Sean Hu

AP US Government and Politics

Mr. Gareth Manning
December 2, 2015
Military-Industrial Complex: The Iron Triangle of US Politics
Question: How can the underlining principles of the iron triangle in US politics be used to explain the
military-industrial complex?
With two firm grips on the sides of a podium and donning a masked face of solemn concern, President
Dwight D. Eisenhower delivered his farewell address that bore the warning against a foreboding threat.
While the remnants of his speech have mostly been lost in the piles of other great orations, one sentence
struck the world and remains unforgotten in the political community:
In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence,
whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.
From this statement, Eisenhower coined the term Military-Industrial Complex but the phrase itself fit into
a larger doctrine. In United States politics, the Iron Triangle is used to describe the relationship between
the legislative committees, interest groups, and bureaucratic bodies that exists to reap mutual benefits.
The Military-Industrial Complex (MIC) is a form of this special alliance established on the premise of a
reciprocal buildup. The legislative branchs power for designating appropriations in military expenditures,
the interest groups vast human resources and financial prowess, and the bureaucratic bodies continuation
of arms purchasing and funding for research and development can be used to reap collective advantages in
such areas including re-election in office, economic gains, and an ever-expanding military force,
respectively. It therefore, sees an inseparable bond between these three units that have garnered an
endless, expanding cycle of repeated reinforcement through the processes as described previously,
characteristic of an Iron Triangle.
This paper seeks to explain this connection by first, defining key terms on the related subject; second,
providing an overview of the military-industrial complex; third, explain the roles of each side of the
underlying Triangle in the examined relationship; fourth, uncover the benefits that is offered to each
throughout the process; and finally, applying the concepts through a case study of the Iraq War.

Section 1: Definitions
To begin, the idea of the Iron Triangle
in the United States, as defined above, is
held together by three forces, hence the
name, and they are: the Congress, interest
groups, and bureaucratic bodies. As
summed by the visual to the right, they
collaborate in order to obtain mutual
benefits; the arrows pointing away show
how each contributes to the relationship
and those pointed towards it labels what
they receive in return. The Congress, the legislative body in the case of the United States, allows or blocks
certain appropriations or funding and pass legislations in the interest of its two other benefactors. Certain
subcommittees such as the Congressional Committee on Armed Services, which overlooks the Department
of Defense, are also tied in. The interest groups often represent the private corporations and industries that
prosper from the policies implemented by the other two such as lowering regulations that restricts
production. Their primary method of reciprocation is through electoral or congressional support that would
be conducted by lobbyists. Defense contractors that specifically work alongside the military are also
considered part of the interest group category. Lastly, the bureaucracy is the set of appointed, officials that
function to implement laws of the state, as directed by the executive branch. The Pentagon is the chief
bureaucratic body in the military-industrial complex. Among other groups that branch out of the
government are the Department of Defense and Department of Justice. The military-industrial complex fits
into the context of an Iron Triangle because it describes the advantages that could be gained from the
intertwined relationship of the United States military, industrial corporations, and Congress.
A crucial notion that the military-industrial complex revolves around is militarismthat is, military
establishment as an end in itself as opposed to utilizing military forces to achieve political, economic, or
territorial gains outside its country (Hossein-zadeh pg. 12, 2006). As man with a military background,
Eisenhower was all for the latter but was still against the idea of militarism, an attitude he pointed to time

and again in his farewell address, not only with his warning against the military-industrial complex
previously identified, but also:
This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the
American experience. The total influenceeconomic, political, even spiritualis felt in every city, every
Statehouse, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this
development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and
livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society (Yale Lillian Goldman Law Library,
1961). [Followed by the quote in the introduction]
Because of historical developments [to be
covered later within the paper],
Eisenhower came to the realization that
the ties between the military and large
arms industries have become rooted in
society. And because it was so deeply
entrenched, he was afraid government
intervention may be futile, thus, he
warned against the military-industrial
complex, despite their initial necessity for
it. Militarism, as such, can be considered
a consequence of the military-industrial complex. Constant development of military equipment by
industries and the governments continued purchase of them would lead to rapid expansion and a sizable
spending. The graph to the right shows the amount of money allocated for different categories by the
United States in 2004, by the billions. Defense expenditures far exceeds any other segment of government
spending, with the second most, education, lagging behind by almost $350 billion USD. Yet, the numbers
continue to increase and in 2014, they reached $571 billion USD (Forbes, McCarthy, 2015). According to a
research conducted by the International Institute of Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, the US has
exhausted more money on defense than the combined expenditures of the fifteen countries ranking below
it (Business Insider, Macias, 2015).

Section 2: Overview of the Military-Industrial Complex

Like everything else, however, the military-industrial complex had a beginning. But the question
remains: when did it start? Most political scientists date its origins to the 20th-century when the United
States began to integrate with the world again after almost a century and a half of isolationism. Ben Baack
and Edward Ray argue that the seeds of a primitive military-industrial complex were actually planted in the
era of peace between the Civil War and World War I. The Civil War had impeded with the United States
ability to trade on the international platform as both sides attempted to hinder the other from obtaining
the supply and economic support it required. But when the war ended, commerce resumed and coupled
with the industrial revolution and a growing population in European countries, particularly Great Britain,
the demand for American raw materials and manufactured goods drastically increased. From 1888 to 1898,
for example, American exports expanded by more than 75% percent, and within the next decade, another
51% percent. As the feasibility and effectiveness of manufacturing industries grasped a hold of the New
England region, the total exports for these goods also increased from 20.4% to 40.9% within the same
timeframe1. On an international scale, their exports of manufactured goods increased from 4.1% to 13%. As
such, in order to correspond with this rapid growth in trade, the United States needed to expand its navy in
order to protect their assets (Baack and Ray, pg. 372).
This shifted the country from one that only raised armies during wartime and relied largely on militias 2
to one that held some military prowess, an important early stepping stone to allow for the
military-industrial complex. In 1880, President Hayes became the first chief executive since the Civil War to
request the Congress to increase the size of the navy (Baack and Ray, pg. 371). But its significance mostly
lies in the fact that the bureaucratic body, the executive office, is seeking to enlarge the size of the military
during peacetime. While this is not militarism because there is a clear purpose behind it and not just
military establishment as an end in itself, their policy of a miniscule army and heavy reliance on its people
to take up arms was beginning to become obsolete. With foreign trade also came, to some degree,
involvement in foreign affairs. The United States began to break out of its shell of isolation with the

Take note that it is the percentage out of all exported goods and not just the amount of manufactured goods itself; therefore,
given a rapid net growth of total exported goods, the increase in manufactured goods is substantial
2
For example, according to the Department of Veteran Affairs, they had a standing army of around 800 soldiers from the
independence war to the early-1800s and capped at 10,000 by the end of the War of 1812

bombardment on Alexandria, alongside the British, where they dispatched three naval ships, as well as
their assistance in the establishment of the Philippines government in 1898 and their proclamation of the
Open Door policy in China. A second indication to the onset of the military-industrial complex was the
entanglement of the private sector in governmental, military matters. To maintain the shipyards and
kick-start its military financing, the navy needed large sums of investments and that flow of money came
from businessmen. The Naval Appropriations Bill of 1882 showed that the Republicans which were
generally backed by the wealthy, voted for its expansion (Baack and Ray pg. 374). Therefore, from the
beginning, the United States military expansion relied on private investors, an unshakeable bond that
stemmed from their history.
The First World War saw catastrophic deaths, resulted in the former hegemon, the United Kingdoms,
fall into an economic dump, and a reset in the global political field, with the fall of Germany,
Austria-Hungary, and Ottoman Empire. This pushed the US public back to an isolationist policy, putting the
embryonic military-industrial complex to an almost dormant state. It would take another World War and
the worst depression in history to reignite the military-industrial complex. The arms industry began to see a
rapid resurgence in the late-1930s with the Second World War on the horizon and the countrys
determination to put the Great Depression behind its back. This brought life to the military-industrial
complex we know today as almost every countrys military spending shot up during the World War, which
would require help from the private sector. At the end of the war, the previous colonizers and world
leaders in Europe fell into the spectator seat with all the devastating fighting as the United States took hold
of the throne to world hegemony, a position that demands a strong military. The Cold War era catalyzed its
growth with the Western and Eastern bloc engaged in an arms race to buy and manufacture more
weapons in spite of whether or not they use it, the core concept of militarism. Furthermore, the Vietnam
War fed the military-industrial complex given the many private corporations interested in the profit that
can be generated from war. For example, Kellog Brown and Root built almost all the American bases in the
Vietnamese jungle and the infamous Dow Chemical would supply the United States army with its napalm
and DDT as they sought to smoke out the Vietcong. The United States would endure and emerge
victorious after the Civil War but in doing so, they had to rely on defense contractors to increase
technological advancements at a faster rate than any other competitors, permanently tying the private

sector in the countrys military growth. To conclude, the buildup of the military-industrial complex itself
shows the connections between the three sides early on. The governments need for financial investments
in order to expand its military establishment from its start in the late-1800s throughout the Cold War, as
well as their reliance on the Congress to achieve their goals, such as with the Naval Appropriations Bill of
1882, entangled the three together, characteristic of the Iron Triangle.

Section 3: Roles in the Military-Industrial Complex

Each body of the military-industrial complex embodies their respective roles within the Iron Triangle.
First, the role of the Congress is usually to help lift regulations for the arms industries, such as removing
environmental regulation, and grant desired appropriations for the bureaucratic bodies. The high economic
and even social dependencesuch as university funding from the Department of Defenseon military
spending have made the majority of Congress members, regardless of political orientation, compete to
attract defense contractors in their districts. The competition for the Pentagon and interest groups
attention has occasionally led to even larger appropriations than requested from the Congress for the
bureaucratic bodies. For example, two Washington state senators, Patty Murray and Maria Cantwell, voted
for a $35 billion defense budget to be spent over a decade that would lease Boeing 767 airplanes to the
Defense Department in order to modify them as tankers for refueling in-flight combat aircrafts despite this
not being on the top of the list of priorities put forth by the defense contractor themselves. Unsurprisingly,
Boeing has sites that build planes in their states, and to show their loyalty and, more importantly, persuade
them to stay within their districts, they granted a much larger favor than was asked (Drew, New York Times,
2011). This helps highlight the main role of the Congress in the military-industrial complex: to grant needed,
or in some cases, exorbitant appropriations and funding for military expenditures.
The interest groups, and the private arms industries they represent, have one role: to offer electoral
and congressional support to their counterparts in the Iron Triangle. Looking at the visual in the previous
page, both arrows show essentially the same description, ensuring the re-election of the same officials that
reciprocate. In August 2015, Pentagons top contractors sent an army of 400 lobbyists to increase the
countrys military spending given the decline due to caps that have been implemented. Their targets were
the Congressmen and their goal was to persuade them to lift these restrictions. The result was obvious and

apparent seeing as recent expenditures have spiked, reaching $58.5 million, a 25% increase from the same
quarter last year. Boeing, another arms corporation hidden with the facet of making commercial airplanes,
spent $13.2 million on lobbying within two quarters this year. Members of Congress and of the
bureaucratic are no strangers to receiving monetary benefits from interest groups in exchange for favors,
and they are often eager to accept these deals. The only question that remains is: how can the interest
groups help have these political officials get re-elected? Since 2010, the cap for campaign donations for the
presidential election has been limited by law to be 2,700 USD per person for both the general election and
primaries, which sums up to a maximum of 5,400 USD. To circumvent these restrictions, they use
Super-Political Action Committees, or Super PACs. In essence, it allows them to pool their money together,
without constraints from the law, to give to candidates. These Super PACs usually keep their contributors
anonymous, allowing interest groups and corporations to deny ties in supporting any specific candidate
that may jeopardize their business (Hu, 2015). Most of these arms corporations, however, tend to spend
more on Congressional elections. Based on statistics from the Center for Responsive Politics, many of the
largest of these defense contractors such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, General Electric, and Dow Chemicals,
each saw a spike in money contributed during the 2014 cycle; they numbered at around: $2.6 million, $2.2
million, $1.8 million, and $700,000 USD, respectively (Center for Responsive Politics, 2015). These do not
account for costs of lobbyists, only campaign financing, and it goes to show the extent to which the
interest group category are willing to go to reap the mutual benefit of the military-industrial complex.
Lastly, the bureaucracys role within the Iron Triangle is two-fold: their policy choice and execution of
the law in their interpretation, as well as helping create lower regulation and offering special favors for the
interest groups. The purchase of excessive weaponry3 by the bureaucratic bodies for the defense
contractors and funding for their research and developmentwhich reaches just over 10% of the US
military budget at $63.3 billionfuels their need for the military-industrial complex in order to sustain
growth. To be put simply, for the arms corporations and bureaucratic bodies to be able to keep buying and
selling military equipment at an ever-increasing rate, largely in the interest of the profit-oriented industries,
would require the cycle of the buildup on expenditures that is provided by the military-industrial complex.
The bureaucracy ensures that the relationship does not end with the revolving doors of politics. For
3

For example, the Bush administrations big space initiatives in setting up a series of orbital radars to track moving ground
targets only to be cancelled after billions have been spent (Thompson, Forbes, 2011)

example, the main executive branch of the US government, the presidential office, under the Bush
administration, appointed key members such as Peter B. Teets as the Undersecretary of the Air Force, the
second-highest civilian ranking official in the Department of Air Force, considered within the Pentagon. Yet
Teets was also the chief operating officer of the largest defense contractor in the country: Lockheed Martin
Corporation. The man is simply a medium by which the two sides can continue to work together effectively.
There are a myriad of different other examples such as with the former Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano, who remained invincible under the protection of lobbyist groups,
responded to peoples complaints of watching children being groped in the airport by stating and later
using as an excuse to purchase the unpopular full-body scanners which were being sold by her predecessor,
Michael Chertoff (Turley, Aljazeera, 2014). This corruption is not exclusive to any one party. Obama recently
replaced his secretary of defense and gave the position to Ashton Carter. Despite his expertise in the area,
he had previously enthusiastically supported for the start and prolonging of the 2003 Iraq War and wanted
to ignite conflicts with other countries including Iran and North Korea. His reason behind this shed light on
his background in defense-connected firms including MITRE, Goldman Sachs, and Global Technology
Partners and Textron (Cohen & Wheeler, 2015). The bureaucracys policies and choice of implementation,
therefore, works in the benefit of these private arms corporations, and under the protection of
Congressional oversight given that subcommittees within them such as the Congressional Committee on
Armed Services that overlooks the Department of Defense.

Section 4: Benefits Received from the Military-Industrial Complex

For Congressmen, the most important benefit they receive is the financial support to be re-elected for
their position. As a result, it is unsurprising to find defense industries contributing heavily to members of
Congress that show reciprocal support. Top ranking officials in the Congress that wield significant influence
over military appropriations are often the targets of these interest groups. The top-ranking Republican on
the Senate Armed Services Committee, James Inhofe, received around $400,000 USD between 2009 and
2014, and almost 10% coming from Lockheed Martin. Virginia Representative Glenn Nye received less than
$10,000 in 2008 from defense industries, but after his involvement with the House Armed Services
Committee and his fight to keep an aircraft carrier stationed in Norfolk, his funding increased ten-fold.

Essentially, this was bribery within legal parameters. Interest groups appeal to these Congressmen for
passing legislations that benefit them by pumping money into campaign financing and ensuring re-election
of these officials (Cohen & Wheeler, 2015).
The arms industries obviously profit from the military-industrial complex because as it expands,
inflating governmental spending, the more they would earn. In 2010, defense contractors earned upwards
of $411 billion USD from the sales of weapons and military service worldwide. Particularly attractive for
government funding is the Research and Development category, which is evident given the top defense
companiesBoeing, L-3 Communications, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and
Raytheonexhausted over $5 billion in 2013. Incidentally, this trend has also led to tech companies joining
in. The three largestGoogle, Apple, and Microsoftcollective spent $22.9 billion USD. The vast majority
of this money came from governmental money for expanding R&D divisions (Weisgerber, 2014). Countless
corporations from a variety of industries have joined in this cycle, amplifying the effects of the
military-industrial complex to truly fulfill Eisenhowers omen; the total influence of military establishment is
now "felt in every city, every Statehouse, every office of the Federal government." To elaborate, the
estimated amount of people involved in the arms industry, according to the Department of Defense, has
reached around 6.1 million. They include those who work in manufacturing, sales, retail, or the R&D
departments; this shows the vast array of possibility for individuals in the United States to be involved in
the process. The United States now also has more gun stores than grocery stores, with a gap of
approximately 15,000 (Blodget, Business Insider, 2012). Consequently, the military-industrial complex is
unshakeable having firmly rooted itself to the foundations of American society and all of this is buttressed
by the government and their hefty spending.
The bureaucracywhich includes the commander-in-chief and as such is the symbolic head of the
militarycan fulfill its demands for technological superiority by connecting themselves to corporations and
defense contractors. As described above, the bureaucracy first request appropriations from the Congress
and when granted, they take a portion of the money to fund for research in the private sector. After which,
they would by the military equipment as they deem fit, and these arms industries would be quick to accept
given the substantial profit that can be generated from the cycle. But the need for constant enhancement
of the military, and hence the emphasis on the R&D divisions, branches from the policy that was

established following World War II and building into the Cold War (Lassman, pg. 97, 2015). Furthermore,
like any other public official, most members of the bureaucratic bodies, including the president themselves,
need to be elected into office one way or the other. To do so, they require congressional, electoral support.

Section 5: Case Study- The Iraq War

There is little doubt today that the War on Iraq had hidden purposes beneath the alleged need for
retaliation and the War on Terrorism claim. The Cold War ushered in an era of militarism to curb the
spread of communism. Yet, the American peoples view on this significant military growth during peacetime
is synonymous to that of Eisenhower, who sees the military-industrial complex as a necessary evil but to
be abolished when it was no longer needed. Their position can be traced back to the Founding Fathers of
their country who, despite their expansionist tendencies, opposed the idea of maintaining large standing
armies because it threatened the liberties of the people. When the Berlin Wall was shattered, the American
people were relieved because they had thought, like the Wall itself, they could finally break the bonds of
the militarism to their country. But at this point, the military-industrial complex had become too
entrenched in the society to be discarded. Thus, with the Soviet Union in pieces, the military-industrial
complex, or more so the three parties involved, preyed for another target or major conflict to address and
protect the American people from.
Immediately after the Cold War, members of the bureaucracy came together to try to prevent military
and the Pentagons budget downsizing. James Mann of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies
reported that key individuals such as Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, and Colin Powell, who back then were
the Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, respectively,
worked closely together on forestalling cutbacks. In an interview, Wolfowitz had said: What we were
afraid of was people who would say, Lets bring all of the troops home, and lets abandon our position in
Europe. (Hossein-zadeh pg. 146, 2006) The Cold War, in many ways, left behind remnants that would
eventually grow into the victims of the military-industrial complex, particularly, the proxy wars in the
Middle-East. Saddam Hussein, as much as the United States would like to deny it, was their blessing to set
the system back in motion. Indeed, while the rationale after the Gulf War, given by the Secretary of
Defense, was to bring back the American soldiers, in an editorial in 1996, Wolfowitz raised the prospect of

launching a preemptive strike against Iraq to finish the job and overthrow Saddam Hussein, who by this
time, was already suspected by many of these American officials for allegedly possessing weapons of mass
destruction (Hossein-zadeh pg. 149, 2006). They were eventually ecstatic at the sight of Clinton leaving
office and George W. Bush taking the presidential office and the immediate results were clear: Cheney
became the vice president, Powell became the secretary of state, and Wolfowitz moved into the number
two position in the Pentagon (Hossein-zadeh pg. 150, 2006). But they were missing one final piece which Al
Qaeda spoon-fed them with the 9/11 terrorist attack. The tragedy allowed for the sure fire approval for war
against Iraq which eventually began just two years after.
It was obvious that they were able to persuade the Congress to side with them because while the war
raged in the borders of Iraq and Afghanistan, and despite polls indicating the majority of Americans
disapproval for the war in the latter years, the military was still able to muster enough support from both
Democrats and Republicans to keep enough funding to sustain the war. Furthermore, while the Congress
planned to cut back billions on core social programs including Medicare due to lack of money, they
continuously pumped out money to the obvious black hole that all their spending were directed towards:
the Iraq War (Hossein-zadeh pg. 153, 2006). The rationale for the war was to bring down Saddam Husseins
regime, which they accomplished pretty well since Day 1 with the storm of bombings on Baghdad and
eventual capture of the dictator in late-2003. Yet the war would drag on to 2011, through the 2007
Recession, exhausting governmental money. Interest groups were also obviously at play here, keeping the
Congressmen in check to prolong the war and, in return, as an effect of the conflict, earn mountains of cash
through sales of arms and military service. For example, KBR, Inc., and American engineering, procurement,
and construction company, originally a subsidiary of the oil field service giant, Halliburton, earned up to
$17.2 billion from 2003-2006 alone from just Iraq-war related venues. They helped maintain or construct
military bases and other infrastructures necessary to host the American troops. And again, Lockheed
Martin and Boeing each earned $46.5 billion USD and $68.7 billion USD, respectively, in their total sales,
mostly with arms, through the 8 years. Ultimately, the Iraq War and George W. Bushs declared War on
Terror not only expand the power of the bureaucracy, but also maximize budget for military and homeland
agencies. This contributed to the Pentagon now appropriating more money in real terms, or inflation
adjusted, than it did in the peak of the Vietnam War when far more US soldiers were in combat, which was

added on to the annual expenditures during the arms race with the Soviet Union. As it would seem, Cheney,
Wolfowitz, and Powell found their new Cold War in the Middle-East, and managed to expand the
influence of the military-industrial complex to a degree that has not been experienced even at the height of
a conflict between two conflicting superpowers.

As shown, the close ties between the interest groupsincluding the corporations they represent
Congress, and the bureaucracy, through militarism in the military-industrial complex is characteristic of an
Iron Triangle whereby the three forces collaborate to reap mutual benefits. The role of the Congress lies in
its ability to appropriate certain funds to the bureaucracy and decrease restrictions set on the private
corporations. In exchange, those who are involved receive the support from both influential powers to
secure a re-election. Similarly, the bureaucracy implements policies as desired by the legislative
committees and establish a sturdy sales relationship with arms industries to also have the backing from the
other two to hold on to their office or even be promoted. The interest groups, on the other hand, provide
the monetary requirements for campaign financing and they make profit by receiving funds from the
government, which initially goes through the Congress, for military purposes and sells them back to the
bureaucracy in control of the military. The Iraq War was an ideal example of a medium by which the
military-industrial complex was at play. It was purposefully sought out for by the bureaucracy from as early
as the mid-1990s and the interest groups and members of the Congress seized the opportunity and took
part in it to prolong the conflict to harvest their desired benefits. The military-industrial complex has
become an unwavering relationship that is rooted within the American society and proven to be highly
costly for the people, evident through their colossal military spending. But given the million that are
unknowingly tied into their process through simply their occupation, the question that is shrouded in
controversy is: should the military-industrial complex be terminated? And if so, how?

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