REPUBLIC V MANGOTARA

Facts:
(Long and confusing case) 7 consolidated cases stemmed from the 1914 case of
Cacho v. Government of the United States (1914 Cacho case).
1914 Cacho Case In the early 1900s, the late Dona Demetria applied for the
registration of 2 parcels of land in the Municipality of Iligan, Moro Province (now
called Iligan City, Lanao Del Norte). Only the Government opposed Doa Demetria's
applications for registration on the ground that the two parcels of land were the
property of the United States and formed part of a military reservation, generally
known as Camp Overton. The land registration court ruled that the applicant Doa
Demetria Cacho is owner of the portion of land occupied and planted by the
deceased Datto Anandog only; and her application as to all the rest of the land
solicited in said case is denied. Moreover, the applicant should present the
corresponding deed from Datto Darondon on or before the above-mentioned 30th
day of March, 1913. Final decision in these cases is reserved until the presentation
of the said deed and the new plan. Dissatisfied, Doa Demetria appealed to the
Supreme Court. SC affirmed the LRC Decision. 83 years later, the Court was again
called upon to settle a matter concerning the registration of the Lots in the case of
Cacho v. CA.
1997 Cacho case Teofilo Cacho (Teofilo), claiming to be the late Doa Demetria's
son and sole heir, filed before the RTC a petition for reconstitution of two original
certificates of title (OCTs). RTC granted Teofilo's petition and ordered the
reconstitution and reissuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. The original
issuance of these decrees presupposed a prior judgment that had become final. CA
reversed the RTC Decision. Teofilo appealed to the SC. The SC reversed the
judgment of the CA and reinstated the decision of the RTC approving the re-issuance
of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. The Court found that such decrees had in fact
been issued and had attained finality, as certified by the Acting Commissioner,
Deputy Clerk of Court III, Geodetic Engineer, and Chief of Registration of the then
Land Registration Commission. MR denied. Hence, the decrees of registration were
re-issued bearing new numbers and OCTs were issued for 2 parcels of land in Dona
Demetrias name.
THE ANTECENT FACTS OF THE PETITIONS AT BAR The dispute did not end with the
termination of the 1997 Cacho case. Another 4 cases involving the same parcels of
land were instituted before the trial courts during and after the pendency of the
1997 Cacho case. These cases are: (1) Expropriation Case (2) Quieting of Title Case
(3) Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case and (4) Cancellation of Titles and Reversion
Case. These cases proceeded independently of each other in the courts a quo until
they reached the SC, that consolidated the seven Petitions. Note: Ill just discuss the
expropriation issue, the case is very long with lots of different issues The Complaint
for Expropriation was originally filed by the Iron and Steel Authority (ISA), now the
NSC, against Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), and the latter's
mortgagee, the Philippine National Bank (PNB). During the existence of ISA, Pres.
Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation No. 2239, reserving in favor of ISA a parcel

of land in Iligan City. MCFC occupied certain portions of this parcel of land. When
negotiations with MCFC failed, ISA was compelled to file a Complaint for
Expropriation. When the statutory existence of ISA expired during the pendency of
Civil Case No. 106, the RTC-Branch 1 allowed the substitution of the Republic for ISA
as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106. Alleging that the lots involved in the 1997 Cacho
case encroached and overlapped the parcel of land subject of the case, Republic
filed with the RTC a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Complaint and to Admit
the Attached Supplemental Complaint, seeking to implead Teofilo Cacho and
Demetria Vidal and their respective successors-in-interest, LANDTRADE and
AZIMUTH. However, the RTC denied the Motion of the Republic for leave to file and
to admit its Supplemental Complaint. RTC agreed with MCFC that the Republic did
not file any motion for execution of the judgment of this Court in the ISA case. Since
no such motion for execution had been filed within the prescriptive period of 5
years, RTC ruled that its Order dated November 16, 2001, which effected the
substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff in the case, was an honest mistake.
MR of the Republic denied because MCFC (the only defendant left in the case) is
NOT a proper party defendant in the complaint for expropriation. Hence, the case
was dismissed. The Republic filed with the SC the consolidated Petition for Review
on Certiorari and Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65.
Issues:
1. Who are the proper parties in an expropriation proceeding?
2. W/N forum shopping was committed by the Republic with the filing of the
expropriation and reversion complaint
First Issue: The court ruled that defendants in an expropriation case are NOT limited
to the owners of the property to be expropriated, and just compensation is not due
to the property owner alone. They include all other persons owning, occupying or
claiming to own the property. In the American jurisdiction, the term 'owner' when
employed in statutes relating to eminent domain to designate the persons who are
to be made parties to the proceeding, refer, as is the rule in respect of those
entitled to compensation, to all those who have lawful interest in the property to be
condemned, including a mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee in possession under an
executory contract. Every person having an estate or interest at law or in equity in
the land taken is entitled to share in the award. If a person claiming an interest in
the land sought to be condemned is not made a party, he is given the right to
intervene and lay claim to the compensation. At the time of the filing of the
Complaint for Expropriation, possessory/occupancy rights of MCFC over the parcels
of land sought to be expropriated were undisputed. Letter of Instructions No. 1277
expressly recognized that portions of the lands reserved by Presidential
Proclamation No. 2239 for the use and immediate occupation by the NSC, were then
occupied by an idle fertilizer plant/factory and related facilities of MCFC. It was
ordered in the same Letter of Instruction that NSC shall negotiate with the owners of
MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the compensation of MCFC's
present occupancy rights on the subject lands. Being the occupant of the parcel of
land sought to be expropriated, MCFC could very well be named a defendant in the

case. The RTC evidently erred in dismissing the Complaint for Expropriation against
MCFC for not being a proper party. Also erroneous was the dismissal by the RTC of
the original Complaint for Expropriation for having been filed only against MCFC, the
occupant of the subject land, but not the owner/s of the said property. Dismissal is
not the remedy for misjoinder or non-joinder of parties. The owner of the property is
not necessarily an indispensable party in an action for expropriation. According to
Rule 67, Section 1, expropriation proceedings may be instituted even when "title to
the property sought to be condemned appears to be in the Republic of the
Philippines, although occupied by private individuals." The same rule provides that a
complaint for expropriation shall name as defendants "all persons owning or
claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest" in the property sought
to be condemned. Clearly, when the property already appears to belong to the
Republic, there is no sense in the Republic instituting expropriation proceedings
against itself. It can still, however, file a complaint for expropriation against the
private persons occupying the property. In such an expropriation case, the owner of
the property is not an indispensable party. To recall, Presidential Proclamation No.
2239 explicitly states that the parcels of land reserved to NSC are part of the public
domain, hence, owned by the Republic. Letter of Instructions No. 1277 recognized
only the occupancy rights of MCFC and directed NSC to institute expropriation
proceedings to determine the just compensation for said occupancy rights.
Therefore, the owner of the property is not an indispensable party in the original
Complaint for Expropriation. Moreover, the right of the Republic to be substituted for
ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106 had long been affirmed by no less than this
Court in the ISA case. The failure of the Republic to actually file a motion for
execution does not render the substitution void. A writ of execution requires the
sheriff or other proper officer to whom it is directed to enforce the terms of the writ.
The Order of the RTC should be deemed as voluntary compliance with a final and
executory judgment of this Court, already rendering a motion for and issuance of a
writ of execution superfluous. Second Issue: The Republic did not commit Forum
shopping Forum-shopping takes place when a litigant files multiple suits involving
the same parties, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable
judgment. Thus, it exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, namely:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in
both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding
particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the
pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata
in the other case. Here, the elements of litis pendencia are wanting. There is no
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in Civil Case No. 106 (expropriation)
and Civil Case No. 6686 (cancellation of OCTs of Dona Demetria because the
certificates exceeded the areas granted by the LRC reversion). Expropriation vis-vis reversion The Republic is not engaging in contradictions when it instituted both
expropriation and reversion proceedings for the same parcels of land. The
expropriation and reversion proceedings are distinct remedies that are not
necessarily exclusionary of each other. The filing of a complaint for reversion does
not preclude the institution of an action for expropriation. Even if the land is
reverted back to the State, the same may still be subject to expropriation as against

the occupants thereof. Also, Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows the filing
of a complaint for expropriation even when "the title to any property sought to be
condemned appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by
private individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff
cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners." Hence, the filing
by the Republic of the Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation impleading Teofilo,
Vidal, LANDTRADE, and AZIMUTH, is not necessarily an admission that the parcels of
land sought to be expropriated are privately owned. At most, the Republic merely
acknowledged in its Supplemental Complaint that there are private persons also
claiming ownership of the parcels of land. The Republic can still consistently assert,
in both actions for expropriation and reversion, that the subject parcels of land are
part of the public domain. In sum, the RTC erred in dismissing the original Complaint
and disallowing the Supplemental Complaint. The Court reinstates the Complaint for
Reversion of the Republic.