Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
ANGELES
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 626-A, providing for the
confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported
from one province to another, dated October 25, 1980 is enforceable
before publication in the Official Gazette on June 14, 1982.
RULING: No. The said order isnt enforceable against the Pesigans on
April 2, 1982 because its a penal regulation published more than 2
months later in the Official Gazette. It became effective only fifteen days
thereafter as provided in A2 of the Civil Code and 11 of the Revised
Administrative Code. The word laws in article 2 includes circulars &
regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise
the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties
binding on the persons affected thereby. Commonwealth Act No. 638
requires that all Presidential Executive Orders having general
applicability should be published in the Official Gazette. It provides that,
every order or document which shall prescribe a penalty shall be
deemed to have general applicability and legal effect. This applies to a
violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation &
forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. It results that
they have cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The
summary confiscation wasnt in order. The recipients of the carabaos
should return them to the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the
carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said
executive order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda and
Zenerosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of
the carabaos.
Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected
hereby. Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be informed of
that provision by means of the publication on the Gazette.
HELD: When private resp. Go Bio, Jr. committed the act complained of in
May 1979 (at the time he issued the check-- the law penalizes the act of
making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check and not only the
fact of its dishonor), there was no law penalizing such act. Following the
special provision of BP 22, it became effective only on June 29, 1979.
The copy editor of the OG made a certification that the penal statute in
question was made public only on 6/14/79 and not on the printed date
4/9/79. Differently stated, 6/14/79 was the date of publication of BP 22.
Before the public may be bound by its contents especially its penal
provisions, the law must be published and the people officially informed
of its contents. For, it a statute had not been published before its viod,
then, in the eyes of the law, there was no such law to be violated and,
consequently the accused could not have committed the alleged crime.
The effectivity clause of BP 22 states that "This Act shall take effect 15
days after publication in the Official Gazette." The term "publication" in
such clause should be given the ordinary accepted meaning, i.e., to
make known to the people in general. If the legislature had intended to
make the printed date of issue of the OG as the point of reference, then it
could have so stated in the special effectivity provision of BP 22.
FACTS: Petitioner argues that since the decision in Manchester had not
yet been published in the Official Gazette when its complaint was filed,
the ruling therein was ineffective; that said ruling may not be given
retroactive effect because it imposes a new penalty for its nonobservance; the dismissal of the complaint for want of jurisdiction; and,
that it should not apply to the present case because the petitioner herein
(plaintiff in the trial court) had no fraudulent intent to deprive the
government of the proper docketing fee, unlike the Manchester case
where enormous amounts of damages were claimed in the body of the
complaint, but the amounts were not mentioned in the prayer thereof, to
mislead the clerk of court in computing the filing fees to be paid.
FACTS: On May 27, 1988, the Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 bags
/ sacks of refined sugar, which were being unloaded from the M/V
Tacloban, and turned them over to the custody of the Bureau of
Customs. On June 7, 1988 the District Collector of Customs ordered the
release of the seized sugar to the petitioner Yaokasin.
On July 15, 1988, the Collector of Customs reversed his order to release
the seized sugar since it is still subject for review by the Commissioner of
Customs since it is adverse to the government citing the Customs
Memorandum Order No. 20-87. This CMO implements Sec 12 of the
Integrated Reorganization Plan, which is under P.D. No. 1, dated
September 24, 1972. This Section 12 states that a decision of a Collector
of Customs in seizure and protest cases adverse to the government is
subject to review by the Commissioner of Customs or the Secretary of
Finance. When no decision is rendered after 30 days by either
commissioner or secretary, the decision of the Collector of Customs shall
become final and executory.
The petitioner objected the applicability of the Sec. 12 of the
reorganization plan and the CMO No. 20-87 on the ground that they had
not been published in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: Whether the enforcement of the Sec. 12 of the Integrated
Reorganization Plan and thereafter CMO No. 20-87 valid when these
laws have not been published in the Official Gazette.
RULING: Yes. CMO and Sec 12 of the Integrated Reorganization Plan is
enforceable. The requirement of Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not apply
to CMO No. 20-87 since it is only an administrative order of the
Commissioner of Customs to his subordinates, namely the customs
collectors. Also in the Commonwealth Act No. 638, which enumerates
what shall be published in the Official Gazette, states that administrative
orders and proclamations shall be published except when these have no
general applicability. CMO No. 20-87 requiring collectors of customs to
comply strictly with Section 12 of the Plan, is an issuance which is
addressed only to particular persons or a class of persons, hence no
general applicability therefore need not be published in the Official
Gazette.
xxx [A] person is deemed a possessor in bad faith when he knows that
there is a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, by which it is
invalidated.
The question to be answered is w/n the petitioner should be deemed a
possessor in GF because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the
manner of its acquisition by w/c it is invalidated. Ignorance of the flaw is
the keynote of the rule. From the facts as found by the CA, we can
neither deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his
title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition
contained in Sec. 116. This being the case, the question is within good
faith may be premised upon ignorance of the laws.
Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be the basis of
good faith but excusable ignorance may be such basis (if it is based
upon ignorance of a fact.) It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant
with the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of
the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was
not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking
possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not
know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of
the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter,
as a lien, was prohibited by Sec. 116. Thus, as to the petitioner, his
ignorance of the provisions of sec. 116 is excusable and may be the
basis of good faith.
The petitioners being in good faith, the respondents may elect to have
the improvements introduced by the petitioner by paying the latter the
value thereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buy and have the
land where the improvements or plants are found, by paying them its
market value to be fixed by the court of origin, upon hearing the parties.
9. MRCA VS. CA
FACTS: Petitioner argues that since the decision in Manchester had not
yet been published in the Official Gazette when its complaint was filed,
the ruling therein was ineffective; that said ruling may not be given
retroactive effect because it imposes a new penalty for its nonobservance; the dismissal of the complaint for want of jurisdiction; and,
that it should not apply to the present case because the petitioner herein
(plaintiff in the trial court) had no fraudulent intent to deprive the
government of the proper docketing fee, unlike the Manchester case
where enormous amounts of damages were claimed in the body of the
complaint, but the amounts were not mentioned in the prayer thereof, to
mislead the clerk of court in computing the filing fees to be paid.
After the parties had submitted a stipulation of facts, the court, upon
plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings and/or summary
judgment, which the defendant did not oppose, rendered judgment
dismissing the complaint with costs against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs
filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. It was denied by the
respondent Judge. They filed a motion for leave to appeal as paupers
and filed a notice of appeal. The trial court granted their motion to appeal
as paupers.
Believing that as pauper litigants they did not have to submit a record on
appeal, they waited for the trial court to elevate the entire records of the
case to the Court of Appeals as provided in Section 16, Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court. Respondent Judge dismissed the appeal for failure to file
a record on appeal. A motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order
was filed by the appellants. They mailed their record on appeal to the
Court. The lower court denied their motion for reconsideration. Hence,
this petition for certiorari by the appellants raising the lone legal question
of whether for the perfection of an appeal by a pauper litigant, the timely
submission of a record on appeal is required.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law can be given retroactive effect.
RULING: The reorganization having been declared to have been
completed, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is now in full force and effect. A
record on appeal is no longer necessary for taking an appeal. The same
proviso appears in Section 18 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued
by this Court on January 11, 1983. Being procedural in nature, those
provisions may be applied retroactively for the benefit of petitioners, as
appellants. 'Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending undetermined at the time of
their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that
extent.'
FACTS: The original parties to this case were Rizaldy T. Zshornack and
the Commercial Bank and Trust Company of the Philippines [hereafter
referred to as "COMTRUST."] In 1980, the Bank of the Philippine
Islands(hereafter referred to as BPI absorbed COMTRUST through a
corporate merger, and was substituted as party to the case.
The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No.
81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful
authorizations or appropriations, unless they are repealed or otherwise
amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying with
the duty to implement the same.
HELD: Day is synonymous with Date; consequently the 5th day shall be
the 15 days after the appeal regardless of the time when it was
submitted. The rule stated in Article 13 of the Civil Code to the effect that
"In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day
included" is similar, but not identical to Section 4 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which provided that "Unless otherwise specially provided, the
time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computed
by excluding the first day and including the last; and if the last be Sunday
or a legal holiday it shall be excluded", as well as the old Rule 28 of the
Rules of Court which stated that prescribed or allowed by the Rules of
Court, by order of a court, or by any other applicable statute, the day of
the act, event or default after which the designated period of time begins
to run is not to be included. The last day of the period so computed is to
be included, unless it is a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the
time shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Sunday or a
legal holiday." In applying this rule, the Court considered the day as
synonymous with the date and we find no cogent reason to adopt a
different view.
ISSUE: Whether or not the present action for the revival of a judgment is
barred by the statute of limitations.
HELD: The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its
theory contravenes the explicit provision of Art. 13 limiting the
connotation of each "year" - as the term is used in our laws - to 365 days.
[The action to enforce a judgment which became final on December 21,
1955 prescribes in 10 years. Since the Civil Code computes "years" in
terms of 365 days each, the action has prescribed on December 19,
1955, since the two intervening leap years added two more days to the
computation. It is not the calendar year that is considered.]
manner which out government believes is contrary to public order & good
morals.
Article 9 of the Old Civil Code, now in Art 15 says that Laws relating to
family rights & duties or to status, condition, and legal capacity of
persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a
foreign country. And the last part of Art 11 of the Old Civil Code, now in
Art 17 also states ...the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts &
their property, and those intended to promote public order & good
morals, shall not be rendered without effect by any foreign laws or
judgements or by anything done or any agreements entered into in a
foreign country.
FACTS: Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent,
Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They
established their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They
were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time
with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8,
1983, stating that petitioners business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon
Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be
ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared as
the administrator of the said property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and
private respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where
petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
RULING: Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over
conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the
court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to
respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She should not be
discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be
served.
HELD: Moral and exemplary damages are awarded to the victims heirs
despite acquittal of accused on grounds of reasonable doubt.
Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free
from civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The
doctrine in Urbano v IAC, wherein a person while not criminally liable,
may still be civilly liable, is applicable.
2.
3.
4.
5.
A three-judge District Court panel tried the cases together and held that
Roe and Hallford had standing to sue and presented justiciable
controversies, and that declaratory relief was warranted. The court also
ruled however that injunctive relief was not warranted and that the Does
complaint was not justiciable. Roe and Hallford won their lawsuits at trial.
The district court held that the Texas abortion statutes were void as
vague and for overbroadly infringing the Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of the plaintiffs. The Does lost, however, because the
district court ruled that injunctive relief against enforcement of the laws
was not warranted.
The Does appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States
and Wade cross-appealed the district courts judgment in favor of Roe
and Hallford.
ISSUES:
1. Do abortion laws that criminalize all abortions, except those
required on medical advice to save the life of the mother, violate
the Constitution of the United States?
2. Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution protect the right to privacy,
including the right to obtain an abortion?
3. Are there any circumstances where a state may enact laws
prohibiting abortion?
4. Did the fact that Roes pregnancy had already terminated
naturally before this case was decided by the Supreme Court
render her lawsuit moot?
5. Was the district court correct in denying injunctive relief?
RULING:
1. Yes. State criminal abortion laws that except from criminality only
life-saving procedures on the mothers behalf, and that do not
take into consideration the stage of pregnancy and other
The Court held that, in regard to abortions during the first trimester, the
decision must be left to the judgment of the pregnant womans doctor. In
regard to second trimester pregnancies, states may promote their
interests in the mothers health by regulating abortion procedures related
to the health of the mother. Regarding third trimester pregnancies, states
may promote their interests in the potentiality of human life by regulating
or even prohibiting abortion, except when necessary to preserve the life
or health of the mother.
The Supreme Court held that litigation involving pregnancy, which is
capable of repetition, yet evading review, is an exception to the general
rule that an actual controversy must exist at each stage of judicial review,
and not merely when the action is initiated.
The Court held that while 28 U.S.C. 1253 does not authorize a party
seeking only declaratory relief to appeal directly to the Supreme Court,
review is not foreclosed when the case is brought on appeal from
specific denial of injunctive relief and the arguments on the issues of
both injunctive and declaratory relief are necessarily identical.
The Does complaint seeking injunctive relief was based on
contingencies which might or might not occur and was therefore too
speculative to present an actual case or controversy. It was unnecessary
for the Court to decide Hallfords case for injunctive relief because once
the Court found the laws unconstitutional, the Texas authorities were
prohibited from enforcing them.
3-6 months (trimesters); stages of birth is equal to a childs
PERSONALITY
In the US, a fetus is not a person, as compared to the Philippines
FACTS: Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for
the first time in 1948 through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she
became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally
married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting
on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant.
After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she
was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy
proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the
defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became
pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion
and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's
clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met
the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old
foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency.
The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for
his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his
consent, to the abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this
action and award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz
we granted certiorari.
RULING: Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support
of the child she was carrying and an independent cause of action for
damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff have the right for damages in behalf
of his unborn child.
This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40) recognizes the provisional
personality of the unborn child, which includes its right to support from its
progenitors, even it is only en ventre de sa mere. Article 742 of the
same Code holds that, just as a conceived child, it may receive
donations through persons that legally represent it. Readings of Articles
40, 854 of the Civil Code and Article 29 of the Spanish Code also further
strengthen the case for reversal of order.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and
damages from defendant despite failure to allege fact of birth in
complaint.
Additionally, for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to
his lust xxx constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that
entitles her to claim compensation for damage caused per Article 21 of
the Civil Code, a provision supported by Article 2219, which provides
moral damages for victims of seduction, abduction, rape or other
lascivious acts.
After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in
Camarines Street Manila where they lived together for about a year.
When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly
departed and he was married with another woman at this time. It should
be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was
in charge of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael
Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned.
ISSUES: Whether or not the note to the padre in connection with the
other letters written by defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy proves
acknowledgement of paternity.
RULING: The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as
admission of paternity and the other letters are sufficient to connect the
admission with the child carried by Antonia. The mere requirement is that
the writing shall be indubitable. The law fixes no period during which a
child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural
child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's
resolution to admit the status. Supreme Court held that they agree with
the trial court in refusing to provide damages to Antonia Loanco for
supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no
standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a
judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the
second baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC found no necessity to modify
the judgment as to the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco
in the amount of P50 pesos per month. They likewise pointed out that it
is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the
amount of pension.
FACTS: Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on February 28,
1962 ordering defendants Soliven, Pedro Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and
Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastics the sum of P3,667.03 plus legal
rate of interest from November 1958 before its decision became final or
else Quality Plastics is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond.
Defendants failed to pay the amount before the limit given. Oria's land,
which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an
area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the
sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962 which he has given as
security under the bond. Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long
before June 13, 1960. Quality Plastics was not aware on Orias death.
The summons and copies of complaint was personally served on June
24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff to Soliven which the latter acknowledged
and signed in his own behalf and his co-defendants. Dionisio, Fausta,
Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in
Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc on March 1,
1963 for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution
against his land (T-873). Dionisio also sued in his capacity as
administrator of Orias testate estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment against Oria and execution against
his land be annulled on the ground of lack in juridical capacity.
RULING: Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons on T-873 just
learned that Oria was already dead prior case T-662 was filed. The
Dumalaos agreed in their stipulation that indeed Quality Plastics was
unaware of Orias death and that they acted in good faith in joining Oria
as a co-defendant. However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria,
thus, the judgment against him is a patent nullity. Lower courts judgment
against Oria in T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person as far
as Oria was concerned. He had no more civil personality and his juridical
capacity which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations was lost
through death. The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics in order
to annul the judgment against Oria does not follow that they are entitled
to claim attorneys fees against the corporation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.
RULING: The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana
was correctly awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to
Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that
Persons charged with duty of burial- if the deceased was an unmarried
man or woman or a child and left any kin; the duty of the burial shall
devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased. Albeit, petitioner claims
he is the spouse as contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code,
Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages where a man
and a woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as
husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband
and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community
where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law
jurisdictions. In addition, it requires that the man and woman living
together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage.
Whereas, the petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman,
legal impediment that disqualified him from even legally marrying
Vitaliana.
FACTS: Smith, Bell & Co. is a corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the Philippine Islands; majority of the stockholders are British.
It is the owner of a motor vessel known as the Bato, brought to Cebu for
the purpose of transporting Smith, Bell & Co.s merchandise between
ports in the islands. An application for registration was made at Cebu at
the Collector of Customs, but was denied. This is because they were not
citizens of the US or the Philippines. Based on Act 2671, Sec. 1172 of
the Certificate of Philippine Register; upon registration of a vessel of
domestic ownership, and of more than 15 tons gross, a certificate of
Philippine register shall be issued for it. If the vessel is of domestic
ownership and of 15 tons gross or less, the taking of the certificate of
Philippine register shall be optional with the owner. Domestic ownership,
as used in this section, means ownership vested in the (a) citizens or
native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands; (b) citizens of the US residing
in the Philippine Islands; (c) any corporation or company composed
wholly of citizen of Philippines, or US, or both. Plaintiffs contends that
Act No. 2671 deprives the corporation of its property without due process
of law because by the passage of the law, the company was
automatically deprived of every beneficial attribute of ownership of the
Bato and that they are left with a naked title they could not use.
The RTC claims that the mother, natural child of petitioner Joaquin,
survived the son; the son dying first before the mother. CA claimed the
reverse. If the son died first, petitioner would reap the benefits of
succession. If the mother died first, the respondent Antonio, son of JN,
Jr. by his first marriage, would inherit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the discussion of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 of the
Rules of Court having repealed Art. 43 of the CC or not is relevant to the
case at bar.
RULING: No, neither of the two provisions is applicable. Both provisions,
as their language implies, are intended as a substitute for facts, and so
are not to be available when there are facts.
Upon the issue of who between the mother and son died first, in light of
the conditions painted by Francisco Lopez, a fair inference can be
arrived at that Joaquin Navarro Jr. died before his mother. The
presumption that Angela Joaquin died before her son was based on
speculations, not evidence. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of
evidence by which civil cases are decided, this inference should prevail.
Evidence of survivorship may be (1) direct (2) indirect (3) circumstantial
or (4) inferential.
Art. 43 Speaks about resolving doubt when 2 or more persons are called
to succeed each other as to which of them died first. In the Civil Code, in
the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time, and
there shall be no transmission of rights from one to another. In the Rules
of Court, in cases of calamity, there is a hierarchy of survivorship.
ISSUE: Whether or not Smith, Bell & Co. were denied of the due process
of law by the Philippine Legislature in its enactment of Act 2761.
RULING: No. (judgment is affirmed, and plaintiff cant be granted
registry.) Act No. 2761, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell &
Co. Ltd., the right to register vessels in the Philippine Coastwide trade,
falls within the authorized exceptions. Specifically within the purview of
the police power. Literally and absolutely, steamship lines are the
arteries of the commerce in the Philippines. If one be severed, the
lifeblood of the nation is lost. If these are protected, security of the
country and general welfare is sustained.
FACTS: On December 15, 1908, Juan Codina Arenas, with one other
persons as principals, along with Vicente Sixto Villanueva, who with two
others as sureties, assumed the obligation to pay jointly and severally
Standard Oil Co. On April 5, 1909, Standard Oil sued for payment of the
debt. On May 12, 1909Villanueva was declared to be in default. The wife
of Villanueva, declared while the judgement was in execution; (1) that
her husband was declared insane on June 24, 1909 by Manilas Court of
First Instance;(2) that she was appointed as guardian on Oct. 11, with
authority to institute legal proceedings for annulment of bonds given by
her husband while insane; (3) that her husband was already permanently
insane when he gave the bond to Standard Oil an was insane and
unable to defend himself during the litigation and for this reason asked
the court to reopen the trial to allow for the introduction of evidence for
Villanueva regarding his incapacity to act at the time he gave the bond.
The court reopened the trial but concluded that Villanueva had capacity
to act at the time he gave the bond on Dec. 15, 1908.
FACTS: This case is about the signing of a deed of sale in which two of
the four parties were minors with age 18, and 19. On the date of sale,
these minors presented themselves that they were of legal age at the
time they signed it, and they made the same manifestation before the
notary public. The plaintiffs alleged that as the sole heirs, along with their
two sisters, to a 48 hectare tract of land which belonged to their mother
the sister of the defendant. The defendant cajoled, induced, and
fraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs to sell their land for a sum
of P400 as opposed to its original value. The plaintiffs demand the
annulment of the sale, the return of the land, and the remuneration of the
thing benefited by the defendant.
The mere fact that one month after the execution of the contract, the
minor informed the other contracting party of his minority, does not affect
the case; such subsequent information is of no moment, because his
previous misrepresentation has already estopped him from disavowing
the contract.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of the piece of land in question void or
valid.
RULING: The sale of the land is void because Isidro is incapacitated to
enter into such contracts, and because the land wasnt even registered
and hence, cannot be sold. The decision in Mercado vs. Espiritu cannot
be used since the petitioner didnt try to hide his age
Art. 38 NCC provides that minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of
being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions
on capacity to act (aptitude for the exercise of rights), and do not exempt
the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter
arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements.
The land in question wasnt even registered in the Register of Deeds; the
sale of the land cannot be executed without registration as provided in
section 50 of Act. 496.
Nine years later, Ramon filed a case at the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, praying that the deed of sale may be annulled on the ground of
his minority at the time of its sale to Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao; action
was denied and Sia Suan, Gaw Chiao, Ramons father and brother,
Nicolas and Antonio Azores were absolved. Ramon brought case to the
Court of Appeals which reversed the CFI Decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ramon Alcantaras execution of the deed of sale
is valid, despite being a minor at the time of its execution.
RULING: Ramon may not be allowed to execute deed of sale, but due to
his act of ratification, the contract was given its binding effect. The deed
of sale is binding on Ramon, because he ratified it. Ramon is not allowed
to annul such deed, because he already ratified it. Mercado doctrine is
applicable in this case. Ramon may have executed his acts in bad faith;
he earned money from Gaw Chiao as a result of the sale and its
ratification, yet he summons the courts to annul the sale because he
executed it while still a minor. previous misinterpretation has already
estopped him from disavowing the contract. The Court of Appeals said
that Ramon may not be stopped because of the letter, yet the Supreme
Court holds that he is already stopped by his misrepresentation in the
deed of sale, due to his minority. The Supreme Court is of the opinion
that Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao is hereby absolved, without incurring any
costs on their part. Under the doctrine laid down by Mercado v Espiritu,
herein followed, to bind a minor who represents himself to be of legal
age, it is not necessary for his vendee to actually part with cash, as long
as the contract is supported by a valid consideration. The circumstance
that about one month after the date of the conveyance, the appellee
informed the appeallants of his minority, is of no moment, because
appellees previous misrepresentation had already estopped him from
disavowing the contract.
FACTS: Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned from De Villa Abrille
P70,000 in Japanese war notes and in consideration thereof, promised in
writing to pay him P10,00 + 2% per annum in legal currency of the
Philippines 2 years after the cessation of the war. Because they have no
paid, Abrille is sued them in March 1949. The Manila court of first
instance and CA held the family solidarily liable to pay according to the
contract they signed. The family petitioned to review the decision of the
CA whereby they were ordered to solidarily pay De Villa Abrille P10,000
+ 2% interest, praying for consideration of the minority of the Braganza
sons when they signed the contract.
FACTS: Evaristo Vaquilar was found guilty of killing his wife and his
daughter, as well as injuring other persons with a bolo. Eyewitnesses
testified that the defendant appeared to be insane prior to the
commission of the crimes. They also testified that the appellant was
complaining of pains in his head and stomach prior to the killing. The
witnesses evidence for insanity include:
appellants eyes were very big and red with his sight penetrating
at the time he was killing his wife.
he looked at me he was crazy because if he was not, he
wouldnt have killed his family
at the moment of cutting those people, he looked like a
madman; crazy because he would cut anybody at random
sister said, then he pursued me.he must have been crazy
because he cut me
ISSUE: Whether or not the boys, who were 16 and 18 respectively, are
to be bound by the contract of loan they have signed.
RULING: The SC found that Rosario will still be liable to pay her share in
the contract because they minority of her sons does not release her from
liability. She is ordered to pay 1/3 of P10,000 + 2% interest.
However with her sons, the SC reversed the decision of the CA which
found them similarly liable due to their failure to disclose their minority.
The SC sustained previous sources in Jurisprudence in order to hold
the infant liable, the fraud must be actual and not constructive. It has
been held that his mere silence when making a contract as to his age
does not constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an action of
deceit.
The boys, though not bound by the provisions of the contract, are still
liable to pay the actual amount they have profited from the loan. Art.
1340 states that even if the written contract is unenforceable because of
their non-age, they shall make restitution to the extent that they may
have profited by the money received. In this case, 2/3 of P70,00, which
is P46,666.66, which when converted to Philippine money is equivalent
to P1,166.67.
FACTS: The SOCNY sued the 5 debtors for payment, including the
appellant Vicente Villanueva who acted as surety to the loan. The CFI of
Manila ordered the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs
SOCNY. While the judgment was in the course of execution, Elisa
Villanueva, wife of Vicente appeared and alleged that her husband was
declared insane on July 24, 1909, and that on Oct. 11, she was
authorized by the court as guardian to institute the proper legal
proceedings for the annulment of several bonds given by her husband
while in a state of insanity.
FACTS: Estelita Ronaya was only 14 years old and was hired as a
housekeeper by the mother of the accused. Accused Policarpio Rafanan
and his family lives with his mother. On March 16 1976 in the evening,
after dinner, Estelita was sent to help the accused in the store. At 11pm,
the accused called Estelita to help him close the door of the store and he
suddenly pulled her inside and said come, let us have sexual
intercourse in which Estelita said she dont like. Despite the struggle of
Estelita, Policarpio was able to rape her and told her not to tell anyone or
else he would kill her. But somehow, the family of the accused was able
to find out which made Estelita leave the house. Estelita was crying on
her home and told her mother about what happened. During trial, the
accused pleaded not guilty but in the end he was convicted. He then
appeal to the court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was insane during the commission
of the crime.
RULING: Schizophrenia is not an exempting circumstance. If there was
impairment of the mental faculties, such impairments was not so
complete as to deprive the accused of intelligence or the consciousness
of his acts. The testimonies negate complete destruction of intelligence
at the time of the commission of the crime. The fact that the appellant
threatened Estelita with death reveals to the court that the accused was
aware of his act. The law presumes every man to be sane. A person
accused of a crime has the burden of proving his affirmative allegation of
insanity and the accused was not able to prove it. Although it is not a
exempting circumstance under art 12 of Revised Penal Code, it is a
mitigating circumstance under the art 13 of RPC.
FACTS: Soledad Cagigas, a teacher and petitioner, who was almost ten
(10) years younger than she, used to go around together and were
regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage
prior thereto their intimacy developed among them Soledad advised
petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to
marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born. However defendant
married one Romanita Perez.
ISSUE: Whether or not the verbal contract entered into by the plaintiff
and the defendant in regard to the delivery of the money by reason of a
prospective marriage is valid and effective.
RULING: Plaintiff invokes paragraph 3 of section 335 of the Code of
Procedure in Civil Action and, appellant argues that the verbal contract,
not having been reduced to writing, plaintiff cannot recover. The section
relied upon by the does not render oral contracts invalid. If the parties to
an action, during the trial of the cause, make no objection to the
admissibility of oral evidence to support contracts like the one in question
and permit the contract to be proved, by evidence other than a writing, it
will be just as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced to
writing.
ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws,
for breach of promise to marry.
RULING: When the woman becomes pregnant and subsequently
delivers. Although she cannot recover moral damages for the breach,
nevertheless she can recover compensatory damages for medical and
hospitalization expenses as well as attorneys fees. Because of
defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed
by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age
and self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said
defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral
damages may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219,
paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.
Marilou then filed for damages before the RTC. Baksh denied the
accusations but asserted that he told her not to go to his place since he
discovered her stealing his money and passport. The RTC ruled in favor
of Gonzales. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable
wrong.
RULING: Mere breach of marriage is not punishable by law. However,
since the respondent was proved to have a good moral character, and
that she had just let her virginity be taken away by the petitioner since
the latter offered a promise of marriage, then she could ask for payment
for damages. Furthermore, since she let her lover, the petitioner,
deflowered her since she believed that his promise to marry was true,
and not due to her carnal desire, then she could have her claims against
the petitioner.
Moreover, the father of the respondent had already looked for pigs and
chicken for the marriage reception and the sponsors for the marriage,
and then damages were caused by the petitioner against the
respondents, which qualified the claims of the respondent against the
petitioner.
48. IN RE SANTIAGO
FACTS: Ernest Baniquit, who was living then separately from his wife
Soledad Colares for nine years, sought the legal advice of respondent
Atty. Santiago, a notary public in Negros Occidental. Santiago assured
Baniquit that he could secure a separation from his wife and marry again,
and told the latter to bring his wife that afternoon to process the
document which authorized each other to marry again and waive
whatever right of action one might have against the party so marrying.
Relying on the validity of the document, Baniquit on June 11, 1939,
contracted a second marriage, with Trinidad Aurelio.
It appeared in the records that petitioner and Orobia filed their application
of marriage license on January 5, 2000 and was stamped that it will be
issued on January 17, 2000 but neither of them claimed it. In addition,
no record also appeared with the Office of the Civil Registrar General for
the alleged marriage.
Before Judge Occiano started the ceremony, he carefully examined the
documents and first refused to conduct the marriage and advised them
to reset the date considering the absence of the marriage license.
However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors and
fear that the postponement of the wedding might aggravate the physical
condition of Orobia who just suffered from stroke, he solemnized the
marriage on the assurance of the couple that they will provide the license
that same afternoon. Occiano denies that he told the couple that their
marriage is valid.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage
without a duly issued marriage license and conducting it outside his
territorial jurisdiction.
RULING: The court held that the territorial jurisdiction of respondent
judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of
solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines
Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative
liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he
allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but
nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge
of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined
P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
FACTS: Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, man and wife, had but one
child, Domingo de Leon. The wife and son survived Eulogio de Leon,
who died in the year 1915. During her widowhood, Flaviana Perez lived
with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. The registry of births of the
municipality of Siniloan, Laguna, shows that on June 1, 1917, a child was
born to Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, which was named Melecio
Madridejo, the necessary data being furnished by Pedro Madridejo. On
June 17, 1917, a 24-day old child of Siniloan, Laguna, as a son of
Flaviana Perez, no mention being made of the father. On July 8, 1920,
Flaviana Perez, being at death's door, was married to Pedro Madridejo, a
bachelor, 30 years of age, by the parish priest of Siniloan. She died on
the following day, July 9, 1920, leaving Domingo de Leon, her son by
Eulogio de Leon, and the plaintiff-appellee Melecio Madridejo, as well as
her alleged second husband, Pedro Madridejo. Domingo de Leon died
on the 2nd of May, 1928. Lower Court ruled that the marriage of
Madridejo and Perez was valid and the Melecio Madridejo was
legitimated by that marriage. Appellant (Gonzalo de Leon) contends that
trial court erred in declaring that the marriage in question was valid and
that Pedro Madridejo was legitimated by that marriage.
FACTS: Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David
Manzano having been married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel
Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On March 22,
1993, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao
before respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that both
contracting parties were separated thus, respondent Judge ought to
know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he
officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew that the two had
been living together as husband and wife for seven years as manifested
in their joint affidavit that they both left their families and had never
cohabit or communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels.
ISSUE: Whether or not the five year cohabitation as husband and wife in
this case can be considered to have sufficiently met the requirement to
be exempt from acquiring a marriage license.
RULING: The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the
marriage license. They cannot be exempted even though they instituted
an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because
from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito
and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five
years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not
the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is
still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the
source of rights. It can be questioned even after the death of one of the
parties and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva
on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in
Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and
Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their
son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had
been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that
his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a
certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for
authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code.
FACTS: Lucio Perido married twice during his lifetime. His first wife was
Benita Talorong, with whom he begot three (3) children: Felix, Ismael,
and Margarita. After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with
whom he had five (5) children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and
Gonzalo. On August 15, 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first
and second marriages of Lucio Perido executed a document
denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition,
"where they partitioned among themselves lots inherited by them from
Lucio Perido. The children belonging to the first marriage of Lucio Perido
filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance against the children of the
second marriage, to annul the "Declaration of Heirship and ExtraJudicial Partition". Petitioners alleged that the children belonging to the
second marriage were illegitimate. The trial court held that the 5 children
of Perido were all legitimate and it annulled the "Declaration of Heirship
and Extra- Judicial Partition". The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of
Appeals, alleging that the trial court erred (1) in declaring that the 5
children were and (2) in declaring that Lucio Perido was the exclusive
owner of Lots because the said lots were the conjugal partnership
property of Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita Talorong.7.The court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. Now, the instant
petition.
HELD: The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that
of marriage. Marriage is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance
of which the public is deeply interested. Every intendment of the law
leans toward legalizing matrimony. Because if they are not married, they
would he living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man
and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage." The petitioners witnesss failed to
prove the illegitimacy of second marriage.
HELD: A man and woman not legally married who co-habit for many
years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as
husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the
community where they live may be considered legally "married" in
common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
FACTS: Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July 1978. Lilia was
married with a certain Eduardo Maxion in 1972. Karl then filed a petition
in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Lilia on the ground of latters former marriage.
Having been allegedly force to enter into a marital union, she contends
that the first marriage is null and void. Lilia likewise alleged that Karl was
married to another woman before their marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the
lower court be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of
marriage pending before the juvenile and domestic relations court on the
ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial question.
RULING: Petitioner Leonilo Donato cant apply rule on prejudicial
question since a case for annulment of marriage can only be considered
as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused if it was
proved that petitioners consent to such marriage and was obtained by
means of duress violence and intimidation to show that his act in the
second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his
conviction for the crime of bigamy.
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order
of denial issued by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be
sustained. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to
costs.
FACTS: Jones married Escano in December 1914 and had a child with
her named Angelita. Four years later Jones secured a passport to go
abroad and was never heard from again. Escano instituted proceedings
to have her husband judicially declared an absentee. The court issued
an order which would take effect six months after publication (Dec.
1919). Later, Escano married Hortiguela in 1927. Escano died intestate
leaving her widower Hortiguela as judicial administratrix and both
Hortiguela and Angelita as sole heirs. Property was divided accordingly.
However, upon Angelitas marriage and her reaching the age of majority,
she filed a complaint claiming that she was the only heir of her mother
since the marriage between Escano and Hortiguela was void because
only six years and fourteen days have elapsed prior to the solemnization
of the second marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Terres marriage with Dorothy is null and
void.
RULING: Dorothys first marriage is indeed void ab initio considering that
Merlito is her first cousin; thereby against public policy. However, she
did not file any declaration for the nullity of their marriage before she
contracted her marriage with Atty. Terre thus, her second marriage is
void. Article 40 states that the absolute nullity of a former marriage may
be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
69. IN RE SZATROW
FACTS: Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa got married in 1981. They have 2
children namely Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. In 1993, Alfonso filed an
annulment of his marriage to Leni. Afterwards, he filed an amended
complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on
psychological incapacity. The case went to trial and the trial court further
held that Alfonso presented quantum evidence that Leni needs to
controvert for the dismissal of the case.
Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with perjury, concubinage and
deportation which shows latters psychological incapacity because
according to him it clearly showed that his wife not only wanted him
behind bars but also to banish outside the country.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented quantum evidence for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Leni on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
RULING: The court held that documents presented by Alfonso during the
trial of the case do not in any way show the alleged psychological
incapacity of his wife. The evidence was insufficient and shows grave
abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity. Alfonso testified and
complained about three aspects of Lenis personality namely lack of
attention to children, immaturity, and lack of an intention of procreative
sexuality and none of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes
psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability. It must be more than just a difficulty, a
refusal or a neglect in the performance of marital obligations. A mere
showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does
not constitute psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, the testimonial evidence from other witnesses failed to
identify and prove root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. It
just established that the spouses had an incompatibility or a defect that
could possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy. The
totality of evidence presented was completely insufficient to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity more so without any medical,
psychiatric or psychological examination.
ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his
marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free
from the bigamy case.
RULING: Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that
there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a
solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract.
The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his
marriage when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago.
Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.
FACTS: Teresita Yaptinchay (petitioner) asked the Pasay City, Rizal, CFI
to appoint her, first, as Special Administratrix and then as regular
administratrix of the estate of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay who died in Hongkong
on July 7, 1965 alleging that Isidro had lived with her continuously,
openly and publicly as husband and wife for 19 yrs (46-64Taft Ave.,
Pasay City, and 64-65Russel Ave., Pasay City). Isidro died without a
will and left an estate in Philippines, HK and other places with estimated
value of about P500K; and left 3 daughters: Virginia, Mary and Asuncion.
On July 7, 8 and 11, 1965, certain parties carted away from the
residences aforesaid personal properties belonging to Isidro together
with others exclusively owned by Teresita. CFI granted such
appointment while Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged legitimate wife,
and Ernesto Y. Yaptinchay and other children, of the deceased opposed
saying that Teresita, not being an heir of the decedent, had no right to
institute the proceeding for the settlement of the latter's estate, much less
to procure appointment as administratrix thereof; and that having
admittedly cohabited with the deceased for a number of years said
petitioner was not qualified to serve as administratrix for want of integrity.
Also, oppositors counter-petitioned for the appointment of Virginia, as
special administratrix and of Josefina, as regular administratrix.
FACTS: Karl Wiegel filed for a declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Lilia Oliva on the ground of Lilias previous existing marriage to one
Eduardo Maxion. Lilia admitted to the previous marriage but claimed that
it was null and void since she was forced to enter the said union. In the
pre-trial that ensued, both parties agreed that the issue was whether the
previous marriage was void or merely voidable. Lilia asked the court for
an opportunity to present more evidence but the respondent judge
denied the petition. Lilia appeals to the SC in hopes of modifying the
agreed facts and to allow her to present evidence in her favor.
FACTS: The man, a lawyer, pursued a woman despite knowing that she
was already married. He convinced her to marry him and that the first
marriage was void because the woman married her first cousin, and was
thus void ab initio. Since it was void, according to the lawyer, it was no
longer necessary to go to court to declare it as such. She agreed to
marry him. After the birth of the first child, the lawyer disappeared and
contracted a second marriage while claiming that his marriage to the
woman was void from the beginning since she had already married her
first cousin.
RULING: Yes. Even if the first mistake was contracted in good faith, the
lawyer would still be liable for bigamy after he contracted his second one.
It was deemed that the moral character of the respondent was deeply
flawed and thus, should be disbarred and struck out from the Roll of
Attorneys.
FACTS: here the second wife filed an action for annulment, and the
husband also assailed the validity of the marriage claiming he was
coerced to marry her by her parents and brothers, and filed a motion for
summary judgment supported by affidavits of the plaintiff's father and
brothers to this effect, and the plaintiff also submitted the case for
judgment on the pleadings.
FACTS: Where the husband filed a case for annulment on the ground of
concealment of pregnancy, and the wife failed to file a responsive
pleading, the court referred the case to the fiscal for investigation.
However, the husband refused to show his evidence nor be interrogated
by the fiscal.
HELD: The court correctly denied the motion for summary judgment in
view of provisions of the Civil Code expressly prohibiting the rendition of
a decree of annulment of marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a
confession of judgment. The affidavits of the wife's father and brothers
practically amounts to these methods not countenanced by the Civil
Code.
HELD: The court correctly dismissed the complaint for annulment. The
investigation of the fiscal is a prerequisite to the annulment of marriage
where defendant has defaulted.
FACTS: Petitioner met defendant in 1938 and married her the same
year. Eighty nine days into the marriage, defendant gave birth to a child.
It is for this reason that petitioner is seeking the annulment of their
marriage. He said she claimed to be a virgin entering into the marriage.
The court decided in favor of the defendant despite the fact that she did
not appear. The court found it untenable that petitioner did not notice that
defendant was pregnant at the time of marriage because she was about
6 months pregnant then. Upon appeal, said decision was affirmed.
FACTS: Morning of April 28, 1949, a civil wedding before Judge Delfin
Hofilena of MC of Davao was held, in the afternoon, spouses remarried
in accordance with rites of Republic of China before Chinese Consul S.T.
Mih in office in Davao City. Plaintiffs testifies that the defendant never
wooed her. And that the wedding arranged by father. The father whipped
her often as she opposed marriage and resorted to beating her. She ran
away from home but found by father and promised she will not force her
again. But when the subject of marriage was renewed, they handed her
a knife telling her to choose between her life or his. Because of fear that
her father might kill her she agreed to the marriage. Testimony
corroborated by mother and Epifania del Rio, relative of her mother. She
lived with her husband in his parents home but considered him a
stranger since she doesnt love him. She was kept a prisoner in the
house; she never occupied the same bed with husband. They never had
sexual intercourse except on June 1, 1949 forced by husband using a
knife, she mustered courage to escape from her husbands home.
Defendant claims that the marriages were regular and legal, entered into
marriage freely and voluntarily. The plaintiff was not kept a prisoner and
plaintiff would everyday ask her father in law to give her and her husband
their own house and business. She slapped her only when she ran away
with P1200 and when asked where she came from she retorted it was
none of his business.
FACTS: On the day of the marriage of the plaintiff and the defendant, the
marriage was not consummated because the defendant complained of
pains. The defendant was operated on and her uterus and ovaries were
surgically removed. The removal rendered the defendant incapable of
procreation as such, plaintiff wants his marriage with the respondent
annulled.
FACTS: Joel Jimenez, the petitioner, filed a petition for the annulment of
his marriage with Remedios Canizares on the ground that the orifice of
her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a male
organ for copulation. It has existed at the time of the marriage and
continues to exist that led him to leave the conjugal home two nights and
one day after the marriage. The court summoned and gave a copy to the
wife but the latter did not file any answer. The wife was ordered to submit
herself to physical examination and to file a medical certificate within 10
days. She was given another 5 days to comply or else it will be deemed
lack of interest on her part and therefore rendering judgment in favor of
the petitioner.
HELD: Where the second wife filed an action for annulment, and the
husband also assailed the validity of the marriage claiming he was
coerced to marry her by her parents and brothers, and filed a motion for
summary judgment supported by affidavits of the plaintiff's father and
brothers to this effect, and the plaintiff also submitted the case for
judgment on the pleadings, the court correctly denied the motion for
summary judgment in view of provisions of the Civil Code expressly
prohibiting the rendition of a decree of annulment of marriage upon a
stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. The affidavits of the
wife's father and brothers practically amounts to these methods not
countenanced by the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage can be annulled with only the
testimony of the husband.
RULING: The wife who was claimed to be impotent by her husband did
not avail of the opportunity to defend herself and as such, claim cannot
be convincingly be concluded. It is a well-known fact that women in this
country are shy and bashful and would not readily and unhesitatingly
submit to a physical examination unless compelled by competent
authority. Such physical examination in this case is not self-incriminating.
She is not charged with any offense and likewise is not compelled to be
a witness against herself. Impotence being an abnormal condition should
not be presumed. The case was remanded to trial court.
FACTS: Petitioner prays that his petition for annulment be allowed even
if the sermons were not served to the respondent.
FACTS: Petitioner requests that she be declared the sole heir of the
intestate estate of Marciana Escano, her mother. Prior to the motion, at
the time when petitioner was still a minor, respondent was awarded a
fixed rate of P10,000for the administration of the estate of the deceased.
Petitioner alleged that when her mother remarried in May 1927, the
judicial declaration of the absence of her father was not yet effective. As
such, the marriage of the deceased and the respondent was null and
void.
HELD: The Supreme Court denied because in accordance with NCC 88, 101, in case of non-appearance of defendant, court shall order a
prosecuting attorney to inquire w/n collusion exists, and if not, the
attorney shall intervene to make sure that evidence is not fabricated and
no collusion is in place.
HELD: Petition denied. Absence of one spouse shall be counted from the
last day of communication or from the reception of the last news
regarding the absent spouse. In this case, the first spouse was absent
for 9 years.
FACTS: This is an appeal from an order of the CFI Manila dismissing the
petition of Angelina Gue. On Oct 11, 1944 Angelina was married to
William Gue and had a child Anthony Gue, and another child named
Eulogio. On January 5, 1946 her husband left Manila and went to
Shanghai China but since then had not been heard of, neither had he
written to her nor in any way communicated with her and she failed to
locate him despite of her efforts and diligence. They had not acquired
any property during the marriage. She asked the court for a declaration
of the presumption of death of William Gue. The Court of First Instance,
after publication and hearing, issued the order of dismissal saying that no
right had been established by the petitioner upon which a judicial decree
may be predicated and this action is not for settlement of the estate of
the absentee as it is clear he did not leave any
HELD: If the widow contracts the marriage in good faith in the belief that
her husband was permanently impotent or sterile, there is no liability.
of the offense gave the injured party the right to a divorce. That provision
of the substantive civil law was not repealed by the change of
sovereignty. The complete separation of the church and the state under
the American government while it changed the tribunal in which this right
should be enforced, could not affect the right itself. The fact that
ecclesiastical courts no longer exercise such power is not important. The
jurisdiction formerly possessed by them is now vested in CFI by virtue of
ACT no. 136.
As the result, the courts of CFI have jurisdiction to entertain suit for
divorce. For that the only ground therefore is adultery and that the action
on that ground can be maintained by husband, and that the decree does
not dissolve the marriage bond. The CFI of Iloilo therefore, committed no
error in assuming the jurisdiction of this case. The adultery of the
defendant was fully proved. The adultery of the plaintiff is however,
plainly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence, which is the
letter showing confession of guilt.
On the main issue of Adultery, the lack of evidence destroys the theory
of the court below and of the appellee that the defendant expelled the
plaintiff from his house because he was tired of her and desired the
company of other women. It is not adequate to explain the sudden
termination of their marital relations. The testimony of the defendant
correctly explained the theoryhe stated that on his return from an
inspection of one his estates his wifes maid gave him a letter in the
handwriting of his wife and directed to her lover, a Spanish Corporal of
the civil guard, named Zabal. She admitted the genuineness of the letter,
fell upon her knees and implored him to pardon her, that same day he
took her to the home of her parents, told what had occurred and left her
there. That the plaintiff is guilty and the defendant has condoned the
offense, though no factual evidence on this claim. Law 6 , Title 9 Partida
4 provides that the wife can defeat the husbands suit for divorce by
proving that he has pardoned her, but no laws in the Partidas says that
the effect of the pardon would be so far-reaching as to entitle her to a
divorce against him in a case like this present one. Therefore, neither of
the party is entitled to a divorce, both committed adultery. Judgment is
therefore reversed.
RULING: No. The law considers as void "any contract for personal
separation between husband and wife" and "every extrajudicial
agreement, during the marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership. A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage
and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and
extrajudically dissolving the conjugal partnership. Family Code 26, Par 2
provides that where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the
Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines
and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign
Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest
Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not Filipino Laws would still prevail.
RULING: No. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to
our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not he can still file for adultery after German divorce
RULING: No. Article 344 of RPC provides that only offended spouse may
bring case of adultery to court and should still be spouse when complaint
was filed. Since he filed it after he divorce was decree he is now not
considered a spouse. It would be absurd to bring action determined by
his status before or subsequent to commencement of adultery. Marriage
in his part was already extinguished thus he cannot sue as spouse
anymore.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce between Recio and Samson was
proven.
RULING: The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson
appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court.
However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated. Fortunately for
respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its
admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the
Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was
admissible, subject to petitioners qualification. Hence, it was admitted in
evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to
object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act
of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. Compliance with the quoted
articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent
was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired
Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting
an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a
citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their
former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an
Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the
vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not the maltreatment in this case is a ground for legal
separation.
RULING: No. Prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, maltreatment
suffered by the wife does not constitute attempts on her life. Intent to kill
must be established with clear and convincing evidence.
FACTS: In Sept. 1962, family driver told Elena Contreras that her
husband Macaraig was living with another woman. She failed to verify
the rumor from her husband. In April 1963, she heard rumors that her
husband was seen with another woman who was pregnant. In May of the
same year she once more failed to ascertain the veracity of the
allegations because she was afraid that it would precipitate a quarrel and
drive him away. However she finally found out about her husbands
mistress and the birth of the latters child. In December 1963, wife finally
met with her husband and pleaded him to give up his mistress and return
to the conjugal home, assuring him that all would be forgiven. He
declined. In the same month, she filed suit for legal separation but the
case was dismissed because prescription had, according to the court,
already taken place from Sept. 1962 when she had found out about her
husbands illicit relationship from the family driver. The CA dismissed the
complaint because of prescription.
FACTS: On August 18, 1953, Camen Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal
separation against Eufeimo S. Eufemio. On September 21, 1934, a Civil
Marriage was celebrated, while on September 30, 1934 a Canon
Marriage took place. They lived together until 1943 when Eufemio
abandoned Lapuz. They had no children. Lapuz found out Eufemio was
cohabiting with Go Hiok on or about March 1949. Petitioner then prayed
for issuance of legal partnership and that Eufemio should be deprived of
his share of the conjugal partnership of profits. Eufemios answer states
declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Lapuz on the ground of
his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law
and customs with Go Hiok alias Ngo Hiok. During the pendency of case,
Lapuz died in a vehicular accident (May 31, 1969). On June 9, 1969,
Eufemio moved to dismiss petition for legal separation on 2 grounds:
first, that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year
period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code, and that the death of
Carmen abated the action for legal separation. On June 26, 1969 the
counsel for Lapuz moved to substitute the deceased by her father,
Macario. On July 29, 1969, the Court dismissed the case, ruling that
Carmen Lapuzs cause of action has not survived, and it did not act on
the motion for substitution. Eufemio acquiesced in the dismissal of said
counterclaims by praying for the affirmance of the order that dismissed
not only the petition for legal separation but also his counterclaim to
declare the Eufemio-Lapuz marriage to be null and void ab initio.
ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an
action for legal separation, abate the action? If it does, whether or not
abatement also applies if the action involves property rights?
RULING: Yes, the action for legal separation is purely personal, it may
be made by the innocent spouse and can still stop proceedings if they
reconcile. The death of one party to the action causes the death of the
action itself.
Yes, it is solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they
cannot survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree. Art
106 of civil code provides for rights and disabilities that, by the very
terms of the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of
the spouses thus cannot be transferred to anyone after their death. The
rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the
decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence,
so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in
expectation. The enumeration of the actions that survive for or against
administrators in Section 1, Rule 87, of the Revised Rules of Court do
CC 102 said action for legal separation can only be filed a year
after such grounds have arisen. Socorro said to have known
cohabitation of Zoilo since Jan 1955 but action was filed on
4/24/56 which was outside reglementary period; and
CC 100 legal separation can be invoked by innocent spouse, i.e.
that there was no condonation. But agreement between Zoilo
and Socorro showed that there was condonation (Exhibit B of
their agreement)
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in saying that petitioner filed
her case for legal separation out of time and cannot claim it since she is
not an innocent spouse
RULING: Yes, petitioner knew of legal separation on Jan 1955 but only
made the complaint on April 24, 1956. Art. 102 of NCC provides for time
one can file for legal separation. As shown in the agreement she
condoned and consented to (1) living separately (2) can commit grounds
for legal separation like concubinage. Condonation and consent are
expressed thus cannot claim to be innocent spouse which law provides
for (NCC 100).
sexual intercourse after she has full knowledge of the husband's guilt,
her consent should operate as a pardon of his wrong. In this case, he
slept with her for 2 nights and 1 day after almost ten months after he
came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery. Thus, falling
under exemptions in Article 100 of NCC: The legal separation may be
claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage.
FACTS: Petitioner filed action against his wife for legal separation on the
ground of adultery. The defendant filed an omnibus petition to secure
custody of their three minor children, a monthly support of P5000 for
herself and said children and the return of her passport to enjoin plaintiff
from ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her as well as
pay for attorneys fees. Plaintiff denied misconduct imputed to him and
alleging that defendant has abandoned the children and that the conjugal
properties were worth only P80,000. Also contends that defendant is not
entitled to the custody of the children as she has abandoned them and
had committed adultery, that by her conduct she had become unfit to
educate her children, being unstable in her emotions and unable to give
the children to love, respect and care of a true mother and without
means to educate them. The CFI granted custody of the children to
defendant and a monthly allowance of P2300 for support for her and the
children, P300 for a house and P2000 as attorneys fees; reconsideration
denied.
FACTS: On June 18, 1971, petitioner Lucy Samosa filed for legal
separation for concubinage and attempt against her life. She also sought
for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of what
she claimed to be her paraphernal and exclusive property (under admin
and management of private respondent). Clemente Ramos (private
respondent) opposed such saying that hearing the petition for injunction
would only make the prospect of reconciliation dim. CFI Judge Vamenta
Jr granted such motion to suspend hearing on the injunction, and thus
this certiorari.
HELD: Writ prayed for is issued and the respondent judge or whosoever
takes his place is ordered to proceed on the question of custody and
support pendent elite in accordance with this opinion. The courts order
fixing the alimony and requiring payment is reversed.
The main reason given by judge for refusing plaintiffs request that
evidence be allowed to be introduced is by Art 103 of CC, provides for 6
months allowance as cooling off period. The provision of the code is
mandatory, court understands that the introduction of any evidence, be it
on the merits of the case or on any incident, is prohibited, status quo is to
be preserved for this time. It may be noted that since 6 months have
elapsed since the filing of the petition may not be allowed, reasons for
granting the preliminary injunction should be given at the scope of the
article cited may be explained. The cooling off period is to make possible
a reconciliation but this practical expedient, is necessary to carry out
legislative policy does not have the effect of overriding other provisions
such as the determination of the custody of children and alimony and
support pendent elite according to the circumstances. The law expressly
enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the
circumstances, if these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to
actual facts, rank in justice may be caused.
FACTS: Socorro Matubis and Zoilo Praxedes were married on Jan. 10,
1943. But from May 30, 1944 they lived separately from each other. They
had an agreement on April 3, 1948 that they relinquish their rights over
each other as husband and wife, and that they cannot prosecute each
other for concubinage or adultery, by way of condonation. They also
agree that each is no longer entitled to support from the other spouse
and that neither can claim anything from each other. On Jan 1955, Zoilo
cohabited with Asuncion Rebulado who gave birth on Sept. 1955 and
recorded as Zoilos. they also publicly appeared as husband and wife.
Socorro then filed on April 24, 1956 at the CFI Camarines Sur for legal
separation and change of surname against husband due to
abandonment and concubinage. The trial court declared that Zoilos acts
constitutes concubinage but dismissed complaint due to:
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent can still claim for support even
though she has already been convicted of adultery.
RULING: No. Adultery is recognized as a defense for support. CC Article
303 - obligation to give support shall cease "when the recipient, be he a
forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to
disinheritance. CC 921 - one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is
"when the spouse has given cause for legal separation. If allowed one
would only need to file a case of legal separation no matter how
groundless in order to get support. Mere filing would not set Art 292 of
FC to action. Still preclude loss of such right in certain cases.
CC 102 said action for legal separation can only be filed a year
after such grounds have arisen. Socorro said to have known
cohabitation of Zoilo since Jan 1955 but action was filed on
4/24/56 which was outside reglementary period; and
CC 100 legal separation can be invoked by innocent spouse, i.e.
that there was no condonation. But agreement between Zoilo
and Socorro showed that there was condonation (Exhibit B of
their agreement)
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in saying that petitioner filed
her case for legal separation out of time and cannot claim it since she is
not an innocent spouse
RULING: Yes, petitioner knew of legal separation on Jan 1955 but only
made the complaint on April 24, 1956. Art. 102 of NCC provides for time
one can file for legal separation. As shown in the agreement she
condoned and consented to (1) living separately (2) can commit grounds
for legal separation like concubinage. Condonation and consent are
expressed thus cannot claim to be innocent spouse which law provides
for (NCC 100).
FACTS: Mariano Ventura and Ursula Sansano got married and had a
child. Shortly after that, Mariano disappeared to Cagayan and
abandoned his family.-Wife did not have any means of survival so she
resorted to cohabiting with Marcelo Ramos. Around 1924, Mariano
returned and filed for adultery, to which both Sansano and Ramos were
sentenced. After conviction, Ursula begs for forgiveness and for Mariano
to take her back. The latter denied and told her to go do what she wants
to do, so she returned to Ramos while he went to Hawaii. Mariano went
back to file for divorce (under Act2710)
Que ambos comparecientes convienen en vivir separados el uno del otro por el
resto de su vida y se comprometen, y obligan reciprocamente a no molastarse ni
intervenir ni mezclarse bajo ningun concepto en la vida publica o privada de los
mismos, entre si, quendado cada uno de los otorgantes en completa libertad de
accion en calquier acto y todos concepto.
FACTS: Brown alleges that while he was interned by the Japanese from
1942 to 1945, his wife had engaged in adulterous relationships from
which she begot a child. He learned of it after his release. From then on
they decided to live separately from each other and executed, to this
effect, an agreement liquidating conjugal partnership, even giving the
erring wife a share. On July, he filed a suit for legal separation praying
for confirmation of said agreement, custodial rights and disqualification of
wife from succession of plaintiff. Her wife was declared in default for not
having answered on time. When cross-examined by the assistant city
fiscal, it was revealed however that Brown, after the liberation from the
internment, had also lived with another woman with whom he has
begotten children. The court refused to grant the petition on the basis of
prescription, commission of similar offense by petitioner, and
involvement of consent and connivance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the copulation which transpired after the husband
knew about his wifes alleged infidelities can be considered an act of
condonation.
HELD: Yes. Condonation is the conditional forgiveness or remission of
one party of a matrimonial offense which the other party committed.
According to American jurisprudence, any cohabitation and sexual
intercourse with the guilty party after the commission for the offense and
with knowledge of the offense will amount to evidence of condonation.
Resumption of marital cohabitation as a basis of condonation is inferred.
ISSUE: Whether or not findings of City Fiscal Rafael Jose that Brown
lived with another woman after war and had children with her can stop
him from legal separation proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not mother can regain custody of her children after
the issuance of a degree of legal separation.
HELD: No. A decision rendering custody of minor children is never
final but until it is reviewed and modified, such a decision must stand.
In the present case, Rosario merely obtained permission from the legal
parental authority who is the father. He may therefore demand their
return at any time. Judge was well within his jurisdiction whether or not
he chose to judge the other way. It is within his power to grant custody or
not. No grave abuse of discretion occurred.
ISSUE Whether or not a wife can use her maiden name after a decree of
legal separation has been granted.
HELD: No. Legal Separation alone is not a ground for wifes change of
name. Art 372 specifically mandates the wife to continue using name and
surname employed before the legal separation. Her marriage status is
unaffected by the separation. Rule 103 (provision for a change of name
in general) does not prevail over the mandatory provision of Art. 372.
ISSUE: Whether or not the wife can be compelled to return and live in
their conjugal dwelling.
RULING: Misunderstandings with a third-party is not seen by the law as
a just cause to leave the conjugal home. The wife cannot be compelled
to live with her husband but support can be denied to the spouse who
left. In this case, the husband has option whether to support her or not.
The husband has expressed that he is willing to establish a conjugal
home separate from his parents.
ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her
outside the conjugal home.
RULING: The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is
created merely in the act of marriage. The law provides that the
husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation
either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own
home at his option. However, this option given by law is not absolute.
The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation
to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home
because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to
leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical
assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the
husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home.
RULING: No. It would be unrealistic for the court to compel or urge the
couple to live together when, at least for the present, they, specially the
husband, are speaking of the impossibility of cohabitation. Marriage
entitles both parties to consortium or cohabitation, but mutual affection
must be the cause of this right, and not any legal mandate. This is an
inherent characteristic of marriage in this jurisdiction. The separation
stays until a different situation exists between the parties.
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts have the ability to force a husband and
wife to cohabit by legal mandate.
ISSUE: Whether the Article 133 of the civil code apply to donations
between live-in partners.
RULING: While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a
donation between the spouses during the marriage, policy considerations
of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require
that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship, as
it is contrary to public policy. The law prohibits donations in favor of the
other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and
improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply
rooted in ancient law. Whatever omission may be apparent in an
interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an
adherence to its avowed objective. It is a principle of statutory
construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it
as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal
provision would not be attained.
FACTS: Petitioner Moises Jocson and Respondent Agustina JocsonVasquez are the only surviving offsprings of the spouses Emilio Jocson
and Alejandra Poblete. Alejandra predeceased her husband without her
intestate estate being settled. Emilio Jocson conveyed by sale almost all
of his properties to Agustina Jocson, including his 1/3 share in the estate
of his wife. Moises says that it should be partitioned between him and
Agustina therefore declaring the said documents null and void.
Defendant Moises says that the first document was signed through fraud
and deceit. Same with the second and third document. Moreover, he
said that there could be no sale between father and daughter on the
same roof, and the unliquidated conjugal property also cannot be sold.
FACTS: Upon the express guarantee of the Fidelity and Surety Company
of the Philippine Islands, the Philippine Trust Company granted Agcaoili
a credit in current account not to exceed 20,000. Angel Ansaldo in turn
agreed to indemnify Fidelity and Surety Company for any losses and
damages from the obligations of Agcaoili to Philippine Trust Company.
Agcaoili defaulted hence Fidelity and Surety Company brought an action
against Ansaldo for the recovery of 19K, and caused the sheriff to levy
on the joint savings account of Ansaldo and his wife. Ansaldo said that
they levied on a conjugal property, hence not liable to Ansaldos personal
obligations. Ansaldo filed action in the CFI to declare it null and void. It
was granted by the CFI.
ISSUE: Whether or not the joint savings account is liable for the payment
of the personal obligations of the husband.
RULING: No. Before tackling the main issue, it must considered that
Moises said that Agustina didnt have enough funds, but then Agustina is
in a buy and sell business; and the purchase price was even more than
the assessed price. Lastly, Certificates of Title in insufficient to prove that
a certain property is conjugal, it does not at all prove that the properties
were gained in the spouses lifetime. Registration and Acquisition of title
are two different acts. In the contrary, it is clear that Emilio Jocson is the
owner of the properties, because it was registered in his name alone.
RULING: No. It must be proven that the fruits of the paraphernal property
benefited the family to prove that it is conjugal. In this case, there was no
effort to prove that the obligations contracted benefited the family of
Ansaldo.
FACTS: Moises and Miat bought two parcels of land, one in Paranaque
and one in Paco. Moises then wanted the Paranaque property to himself
but would leave the two properties to his sons. Moises and Concordia
bought the property on installment basis on 1977, and it was only on
1984 it was finished. Alexander agreed to sell the said lot to Romeo.
However, Romeo found out that the property was sold to Castro by
Moises. Moises bought the property through mortgage from Castro.
Alexander received 2/3, Moises 1/3, Romeo received none. The Court of
Appeals rendered a decision nullifying deed of sale between Moises and
Castro and ordered them to reconvey the land to Romeo for P36,000.
FACTS: On June 20, 1918 PNB granted the defendants a credit to the
amount of P31, 284 to which defendants mortgaged stocks from BPI,
Compaia Naviera, Davao Agriculture and Commercial Company. In the
document, it did not clearly show that they were husband and wife,
except in their civil statues. It also does not show that they bound
themselves solidarily to the debt incurred. A complaint was then filed
requiring Mr. Ansaldo to pay his debt. Defendants claim that their debt is
not of a solidary nature and should thus only bind one to the extent of
their share in the obligation thus should not be charged to their conjugal
partnership. Petitioner raises Art 1408 of NCC that provides all debts
incurred by both husband and wife during the marriage are chargeable to
the conjugal partnership thus Margarita Ansaido, the wife, is part of the
obligation as her husband as the legal manager of the conjugal
partnership is liable for the debt. Supreme Court held that conjugal
partnership should be used to pay for the debt incurred as well as private
property of each of them since they are both obligated. Upon Motion for
Reconsideration, the court reasserts that conjugal property is liable for
the debt they incurred as husband and wife.
ISSUE: Whether or not they are jointly liable for the debts incurred
through conjugal partnership
RULING: Yes, the Civil Code expressly states that partners are not
solidarily liable with respect to the debt of the partnership. Also Article
1137 provides solidarity will exist only when it is expressly determined. A
partner cannot be solidarity liable for the debts of the partnership,
because, there is no legal provision imposing such burden upon one.
Properties of the conjugal partnership of the defendants are liable for the
debt to the plaintiff, and in default thereof, they are jointly liable for the
payment thereof.
FACTS: Amailia Plata purchased land which he then sold the property to
Celso Saldana but he resold it to her seven months after when she was
already married to Gaudencio Begosa. On Sept 1958, Amalia mortgaged
to Cesarea Villanueva the property in consideration of a loan of 3,000.
Gaudencio also signed the deal. Amalia and Gaudencio failed to pay
mortgage and the land was then sold to Cesarea and husband Gregorio.
They then sued Gaudencio Begosa alone for illegal detainer which was
granted. However, Amalia resisted all efforts ejecting her from the party
since she is claiming that land was her own paraphernal property and not
conjugal property
(against third parties). Lucero and Sojio were also found to have acted in
bad faith since the latter waited a long time before going to PTC, ignored
the Court summons, and instead executed a deed of assignment, while
the latter constructed a house when he was a mere lessee.
FACTS: On December 21, 1929, Decree No. 440157 was issued in favor
of Felimon Torela, married to Graciana Gallego, decreeing that he is the
owner of a certain parcel of land (Lot No. 3770). By March 5, 1958,
Felimon Torela, filed a Motion Ex-Parte alleging that Lot No. 3770 of the
Cauayan Cadastre having been acquired by him by way of inheritance
prior to his marriage to his first wife. He, therefore, prayed that the court
order the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental to change his
(movant's) civil status, appearing on the face of the original certificate of
title, "from Felimon Torela, married to Graciana Gallego to Felimon
Torela, married to Marciana Gepanago". He then executed a definite
deed of sale whereby, for and in consideration of P3,000.00, he sold Lot
No. 3770 of the Cadastral Survey of Cauayan to Marcos P. Mahilum and
Maria Luna Mahilum. The children claim that the land was conjugal
property and they were entitled to the proceeds. They claim that while in
their youth they had seen their father Felimon and their mother Graciana
Gallego clean the lot in question. Felimon Torela declared that he and
his first wife Graciana were married in 1915 and the land in question was
decreed in the name of Felimon Torela, married to Graciana Gallego.
FACTS: The subject of the action is 30 parcels of land which they claim
to be the conjugal property of the spouses Donata Montemayor and
Clodualdo Vitug of which they claim a share of 2/11 of 1/2 thereof. They
assailed the mortgage to the PNB and the public auction of the
properties as null and void. They invoked the case of Vitug vs.
Montemayor, L-5297 decided by this Court on Oct. 20, 1953 which is an
action for partition and liquidation of the said 30 parcels of land wherein
the properties were found to be conjugal in nature.
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties belong to the one spouse alone.
RULING: When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only
and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said
spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said
spouse. And this presumption under Art. 160 of the Civil Code cannot
prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of
innocent third parties are involved.
the homestead claim on the land was shown to have been perfected
during Martin Lacerna's marriage to Eustaquia Pichan, mother of the
private respondents.
FACTS: This case is about the off-loading of Rafael Zulueta from his
flight back to the Philippines. Rafael Zulueta, along was his wife and
daughter, was traveling from Wake island, going back home to Manila.
While waiting for the flight, Mr. Zulueta went to relieve himself, but for
some weird reason, did not go into one of the 8 restrooms in the
terminal, but went to a secluded spot in the beach outside some 400
yards from the terminal. Upon his return, he was late, and the captain of
the plane, Capt. Zentner was already being arrogant. As such there was
an altercation between Zentner and Zulueta. Consequently,
Capt.Zentner had Zuluetas luggage off loaded, but only 3 of the 4
suitcases were found, and the last piece of luggage remained on the
flight to Manila. Originally, Even Mrs. and Ms. Zulueta were supposed to
be offloaded, but Mr. Zulueta was able to negotiate a compromise to
allow them to stay on the plane back to Manila. Upon reaching Manila,
wife tried asking local Pan-Am office to bring her husband home but they
refused. When Zulueta sued, trial court awarded them damages which
the SC reduced the amount upon appeal by Pan-Am. Upon, motion for
reconsideration initiated by both parties (case at hand), Zulueta wants
the trial courts decision to be affirmed in toto while Pan-Am wants the
amount of damages reduced.32 While waiting for the results of the
appeal, Mr. and Mrs. Zulueta, for reasons of their own, separated from
each other. Mrs. Zulueta then entered into a compromise agreement with
Pan-Am, settling for P50,000.00. Motion to dismiss, as far as she was
concerned anyway, was filed but was subsequently denied by the SC on
the ground that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the
husbands consent, except in case cases provided by law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the damages involved are part of the conjugal
property
RULING: Yes. Plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs. Zulueta entered into a contract of
carriage with defendant, one which was ultimately breached by the
offloading of Mr. Zulueta. The award of damages therefore was done
collectively. Since Mr. Zulueta, having acted in his capacity as
administrator, entered into contract with PanAm and paid for this with
funds from the Conjugal funds, damages incurred by breach of contract
of carriage naturally would be conjugal.
FACTS: Ponciano Reyes and Julia de Reyes were married in 1915. They
were able to acquire two parcels of land in QC, plus buildings erected
thereon from Araneta Inc. sometime in Feb. 1947 on installment basis.
They had to borrow money from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation
(RFC) to pay the installments (2 joint loans of P12,000 and P8,000
acquired on 1948 and 1952 respectively). In the deed of sale, the vendee
named is JULIA de REYES, with marital consent from Ponciano. The
transfer certificates in the Register of Deeds were also in her name. The
spouses built a house and camarin on the lots which were eventually
leased to Efren and Inocencia Mendoza (appellees) who transformed the
camarin into a movie house. November 1958, the Reyes spouses had to
ask for an extension of 5 years from the Devt Bank of the Phil
(successor of the RFC) for the payment of the money they borrowed, as
payment for the outstanding balance of the lots. On March 3, 1961, Julia
sold the lots to the Mendoza couple while Ponciano was in Pampanga,
attending to his farm. The couple aint cool with one another anymore.
The sale was made without the consent of Ponciano. the contract was
entered into using funds from the conjugal partnership, if the right of
redemption pertains to the wife, it may make the property redeemed, in
this case the damages, not conjugal. in this case however, since this
right of redemption was not proven, there remains a presumption that the
damages are part of the conjugal property. In the end, petitions were
dismissed. Transfer certificates were issued to Mendozas. Ponciano filed
a case in the CFI for the annulment of the sale. The Mendozas and Julia
allege that the lots were paraphernal properties of Julia, and the
purchase was done in good faith. The CFI ruled in favor of Julia and the
Mendozas. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision, declaring the
sale null and void with respect to the share of Julia to the lots in
question.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment debt could be satisfied from the
proceeds of the properties sold at the public auction.
RULING: It cannot. This is only on properties acquired during the
marriage. In this case, it is established that the property is paraphernal to
the wife alone. The court has previously stated that the construction of a
house at conjugal expense on the exclusive property of one of the
spouses does not automatically make it conjugal.
The ownership remains the same until the value is paid but payment can
only be demanded in the liquidation of the partnership. Since there was
no liquidation yet in the conjugal partnership of Nieves and Pascual, her
exclusive property cannot be made to answer for the liability of the other
defendant. While they may both use the building constructed in
paraphernal land, ownership is still with her until liquidation of
partnership pays for it.
FACTS: One May, Augusto abandoned his wife and children. On July 1,
1975, Augusto Yulo secured loan from BA Finance Corp. as evidenced
by a promissory note he signed in own behalf and as representative of
A&L industries which is managed by his wife, Lily Rulo whom he said
gave him authority to procure loan and sign the promissory note.
Augusto failed to pay loan. Thus BA Finance filed a complaint against
the spouses. Lily Yulo contended thought that they were already
separated when promissory note was executed, that her signature was
forged, and she was the sole proprietor of A&L and never gave Augusto
any authority to sign the promissory note and said business already
closed. Both the TC and CA dismissed petitioners complaint and
ordered them to pay Lily damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not Augusto and Lily can be made answerable for
obligations since it is part of the conjugal partnership of spouses.
RULING: No. While Augusto and Lily is part of conjugal property, it cant
be made liable since the obligation contracted by Augusto is not for the
benefit of the conjugal partnerships (Art 161 of CC). Evidenced by his
abandonment two months prior to when he contracted the promissory
note. Made it appear that wife gave him authority to procure such loan.
FACTS: On Oct. 31, 1989, Honorio Carlos issued a check worth $25k, in
the name of Pura Vallejo, against his personal account in Bankers Trust.
It was allegedly a loan to his daughter Maria Theresa and her husband
Manuel Abelardo for the purchadse of a house and lot from Vallejo in
order to help them in their married life. Vallejo issued an
acknowledgement receipt. The failure of the spouses to pay led Honorio
to formally demand the payment. Maria Theresa acknowledged their
debt to her father but claimed that it was payable on a staggered basis.
Despite this acknowledgement and the evidence of Honorios Banks
Trust Check (the one paid to Vallejo) and his formal demand, Manuel
denied the nature of the money as a loan. He claimed, instead, that the
amount given was his share in income from Honorios business, H. L.
Carlos Construction. He even presented 10 BPI checks against the
account of HLCC to prove that he had been receiving profit from HLCC.
However, he is not included in HLCCs Articles of Incorporation or
Organizational Profile as stockholder, officer, employee, or agent.
Nonetheless, it is undisputed that a check of $25k had been issued to
Vallejo against the personal account of Honorio and that the same was
received by the spouses and given to Vallejo for payment of a house and
lot that became their conjugal dwelling.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conjugal property should pay for the loan of
25, 000 even when acknowledgement was not signed by husband
RULING: Yes. Art 121 of FCC, conjugal partnership is liable for (1) debts
and obligations that benefit the conjugal partnership of gains made by
both the spouses or one of them but with the consent of the other (2)
debts and obligations that are without consent f one of the spouse but
their family has benefited. Evidence here shows that family did benefit
since they used the loan to buy the house which became their conjugal
home.
ISSUE: Whether or not the civil indemnities may be taken from the
offenders conjugal properties even before the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership and the liquidation of its assets.
RULING: Yes, the Civil Code provides that indemnities may be imposed
on the conjugal property of an offender when the offenders exclusive
properties are insufficient to cover the cost his indemnity. In this the law
does not contemplate that the conjugal partnership must be dissolved
and its assets liquidated before the indemnity is to be drawn. It merely
requires that the offending spouse repay the liabilities taken from the
conjugal partnership when such partnership is to be dissolved. However
it is a condition in the article that the indemnities collectible from the CPG
must not eat in to the funds for the maintenance of the family and the
education of the children as it would lead to injustice.
HELD: The sale is void. The wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership by
selling conjugal property without the consent of her husband.
FACTS: Dela Cruz began to live away from his wife and six children. He
never visited the conjugal home for three years.
HELD: The wife does not administer the conjugal property unless with
the consent of the husband. In the event of such maladministration by
the wife, the remedy of the husband doesnt lie in a judicial separation of
properties but in revoking the power granted to the wife and resume the
administration of the communal property & the conduct of the affairs of
the conjugal property.
FACTS: On Feb. 14, 1953 the Lacson spouses got married. On Jan. 9,
1963, Carmen (respondent) left their home in Bacolod to go to Manila.
On March 12, 1963, she filed a complaint for custody of children as well
as support in Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila. Before it
pushed through though they reached a settlement where the two eldest
kids would go to petitioner Alfonso and the youngest would stay with
Carmen and this was affirmed by the CFI. By May 7, 1963, respondent
filed a motion for the custody of all children be given to her in JDRC
since she said she only entered into agreement to gain custody of her
younger children and thus should be given custody of the older ones as
well who are all below 7 years old. The CA ruled that compromise
agreement as relating to custody of children should be declared null and
void and as such the execution of said judgment is void too.
FACTS: Lipana contracted two marriages: first with Maria Loreto Ancino
on 1930 and second with Isidra Gomez y Aquino on 1935. This while the
first marriage was still subsisting but Isidra didnt know. On Dec. 13,
1943, Lipana and Isidra purchased a piece of land in Cubao worth
P3,000. With the Torrens Title issued in Feb. 1, 1944 and named under
Joaquin Lipana married to Isidra Gomez. On July 20, 1958, Isidra died
intestate and childless, survived only by her sisters. By August 7, 1961,
Ofelia Gomez, judicial administratrix of Isidras estate prayed for the
forfeiture of the husbands share in the Cubao property in favor of the
estate relying on Art. 1417 of the Old Civil Code. The Trial Court ruled in
favor of the estate. Because the second marriage was void ab initio and
the husband was the one who gave cause for nullity
ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 1417 of the old Civil Code is applicable.
RULING: No. Since Lipanas first marriage hasnt been dissolved or
declared void, the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has
not ceased. Under the 2nd paragraph of Art. 1417, it is upon the
termination of the partnership by either of said causes that the forfeiture
of the guilty spouse takes place. When did the conjugal partnership
formed by virtue of 2nd marriage terminate? Only upon Isidras death in
1958. Art. 1417 was no longer in force, it is changed by NCC (took effect
1950. No action lies under Art. 1417 for the forfeiture of the husbands
share. It should recognize the right of second wife to her husband while
other half is conjugal partnership of first marriage. Thus decision is
reversed.
FACTS: Consuegra contracted two marriages. Upon his death, the two
wives wanted to get his retirement insurance benefits.
FACTS: Facts: Maning Yap married Talina Bianong in 1939 and they had
4 children. 2 of which died in infancy. Herein petitioners are the two
surviving children, Shirley and Jaime. While the first marriage was still
subsisting, Maning married Nancy on December 11, 1948. They had four
children. On February 21, 1964, Maning died because of a plane crash.
On March 3, 1964, Talina sought the issuance of letters of administration
for the estate of Maning. It was opposed by Nancy and her minor
children. Talina was initially appointed special administratrix and then
later Shirley Yap was appointed regular administratrix.
HELD: The equitable solution was for the two wives to each be given half
of the benefits. The first wife was the wife recognized by law. The second
wife, on the other hand, married Consuegra in good faith. It was also the
second wife and her children who were acknowledged beneficiaries of
the insurance.
HELD: Both marriages were void. The first marriage is void for lack of
marriage license. The second marriage is void for being bigamous.
Article 147 governs the first marriage while Article 148 governs the
second. One- half of the subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go
to the first wife as her share in the property regime, and the other half
pertaining to the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs, his children with
the first wife.
ISSUE: Whether the claimant and her children had the right to claim
death benefits of the deceased.
RULING: Yes. Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great
favor. If such relationship was not denied or contradicted, the
presumption of marriage must be admitted as fact. Public and open
cohabitation as husband and wife, birth certificate and baptismal
certificate were held as competent evidence. There is no evidence on
record that will overthrow the presumption of marriage. The marriage
certificate is enough proof of marriage. It is certified to be a true copy of
the original issued by the Local Civil registrar of City of Tacloban. The
provisions of the WCC must be interpreted in favor of laborers, WCC
being a social legislation aimed at protecting the rights of the
workingmen. WCC decision is set aside. Award is reinstated.
FACTS: Nov 2, 1982, Dr. Jorge Neri filed criminal complaint for adultery
against wife Ruby Neri with Eduardo Arroyo. This is witnessed by
Jabunan in Baguio. Motions of reconsideration filed by the accused party
were denied. On Aug 26 1991, Dr. Neri prayed case to be dismissed
since he consented to his wifes infidelity. Petitioners thus filed motions
for dismissal or grant new trial.
FACTS: The records show that on July 31, 1967, Pedro Gayon filed said
complaint against the spouses Silvestre Gayon and Genoveva de
Gayon, alleging substantially that, on October 1, 1952, said spouses
executed a deed copy of which was attached to the complaint, as
Annex A whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera, for the sum of P500.00,
a parcel of unregistered land therein described, and located in the barrio
of Cabubugan, municipality of Guimbal, province of Iloilo, including the
improvements thereon, subject to redemption within five (5) years or not
later than October 1, 1957; that said right of redemption had not been
exercised by Silvestre Gayon, Genoveva de Gayon, or any of their heirs
or successors, despite the expiration of the period therefor; that said
Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita Damaso had, by virtue of a deed of
sale copy of which was attached to the complaint, as Annex B
dated March 21, 1961, sold the aforementioned land to plaintiff Pedro
Gayon for the sum of P614.00; that plaintiff had, since 1961, introduced
thereon improvements worth P1,000; that he had, moreover, fully paid
the taxes on said property up to 1967; and that Articles 1606 and 1616 of
our Civil Code require a judicial decree for the consolidation of the title in
and to a land acquired through a conditional sale, and, accordingly,
praying that an order be issued in plaintiffs favor for the consolidation of
ownership in and to the aforementioned property. In her answer to the
complaint, Mrs. Gayon alleged that her husband, Silvestre Gayon, died
on January 6, 1954, long before the institution of this case; that Annex
A to the complaint is fictitious, for the signature thereon purporting to be
her signature is not hers; that neither she nor her deceased husband had
ever executed any document of whatever nature in plaintiffs favor; that
the complaint is malicious and had embarrassed her and her children;
that the heirs of Silvestre Gayon had to employ the services of counsel
for a fee of P500.00 and incurred expenses of at least P200.00; and that
being a brother of the deceased Silvestre Gayon, plaintiff did not exert
efforts for the amicable settlement of the case before filing his
complaint. She prayed, therefore, that the same be dismissed and that
plaintiff be sentenced to pay damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not pardon made by spouse after court ruled that one
is guilty of adultery can enable for a new trial to commence.
RULING: Pardon has to be given before criminal complaint has been
filed. Once the complaint has been filed, the control of the case passes
to the public prosecutor. In this case given after the trial court had
already rendered its decision dated 17 December 1987 finding
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt. In protection of family and
marriage as inviolable institution.
FACTS: CFI ordered Filemon Lucasan to pay 80k to Siari Valley for
damages and value of cattle. A writ of execution was issued. Sheriff
levied on lands of the defendant. The lands were sold to the highest
bidder. Lucasan files an opposition challenging the validity of the
execution since one of the lands auctioned was the land where he
extrajudicially constituted as the family home.
HELD: The family home is not exempt from liability. Modequillos house
and lot were constituted as a family home NOT under the NCC (by
judicial or extrajudicial means) but under the FC by operation of law
when the FC took effect on August 3, 1988. FC 162 provides that all
existing family residences at the time of the FCs effectivity are
considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to the family home under the FC. FC 162 has a prospective
application. Hence, his family home was constituted only on August 3,
1988 and not on 1969 when it was first occupied as a family home. The
accident took place on March 16, 1976 and the judgment became final
on Jan. 29, 1988, prior to the constitution of the family home in August.
Liability can thus be held against the family home.
RULING: No. The family home is exempt from execution EXCEPT when
a debt is incurred before the family home was registered (CC art 243).
The reason for this is to protect creditors from a debtor who may act in
bad faith by making such property a supposed family home for the sole
purpose of defeating the claim against him.
FACTS: Lucio Perido married twice during his lifetime. He died on 1942.
The children and grandchildren from his first and second marriages
executed a document entitled Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial
Partition where they would partition amongst themselves the estate of
Lucio. Eventually, the heirs from the first marriage backed out from said
partition. They now say that they are exclusive heirs of the estate since
ALL FIVE CHILDREN of LUCIO are illegitimate and have no succesional
rights. Heirs from the first marriage say that the first three children from
the second marriage are born before the first wife died in 1905, therefore
proving that they were born out of wedlock. The last two were also born
out of wedlock as testified by the heirs from the first marriage. The case
reached the SC, hence the instant case.
FACTS: Dominga Revuelta died on July 3, 1966, at the age of 92, with a
will leaving her properties to her three surviving children, namely,
Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel, all surnamed de la Puerta. Isabel was given
the free portion in addition to her legitime and was appointed executrix of
the will. The petition for the probate of the will filed by Isabel was
opposed by her brothers, who averred that their mother was already
senile at the time of the execution of the will and did not fully
comprehend its meaning. Moreover, some of the properties listed in the
inventory of her estate belonged to them exclusively. Meantime, Isabel
was appointed special administratrix by the probate court. Alfredo
subsequently died, leaving Vicente the lone oppositor. On November 20,
1981, Carmelita, having been allowed to intervene in the probate
proceedings, filed a motion for the payment to her of a monthly
allowance as the acknowledged natural child of Vicente de la Puerta. At
the hearing on her motion, Carmelita presented evidence to prove her
claimed status to which Isabel was allowed to submit counter-evidence.
FACTS: April 1971 when as Felicidad said, Galileo Trocio raped her
which begot a son, Jewel. She didnt immediately tell the police since
Trocio was threatening to have her alien husband and to tell authorities
that she was violating the Anti-Dummy Law in operation of her vocational
school. On Nov 1979, Felicidad filed case of disbarment against Atty.
Trocio. Trocio denied allegation of rape, only testifying that he dealt her
and her familys cases and said she was only doing this because he
declined on her request to increase his fee so that she may get the extra.
On Feb 13 1986,since Trocio failed to attend the hearings etc,, the
provincial fiscal of Lanao Del Norte, on prima facie evidence presented,
held Trocio administratively liable.
ISSUE: Whether or not law permits minor to adopt surname of the 2nd
husband of his mother and is there is justifiable reason exists to allow
change of name.
RULING: Regarding the first issue, RP said that through NCC 364
legitimate child should use the surname of his father. NCC 369 moreover
cites that in case of annulment, child conceived before such decree shall
use the surname of his/ her father. Likewise, same concept rules over
decree of divorce; therefore law does NOT sanction such change of
name. SC upheld such position, saying that confusion may arise with
respect to paternity and that said change may even redound to the
prejudice of the child. Moreover, the child is still a minor and therefore
aforesaid action is premature. Said child may in his mature age decide
for himself to instigate such change of name.
FACTS: Plaintiffs say that they are the legitimate children of the
defendant Pio Valencia in the latters lawful wedlock with plaintiff
Catalina Osmena. Defendants on the other hand are the illegitimate
children of defendant Pio Valencia with Emilia Rodriguez his commonlaw wife. Plaintiffs allege that they alone have the right to the surname
Valencia.
ISSUE: Whether or not the illegitimate children could use the surname
Valencia.
RULING: Yes. This cannot happen since if plaintiffs were correct then
they could stop numerous inhabitants from using the surname Valencia
as well. Moreover, Pio Valencia has acquiesced to this as well. Finally,
there is no law granting the exclusive ownership over a surname.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mariano is the legitimate son and can thus inherit
the land.
RULING: Yes. Art 108 of NCC Children born after the one hundred and
eighty days next following that of the celebration of marriage or within the
three hundred days next following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. Emiliano is presumed to be
legitimate sine he was born within 300 days following the dissolution of
marriage. Evidence did not show that Emiliano, even when he was sick
of tuberculosis, could not sexually perform so even if Maria was having
an affair even before eloping with Felix, it is still presumed that Mariano
is Emilianos son. As result the son is the legit heir and thus inherits the
land of his father.
ISSUE: Whether or not the death of a spouse after a final decree of legal
separation has effect on the legal separation.
RULING: The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation
has no effect on the legal separation. When the decree itself is issued,
the finality of the separation is complete after the lapse of the period to
appeal the decision to a higher court even if the effects, such as the
liquidation of the property, have not yet been commenced nor
terminated.
The law clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal separation
on the conjugal property. Therefore, upon the liquidation and distribution
conformably with the effects of such final decree, the law on intestate
succession should take over the disposition of whatever remaining
properties have been allocated to the deceased spouse.
Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final
decree. Article 106 of the Civil Code, now Article 63 of the Family Code
provides the effects of the decree of legal separation. These legal effects
ipso facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable incident of the
judgment decreeing legal separation, for the purpose of determining the
share of each spouse in the conjugal assets.
FACTS: Jao filed petition for recognition and support against Perico.
Based on the Blood Grouping Test, Janice could not have been the
possible offspring of Perico.
HELD: Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already
been done with their education by the time of the promulgation of this
decision, we deem it proper to award support pendente lite in arrears.
FACTS: Chua Keng Giap filed on May 19, 1983, a petition for the
settlement of the estate of the late Sy Kao in the regional trial court of
Quezon City. He claims that he is the son of Chua Bing Guan and Sy
Kao. The private respondent, moved to dismiss for lack of a cause of
action and of the petitioner's capacity to file the petition. No cause of
action because he is not the son of the abovementioned couple as
testified by the mother herself.
FACTS: Violeta is claiming to be the only child of the late Dra Esperanza
Cabatbat.
Respondent contends res judicata: The latter, it was claimed, had been
declared as not the son of the spouses Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao in
S.P. No. Q-12592, for the settlement of the estate of the late Chua Bing
Guan. And also the mothers testimonials, SY Kua herself testified that
she is not her son. Petitioner contends paternity and not the maternity of
the petitioner is to be decided. Therefore, the testimony of the mother
should not be credited.
ISSUE: Whether or not Chua Keng Giap is the son of Chua Bing and Sy
Kua.
RULING: Yes. Who better than Sy Kao herself would know of Chua
Keng Giap was really her son? More than anyone else, it was Sy Kao
who could say - as indeed she has said these many years - that Chua
Keng Giap was not begotten of her womb. Petition Denied.
HELD: Factual findings indicate that child is not born of the deceased;
she is only a ward (ampon) without formal adoption proceedings. The
action is not impugning legitimacy since the claim is not that child is
illegitimate but that she is not the decedent's child at all.
FACTS: Corazon Garcia was married to Ramon Yulo. William Liyao, Sr.
was married to Juanita Tanhoti Liyao. Corazon cohabited with Liyao and
begot a son. Son claims that he is the illegitimate child of Liyao, Sr.
FACTS: Private respondent filed with the CFI for order compelling the
petitioner Irene Reyes a.k.a. Irene Ramero to execute a deed of
reconveyance on several props to the respondent. Respondent allege
that petitioner acquired the props in question through fraud, deceit and
misrepresentation by registering herself as the sole child of decedent
Franciscoo Delgado and thus entitled to inherit. Respondent who are the
sisters and brother of the decedent claim otherwise since they allege the
petitioner was born during the legal marriage of her mother Genoveva
Ramero and the latters husband Justino Reyes. Petitioner claims that
she was the fruit of the cohabitation b/w her mother and the decedent
during the time subsequent to the separation of her mother with Justino
Reyes. She also claims continuous possession of the status of
illegitimate child since she mentions that decedent supported her
financially through her education. CFI rules against respondent
dismissing the order for reconveyance. Respondent appeal to CA which
rules in their favor reversing the CFI declaring that the TCTs of the
petitioner on the said props are null and void. CA rules that though
petitioner was a spurious child of the decedent she was never
recognized and thus cannot inherit. In her motion for reconsideration w/
the CA petitioner cites how she was in fact acknowledged by the
decedent as proven by the latters consent noted on the petition marriage
certificate.
HELD: The law favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the
child. Liyao, Jr. cannot choose his own filiation. If Corazons husband,
Yulo, does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the
child is fixed and the child cannot choose to be the child if his mothers
alleged paramour.
ISSUE: Whether or not actions of the father and his family imply
recognition of plaintiffs status as an acknowledged natural child.
FACTS: Lim and Uy are both alleging that they are heirs of deceased
Susana.
RULING: The fact that the plaintiffs, as natural children of Martin Ramos,
received shares in the estate implies that they were acknowledged.
Obviously, defendants Agustin and Granada Ramos, and the late Jose
Ramos accorded successional rights to the plaintiffs because Martin
Ramos and members of his family had treated them as his children.
Presumably, that fact was well known in the community. Under the
circumstances, Agustin Ramos and Granada Ramos and the heirs of
Jose Ramos are estopped from attacking plaintiffs status as
acknowledged natural children.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
FACTS:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
ISSUE:
RULING:
RULING:
FACTS:
HELD: In the first place, the consent required by Article 281 of a person
of age who has been voluntarily recognized may be given expressly or
tacitly. Assuming then that Ligaya was of age at the time of her voluntary
recognition, the evidence shows that she has in fact consented thereto.
Her consent to her recognition is not only implicit from her failure to
impugn it at any time before her mother's death, but is made clearly
manifest and conclusive by her assertion of that recognition in the judicial
proceeding for the settlement of her mother's estate as basis for her
rights thereto. Assuming on the other hand, that she was a minor at the
time of her recognition, and therefore judicial approval of the recognition
was necessary, the absence thereof was cured by her ratification of that
recognition, after having reached the age of majority, by her initiation of
the proceedings for the settlement of her deceased mother's estate on
the claim precisely that she was the decedent's acknowledged natural
daughter. The requirement of judicial approval imposed by Article 281 is
clearly intended for the benefit of the minor. "The lack of judicial approval
can not impede the effectivity of the acknowledgment made. The judicial
approval is for the protection of the minor against any acknowledgment
made to his prejudice." "Therefore, the lack, or insufficiency of such
approval is NOT a defect available to the recognizing parent but one
which the minor may raise or waive. If after reaching majority the minor
consents to the acknowledgment, the lack of judicial approval should
make no difference. Implied consent to the acknowledgment may be
shown (e.g.,) by such acts as keeping, even after reaching the age of
majority, the acknowledgment papers and the use of the parent's
surname.
ISSUE:
RULING:
FACTS: Concepcion Dimen noticed that the stomach of her 22-year old
mongoloid sister was bigger than usual. She discovered that she was
pregnant. Felicidad revealed that Rizo, the husband of her yaya had
intercourse with her in the bodega. Rizo admitted that he had sexual
intercourse with Felicidad. On October 22, 1986, Felicidad delivered a
baby. Rizo did not confirm nor deny that he had sexual intercourse with
her but filed a motion to dismiss claiming insufficiency of evidence. RTC
found Felicidad to be a competent witness and rendered judgment
against the accused. RTC also ordered Rizo to recognize the offspring
as his legitimate son despite the fact that Rizo is a married man.
HELD: Article 283 (1) of the Civil Code of the Philippines provide iIn any
of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his
natural child: (1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the
period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception;
In the case at bar, the record shows that conception had occurred at or
about the time that rape been inflicted upon Filomena by the accused, or
more particularly, within 120 days from the commission of the offense. 19
The acknowledgment required of the accused by the trial court should be
understood to be acknowledgment merely of the filiation of the child; the
accused being a married man could not sire an illegitimate natural child,
20 a status which in any event is no longer recognized under the Family
Code of the Philippines.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
ISSUE:
RULING:
FACTS: This case is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed with this
court over the person of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. Mino was
born on Feb. 14, 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina
Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife. Respondents offered
the child for adoption to Gina Carreons sister and brother in law, the
petitioners. Petitioner spouses took care and custody of the child when
she was barely 2 weeks old. An affidavit of Consent to the adoption of
the child by herein petitioners was also executed by respondent Gina.
The appropriate petition for adoption was filed by petitioenrs over the
child. RTC rendered a decision granting the petition. Angelie Anne
Fajardo was changed to Cervantes. Sometime in March or April 1987,
petitioners received a letter from respondents demanding to be paid
P150,000, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused
to accede to the demand. On Sept. 11, 1987: respondent Gina took the
child from her yaya at the petitioners residence on the pretext that she
was instructed to do so by her mother. Gino brought the child to her
house. Petitioners demanded the return of the child but Gina refused
HELD: The notice for correction of entry must also be published. While
there was notice given by publication, it was only a notice for adoption.
The local civil registrar, an indispensible party to the case was not
notified. Thus correction of entry must not be granted.
FACTS: Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes filed petition for adoption of
Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos on June 4, 1949. With their parents
whereabouts unknown, their current guardian, Crisanto de Mesa gave
his written consent, Paulina being 14 years old likewise gave consent.
Hence, Court granted petition. On Oct 21, 1957, Juliana dies, Simplicio
files for settlement of intestate estate including Paulina and Aurora as
surviving heirs. Gregoria Aranzanso, alleges that she is the first cousin of
Juliana files an opposition to the petition, stating that Simplicios
marriage to Juliana was bigamous and thus void and that the adoption of
Paulina and Aurora were void for there is no written consent from natural
parents. Demetria Ventura, alleging also that she is the first cousin of
Juliana and adding that she is the mother of Paulina Santos, likewise
files as opposition. The CFI says that validity of adoption cannot be
attacked collaterally, CA however REVERSES and declares that the
adoption is void for lack of written consent. Petitioners file for preliminary
injunction against the CA orders and the Court grants it hence this
petition by the respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision w/c granted
the petition in favor of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles.
RULING: No. Though Dioscoro was not named as a petitioner, he did
provide written consent that he himself actually joined his wife in
adopting the child, which is sufficient to make him a petitioner. The future
of the child must not be compromised by insistence of rigid adherence to
procedural rules. Adoption statutes are liberally construed to carry out
the beneficent purposes of the adoption institutions and to protect the
child. Welfare of the child is of paramount consideration. The rights
concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption will be for the
best interest of the child. The CA found the following in the petition and
correctly approved the adoption: Natural parents gave consent / DSWD
recommended approval / Trial court approved / Written consent of
adopting parents
FACTS: pouses Ernesto and Matilde Magat reared as their own child
Roy Sumintac, who is their nephew, from his birth until the spouses went
to Guam to work when the boy was already four years old. They
petitioned the court to allow them to adopt Roy, but the trial court denied
this, on the ground that they are non-residents of the Philippines and that
the trial custody as required under P.D. No. 603 cannot be effected.
They went to the Supreme Court to have the decision reviewed.
FACTS: A 3-year old baby was given by his unwed mother to Atty.
Velasquez. Atty. Velasquez then gave consent for the Duncan spouses
to adopt the child.
FACTS: Spousess Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano were legally
separated. The brother and sister-in-law of Clavano wanted to adopt the
3 children of the spouses Cang. Their 14-year old son signed the petition
for adoption along with Clavano.
HELD: Atty. Velasquez is the proper party required to give consent to the
adoption. The fathers consent is not required because the child is
illegitimate. The mothers consent is not necessary either, because she
is deemed to have abandoned the child and has given the child to Atty.
Velasquez for guardianship. (NB: If under RA8552, Velasquez is not a
proper party. Provision says legal guardian)
HELD: The adoption may not be granted. Cangs consent as the father is
necessary. Despite the fact that Cang abandoned his children, it was
proven that he continued to send support for the family from the US. It
was mere physical estrangement that existed. Cang did not manifest a
settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental
claims over his children as to constitute abandonment.
ISSUE:
FACTS: On June 19, 1986, the Gordons sought to adopt the minor,
Anthony Gandhi O. Custodio, a natural son of Adoracion Custodio. On
the date of hearing, nobody appeared to oppose the Petition, OSG failed
to send any representative for the State. Evidence established that the
Gordons (British spouse) are allowed by their home country to adopt
foreign babies specifically from the Republic of the Philippines. The
husband is employed at the Dubai Hilton International Hotel as Building
Superintendent therefore financially secured. Anthony's mother,
Adoracion Custodio, had given her consent to the adoption realizing that
her child would face a brighter future. The Case Study Report submitted
by the Social Worker of the Trial Court gave a favorable recommendation
as the natural mother thought of the best for her 1yr 2mos child. Trial
Court declared Anthony the truly and lawfully adopted child of the
Gordons. The Gordons wrote MSSD for a travel clearance for Anthony
on 8/11/86 but MSSD opposed even if subpoenaed, saying that the
Report of the Court Social Worker and that of the Pastor of the
International Christian Church of Dubai cannot take the place of a report
of the MSSD or a duly licensed child placement agency. And that there is
a required six-month trial custody, which had not been met nor were the
reasons therefor given as required by Article 35 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code (P.D. No. 603). Contended also that the Gordons had
given P10,000.00 to the natural mother, which is reflective of the
undesirable attitude of the Gordons to shop for children as if they were
shopping for commodities. Under the Muslim Law (Dubai), Anthony
cannot inherit from the adopting parents. The Gordons had filed another
petition for adoption of a baby girl before the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 94, on 24 June 1986 but because she died a month
later they tried to pass off another child to whom they gave the same
name and represented that she was the very same girl they were
adopting. There being no Memorandum of Agreement between Dubai
and the Philippines there is no guarantee that the adopted child will not
be sold, exchanged, neglected or abused.
RULING:
foreigners whose livelihood was earned abroad. And that the Decision
had become final and executory.
The Trial Court relied on the Resolution of this Court in Administrative
Matter No. 85-2-7136-RTC denying the request of the MSSD for a
Supreme Court Circular to all Regional Trial Court and the ruling in
Bobanovic vs. Hon. Montes "In refusing to grant the travel clearance
certificate, respondent MSSD discounts and negates the effects of a
valid and final judgment of the Court regarding which no appeal had
even been taken from (Bobanovic vs. Hon. Montes G.R. L-71370, July 7,
1986)." The 10,000.00 given by Gordon spouses was only a financial
assistance to the natural mother of the child. The spouses also would
want to adopt a baby girl but upon learning that shes mongoloid, they
turned her over to International Alliance for Children, where she
unfortunately died. And finally, Muslim Laws shall not apply to them, they
being Britons.
FACTS: A Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed with this court over the
person of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. Mino was born on Feb. 14,
1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are
common-law husband and wife. Respondents offered the child for
adoption to Gina Carreons sister and brother in law, the petitioners.
Petitioner spouses took care and custody of the child when she was
barely two weeks old. An affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child
by herein petitioners was also executed by respondent Gina. The
appropriate petition for adoption was filed by petitioners over the child.
The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision granting the petition.
Angelie Anne Fajardo, now Cervantes. Sometime in March or April 1987,
petitioners received a letter from respondents demanding to be paid
P150,000, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused
to accede to the demand. On Sept. 11, 1987, respondent Gina took the
child from her yaya at the petitioners residence on the pretext that she
was instructed to do so by her mother. Gino brought the child to her
house. The petitioners demanded the return of the child but Gina
refused.
FACTS: On the evening of October 13, 1906, Dr. Arturo Pelayo was
called to the house of Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella. He was asked
to give birth to their daughter-in-law. He assisted in the delivery of the
child and was kept occupied until the next day. He valued his fee at P500
but Marcelo and Juana refused to pay without reason. On November 23,
1906, a Complaint by Pelayo against Lauron and Abella for collection of
money was filed. Lauron and Abella contends that that their son and his
wife lived independently from them and in a separate house and that if
she did stay in their house that night, it was due to fortuitous
circumstances. They also allege that their daughter-in-law had died due
to the childbirth. On April 5, 1907, the Regional Trial Court held Lauron
and Abella absolved from the complaint due to lack of sufficient evidence
to establish a right of action against them.
FACTS: Feliciano Sanchez married Josefa Diego and had a child Mario
Sanchez. On 1932 Feliciano refused to support Josefa and Mario and
then abandoned them. Josefa and Mario have no means of subsistence.
Feliciano receives a monthly pension of P174.20 from US Army. Josefa
Diego and Mario Sanchez sought monthly allowance for support and
support pendente lite against Feliciano Sanchez. Feliciano contends that
Josefa had an affair with Macario Sanchez which resulted to Mario
Sanchez. Also that on October 27, 1930, Josefa abandoned the conjugal
home. And as the illegitimate child of Josefa with Macario, Mario is not
entitled to his support. He asked for an opportunity to adduce evidence in
support of this defense which Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals
denied
FACTS: On January 18, 1958, Manuel J. C. Reyes married Celia IlustreReyes and had children. On March 10, 1976, Manuel attacked Celia by
fist blows, bumping her head against the cement floor, pushing her down
the 13-flight stairs and hitting her in the abdomen that floored her half
unconscious. By May 11, 1976, she left their office. On May 26, 1976,
she returned to get her overnight bag and Manuel demanded that she
get out but she ignored him, hence, he doused her with grape juice,
kicked her and attempted to hit her with a steel tray but was stopped by
her driver. On June 3, 1976, Celia Ilustre-Reyes filed against Manuel J.
C. Reyes an action for support pendente lite, and for Legal Separation
when he had attempted to kill her. Manuel contends that Celia committed
adultery with her physician and that she is thus not entitled to support
and if she was, the assigned amount of P4000 by the Court was
excessive
FACTS: Unson and Araneta were married on April 19, 1971. Maria
Teresa, their child would stay with petitioner during school days and
spend weekends with her mother but her mother wouldn't even bother to
pick her up during non-school days. During early part of 1978, Unson
found out that Araneta has been living with her brother in law Reyes.
Reyes and Araneta later beget two kids and later embraced a protestant
sect. Petitioner contends that Maria Teresa was born and reared under
the Roman Catholic faith and should not be exposed to an environment
alien to the Catholic way of life which is the upbringing and training her
father is committed to. Araneta claims that they had an amicable
arrangement and no specific terms were agreed and stipulated upon by
her and Unson regarding custody of the child and that Maria Teresa was
always allowed to visit and to be picked up at any time by petitioner's
parents. She admits her present circumstances at first impression might
seem socially if not morally unacceptable but Maria Teresa has been
reared and brought up in an atmosphere of Christian love, affection and
honesty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the custody of the child should be given to the
mother.
RULING. No. It is in the best interest of the child to be freed from the
obviously unwholesome, not say immoral influence, that the situation in
which Araneta has placed herself might create in the moral and social
outlook of Teresa who is now in her formative and most impressionable
stage in her life. She might start getting ideas about the peculiar
relationship of her mother with her own uncle-in-law.
The Court has no alternative than to grant Araneta no more than visitorial
rights over the child. Anyway, decisions even of the SC on the custody of
minor children are open to adjustment as the circumstances relevant to
the matter may demand in the light of the inflexible criterion.
FACTS: Spouses filed a case with the RTC for damages on the death of
their son Dominador Palisoc inside Manila Technical Institute grounds
(laboratory room) against defendants Antonio C. Brillantes (member of
the Board of Directors), Teodosio Valenton (the President), Santiago M.
Quibulue (instructor of the class), and Virgilio L. Daffon (co-student and
assailant of Palisoc). The death of the victim was believed to have been
caused by the heavy fist blows to the body which he had incurred from a
fight with Daffon which damaged his internal organs. The lone witness to
the event, Desiderio Cruz, attested that he and Daffon were fixing a
machine while the victim was looking on. After a snide comment by
Daffon regarding his inaction, the victim slapped him which started the
fight. Daffon then retaliated with fist blows to the body. After which
Palisoc fell down and fainted after which he was brought to the hospital
where he later died from his injuries. The TC found Daffon guilty for the
quasi delict under Article 2176 of the NCC but absolved the other
defendants from liability under Article 2180 of the NCC. The court cited
that the damages to incurred in the case would not be on the defendant
from MTI since Article 2180 of the New Civil Code contemplated a
situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the
control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents.
ISSUE: Whether or not Delfin can be held jointly and severally liable with
his son Dante for damages resulting from the death of Isidro caused by
the negligent act of his minor son Dante.
RULING: Article 1903, 1st and 5th paragraphs: The father, and, in case
of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused
by minor children who live with them. Teachers and directors of arts
and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody.
The 5th paragraph only applies to an institution of arts and trades and
not to any academic educational institution. Hence, neither the head of
the school, nor the city schools supervisor, could be held liable for the
negligent act of Dante because he was not then a student of an
institution of arts and trades as provided by law.
The civil liability imposed upon the father and mother for any damages
that may be caused by the minor children is a necessary consequence of
the parental authority they exercise over them, which imposes upon
parents the duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company,
educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means, while,
on the other hand, gives them the right to correct and punish them in
moderation. The only way to relieve them is if they prove that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family. The defendants
failed to do.
ISSUE: Whether or not under the factual findings, the trial court erred in
absolving the defendants-school officials from civil liability under Art.
2180 of the NCC.
RULING: Yes, the SC held the lower court erred in its application of Art.
2180 in as much as they misconstrued the phrase 'so long as they (the
student) remain in their (the schools) custody, to mean that the school
incurs liability for a students actions only if the student actually boards or
resides w/ them (a case where their influence over the student
supersedes that of the parents(as held in Mercado vs. Court of
Appeals)), to counter this the SC held that the mentioned phrase actually
implied that liability arises not from the boarding of the student w/ the
school but from the protective and supervisory custody that the school
and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as
long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. As
such being that the offense occurred in school premises during class
time within the supervision of the school. They should be held liable
under 2180 unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in
compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by
"(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage." which they did not do.
ISSUE: Whether or not they should be held liable now that the semester
had ended when the incident happened.
RULING: No and the petition is hereby denied. Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code states that: Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody. There
have been cases in the past where who was liable would depend on w/n
the school was academic or non-academic. If it were academic, the
teacher-in-charge of the student would be liable, while if it were nonacademic, the head would be. (The ratio of this being that heads of
schools of arts and trade would be closer and more involved with their
students, who can be considered their apprentices.) The Court believes
that this provision should apply to ALL schools, academic and nonacademic. Even if the student was within the school grounds and
basically doing nothing, he is still within the school custody and subject
to the discipline of school authorities. However, in the case at bar, none
of the respondents can be clearly said to have been responsible for what
happened to Amadora. The school itself cannot be held directly liable
because according to the provision, it is only either the teacher-in-charge
or the head of the school. The rector, dean of boys or the high school
principal also may not be held liable because it is clear that they are not
teachers-in-charge. Alfredos physics teacher cannot be held liable
because he was not necessarily the teacher-in-charge of Daffon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can be held solidarily liable with
Jimmy Abon for damages under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
RULING: No. Even if Abon was enrolled in BCF, the incident was around
8 pm, Jimmy Abon was supposed to be in the ROTC office at that time,
as ordered by his Commandant, Ungos. Abon could not have been in the
custody of the school at the time, as he was under direct orders to have
been somewhere else. IAC decision is reversed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the LC erred in ordering the minor to stay with
the respondent.
RULING: No, petition dismissed. While the law recognizes the right of
parent to the custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the basic
principle that "in all questions on the care, custody, education and
property of children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount" (NCC Art.
363), and that for compelling reasons, even a child under seven may be
ordered separated from the mother. The right of parents to the company
and custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper discharge of
parental duties to provide the children with adequate support, education,
moral, intellectual and civic training and development (Civil Code, Art.
356). As remarked by the Court below, petitioner Zenaida Medina proved
remiss in these sacred duties; she not only failed to provide the child with
love and care but actually deserted him, with not even a visit, in his
tenderest years, when he needed his mother the most.
FACTS: When plaintiffs were minors, their mother sold parcels of land
whose title was under their names.
FACTS: Pacita Chua worked as a hostess and lived with Chua Ben in
1950. They had a child but died in infancy. She then cohabited with Sy
Sia Lay, with Robert and Betty Chua Sy as fruits. After Bettys birth, they
separated. She then became Victor Tan Villareals mistress in 1960, a
girl was born to her but then they separated and she gave the child away
to a comadre in Cebu. On May1958, Bartolome Cabangbang and his
wife, who were then childless, acquired custody of Betty, who was then
four months old. They had her baptized as Grace Cabangbang. On how
Cabangbangs acquired Betty: according to Pacita, it was Villareal during
their cohabitation, who gave Betty to Cabangbangs (for favors Villareal
received). She only knew of such when Betty was three years old and
was brought to her by Villareal, who then returned Betty to the
Cabangbangs due to threats. The Cabangbangs say they found her
wrapped in bundles at their gates and then treated her as their own, and
that only when Betty/Grace was 5 years old that the controversy
arose.
Trial Court said that Betty was given to Cabangbangs by Villareal but
with knowledge and consent from Pacita. Pacita demanded the custody
of the child. Respondents were the Cabangbangs and Villareal. A writ
was issued by court but the body of child was not produced. The Trial
court eventually ruled that for the welfare of the child, she should remain
in the custody of the Cabangbangs
ISSUE: Whether or not the child should be with Pacita.
RULING: No. Article 363 of the New Civil Code say that minor under
seven years of age shall not be separated from mother, but issue is now
moot as Grace is already 11. The courts may, in cases specified by law,
deprive parents of their [parental] authority." And there are indeed valid
reasons, as will presently be expounded, for depriving the petitioner of
parental authority over the minor Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang.
Petitioner did not at all - not ever - report to the authorities the alleged
disappearance of her daughter, and had not been taken any step to see
the child when she allegedly discovered that she was in the custody of
the Cabangbangs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the two childrens prayer to drop their fathers
surname is justified.
RULING: No. Following the New Civil Code Art. 364, since Junior and
Bombi are legitimate children, therefore they should use their fathers
surname. Said minors and their father should be consulted about such,
mothers desire should not only be the sole consideration. Change of
name is allowed only upon proper and reasonable cause (Rule 103 Sec
5 ROC). Change of name may even redound to the prejudice of the
children later on, may cause confusion as to the minors parentage and
might also create the impression that said minors are illegitimate
children, which is inconsistent with their legal status. In Oshita v.
Republic and in Alfon v. Republic, their petition to change names have
been granted, but petitioners in said cases have already attained mature
age. In this case, when these minors have attained the right age, then
they can already file said action for themselves.
FACTS: Atanacia Llaneta was married with Serafin Ferrer whom she had
a child named Victoriano Ferrer. Serafin died and about four years later
Atanacia had a relationship with another man out of which Teresita
Llaneta, herein petitioner, was born. All of them lived with Serafins
mother in Manila. Teresita was raised in the household of the Ferrers
using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealing even her school records.
She then applied for a copy of her birth certificate in Sorsogon as it is
required to be presented in connection with a scholarship grant.
Subsequently, she discovered that her registered surname was Llaneta
and that she was the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown
father. She prayed to have her name changed from Teresita Llaneta to
Teresita Llaneta Ferrer since not doing so would result in confusion
among persons and entities she dealt with and would entail endless and
vexatious explanations of the circumstances.
ISSUE: Whether the adopted child can use the surname of adopters
husband.
RULING: No, because only Isabel adopted Ana, only her surname can
be used by the child.
NCC 341 (4): Adopted minor is entitled to use the adopters
surname.
The husband of Isabel did not join in the adoption, his consent to the
adoption did not have the effect of making him an adopting father.
Hence, his surname cannot be used because it would give the wrong
impression that he adopted Ana also and wrongly entitle Ana to the
status of his legitimate child under NCC 341 (1).
But why Valdes despite her marriage to Johnston? Because Valdes
remains to be as her own surname. Use of the surname of the husband
is only an addition to the surname of the wife and it does not change the
latter. NCC 370 (1) allows a married woman to add to her surname her
husband's surname but she has a surname of her own to which her
husband's surname may only be added if she so chooses.
FACTS: Corazon Legamia lived with Emilio N. Reyes for 19 years from
November 8, 1955 to September 26, 1974, when Emilio died. During
their live-in arrangement they produced a boy who was named Michael
Raphael Gabriel L. Reyes. He was born on October 18, 1971.
From the time Corazon and Emilio lived together until the latters death,
Corazon was known as Corazon L. Reyes; she styled herself as Mrs.
Reyes; and Emilio introduced her to friends as Mrs. Reyes.
Emilio was Branch Claim Manager Naga Branch, of the Agricultural
Credit Administration when he died. On October 29, 1974, or shortly after
Emilios death, Corazon filed a letter in behalf of Michael with the
Agricultural Credit Administration for death benefits. The letter was
signed Corazon L. Reyes. The voucher evidencing payment of
Michaels claim in the amount of P2,648.76 was also signed Corazon L.
Reyes.
For using the name Reyes although she was not married to Emilio,
Felicisima Reyes who was married to Emilio filed a complaint which led
to Corazons prosecution.
HELD: It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent
herself as the wife and use the name of the man she is living with despite
the fact that the man is married to another woman. The practice, to be
sure, is not encouraged but neither is it unduly frowned upon. A number
of women can be Identified who are living with men prominent in political,
business and social circles. The woman publicly holds herself out as the
mans wife and uses his family name blithely ignoring the fact that he is
not her husband. And yet none of the women has been charged of
violating the C.A. No. 142 because ours is not a bigoted but a tolerant
and understanding society. It is in the light of our cultural environment
that the law must be construed.
In the case at bar, Corazon had been living with Emilio for almost 20
years. He introduced her to the public as his wife and she assumed that
role and his name without any sinister purpose or personal material gain
in mind. She applied for benefits upon his death not for herself but for
Michael who as a boy of tender years was under her guardianship.
Surely, the lawmakers could not have meant to criminalize what Corazon
had done especially because some of them probably had their own
Corazons.
FACTS: On October 31, 1979, Capt. Julio J. Lucero, Jr. was appointed
as captain of the ship EASTERN MINICON of eastern shipping lines.
Under the contract, his employment was good for one (1) round trip only,
meaning the contract would automatically terminate upon arrival of the
vessel at the Port of Manila, unless renewed. It was further agreed that
part of the captain's salary, while abroad, should be paid to Mrs.
Josephine Lucero, his wife, in Manila.
FACTS: HC served over the body of Vitaliana Vargas who allegedly died
on the 28th of august 1988 but was only made known to the courts on
September of 1988 after the HC petition of Vitalianas brothers and
sisters, with the allegation that Tomas Eugenio unduly took away their
sister sometime in 1987 and made her reside in his palacial residence in
Misamis Oriental. Tomas Eugenio was arguing that HC should not
govern the dead body, and besides he was already (allegedly) able to
secure a burial permit to bury her at the grounds of PBCM of which he is
the head. The brothers and sisters of Vitaliana were arguing that Tomas
doesnt belong to the list of persons who are mandated by the law
(According to NCC 305 and 308) to bury her (he being just a commonlaw husband, therefore lawfully has no relations with her).
ISSUE: Whether or not the brothers and sisters are the lawful custodians
of her body (right to bury the deceased)
RULING: Yes. Supreme Court decided for the sisters and brothers of
Vitaliana, given that Tomas was just the common-law husband of the
deceased. The right to bury her therefore remains on the nearest kin of
Vitaliana, who are the respondents herein.
FACTS: Ramon Tan Biana, Jr. was born on January 9, 1952 in Nueva
Vizcaya as the fifth legitimate child of his parents. The nurse erroneously
reported to the Local Civil Registrar that his and his parents' citizenship
as Chinese instead of Filipino. He now claims that he and his parents are
Filipino citizens. Copies were furnished to the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal, the Office of the Solicitor General and the Local Civil Registrar.
Copy of the notice of hearing was posted and it was also published in a
newspaper of general circulation published once a week for three
consecutive weeks. The TC then proceeded to receive evidence for the
petitioner with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal representing the
Government.
ISSUE: Whether or not the name of Mary Pang can be changed to Mary
Pang De la Cruz.
RULING: No. Firstly, the republic pointed out that the petition to change
the name did not include Mary Pang but only May Sia and Manman
Huang. The omission of her other alias "Mary Pang" in the captions of
the court's order and of the petition defeats the purpose of the
publication. The general rule is that a change of name should not be
permitted if it will give a false impression of family relationship to another
where none actually exists. Furthermore, Mary Pang is the only one who
can pray for the change of her name. This cannot be done by her mother
for her.
ISSUE: Whether or not Emperatriz can change her civil status from
married to single in Victorias birth certificate.
RULING: No. The petition for correction of entries in the civil registry
does not only involve the correction of petitioner Labayo's name and
surname registered as "Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayo in the birth
certificates of her children. The petition also seeks the change of her
status from "married" to "not married" at the time of her daughter's birth,
thereby changing the status of her child Victoria Miclat from "legitimate"
to "illegitimate." The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents
would be substantially impaired if her status would be changed from
"legitimate" to "illegitimate." Moreover, she would be exposed to
humiliation and embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an
illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter.