Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners, referring to
themselves as "duals" or dual citizens, pray that they and others who
retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, be allowed
to avail themselves of the mechanism provided under the Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003 1 (R.A. 9189) and that the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) accordingly be ordered to allow them to vote and register as
absentee voters under the aegis of R.A. 9189.
The facts:
Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship
under R.A. 9225 which accords to such applicants the right of suffrage,
among others. Long before the May 2004 national and local elections,
petitioners sought registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter"
only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a
COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23,
2003 2, they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their lack of
the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution. The
same letter, however, urged the different Philippine posts abroad not to
discontinue their campaign for voters registration, as the residence
restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely certain individuals
who would likely be eligible to vote in future elections.
Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections
owing to the COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of
Absentee Voters, petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al., 5 filed on April 1, 2004 this
petition for certiorari and mandamus.
A little over a week before the May 10, 2004 elections, or on April 30, 2004,
the COMELEC filed a Comment, 6therein praying for the denial of the
petition. As may be expected, petitioners were not able to register let alone
vote in said elections.
On May 20, 2004, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment), therein stating that "all qualified
overseas Filipinos, including dual citizens who care to exercise the right of
suffrage, may do so" , observing, however, that the conclusion of the 2004
elections had rendered the petition moot and academic. 7
The holding of the 2004 elections had, as the OSG pointed out, indeed
rendered the petition moot and academic, but insofar only as petitioners
participation in such political exercise is concerned. The broader and
transcendental issue tendered or subsumed in the petition, i.e., the propriety
of allowing "duals" to participate and vote as absentee voter in future
elections, however, remains unresolved.
Observing the petitioners and the COMELECs respective formulations of the
issues, the same may be reduced into the question of whether or not
petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or
(a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with
Philippine laws;
The Court resolves the poser in the affirmative, and thereby accords merit to
the petition.
(b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who
have pledged allegiance to a foreign country;
In esse, this case is all about suffrage. A quick look at the governing
provisions on the right of suffrage is, therefore, indicated.
As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically
disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who is "recognized as such
in the host country" because immigration or permanent residence in another
country implies renunciation of one's residence in his country of origin.
However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad
to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that
he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional
intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that "all citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law" must be entitled to exercise the
right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee
voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is
required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate
Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Contrary to the claim of [the challenger], the execution of the affidavit itself
is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section
5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent
resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more
significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact
abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the
execution of the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that
proscribes "provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a
condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise." 11
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No.
9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and
other existing laws;
Soon after Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 passed the test of constitutionality,
Congress enacted R.A. 9225 the relevant portion of which reads:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship ;
3) xxx xxx xxx.
(4) xxx xxx xxx;
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of
which they are naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in
the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.
After what appears to be a successful application for recognition of Philippine
citizenship under R.A. 9189, petitioners now invoke their right to enjoy
political rights, specifically the right of suffrage, pursuant to Section 5
thereof.
Opposing the petitioners bid, however, respondent COMELEC invites
attention to the same Section 5 (1) providing that "duals" can enjoy their
right to vote, as an adjunct to political rights, only if they meet the
requirements of Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, R.A. 9189 and other
existing laws. Capitalizing on what at first blush is the clashing provisions of
the aforecited provision of the Constitution, which, to repeat, requires
residency in the Philippines for a certain period, and R.A. 9189 which grants
a Filipino non-resident absentee voting rights, 12 COMELEC argues:
4. DUALS MUST FIRST ESTABLISH THEIR DOMICILE/ RESIDENCE IN THE
PHILIPPINES
4.01. The inclusion of such additional and specific requirements in RA 9225
is logical. The duals, upon renouncement of their Filipino citizenship and
acquisition of foreign citizenship, have practically and legally abandoned
their domicile and severed their legal ties to the homeland as a
consequence. Having subsequently acquired a second citizenship (i.e.,
Filipino) then, duals must, for purposes of voting, first of all, decisively and
definitely establish their domicile through positive acts; 13
non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as
that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be
overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as
possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements
exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.
Thus, wrote the Court in Macalintal:
It is clear from these discussions of the Constitutional Commission that [it]
intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who
have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended
to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents
domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters
for the first time.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section
2 [Article V] immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By
the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, , the
strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission
provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1
with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect
declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be
allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the
residency requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the
subject of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which became R.A. No. 9189,
was deliberated upon on the Senate floor, thus:
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, this bill should be looked into in relation to
the constitutional provisions. I think the sponsor and I would agree that the
Constitution is supreme in any statute that we may enact.
Let me read Section 1, Article V, of the Constitution .
Now, Mr. President, the Constitution says, "who shall have resided in the
Philippines." They are permanent immigrants. They have changed residence
so they are barred under the Constitution. This is why I asked whether this
committee amendment which in fact does not alter the original text of the
bill will have any effect on this?
Senator Angara. Good question, Mr. President. And this has been asked in
various fora. This is in compliance with the Constitution. One, the
interpretation here of "residence" is synonymous with "domicile."
As the gentleman and I know, Mr. President, "domicile" is the intent to return
to one's home. And the fact that a Filipino may have been physically absent
from the Philippines and may be physically a resident of the United States,
for example, but has a clear intent to return to the Philippines, will make him
qualified as a resident of the Philippines under this law.
WENCESLAO
RANCAP
LAGUMBAY, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CESAR CLIMACO, respondents.
Wenceslao
R.
Lagumbay
Ambrosio Padilla for the respondents.
for
the
petitioner.
BENGZON, C.J.:
This petition prays for revision of an order of the Commission on Elections
declining to reject the returns of certain precincts of some municipalities in
Mindanao. The Constitution provides for review by this Court of the rulings of
the said Commission.
The matter being urgent, and having reached the conclusion that the returns
of certain questioned precincts were "obviously manufactured" within the
meaning of pertinent jurisprudence, particularly Mitchell v. Stevens, 1 we
issued on December 24, 1965, a short resolution upholding the
Commission's power and duty to reject the returns of about fifty precincts.
It appearing therein that contrary to all statistical probabilities
in the first set, in each precinct the number of registered voters
equalled the number of ballots and the number of votes reportedly
cast and tallied for each and every candidate of the Liberal Party, the
party in power; whereas, all the candidates of the Nacionalista Party
got exactly zero; and in the second set, again contrary to all
statistical probabilities all the reported votes were for candidates
of the Liberal Party, all of whom were credited with exactly the
eight candidates of one party garnered all the votes, each of them
receiving exactly the same number, whereas all the eight candidates of the
other party got precisely nothing.
We opined that the election result to said precincts as reported, was utterly
improbable and clearly incredible. For it is not likely, in the ordinary course
of things, that all the electors of one precinct would, as one man, vote for all
the eight candidates of the Liberal Party, without giving a single vote
to one of the eight candidates of the Nacionalista Party. Such extraordinary
coincidence was quite impossible to believe, knowing that the Nacionalista
Party had and has a nationwide organization, with branches in every
province, and was, in previous years, the party in power in these islands.
We also know from our experience in examining ballots in the three Electoral
Tribunals (Presidential, Senate, and House) that a large portion of the
electors do not fill all the blanks for senators in their ballots. Indeed, this
observation is confirmed by the big differences in the votes received by the
eight winning senators in this as well as in previous national
elections;2 almost a million votes between the first place and the eight.
Furthermore, in 1965, the total number of electors who cast their votes was
6,833,369 (more or less). If every voter had written eight names on his
ballot, the total number of votes cast for all the candidates would be that
number multiplied by 8, namely 54,666,952. But the total number of the
votes tallied for the candidates for senator amounted to 49,374,942 only.
The difference between the two sums represents the number of ballots that
did not contain eight names for senators. In other words, some 5 million
ballots did not carry eight names. Of course, this is a rough estimate,
because some ballots may have omitted more names, in which case, the
number of incomplete ballots would be less. But the general idea and the
statistical premise is there.
Hence, denying prima facie recognition to such returns on the ground that
they are manifestly fabricated or falsified, would constitute a practical
approach to the Commission's mission to insure free and honest elections.
The same statistical result is deducible from the 1963 election data: total
number of electors who voted, 7,712,019; if each of them named eight
senators, the total votes tallied should have been 61,696,152; and yet the
total number tallied for all the senatorial candidates was 45,812,470 only. A
greater number of incomplete ballots.
It must be noted that this is not an instance wherein one return gives to one
candidate all the votes in the precinct, even as it gives exactly zero to the
other. This is not a case where some senatorial candidates obtain
zeroexactly, while some others receive a few scattered votes. Here, all the
What happened to the vote of the Nacionalista inspector? There was one in
every precinct. Evidently, either he became a traitor to his party, or was
made to sign a false return by force or other illegal means. If he signed
voluntarily, but in breach of faith, the Nacionalista inspector betrayed his
party; and, any voting or counting of ballots therein, was a sham and a
mockery of the national suffrage.
inspector. It is, of course, "possible" that such inspector did not like his
party's senatorial line-up; but it is not probable that he disliked all of such
candidates, and it is not likely that he favored all the eight candidates of the
Liberal Party. Therefore, most probably, he was made to sign an obviously
false return, or else he betrayed his party, in which case, the election therein
if any was no more than a barefaced fraud and a brazen contempt of
the popular polls.
At any rate, fraud or no fraud, the verdict in these fifty precincts may
ultimately be ascertained before the Senate Electoral Tribunal. 4 All we hold
now, is that the returns show "prima facie" that they do not reflect true and
valid reports of regular voting. The contrary may be shown by candidate
Climaco in the corresponding election protest.
The well-known delay in the adjudication of election protests often gave the
successful contestant a mere pyrrhic victory, i.e., a vindication when the
term of office is about to expire, or has expired. And so the notion has
spread among candidates for public office that the "important thing" is the
proclamation; and to win it, they or their partisans have tolerated or abetted
the tampering or the "manufacture" of election returns just to get the
proclamation, and then let the victimized candidate to file the protest, and
spend his money to work for an empty triumph.
It is generally admitted that the practice has prevailed in all previous
elections. Never was the point pressed upon us in a more clear-cut manner.
And without, in any way, modifying our stand as outlined in the Nacionalista
Party vs. Commission decision, we feel the mores of the day require
application even extension of the principle in the Mitchell decision,
which is realistic and common sensical even as it strikes a blow at such
pernicious "grab - the - proclamation - prolong - the - protest" slogan of
some candidates or parties.
It is strongly urged that the results reported in these returns are quite
"possible", bearing in mind the religious or political control of some leaders
December 7, 2010
L.
MAZA
and
SATURNINO
C.
OCAMPO, Petitioners,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
ARROYO, Respondents.
and
JUAN
MIGUEL
"MIKEY"
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Under Section 10 of the same Resolution, the COMELEC may motu proprio
effect the disqualification of party-list nominees who violate any of the
limitations mentioned in Section 7 of the Resolution. 7 Section 8 of Rule 32 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure also states that the COMELEC may cancel
motu proprio the registration of any party registered under the party-list
system for failure to comply with applicable laws, rules or regulations of the
Commission. Pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8646, 8 in relation to
Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807, the deadline for submitting the
requirements mentioned in Section 6 of the latter Resolution was on March
29, 2010.9
On March 25, 2010, petitioners Liza L. Maza, Saturnino C. Ocampo, and
Bayan Muna Party-List, represented by Teodoro Casio, (collectively referred
to as certiorari petitioners) filed with the COMELEC a petition for
disqualification10 against Arroyo, pursuant to Resolution No. 8696, 11 in
relation with Sections 2 and 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 12 (the PartyList System Act).13
The certiorari petitioners argued that not only must the party-list
organization factually and truly represent the marginalized and the
underrepresented; the nominee must as well be a Filipino citizen belonging
to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties,
citing in this regard the case of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC.14 On this basis, the certiorari petitioners concluded that Arroyo
cannot be considered a member of the marginalized and underrepresented
sector, particularly, the sector which the AGPP represents tricycle drivers
and security guards because he is not only a member of the First Family,
but is also (a) an incumbent member of the House of Representatives; (b)
the Chairman of the Houses Energy Committee; and, (c) a member of key
committees in the House, namely: Natural Resources, Aquaculture, Fisheries
Resources, Ethics and Privileges, Justice, National Defense and Security,
Public Works and Highways, Transportation and Ways and Means. 15
In his Answer, Arroyo counter-argued that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction
over issues involving the qualifications of party-list nominees; Section 9 of
RA 7941 merely requires that the party-list nominee must be a bona fide
member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election. 16
When the COMELEC published on March 26, 2010 its initial "List of Political
Parties/Sectoral Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the May 10, 2010
elections with their respective Nominees," Arroyo was listed as AGPPs first
nominee.
On March 30, 2010, the petitioner Bayan Muna Party-List, represented by
Neri Colmenares, filed with the COMELEC another petition for disqualification
against Arroyo.17 It alleged that Arroyo is not qualified to be a party-list
nominee because he (a) does not represent or belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented sector; (b) has not been a bona fide member of AGPP
ninety (90) days prior to the May 10, 2010 elections; (c) is a member of the
House of Representatives; and that (d) AGPP is not a legitimate and qualified
party-list group and has no authority to nominate him. 18
In his Answer, Arroyo reiterated that the COMELEC does not have jurisdiction
over cases involving the qualifications of party-list nominees. He stated as
well that he is a bona fide member of AGPP at least ninety (90) days prior to
the elections.19
Meanwhile, on April 6, 2010, petitioners Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P.
Rosales (mandamus petitioners) wrote the COMELEC Law Department a
letter requesting for a copy of the documentary evidence submitted by AGPP,
in compliance with Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807. On the same day, the
COMELEC Law Department replied that as of that date, the AGPP had not yet
submitted any documentary evidence required by Resolution No. 8807. 20
Through a letter dated April 7, 2010, the mandamus petitioners requested
the COMELEC and its Law Department to act, consistently with Section 10 of
Resolution No. 8807, and declare the disqualification of the nominees of
AGPP for their failure to comply with the requirements of Section 6 of
Resolution No. 8807.21 They also wrote the COMELEC on April 20, 2010,
reiterating their letter-request dated April 7, 2010. The COMELEC failed to
respond to both letters.22
The COMELEC Second Division Ruling
In its May 7, 2010 Joint Resolution, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed
the petitions for disqualification against Arroyo. 23 It noted that Section 9 of
RA 7941 merely requires the nominee to be "a bona fide member [of the
party or organization which he seeks to represent for] at least ninety (90)
days preceding the day of the elections." 24 It found that Arroyo (a) became a
member of the party on November 20, 2009; (b) actively participated in the
undertakings of AGPP and adhered to its advocacies; and, (c) actively
supported and advanced the projects and programs of the AGPP by regularly
attending its meetings, livelihood and skills program, and farmers day
activities.25
The COMELEC en banc Ruling
The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second Divisions ruling in
its July 19, 2010 consolidated resolution. 26 It held, among others, that a
Filipino citizen, in order to qualify as a party-list nominee, only needs to be a
bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent,
for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and must
likewise be at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election.27 The COMELEC en banc also held that Section 6 of Resolution No.
8807 is ultra vires, since the requirement that a nominee belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector he seeks to represent is not found
in RA 7941.28 Thus, it concluded that Arroyo possessed all the requirements
mandated by Section 9 of RA 7941.29
On May 7, 2010, the mandamus petitioners filed with this Court their Petition
for Mandamus and Prohibition with Application for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, 30 docketed as G.R. No. 191998.31They
sought to compel the COMELEC to disqualify motu proprio the AGPP
nominees for their failure to comply with Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807,
and to enjoin the COMELEC from giving due course to the AGPPs
participation in the May 10, 2010 elections.
On July 23 and 29, 2010, the certiorari petitioners elevated their case to this
Court via two (2) separate petitions for certiorari, 32 docketed as G.R. Nos.
19276933 and 192832,34 to annul the COMELEC Second Divisions May 7,
2010 joint resolution and the COMELEC en bancs July 19, 2010 consolidated
resolution that dismissed their petitions for disqualification against Arroyo as
AGPPs nominee.
In the interim, AGPP obtained in the May 10, 2010 elections the required
percentage of votes sufficient to secure a single seat. This entitled Arroyo, as
AGPPs first nominee, to sit in the House of Representatives. 35
On July 21, 2010, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers,
proclaimed Arroyo as AGPPs duly-elected party-list representative in the
House of Representatives.36 On the same day, Arroyo took his oath of office,
as AGPPs Representative,37 before Court of Appeals Presiding Justice Andres
B. Reyes. His name was, thereafter, entered in the Roll of Members of the
House of Representatives.38
On July 28 and 29, 2010, two (2) separate petitions for quo warranto 39 were
filed with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) questioning
Arroyos eligibility as AGPPs representative in the House of Representatives.
On September 7, 2010, the HRET took cognizance of the petitions by issuing
a Summons directing Arroyo to file his Answer to the two petitions. 40
The Petitions
The mandamus petitioners in G.R. No. 191998 argue that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion (a) in failing to order the motu proprio
disqualification of AGPP despite its failure to comply with the mandatory
requirements under Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807; and, (b) in giving due
course to the participation of AGPP and its nominees in the May 10, 2010
elections.
On the other hand, the certiorari petitioners in G.R. Nos. 192769 and
192832 contend in common that the COMELEC en banc gravely abused its
discretion in failing to disqualify Arroyo as AGPPs nominee since: (1) he
does not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector he claims
to represent; (2) he is not a bona fide AGPP member for at least ninety (90)
days preceding the May 10, 2010 elections; (3) in light of these preceding
reasons, he would not be able to contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislations for the sector he seeks to represent;
and (4) his nomination and acceptance of nomination as AGPPs nominee
violate AGPPs continuing undertaking upon which its petition for registration
and accreditation was based and granted.
In G.R. No. 192832, the petitioner Bayan Muna Party-List also prays that the
Court: (a) direct the COMELEC en banc to review all its decisions in cases for
Similarly, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
prays for the dismissal of the petitions in G.R. Nos. 192769 and 192832 for
lack of jurisdiction in view of Arroyos proclamation and assumption to office
as a Member of the House of Representatives.
Despite notice, the OSG failed to comment on the G.R. No. 191998 petition.
We deemed the case ready for resolution on the basis of the parties
submissions.
Issues
The core issues boil down to (1) whether mandamus lies to compel the
COMELEC to disqualify AGPPs nominees motu proprio or to cancel AGPPs
registration; (2) whether the COMELEC can be enjoined from giving due
course to AGPPs participation in the May 10, 2010 elections, the canvassing
of AGPPs votes, and proclaiming it a winner; and (3) whether the HRET has
jurisdiction over the question of Arroyos qualifications as AGPPs nominee
after his proclamation and assumption to office as a member of the House of
Representatives.
Our Ruling
in the May 10, 2010 elections. The prohibition issue has been rendered moot
since there is nothing now to prohibit in light of the supervening events. A
moot case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon (in this case, the
prevention of the specified acts) can no longer be done. Under the
circumstances, we have to recognize the futility of the petition and to
dismiss it on the ground of mootness since we cannot provide the
mandamus petitioners any substantial relief.47
We move on to the principal issue raised by the certiorari petitions in G.R.
Nos. 192769 and 192832 whether jurisdiction over Arroyos qualifications
as AGPP nominee should now properly be with the HRET since Arroyo has
been proclaimed and has assumed office as Member of the House of
Representatives.1avvphi1
This issue is far from novel and is an issue previously ruled upon by this
Court. The consistent judicial holding is that the HRET has jurisdiction to
pass upon the qualifications of party-list nominees after their proclamation
and assumption of office; they are, for all intents and purposes, "elected
members" of the House of Representatives although the entity directly voted
upon was their party. In Abayon v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal,48 the Court said:
But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the
elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of
the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,
identifies who the "members" of that House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fiftymembers, unless otherwise fixed by
law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered
national,
regional,
and
sectoral
parties
or
organizations. (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds:
"members x x x who shall be elected from legislative districts" and "those
who x x x shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself
recognizes party-list nominees as "members of the House of
Representatives," thus:
xxxx
In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent.
The Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be a "bona
fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent."
bancdenied on June 11, 1998. Clearly, this could not be done. Sec. 6 of R.A.
No. 6646 authorizes the continuation of proceedings for disqualification even
after the elections if the respondent has not been proclaimed. The
COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion because the
proclamation of private respondent barred further consideration of
petitioners action. In the same vein, considering that at the time of the filing
of this petition on June 16, 1998, private respondent was already a member
of the House of Representatives, this Court has no jurisdiction over the
same. Pursuant to Art. VI, 17 of the Constitution, the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive original jurisdiction over
the petition for the declaration of private respondents ineligibility. As this
Court held in Lazatin v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal:
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the
jurisdiction conferred. The exercise of the power by the Electoral
Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended to
be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature." Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was characterized
by Justice Malcolm "as full, clear and complete." Under the amended 1935
Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal
and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the
legislature and the Electoral Commission. The same may be said with regard
to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution. 50
In the present case, it is not disputed that Arroyo, AGPPs first nominee, has
already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the
House of Representatives. We take judicial notice, too, of the filing of two (2)
petitions for quo warranto against Arroyo, now pending before the HRET.
Thus, following the lead of Abayon and Perez, we hold that the Court has no
jurisdiction over the present petitions and that the HRET now has the
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and rule upon Arroyos qualifications as
a Member of the House of Representatives.
In light of these conclusions, we see no need to further discuss the other
issues raised in the certiorari petitions.
WHEREFORE, we RESOLVE to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 191998 for
prematurity and mootness. The petitions in G.R. Nos. 192769 and 192832
are likewise DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
MERCADO, petitioner,
and
the
COMMISSION
ON
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano
were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election
were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275 1
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending
petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged
that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United
States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, 2 the Second Division of the COMELEC
granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate
of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen
and, under 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual
citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The
COMELEC's Second Division said:
What is presented before the Commission is a petition for
disqualification of Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for
the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998
elections. The petition is based on the ground that the
downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by FilipinoChinese it is of common knowledge in Manila. It can mean
a tragic capital outflow when we have to endure a capital
famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening
unemployment and social unrest.
petition
for certiorari is
DISMISSED
for
lack
of
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
For resolution is the Petition1 for certiorari and mandamus filed by AklatAsosasyon Para Sa Kaunlaran Ng Lipunan At Adhikain Para Sa Tao, Inc.
(Aklat) assailing the Commission on Elections (Comelec) Resolution2 dated
January 8, 2004, which dismissed its Petition3 for re-qualification as a partylist organization, and the Resolution4dated February 13, 2004, which denied
its Motion for Reconsideration.5
Briefly, the facts are as follows:
On November 20, 2003, Aklat filed a Petition for declaration of requalification as a party-list organization for purposes of the May
2004 elections. It alleged in its petition that it participated in the
2001 elections but was disqualified by the Comelec as it was found
not to have complied with the guidelines set by the Court in the case
of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Comelec (Bagong
Bayani case)6 for party-list organizations to qualify and participate as
such in the party-list elections. Accordingly, Aklat "re-organized itself
in order that it will comply with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by
the Supreme Court"7 in the said case.
In its assailed Resolution dated January 8, 2004, the Comelec dismissed the
petition stating that Aklat cannot be considered as an organization
representing the marginalized and underrepresented groups as identified
under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. 7941). According to the
Comelec, Aklats statement that it has re-organized itself does not cure this
defect as "there is nothing in the petition which will help us identify what
particular marginalized and underrepresented group AKLAT is now
representing."8 Further, the Comelec held that "AKLAT lumped all the
sectoral groups imaginable under the classification of regular members just
to convince us that it is now cured of its defect." 9
On January 15, 2004, Aklat filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated January
14, 2004, substantially averring that it has reorganized itself and taken the
necessary steps to make it an organization of, by and for the marginalized
and underrepresented groups of society, particularly the indigenous cultural
communities and the youth. To this end, it has allegedly effected a