NMSMI VS. DND, G.R. NO.

187587 (JUN 5, 2013)

COJUANGCO, JR. VS. REPUBLIC, G.R. NO. 180705 (NOV 27 2012)

FACTS:
On January 7, 1986, Pres. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476 which
excluded barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of
Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under the provisions of RA Nos.
274 and 730. At the bottom of Proc.No. 2476, Pres. Marcos made a handwritten addendum,
which reads: P.S. This includes Western Bicutan. Proclamation No. 2476 however was
published in the Official Gazette without the handwritten addendum. On Aug 27, 1999,
members of the Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a petition with
the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) praying among others, for the
reclassification of the areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of Western
Bicutan, from public land to alienable and disposable land pursuant to Proclamation No.
2476. The COSLAP granted the petition. Respondent MSS-PVAO filed a MR with the
COSLAP but was denied. It then filed a petition with the CA which granted it. Hence, this
petition.

FACTS:
In 1971, RA No. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment
Company (CIC) to administer the Coconut Investment Fund (CIF). The declaration of martial
law saw the issuance of several presidential decrees, which included PD No. 755 providing
for the implementation of the Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the
benefit of Coconut Farmers, purportedly designed to improve the coconut industry through
the collection and use of the coconut levy fund. Relevant to the petition is the acquisition of
the First United Bank, which was renamed as United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB).
Concerning the intended acquisition, FUB was the bank of choice which Pedro Cojuangcos
group had control of. The plan, then, was for PCA to buy all of Cojuangcos shares in FUB
which did not ensue since Cojuangco had the exclusive option to acquire the formers FUB
controlling interests. Two deeds emerged from the agreement: one between Pedro
Cojuangco group and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and the other between PCA and Eduardo
Conjuangco, Jr. The PC-ECJ (1st contract) agreement allegedly contains, inter alia,
Cojuangcos personal and exclusive option to acquire the FUB (UCPB) shares from Pedro
and his group. The PCA Cojuangco agreement (2nd contract) shows PCAs acquisition of the
said option from Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.

ISSUE:
W/N the subject lots were not alienable and disposable by virtue of Proc.No.
2476 on the ground that the handwritten addendum of Pres. Marcos was not included in the
publication of the said law.
HELD:
Under Art. 2 of the Civil Code, the requirement of publication is indispensable
to give effect to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase unless
otherwise provided refers to a different effectivity date other than fifteen days following the
completion of the laws publication in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the
requirement of publication may be dispensed with. As held in Taada vs. Hon. Tuvera,
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature
may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen day period shall be
shortened or extended. xxx We hold therefore that all statutes, including
those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Consitution.xxx We agree that the
publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is
to inform the public of the contents of the laws.xxx

ISSUE:
W/N the PCA Cojuangco agreement cannot be accorded the status of a law
for the lack of the requisite publication?
HELD:
Section 1 of PD No. 755 incorporated, by reference, the Agreement for the
Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the Benefit of the Coconut Farmers executed by the
PCA. It bears to stress that the PCA Cojuangco Agreement referred to in Section 1 of PD
755 was not reproduced or attached as an annex to the same law. And it is well-settled that
laws must be published to be valid. In fact, publication is an indispensable condition for the
effectivity of a law. The publication, as further held in Taada, must be of the full text of the
law since the purpose of publication is to inform the public of the contents of the law. Mere
referencing the number of the presidential decree, its title or whereabouts and its supposed
date of effectivity would not satisfy the publication requirement. In this case, while it
incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement by reference, Section 1 of PD 755 did not in any
way reproduce the exact terms of the contract in the decree. Neither was a copy thereof
attached to the decree when published. We cannot, therefore, extend to the said Agreement
the status of a law. Consequently, we join the Sandiganbayan in its holding that the PCA
Cojuangco Agreement shall be treated as an ordinary transaction between agreeing minds to
be governed by contract law under the Civil Code.

Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a
handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without
publication, the note never had any legal force and effect. Furthermore, under Section 24,
Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, the publication of any law, resolution or other
official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority. Thus,
whether or not President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant
but speculative.

SEC vs. GMA NETWORK, INC., G.R. NO. 164026 (DEC 23 2008)

REPUBLIC vs. PILIPINAS SHELL, G.R. NO. 173918 (APR 8 2008)

FACTS:
GMA Network, Inc. filed an application for collective approval of various
amendments to its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, which include, among others, the
extension of the corporate term, with the SEC. Upon such filing, GMA had been assessed by
the SEC a separate filing fee for the application of corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of
its authorized capital stock plus 20% thereof or an amount of P1,212,200.00, pursuant to
SEC Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994. GMA formally protested the assessment
but the SEC issued its ruling upholding the validity of the questioned assessment. In the
petition for review with the CA, the CA held that MC No. 2, S. 1994 is legally invalid and
ineffective for not having been published in accordance with law. Hence this petition.

FACTS:
On Dec 4, 1991, the Office of the Energy Affairs, now the DOE,
informed the respondent that its contributions to the OPSF for foreign exchange risk charge
for the period Dec 1989 to March 1991 were insufficient. OEA Audit Task Force noted a total
underpayment of P14,414,860.75 by respondent to the OPSF. As a consequence of the
underpayment, a surcharge of P11,654,782.31 was imposed upon respondent. The said
surcharge was imposed pursuant to MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended by Department of
Finance Circular No. 2-94. Another underpayment in the amount of P10,139,526.56 for the
period Apr1991 to Oct1991 was noted with additional surcharges for P2,806,656.65. The
respondent paid the OEA in full the principal amount of its underpayment, totaling
P24,554,387.31, but not the surcharges. The OEA notified the respondent that the latter is
required to pay the surcharges on the late payment. Respondent then filed a Notice of Appeal
before the OP which affirmed the conclusion of the DOE. The CA on appeal reversed the
Decision of the CA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

W/N the assessment based on MC No. 2,s.1994 is valid.

HELD:
We agree with the CA that the questioned memo circular is invalid as it does
not appear from the records that it has been published in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. E.O. No. 200, which repealed Art. 2 of the Civil Code,
provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. The questioned memo circular, furthermore, has
not been filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register of the University of the
Philippines Law Center as required in the Administrative Code of 1987. The questioned
memo circular, it should be emphasized, cannot be construed as simply interpretative of RA
No. 3531. This administrative issuance is an implementation of the mandate of RA No. 3531
and indubitably regulates and affects the public at large. It cannot, therefore, be considered a
mere internal rule or regulation, nor an interpretation of the law, but a rule which must be
declared ineffective as it was neither published nor filed with the Office of the National
Administrative Register. Rate fixing is a legislative function which concededly has been
delegated to the SEC by RA No. 3531 and other pertinent laws. The due process clause,
however, permits the courts to determine whether regulation issued by the SEC is reasonable
and within the bounds of its rate-fixing authority and to strike it down when it arbitrarily
infringes on a persons right to property.

ISSUE:
W/N MOF Circular 1-85, as amended, was ineffective for failure to
comply with the requirement to file with ONAR.
HELD:
As early as 1986, this Court, in Taada vs. Tuvera, enunciated that the
publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative rules that are
intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force and effect. Under the
doctrine of Taada vs. Tuvera, the MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, is one of those
issuances which should be published before it becomes effective since it is intended to
enforce PD No. 1956. The said circular should also comply with the requirement stated under
Sec. 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 filing with the ONAR in the
University of the Phils. Law Center for rules that are already in force at the time the Admin
Code of 1987 became effective. These requirements of publication and filing were put in
place as safeguards against abuses on the part of lawmakers and as guarantees to the
constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern and,
therefore, require strict compliance. In National Association of Electricity Consumers for
Reforms v. Energy Regulatory Board, this Court emphasized that both the requirements of
publication and filing of administrative issuances intended to enforce existing laws are
mandatory for the effectivity of said issuances. While MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended,
may be unimpeachable in substance, the due process requirements of publication and filing
cannot be disregarded. Moreover, none of the provisions of EO No. 137 exempts MOF
Circular No. 1-85, as amended from the aforementioned requirements.

PASEI VS. TORRES, G.R. NO. 101279 (AUG 6 1992)

ROTAIRO VS. ALCANTARA, G.R. NO. 173632 (SEP 29 2014)

FACTS:
On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses
suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Torres issued
Department Order No. 16, s.1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private
employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. The DOLE itself,
through the POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong bound workers.
Pursuant to the DOLE Circular, the POEA issued Memo Circular No. 30,S.1991 providing
guidelines on the government processing and deployment of Filipino Domestic helpers in
Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino
domestic helpers. It also issued Memo Circular No. 37,s.1991, on the processing of
employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong. On Sep. 2, 1991, PASEI filed this
petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit
their implementation.

FACTS:
A parcel of land in Brgy. San Andres, Cainta, Rizal was mortgaged by
Victor Alcantara and Alfred Ignacio to Pilipinas Bank and Trust Company in 1968. Two years
after, the property was parceled out by Alcantara and Ignacio and separately sold to different
buyers, one of whom was Ambrosio Rotairo. Rotairo constructed his house on the property
and after completing payments, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on Sep 25 1979 in his
favor by Ignacio & Co. In the meantime, Alcantara and Ignacio defaulted in their loan
obligations causing Pilipinas Bank to foreclose the mortgage on the entire property. Alcantara
and Ignacio failed to redeem the property thus title was consolidated in the name of Pilipinas
Bank. Pilipinas Bank then sold the property to Rovira Alcantara who is the daughter of
Alcantara. Rovira filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages before the RTC
which dismissed the same. The CA on appeal set aside the RTC decision and ordered the
turnover of possession of the property to Rovira. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

ISSUE:

W/N the DOLE and POEA circulars are valid.

HELD:
The questioned circulars are valid exercise of the police power as delegated
to the executive branch of the Government. Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective
and unenforceable for lack of publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative
Register as required in Art. 2 of the Civil Code, Art. 5 of the Labor Code and Secs. 3(1) and 4,
Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. (CC)
Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. the Department of Labor and other
government agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this
Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and
regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days
after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation. (LC, as
amended)
Sec.3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines
Law Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on
the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three(3) months shall
not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Chap2,
Book VII of the Admin Code of 1987)
Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule making requirements provided by
law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15)
days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by
law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and
welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying
the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules
known to persons who may be affected by them. (Chap2, Book VII of the Admin
Code of 1987).

W/N PD NO. 957 is applicable in this case.

HELD:
The retroactive application of PD No. 957 to transactions entered into prior to
its enactment in 1976 is already settled. In Eugenio vs. Exec. Sec. Drilon, the Court stated
that the unmistakable intent of the legislature is to have PD NO. 957 operate retrospectively.
Moreover, the specific terms of PD No. 957 provide for its retroactive effect even to contracts
and transactions entered into prior to its enactment. In this case, the contract to sell between
Rotairo and Ignacio & Co. was entered into in 1970, and the agreement was fully
consummated with Rotairos completion of payments and execution of the Deed of Sale in his
favor in 1979. Clearly, PD No. 957 is applicable in this case. It must be noted that at the time
of the enactment of PD No. 957 in 1976 and as early as 1974, Pilipinas Bank has already
foreclosed the mortgage and bought the properties in the foreclosure sale. There was, thus,
no more mortgage to speak of such that Rotairo should be notified thereof so that he could
properly exercise his option to pay the installments directly to Pilipinas Bank.
Under different circumstances, the prior registration of the mortgage between
Pilipinas Bank and Alcantara and Ignacio, and Roviras subsequent purchase of the subject
property would have been valid and binding, and could have defeated Rotairos unregistered
claim over it. But given Roviras privity with her father Victor C. Alcantara and the fact that she
had actual knowledge of the disposition of the property and Rotairos possession thereof, her
acquisition of the property cannot be upheld.

For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in question may not be
enforced and implemented.

GARCIA QUIAZON VS. BELEN, G.R. NO. 189121 (JUL 31 2013)

QUIAO VS. QUIAO, G.R. NO. 176556 (JUL 4 2012)

FACTS:
Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen,
filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the RTC of Las Pias City. Elise claims that
she is the natural child of Eliseo, who died intestate, having been conceived and born at the
time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal
capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseos marriage to
Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of
the latters marriage with one Filipito Sandico. Further, in order to preserve the estate of
Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as
administratrix of her late fathers estate. Claiming that the venue of the petition was
improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the
issuance of the letters of administration. The RTC directed the issuance of Letters of
Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The CA, on appeal, affirmed in toto
the decision of the RTC. Hence this petition.

FACTS:
On Oct 26, 2000, Rita Quiao filed a complaint for legal separation against
Brigido Quiao. The RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation of the parties and
among others, the forfeiture of Brigidos share of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership in favor of their common children. No MR or appeal was filed by either party. After
more than 9 months from the promulgation of the decision, however, Brigido filed before the
RTC a Motion for Clarification asking the RTC to define the term Net Profits Earned. Not
satisfied with the RTCs Order, the petitioner filed petition for review before the SC.

ISSUE:

W/N the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise is proper.

HELD:
Under Sec 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where
decedent resides at the time of his death. The term resides connotes ex vi termini actual
residence as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. In the application of venue
statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
domicile still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. As
thus defined, residence in the context of venue provisions means nothing more than a
persons actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City. For this reason, the venue for the
settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the
source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void
marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. Relevant
to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced
by her fathers marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the
death of her father.
An interested party in estate proceedings is one who would be benefited in the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. In the
instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of
Eliseos estate, is deemed to be an interested party. Certainly, the right of Elise to be
appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right
as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitime after the debts of the
estate are satisfied. Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseos estate as one of his
natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of
the law.

ISSUE:
W/N the family code of the Philippines may be given retroactive effect for
purposes of determining the net profits subject of forfeiture without impairing vested rights
already acquired under the Civil Code?
HELD:
manner:

In Go, Jr. vs. CA, we define and explained vested right in the following

A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not

depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder, or to the exercise of which
no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not
dependent upon a contingency. The term vested right expresses the concept of
present fixed interest which, in right reason and natural justice, should be
protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right
which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual
rights, cannot deny.
To be vested, a right must have become a title, legal or equitable, to
the present or future enjoyment of property.
In ABAKADA vs. Ermita, we also explained:
The concept of vested right is a consequence of the constitutional
guaranty of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right
reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it includes
not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also
exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become vested.
Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest,
absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable.
From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his vested right,
he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and
jurisprudence. In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. The
petitioners claim of a vested right has no basis considering that even under Art. 176 of the
Civil Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the guilty
party in a legal separation case. Thus, after trial and after the petitioner was given the chance
to present his evidence, the petitioners vested right claim may in fact be set aside under the
Civil Code since the trial court found him the guilty party.