD
In order to determine whether P&G is the employer of
petitioners, it is necessary to first determine whether
Promm-Gem and SAPS are labor-only contractors or
legitimate job contractors. There is "labor-only"
contracting where the person supplying workers to an
employer does not have substantial capital or
investment in the form of tools, equipment,
machineries, work premises, among others, and the
workers recruited and placed by such person are
performing activities which are directly related to the
principal business of such employer. The Court held
that Promm-Gem cannot be regarded as labor-only
contractor but a legitimate independent contractor
because the financial statement of Promm-Gem shows
that it has authorized capital stock of P1 million and a
paid-in capital, or capital available for operations, of
P500,000.00 as of 1990.
ISSUE
Whether or not CAMPCO is a legitimate contractor and
if no, whether or not DOLE is liable as direct employer
RULING
NO. CAMPCO was a labor-only contractor and, thus,
petitioner is the real
80
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the company validly contracted
out or outsourced the services involving
forwarding, packing, loading and clerical
activities related thereto.
2. Whether or not the functions of the forwarders
employees are functions being performed by
regular rank-and-file employees covered by
the bargaining unit
HELD
YES. In Meralco v. Quisumbing, we joined this
universal recognition of outsourcing as a legitimate
activity when we held that a company can determine in
its best judgment whether it should contract out a part
of its work for as long as the employer is motivated by
good faith; the contracting is not for purposes of
circumventing the law; and does not involve or be the
result of malicious or arbitrary action. Our own
examination of the agreement shows that the
forwarding
arrangement
complies
with
the
requirements of Article 106[26] of the Labor Code and
81
ISSUE
Whether or not the cause for Astorgas dismissal is
valid
ISSUES
1. Whether or not Inteserve is a labor-only contractor;
2. Whether or not an employer-employee relationship
exists between petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. Inc.
and respondents.
RULING
Yes. Contrary to her claim, an employer is not
precluded from adopting a new policy conducive to a
more economical and effective management even if it
is not experiencing economic reverses. Neither does
the law require that the employer should suffer
financial losses before he can terminate the services of
the employee on the ground of redundancy.
HELD
1. Yes. In sum, Interserve did not have
substantial capital or investment in the form of
tools, equipment, machineries, and work
premises; and respondents, its supposed
employees, performed work which was directly
related to the principal business of petitioner. It
is, thus, evident that Interserve falls under the
definition of a labor-only contractor, under
Article 106 of the Labor Code; as well as
Section 5(i) of the Rules Implementing Articles
106-109 of the Labor Code, as amended. It is
also apparent that Interserve is a labor-only
contractor under Section 5(ii) of the Rules
Implementing Articles 106-109 of the Labor
Code, as amended, since it did not exercise
the right to control the performance of the work
of respondents.
2. Yes. With the finding that Interserve was
engaged in prohibited labor-only contracting,
petitioner shall be deemed the true employer
of respondents. As regular employees of
petitioner, respondents cannot be dismissed
except for just or authorized causes, none of
which were alleged or proven to exist in this
case, the only defense of petitioner against the
charge of illegal dismissal being that
respondents were not its employees.
82
83
ISSUE
Is BMSI engaged in labor-only contracting, entitling
petitioners to be considered as employees of LSC?
RULING
Yes. A person is considered engaged in legitimate job
contracting or subcontracting if the following conditions
concur:(a) The contractor carries on a distinct and
independent business and undertakes the contract
work on his account under his own responsibility
according to his own manner and method, free from
the control and direction of his employer or principal in
all matters connected with the performance of his work
except as to the results thereof;(b) The contractor has
substantial capital or investment; and(c) The
agreement between the principal and the contractor or
subcontractor assures the contractual employees'
entitlement to all labor and occupational safety and
health standards, free exercise of the right to selforganization, security of tenure, and social welfare
benefits.
ISSUE
WON there is an EE-ER relationship
RULING
Yes, The element of control is present in this case.
Teng not only owned the tools and equipment, he
directed how the respondent workers were to perform
their job as checkers; they, in fact, acted as Teng's
eyes and ears in every fishing expedition. furthermore
it was his company that issued to the respondent
workers identification cards (IDs) bearing their names
as employees and Teng's signature as the employer.
Generally, in a business establishment, IDs are issued
to identify the holder as a bonafide employee of the
issuing entity. For the 13 years that the respondent
workers worked for Teng, they received wages on a
regular basis, in addition to their shares in the fish
caught.
CLASSES OF EMPLOYEE
MAGIS YOUNG ACHIEVERS LEARNING CENTER
AND MRS. VIOLETA T. CARIO V. ADELAIDA P.
MANALO
G.R No. 178835, February 13, 2009, Nachura
On April 18, 2002, Adelaida Manalo was hired as a
teacher and acting princiapl of Magis Young Achievers
Learning Center. It appears that, on March 29, 2003,
Manalo wrote a letter of resignation to Magis
directress Violeta Cario but, on March 31, 2003,
Manalo received a letter of termination from Magis so
Manalo filed a comlaint for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of 13th month pay with prayer for
reinstatement. Magis, among others, claimed that
Manalo was legally terminated becayse the 1-year
probationary periof had already lapsed and she failed
84
ISSUE
Is Adelaida Manalo a permanent employee?
HELD
No. The 6-month limit on the term of probationary
employment does not apply to all classes of
occupations. For academic personnel in private
schools, colleges, and universities, probationary
employment is governed by Sec. 92 of the 1992
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools,
supplemented by DOLE-DECS-CHED-TESDA Order
No. 1 dated February 7, 1996 and Sec. 4.m(4)[c] of the
Manual. For academic personnel in private elementary
and secondary schools, it is only after one has
satisfactorily completed the probationary period of
three (3) school years and is rehired that he acquires
full tenure as a regular or permanent employee.
ISSUE
Whether or not he has attained regular status .
RULING
Yes. Though usual and necessary, his employment is
dependent on availability of work SC took judicial
notice that it is an industry practice in port services to
hire reliever stevedores in order to ensure smoothflowing 24-hour stevedoring and arrastre operations in
the port area. No doubt, serving as a stevedore,
respondent performs tasks necessary or desirable to
the usual business of petitioners. However, it should
be deemed part of the nature of his work that he can
only work as a stevedore in the absence of the
employee regularly employed for the very same
function.
85
86
HELD
YES. There are two kinds of regular employees: (1)
those who are engaged to perform activities which are
USUALLY NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE in the
USUAL BUSINESS or TRADE of the employer; and
(2) those who have rendered at least one year of
service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to
the activity in which they are employed. Taripe
belonged to the first category.
ISSUE
W/N the respondents can be considered as regular
employees
HELD
YES. They are regular employees. Where a person
has rendered at least one year of service, regardless
of the nature of the activity performed, or where the
work is continuous or intermittent, the employment is
considered regular as long as the activity exists, the
reason being that a customary appointment is not
indispensable before one may be formally declared as
having attained regular status. Article 280 of the Labor
Code provides:
The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular
employment is the reasonable connection between the
particular activity performed by the employee in
relation to the usual trade or business of the employer.
The test is whether the former is usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer.
87
ISSUES
Whether the reckoning point in determining who
among Kimberlys casual employees are entitled to
regularization should be April 21, 1986, the date
KILUSAN-OLALIA filed a petition for certification
election to challenge the incumbency of UKCEOPTGWO
Whether the employees who are not parties in the
cases between the parties should not be included in
the implementation orders of DOLE
RULING
No. The law [thus] provides for two kinds of regular
employees, namely: (1) those who are engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer; and (2) those who have rendered at least
one year of service, whether continuous or broken,
with respect to the activity in which they are employed.
The individual petitioners herein who have been
adjudged to be regular employees fall under the
second category. These are the mechanics,
electricians, machinists, machine shop helpers,
warehouse helpers, painters, carpenters, pipefitters
and masons. It is not disputed that these workers have
been in the employ of KIMBERLY for more than one
year at the time of the filing of the petition for
certification election by KILUSAN-OLALIA.
OF
Considering that an employee becomes regular with
respect to the activity in which he is employed one
year after he is employed, the reckoning date for
determining his regularization is his hiring date.
Therefore, it is error for petitioner Kimberly to claim
that it is from April 21, 1986 that the one-year period
should be counted. While it is a fact that the issue of
regularization came about only when KILUSANOLALIA filed a petition for certification election, the
concerned employees attained regular status by
operation of law.
During the pendency of a case filed by KILUSANOLALIA against the Ministry of Labor and
Employment, Kimberly dismissed from service several
employees among which are the casual employees
whose regularization are in question. After a series of
cases between the parties which reached the Supreme
Court, DOLE eventually ordered Kimberly to pay the
workers who have been regularized their differential
pay with respect to minimum wage, cost of living
allowance, 13th month pay, and benefits provided for
under the applicable collective bargaining agreement
from the time they became regular employees.
BENARES V. PANCHO
G.R. NO. 151827, April 29, 2005
Respondent Had. Maasin II is a sugar cane plantation
located in Murcia, Negros Occidental with an area of
88
ISSUE
Whether respondents are regular employees of
Hacienda Maasin and thus entitled to their monetary
claims; whether respondents were illegally dismissed.
ISSUE
Whether respondents are regular employees of
Hacienda Maasin and thus entitled to their monetary
claims.
HELD:
YES. The law provides for three kinds of employees:
(1) regular employees or those who have been
engaged to perform activities which are usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade
of the employer; (2) project employees or those whose
employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking, the completion or termination of which
has been determined at the time of the engagement of
the employee or where the work or service to be
performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is
for the duration of the season; and (3) casual
employees or those who are neither regular nor project
employees.
HELD
In this case, petitioner argues that respondents were
not her regular employees as they were merely
"pakiao" workers who did not work continuously in the
sugar plantation. They performed such tasks as
weeding, cutting and loading canes, planting cane
points, fertilizing, cleaning the drainage, etc. These
functions allegedly do not require respondents daily
presence in the sugarcane field as it is not everyday
that one weeds, cuts canes or applies fertilizer. In
support of her allegations, petitioner submitted "cultivo"
and milling payrolls.
The probative value of petitioners evidence, however,
has been passed upon by the labor arbiter, the NLRC
and the Court of Appeals. Although the labor arbiter
dismissed respondents complaint because their
"position paper is completely devoid of any discussion
about their alleged dismissal, much less of the
probative facts thereof,"20 the ground for the dismissal
of the complaint implies a finding that respondents are
regular employees.
89
GAPAYAO V. FULO
G.R. No. 193493, June 13, 2013, Sereno
ISSUE
Whether or not there exists between the deceased
Jaime Fulo and petitioner an employer-employee
relationship that would merit an award of benefits in
favor of private respondent under social security laws
RULING
Yes. Farm workers generally fall under the denition of
seasonal employees. We have consistently held that
seasonal employees may be considered as regular
employees. 56 Regular seasonal employees are those
called to work from time to time. The nature of their
relationship with the employer is such that during the
o season, they are temporarily laid o; but
reemployed during the summer season or when their
services may be needed. 57 They are in regular
employment because of the nature of their job, and not
because of the length of time they have worked.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondents are regular or
seasonal employees of Hacienda Bino?
RULING
Regular employees. The primary standard for
determining regular employment is the reasonable
connection between the particular activity performed
by the employee in relation to the usual trade or
business of the employer. There is no doubt that the
90
ISSUE
Whether Roger Puente is a project employee.
RULING
In general, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals
are binding on the Supreme Court. One exception to
this rule, however, is when the factual findings of the
former are contrary to those of the trial court (or the
lower administrative body, as the case may be). The
question of whether respondent is a regular or a
project employee is essentially factual in nature;
nonetheless, the Court is constrained to resolve it due
to the incongruent findings of the NLRC and the
CA.The Labor Code defines regular, project and
casual employees as follows: ART. 280. Regular and
Casual Employment. - The provision of written
agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and
regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an
employment shall be deemed to be regular where the
employee has been engaged to perform activities
which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer, except where the
employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has
been determined at the time of the engagement of the
employee or where the work or services to be
performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is
for the duration of the season. With particular
reference to the construction industry, to which
Petitioner Filsystems belongs, Department (of Labor
and Employment) Order No. 19,11 Series of 1993,
which make it clear that a project employee is one
whose "employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or termination of
which has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee or where the work or
services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season." In D.M.
Consunji, Inc. v. NLRC, this Court has ruled that "the
length of service of a project employee is not the
controlling test of employment tenure but whether or
ISSUE
Are the employees considered regular employees?
HELD
Yes. However, the designation must be qualified. They
are
regular
seasonal
employees.
To exclude the asserted seasonal employee from
those classified as regular employees, the employer
must show that: (1) the employee must be performing
work or services that are seasonal in nature; and (2)
he had been employed for the duration of the season.
Hence, when the seasonal workers are continuously
and repeatedly hired to perform the same tasks or
activities for several seasons or even after the
cessation of the season, this length of time may
likewise serve as badge of regular employment. Even
though denominated as seasonal workers, if these
workers are called to work from time to time and are
only temporarily laid off during the off-season, the law
does not consider them separated from the service
during the off-season period. The law simply considers
these seasonal workers on leave until re-employed.
FILIPINAS PRE-FABRICATED BUILDING SYSTEMS
(FILSYSTEMS) V. PUENTE
March 18, 2005, Panganiban
"[Respondent] avers that he started working with
[Petitioner] Filsystems, Inc., a corporation engaged in
construction business, on June 12, 1989; that he was
initially hired by [petitioner] company as an installer;
that he was later promoted to mobile crane operator
and was stationed at the company premises; that his
91
ISSUE
Whether or not private respondent is a permanent
regular employee, full time, and was illegally
dismissed.
UNIVERSITY
V.
COURT
RULING
No. Section 93 of the 1992 Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools, provides that full-time teachers who
have satisfactorily completed their probationary period
shall be considered regular or permanent.6
Furthermore, the probationary period shall not be more
than six consecutive regular semesters of satisfactory
service for those in the tertiary level. Thus, the
following requisites must concur before a private
school teacher acquires permanent status: (1) the
teacher is a full-time teacher; (2) the teacher must
OF
92
93
94
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners are regular employees.
RULING
Yes. they are ABS-CBNs regular employees entitled to
the benefits and privileges of regular employees.
These benefits and privileges arise from entitlements
under the law (specifically, the Labor Code and its
related laws), and from their employment contract as
regular ABS-CBN employees, part of which is the CBA
if they fall within the coverage of this agreement.
ISSUE
Is Arceo eligible to become a regular employee of
PLDT?
HELD
Yes. Under Art 280 of the LC, a regular employee is
(1) one who is either engaged to perform activities that
are necessary or desirable in the usual trade or
business of the employer or (2) a casual employee
who has rendered at least one year of service, whether
continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in
which he is employed.
Under the first criterion, respondent is qualified to be a
regular employee. Her work, consisting mainly of
photocopying documents, sorting out telephone bills
and disconnection notices, was certainly necessary or
desirable to the business of PLDT. But even if the
contrary were true, the uncontested fact is that she
rendered service for more than one year as a casual
employee. Hence, under the second criterion, she is
still eligible to become a regular employee.
ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 170351, March 30, 2011
Respondent is a GOCC while petitioner is a legitimate
labor organization. Among [respondents] geothermal
projects is the Leyte Geothermal Power Project
located at the Greater Tongonan Geothermal
Reservation in Leyte. Thus, the [respondent] hired and
employed hundreds of employees on a contractual
basis, whereby, their employment was only good up to
the completion or termination of the project and would
automatically expire upon the completion of such
project. Majority of the employees hired by
[respondent] in its Leyte Geothermal Power Projects
had become members of petitioner. In view of that
circumstance, the petitioner demands from the
[respondent] for recognition of it as the collective
bargaining agent of said employees and for a CBA
95
ISSUE
WON they are project employees
HELD
Yes.
-This Court is convinced however that although he
started as a project employee, he eventually became a
regular employee of PNCC. In the case at bar,
petitioner worked continuously for more than two years
after the supposed three-month duration of his project
employment for the NAIA II Project. While his
appointment for said project allowed such extension
since it specifically provided that in case his services
are still needed beyond the validity of [the] contract,
the Company shall extend [his] services.
HELD
YES. By entering into such a contract, an employee is
deemed to understand that his employment is
coterminous with the project. He may not expect to be
employed continuously beyond the completion of the
project. It is of judicial notice that project employees
engaged for manual services or those for special skills
like those of carpenters or masons, are, as a rule,
unschooled. However, this fact alone is not a valid
reason for bestowing special treatment on them or for
invalidating a contract of employment. Project
employment contracts are not lopsided agreements in
favor of only one party thereto. The employers interest
is equally important as that of the employee[s] for
theirs is the interest that propels economic activity.
While it may be true that it is the employer who drafts
project employment contracts with its business interest
as overriding consideration, such contracts do not, of
necessity, prejudice the employee. Neither is the
employee left helpless by a prejudicial employment
contract. After all, under the law, the interest of the
worker is paramount. Unions own admission, both
parties had executed the contracts freely and
voluntarily without force, duress or acts tending to
vitiate the worker[s] consent. Thus, we see no reason
not to honor and give effect to the terms and
conditions stipulated therein. The litmus test to
determine whether an individual is a project employee
lies in setting a fixed period of employment involving a
specific undertaking which completion or termination
has been determined at the time of the particular
employees engagement.
PASOS V. PNCC
G.R. No. 192394, July 3, 2013, Villarama
96
FACTS:
Petitioners Malicdem and Flores were hired by
respondent corporation as extruder operators in 2006
They were responsible for the bagging of filament
yarn, the quality of pp yarn package and the
cleanliness of the work place area. Their employment
contracts were for a period of one (1) year. Every year
thereafter, they would sign a Resignation/Quitclaim in
favor of Marulas a day after their contracts ended, and
then sign another contract for one (1) year until such
time that they were told not to report to work anymore.
They were asked to sign a paper acknowledging the
completion of their contractual status. Claiming that
they were illegally dismissed, the corporation
countered that their contracts showed that they were
fixed term employees for a specific undertaking which
was to work on a particular order of a customer for a
specific period. Their severance from employment then
was due to the expiration of their contracts.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed
EXODUS
INTERNATIONAL
CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION and ANTONIO P. JAVALERA v.
GUILLERMO BISCOCHO, FERNANDO PEREDA,
FERDINAND MARIANO, GREGORIO BELLITA and
MIGUEL BOBILLO
G.R. No. 166109, February 23, 2011, Del Castillo
HELD
Yes.
The test to determine whether employment is regular
or not is the reasonable connection between the
particular activity performed by the employee in
relation to the usual business or trade of the employer.
If the employee has been performing the job for at
least one year, even if the performance is not
continuous or merely intermittent, the law deems the
repeated and continuing need for its performance as
sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not
indispensability of that activity to the business.
Petitioner
Exodus
International
Construction
Corporation (Exodus) is a duly licensed labor
contractor for the painting of residential houses,
condominium units and commercial buildings.
Petitioner Antonio P. Javalera is the President and
General Manager of Exodus.
On February 1, 1999, Exodus obtained from Dutch
Boy Philippines, Inc. (Dutch Boy) a contractfor the
painting of the Imperial Sky Garden located at Ongpin
Street, Binondo, Manila. On July 28, 1999, Dutch Boy
awarded another contractto Exodus for the painting of
Pacific Plaza Towers in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. In
the furtherance of its business, Exodus hired
respondents as painters on different dates with the
corresponding wages.
97
ISSUE
WON respondents were illegally dismissed.
RULING
There was no dismissal in this case, hence, there is no
question that can be entertained regarding its legality
or illegality. As found by the Labor Arbiter, there was
no evidence that respondents were dismissed nor
were they prevented from returning to their work. It
was only respondents unsubstantiated conclusion that
they were dismissed. As a matter of fact, respondents
could not name the particular person who effected
their
dismissal
and
under
what
particular
circumstances.
98
99
ISSUE
Should the teachers probationary status be
disregarded simply because the contracts were fixedterm?
HELD
NO. To be sure, nothing is illegitimate in defining the
school-teacher relationship in this manner. The school,
however, cannot forget that its system of fixed-term
contract is a system that operates during the
probationary period and for this reason is subject to
the terms of Article 281 of the Labor Code. Unless this
reconciliation is made, the requirements of this Article
on probationary status would be fully negated as the
school may freely choose not to renew contracts
simply because their terms have expired.The
inevitable effect of course is to wreck the scheme that
the Constitution and the Labor Code established to
balance
relationships
between
labor
and
management.
100
knew that his Teachers Contract for school year 19941995 with CSR would expire on March 31,
1995. Accordingly, respondent was not dismissed but
his probationary contract merely expired and was not
renewed. Petitioners also claimed that the three
years mentioned in paragraph 75 of the 1970 Manual
refer to 36 months, not three school years. And since
respondent served for only three school years of 10
months each or 30 months, then he had not yet served
the three years or 36 months mentioned in paragraph
75 of the 1970 Manual.
ISSUE
Whether or not Rojo has acquired permanent status
ISSUE
Whether or not UE illegally dismissed Bueno and
Pepanio.
HELD
Yes. The common practice is for the employer and the
teacher to enter into a contract, effective for one
school year. At the end of the school year, the
employer has the option not to renew the contract,
particularly considering the teachers performance.
HELD
No. The policy requiring postgraduate degrees of
college teachers was provided in the Manual of
Regulations as early as 1992. The requirement of a
masteral degree for tertiary education teachers is not
unreasonable. The operation of educational institutions
involves public interest. The government has a right to
ensure that only qualified persons, in possession of
sufficient academic knowledge and teaching skills, are
allowed to teach in such institutions. Government
regulation in this field of human activity is desirable for
protecting, not only the students, but the public as well
from ill-prepared teachers, who are lacking in the
required scientific or technical knowledge. They may
be required to take an examination or to possess
postgraduate degrees as prerequisite to employment.
Respondents were each given only semester-tosemester appointments from the beginning of their
employment with UE precisely because they lacked
the required master's degree. It was only when UE and
the faculty union signed their 2001 CBA that the school
extended petitioners a conditional probationary status
subject to their obtaining a master's degree within their
probationary period. It is clear, therefore, that the
parties intended to subject respondents' permanent
status appointments to the standards set by the law
and the university.
101
ISSUE
Whether the completion of a masters degree is
required in order for a tertiary level educator to earn
the status of permanency in a private educational
institution?
ISSUE
Does the single act (omission) of an employee
constitute gross neglect so as to warrant the penalty of
dismissal?
HELD
Yes.Art. 281.of the Labor Code provides, Probationary
employment shall not exceed six (6) months from the
date the employee started working, unless it is covered
by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer
period. The services of an employee who has been
engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated
for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular
employee in accordance with reasonable standards
made known by the employer to the employee at the
time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed
to work after a probationary period shall be considered
a regular employee.
RULING
No. Gross negligence connotes want or absence of or
failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire
absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of
consequences without exerting any effort to avoid
them. To warrant removal from service, the negligence
should not merely be gross, but also habitual.
Undoubtedly, it was Salas duty, as material controller,
to monitor and maintain the availability and supply of
Quickbox needed by Aboitiz in its day-to-day
operations, and on June 4, 2003, Aboitiz had run out of
Large Quickbox. However, records show that Salas
made a requisition for Quickbox as early as May 21,
2003; that he made several follow-ups with Eric
Saclamitao regarding the request; and that he even
talked to the supplier to facilitate the immediate
delivery of the Quickbox. It cannot be gainsaid that
Salas exerted efforts to avoid a stock out of Quickbox.
Accordingly, he cannot be held liable for gross
negligence.
SECURITY OF TENURE
SALAS V. ABOITIZ ONE
G.R. No. 178236, June 27, 2008, Nachura
Salas was hired as an assistant utility man by Aboitiz
who eventually became material controller after a few
years. He was tasked with monitoring and maintaining
the availability and supply of Quickbox needed by
Aboitiz in its day-to-day operations. Some time in
102
ISSUES
Whether there was just cause to terminate the
employment of respondent
RULING
Respondent did not adduce any evidence to show
waiver or condonation on the part of petitioners. Thus
the finding of the CA that petitioners cannot use the
previous absences and tardiness because respondent
was not subjected to any penalty is bereft of legal
basis. The petitioners did not impose any punishment
for the numerous absences and tardiness of
respondent. Thus, said infractions can be used
collectively by petitioners as a ground for dismissal.
ISSUE
Whether or not the dismissal was correct
HELD
YES, Respondents dismissal was well within the
purview of SMCs management prerogative.
103
ISSUE
Whether or not Genuino is entitled to payment of such
salaries.
negligent
in
HELD
No, since the dismissal was valid. Citibank had valid
grounds to dismiss Genuino on ground of loss of
confidence.
The
NLRC's
order
for
payroll
reinstatement is set aside. The employee shall either
be admitted back to work under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or
separation or, at the option of the employer, merely
reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the
employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement
provided herein. If the decision of the labor arbiter is
later reversed on appeal upon the finding that the
ground for dismissal is valid, then the employer has
the right to require the dismissed employee on payroll
reinstatement to refund the salaries s/he received
while the case was pending appeal, or it can be
deducted from the accrued benefits that the dismissed
employee was entitled to receive from his/her
employer under existing laws, collective bargaining
agreement provisions, and company practices.
However, if the employee was reinstated to work
during the pendency of the appeal, then the employee
is entitled to the compensation received for actual
services rendered without need of refund. Considering
that Genuino was not reinstated to work or placed on
payroll reinstatement, and her dismissal is based on a
just cause, then she is not entitled to be paid the
salaries.
the
RULING
YES. Mateo was undisputedly negligent when he left
the motorcycle along
Escolta, Manila without locking it despite clear, specific
instructions to do so. It proved that he did not exercise
even the slightest degree of care during that very short
time. Mateo deliberately did not heed the employers
very important precautionary measure to ensure the
safety of company property.
Although Mateos
infraction was not habitual, we must take into account
the substantial amount lost. In this case, LBC lost a
motorcycle with a book value of P46,000 which by any
means could not be considered a trivial amount.
104
105
ISSUE
Whether or not sufficient grounds existed for the
dismissal of the respondent
RULING
No. In termination cases, the burden of proof rests with
the employer to show that the dismissal is for just and
valid cause. Failure to do so would necessarily mean
that the dismissal was not justified and therefore was
illegal. Dishonesty is a serious charge, which the
employer must adequately prove, especially when it is
the basis for termination.
In this case, petitioner had not been able to identify an
act of dishonesty, misappropriation, or any illicit act,
which the respondent may have committed in
connection with the erroneously reported product
samples. While respondent was admittedly negligent in
filling out his August and September 1998 DCR, his
errors alone are insufficient evidence of a dishonest
purpose. Since fraud implies willfulness or wrongful
intent, the innocent non-disclosure of or inadvertent
errors in declaring facts by the employee to the
employer will not constitute a just cause for the
dismissal of the employee. In addition, the subsequent
acts of respondent belie a design to misappropriate
product samples. So as to escape any liability,
respondent could have easily just submitted for audit
only the number of product samples which he
reported. Instead, respondent brought all the product
samples in his custody during the audit and,
afterwards, honestly admitted to his negligence.
Negligence is defined as the failure to exercise the
standard of care that a reasonably prudent person
would have exercised in a similar situation. To this
Court, respondent did not commit any willful violation,
rather he merely failed to exercise the standard care
required of a territory representative to carefully count
the number of product samples delivered to him in
August and September 1998.
Moreover, petitioner failed to observe procedural due
process in connection with the aforementioned charge.
Section 2(d) of Rule 1 of The Implementing Rules of
Book VI states that:
ISSUE:
Whether PLDT violated the requirements of due
process under the Labor Code when it dismissed said
106
PEREZ v. PT&T
G.R. No. 152048, April 7, 2009, Corona
Petitioners Felix Perez and Amante Doria were
employed by respondent Philippine Telegraph and
Telephone Company. They later received a
memorandum dismissing them from the service for
having falsified company documents, prompting them
to file a complaint for illegal dismissal on the ground
that they were dismissed on the same date that they
received the said memorandum. Petitioners argue that
due process was not observed in the absence of a
hearing in which they could have explained their side.
ISSUE
WON petitioner observed due process in dismissing
respondent
RULING
No, petitioner did not comply due to the fact that in
validly dismissing and employee two notices are
mandatory 1) a first notice to apprise him of his fault,
and 2) a second notice to him that his employment is
being terminated.
ISSUE
Is a hearing (or conference) mandatory in cases
involving the dismissal of an employee?
RULING
No. We note a marked difference in the standards of
due process to be followed as prescribed in the Labor
Code and its implementing rules. The Labor Code, on
one hand, provides that an employer must provide the
107
ISSUES
1. Was Vallota validly dismissed on the ground of
loss of trust and confidence?
2. Were the requirements of procedural due
process for termination observed?
HELD
(1) No. Vallotas position as Junior Programmer is
analogous to the second class of positions of trust and
confidence. The act alleged to have caused the loss of
trust and confidence of PGAI in Vallota was the
presence in his computers hard drive of a folder
named MAA allegedly containing files with information
on MAA Mutual Life Philippines, a domestic
corporation selling life insurance policies to the buying
public, and files relating to PGAIs internal affairs.
108
ISSUE
Whether or not the termination is valid.
RULING
Yes. Article 282(e) of the Labor Code talks of other
analogous causes or those which are susceptible of
comparison to another in general or in specific detail
as a cause for termination of employment. A cause
analogous to serious misconduct is a voluntary and/or
willful act or omission attesting to an employees moral
depravity. Theft committed by an employee against a
person other than his employer, if proven by
substantial evidence, is a cause analogous to serious
misconduct. Previous infractions may be cited as
justification for dismissing an employee only if they are
related to the subsequent offense. However, it must be
noted that such a discussion was unnecessary since
the theft, taken in isolation from Fermins other
violations, was in itself a valid cause for the termination
of his employment.
109
INC.
v.
ISSUE
W/N respondent's dismissal from employment is valid
HELD
YES. To be sure, an employer is free to regulate all
aspects of employment. It may make reasonable rules
and regulations for the government of its employees
which become part of the contract of employment
provided they are made known to the employee. In the
event of a violation, an employee may be validly
terminated from employment on the ground that an
employer cannot rationally be expected to retain the
employment of a person whose lack of morals, respect
and loyalty to his employer, regard for his employers
rules and application of the dignity and responsibility,
has so plainly and completely been bared.
110
and
ISSUE
Whether Michelle was illegally dismissed, specifically:
a)
Whether Michelles AWOLs were habitual
b)
Whether the dismissal imposed by Cavite
Apparel too harsh of a penalty
RULING
Yes.
Michelles four absences were not habitual; "totality of
infractions" doctrine not applicable. Neglect of duty, to
be a ground for dismissal under Article 282 of the
Labor Code, must be both gross and habitual. Gross
negligence implies want of care in the performance of
111
ction should be taken against her for the nonremittance of the Ballrooms sales. Esguerra was
placed under preventive suspension with pay, pending
investigation. In her letter-response, Esguerra denied
having committed any misappropriation. Valle Verde
found Esguerras explanation unsatisfactory and,
on July 26, 2000, issued a second memorandum
terminating Esguerras employment.
ISSUE
Whether the dismissal is valid.
HELD
We now dwell on the substantive aspect of Esguerras
dismissal. We have held that there are two (2) classes
of positions of trust the first class consists of
managerial employees, or those vested with the power
to lay down management policies; and the second
class consists of cashiers, auditors, property
custodians or those who, in the normal and routine
exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant
amounts of money or property.
ISSUE
Whether petitioners were legally dismissed.
HELD
NO. A companys exercise of its management
prerogatives is not absolute. It cannot exercise its
prerogative in a cruel, repressive, or despotic manner.
The requirements for retrenchment are: (1) it is
undertaken to prevent losses, which are not merely de
minimis, but substantial, serious, actual, and real, or if
only expected, are reasonably imminent as perceived
objectively and in good faith by the employer; (2) the
employer serves written notice both to the employees
and the DOLE at least one month prior to the intended
date of retrenchment; and (3) the employer pays the
retrenched employees separation pay equivalent to
one month pay or at least month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher. The Court later added the
requirements that the employer must use fair and
112
program
HELD
Yes. The Court finds that respondent was fully justified
in implementing a retrenchment program.
Retrenchment is the termination of employment
initiated by the employer through no fault of the
employees and without prejudice to the latter, resorted
to by management during periods of business
recession; industrial depression; or seasonal
fluctuations, during lulls occasioned by lack of orders,
shortage of materials, conversion of the plant for a new
production program, or the introduction of new
methods or more efficient machinery or automation.
Retrenchment is a valid management prerogative. It is,
however, subject to faithful compliance with the
substantive and procedural requirements laid down by
law and jurisprudence. In the discharge of these
requirements, it is the employer who bears the onus,
being in the nature of affirmative defense.
113
ISSUE
Whether or not there was an illegal reduction of work.
ISSUE
Is redundancy the same as retrenchment?
RULING
Yes. A close examination of petitioners' nancial
reports for 1997-1998 shows that, while the company
suered a loss of P3, 645,422.00 in 1997, it retained a
considerable amount of earnings 45 and operating
income. A year of nancial losses would not warrant
the immolation of the welfare of the employees, which
in this case was done through a reduced workweek
that resulted in an unsettling diminution of the periodic
pay for a protracted period. Permitting reduction of
work and pay at the slightest indication of losses would
be contrary to the State's policy to afford protection to
labor and provide full employment. Certainly,
management has the prerogative to come up with
measures to ensure protability or loss minimization.
However, such privilege is not absolute. Management
prerogative must be exercised in good faith and with
due regard to the rights of labor.
HELD
No. The existence of redundancy or retrenchment is a
question of fact. AMA failed to sufficiently prove either
of the two.
Redundancy exists when the service capability of the
workforce is in excess of what is reasonably needed to
meet the demands of the business enterprise. Among
the requisites of a valid redundancy program are: (1)
the good faith of the employer in abolishing the
redundant position; and (2) fair and reasonable criteria
in ascertaining what positions are to be declared
redundant and accordingly abolished.
The determination that the employee's services are no
longer necessary or sustainable for being redundant is
an exercise of business judgment of the employer. The
wisdom or soundness of this judgment is not subject to
discretionary review of the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC, provided there is no violation of law and no
showing that it was prompted by an arbitrary or
malicious act. In other words, it is not enough for a
company to merely declare that it has become
overmanned. It must produce adequate proof of such
redundancy to justify the dismissal of the affected
employees.
114
GSWU-NAFLU-KMU v. NLRC
G.R. No. 165757, October 17, 2006, Carpio Morales
On September 8, 1999, petitioners Galaxie Steel
Workers Union and Galaxie employees filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice,
and money claims against Galaxie. The Labor Arbiter,
by Decision of October 30, 2000, declared valid
Galaxies closure of business but nevertheless ordered
it to pay petitioner-employees separation pay, pro-rata
13th month pay, and vacation and sick leave credits.
115
ISSUE
Whether or not private respondent Esmaquel is
illegally dismissed.
RULING
Yes. Petitioners utterly failed to establish by
substantial evidence that indeed, respondents position
in the company became redundant due to concrete
and real factors recognized by law and relevant
jurisprudence. Redundancy is one of the authorized
causes of dismissal. Redundancy in an employers
personnel force necessarily or even ordinarily refers to
duplication of work. That no other person was holding
the same position that private respondent held prior to
the termination of his services, does not show that his
position had not become redundant. Indeed, in any
well organized business enterprise, it would be
surprising to find duplication of work and two (2) or
more people doing the work of one person. We believe
that redundancy, for purposes of the Labor Code,
exists where the services of an employee are in
excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual
requirements of the enterprise. Succinctly put, a
position is redundant where it is superfluous, and
superfluity of a position or positions may be the
outcome of a number of factors, such as overhiring of
workers, decrease in volume of business, or dropping
116
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner undertook a valid
retrenchment
as
it
was
already actually
sufferingserious financial losses
FASAP v. PAL
G.R. No. 178083, July 22, 2008, Ynares Santiago
Petitioner is the EBR of respondents flight attendants
and stewards. Due to its alleged financial loss,
respondent made a retrenchment scheme, thereby,
terminating many of the employees, including
members of petitioner union. As a consequence,
petitioner filed for illegal dismissal on the ground that
the retrenchment scheme of the respondent is illegal.
HELD
Retrenchment is one of the authorized causes
recognized by the Labor Code for the dismissal of
employees. It is a management prerogative resorted to
by employers to avoid or minimize business
losses. The Court has laid down the following
standards that a company must meet to justify
retrenchment and to foil abuse:
1.
Firstly, the losses expected should be
substantial and not merely de minimis in
extent. If the loss purportedly sought to be
forestalled by retrenchment is clearly shown to
be insubstantial and inconsequential in
character, the bonafide nature of the
retrenchment would appear to be seriously in
question.
2.
Secondly, the
substantial
loss
apprehended must be reasonably imminent,
as such imminence can be perceived
objectively and in good faith by the
employer. There should, in other words, be a
certain
degree
of
urgency
for
the
retrenchment, which is after all a drastic
recourse with serious consequences for the
livelihood of the employees retired or
otherwise laid-off.
3.
thirdly, it
must
be
reasonably
necessary and likely to effectively prevent the
expected losses.
4.
Lastly, but certainly not the least
important, alleged losses if already realized,
and the expected imminent losses sought to
be forestalled, must be proved by sufficient
and convincing evidence.
ISSUE
Whether or not the retrenchment scheme by PAL is
valid
RULING
No. while it is true that the exercise of this right is a
prerogative of management, there must be faithful
compliance
with
substantive
and
procedural
requirements of the law and jurisprudence, for
retrenchment strikes at the very heart of the workers
employment, the lifeblood upon which he and his
family owe their survival. Retrenchment is only a
measure of last resort, when other less drastic means
have been tried and found to be inadequate.
The burden clearly falls upon the employer to prove
economic or business losses with sufficient supporting
evidence. Its failure to prove these reverses or losses
necessarily means that the employees dismissal was
not justified. Any claim of actual or potential business
losses must satisfy certain established standards, all of
which must concur, before any reduction of personnel
becomes legal. These are:
(1) That retrenchment is reasonably
necessary and likely to prevent
business losses which, if already
incurred, are not merely de minimis,
but substantial, serious, actual and
real, or if only expected, are
reasonably imminent as perceived
objectively and in good faith by the
employer;
117
its
in
its
or
ISSUE
Whether or not Viajar was validly terminated from
GMC
HELD
The petition is denied. Art. 283 of the Labor Code
provides that redundancy is one of the authorized
causes for dismissal. It is imperative that the employer
must comply with the requirements for a valid
implementation of the companys redundancy program,
to wit: (a) the employer must serve a written notice to
the affected employees and the DOLE at least one (1)
month before the intended date of retrenchment; (b)
the employer must pay the employees a separation
pay equivalent to at least one month pay or at least
one month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher; (c) the employer must abolish the redundant
positions in good faith; and (d) the employer must set
fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining which
positions are redundant and may be abolished.
ISSUE
Was the suspension justified?
HELD
No.
Sections 8 and 9 of Rule XXIII, Book V of the
Implementing Rules provide as follows:
Section 8. Preventive suspension. --The employer may place the worker
concerned
under
preventive
suspension
if
his
continued
employment poses a serious and
imminent threat to the life or property
of the employer or his co-workers.
118
ISSUE
Whether or
dismissed.
FACTS
Amalia Kawada, a Full Assistant Store Manager
received 3 Memorandums issued by the Store
Manager Apduhan: (1) summarizing the various
reported
incidents
signifying
unsatisfactory
performance on the latter's part which include the
commingling of good and damaged items, sale of a
voluminous quantity of damaged toys and ready-towear items at unreasonable prices, and failure to
submit inventory reports; (2) Memorandum satting that
the answers given were all hypothetical and did not
not
respondent
was
constructively
HELD
No. The Court finds that private respondent's
allegation of harassment is a specious statement
which contains nothing but empty imputation of a fact
that could hardly be given any evidentiary weight by
this Court. Private respondent's bare allegations of
constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by the
evidence on record, cannot be given credence.
119
120
respondent
was
constructively
Ruling:
Petitioners contend that factual findings of quasijudicial agencies, while generally accorded finality,
may be reviewed by this Court when the findings of the
NLRC and the LA are contradictory; that in the
exercise of its equity jurisdiction, this Court may look
into the records of the case to re-examine the
questioned findings.
121
FACTS
Rodelia S. Fungo, petitioner, alleged in her petition
that she was employed as secretary of respondent Fr.
Servillano B. Bustamante, rector of Lourdes School of
Mandaluyong. Respondent Fr. Bustamante authorized
her to file and keep confidential documents in his
office. He entrusted to her the duplicate keys of the
filing cabinet and she was allowed to take any
document therefrom whenever she had to bring some
matters to his attention.
Anent
petitioners'
claim
that
respondent
unconditionally accepted his formal appointment as
Marketing Assistant on August 3, 2000, we note that in
a letter dated July 27, 2000 addressed to petitioner
Albos when he learned that he would be assigned as a
Marketing Assistant, respondent had expressed
reservations on such assignment and asked that he
instead be assigned as Sales Engineer or to any
position
commensurate
to
his
qualifications.
Respondent could not be faulted for accepting the
position of a Marketing Assistant, since he did so and
stayed put in order to compare and evaluate his
position. However, he experienced not only a demotion
in his duties and responsibilities, an undignified
treatment by his immediate superior, which prompted
him to file this case.
Petition denied
RODELIA FUNGO V. LOURDES SCHOOL OF
MANDALUYONG
G.R. No. 152531, July 27, 2007
122
ISSUE
WON the petitioner was constructively dismissed from
the service. - YES
RULING
Respondents argue that petitioners act of retrieving the
document from the files inside the rectors office was
improper and constituted a willful breach of the trust
reposed upon her by Fr. Bustamante. Such breach of
trust is a just cause for terminating her services.
THE
UNIVERSITY
OF
THE IMMACULATE
CONCEPTION V. NLRC
G.R. No. 181146, January 26, 2011, Carpio
Private respondent Teodora C. Axalan is a regular
faculty member in the Petitioner Uiversity holding the
position of Associate Professor II. From 18 November
to 22 November 2002, Axalan attended a seminar in
Quezon City on website development. Axalan then
received a memorandum from Dean Maria Rosa
Celestial asking her to explain in writing why she
should not be dismissed for having been absent
without official leave. In her letter, Axalan claimed that
123
ROBINSONS
GALLERIA/ROBINSONS
SUPERMARKET CORPORATION and/or JESS
MANUEL v. IRENE R. RANCHEZ
G.R. No. 177937, January 19, 2011
ISSUE
Was Axalan constructively dismissed?
HELD
NO.
Constructive dismissal occurs when there is cessation
of work because continued employment is rendered
impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely as when there is
a demotion in rank or diminution in pay or when a clear
discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer
becomes unbearable to the employee leaving the latter
with no other option but to quit.
In this case however, there was no cessation of
employment relations between the parties. It
is unrefuted that Axalan promptly resumed teaching at
the university right after the expiration of the
suspension period. In other words, Axalan never quit.
Hence, Axalan cannot claim that she was left with no
choice but to quit, a crucial element in a finding of
constructive dismissal. Thus, Axalan cannot be
deemed to have been constructively dismissed.
ISSUE
Whether respondent was legally terminated from
employment
by
petitioners.
HELD
NO. The petition is unmeritorious.
124
(1) a just or
(2) an authorized cause; and
(3) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in
accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by
the employer.
Article 277(b) of the Labor Code mandates that the
employer shall furnish the worker, whose employment
is sought to be terminated, a written notice containing
a statement of the causes of termination, and shall
afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself with the assistance of a representative
if he so desires, in accordance with company rules and
regulations pursuant to the guidelines set by the
Department of Labor and Employment.
ISSUE
Whether or not Johnson voluntarily resigned.
HELD
No. Although the resort did not open until
approximately
8th
October
2007,
Johnson's
employment began, as per Employment Agreement,
on 1st August 2007. During the interim period,
Johnson was frequently instructed by Prentice to
supervise the construction staff and speak with
potential future guests who visited the site out of
curiosity. The petitioners maintain that they have paid
the amount of P7,200.00 to Johnson for his three
weeks of service from October 8, 2007 until November
3, 2007, the date of Johnson's resignation, which
Johnson did not controvert. Even so, the amount the
petitioners paid to Johnson as his three-week salary is
significantly deficient as Johnson's monthly salary as
stipulated in their contract is P60,000.00. Thus, the
amount which Johnson should have been paid is
P45,000.00 and not P7,200.00. In light of this
deficiency, there is more reason to believe that the
petitioners withheld the salary of Johnson without a
valid reason. It only goes to show that while it was
Johnson who tendered his resignation, it was due to
the petitioners acts that he was constrained to resign.
The petitioners cannot expect Johnson to tolerate
working for them without any compensation. Since
Johnson was constructively dismissed, he was illegally
dismissed. Thus, an illegally dismissed employee is
entitled to two reliefs: backwages and reinstatement.
The two reliefs provided are separate and distinct. In
instances where reinstatement is no longer feasible
because of strained relations between the employee
and the employer, separation pay is granted. In effect,
an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either
reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if
reinstatement is no longer viable, and backwages. The
accepted doctrine is that separation pay may avail in
lieu of reinstatement if reinstatement is no longer
practical or in the best interest of the parties.
Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement may likewise
be awarded if the employee decides not to be
reinstated. Under the doctrine of strained relations, the
payment of separation pay is considered an
125
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondents dismissal from the
Club was proper?
RULING
Yes. One cause for termination is dismissal from
employment due to the enforcement of the union
security clause in the CBA. Here, Art. II of the CBA on
Union security contains the provisions on the Union
shop and maintenance of membership shop. There is
union shop when all new regular employees are
required to join the union within a certain period as a
condition for their continued employment. There is
maintenance of membership shop when employees
who are union members as of the effective date of the
agreement, or who thereafter become members, must
maintain union membership as a condition for
continued employment until they are promoted or
transferred out of the bargaining unit or the agreement
is terminated.
ISSUE
Is the dismissal valid?
RULING
Yes. In terminating the employment of an employee by
enforcing the Union Security Clause, the employer
needs only to determine and prove that: (1) the union
security clause is applicable; (2) the union is
requesting for the enforcement of the union security
provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient
evidence to support the union's decision to expel the
employee from the union or company.
126
ISSUE
Whether the dismissal from employment due to the
enforcement of the union security clause in the CBA is
legal?
RULING
The dismissal is illegal. There is no question that in the
present case, the CBA between GMC and IBM-Local
31 included a maintenance of membership and closed
shop clause as can be gleaned from Sections 3 and 6
of Article II. IBM-Local 31, by written request, can ask
GMC to terminate the employment of the
employee/worker who failed to maintain its good
standing as a union member. Union security clauses
are recognized and explicitly allowed under Article
248(e) of the Labor Code It is State policy to promote
unionism to enable workers to negotiate with
management on an even playing field and with more
persuasiveness than if they were to individually and
separately bargain with the employer. For this reason,
the law has allowed stipulations for union shop and
closed shop as means of encouraging workers to join
and support the union of their choice in the protection
of their rights and interest vis--vis the employer In
terminating the employment of an employee by
enforcing the union security clause, the employer
needs only to determine and prove that: (1) the union
security clause is applicable; (2) the union is
requesting for the enforcement of the union security
provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient
evidence to support the decision of the union to expel
the employee from the union. These requisites
constitute just cause for terminating an employee
based on the union security provision of the CBA.[26]
There is no question that in the present case, the CBA
between GMC and IBM-Local 31 included a
maintenance of membership and closed shop clause
as can be gleaned from Sections 3 and 6 of Article II.
IBM-Local 31, by written request, can ask GMC to
terminate the employment of the employee/worker who
failed to maintain its good standing as a union
member.
127
RULING
NO.
A plain reading of the provision clearly
presupposes that it is the employer who terminates the
services of the employee found to be suffering from
any disease and whose continued employment is
prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well
as to the health of his co-employees. It does not
contemplate a situation where it is the employee who
severs his or her employment ties.
ISSUE
Whether or not Padillo is entitled to claim for retirement
benefits
under
the
Labor
Code?
HELD
No. In the absence of any applicable agreement, an
128
MANILA
MINING
CORP.
EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION-FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS
CHAPTER, SAMUEL G. ZUIGA v. MANILA MINING
CORP.
G.R. Nos. 178222-23, September 29, 2010, Perez
Respondent is a mining corporation. Due to its failure
to obtain the necessary permit with the DENR-EMBs
to operate the mining business, it temporary lay-off
private complainant for a period exceeding 6 months
resulting
in
their
constructive
dismissal.
The Union attributes bad faith on the part of MMC in
implementing the temporary lay-off, hence this case.
ISSUE
Whether or not the layoff is illegal
Whether or not the employees are entitled to a
separation pay
HELD
The lay-off is neither illegal nor can it be considered as
unfair labor practice. Even as we declare the validity
of the lay-off, we cannot say that MMC has no
obligation at all to the laid-off employees. The validity
of its act of suspending its operations does not excuse
it from paying separation pay. Article 286 of the Labor
Code allows the bona fide suspension of operations for
a period not exceeding six (6) months.During the
suspension,
an
employee
is
not
deemed
terminated. As a matter of fact, the employee is
entitled to be reinstated once the employer resumes
operations within the 6-month period. However, Article
286 is silent with respect to the rights of the employee
129
RULING
Yes. Although petitioners suspension of operations is
valid because the fire caused substantial losses to
petitioner and damaged its factory, it failed to prove
that its suspension of operations is bona fide. The list
of materials burned was not the only evidence
submitted by petitioner. It was corroborated by pictures
and the fire investigation report, and they constitute
substantial evidence of petitioners losses.
ISSUE
Whether or not Leynes floating status is tantamount to
constructive dismissal.
RULING
No, the placement of Leynes on a floating status due
to redundancy is valid. The record, moreover, shows
that NHPI simply placed her on floating status "until
such time that another project could be secured" for
her. The rule is settled, however, that "off-detailing" is
not equivalent to dismissal, so long as such status
does not continue beyond a reasonable time and that it
is only when such a "floating status" lasts for more
than six months that the employee may be considered
to have been constructively dismissed. A complaint for
illegal dismissal filed prior to the lapse of said sixmonth and/or the actual dismissal of the employee is
generally considered as prematurely filed. Since the
petitioner has no other client for the building
management side of its business, it acted within its
prerogatives when it eventually terminated Leynes'
services on the ground of redundancy. One of the
recognized authorized causes for the termination of
employment, redundancy exists when the service
capability of the workforce is in excess of what is
reasonably needed to meet the demands of the
business enterprise.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondents were illegally dismissed
130
ISSUE
Is payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement
allowed?
RULING
Yes. The absence from an order of reinstatement of an
alternative relief should the employer or a supervening
event not within the control of the employee prevent
reinstatement negates the very purpose of the order.
The judgment favorable to the employee is thereby
reduced to a mere paper victory, for it is all too easy
for the employer to simply refuse to have the employee
back. To safeguard the spirit of social justice that the
Court has advocated in favor of the working man,
therefore, the right to reinstatement is to be considered
renounced or waived only when the employee
unjustifiably or unreasonably refuses to return to work
upon being so ordered or after the employer has
offered to reinstate him.
ISSUE
Whether or not the filing of a petition with the labor
arbiter to declare a strike illegal is a condition sine qua
non for the valid termination of employees who commit
an illegal act in the course of such strike
RULING
Not a condition sine qua non. Article 264(e) of the
Labor Code prohibits any person engaged in picketing
from obstructing the free ingress to and egress from
the employers premises. Since respondent was found
by the NLRC to have prevented the free entry into and
exit of vehicles from petitioners compound,
respondents officers and employees clearly committed
illegal acts in the course of the strike. The use of
unlawful means in the course of a strike renders such
strike illegal. Therefore, pursuant to the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment, strike was ipso facto
illegal. The filing of a petition to declare the strike
illegal was thus unnecessary. Consequently, we
uphold the legality of the dismissal of respondents
officers and employees. Article 264 of the Labor Code
further provides that an employer may terminate
employees found to have committed illegal acts in the
course of a strike. Petitioner clearly had the legal right
to terminate respondents officers and employees.
ESCARIO v. NLRC
G.R. No. 160302, September 27, 2010, Bersamin
131
ISSUE
1. Was the strike illegal?
2. Was there illegal dismissal?
HELD
(1) Yes. Despite the validity of the purpose of a strike
and compliance with the procedural requirements, a
strike may still be held illegal where the means
employed are illegal falling within the prohibitions
under Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code. While the picket
was moving, the movement was in circles, very close
to the gates, with the strikers in a hand-to-shoulder
formation without a break in their ranks, thus
preventing non-striking workers and vehicles from
coming in and getting out. Supported by actual
blocking benches and obstructions, what the union
demonstrated was a very persuasive and quietly
intimidating strategy whose chief aim was to paralyze
the operations of the company, not solely by the work
stoppage of the participating workers, but by excluding
the company officials and non-striking employees from
access to and exit from the company premises. No
doubt, the strike caused the company operations
considerable damage, as the NLRC itself recognized
when it ruled out the reinstatement of the dismissed
strikers.
ISSUE
WON the termination was valid
RULING
Only the termination of union officers were said to be
valid even though it was conducted by labor union not
registered with DOLE as the law provides that union
officers are held to be liable in cases of illegal strikes
and that the union members participating in a illegal
strike may only be terminated only if they committed
the said illegal and/or prohibited acts during the strike.
Although there was picture of violence and other
prohibited acts committed by the members, they were
not individually identified nor is their illegal/prohibited
acts identified.
PHIMCO
INDUSTRIES
INC.
V.
PHIMCO
INDUSTRIES LABOR ASSOCIATION (PILA), AND
ERLINDA VASQUEZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. 170830, August 11, 2010, Brion
132
CAONG V. REGUALOS
G.R. No. 179428, January 26, 2011, Nachura
Petitioners Caong, Tresquio and Daluyon were
employed as jeepney drivers by Respondent Regualos
under a boundary agreement. They filed separate
complaints for illegal dismissal against Regualos who
barred them from driving the jeepneys due to
deficiencies in their boundary payments. However,
Regualos told them that they could resume their use of
the vehicles after they pay their arrears.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioners were illegally dismissed
HELD
It is already settled that the relationship between
jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers under
the boundary system is that of employer-employee and
not of lessor-lessee. The fact that the drivers do not
receive fixed wages but only get the amount in excess
of the so-called "boundary" that they pay to the
owner/operator is not sufficient to negate the
relationship between them as employer and employee.
RULING
Article 223 (3rd paragraph) of the Labor Code, as
amended by Section 12 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6715,34 and Section 2 of the NLRC Interim Rules on
Appeals under R.A. No. 6715, Amending the Labor
Code, provide that an order of reinstatement by the
Labor Arbiter is immediately executory even pending
appeal.
133
ISSUE
Is the petitioner entitled to reinstatement?
HELD
YES. We find for the petitioner on the issue of
reinstatement.
Article 279 of the Labor Code provides the law on
reinstatement, viz.:
Article 279. Security of Tenure. -- In cases of regular
employment, the employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a just cause or
when authorized by this Title. An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation
was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement.
134
135
ISSUE
What are the legal implications of a situation where an
employee is dismissed for cause but such dismissal
was effected without the employers compliance with
the notice requirement under the Labor Code
RULING
We note that there are divergent implications of a
dismissal for just cause under Article 282, on one
hand, and a dismissal for authorized cause under
Article 283, on the other.
A dismissal for just cause under Article 282 implies
that the employee concerned has committed, or is
guilty of, some violation against the employer, i.e. the
employee has committed some serious misconduct, is
guilty of some fraud against the employer, or he has
neglected his duties. Thus, it can be said that the
employee himself initiated the dismissal process.
136
ISSUE
(a) Whether or not the minority employees are entitled
to separation pay; and (b) Whether or not SPI
complied with the notice requirement of Article 297
(formerly Article 283) of the Labor Code.
HELD
(a) NO. Article [297] of the Labor Code does not
obligate an employer to pay separation benefits when
the closure is due to serious losses. To require an
employer to be generous when it is no longer in a
position to do so, in our view, would be unduly
oppressive, unjust, and unfair to the employer. Ours is
a system of laws, and the law in protecting the rights of
the working man, authorizes neither the oppression
nor the self-destruction of the employer.
(b) NO. Article 297 of the Labor Code provides that
before any employee is terminated due to closure of
business, it must give a one (1) month prior written
notice to the employee and to the DOLE. In this
relation, case law instructs that it is the personal right
of the employee to be personally informed of his
proposed dismissal as well as the reasons therefor;
and such requirement of notice is not a mere
technicality or formality which the employer may
dispense with. To this end, jurisprudence states that
an employers act of posting notices to this effect in
conspicuous areas in the workplace is not enough.
Verily, for something as significant as the involuntary
137
HELD
The Labor Code under Article 279 mandates that an
employees full backwages shall be inclusive of
allowances and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent.
For backwages to be awarded to an illegally dismissed
employee, should not, as a general rule, be diminished
or reduced by the earnings derived by him elsewhere
during the period of his illegal dismissal.
Backwages in general are granted on grounds of
equity for earnings which a worker or employee has
lost due to his illegal dismissal. It is not private
compensation or damages but is awarded in
furtherance and effectuation of the public objective of
the Labor Code. Nor is it a redress of a private right
but rather in the nature of a command to the employer
to make public reparation for dismissing an employee
either due to the formers unlawful act or bad faith.
vs.
ISSUE
138
RULING
Yes. Resignation is the voluntary act of employees
who are compelled by personal reasons to dissociate
themselves from their employment. It must be done
with the intention of relinquishing an office,
accompanied by the act of abandonment. 17 It is
illogical for private respondents to resign and then le
a complaint for illegal dismissal.
HELD
Yes. The payment of backwages is generally granted
on the ground of equity. It is a form of relief that
restores the income that was lost by reason of the
unlawful dismissal; the grant thereof is intended to
restore the earnings that would have accrued to the
dismissed employee during the period of dismissal
until it is determined that the termination of
employment is for a just cause. It is not private
compensation or damages but is awarded in
furtherance and effectuation of the public objective of
the Labor Code. Nor is it a redress of a private right
but rather in the nature of a command to the employer
to make public reparation for dismissing an employee
either due to the formers unlawful act or bad faith.
139
ISSUE
Whether or not the basis of computation of backwages
by the NLRC is correct.
RULING
There is no question that petitioners illegally dismissed
private respondent Neal Cruz. Even petitioners
themselves are no longer questioning the findings of
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC on this aspect.
Petitioners main concern in this petition is the proper
computation of backwages to be awarded to the
private respondent who is rightfully entitled to the
payment of backwages, the only question that remains
is how much? Backwages, in general, are granted on
grounds of equity for earnings which a worker or
employee has lost due to his illegal dismissal. It
represents compensation that should be earned but
was not collected because an employer has unjustly
dismissed an employee.33 Thus, the payment of
backwages is a form of relief that restores the income
that was lost by reason of unlawful dismissal.
INTERCONTINENTAL
BROADCASTING
CORPORATION v. REYNALDO BENEDICTO
G.R. NO. 152843, July 20, 2006, Corona
Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation is a
government-owned and controlled corporation. It is
engaged in the business of mass media
communications. Reynaldo Benedicto was appointed
by Ceferino Basilio, the general manager then of
petitioner, as marketing manager. In a letter dated
October 11, 1994 signed by Tomas Gomez III, at that
time the president of petitioner, Benedicto was
terminated from his position. Benedicto filed a
complaint with the NLRC for illegal dismissal and
damages. He alleged that after his appointment, he
was able to increase the televiewing, listening and
audience ratings of petitioner which resulted in its
improved competitive financial strength.11 He claimed
that he successfully initiated, pursued and
consummated an advertising contract with VTV
Corporation for a period of five years involving the
amount of P600 million.12 However, on October 11,
1994, he was terminated from his position without just
or authorized cause. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of
Benedicto finding that he was indeed illegally
dismissed. Finding the award excessive, petitioner, on
October 15, 1998, filed with the NLRC its
memorandum on appeal with motion to re-compute the
award on which the appeal bond was to be based. The
NLRC dismissed the appeal and ruled that petitioner
failed to perfect its appeal since it did not file the
appeal bond within the reglementary period. The CA
affirmed the NLRC's decision.
140
ISSUE
Whether or not Benedicto was illegally dismissed.
HELD
An employee dismissed for any of the just causes
enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code is
not, as a rule, entitled to separation pay. As an
exception, allowing the grant of separation pay or
some other financial assistance to an employee
dismissed for just causes is based on equity. The
Court has granted separation pay as a measure of
social justice even when an employee has been validly
dismissed, as long as the dismissal was not due to
serious misconduct or reflective of personal integrity or
morality.
RULING
Yes. The labor arbiter found that Benedicto was an
employee (the marketing manager) of petitioner. He
also determined that there was no just or authorized
cause for Benedicto's termination. Neither did
petitioner comply with the two-notice requirement for
valid termination under the law. He therefore
concluded that Benedicto was illegally dismissed.
These factual findings of the NLRC, confirmed by the
CA, are binding on us since they are supported by
substantial evidence. Petitioner, aside from merely
stating
that
Benedicto's
appointment
was
unauthorized, did not extensively deal with the issue of
whether Benedicto was in fact its employee. Besides, it
is estopped from denying such fact considering its
admission that its former President, Tomas Gomez III,
wrote him a letter of termination on October 11,
1994.37 Petitioner, furthermore, never contested the
finding of illegal dismissal. Accordingly, there are no
strong reasons for us to again delve into the facts.
ISSUE
WON the Court of Appeals grossly erred in awarding
separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) months
pay for every year of service to respondent, the same
being contrary to law and jurisprudence. (The Court is
tasked to determine the propriety of awarding
separation pay to an employee despite the finding of
lawful dismissal.)
ISSUE
141
RULING
Yes. Arlyns claim that she is an ordinary rank-and-file
employee, hence, she cannot be dismissed for loss of
trust and confidence does not lie. The observation of
the Court of Appeals that "[h]er work is of such nature
as to require a substantial amount of trust and
confidence on the part of x x x her employer" is welltaken in light of her following functions, as enumerated
by the NLRC:
1. Batches, collates and encode[s] policies,
endorsements and official receipts;
2. Generates printed production, collection, statistical
and receivable reports for submission to the Head
Office;
3. Reconciles and finalizes production and collection
reports;
4. Maintains the computer hardware and software;
and
5. Performs other related functions as may be
assigned to her by her superior from time to time
which functions "required the use of judgment and
discretion."
ISSUE
Whether or not Milagros has been illegally dismissed
Arlyn of course incorrectly assumes that mere rankand-file employees cannot be dismissed on the ground
of loss of confidence. Jurisprudence holds otherwise
albeit it requires "a higher proof of involvement" in the
questioned acts.
HELD
Panuncillos repeated violation of Section 8.4 of CAP
Philippines Incs Code of Discipline, she violated the
trust and confidence of CAP Philippines Inc. and its
customers. To allow her to continue with her
employment puts CAP Philippines Inc. under the risk
of being embroiled in unnecessary lawsuits from
customers similarly situated as Josefina, et al. Clearly,
CAP Philippines Inc. exercised its management
prerogative when it dismissed Panuncillo. Under the
Labor Code, the employer may terminate an
employment on the ground of serious misconduct or
willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful
orders of his employer or representative in connection
with his work. Infractions of company rules and
regulations have been declared to belong to this
category and thus are valid causes for termination of
employment by the employer. The employer cannot be
compelled to continue the employment of a person
who was found guilty of maliciously committing acts
which are detrimental to his interests. It will be highly
prejudicial to the interests of the employer to impose
on him the charges that warranted his dismissal from
employment. Indeed, it will demoralize the rank and file
if the undeserving, if not undesirable, remain in the
service. It may encourage him to do even worse and
will render a mockery of the rules of discipline that
employees are required to observe. This Court was
more emphatic in holding that in protecting the rights of
the laborer, it cannot authorize the oppression or selfdestruction of the employer.
142
HELD
(1) Yes. The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle
that even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor
Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the
part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of
the dismissed employee during the period of appeal
until reversal by the higher court. It settles the view
that the Labor Arbiter's order of reinstatement is
immediately executory and the employer has to either
re-admit them to work under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal, or to
reinstate them in the payroll, and that failing to
exercise the options in the alternative, employer must
pay the employees salaries.
HELD
Employees are entitled to their accrued salaries during
the period between the Labor Arbiters order of
reinstatement pending appeal and the resolution of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
overturning that of the Labor Arbiter. Otherwise stated,
even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter
is reversed on appeal, the employer is still obliged to
reinstate and pay the wages of the employee during
the period of appeal until reversal by a higher court or
tribunal. In this case, respondents are entitled to their
accrued salaries from the time petitioner received a
copy of the Decision of the Labor Arbiter declaring
respondents termination illegal and ordering their
reinstatement up to the date of the NLRC resolution
overturning that of the Labor Arbiter.
LANSANGAN
v.
AMKOR
TECHNOLOGY
PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 177026, January 30, 2009, Carpio Morales
143
FACTS
Petitioner Elizabeth D. Palteng was the Senior
Assistant Manager/Branch Operations Officer of
respondent United Coconut Planters Bank in its
Banaue Branch in Quezon City.
On April 15, 1996, Area Head and Vice-President
Eulallo S. Rodriguez reported to the banks Internal
Audit and Credit Review Division that bank client
Clariza L. Mercado -The Red Shop has incurred Past
Due Domestic Bills Purchased (BP) of P34,260,000.
After conducting a diligence audit, the division reported
to the Audit and Examination Committee that Palteng
committed several offenses under the Employee
Discipline Code in connection with Mercados Past
Due Domestic BP. It also recommended that the
matter be referred to the Committee on Employee
Discipline for proper disposition.
ISSUE
WON petitioners committed serious misconduct, fraud,
dishonest and breach of trust
RULING
The decision of the Arbiter finding that petitioners
committed "dishonesty as a form of serious
misconduct and fraud, or breach of trust" had become
final, petitioners not having appealed the same before
the NLRC as in fact they even moved for the execution
of the reinstatement aspect of the decision. It bears
144
ISSUE
Is the strike invalid notwithstanding compliance with
procedural requirements under the Labor Code?
HELD
YES.
HELD
Settled is the rule that an employee who is illegally
dismissed from work is entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights, and other privileges as
well as to full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and
to other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement.
However,
in
the
event
that
reinstatement is no longer possible, the employee may
be given separation pay instead.
145
(a) Serious
misconduct or
willful
disobedience by the employee of the
lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his
work;
xxx
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the
employee of the trust reposed in him
by his employer or duly authorized
representative;
xxx"
ISSUE
Whether or not Aboc was legally dismissed.
HELD
Yes. Article 282 states:
"ART. 282.
TERMINATION
BY
EMPLOYER. - An employer may
terminate an employment for any of
the following causes
146
ISSUE
Whether or not the order to reinstate respondents was
valid considering that the issue of reinstatement was
never brought up before the CA and respondents
never questioned the award of separation pay.
HELD
YES. It is clear from the complaints filed by
respondents that they are seeking reinstatement.
Section 2 (c), Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides
that a pleading shall specify the relief sought, but may
add a general prayer for such further or other reliefs as
may be deemed just and equitable. Under this rule, a
court can grant the relief warranted by the allegation
and the proof even if it is not specifically sought by the
injured party; the inclusion of a general prayer may
justify the grant of a remedy different from or together
with the specific remedy sought, if the facts alleged in
the complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant.
The general prayer is broad enough to justify
extension of a remedy different from or together with
the specific remedy sought. Even without the prayer
for a specific remedy, proper relief may be granted by
the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the
evidence introduced so warrant. The court shall grant
relief warranted by the allegations and the proof even if
no such relief is prayed for. The prayer in the
complaint for other reliefs equitable and just in the
premises justifies the grant of a relief not otherwise
specifically prayed for. In the instant case, aside from
their specific prayer for reinstatement, respondents, in
their separate complaints, prayed for such reliefs
which are deemed just and equitable.
ROBINSONS
GALLERIA/ROBINSONS
SUPERMARKET CORP. V. RANCHEZ
G.R. No. 177937, January 19, 2011, Nachura
Respondent was a probationary employee of petitioner
Robinsons
Galleria/Robinsons
Supermarket
Corporation (petitioner Supermarket) for a period of
five (5) months. Two weeks after she was hired,
respondent reported to her supervisor the loss of cash
amounting to Twenty Thousand Two Hundred NinetyNine Pesos (P20,299.00) which she had placed inside
the company locker.An information for Qualified Theft
was filed against her.Respondent filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal and damages, and was put in prison
for 2 weeks. On March 12, 1998, petitioners sent to
respondent by mail a notice of termination and/or
notice of expiration of probationary employment dated
147
PFIZER V. VELASCO
G.R. No. March 9, 2011, Leonardo-De Castro
Geraldine L. Velasco, an employee of PFIZER, INC.,
having a high risk pregnancy, was advised to undergo
bed rest, resulting to an extended leave of absence.
She was served two show cause noticed for violation
of company rules and was effectively placed under
preventive suspension. Velasco filed a complaint for
illegal suspension with money claims. She then
received a "Third Show-cause Notice. PFIZER
informed Velasco of its "Management Decision"
terminating her employment. On 5 December 2003,
the Labor Arbiter rendered its decision declaring the
dismissal of Velasco illegal, ordering her reinstatement
with backwages and further awarding moral and
exemplary damages with attorneys fees. Pfizer argues
the validity of respondents dismissal from employment
having found that it was in accordance with the two
notice rule pursuant to the due process requirement
and with just cause.
Respondent
Velasco
filed
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration wherein the Court of Appeals affirmed
the validity of respondents dismissal from employment
but modified its earlier ruling by directing PFIZER to
pay respondent her wages from the date of the Labor
Arbiters Decision dated December 5, 2003 up to the
Court of Appeals Decision dated November 23, 2005.
On the other hand, PFIZER filed the instant petition
assailing the aforementioned Court of Appeals
Resolutions. PFIZER further assert that Velasco
should reimburse the wages received while the case
was pending on appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a
serious but reversible error when it ordered Pfizer to
pay Velasco wages from the date of the Labor Arbiters
decision ordering her reinstatement until November 23,
2005, when the Court of Appeals rendered its decision
declaring Velascos dismissal valid.
RULING
No. The petition is without merit.
The provision of Article 223 is clear that an award [by
the Labor Arbiter] for reinstatement shall be
immediately executory even pending appeal and the
posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the
execution for reinstatement. In the case at bar,
PFIZER did not immediately admit respondent back to
work which, according to the law, should have been
done as soon as an order or award of reinstatement is
handed down by the Labor Arbiter without need for the
issuance of a writ of execution.
148
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner was entitled to separation
pay
HELD
NO. The Court agrees with the CA in its observation of
the following circumstances as proof that respondent
did not terminate petitioner's employment: first, the
only cause of action in petitioner's original complaint is
that he was offered a very low separation pay; second,
there was no allegation of illegal dismissal, both in
petitioner's original and amended complaints and
position paper; and, third, there was no prayer for
reinstatement.
ISSUES
Whether the NLRC could still review issues not
brought during the appeal.
RULING
The 2002 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, which was
in effect at the time respondents appealed the Labor
Arbiters decision, provided that the NLRC shall limit
itself only to the specific issues that were elevated for
review. Here, the NLRC passed upon the issue of
illegal dismissal although this was not brought up in
the appeal. Therefore, by considering the arguments
and issues in the reply/opposition to appeal which
were not properly raised by timely appeal nor
comprehended within the scope of the issue raised in
petitioners appeal, public respondent committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
149
ISSUE
Whether or not the LA is correct
RULING
NO. Refer to the doctrine. This is just but a risk that the
employer cannot avoid when it continued to seek
recourses against the Labor Arbiters decision. This is
also in accordance with Article 279 of the Labor Code.
INTEGRATED MICROELECTRONICS, INC. v.
PIONILLA
G.R. No. 200222, August 28, 2013, Perlas-Bernabe
Petitioner IMI employed respondent Adonis Pionilla as
one of its production worker. Pionilla was later on
dismissed for violating company rules and regulations
which prohibits lending one's ID since the same is
considered a breach of its security rules. It was
reported that Pionilla was seen escorting a lady to
board the company shuttle bus at a terminal, and that
the lady was wearing a company ID which serves as
a free pass for shuttle bus passengers even if she
was just a job applicant at IMI. Pionilla admitted that he
lent his ID to the lady who turned out to be his relative.
It was also admitted by Pionilla that at the time of the
incident, he had two Ids in his name as he lost his
original ID but was able to secure a temporary ID later
on. As Pionilla and his relative were about to board the
shuttle bus, they were both holding separate Ids, both
in his name. The day after the incident, Pionilla
received a notice requiring him to explain the incident
and a committee was subsequently formed to
investigate the matter. Subsequently IMI found Pionilla
guilty and was dismissed from service.
ISSUE
Whether or not Pionilla was illegally dismissed and
hence entitled to reinstatement and full back wages
HELD
An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either
reinstatement, if viable or separation pay if
reinstatement is no longer viable and backwages. In
certain cases, however, the Court has ordered
reinstatement of the employee without backwages
considering the fact that (1) the dismissal of the
employee would be too harsh a penalty and, (2) the
employer was in good faith in terminating the
employee.
150
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
ISSUE
Whether or not Kemplin is a regular employee
Whether or not Kemplin was illegally dismissed
ISSUE
Whether or not the Secretary of Labor has the power
to determine the existence of an employer-employee
relationship and settled the dispute.
HELD
YES. Considering that he continued working as
President for UTP for about one (1) year and five (5)
months and since [his] employment is not covered by
another fixed term employment contract, [Kemplins]
employment after the expiration of his fixed term
employment is already regular. Therefore, he is
guaranteed security of tenure and can only be
removed from service for cause and after compliance
with due process. This is notwithstanding [UTP and
Jerseys] insistence that they merely tolerated
[Kemplins] "consultancy" for humanitarian reasons.
RULING
NO. Art. 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by
R.A. 7730. The provision is explicit that the visitorial
and enforcement power of the DOLE comes into play
only in cases when the relationship of employeremployee still exists. This clause signifies that the
employer-employee relationship must have existed
even before the emergence of the controversy.
Necessarily, the DOLEs power does not apply in two
instances, namely: (i) where the employer-employee
relationship has ceased; and (ii) where no such
relationship has ever existed. The existence of an
employer-employee relationship is a statutory
prerequisite to and a limitation on the power of the
Secretary of Labor, one which the legislative branch is
entitled to impose. The rationale underlying this
limitation is to eliminate the prospect of competing
conclusions of the Secretary of Labor and the NLRC. If
the Secretary of Labor proceeds to exercise his
visitorial and enforcement powers absent the first
requisite, his office confers jurisdiction on itself which it
cannot otherwise acquire. Nevertheless, a mere
assertion
of
absence
of
employer-employee
relationship does not deprive the DOLE of jurisdiction
over the claim. At least a prima facie showing of such
absence of relationship, as in this case, is needed to
preclude the DOLE from the exercise of its power.
151
Revised Ruling:
No limitation in the law was placed upon the power of
the DOLE to determine the existence of an employeremployee relationship. No procedure was laid down
where the DOLE would only make a preliminary
finding, that the power was primarily held by the
NLRC. The law did not say that the DOLE would first
seek the NLRCs determination of the existence of an
employer-employee relationship, or that should the
existence of the employer-employee relationship be
disputed, the DOLE would refer the matter to the
NLRC. The DOLE must have the power to determine
whether or not an employer-employee relationship
exists, and from there to decide whether or not to issue
compliance orders in accordance with Art. 128(b) of
the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730.
Held:
No. First, Article IV, Section 4(a)(6) of the FLAMES
CBL, embraces exclusively the case of dismissal
and/or expulsion of members from the union. Even a
cursory reading of the provision does not tell us that
the same is to be automatically or directly applied in
the disqualification of a candidate from union elections,
which is the matter at bar. It cannot be denied that the
COMELEC erroneously relied on Article IV, Section
4(a)(6) because the same does not contemplate the
situation of private respondents Daya, et al. The latter
are not sought to be expelled or dismissed by the
Executive Board. They were brought before the
COMELEC to be disqualified as candidates in the 7
May 2003 elections.
152
Fifth, from
another
angle,
the
erroneous
disqualification of private respondents Daya, et al.,
constituted a case of disenfranchisement on the part of
the member-voters of FLAMES. By wrongfully
excluding them from the 7 May 2003 elections, the
options afforded to the union members were
clipped. Hence, the mandate of the union cannot be
said to have been rightfully determined. The factual
irregularities in the FLAMES elections clearly provide
proper bases for the annulment of the union elections
of 7 May 2003.
ISSUE
Whether petitioner may claim reimbursement from
Delta Milling through a cross-claim filed with the labor
court.
RULING
In the present case, there exists no employeremployee relationship between petitioner and Delta
Milling. In its cross-claim, petitioner is not seeking any
relief under the Labor Code but merely reimbursement
of the monetary benefits claims awarded and to be
paid to the guard employees. There is no labor dispute
involved in the cross-claim against Delta Milling.
Rather, the cross-claim involves a civil dispute
between petitioner and Delta Milling. Petitioner's crossclaim is within the realm of civil law, and jurisdiction
over it belongs to the regular courts. Moreover, the
liability of Delta Milling to reimburse petitioner will only
arise if and when petitioner actually pays its
employees the adjudged liabilities. Payment, which
153
INC.
v.
Petitioner then pending resolution of the first case reassigned respondent to Manila in a night-shift which is
alleged to be a schedule whose income is unstable
and is irregular contrary to which being granted to him
in his current work with the petitioner. Thus, he filed in
Manila a case for illegal dismissal.
Petitioner now sought to dismiss the complaint as he
alleged that respondent is guilty of forum-shopping
ISSUE
WON respondent is guilty of forum-shopping
RULING
No, the law upon which petitioner stand states "a party
having more than one cause of action against the
other party arising out of the same relationship shall
include all of them in one complaint or petition."
(Section 1 (b), Rule 3 of the NLRC Rules of
Procedure).
ISSUE
Which court has jurisdiction over the dispute?
RULING
The RTC has jurisdiction. Where no employeremployee relationship exists between the parties and
no issue is involved which may be resolved by
reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or
any collective bargaining agreement, it is the Regional
Trial Court that has jurisdiction. In the present case, no
employer-employee relationship exists between
petitioners and respondent. In fact, in his complaint,
private respondent is not seeking any relief under the
Labor Code, but seeks payment of damages on
account of petitioners' alleged breach of their
obligation under their agreement to employ him. It is
settled
that
an
action
for
breach
of
contractual obligation is intrinsically a civil dispute. In
the alternative, respondent seeks redress on the basis
of the provisions of Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code. Hence, it is clear that the present action is within
the realm of civil law, and jurisdiction over it belongs to
the regular courts.
154
ISSUE
Was the availment for the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari proper?
HELD
No. The rule is, for the writ to issue, it must be shown
that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A
motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non
for the filing of a petition for certiorari. Its purpose is to
grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual
or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination
of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. The
rationale of the rule rests upon the presumption that
the court or administrative body which issued the
assailed order or resolution may amend the same, if
given the chance to correct its mistake or error.
RULING
155
MASMUD v. NLRC
G.R. No. 183385, February 13, 2009, Nachura
156
ISSUE
Should the legal compensation of a lawyer in a labor
proceeding be based on Article 111 of the Labor Code
HELD
NO. Contrary to Evangelinas proposition, Article 111 of the Labor
Code deals with the extraordinary concept ofattorneys fees. It
regulates the amount recoverable as attorney's fees in
the nature of damages sustained by and awarded to
the prevailing party. It may not be used as the
standard in fixing the amount payable to the lawyer by
his client for the legal services he rendered. In this
regard, Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
should be observed in determining Atty. Gos
compensation. Considering that Atty. Go successfully
represented his client, it is only proper that he should
receive adequate compensation for his efforts. Even
as we agree with the reduction of the award of
attorney's fees by the CA, the fact that a lawyer plays
a vital role in the administration of justice emphasizes
the need to secure to him his honorarium lawfully
earned as a means to preserve the decorum and
respectability of the legal profession. A lawyer is as
much entitled to judicial protection against injustice or
imposition of fraud on the part of his client as the client is
against abuse on the part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not
alone to ensure that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful
manner, but also to see that a lawyer is paid his just
fees. With his capital consisting of his brains and with
his skill acquired at tremendous cost not only in money
but in expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to
the protection of any judicial tribunal against any
attempt on the part of his client to escape payment of
his just compensation. It would be ironic if after putting
forth the best in him to secure justice for his client; he
himself would not get his due.
ISSUE
W/N grievance machinery procedure should have
been followed first before respondents complaint for
illegal dismissal could be given due course
RULING
NO. Under Art. 217, it is clear that a labor arbiter has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over termination
disputes. On the other hand, under Article 261, a
voluntary arbitrator has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over grievances arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company policies.
As a general rule then, termination disputes should be
brought before a labor arbiter, except when the parties,
under Art. 262, unmistakably express that they agree
to submit the same to voluntary arbitration.
In the present case, the CBA provision on grievance
machinery being invoked by petitioner does not
expressly state that termination disputes are included
in the ambit of what may be brought before the
company's grievance machinery.
TIMOTEO H. SARONA vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, ROYALE SECURITY
AGENCY (FORMERLY SCEPTRE SECURITY
AGENCY) and CESAR S. TAN
G.R. No. 185280, January 18, 2012
Petitioner was hired in 1976 by Sceptre as a security
guard. In 2003, he was asked to resign as a
requirement for his application for a position at Royale.
Shortly thereafter, however, he was dismissed.
Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, in
which he prayed for piercing the corporate veil of
Sceptre and Royale in connection with computing for
his separation pay. The Labor Arbiter ruled in
petitioners favor but refused to pierce the corporate
veil. Petitioner filed a reply to the respondents
Memorandum of Appeal. As the filing of an appeal is
the prescribed remedy, the NLRC dismissed the
petitioners efforts to reverse the Labor Arbiters
decision, essentially saying that petitioner has already
waived his right to question the latters decision. On
the other hand, respondent argues that the petitioner is
barred from questioning the manner by which his
backwages and separation pay were computed as he
had, earlier, moved for the execution of the NLRCs
November 30, 2005 Decision and the respondents
paid him the full amount of the monetary award
157
ISSUES
Whether the full satisfaction of the award under the
NLRCs November 30, 2005 Decision bars the
petitioner from questioning the validity thereof
Whether the petitioners backwages should be limited
to his salary for three (3) months
RULING
Because his receipt of the proceeds of the award
under the NLRCs November 30, 2005 Decision is
qualified and without prejudice to the CAs
resolution of his petition for certiorari, the
petitioner is not barred from exercising his right to
elevate the decision of the CA to this Court.
The petitioners receipt of the monetary award
adjudicated by the NLRC is not absolute, unconditional
and unqualified. The petitioners May 3, 2007 Motion
for Release contains a reservation, stating in his
prayer that: "it is respectfully prayed that the
respondents and/or Great Domestic Insurance Co. be
ordered to RELEASE/GIVE the amount of P23,521.67
in favor of the complainant TIMOTEO H. SARONA
without prejudice to the outcome of the petition with
the CA."
158
HELD
The present rule on the matter is Section 6, Rule VI of
the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, which was
substantially the same provision in effect at the time of
the respondents appeal to the NLRC.
The posting of a bond is indispensable to the
perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary
awards from the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The
lawmakers clearly intended to make the bond a
mandatory requisite for the perfection of an appeal by
the employer as inferred from the provision that an
appeal by the employer may be perfected "only upon
the posting of a cash or surety bond." The word "only"
makes it clear that the posting of a cash or surety bond
by the employer is the essential and exclusive means
by which an employers appeal may be perfected. x x
x.
ISSUE
Whether MPH retained the authority to continue with
the administrative case against Delada for
insubordination and willful disobedience of the transfer
order
RULING
Accordingly, we rule in this case that MPH did not lose
its authority to discipline respondent for his continued
refusal to report to his new assignment. In relation to
this point, we recall our Decision in Allied Banking
Corporation v. Court of Appeals.
159
ISSUE
Whether or not a validly dismissed employee, like
Rivera, is entitled to an award of separation pay
RULING
As a general rule, an employee who has been
dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under
Article 282 of the Labor Code is not entitled to a
separation pay.
In this case, Rivera was dismissed from work because
she intentionally circumvented a strict company policy,
manipulated another entity to carry out her instructions
without the companys knowledge and approval, and
directed the diversion of funds, which she even
admitted doing under the guise of shortening the
laborious process of securing funds for promotional
activities from the head office. These transgressions
were serious offenses that warranted her dismissal
from employment and proved that her termination from
work was for a just cause. Hence, she is not entitled to
a separation pay.
160
PHILIPPINE
CARPET
MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION v. TAGYAMON
G.R. No. 191475, December 11, 2013
ISSUE
W/N the respondents' acceptance of separation pay
and signing of quitclaim is a bar to the pursuit of illegal
dismissal case
HELD
NO. "As a rule, deeds of release and quitclaim cannot
bar employees from demanding benefits to which they
are legally entitled or from contesting the legality of
their dismissal. The acceptance of those benefits
would not amount to estoppel." To excuse
respondents from complying with the terms of their
waivers, they must locate their case within any of three
narrow grounds: (1) the employer used fraud or deceit
in obtaining the waivers; (2) the consideration the
employer paid is incredible and unreasonable; or (3)
the terms of the waiver are contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals, or good customs or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law. The instant case falls under the first situation.
ISSUES
a. Whether the Court of Appeals should have
respected the findings of the Labor Arbiter, which was
affirmed by the NLRC
b. Whether the petition filed with the CA is fatally
defective, because the attached verification and
certificate against forum shopping was signed only by
respondent Garcia
161
RULING
a. No. The power of the CA to review NLRC decisions
via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court has been settled as early as this Courts
decision in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC. In said
case, the Court held that the proper vehicle for such
review is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the said Rules, and that the case should be filed
with the CA in strict observance of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Moreover, it is already settled that
under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7902, the CA
pursuant to the exercise of its original jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari is specifically given the power
to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to
resolve factual issues.
Firstly, petitioners posit that the petition filed with the
CA is fatally defective, because the attached
verification and certificate against forum shopping was
signed only by respondent Garcia.
b. No. While the general rule is that the certificate of
non-forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs
in a case and the signature of only one of them is
insufficient, the Court has stressed that the rules on
forum shopping, which were designed to promote and
facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should
not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to
subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. Strict
compliance with the provision regarding the certificate
of non-forum shopping underscores its mandatory
nature in that the certification cannot be altogether
dispensed with or its requirements completely
disregarded. It does not, however, prohibit substantial
compliance therewith under justifiable circumstances,
considering especially that although it is obligatory, it is
not jurisdictional.
162
163