Federalizing the Indian federalism

http://bit.ly/1Qv8XrR
Teotonio R de Souza
After nearly four decades of Congress rule since Independence, the
emergence of regional parties contributed to the break-down of One-party
dominant system at the Centre. As an irony of history, it happened just as
the Indian National Congress was planning to celebrate Indias 50 years of
Independence under their unshaken dominant rule.
The state of Emergency in 1975-77 brought about the possibility of much
awaited change, but only in 1997 a coalition of 13 regional parties,
including MGP, at the Centre under the banner of Janata Dal gave the
regional politics a say in the national politics, helping to initiate the
federalization of the Indian federalism, which is classified by Constitutional
experts as a cooperative federalism or prefactorial federalism.
India's Constitution is not a covenant, or compact, between the states like in
USA. The states in India are the creation of Constitution and subsequently of
Parliament. Article 2 of the Constitution empowers Parliament to admit into
Union, or establish new States on such terms and conditions as it thinks
proper. Article 3 gives even more comprehensive powers to Parliament for
formation of new states and alteration of areas, boundaries or names of the
existing States.
Goan politics were marked by regional political parties, namely the U(nited)
G(oans) P(arty) and the M(aharashtrawadi G(omantak) P(arty) immediately
after the end of Portuguese colonial rule. The Indian National Congress party
that boasted of having brought about this change was relegated to limbo in
the first democratic elections that followed, including the referendum known
as the Opinion Poll of 1967.
This scenario may be classified as regional, rather regionalist politics. The
regional political parties accepted the integration of Goa in the Indian Union
and showed no tinge of separatism. The regional politics permitted the
Goans to have a first hand experience of democratic elections and to give
vent to their pent-up feelings of anger / ambitions provoked and sustained
by the colonial interests.
The colonial dominance of the feudal bhattkars (landlords) or favoured
religious affiliation of Catholics were challenged by the dominant majority
of the Hindu low-caste and munddkar citizens who could now freely display
the power of their vote and demand the benefits of Liberation. Such
sectarian and communal hangover of the colonial past provided justification
to the regional politics. The attempt by MGP to merge Goa with Maharashtra
was a strategy to win the political backing of a regional neighbour with its
experience and power at the national level.
The Goan Catholics represented by UGP sought to ensure their identity with
success by seeking statehood and recognition of Konkani as the official state
language. These were instruments for integration in India by ensuring the
identity. The Hindu-Brahmin minority joined in this strategy and its links with

the national politics, so much so that during a visit of Sonia Gandhi to Goa
on the eve of the last elections of 2012 she could claim that statehood and
official language of Goa were a gift of the Congress Party, if not of the Nehru
family.
Once the two major identity issues of statehood and official language were
settled in 1987, it was in the interest of Goans to seek greater integration in
national politics so as to win a greater share in national projects of
development. However, this is a process that is fraught with dangers of
diluting local identity through carrot and cooption of powerful external
interests. As some of the earlier marginalized groups have gained with
integration-based development, some of the former groups with social
status and corresponding economic power are experiencing insecurity and
fear losing their hold in the local communities.
A recent tendency to return to the regional politics is an indicator of such a
situation in Goa. The colonial past, once used as a leverage to gain benefits
in the post-colonial politics, is now being used to emphasize the uniqueness
of Goan identity and to seek special status to protect against the perceived
threat of the new beneficiaries of national integration.
A new arrival on Goas political scenario, the Goa Forward promises to
harmonize the regional interests with the national integration. Its manifesto
containing over a score of non-negotiable issues is yet to convince the
Goans how its politics will cease to be the art of the possible through
negotiations that always imply capacity to compromise, specially on issues
that really matter.
The dynamics of regionalism and integration is very tricky and requires
constant watching and flexibility to harmonize local and national gains. For a
working federalism there should be no loser in the long run, but requires
patience of mature politics for timely and temporary compromises on either
side, particularly in times when a new actor has arisen in the form of
international terrorism, in addition to internal terrorism, like the Maoist
version. They require fresh structural adaptations to meet the threat. It can
no longer be a centralized power in a new nation born out of a tragic
partition. The new federalism calls for sharing the responsibility for Law and
Order. Entrusting the defence portfolio to a Goan is a prime indicator of the
trust and hope of such an effective federalism.