Persons Case Digests

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Legarda/Atty. Ayo

DLSU College of Law Batch 5, OG05
Tanada vs. Tuvera
AUTHOR: Viloria, Patricia
[GR L-63915, April 24, 1985]
NOTES: (if applicable)
TOPIC: Publication
PONENTE: Escolin, J
FACTS:
Tanada invoked due process by demanding the disclosure of presidential decrees, letters of instructions, General orders,
proclamation, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative order which had not been published as required
by law. The court ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of
general force and effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and
those which are not. The publication means complete publication, and that publication must be made in the official gazette. In
a comment required by the solicitor general, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and
therefore be dismissed. And on the clause unless otherwise provided in Article 2 of the new civil code meant that the
publication required was not always imperative, that the publication when necessary, did not have to be made in the official
gazette.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not publication is a sine que non requirement
HELD: Yes.
RATIO:
- The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate
their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of
the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen
for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
- The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is
a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no
force and effect.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
Concurring, Fernando, CJ:
Due process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any
legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law.
No person should be bound by a law without notice as such should be in the Official Gazette
Must be ascertainable in some for if the law is to be enforced at all
Publications is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of general application.
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Magsino Padrones Parian Ocampo Rayos Del Sol Villaseor
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Presidential decrees and executive acts previously published not in the official gazette should not be devoid of legal
character.
Concurring, Melencio, J
There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it should be published.
Separate, Plana, J
The law is not precise regarding due process of the notice of laws. Law does not provide that publication in the Official
Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws.
Separate, Teehankee, J
Rule of law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal protection to all similarly
circumstanced and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. Fair play and justice. If there is no
publication then there is no Art 3 ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith
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Acaac v Azcuna
[GR no. 187378, Sept. 30, 2013]
TOPIC: Effectivity of law
PONENTE: Perlas-Bernabe, J
AUTHOR: Viloria, patricia

FACTS: (chronological order)

Peoples Eco tourism and livelihood Foundation (PETAL) is a non governmental org founded by Acaac. It built cottages made of
indigenous material on Capayas island (1605 sqm). Mayor Azcuna notified PETAL of its violation of the National Building Code
of the Philippines, its failure to apply for a building permit prior to construction. A notice of demolition was served. PETAL
assails the validity of the ordinance for there was no public consultation and it was not published.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and enforceable against petitioners
HELD: Yes, it is valid
RATIO:
- Though the subject ordinance cannot be deemed approved through the mere passage of time considering that the same
is still pending with the Committee on fisheries and aquatic resources of the SP, 30 days have already elapsed form the
time the said ordinance was submitted for review by the SB. If no action has been taken by the SP within 30 days after
submission of such ordinance, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and valid. Assumption that officials have
done which the law requires them to do.
- A public hearing was conducted prior to the promulgation of the subject ordinance. Acaac, has the burden of proof,
failed to present any evidence to show that no publication or posting of the subject ordinance was made. In accordance
with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the
absence of evidence showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in their enactment.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Section 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
(a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the sanggunian panlungsod or sangguniang bayan shall forward to the
sangguniang panlalawigan for review, copies of approved ordinances and the resolutions approving the local development
plans and public investment programs formulated by the local development councils.
(b) Within thirty (30) days after the receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions, the sangguniang panlalawigan shall
examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial prosecutor for prompt
examination. The provincial attorney or provincial prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the
documents, inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing of his comments or recommendations, which may be considered
by the sangguniang panlalawigan in making its decision.
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(c) If the sangguniang panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond the power conferred upon the
sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in
part. The sangguniang panlalawigan shall enter its action in the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or municipal
authorities of the action it has taken.
(d) If no action has been taken by the sangguniang panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission of such
an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.
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Kasilag v. Rodriguez
[69 PHIL 217]
TOPIC: Ignorance of the law
PONENTE: Imperial, J.
AUTHOR: Padrones, Mark
FACTS: The parties, Kasilag and Emiliana Rodriguez, entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land
acquired as homestead to secure the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 plus interest.
One year after the execution of the mortgage deed, it came to pass that Emiliana Ambrosio was unable to pay the stipulated
interest as well as the tax on the land and its improvements. For this reason, she and Kasilag entered into another verbal
contract whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on condition that the latter would not collect the
interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduce
improvements thereon.
Respondents, Rafaela Rodriguez, et. al., children and heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced a civil case to
recover from the petitioner the possession of the land and its improvements granted by the way of homestead to Emiliana
Ambrosio.
The CA held that petitioner acted in Bad Faith in taking possession of the land because he knew that the contract he made with
Emiliana Ambrosio was an absolute sale, and that the latter could not sell the land because it is prohibited by Sec. 116 of Act
2874.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner should be deemed a possessor in Good Faith because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in
the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated.
HELD: The petitioners ignorance of the provisions of sec. 116 is excusable and may be the basis of Good Faith.
RATIO: Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be the basis of Good Faith but excusable ignorance may be such
basis (if it based upon ignorance of a fact). In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded
belief that he was not violating rhe prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in
consenting to receive the fruits, he did not know that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract
of antichresis and that the latter, as alien, was prohibited by Sec. 116.
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Simon v. Chan
[G.R. No. 157547]
TOPIC: Retroactivity of Laws
PONENTE: Bersamin, J.
FACTS: Eduardo Simon was charged by Elvin Chan of violating BP 22.

Chan then commenced a civil action in the MeTC for the collection of the principal amount.
Dec. 1, 2000, Rule 111, Sec. 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure became effective
ISSUE(s): WON Chans civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check was an independent civil action.
HELD: No
RATIO: No vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws. Any new rules may validly be made to apply to cases
pending at the time of their promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of procedure,
except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence to
convict than what us required at the time of the commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity would be
unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the Constitution.
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Francisco vs. CA
AUTHOR: Ocampo, Miguel
FACTS:
Petitioner Teresita Francisco is the legal wife of respondent Eusebio Francisco by his 2nd marriage. Conchita, Araceli and
Antonio, who are also respondents here in this case, are children of Eusebio by his 1st marriage.
This case involves disputed properties such as:
1. A sari-sari store
2. A house and lot
3. An apartment house (1-3 located at Brgy. Balite, Rodriguez, Rizal)
4. Another house in lot (But at Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal)
These disputed properties was alleged by petitioner that she is to be the administrator because:
a. Eusebio acquired such properties during their marriage since Feb. 10, 1962;
b. The properties was administered by Eusebio until he became unfit due to tuberculosis, heart disease and cancer;
and
c. That the signing of Eusebio to the general power of atty. authorizing Conchita to administer such properties is void.
RTC rules in favor of respondents. Affirmed by CA. Both courts state that petitioner failed to give evidence that the
properties were acquired during their marriage. Hence, prompting a decision that it was exclusively owned by Eusebio
pursuant to NCC 158 and 160 (which was repealed by NCC 254 and NCC256 [making the NCC retroactive provided it
does not impair vested or acquired rights with the Civil Code and other laws)
Petitioner now appeals to SC alleging that the lower court erred in applying NCC 158 and 160. It should have been
NCC254 and 256.
ISSUE(s): WON NCC 158 and 160 is applicable or not (Using NCC4 as stated in the syllabus)
HELD: YES
RATIO:
SC states that NCC158 and 160 was indeed repealed by the Family Code since Aug. 3, 1988 giving 254 and 256
applicability.
However, the rights was vested before the effectivity of the Family Code thus giving NCC158 and 160 applicable to the
case. Therefore, applying NCC4 (no retroactive effect)
But petitioner failed to produce proof that the property was acquired during their marriage.
With regard to the properties in Brgy. Balite:
a. The house and lot was acquired by Eusebio thru lucrative title (He inherited it from his parents and then he brought
it into his marriage with petitioner)
b. The sari-sari store and the apartment house was evidenced that Eusebio was the owner and that the business
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licenses issued under petitioners name alone does not tantamount to conjugal property.
With regard to the house and lot in Barrio, San Isidro:
a. The certificate title stating that Eusebio married to Teresita is no proof that the property was acquired during the
marriage. It is merely descriptive of a civil status.
Also, Eusebio was found that he is not suffering from serious illness. Only handicapped by a leg injury in a bicycle
accident and was aggravated when petitioner pushed him to the ground during a quarrel.
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Pesca vs. Pesca
FACTS:
Petitioner Lorna met respondent Zosimo in 1975 on board an inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod City. They got
married in March 3, 1975 but they did not live together because Lorna was still in college and Zosimo was a seaman
and had to leave the country for a month. But after sometime, they finally resided in Caloocan and had 4 children
(Ruhem 19, Rez 17, Ryan 11 and Richie 9).
In 1988, Lorna said Zosimo began to show signs of psychological incapacity:
o Showing his true color of being emotionally immature
o Irresponsible husband
o Cruel and violent
o Habitual drinker
o Staying with friends from 4pm-1am and when stopped, beats and kicks Lorna
o Threatened to kill Lorna with a shotgun even at the presence of their children
o Also beats children
Nov. 19, 1992, Lorna and children left the abode and lived with her sister in QC because of this. But eventually returned
to the conjugal abode and forgave Zosimo. However, it only became worse.
March 22, 1994, 8am, Zosimo assaulted Lorna for half an hour at the presence of the children. This prompted Lorna to
finally leave Zosimo and file for a declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity and custody
of their children.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner Lorna but CA reversed the decision that the psychological incapacity was not sufficiently
proved relying on the Santos v. CA and Republic v. Molina
Petitioner states that these 2 cases should not have retroactive effect and even assuming arguendo, the guidelines of
the 2 cases should only pose advisory, not mandatory. Also, it should only warrant a remand of the case to the lower
court for further proceedings and not its dismissal.
ISSUE(s): WON the 2 cases should be given retroactive effect (NCC4)
WON the 2 cases should have the force of law
HELD: YES
RATIO:
Judicial decisions such as the decisions in the 2 cases expresses the doctrine of stare decisis It means that the
interpretation made upon the cases by a competent court has the force of law.
It is in Santos case when, for the first time, the Court has given life to the term of psychological incapacity. The Molina
case, that followed, has only additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying
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cases for annulment of marriages pursuant to psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned,
Santos.
It constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds
itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine of the case may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance
therewith.
DOCTRINE:
The interpretation made upon the cases by a competent court has the force of law.
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.
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Nerwin vs. PNOC
FACTS:
R. A. 8975 expressly prohibits any court, EXCEPT SC, from issuing any TRO, preliminary injunction, etc. against the
Government xxxxx from: xxxxx (b) bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the National Government
xxxxxx
In 1999, National Electrification Administration (NEA) made an invitation to pre-qualify and bid for a contract, otherwise
known as IPB No. 80, for the supply and delivery of about 60k pieces of wood poles and 20k pieces of cross arms
needed in the countrys Rural Electrification Project.
Nerwin was one of the 4 bidders who qualified and bid in the contract and he was the lowest. Even though he was the
lowest, NEAs administrator, Conrado Estrella, recommended the board of directors of NEA to award the contract to
Nerwin for he is the lowest bidder and there was a big difference between the 2nd lowest bidder.
However, NEAs board of directors made Resolution No. 32 decreasing the IPB No. 80 material requirements by 50%.
Nerwin contends that it was only a ploy to accommodate the losing bidder.
And then, the other losing bidders such as Tri State and Pacific Synnergy filed a complaint alleging that Nerwin falsified
documents in the pre-qualification in the IPB No. 80. But it was then validated by the Govt Corporate Counsel.
On the other hand, respondent PNOC claiming to be under the Dept of Energy, issued an invitation to pre-qualify and
bid for wooden poles needed for its Samar Rural Electrification Project or O-ILAW Project).
When petitioner learned about this, they filed this complaint alleging that it was an attempt to subject the materials in
the IPB No. 80 to the O-ILAW Project and prayed that a TRO be issued.
Respondent as defense states that petitioner has no cause of action for:
o It violates the rule that government infrastructure projects were not to be subjected to TROs;
o It contravened the mandatory prohibition against non-forum shopping; and
o The corporate president had no authority to sign and file the complaint
RTC ruled in favor of Nerwin granting the TROs and declaring PNOC in default. However, CA reversed the decision
stating that RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TROs.
Nerwin now appeals to SC.
ISSUE(s): WON the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO against PNOC
HELD: YES
RATIO:
SC states that the CA is correct in ruling that RTC gravely abused its discretion in entertaining an application for
TRO/preliminary injunction, and worse, in issuing a preliminary injunction through the assailed order enjoining
petitioners sought bidding for its O-ILAW Project which was section 3 and section 4 of RA8975.
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It is a violation of RA 8975 which was approved on Nov. 7, 2000, therefore, already existing at the time RTC issued the
assailed TRO dated July, 20 and December 29, 2003. RA 8975 clearly and expressly PROHIBITS any court except SC
from doing such actions.
SC then fined the presiding RTC Judge of 40k for gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law
D.M. Consunji, Inc. v Court of Appeals (CA)
TOPIC: Waiver of Rights (NCC Art. 6)
PONENTE: Kapunan, J
AUTHOR: Magsino, Patricia Marie C.

Note: There is a discussion on res ipsa loquitur in this case re:
negligence of Consunji. Please read that JUST IN CASE! :)

Around 1:30PM (November 2, 1990), Jose Juego a construction worker at DM Consunji Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance
Tower, Pasig City to his death. Juego was crushed to death when the platform he was on fell, the falling was due to the removal
or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a
safety lock. PO3 Rogelio Villanueva investigated and filed a report on November 25, 1990.
On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow Maria, filed in the RTC of Pasig a complaint for damages against DM Consunji.
Consunji raised the defense that Maria had previously availed of the death benefits provided for under the Labor Code and is
now precluded from claiming damages from them under the Civil Code.
After trial, RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. RTC ordered DM Consunji to pay Php 644, 000.00 in
total. On appeal by DM Consunji, CA affirmed the RTC decision.
DM Consunji now seeks for the reversal of the CA decision.
ISSUE(S):
WON private respondent is precluded from claiming damages under the Civil Code after having claimed damages under the
Labor Code
HELD:
NO. She may still claim damages under Civil Code.
RATIO:
The Court, following the doctrine in the case of Floresca v Philex Mining Corporation, held that an injured worker has the choice
to claim from either the Labor Code or the Civil Code, provided that the choice of one remedy will preclude a claim for additional
benefits under the other remedy. An exception can be made on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after
he opted for the first remedy. CA held that Maria Juegos case fell under the exception because she was unaware of Consunjis
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negligence when she filed the claim for death benefits. CA further held that Maria was not only ignorant of the facts but also
ignorant of her rights as well. (Having only reached elementary school)
When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies, the election is final and bars any
action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of
election acts as a bar. The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election.
Waiver, though, is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. To make an intelligent waiver, the person must know that
such right exists. Maria Juego was not aware of her rights and remedies. Her election to claim from the State Insurance Fund
(Labor Code) does not constitute a waiver on her part to claim from DM Consunji.
CASE IS REMANDED for determination of amount of damages!
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Villareal v People
PONENTE: Sereno, J

Note: Consolidated case to ng 5 other cases related to it. LENNY VILLA
CASE! This only has facts and decisions under VILLAREAL! Haba ng facts,
pero kwento lang yan :))

In February 1991, 7 freshmen law students of Ateneo Law School (ALS) signified their intention to join Aquila Legis. Among them
was Leonardo Lenny Villa. On the night of Feb 8, 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of Aquila at the lobby of
the ALS and were brought to Rufos for dinner. After dinner, they were brought to the house of Musngi, who briefed them on
what to expect at the initiation rites. They were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any
time. The initiation rites were to last 3 days. After the briefing, they were brought to Almeda Compound in Caloocan City.
At the Almeda Compound they were subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan initiation rites like, the Indian Run, Bicol Express,
Rounds, and Auxies Privilege Round. The neophytes survived day 1. On the morning of day 2, the neophytes were made to
present comic plays and play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys
principles. When they gave a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms and legs. In the afternoon, the neophytes were
again subjected to the same hazing they endured on day 1. After a few hours, day 2 officially ended. After a while, accused
Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal demanded that the rites be reopened, the head of the initiation initially refused but at the
insistence of Dizon and Villareal, it was reopened. The neophytes were subjected to paddling and additional rounds of physical
pain.
Lenny Villa received several paddle blows and one was so strong that it sent him sprawling to the ground. The other neophytes
heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty of breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no
longer walk. He had to be carried to the carport where they slept.
After an hour of sleep, Lennys shivering and mumblings woke the neophytes. Villareal and Dizon initially dismissed this as
Lenny just over reacting. Later they realized that Lenny was really feeling cold, some Aquilans started to help him. They
removed his clothes and helped him into a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed
him to the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
26 were accused including Villareal, on Nov. 8, 1993 the trial court rendered judgment holding the 26 accused guilty of the
crime of homicide. Accused Villareal petitioned for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 on the grounds that the CA made 2
reversible errors: first, denial of due process and second, conviction absent proof beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently,
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petitioner Villareal died on 13 March 2011 and filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011.
ISSUE(S): WON criminal liability and civil liability is extinguished by death of the accused
HELD: YES. Death of accused extinguishes criminal and civil liability.
RATIO: According to RPC 89(1), death of accused extinguishes the criminal liability for personal penalties (imprisonment). On
the other hand criminal liability for pecuniary penalties (fines and costs) is extinguished if the offender dies prior to final
judgment. Villareal died pending judgment of his case so his liability is extinguished. His civil liability arising directly from the
delict complained of is also extinguished.
His petition is dismissed and the criminal case against him is closed and terminated.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Art. 2305 (1) the civil status of persons re: death of Villareal
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Villareal v People (DIZON v PEOPLE)
PONENTE: Sereno, J

Note: Please note that this is another case under Villareal but focusing
on WAIVER OF RIGHTS!

SAME FACTS AS VILLAREAL v PEOPLE. Read that!
Dizon filed a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 on the grounds that the CA made 2 reversible errors; (1) he was
denied due process, and (2) denied due proves when CA didnt apply to him the same ratio decidendi which served as the
basis of acquittal of the other accused. For his first argument, the trial court ruled that Dizon waived his right to present
evidence on an earlier date, since one of his co-accused no longer presented separate evidence during trial.
Dizon was set to present his evidence on five different set dates. Sept 8, 15, 22, and Oct. 5, 12, 1993. The order stated that the
accused should be ready at all times, and that the failure on their part to present evidence will be construed a waiver of their
right to present evidence. On Aug. 19, 1993; Dizons co-accused stated that he would no longer present evidence. Due to this
and pursuant to the order that they should be ready at all times Dizon was asked to present his evidence on the next trial, Aug.
25, 1993. Dizons counsel was unable to present their evidence and this was construed as Dizon waiving his right to present
evidence.
ISSUE(S): WON Dizon waived his right to present evidence
HELD: No. Trial court erred in holding that Dizon waived his right to present evidence
RATIO: The Constitution guarantees that the accused may present evidence in his defense (Art II, Sec. 14(2)). In the case of
Crisostomo v Sandiganbayan, the court stressed that while constitutional rights may be waived, the waiver must be clear and it
must be coupled with the actual intention of relinquishing the right. The trial court should not have deemed the failure of Dizon
to present evidence at the earlier date to be a waiver of his right. Dizon was not scheduled to testify until two weeks later.
Stripping the accused of all his pre-assigned trial dates is a clear denial of his constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.
An invalid waiver of right does not presume to vacate the finding of guilt in the criminal case. The SC does not see any material
inadequacy or any procedural irregularity that would prejudice the prosecution or defense resulting from the invalid waiver.
SC rules that Dizon is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
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CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Art. 6 rights may be waived provided its not contrary to LAW
Thornton v. Thornton
[Aug. 16, 2004]
TOPIC: Repeal of Laws
PONENTE: Corona, J.
AUTHOR: RAYOS DEL SOL, Angelo S.

NOTES:
FACTS:
- August 28, 1998 American petitioner (P) and Filipino respondent (R) were married. A year later, respondent gave birth
to a daughter (D, on whose behalf P filed this case).
- After three years, R wanted to return to her job as a GRO and go out with her friends. When P was out of the country, R
often went out with her friends, leaving D with the househelp.
- December 7, 2001 despite being admonished by P, R left with D without notifying P, and telling the househelp that she
was going to Basilan.
- P filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Makati Family Court, but it was dismissed because the child was allegedly in
Basilan. When P went there, he could not find them and was issued a certification that R was not residing there.
- P then got Rs cell phone bills showing calls from Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila, etc., so he filed another petition for
habeas corpus, but this time with the CA (writs of habeas corpus issued by them are enforceable anywhere in the
country).
- The CA denied the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. They ruled that RA 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997) gave
family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, thus impliedly repealing RA 7902 (An Act
Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and BP 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980).
- Hence, the appeal to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE(S):
WON The CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in light of RA 8369, which
grants exclusive original jurisdiction to family courts.
HELD:
Petition Granted; Petition for habeas corpus reinstated and remanded to the CA.
RATIO:
- Nothing in RA 8369 revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving custody of minors.
- The CAs reasoning will leave individuals like petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. This
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lack of recourse could not have been the intent behind RA 8369.
- The SolGen cited Floresca v. Philex Mining Corp. as another case wherein the word exclusive did not prevent resorting
to another jurisdiction, applying and giving effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice. What is controlling is
the spirit and intent, not the letter of the law.
- In this case, heirs of miners killed in a work-related accident were allowed to file suit in the regular courts, even
though the Workmens Compensation Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction over such cases, under the
Workmens Compensation Act.
- Under statutory construction, implied repeals are not favored. RA 8369 reveals no manifest intent to revoke the CAs
jurisdiction; the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092, and BP 129 are not absolutely incompatible.
- Any uncertainty has been settled by AM No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in
Relation to Custody of Minors.
- Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over the country is not unreasonable (thus, not a ground for
dismissing the petition) because enforceable anywhere in the country, like a warrant of arrest.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
- Implied repeals are not favored.
- Interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi (every statute must be so interpreted and brought into
accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence).
- In implied repeals, the two laws must be absolutely incompatible.
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De Castro v. JBC
[April 20, 2010]
TOPIC: Judicial Decisions

NOTES: The facts are not explicit I had to piece them together based on
the decision.
The topic under which the case is found is only minimally discussed in
the ponencia. Be ready for curveball questions.
FACTS:
- Allegedly contravening 15, Art. VII, which is the ban on Midnight Appointments, Pres. Arroyo appointed many people to
govt offices.
- This included an attempt to appoint a new Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, as then-CJ Puno was retiring on May 17,
2010.
- March 17, 2010 - Despite many protests, attempts to prevent the nomination process, and cases filed against the JBC
and the president, the Court rendered a decision: a) dismissing the cases against it; and b) directed the JBC to begin the
nomination and selection process for the next Chief Justice and other vacancies in the judiciary.
- 12 different parties then filed individual motions for reconsideration.
ISSUE(S):
1. WON the Court erred in overturning the decision in In re: Appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta (298 SCRA 408,
November 9, 1998).
- In Valenzuela, the appointments of Valenzuela and Villarta to the Judiciary were not allowed because 4(1) and 9, Art.
8 were still limited by the ban under 15, Art. VII
2. WON 15, Art. VII of the Constitution included a ban on presidential appointments to the judiciary.
3. WON the exceptions under 15, Art. VII apply to appointments in the judiciary
HELD: Motions for Reconsideration DENIED for lack of merit and for already having been resolved in the March 17, 2010
decision.
RATIO:
1. While petitioners invoke stare decisis as basis for not overturning Valenzuela, the Court is not necessarily controlled by
precedent. The Court may reverse such a decision en banc if deemed fit, as it did in the March 17, 2010 decision.
2. The deliberations cited by Justice Carpio-Morales regarding the Con Coms intention to include Judiciary appointments in
the ban only referred to 13, Art. VII, which only deals with nepotism (i.e. appointing relatives to high govt positions).
3. While the petitioners claim that the Court failed to apply principles of statutory construction in interpreting 15, Art. VII,
they too fail to apply principles of statutory construction. They are interpolating words into the provision because there is
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no express ban on appointments to the judiciary.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, xxx
the criteria that must control the actuations, xxx of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.
Brion, J. regarding the Valenzuela case
Valenzuela was not actually overturned because it only dealt with appointments to the Judiciary below the Supreme Court.
(The rest of Justice Brions Opinion, and Justice Carpio-Morales dissent are not relevant to the topic, but it might be helpful to
read them, nonetheless.)
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Republic v Remman Enterprise
[717 SCRA 72, 2014]
TOPIC: Judicial Decision
PONENTE: Reyes, J
AUTHOR: PARIAN, Arjay

Laguna BeachUmBay

2001: Remman applied for judicial confirmation of title over two parcels of land near Laguna de Bay.
The State contested that the lands were not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
RTC, affirmed by CA, granted the application; stating that Remman established all the requirements under Public Land
Act: (1) the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of public domain; (2) that the applicant and his
predecessors are adverse possessors of the land; (3) it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
In the review, SC did not agree that Remman established requirement (1). In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc., the Court clarified that, in addition to proper government agency certifications, applicants for land
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of public
domain as alienable and disposable.
Remman contested that Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. should not apply to his application since the
case was promulgated in 2008 while his application was in 2001; invoking that laws shall have no retroactive effect (NCC
Art 4)
ISSUE(S): WON there is retroactivity with regard to the application of the cited case.
HELD: There is none.
RATIO: The interpretation of a law by the Supreme Court constitutes part of that law from the date it was originally passed.
Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law, but consists merely of a construction or interpretation of a
pre-existing one.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The interpretation of a law by the Supreme Court constitutes part of that law from the date it was originally passed
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Alonzo v. Padua
[150 SCRA 378, 1987]
TOPIC: Duty to Render Judgment
PONENTE: Cruz
AUTHOR: Pam
NOTES:
FACTS:
Five brothers and sisters (Padua) inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in the name of their
deceased parents.
Celestino Padua transferred his undivided share by way of absolute sale. A year later, Eustaquia Padua also sold her
share.
By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the
said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence and built a
semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.
One of the co-heirs sought to redeem the land sold 14 years after the sale. Trial court dismissed the complaint, on the
ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales. Although there
was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law.
Respondent court reversed the decision of the Trial Court.
Respondents assail that they were not notified of the sale and invokes Art. 1088 NCCwhich provides: "Should any of the
heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the
rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month
from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
ISSUE: Was Art. 1088 correctly interpreted?
HELD: Yes. Even if there was no written notice, knowledge of the respondents is undeniable.
RATIO:
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given them. The
respondents live on the same lot. They also live in the same house with the co-heirs who sold their share of the land.
There is no doubt either that the 30 day period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and
the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The Court's deviation from the strict letters of Art. 1088 NCC on giving of written notice to co-heirs of
the sale of an heir's share is not being abandoned. The ruling here should be deemed an exception due to peculiar
circumstances of this case. Law and justice are inseparable. Laws must be applied in consonance with justice.
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Martinez v. Van Buskirk
[18 Phil. 79, 1910]
TOPIC: Presumption and Applicability of Custom
PONENTE: Moreland, J.
AUTHOR: Pam
NOTES:
FACTS:
Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding a carromata in Ermita, Manila when a delivery wagon owned by the defendant (used
for the transportation of fodder wherein two horses are attached), came from the opposite direction, while their
carromata went close to the sidewalk in order to let the delivery wagon pass by. However, instead of merely passing by,
the horses ran into the carromata occupied by the plaintiff with her child and overturned it, causing a serious cut upon
her head.
The defendant contends that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time of the accident, was actually a
good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero. He also claims that the cochero was tasked to deliver
some forage at Calle Herran, and for that purpose the defendants employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the
front end of the delivery wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered. However, a vehicle passed by
the driver and made noises that frightened the horses causing them to run. The employee failed to stop the horses since
he was thrown upon the ground.
ISSUE: Is the employer, who has furnished a gentle and tractable team (of horses) and a trusty and capable driver, liable for the
negligence of the driver?
HELD: No.
RATIO:
The cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in this
case. It is believed that acts or performances which, in a long time, have not been destructive and which are approved
by the society are considered as custom. Hence, they cannot be considered as unreasonable or imprudent.
The reason why they have been permitted by the society is that they are beneficial rather that prejudicial. One could not
easily hold someone negligent because of some act that led to an injury or accident. It would be unfair therefore to
render the cochero negligent because of such circumstances.
The court further held that it is a universal practice of merchants during that time to deliver products through horsedrawn vehicles; and it is also considered universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left
during the accident. It has been practiced for a long time and generally has not been the cause of accidents or injuries
the judgment is therefore reversed.
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CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The practice is customary.
Internal Revenue v. Primetown

[GR. 162155]
TOPIC: Legal Periods
PONENTE: Corona
AUTHOR: Pam
NOTES:
Art. 13 was repealed by Sec. 13 of the Administrative Code of 1987.
FACTS:
Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondents
paid in 1997. He alleged that the company suffered loses, therefore making them not liable to pay their income taxes.
The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit
commenced on that date. According to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of
judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year, respondent's petition, which was filed 731
days after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary period.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA. It ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish
between a regular year and a leap year. Even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods covered by April 15, 1998 to April
14, 1999 and April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 should still be counted as 365 days each or a total of 730 days. A statute which is
clear and explicit shall be neither interpreted nor construed.
ISSUE:
Should the counting of the 2-year prescriptive period for filing claim of refund be governed by the Civil Code?
HELD:
No. Counting of 2-year period for filing claim for refund is no longer in accordance with Article 13 of the Civil Code but under
Sec. 31 of EO 227 - The Administrative Code of 1987.
RATIO:
As between the Civil Code, which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and the Administrative Code of 1987, which
states that a year is composed of 12 calendar months, it is the latter that must prevail being the more recent law, following the
legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori (more recent law prevails over an inconsistent law).
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In the case at bar, there are 24 calendar months in 2 years. For a Final Corporate ITR filed on Apr 14, 1998, the counting should
start from Apr 15, 1998 and end on Apr 14, 2000. The procedure is 1st month -Apr 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998 . 24th month Mar 15, 2000 to Apr 14, 2000.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Sec. 31 of the Administrative Code, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal
periods.
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Testate estate of Amos G. Bellis
[ G.R. No. L-23678, June 06, 1967 ]
TOPIC: NCC16
PONENTE: Bengzon, J.
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis lived and was a citizen of San Antonio, Texas. He had 2 marriages with several legitimate children
respectively, and finally 3 illegitimate children.
In Aug. 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis made a will that his estate be divided after its liquidation:
1. $240k to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen
2. Php120k to the 3 illegitimate children
3. Remainder goes to the children of the 1st and 2nd wives
After his death in July 8, 1958, Peoples Bank and Trust Co. (PBTC), as executor of the will, liquidated the estate according
to the will above. But in Jan 8, 1964, PBTC filed its Executors Final Account, report for administration and project of
partition, reporting the respective shares of the wife and children respectively.
Subsequently, Maria and Miriam Bellis (both belong to the 3 illegitimate children) filed an opposition against the project
of partition alleging that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children, because they were compulsory
heirs of their father Amos G. Bellis.
But RTC ruled approving the Executors Final Account relying on NCC16 par. 2, applying the national law of the
deceased which is Texas law that did not provide for legitimes.
Appellants appealed to SC using NCC17 as a counter-argument (Which should be an exception to NCC16 par. 2). Hence,
Philippine law should govern
ISSUE:
WON Philippine law applies to the will of the deceased
HELD: NO
SC stated that Congress has already amended NCC17 and even provided Art. 1039 to support NCC16 par. 2
a. Art. 1039 - Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent."
b. Art. 16 Par. 1 - Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
Par. 2 - However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found.
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of Texas and was domiciled in Texas. Hence, Philippine law should not govern the estate
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rather it should be Texas law, which did not provide legitimes or no compulsory heirs.
If it were to apply Philippine law and ignore Texas law, such distribution of the properties is void and illegal.
DOCTRINE: NCC16 Par. 2 (Nationality Principle)
Raytheon v. Rouzie
[G.R. 162894, February 26, 2008]
TOPIC: NCC 17 (Lex Loci Celebrationis)
PONENTE: Tinga, J.


1990: Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation organized and existing under the laws of State of Connecticut and
Rouzie entered into a contract (BMSI hired Rouzie as its representative in the Philippines).
March 11, 1992: Rouzie secured a service contract with the Rep. of the Phil. On behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers
affected by Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.
July 14, 1994: Rouzie filed a suit against BMSI for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of
employment contract.
ISSUE(S): WON the complaint be dismissed on the ground of Forum Non Conveniens
HELD:
RATIO:
- On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court and where the
court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the
rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum.
- As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Rouzie upon filinf of the complaint. On
the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of Raytheon was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court.
- That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut
does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing the
civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a
defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law
which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only
when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial
court.
- Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual
determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial
court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to
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determine whether special circumstances require the courts desistance.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Under the doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where
it is not the most convenient or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
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TAMANO v ORTIZ
[291 SCRA 584, 1998 ]
TOPIC: Binding Effect, NCC 18
PONENTE: Bellosillo, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Sen. Tamano (+) was married to Zorayda (respondent) in civil rights. Both are Muslims.
One year before his death, Tamano also married Estrellita (petitioner), also a Muslim, in civil rights.
Zorayda filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the grounds of
bigamy: they misrepresented themselves as divorced and single, respectively, making the entries in the
marriage contract false and fraudulent.
Estrellita filed a motion dismiss and contended that since the 2 nd marriage was celebrated under Muslim rites,
jurisdiction should be with the Sharia courts.
RTC and CA dismissed the motion. Hence, the certiorari.
ISSUE(S): WON marriage was under Civil Code or Code of Muslim Personal Laws
WON RTC has jurisdiction
HELD: Marriage was under Civil Code.
RTC has jurisdiction.
Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.
RATIO:
As alleged in the complaint. Tamano and Estrellita were married under the Civil Code. It was never mentioned in the
motion to dismiss that they were married under Muslim laws.
Assuming they were also married under Muslim laws, it will still be under the general original jurisdiction of RTC. The
Code of Muslim Personal Laws does not provide a situation where parties were married both under civil law and muslim
law. Consequently, Sharia courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages
celebrated both under civil and Muslim laws.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The deficiency of special laws shall be supplied by the provisions of the Civil code (NCC 18).
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Geluz v. CA
[July 20, 1961]
TOPIC: Natural Persons / Birth
PONENTE: Reyes, JBL, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Oscar Lazo is the husband of Nita Villanueva. Nita had a total of three abortions from petitioner Antonio
Geluz.
Lazo was aware of, and even initiated, Nitas first two abortions: the first, before they got married; and the second, when
she was working for the COMELEC.
The third abortion was acquired without Lazos knowledge when he was campaigning in Cagayan. This gave rise to his
demand for damages from Geluz, based on Art. 2206 of the Civil Code.
The CFI and the CA both ruled in favor of Lazo, ordering Geluz to pay damages and attorneys fees.
ISSUE(S): WON Lazo, who voluntarily procured an abortion for Nita, may recover damages (on behalf of the aborted fetus) from
Geluz, who performed the abortion.
HELD: No, he may not. Decisions of the CFI and CA reversed; copy furnished to DOJ and Board of Medical Examiners for possible
action against Geluz.
RATIO:
Art. 2206 of the Civil Code does not apply to the unborn fetus, who is not endowed with personality.
o An action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or death pertains to the one injured. Because the fetus has
no juridical personality based on Arts. 40-41 of the Civil Code, it has no cause of action, let alone one that may
accrue to its parents.
Because the aborted fetus is already dead when it is separated from its mothers womb, it doesnt even have provisional
personality based on Art. 40, because the requirement is that it be born alive.
While the recourse of the parents could have been moral damages (2217) or exemplary damages (2230), their acts and
demeanor served as no basis for such because they themselves caused and consented to the abortions.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
A person with no juridical personality cannot be the source of actions.
A conceived child has personality, but only if it is later born alive.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S): N/A
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Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Pio Fragante
[80 Phil 776, 1948]
TOPIC: Commencement and Termination of Civil
Personality Natural Persons (Death)
PONENTE: Hilado, J.
AUTHOR: Villaseor, Pamela

NOTES:
FACTS:
Pedro Fragrante, a Filipino citizen, applied for a certificate of public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in
San Juan, Rizal. Fragrante dies while his application was still pending.
At the time of his death, his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service.
The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to the intestate estate of the deceased through
authorizing the said intestate estate with its special or judicial administrator, appointed by the Court, to maintain and
operate the plant.
Limjoco (petitioner) argues that the intestate estate of Fragrante cannot be substituted as applicant for the deceased
and is a contravention of law.
ISSUE: Is the intestate estate of Fragrante a juridical person?
HELD: YES. Therefore, the issuance of certificate of public convenience to the intestate estate of the deceased is valid.
RATIO:
Fragrante was a Filipino citizen and continued to be such until his death. His estate was able to financially maintain and operate.
His right to prosecute the application to its final conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse through his death. There
would be grave injustice for failure to recognize the said estate as a person for the quashing of the proceedings for no other
reason than his death would entail prejudicial results to his investment.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The estate obtains a personality of its own which can also be sued. The judicial administrator will take
in charge in representing the estate.
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Joaquin v Navarro
TOPIC: Death, doubt as to presumption of order of
death (NCC 43)
PONENTE: Tuason, J

Note:
Feb. 6, 1954 Battle for Liberation of Manila, spouses; Joaquin Navarro Sr., Angela Joaquin de Navarro, 3 daughters;
Pilar, Concepcion, Natividad, and son Joaquin Navarro Jr, and his wife Adela Conde, and friend Lopez sought refuge at
the ground floor of the German club
Building was packed with refugees, shells exploding around and the club was set on fire. Japanese started to shoot
people inside, especially those trying to escape 3 daughters were hit and fell to the ground
Navarro Sr. and Navarro Jr. decided to abandon the club, they could not convince Angela Joaquin. As they came out
Joaquin Jr. was shot in the head and dropped immediately
Minutes later the German Club collapsed, trapping people inside including presumably, Angela
Facts are from Lopezs sworn testimony
Court of Appeals states the order of death as (1) Three daughters, (2) Angela Joaquin de Navarro, (3) Joaquin Navarro,
Jr. and (4) Joaquin Navarro, Sr.
ISSUE(S):
WON mother died before son (vice versa)
HELD:
NO. Mother did not die before son. CA decision reversed to reflect that Joaquin Navarro Jr died first then the mother.
RATIO:
The son died first. Facts and evidence derived from Lopezs testimony proves this much.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Catalan v. Basa
[ G.R. NO. 159567, July 31, 2007 ]
TOPIC: NCC38
PONENTE: Puno, C.J.
FACTS:
In Oct. 20, 1948, Feliciano Catalan was discharged from military service due to the diagnosis of schizophrenia by the
Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs.
In Sept. 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo.
In June 16, 1951, Feliciano donated to his sister Mercedes Catalan 1/2 of the real property located in Pangasinan.
In Dec. 11, 1953, BPI filed a petition to declare Feliciano incompetent and so the RTC granted it and made BPI the
guardian.
In March 26, 1979, Mercedes, the sister of Feliciano, sold the disputed property to her children Delia and Jesus Basa and
was only registered in 1992.
In April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Felicianos guardian, filed a case for declaration of nullity against the deed of absolute sale
by Mercedes to her children because Feliciano was of unsound mind therefore incapable of giving consent. It also follows
that Mercedes would have no right to sell the property.
RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondents therefore dismissing BPIs complaint.
ISSUE:
WON the donation was valid.
HELD: YES.
BPI showed as evidence that as early as 1948, he was diagnosed with schizophrenia but SC stated it was insufficient.
According to the scientific studies mentioned, a person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his
competence to intelligently dispose his property. By merely alleging the existence of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to
show substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his
mental faculties.
Thus, the lower courts correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at the time he gave consent to the donation. He
was only declared incompetent or incapable to give consent to contracts in Dec. 22, 1953 by the RTC of Pangasinan.
DOCTRINE: Incompetency must be evidenced with substantial proof
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Mercado v. Espiritu
[37 Phil 215, 1917]
TOPIC: Restrictions on civil personality (minority)
PONENTE: Torres, J.


The Mercado siblings alleged that as the sole heirs to a 48 hectare tract of land which belonged to their mother, Espiritus sister.
According to the Mercado siblings, Espiritu cajoles, induced, and fraudulently succeeded in getting them to sell their land for a
sum of P400 as opposed to its original value. They demand the annulment of the sale; return the land to them, and the
remuneration of the thing benefited by Espiritu.
ISSUE(S): WON the contract is valid.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO:
Such sale was still valid since it was executed by minors, who have passed the ages of puberty and adolescence, and near the
adult age, and that the minors pretended that they had already reached their minority. These minors cannot be permitted
afterwards to excuse themselves from compliance with the obligation assumed by them or seek their annulment.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Carson, J., concurring:
If he who is a minor (1) deceitfully says or sets forth in an instrument that he is over twenty-five years of age, and this
assertion is believed by another person who takes him to be of about that age, (2) in an action at law he should be deemed to
be of the age he asserted, and should not (3) afterwards be released from liability on the plea that he was not of said age when
he assumed the obligation. The reason for this is that the law helps the deceived and not the deceivers.
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ATIZADO v PEOPLE
[633 SCRA 06, 2010]
TOPIC: Restrictions on capacity to act a. Minority:
Criminal liability
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Atizado and Monreal (minor) were convicted of murder for killing Rogelio Llona. The deceased and his common
law wife Mirandilla were attending a barangay fiesta when the incident happened.
CA affirmed the conviction and the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE(S): WON Monreal should also serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua
HELD: No. Decision affirmed but penalty for Monreal was modified to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as the minimum
period, to 14 years, 8 months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum period.
RATIO:
Monreal was proven to be a minor, when they committed the crime, based on affidavits, police blotter, and court minutes
even when his birth certificate was not presented to the trial.
Pursuant to Art. 68 (2) of the RPC: when the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of age, the penalty next lower than
the prescribed law is imposed.
Monreal has been detained for over 16 years and has already served his sentence. Therefore, he should be immediately
released.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Sec. 7 Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006: Minors shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is
proven to be 18 years old or older.
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US v. Vaquilar
[March 31, 1914]
TOPIC: Insanity re: criminal liability as a restriction
on the capacity to act
PONENTE: Trent, J.

FACTS:
Evaristo Vaquilar was convicted of parricide for killing his wife and his daughter.
His appeal was based on testimony by several witnesses who claimed that he was insane during and before the
commission of the crimes:
o Before the act, he had pains in his stomach and head
o His eyes were big and red; he would not have killed his wife and kids if he were not crazy
o He looked like a madman; cut everyone at random regardless of who it was
o He looked sad; crazy because he cut his sister
o And more!
Health officer did not notice whether defendant was suffering from mental derangement or not.
ISSUE(S): WON Vaquilar is insane, therefore, not guilty of parricide.
HELD: Not insane. Judgments affirmed.
RATIO:
Insanity is different from extreme passion or the failure to use reason or good judgment because of anger.
Crazy is not synonymous with insane.
It is not unnatural for a murderer to strike promiscuously when he is caught in the act.
His conduct in jail showed reflection and remorse.
Those who have not lost control of their reason by mental unsoundness are bound to control their tempers and restrain
their passions, and are liable to the law if they do not.
The presumption is that the person is sane. The burden of proof when alleging insanity as a defense falls upon the
defense who alleges it. It requires positive evidence that criminal intent was not present because of the insanity, and
that the offense was a direct result of that insanity; enough to overcome the presumption of sanity.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Insanity, as a defense, must be shown by the defense, through positive evidence, to have been the cause of the offense.
Insanity is not the same as an inability to control ones temper or a lack of judgment.
Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 193237, 2012]
TOPIC: Restrictions on Civil Capacity (Restrictions
on capacity to act Civil interdiction)
PONENTE: Carpio, J.

NOTES:
FACTS:
Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte in the May 2010 elections. Jalosjos
was running for his third term.
Cardino filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to deny due course and to cancel the certificate
of candidacy of Jalosjos. It was alleged that Jalosjos made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy
when he declared under oath that he was eligible for the Office of Mayor. Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed
his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos had already been convicted by final judgment for robbery and sentenced to prisin
mayor by the RTC Cebu and have not served his sentence.
Jalosjos admitted his conviction but stated that he had already been granted probation. Cardino countered that the RTC
revoked Jalosjos probation. Jalosjos refuted Cardino and stated that the RTC issued an Order declaring that Jalosjos had
duly complied with the order of probation.
Jalosjos further stated that during the 2004 elections the COMELEC denied a petition for disqualification filed against him
on the same grounds.
COMELEC First Division ruled in favor of Cardino and found that Jalosjos certificate of compliance of probation was
fraudulently issued; thus, Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. Therefore, he is not eligible to run.
ISSUE: Did COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it disqualified Jalosjos
to run as Mayor?
HELD: No.
RATIO:
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a false statement in a certificate of candidacy that a candidate is
eligible to run for public office is a false material representation is a ground for disqualification. Jalosjos certificate of
candidacy was void from the start since he was not eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed his certificate
of candidacy. Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time.
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The penalty of prisin mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the accessory penalties of temporary
absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification, both would constitute ineligibilities to be elected or hold
public office.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Revised Penal Code
Art. 31. Effect of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification. The penalties of perpetual or
temporal special disqualification for public office, profession or calling shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected;
2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or during the term of the sentence
according to the extent of such disqualification.
Art. 34. Civil interdiction. Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of
parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to
manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
Art. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal; Their accessory penalties. The penalties of reclusion perpetua
and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the
case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to
the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
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Reyes v COMELEC
TOPIC: Alienage (1987 Constitution, ART IV Sec 1-5)
PONENTE: Perez, J

Note: Art IV, Sec 1-5 is about citizenship
Oct. 31, 2012 Joseph Socorro Tan filed before COMELEC an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the
Ceriticate of Candicacy of petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes on the ground that it contained material
misrepresentations
Among which were that she stated (1) she was not a permanent resident of another country when in fact, she is a
permanent resident or an immigrant of the USA and (2) that she is a Filipino citizen, but in fact she is an American
citizen
March 27, 2013 cancelled the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner
April 8, 2013 Reyes filed for Motion for Reconsideration stating that she was a Filipino citizen
May 14, 2013 COMELEC denied her motion
May 18, 2013 Reyes was declared the winner of the 2013 election
June 5, 2013 COMELEC issued a Certificate of Finality declaring their Resolution (May 14 decision) final and executory,
on the same day Reyes took her oath of office
Reyes has yet to assume office at the time because her term officially starts at noon of June 30, 2013
Reyes assails through a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction
resolution of the COMELEC ordering the cancellation of Reyes
ISSUE(S):
WON Reyes is a Filipino citizen
HELD:
NO. Reyes is not a Fililpino citizen.
Petition is dismissed and May 14 decision is upheld.
RATIO:
Tan submitted to Bureau of Immigration evidence showing that Reyes is a holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of
a balikbayan. For Reyes to reacquire her citizenship, she must take an oath of allegiance, and make a personal sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship (RA 9225). Reyes did none of these requirements, and as it stands she remains to be
an American citizen. This makes her ineligible to run and hold any elective public office in the PHL.
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CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Olaguer v. Parugganan
[ G.R. NO. 158907, February 12, 2007 ]
TOPIC: NCC38
PONENTE: Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner was the owner of 60k shares of stocks of Businessday Corporation with a total par value of Php600k and was
against the Marcos dictatorship.
While anticipating to be arrested because of the Marcos dictatorship, petitioner then made an oral agreement with Raul
Locsin, Enrique Joaquin and Hector Hilofena, that they would support petitoners family with his salary. And also made an
SPA appointing them 3 as his attorney-in-fact for selling or transferring the petitioners shares with Businessday for the
purpose of concealing that he was a stockholder of Businessday, in the event of a military crackdown against the
Marcos.
The parties acknowledged the SPA before respondent Emilio Purugganan, Jr., who was then the Corporate Secretary of
Businessday, and at the same time, a notary public for Quezon City.
In Dec. 24 1979, petitioner was arrested by the Marcos military and detained for committing arson. During the
petitioner's detention, Locsin ordered Purugganan to cancel petitioner's shares in the books of the corporation and to
transfer them to respondent Locsin's name.
When petitioner was finally released from detention in 1986, he discovered that he was no longer registered as
stockholder of Businessday. He also learned that Purugganan, had already recorded the transfer of shares in favor of
Locsin, while petitioner was detained. When petitioner demanded that respondents restore to him full ownership of his
shares of stock, they refused to do so.
On 29 July 1986, petitioner filed this petition against Purugganan and Locsin to declare the sale of the shares of stock as
illegal, to restore to the petitioner full ownership of the shares.
RTC ruled in favor of respondents stating that the sale was valid and petitioner intended to sell the shares to anyone
including Locsin.
CA affirmed stating that granting that there was no perfected contract of sale, petitioner ratified the sale to Locsin by his
receipt of the purchase price (The 600k), and his failure to raise any protest over the said sale.
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ISSUE:
WON the sale is valid
HELD: YES.
In petitioners allegations, he stated that the authority of the afore-named agents to sell the shares of stock was limited
to the following conditions:
1. In the event of the petitioner's absence and incapacity; and
2. For the limited purpose of applying the proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of petitioner's subsisting obligations
with the companies adverted to in the SPA.
He wanted to apply a strict definition of absence and incapacity wherein "a person disappears from his domicile, his
whereabouts being unknown, without leaving an agent to administer his property," pursuant to NCC381 and NCC38:
a. ART 381. When a person disappears from his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, and without leaving an agent
to administer his property, the judge, at the instance of an interested party, a relative, or a friend, may appoint a
person to represent him in all that may be necessary.
b. ART. 38 Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere
restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person, from certain obligations, as when the
latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements.
If we apply NCC381 and NCC38, it would negate the effect of the SPA by creating absurd, if not impossible, legal
situations.
Petitioner did not give evidence that he was in debt with Businessday at the time he had executed the SPA. Nor could he
have considered incurring any debts since he admitted that, at the time of its execution, he was concerned about his
possible arrest, death and disappearance.
Petitioner alleges that the purported sale between himself and Locsin of the disputed shares is void since it contravenes
Article 1491 of the Civil Code, which provides that:
a. ART. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or
through the mediation of another: x x x x
2. Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been entrusted to them, unless the consent of the
principal has been given; x x x.
However, NCC1491 is not absolute due to CAs ruling.
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Umale v. ASB Realty Corporation
[G.R. 181126, June 15, 2011]
TOPIC: Restrictions on capacity to act (Insolvency
and Trusteeship
PONENTE: Del Castillo, J.


1996: Amethyst Pearl executed a Deed of Assignment in Liquidation of a parcel of land in favor of ASB Realty in consideration of
Amethyst Pearls outstanding capital stock from ASB Realty making ASB Realty the owner of the parcel of land.
Sometime in 2003: ASB Realty commenced an action in the MTC for unlawful detainer against Umale. ASB Realty alleged that it
entered into a lease contract with Umale for the period June 1, 1999-May 31, 2000. Their agreement was for Umale to conduct a
pay-parking business on the property and pay a monthly rent of P60,720.00. Upon the contract's expiration on continued
occupying the premises and paying rentals.
June 2003: ASB Realty served on Umale a Notice of Termination of Lease and Demand to Vacate and Pay. ASB Realty stated that
it was terminating the lease effective midnight of June 30, 2003.Umale failed to comply with ASB Realty's demands and
continued in possession of the subject premises, even constructing commercial establishments thereon.
ISSUE(S): Can a corporate officer of ASB Realty (duly authorized by the Board of Directors) file suit to recover an unlawfully
detained corporate property despite the fact that the corporation had already been placed under rehabilitation?
HELD: Yes
RATIO:
- What petitioners argue is that the corporate officer of ASB Realty is incapacitated to file this suit to recover a corporate
property because ASB Realty has a duly-appointed rehabilitation receiver. Allegedly, this rehabilitation receiver is the
only one that can file the instant suit.
- Corporations, such as ASB Realty, are juridical entities that exist by operation of law. As a creature of law, the powers
and attributes of a corporation are those set out, expressly or impliedly, in the law.
- Corporate Rehabilitations concept of preserving the corporations business as a going concern while it is undergoing
rehabilitation is called debtor-in-possession or debtor-in-place.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Corporate rehabilitation is defined as the restoration of the debtor to as position of successful operation and solvency, if it is
shown that its continuance of operation is economically feasible and its creditors can recover by way of the present value of
payments projected in the plan more if the corporation continues as a going concern than if it is immediately liquidated
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45
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HEIRS of FAVIS v GONZALES
[713 SCRA 569, 2010]
TOPIC: Restrictions on capacity to act k. Physical
incapacity/disease
PONENTE: Perez, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN
Dr. Favis and his sneaky, greedy 2nd wife.

Dr. Favis was married to Capitolina and had children with her. After she died, he took in Juana as his common-law
wife (they eventually got married). They had one child, Mariano, with whom they had four grandchildren.
In 1992, he was diagnosed with Parkinsons disease, kidney trouble, hernia, etc.
In 1994, he allegedly executed a Deed of Donation transferring and conveying parts of his estate in favor of his
grandchildren with Juana.
In 1995, Dr. Favis died.
Dr Favis children with Capitolina filed an action for annulment of the deed, claiming that it prejudiced their
legitime.
RTC found that Dr. Favis, at the age of 92, plagued with illnesses, could not have had full control of his mental
capacities to execute a valid Deed of Donation. It nullified the deed on the ground of vitiated consent.
CA dismissed the complaint solely because of Art. 151 FC: that it was not alleged that there was earnest efforts
toward a compromise, and that it had failed.
ISSUE(S): WON the deed of donation is valid.
HELD: No. CA decision was set aside. RTC decision affirmed.
RATIO:
CA did not touch on the correctness of the findings of RTC. CA chose to confine its review to the procedural aspect.
RTCs findings, therefore, stands unreversed.
RTC decision: The fact that the deed of donation was only executed after Dra. Mercedes (his daughter from 1 st marriage)
left his fathers house necessarily indicates that they dont want the same to be known by the first family, which is an
indicia of bad faith on the part of the defendant, who at the time had influence over the donor.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Physical incapacity brought by illness is a restriction on capacity to act.
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Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr.
[March 29, 1995]
TOPIC: Effect and Retroactivity of Family Code
PONENTE: Quiason, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Lupo Atienza alleges Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Respondent Judge Francisco
Brillantes, Jr.
December 1991 Atienza found Brillantes sleeping in his bed, and was told that Brillantes was cohabiting with his baby
mama, Yolanda De Castro, even though Brillantes was allegedy married to a Zenaida Ongkiko.
Brillantes claims that he is not married to Ongkiko, because, despite having two marriage ceremonies (Nueva Ecija, April
1965; and Manila, June 1965), they didnt have a marriage license in either one. Ongkiko abandoned Brillantes 19 years
ago.
Brillantes married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles on December 4, 1991, supposedly believing that he was single
because his first marriage/s had no license/s.
Brillantes also claims that his remarriage did not require a judicial declaration of nullity because the first marriage was
not governed by the Family Code.
ISSUE(S): WON Brillantes acted immorally by getting remarried without a judicial declaration of nullity.
HELD: Yes, his acts were immoral. Dismissed from legal service.
RATIO:
Art. 40 of the Family Code applies to marriages entered into after its effectivity regardless of when prior marriages took
place.
Art. 256 of the FC gives the FC retroactive effect as long as vested rights are not impaired. This is especially true fir Art.
40 of the FC because it is a rule of procedure.
Brillantes cannot invoke good faith because he was already a lawyer, thus aware of the laws, when he twice got
married in 1965.
Brillantes cohabitation with De Castro took place when he was already in the judiciary.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
No vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws, therefore, procedural laws are generally retroactive.
There is no duality of morality. A public figure is judged by his private life.
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48
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Goitia v. Campos Rueda
[35 Phil. 22, 1916]
TOPIC: Marriage and Personal Relations between
Spouses
PONENTE: Trent, J.

NOTES:
FACTS:
Parties were legally married and have been living together for a month in their conjugal dwelling.
The wife (petitioner) was maltreated after refusing the demands of her husband (respondent) to perform lascivious and
unchaste acts on his genitals.
She left the conjugal dwelling.
CFI ruled in favor of respondent and stated that petitioner could not compel her husband to support her except in the
conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from respondent as Art. 149
provides that the person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it, either by paying the pension that may be
fixed or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the person having the right to the same.
ISSUE: Can the wife compel her husband to give her support outside the conjugal home?
HELD: Yes.
RATIO:
Art. 149 of the Civil Code is not absolute." but it is insisted that there existed a preexisting or preferential right in each
of these cases which was opposed to the removal of the one entitled to support.
The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away
from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts.
In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of
the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal
home.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Espinosa v Omaa
TOPIC: Stipulations in marriage (FC 1, NCC 221)
PONENTE: Carpio, J

Note: Art 221 cant be found in NCC, but accdg. to Atty. Legardas
outline, this is the pertinent provision

Complaint for disbarment by Rodolfo Espinosa and Maximo Glindo against Atty. Julieta Omaa, for violating her oath as a
lawyer, malpractice and gross misconduct in office
Nov. 17, 1997 Espinosa and wife Marantal sough Omaas legal advice on whether they an LEGALLY live separately and
dissolve their marriage. Omaa answered in the affirmative and prepared a document entitled, Kasunduan ng
Paghihiwalay
Espinosa and Marantal fully convinced that the document was valid and the marriage dissolved, the couple strated
implementing the terms and conditions of the document. However against the terms and conditions, Marantal took
custody of all the children and took possession of most of their properties
Espinosa then sought Glindos (law grad) advice who informed him that the document is VOID
Espinosa and Glindo then filed a complaint before the IBP-CBD (Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar
Discipline) against Omaa
Omaa admitted to seeing the couple but denied that she authored the document, she alleges that it was her part time
worker who forged her signature to notarize it
ISSUE(S):
WON document is valid
HELD:
NO. Constract is not valid, it is VOID.
Court upheld IBP-CBD decision suspending Omaa for 1 year from her law practice, and 2 years from notary public
RATIO:
Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is VOID.
Referring to NCC 221 (cant be found on NCC now, so Ill put this here)
Art 221. The following shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;
(2) Extrajudicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute
community of property between husband and wife;
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(3) Every collusion to obtain a decree of legal separation, or of annulment of maariage
(4) Any simulated alienation of property with intent to deprive the compulsory heirs of their legitime
The extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is VOID.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Hermosisima v. CA
1960-09-30 | G.R. No. L-14628
TOPIC: Moral damages in breach of
promise to marry
PONENTE: Concepcion, J.
FACTS:
Since 1950, Soledad was a teacher in Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner Francisco Hermosisima
(F.H.), who was almost 10 years younger than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although
he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto.
In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter in Cebu, where intimacy developed among her
and the F.H., since one evening, in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin
which they had a child named Chris Hermosisima, as a result.
On July 24, 1954, Francisco married Romanita Perez which prompted this action for support and damages.
F.H. acknowledged the support of their child Chris Hermosisima but denied the fact that he promised to marry Soledad.
But RTC ruled in favor of Soledad stating:
a. Ordering Francisco to pay to the said child, through Soledad, the sum of P30, payable on or before the 5th day of
every month;
b. Sentencing him to pay to Soledad the sum of P4,500 for actual and compensatory damages;
c. The sum of P5,000 as moral damages; and
d. The further sum of P500 as attorney's fees for Soledad
CA affirmed decision but increased the amount of damages:
a. P5,614.25 for actual and compensatory damages; and
b. P7,000 for moral damages
ISSUE:
WON Soledad can recover moral damages
HELD: NO.
Our Congress eliminated Art. 56-65 due to the history of breach of promise to marry suits in the US and England has
shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous man. It is this
experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Balm suits in many of the American States.
CA also erred in stating that F.H. committed seduction as contemplated in Art. 337 and 338 of RPC.
SC stated that petitioner is not morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is 10 years younger than Soledad, who
was around 36 years old, but, also because, the RTC found that, Soledad "surrendered herself" to F.H. because she was
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"overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they
had the benefit of clergy."
Mariategui v. CA
[205 SCRA 337]
TOPIC: Requisites for valid marriage
PONENTE: Bidin, J.


June 26, 1953: Lupo Mariategui died w/o a will. He contacted 3 marriages; 4 children with his first wife; a daughter with his
second wife; and 3 with his third wife.
Dec. 2, 1967: Lupos descedantsby his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition of a lot in
Muntinlupa.
April 23, 1973: Lupos children by his third marriages filed with the lower court an amended complaint that they were deprived
of their respective shares in the lots.
ISSUE(S): WON Lupo and his third wife were legally married
HELD: Yes
RATIO: Lupo communicated to his son by his third wife that they were able to get married before a Justice of Peace of Taguig,
Rizal on 1930. The court held that the laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as huband and wofe, have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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VDA. DE MIJARES v VILLALUZ
[274 SCRA 2, 1997]
TOPIC: Kinds of requisites of a valid marriage &
effects of non-compliance
PONENTE: Regalado, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN
Sham Marriage with Your Honor

Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. De Mijares married retired Justice Villaluz.
The two had a heated argument during their honeymoon. A woman answered Justice Villaluz phone when Judge
Mijares called the formers phone. The confrontation went bad which prompted them to live separately since then.
Four months later, Judge Mijares was informed that Justice Villaluz married another woman.
Judge Mijares filed to the SC this disbarment case against Justice Villaluz for gross immorality and grave
misconduct when he entered into a bigamous marriage. (She also filed a bigamy case with RTC)
Justice Villaluz averred that he only penned a sham marriage with Judge Mijares to help her with the
administrative case for immorality filed against her.
ISSUE(S): WON the marriage between the judge and the justice is valid
HELD: Yes. All the essential and formal requisites of marriage are present.
Justice Villaluz was suspended for 2 years.
RATIO:
The sham marriage theory of Justice Villaluz was too incredible to deserve serious consideration.
Regardless of the intention of Villaluz in saying I do with Mijares before a competent authority, all ingredients of a valid
marriage were present. His consent was freely given.
For the sake of argument that the annulment of his first marriage has not yet attained finality, it only makes his marriage
with Mijares voidable and did not necessarily render it void.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
When a marriage satisfies all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage, it is, therefore, undoubtedly a valid
marriage.
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Silverio v. Republic
[October 19, 2007]
TOPIC: Nature of Marriage in Philippine Law /
Gender as an Essential Requisite of Marriage / many
more
PONENTE: Corona, J.

NOTES: sex change = entry change
FACTS:
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, born male, is transsexual. He became a woman via hormone treatment, breast
augmentation in the US, and sex reassignment surgery in Thailand (where else?).
Later, she (see what I did there?) got engaged to Richard Edel, an American. Silverio then sought to change her name
and sex in her birth certificate to Mely and female, respectively.
The RTC of Manila decided in favor of Silverio, ordering the civil registrar to change the entries.
Afterwards, the OSG (/Republic) filed a petition to the CA, claiming that there was no law allowing the change of entries
in the birth certificate due to sex alteration. The CA ruled in favor of the Republic, saying that the RTCs decision lacked
legal basis.
Silverio then came to the SC, citing Arts. 407-413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court, and RA
9048.
ISSUE(S): WON Silverio can have her name and sex in her birth certificate changed to fit her sex alteration.
HELD: No, she may not. Petition denied.
RATIO:
Based on RA 9048, which covers clerical and typographical errors, the petition fails because:
o The remedy was administrative, not yet judicial. It should have been filed with the local civil registrar at the Office
of the Civil Registrar where the birth certificate in question is kept.
o Silverio was not prejudiced by the use of her original name because sex reassignment does not make her a real
woman. (Blame Corona for this crap)
o The change of sex in the birth cert. is not merely clerical.
There is no legal basis for the correction of entries
o Entries under Art. 412 of the Civil Code, which are correctable under Rule 108, are provided for in Arts. 407 and
408 of the Civil Code; but they do not cover corrections due to sex reassignment.
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o Art. 407 authorizes the entry of acts, events, and judicial decrees into the civil register, which may alter legal
capacity, status, and nationality. Sex reassignment is not one of them.
o Art. 413 provides that special laws shall govern matters pertaining to civil status. There is no special law
governing sex reassignment and its effects.
The sex of a person is determined at birth, and is immutable in the absence of any errors.
Courts must apply the law, not amend it; and since the Family Code says man and woman, and a sex-reassigned
woman is not a woman, she cannot be given the status that would allow her to violate that. It is in the hands of the
legislature to enact a law governing sex alterations.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
A persons sex is a part of that persons legal capacity and civil status, and thus, an essential factor in marriage and
family relations.
Courts may only interpret and apply the law, not make or amend it.
Name changes require substantial and compelling reasons, if not due to clerical errors.
Changes in civil registry entries may only be corrections, or alterations as provided by law.
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Garcia v. Recio
[365 SCRA 437, 2001]
TOPIC: Absence of impediment
PONENTE: Panganiban, J.

NOTES:
FACTS:
March 1, 1987 - Roderick Recio, a Filipino citizen, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen. They lived
together in Australia.
May 18, 1989 - An Australian family court issued a decree of divorce.
June 26, 1992 - Recio obtained Australian citizenship.
January 12, 1994 - Recio and Grace Garcia, a Filipino citizen, got married. They lived together in Australia.
October 22, 1995 - They lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
May 16, 1996 - Their conjugal assets were divided in accordance with the Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
March 3, 1998 - Garcia filed a Complaint for Nullity of Marriage on the grounds of bigamy. She claimed that Recio was
incapacitated to marry her because of his prior marriage to Editha Samson.
July 7, 1998 - Recio obtained a divorce decree from a Sydney family court. He then filed a motion to dismiss. OSG agreed.
RTC decided that the marriage was dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized
in the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Was the divorce between Recio and Samson valid?
HELD:
The case was remanded to RTC to determine his legal capacity to marry Garcia.
RATIO:
In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Art. 26 of the Family Code allow the Filipino to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. To
be admitted as evidence, the divorce decree must be proven as a public record of a foreign country by (1) an official
publication, or (2) a certified true copy (attestation). If the record is not kept in the Philippines, it must be authenticated
and certified by a diplomatic or consular officer in a Philippine embassy/consulate in the foreign country.
The divorce decree between Recio and Samson appeared authentic but compliance with the rules on evidence was not
demonstrated.
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The divorce obtained by Recio to Samson was restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry.
The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. Recio did not submit a
certificate of legal capacity as required in Art. 21 of the Family Code.
Anaya v Palaroan (Nov. 26, 1970)

TOPIC: Effect of fraud FC 45 (3), FC 46, NCC 13381344
PONENTE: REYES, J.B.L., J

Note: Art. 86 is from old CC, refer to FC 45 and FC 46, specifically 46!!
1953 Aurora and Fernando married, a month later Fernando filed an action for annulment of their marriage on the
ground that his consent to the marriage was obtained through force and intimidation
The action was then dismissed, and the validity of the marriage was upheld. Auroras counterclaim was then granted.
While the amount for the counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando admitted that several months prior to their
wedding, he had a pre-marital relationship with his close relative
Aurora alleges that this non-divulgement of Fernandos pre-marital relationship constituted in fraud to obtain her consent
to marry
Aurora now prays for the annulment of their marriage on this ground (non-divulgement as fraud), and moral damages
ISSUE(S):
WON non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of
marriage.
HELD:
NO. This is not considered fraud, and therefore a ground for annulment of marriage.
Appealed decision is upheld.
RATIO:
The FRAUD being discussed in this case does not include non-disclosure of a pre-marital relationship. NCC only admits to (1)
misrepresentation as to identity, (2) non-disclosure of previous conviction of a crime, and (3) concealment by wife of the fact
that at the time of marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband (NCC 86). It is clear that non-disclosure of a
pre-marital relationship does not fall in any of those stated. Further, the last paragraph of Art. 86 states that no other
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misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune, or chastity shall constitute fraud as will give grounds for action for
the annulment of marriage.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Villanueva v. CA
G.R. No. 132955. October 27, 2006
TOPIC: Effect of force, intimidation and
undue influence, FC 45 (4)
PONENTE: Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva (O.V.) and respondent Lilia Villanueva (L.V.) got married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto
Princesa, Palawan.
On Nov. 17, 1992, Orlando filed for annulment of their marriage due to:
a. Threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying L.V., who was already pregnant but did not get her pregnant
before their marriage. The threats alleged by O.V. were;
1. The harassing phone calls from L.V. and strangers;
2. The unwanted visits by 3 men at the premises of the U.E. after his classes thereat; and
3. The threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of NPA whom O.V. claimed to have been
hired by L.V. and who accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan to marry her.
b. That he never cohabited with her even after their marriage; and
c. That the child died during delivery on Aug. 28, 1988.
L.V. as defense states that:
a. O.V. freely and voluntarily married her;
b. O.V. stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month after their marriage;
c. O.V. wrote letters to her containing expressions of love for her after O.V. returned to Manila; and
d. O.V. knew the progress of the pregnancy;
RTC ruled in favor of respondent L.V., which CA affirmed. But CA reduced the damages stated by the RTC.
ISSUE:
WON the annulment will prosper
HELD: NO.
SC affirms the decision of CA that O.V. freely and voluntarily married L.V.:
a. It took 4 yrs. and 8 mos. For O.V. to file this case unexplained;
b. Found basis on L.V.s allegations that O.V. only wants this annulment case to prosper to be acquitted of his pending
bigamy case; and
c. There was 13 letters but he acknowledged the 7 letters and denied the other 6 but subsequently, he also denied the
7 alleging he was threatened and forced to admit it.
SC was not convinced by the alleged threats of L.V. to deprive him of his will to enter the marriage:
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a. He was a security guard in a bank and it only follows that it is reasonable to assume that he knew the rudiments of
self-defense or at least to keep himself out of harms way;
b. He never sought the assistance of security personnel in U.E. nor the police regarding the alleged threats; and
c. Neither did he inform the judge who performed their marriage about his alleged predicament.
SC was also not convinced that there was fraud on the part of L.V. regarding the child:
a. O.V.s counsel stated that O.V. had sex with L.V. in a hotel with L.V. on top on January 1988.
b. He also was not right in saying that the child of L.V. died in Aug. 29, 1989. Because in the Civil Registrar, it was
recorded that the child died in Aug. 29, 1988.
Also, lack of cohabitation between them is not a ground for annulment (DOCTRINE).
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Abanag vs. Mabute
[AM P-11-2922, 2011]
TOPIC: Breach of promise to marry
PONENTE: Brion, J.


Administrative case against Mabute, a court stenographer in MCTC in Samar filed by Abanag for disgraceful and
immoral conduct.
They met in Singles For Christ, then fell in love. He professed his undying love for her.
When she became pregnant, he took her to the manghihilot to have the baby aborted. When she refused, Mabute
turned cold and eventually left her.
Mabute denies the allegations. He said that a co-employee who resent him did this to harass him.
ISSUE(S): Does his action amount to gross and immoral conduct?
HELD: No.
RATIO:
We find it evident that the sexual relations between the complainant and the respondent were consensual. Mere sexual
relations between two unmarried and consenting adults are not enough to warrant administrative sanction for illicit
behavior. The Court has repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married,
where both are not under any impediment to marry and where no deceit exists, is neither a criminal nor an unprincipled
act that would warrant disbarment or disciplinary action.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The Court defined immoral conduct as conduct that is willful, flagrant or shameless, and that shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.
To justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act
is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or an act so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible
to a high degree.
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Avenido vs. Avenido
[GR No. 173540, 2014]
TOPIC: Nature of marriage in the Philippines
PONENTE: Perez, J.


This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to the same man,
Eustaquio Avenido, now deceased.
1942 Tecla was married to Eustaquio in Talibon, Bohol by the parish priest. Records were destroyed due to WW2
1954 Eustaquio left his family.
1979 Eustaquio married Peregrina in St. Jude Parish in Davao City.
1989 Eustaquio died.
Tecla presented evidence of marriage: 1) Testimonies of witness that marriage happened, 2) Documentary
evidence of certificate of loss of marriage certificate from the Office of the Civil Registrar in Bohol, certification
that files were destroyed during 1932 to early part of 1945 due to WW2, certificate of marriage given by the
parish priest, birth certificates of their children.
CA ruled in favor of Tecla. Peregrina appeals.
ISSUE(S): WON the evidence presented during the trial proves the existence of the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.
HELD: YES
RATIO:
There was a presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and
wife and begot four (4) children and supported by documentary and testimonial evidence.
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the
marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony
and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the
due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence
testimonial and documentarymay be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Fuentes vs. Roca
[GR. No. 178902, 2010]
TOPIC: Effect and retroactivity
PONENTE: Abad, J.

NOTES:

October 11, 1982 Sabina Tarroza sold a parcel of land to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of
absolute sale.
1988 - Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the Fuentes spouses (petitioners). The agreement required the Fuentes
spouses to pay Tarciano a down payment of P60,000.00 for the transfer of the lots title to him. Within six months,
Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario
Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale.
Atty. Plagata fixed all the requirements of the sale and he allegedly went to see Rosario in one of his trips to
Manila and had her sign an affidavit of consent. He then notarized the said affidavit.
1989 Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale.
1990 Tarciano died.
1997 Respondents (children of Tarciano and Rosario) filed an action of annulment of sale since their mother did
not give consent to the sale.
Petitioners contend that Rosario gave her consent as evidenced by the affidavit that was notarized bearing her
signature and that four year prescriptive period on filing already elapsed.
ISSUE(S):
1. WON Rosarios signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarcianos sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes
spouses was forged;
2. WON the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already prescribed; and
3. WON only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to annul that sale.
HELD:
1. YES. Different strokes.
2. NO.
3. NO. Heirs can bring an action to annul the sale.
RATIO:
The law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got
married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989.
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While its Article 165 made Tarciano the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article 166 prohibited him from
selling commonly owned real property without his wifes consent.
Still, if he sold the same without his wifes consent, the sale is not void but merely voidable. Article 173 gave Rosario the
right to have the sale annulled during the marriage within ten years from the date of the sale.
Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her
husbands sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouses written consent or a court order
allowing the sale, the same would be void.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Jalosjos vs. COMELEC
[GR. No. 191970, 2012]
TOPIC: Natural persons
PONENTE: Abad, J.
AUTHOR: Pam

Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and acquired Australian citizenship.
On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother in Barangay Veterans
Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then renounced his Australian
citizenship in September 2009.
He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in the Municipality of Ipil. His
application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was eventually granted
by the Election Registration Board.
A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by Erasmo before the MCTC. Said
petition was denied. It was then appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the lower court's decision.
On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province.
Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one
year residency requirement of the local government code.
COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a gubernatorial candidate and
failed to show ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en banc affirmed the
decision.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
HELD: Yes. Court ruled in favor of Jalosjos.
RATIO:
The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a resident of the
province for at least one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is
synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have
personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every
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person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a
new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.
It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the residency requirement
for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.
He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he
reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being
issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited
his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else
except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived and a fish pond in San
Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders, including local and national partymates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga Sibugay.
While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the COMELEC, this does not prevent
it from exercising its review powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant
considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.
Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court will respect
the decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life to
their manifest will.
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Jimenez v. Republic of the Philippines
[109 Phil 27, 1960]
TOPIC: Effect of physical incapacity
PONENTE: Padilla, J.


August 3, 1950: Jimenez and Canizares got married before a judge of the municicpal court of Zamboanga City
June 7, 1955: Jimenez filed an annulment case upon the ground that the orifice of her genitals ir vagina was too small to allow
the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation
ISSUE(S): WON marriage may be annulled on sole testimony of husband that his wife is impotent
HELD: No
RATIO:
- The annulment of the marriage was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give
testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. The husbands testimony
must be proven by physical examination.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Art. 45 (5): A marriage may be annulled if either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other,
and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable (impotency)
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Alcazar vs. Alcazar
[GR No. 174451, 2009]
TOPIC: Effect of physical incapacity/impotence


This is a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage by Veronica Alcazar. She was married to respondent Rey
Alcazar.
When they went back to Manila after the wedding the respondent did not live with petitioner. He left for Saudi
Arabia to work.
The couple did not communicate the whole time he was abroad despite numerous attempts by petitioner to call
him. She even had to find out her husband was coming home to the Philippines from a co-teacher about a year
and a half after respondent left for Riyadh.
Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in the Philippines, the latter did not go
home to petitioner in Manila; instead, respondent proceeded to his parents house in Occidental Mindoro. She
asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never contacted her.
Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her,
providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code
of the Philippines (Family Code).
There was also no more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and respondent. RTC of Malolos City
dismissed the Complaint, a decision later affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not, as defined by the law and jurisprudence, respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations.
HELD: No
RATIO:
The Court scrutinized the totality of evidence presented by petitioner and found that the same was not enough to
sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners evidence, particularly her and her
mothers testimonies, merely established the facts in the complaint. These testimonies though do not give us much
insight into respondents psychological state.
Dr. Tayags psychological report concluding that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder,
traceable to the latters experiences during his childhood, did not help petitioners cause. It must be noted that Tayag
was not able to personally examine respondent. Tayag, in evaluating respondents psychological state, had to rely on
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information provided by petitioner, who was hardly impartial.
The Court emphasized that the burden falls upon petitioner to prove that the respondent is truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal, or a neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations.
Presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. In the case at bar, petitioner failed to persuade us that
respondents failure to communicate with petitioner since leaving for Saudi Arabia to work, and to live with petitioner
after returning to the country, are grave psychological maladies that are keeping him from knowing and/or complying
with the essential obligations of marriage.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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REPUBLIC v CA
[236 SCRA 257, 1994]
TOPIC: Formal requisites Marriage license
PONENTE: Puno, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN
Family Code took effect on Aug. 3, 1988.

1970: Castro (private respondent) and Cardenas were married in civil rights.
Only a year after marriage that they decided to live together when Castro became pregnant. But their
cohabitation lasted for only four months.
Before migrating to US, Castro filed for judicial declaration of nullity for lack of marriage license.
Civil Registry issued a certification that there are no records of their marriage license.
She alleged that it was only Cardenas who was present during the processing of the license and that she only
affixed her signature to it on the day of their wedding.
RTC ruled that the inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that
there was no marriage license issued.
CA reversed and declared the marriage void ab initio.
ISSUE(S): Is CA correct in declaring the marriage void ab initio?
HELD: Yes. CA decision affirmed.
RATIO:
CA considered the inability of the civil registrar to find any records of the marriage license as having the marriage license
inexistent. This is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record.A written
statement signed by an officer having custody of an official record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record
or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided,
is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
Considering that the marriage was held in 1970, Art 80., NCC shall govern, wherein no marriage shall be solemnized
without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage,
absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, marriage license was an essential requisite of a valid marriage.
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Abbas v. Abbas
[689 SCRA 647, 2013]
TOPIC: Formal Requisites Marriage License
PONENTE: Velasco, Jr., J.

NOTES:
FACTS:
This is a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage between Syed Azzar Abbas (Syed), a Pakistani, and Gloria Goo
Abbas (Gloria), a Filipino citizen. They married at a Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.
Syed was in his mother in laws residence in the Philippines. He was told that he will undergo a certain ceremony but he
did not know what kind. He signed a document with Gloria. He claimed that he did not know it was a marriage ceremony
until Gloria told him.
In the marriage contract, it is stated that a marriage license was issued in Carmona, Cavite. He testified that he never
went to Carmona, Cavite to acquire a marriage license nor reside in the area. Their marriage license number was
registered under the name of another couple as testified by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite.
On cross examination, Syed testified that Gloria filed bigamy cases against him and that he went to Carmona, Cavite to
check the validity of their marriage license.
Gloria testified that a certain Qualin was the one who acquired their marriage license for them.
Testimonies: Rev. Dauz (that he solemnized the marriage and there was a valid marriage certificate), Atty. Sanchez (that
he was a sponsor and he requested for Qualin to get a marriage license), Felicitas Goo (that her daughter married Syed
and asked for the help of Atty. Sanchez to secure a marriage license).
RTC No valid marriage license was issued and declared the marriage void ab initio.
CA It was in favor of Gloria. It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to make a diligent search
of the marriage license of Gloria and Syed and there were sufficient testimonies saying that they were validly married.
Petition was reversed.
ISSUE: Was there a valid marriage license?
HELD: No. Petition granted. CA decision reversed and set aside. RTC ruling reinstated.
RATIO:
Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license and relied on the marriage certificate and the testimonies. She failed
to explain why the license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a place wherein no party resided.
Syed, on the other hand, went to Cavite to prove that there was no marriage license issued and a certification was issued
that indeed the license number they had belonged to another couple.
Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states that there is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been
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regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence contrary and so SC did not follow CAs decision because of a
lack of diligent search.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the nonissuance of said license.
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Alcantara v. Alcantara
[531 SCRA 446, 2007]
TOPIC: 1.Marriage License as a requisite for
marriage/Duties of the Civil Registrar
2. Kinds of void marriage absence of requisites

NOTES:
FC took effect on Aug. 3, 1988
FACTS:
December 8, 1982 first marriage; stairs of Manila City Hall; no marriage license; arranged through a fixer.
March 26, 1983 second marriage; church in Tondo; alleged license was from Carmona, Cavite.
Restituto claims that the marriage license during the second marriage was a sham because neither party lived in
Carmona, nor did either of them go to Carmona to get the license. Also, that the marriage license number (7054133)
does not match the license number in their marriage contract (7054033).
Rosita claims that Restituto only filed for annulment in order to evade prosecution for a concubinage charge she filed
against him.
The RTC and CA denied the petition for annulment, with the CA stating that Restituto did not present evidence to
overcome the presumption of validity of the marriage license.
ISSUE(S): WON their marriage is void due to lack of a marriage license.
HELD: No, the marriage is valid. There is a valid marriage license. Petition denied.
RATIO:
(NOTE: Since the marriage took place before the Family Code came into effect, the old Civil Code applies.)
Under Art. 53 of the Civil Code, a marriage license is a requisite of marriage, without which, the marriage is void ab initio.
The Court cited cases wherein this was applied:
o In Republic v. CA, the marriage therein was declared void because, after due search and inability to find, the civil
registrar issued a certificate affirming that the license could not be found.
o In Cario v. Cario, the marriage contract bore no license number, and the civil registrar issued a certificate
stating that their office had not issued a license to the parties.
o In Sy v. CA, the marriage license was issued one year after the ceremony took place.
The law requires that the absence of a marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract or supported by
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certification from the local civil registrar. (Also for Topic #2)
In this case, the civil registrar of Carmona certified the issuance of the marriage license to the Alcantaras. Because of
this, there is a presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. Issuance of a license in a city where neither
party resides, or issuance in the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are
mere irregularities that do not affect the marriages validity. (Also for Topic #2)
The inconsistent license number is merely a typo.
Restituto initiated the civil marriage, therefore he cannot claim that he was not a party to it. (He who comes to court
must come with clean hands)
The solemnizing officer is not required to investigate whether the marriage license was issued properly or not.
CASE
LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage.
The absence of a marriage license must be apparent. (Also for Topic #2)
The presumption of regularity in the discharge of official duties by government officials must be overturned by clear,
positive evidence.
Irregularity in any of the formal requisites does not affect the marriages validity, but the party/ies responsible are civilly,
criminally, and administratively liable. (Also for Topic #2)
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Republic v. Dayot
[550 SCRA 436, 2008]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Marriages exempt from license requirement
FACTS:
1986 Jose Dayot and Felisa Tecson were married at the Pasay City Hall solemnized by Rev. Atienza. In lieu of marriage
license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they cohabited for 5 years.
1993 Jose filed for a declaration of nullity of marriage. He attested that their marriage was a sham. There was no
marriage ceremony, he did not execute a sworn affidavit of cohabitation, and that his consent was obtained through
fraud.
Joses version of events: Felisa was his landlady. She asked him to accompany her to the city hall to pick up boxes sent
by her brother. At the city hall, there was a man who presented 3 documents to Jose that needed to be sign in order to
get the packages. He refused but Felisa cajoled him to sign. It was in 1987 when he discovered that he contracted
marriage with Felisa as he saw a piece of paper which was their alleged marriage certificate.
Felisa denied Joses allegations and maintained that they started cohabiting in 1980 and deferred contracting marriage
due to their 10 year age difference.
Felisa further filed an action of bigamy against Jose. She alleged that during the subsistence of their marriage, Jose
contracted another marriage and also filed an administrative complaint because Jose and his wife were employees of
National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Ombudsman found Jose liable and was suspended from service.
RTC Dismissed the complaint based on the testimonies and evidence that there was a valid marriage. The action also
has prescribed.
CA In favor of Jose as he maintained that they did not live together for 5 years and the affidavit was false.
Meanwhile, the Republic through OSG, filed a petition for review to declare their marriage valid and subsisting.
ISSUE: Does the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation make the marriage void?
HELD: Yes. Petition denied, the declaration of the marriage void ab initio is affirmed.
RATIO:
The facts derived from the CA show that the two met in 1986, therefore they could not have started to live with each
other since 1980. Therefore, they did not meet the 5 year requirement.
The insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements will not affect the validity of the marriage is not
permissible. It cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without a marriage license.
The action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible..
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CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Navarro v. Domagtoy
[A.M. MTJ-96-1088, 1996]
TOPIC: Who are authorized to solemnize marriages
PONENTE: Romero, J.

NOTES:
FACTS:
Complainant Mayor Navarro of Dapa, Surigao del Norte contends that Judge Hernando Domagtoy exhibited gross
misconduct as well as ineffiency in office and ignorance of the law.
First Respondent judge solemnized a marriage despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first
wife.
Judge Domagtoy contented that he relied on the affidavit issued by RTC Judge of Bassey, Samar that the groom
and his first wife have not seen each other for seven years. However, the certified true copy of the marriage said
that his civil status was separated.
Second It is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony outside his courts jurisdiction. He hold office in MCTC Sta.
Monica Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he solemnized a marriage in the municipality of Dapa in his residence.
He maintains that he did not violate Art. 7, par. 1 which states that Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any
incumbent member of the Judiciary within the courts jurisdiction
ISSUE:
First Can a court solemnize another marriage of a husband who has merely separated from his wife for almost 7 years?
Second Can a judge solemnize marriages in his residence?
HELD: No. Judge Domagtoy is suspended for 6 months and is given a stern warning.
RATIO:
First The groom still remains married to his first wife. To contract a subsequent marriage, the spouse must institute a
summary proceeding as provide in the Code for the declaration of presumptive death.
Second FC Art. 8 further gave exceptions that a judge may solemnize marriages not in his jurisdiction when the
contracting parties are at the point of death or in remote place. There is no pretense that the parties were at the point of
their death or in a remote place. Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdiction may officiate in marriages only within
said areas and not beyond.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and
registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted by his church or religious sect
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and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect;
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case mentioned in Article 31;
(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the latter, during a military operation,
likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32;
(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10. (56a)
Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or
temple, or in the office the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of
marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the
parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated
by them in a sworn statement to that effect. (57a)
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MARTINEZ v TAN
[12 PHIL 732, 1909]
TOPIC: Form of marriage ceremony
PONENTE: Willard, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Martinez filed an action to cancel her marriage contract with Tan insisting that there was no ceremony that took
place. That she thought that the document she signed was a document authorizing Tan to ask the consent of her
parents to the marriage.
Tan contended that the marriage contract was signed by both of them, in the presence of two witnesses, and a
solemnizing officer.
With this evidence, CFI ruled in favor of Tan.
Martinez appealed stating that both of them did not declare in the supposed ceremony that they take each other
as husband and wife, which violates General Orders, No. 68, Sec. 6 (couple must declare they take each other as
husband and wife).
ISSUE(S): WON the marriage ceremony is valid.
HELD: Yes. CFI decision affirmed.
RATIO:
The contract signed by Martinez and Tan contained a positive statement that they had mutually agreed to be married
and they asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the marriage.
The document signed by Martinez, Tan and the solemnizing justice stated that they ratified under oath, before the
justice, the contents of the contract and that witnesses of the marriage were produced.
Martinez testimony that her consent was vitiated was contradicted by the letters she sent to Tan, evidencing that they
secretly planned the wedding.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required.
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Morigo v. People
[Feb. 6, 2004]
TOPIC: Form of Ceremony
PONENTE: Quisumbing, J.

NOTES: Not quite soulmates
FACTS:
Aug. 30, 1990 Lucio Morigo married Lucia Barrete.
Aug. 19, 1991 Lucia was granted a divorce from Lucio in Canada, to take effect on Feb. 17, 1992.
Oct. 4, 1992 Lucio married Maria Lumbago.
Sept. 21, 1993 Lucio sought a judicial declaration of the nullity of his marriage with Lucia, alleging that no marriage
ceremony took place.
Oct. 19, 1993 the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran charged Lucio with bigamy. Lucio moved for suspension because his
judicial nullification posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. The suspension was granted, then denied.
Aug. 5, 1996 the Bohol RTC convicted Lucio of bigamy. The RTC cited Domingo v. CA and said that lack of a valid
marriage ceremony is not a defense against a charge of bigamy. They also cited Ramirez v. Gmur and said that a divorce
issued by the court in a country where neither spouse is domiciled has no jurisdiction to determine their marital status.
Oct. 23, 1997 while Lucios appeal to the CA was pending, his marriage to Lucia was declared void, and it became final
and executory.
Oct. 21, 1999 the CA affirmed the RTCs conviction, claiming that Art. 349 of the RPC punishes the act of contracting a
second marriage before the first one is dissolved; also claiming that the divorce is against public policy, thus, ineffectual.
Lucios motion for reconsideration was also denied.
ISSUE(S): WON Lucio Morigo committed bigamy
If so, WON his defense of good faith is valid
HELD: No, he did not commit bigamy. Petition granted.
RATIO:
A marriage declared void ab initio is deemed to have never taken place at all, because such a declaration retroacts to
the date of the supposed marriage. Lucios marriage to Lucia was declared void because they merely signed a marriage
contract without the presence of a solemnizing officer. Therefore, the first element of bigamy as laid down in Bobis v.
Bobis, that the offender has been legally married, is absent.
Unlike in Mercado v. Tan, where the first marriage was solemnized twice, and the declaration of nullity was obtained after
the second marriage was celebrated.
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CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
A marriage declared void ab initio is a valid defense against a charge of bigamy.
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Madridejo v. De Leon
[55 Phil. 1, 1930]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Issuance of marriage certificate
PONENTE: Villa-Real, J.
FACTS:
Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez married and conceived one child, Domingo de Leon.
The wife and son survived Eulogio de Leon, who died in the year 1915.
During her widowhood, Flaviana Perez lived with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor.
A child was born to Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, which was named Melecio Madridejo. In the birth certificate,
there was no mention of the father.
When she was about to die, Flaviana Perez was married to Pedro Madridejo by the parish priest of Siniloan, Laguna.
She died on the following day leaving Domingo de Leon (her son by Eulogio de Leon) and the petitioner Melecio
Madridejo, as well as her alleged second husband, Pedro Madridejo.
Lower Court ruled that the marriage of Madridejo and Perez was valid and the Melecio Madridejo was legitimated by that
marriage.
Respondent contends that trial court erred in declaring that the marriage in question was valid and that Pedro Madridejo
was legitimated by that marriage.
ISSUE:
1. Is the marriage of Flaviana Perez to Pedro Madridejo valid?
2. Did the marriage subsequently legitimate Melecio Madridejo?
HELD:
1. Yes
2.No
RATIO:
1. The mere fact that the parish priest of Siniloan, Laguna, who married Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, failed to send a
copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary does not invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing
that the essential requisites required by law for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding of a copy of the
marriage certificate is not one of said essential requisites.
2. It is evident that Melecio Madridejo has not been acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, either voluntarily or
by compulsion, before or after their marriage, and therefore said marriage did not legitimate him.
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CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Fujiki v. Marinay
G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013
TOPIC: Law governing validity of marriages
abroad (Lex loci celebrationis, NCC17)
(FC26, FC21, FC10)
PONENTE: Carpio, J.
FACTS:
On Jan. 23, 2004, Minoru Fujiki (Japanese) married Maria Marinay (Pinay) in PH. However, the marriage did not go well
due to Fujikis parents and so Fujiki couldnt bring her to Japan and lost contact w/ each other.
On 2008, Marinay met another Japanese named Shinichi Maekara and they got married w/o dissolving her marriage with
Fujiki. But later on, Marinay alleges she was physically abused by Maekara. Thus, prompting her to reunite w/ Fujiki.
On 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay get a judgment from Japan w/c declared Maekara-Marinay marriage void due to bigamy.
On Jan. 14, 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC to recognize the foreign judgment but RTC dismissed the petition due to
Fujiki being an improper party filing the petition. RTC cites A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:
a. Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages - (a) Who may file - A petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. x x x
b. It means that only Marinay or Maekara can file this petition.
Fujiki then argues that:
a. The A.M. does not apply because a petition to recognize a foreign judgment is a special proceeding w/c seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact, and not a civil action which is for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
b. To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. He has
material interest and therefore has personality to nullify the bigamous marriage.
But RTC still dismissed the petition on the same basis above. It considered Fujiki as a 3rd person in the proceeding
because he was not the husband in the divorce decree issued by the Japan court.
However, the Solicitor General (OSG) agreed with Fujiki for him being the spouse of the 1st marriage, is an injured party
who can sue to declare the subsequent marriage bigamous. He cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic w/c held:
a. That the A.M. is not applicable; and
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b. Also stated in the particular case that the parties in the bigamous marriage is not expected to file an action to
declare their marriage bigamous.
ISSUE:
WON Fujiki, as the husband of the 1st marriage, can file the petition to recognize the foreign judgment. YES.
HELD:
SC states that the A.M. Sec. 2(a):
a. Not applicable if the case is bigamy.
b. Applying the A.M. is absurd because it will re-litigate the case.
c. Refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under FC35(4), bigamous marriages are void
from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law.
The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under said provision.
Fujiki only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the ROC.
Also, to effect the foreign judgment, PH courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent w/ domestic public
policy and other mandatory laws.
While PH has no divorce law, the foreign judgment is fully consistent with PH public policy, as bigamous marriages are
declared void from the beginning under FC35(4).
SC further elaborates as ruled in Juliano-Llave that the prior spouse (like Fujiki) is clearly the aggrieved party as the
bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all,
it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse.
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Estrada v Escritor
TOPIC: Common law marriages/live in relationship
PONENTE: Puno, J.

Note: RATIO IS LIFTED OFF A DIGEST I FOUND OVER THE NET.
Wont go into discussion of religious history, American history,
jurisprudence, but only relevant topic in this case!

Administrative matter in the Supreme Court (Immorality)
Jul. 27, 2000 Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Caoibes requesting for an investigation of rumours about
Soledad Escritor (court interpreter) living with a man not her husband and allegedly having a child of 18-20 years of age
Estrada does not personally know Escritor but filed the charge because he believe that she is committing and immoral
act that tarnished the image of the court and should not be allowed to continue as an employee of the court because it
may appear that it condones her actions
Escritor stated that there was no truth to the allegations and challenged Estrada to appear in the open and to prove his
allegations, she then moved for Judge Caoibes inhibition in the case as she had previously filed an administrative
complaint against him, this was denied
Estrada stated that because of his frequent visit to the Hall of Justice of Las Pias City, he heard of the rumours and
believed that the employees if the judiciary should be respectable and Escritors live-in arrangement did not command
respect (chismoso)
1999 Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary, she had already been widowed as her husband died in 1998
She admitted that she has been liing with Luciano Quilapio, Jr, without the benefit of marriage for 20 years and that they
have a son, she states that as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and Watch Tower and
Bible Tract Society; their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs and is not immoral
Jul. 28, 1991 After 10 years of living together, Escritor and Quilapio executed a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness
in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by 3 witnesses
At the time Escritor executed her pledge, her husband was still alive but living with another woman, Quilapio was also
married at the time but had been separated in fact with his wife
Escritor volunteered to present the members of her congregation to confirm the truthfulness of their declaration but
Judge Caoibes deemed it unnecessary and considered her identification of her signature and Quilapios to be sufficient to
authenticate the documents
Upon order to comment, Escritor again stated her religious congregations approval of her conjugal arrangement with
Quilapio and that it does not consider the arrangement to be immoral
The Jehovahs congregation requires that at the time the declarations were executed, the couple cant secure civil
authorities approval because of legal impediment
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In 1998 Escritor was widowed, lifting her legal impediment but Quilapio was still incapacitated to remarry so their
declarations remain to be valid until all legal impediment disappear
As far as the congregation is concerned, Escritor and Quilapio have not done anything immoral and they remain
members of good standing in their congregation
After considering the Report and Recommendation of Executive Judge Maceda (recommending to dismiss Escritor),
through Deputy Court of Admin (DCA) Lock concurred with the factual findings of Judge Maceda but departed form his
recommendation to dismiss Escritor
DCA Lock stresses that Escritor may still be subject to disciplinary action because although she became capacitated to
marry (with her husband dying) she still continues to live with another man
He also found her defense of freedom of religion unavailing to warrant the dismissal of the charge of immorality, he
recommended that she be found guilty and be suspended
ISSUE(S):
WON Escritors right to religious freedom would carve out an exemption from the prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations for
which government employees are held administratibly liable
HELD:
Court remanded the case OCA.
Although remanded OCA still found Escritors defense of religious freedom unavailing
RATIO:
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strives to
uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality
contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it
does not offend compelling state interests. It still remains to be seen if respondent is entitled to such doctrine as the state has
not been afforded the chance has demonstrate the compelling state interest of prohibiting the act of respondent, thus the case
is remanded to the RTC.
Benevolent neutrality is inconsistent with the Free Exercise Clause as far as it prohibits such exercise given a compelling state
interest. It is the respondents stance that the respondents conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes
within the scope of free exercise protection. Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause
protects it, the Courts action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. The Court cannot
therefore simply take a passing look at respondents claim of religious freedom, but must instead apply the compelling state
interest test. The government must be heard on the issue, as it has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of
demonstrating the states compelling interest, which can override respondents religious belief and practice.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Alcantara v. Alcantara
G.R. No. 167746. August 28, 2007
TOPIC: FC20, FC24-25 Marriage license; where valid, period of
validity and duties of civil registrar
FACTS:
A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara against his wife Rosita Alcantara
(respondent). He alleges that he married respondent w/o a marriage license on their ff. marriages:
a. They only got married on Dec. 8, 1982 in Manila City Hall because of the help of a fixer. They got married at the
stairs in such city hall and not in the chapel where the solemnizing officer belongs (Rev. Aquilino Navarro was the
solemnizing officer); and
b. They re-celebrated their marriage on March, 26, 1983 in at church in Tondo
He also alleges that the marriage license in the marriage contract is a sham because neither of them were a resident of
and never went to apply in Carmona, Cavite.
Respondents defense:
a. She has 2 daughters w/ petitioner;
b. Petitioner has a mistress w/ whom he has 3 children.
c. Petitioner only filed this annulment to evade prosecution for concubinage.
d. She, in fact, has filed that case for concubinage against him before the MTC in Mandaluyong.
RTC and CA rules in favor of respondent for petitioner did not present any evidence to overcome the presumption of
validity of the marriage license.
ISSUE:
WON the marriage license is valid. YES.
HELD:
SC states that petitioner cannot insist that a marriage license was absent to impugn the validity of their marriage. So SC
cites cases to consider a marriage license absent:
a. In Republic v. CA, inability to find a marriage license in the Civil Registrar is considered absent there makes the
marriage void ab initio
b. In Carino v. Carino, the marriage contract that bears no marriage license number w/c the Civil registrar has no record
of is also considered absent therefore the marriage is void ab initio
c. In Sy v. CA, the marriage happened on Nov. 15, 1973 but the marriage license was only issued on Sept. 17, 1974.
In this case:
a. The marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number;
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b. A certification was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite;
c. The certification is precise that it specifically identified the parties name to whom the marriage license was issued
further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to them.
d. Also, issuance of the license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and
issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for
publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage.
Petitioner also asserts the number in the marriage license was 7054133. While in the marriage contract, the number was
7054033. SC says its only typographical error.
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Mercado v. Tan
[August 1, 2000]
TOPIC: Bigamous and Polygamous Marriages

NOTES: see and compare with Morigo v. People
FACTS:
1976 Vincent Mercado married Ma. Thelma Oliva, both civilly and in a church.
1991 Mercado married Ma. Consuelo Tan, both civilly and religiously, without a judicial declaration of nullity for his first
marriage.
Oct. 5, 1992 Tan filed a complaint for bigamy against Mercado.
Nov. 13, 1992 Mercado filed an action for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva.
March 1, 1993 Bigamy case began.
May 6, 1993 Mercado-Oliva marriage was declared void.
Both the RTC and the CA found Mercado guilty of bigamy, citing the requirement of a judicial declaration of nullity before
remarriage based on Art. 40 of the Family Code.
ISSUE(S): WON Mercado is guilty of bigamy.
HELD: Yes he is. Petition denied.
RATIO:
When the information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of bigamy were present. The declaration that the
first marriage was void came after the information was filed, therefore the crime of bigamy was already consummated.
While jurisprudence until then was conflicting regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity, Art. 40 erases all
doubts and makes a judicial declaration of absolute nullity essential before one may remarry.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
A marriage declared void ab initio is not a defense against a charge of bigamy if such declaration came after the
bigamous marriage.
Justice Vitug:
The necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity should only refer to cases wherein the marriage had, at least ostensibly,
taken place. Thus, marriages that are obviously void should not need such a declaration.
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(This reflects the decision in Morigo v. People, wherein the marriage ceremony was merely the signing of a marriage
license without the presence of a solemnizing officer; a.k.a. obviously void.)
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IWASAWA v GANGAN
[G.R. No. 204169. September 11, 2013]
TOPIC: Bigamous marriage
PONENTE: Villarama, Jr., J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN

1994: Gangan married Arambulo
2002: Gangan introduced herself to Iwasawa as single. Later that year, they got married and moved to Japan.
2009: Gangan got news that Arambulo died and she got depressed. Iwasawa inquired about her depression and
found out that she had a prior existing marriage.
Iwasawa filed a declaration of nullity of his marriage with Gangan for being bigamous.
He presented to the RTC: (1) certificate of marriage between Arambulo and Gangan; (2) certificate of marriage
between Iwasawa and Gangan; (3) death certificate of Arambulo.
RTC dismissed the case for lack of evidence that Gangan had a prior existing marriage.
Iwasawa filed for certiorari.
ISSUE(S): WON the documents presented should be admitted as evidence of marriage
HELD: Yes. RTC decision set aside. Marriage of Iwasawa and Gangan declared null and void.
RATIO:
The documents submitted are public documents. In effect, as per NCC 410: The books making up the civil register and all
documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein
contained.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness.
Therefore, the public documents are prima facie proof that Gangan had a prior existing marriage when she married
Iwasawa.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Marriage certificates, being a public document, are prima facie evidence that such marriage is a fact.
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JONES v HORTIGUELA
[64 PHIL 180, 1937]
TOPIC: Kinds of void marriage subsequent
marriage
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Escao was first married to Arthur Jones. They had a daughter, Angelita (petitioner).
1918: Arthur left the country and nothing was ever heard of him.
1919: Escao filed an action to declare Arthur as absentee.
1921: Court declared Arthur as absentee.
1927: Escao married Hortiguela (respondent)
1932 (?): Escao died intestate. Court declared Hortiguela and Angelita as heirs, and Angelita being a minor then,
it appointed Hortiguela as the administrator.
1934: Angelita filed a motion alleging that she is the only heir; and that the marriage between her mother and
Hortiguela is null and void on the ground that they were married before the 7-year absence had elapsed.
ISSUE(S): WON the Escao is validly married to Hortiguela.
HELD: Yes. SC denied Angelitas motion.
RATIO:
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee.
(Civil Code requires it for the administration of the estate of the absentee.)
The law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is
generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration.
Therefore, the 7 year absence should begin in 1918 when Arthur left and was never heard of, not in 1921 when the court
declared his absence.
Arthur was already more than 9 years absent when Escao married Hortiguela. 2nd marriage is valid.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
It is not necessary that the former spouse to be judicially declared absent for a 2 nd marriage to be valid. However, it requires
that the former spouse be absent for 7 consecutive years.
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SSS v Jarque
TOPIC: Subsequent marriage, upon reappearance
of absent spouse (FC 41, 42-44, 55(9), 101, NCC
390-391)
PONENTE: Carpio-Morales, J.

Note:

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the CA
Apr. 25, 1955 Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz got married
Oct. 9, 1970 Bailon filed a petition to declare Alice Diaz presumptively dead
Dec. 10, 1970 CFI granted the petition and declared Alice Diaz for all legal intents and purposes presumptively dead
Aug. 8, 1983 Bailon (a member of SSS) married Teresita Jarque
Jan. 30, 1998 Clemente Bailon died
Jarque then filed for a claim for funeral benefits and was granted by the SSS
Mar. 11, 1998 additional claim for death befnefits were claimed and granted by Jarque
Cecilia Bailon-Yap (daughter of Bailon and a certain Elisa Jayona) contested the release of death and funeral benefits to
Jarque, she claims that Bailon contracted 3 marriages in his lifetime (1) Alice Diaz, (2) Elisa Jayona, and (3) Teresita
Jarque
Cecilia and her siblings paid for the medical and funeral expenses of Bailon, and she claims that they reserved the right
to file to contest marriage between Bailon and Jarque because they personally knew that Alice is still very much alive
In a memorandum by Atty. Marites de la Torre, it alleged that Alice/Aliz Diaz never disappeared and that it was Bailon
who abandoned the wife
Sept. 7, 1999 SSS advised Jarque of the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits in view of the legal
opinion (by SSC) that her marriage with Bailon is VOID for being bigamous
Apr. 2, 2003 SSC found marriage of Bailon and Jaque to be void and Jarque to be just a common-law-wife
Teresita Jarque-Bailon is not the legitimate spouse and primary beneficiary of Clemente Bailon
ISSUE(S):
WON reappearance of absentee spouse renders subsequent marriage void
HELD:
NO.
Reappearance of absentee spouse does not render subsequent marriage void for being bigamous.
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RATIO:
Second marriage was contracted because of a presumption that former spouse (Alice Diaz) was dead. Such presumption
continues despite absentee spouses physical reappearance. If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an
affidavit of reappearance or by judicial declaration but by death of either spouse then good faith or bad faith of either spouse
can no longer be raised. Since no step was taken to nullify Bailon and Jarques marriage before Bailons death Jarque remains
the rightful dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.
Petition is DENIED!
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Republic v. Granada
G.R. No. 187512. June 13, 2012
TOPIC: FC41, NCC390-392, Presumption of
death
PONENTE: Sereno, J.
FACTS:
On May 1991, respondent Yolanda Granada met Cyrus Granada at an electric company named Sumida Electric, where
they both work at. They eventually got married on March 3, 1993 and after which, they had a son named Cyborg.
However, sometime in May 1994, the Sumida closed down and so Cyrus went to Taiwan to work. Yolanda then claims that
from that time, she didnt receive any communication from Cyrus despite her not making any efforts to locate him.
Yolandas brother testified that he asked Cyrus relatives regarding his whereabouts but no news as well.
With that said, after 9 years, Yolanda filed this petition to have her husband, Cyrus, declared presumptively dead which
the RTC granted.
However, the OSG filed a petition arguing that Yolanda did not make earnest efforts to look for her husband, therefore,
failed to prove the well-founded belief that her husband is already dead.
RTC denied the OSGs petition. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
1. WON the CA erred in affirming the RTCs decision of Yolandas petition pursuant to FC41 for it was a summary proceeding
(Cannot be appealed hence final and executory). NO.
2. WON the CA erred in affirming the RTCs decision of Yolandas petition pursuant to FC41. NO.
HELD:
1. Regarding procedure, while an action for declaration of death or absence under Rule 72, Sec.1(m), falls under special
proceedings, a petition for declaration of presumptive death under FC41 is a summary proceeding, as provided by
FC238, 247, and 253. The purpose was to enable her to contract a subsequent valid marriage, Yolandas action was a
summary proceeding based on FC41, rather than a special proceeding under Rule 72 of the ROC.
Considering that this action was not a special proceeding, the OSG was not required to file a record on appeal when it appealed
the RTC Decision to the CA.
2. Petitioner cited 3 cases to support its claims:
a. In Republic v. Nolasco, petitioner also wants to reverse the RTCs decision granting a petition of presumptive death
(FC41) of his absent British spouse, who left after giving birth to their son while respondent was on a vessel working
as a seafarer. Respondent did not also establish a well-founded belief as contemplated by FC41:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for 4 consecutive years, or 2 consecutive years if the disappearance
occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in NCC391;
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2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
b. In U.S. v. Biasbas, this Court held that Biasbas failed to exercise due diligence in knowing the whereabouts of his 1st
wife and also considering that the only basis of presumptive death was his admission that he only had a suspicion.
c. In Republic v. CA and Alegro, same as Nolasco and provided a criteria for determining well-founded belief as
contemplated in FC41 (Check requisites above).
Petitioner argues that respondent was not diligent in her search for her husband:
a. If she were diligent, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or help from other
govt agencies in Taiwan or PH;
b. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not; and
c. Worse, she failed to explain her omissions.
d. SC states that the OSGs arguments are well-taken but still affirmed the CAs decision because the RTCs decision
is already final and executory, the appeals under the ROC is only filed in special proceedings.
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Santos v. CA
[G.R. 112019, January 4, 1995]
TOPIC: Psychological Incapacity
PONENTE: Vitug, J.


- September 20, 1986: Leouel Santos and Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos got married.
- July 18, 1987: Julia gave birth to Leouel Santos, Jr.
- May 18, 1988: Julia left for the US to work as a nurse
- January 1, 1989: Julia called Leouel for the first time after her departure and promised to return home in July 1989
upon the expiration of her contract (She never return home)
- April 10 August 25, 1990: Leouel tried to locate or get in touch with Julia when he got a chance to go the US for a
training program under the observation of the AFP (he failed)
- He filed with the RTC a complaint for Voiding of Marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code (after his failed
attempt to locate or communicate with Julia)
- RTC and CA dismissed the complaint
ISSUE(S): WON their marriage could be annulled under Psychological Incapacity (FC 36)
HELD: No
RATIO:
- Psychological Incapacity must be characterized by
- (a) gravity it must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage
- (b) juridical antecedence it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage
- (c) incurability it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
- Psychological incapacity is mental and not physical incapacity; the most serious cases of personality disorders.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Psychological Incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
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CHI MING TSOI v CA
[G.R. No. 119190. January 16, 1997]
TOPIC: Psychological incapacity
PONENTE: Torres, Jr., J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Chi Ming Tsoi married Gina Lao in May 1988.
Since then until Mar 1989, when they separated, no sexual intercourse happened.
She then filed for annulment due to psychological incapacity.
She alleged that although they sleep in one bed, he avoids having sex with her even during their honeymoon.
He defended that it was her who does not want to have sex with him.
They both submitted themselves to a physical exam. Results say that both are healthy. (But the doc found Chi
Ming Tsoi is a tiny dancer! 3 inches to be exact.)
RTC declared Chi Ming Tsoi as psychologically incapacitated. CA affirmed.
ISSUE(S): WON not having sex with ones spouse is a ground for annulment of marriage due to psychological incapacity
HELD: Yes. SC affirmed.
RATIO:
Chi Ming Tsoi defense was weak. He failed to prove his claim by evidence.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is To procreate children based on the universal principle
that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.
Constant nonfulfillment of this obligation destroys the integrity of the marriage.
The senseless and continuous refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological
incapacity.
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Republic v. CA, Molina
[G.R. No. 108763, Feb. 13, 1997]
TOPIC: Psychological Incapacity

NOTES: Guidelines for determining Psychological Incapacity
FACTS:
Respondent Roridel Molina filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Reynaldo Molina. She
alleged that he showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and father because he spent more time
with his friends than with his family, he squandered his money, he lost his job, etc. After a big fight, Roridel went to
Baguio to live with her parents, and weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their children.
Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but his reason was that she
would refuse to perform her marital duties, like cooking, and her failure to manage their finances.
During the pre-trial, Roridel presented the testimony of witnesses, which included her friends, a social worker, and a
psychiatrist. Reynaldo did not present any evidence. The RTC declared the marriage void, and the CA affirmed it on
appeal.
ISSUE(S):
WON the marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo Molina is void due to psychological incapacity.
HELD:
No, there is no psychological incapacity present. Petition granted.
RATIO:
Citing Leouel Santos v. CA, the Court said that psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity; that the law confines its meaning to personality disorders which demonstrate an insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage; that it must exist at the time of the marriage; and that it must
be characterized by a) gravity, b) juridical antecedence, and c) incurability.
In the present case, the Roridel merely showed that she and Reynaldo could not get along with each other. Difficulty,
refusal, neglect, and irreconcilable differences are not equal to psychological incapacity. What is essential is that a party
is incapable of fulfilling their marital duties.
Dr. Sisons, the psychiatrist, evaluation only showed incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The Court set guidelines for the interpretation of Art. 36 of the Family Code:
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1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Doubt is resolved in favor of the
continuation of the marriage.
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
Medically identified
Alleged in the complaint
Sufficiently proven by experts
Clearly explained in the decision
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. It is not necessarily
manifest at the time, but it must already be there.
4. It must be medically permanent or incurable. Its incurability may be absolute or relative in regard to the other
spouse, and it must only be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations.
5. The illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Arts. 68-71 of the Family Code, regarding the husband
and wife, and Arts. 220, 221, and 225 of the same, regarding parents and their children. These non-complied
obligations must be stated in the petition, proven by evidence, and included in the text of the decision.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines should
be given great respect (Note: bullshit) because Art. 36 of the Family Code has its roots in Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law (a CHURCH code).
8. The prosecuting atty. or fiscal, and the Sol Gen must appear as counsel for the State. The Sol Gen must issue a
certification stating why is agrees with or opposes the petition, which will be quoted in the decision that may not be
passed without the certification.
Padilla, J. Concurs with the decision in this case, but disagrees with the Santos v. CA ruling, stating that psychological
incapacity was present, and such petitions must be determined case-to-case, based on their unique, specific facts.
Romero, J. Incapacity should not be the result of mental illness; otherwise it would be insanity and governed by Art. 45 of the
Family Code. In other words, psychological incapacity is insanity of a lesser degree. (Long opinion, but a bit roundabout. Might
be worth a read.)
Vitug, J. concurs, and lists his own guidelines:
The incapacity must psychological or mental, not physical, in nature.
It must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to understand, assume, and discharge the basic marital obligations.
It must exist at the time the marriage is contracted, although it may only be manifested after.
It must be grave or serious, and incurable.
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Republic v De Gracia
TOPIC: Psychological incapacity (FC 36)
PONENTE: Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Note:

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the CA
Feb. 15, 1969 Rodolfo O. De Gracia and Natividad N. Rosalem got married
Dec. 28, 1998 Rodolfo filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage, alleging Natividad was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations
Rodolfo testified that he and Natividad met when they were highschool students, and 3 months into their courtship
Natividad accidentally became pregnant
Natividad (18) and Rodolfo (21) didnt have stable jobs, so Rodolfo decided to train and join the army. Natividad left the
conjugal home and sold it without Rodolfos consent, she then moved to Dipolog city where she lived with an Engineer
Terez and had a child
Jan. 11, 1991 Natividad Rosalem married a certain Anotnio Mondarez and has since lieved with him in Cagayan de Oro
Since Natividad left, Rodolfo took care of the children and tried to save their marriage but this proved futile because of
her psychological incapacity that appeared to be incurable
Natividad submitted herself to a psychiatric examination by Dr. Cheryl Zalsos, Rodolfo did the same, based on the
examination Zalsos found that both were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
Feb. 10, 1999 OSG representing RP filed an opposition contending acts committed by Natividad did not demonstrate
psychological incapacity contemplated by law
Oct. 17, 2000 RTC declared the marriage between Rodolfo and Natividad void on the ground of psychological
incapacity, relying on the findings of Zalsos holding Natividads emotional immaturity exhibited a behavioral pattern
which in psychiatry constitutes a form of personality disorder that existed from the time of marriage but manifested only
after marriage, and the condition is incurable
RP appealed to CA CA affirmed the RTC ruling, so RP moved for reconsideration
ISSUE(S):
WON CA erred in finding Natividad psychologically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligation
HELD:
YES.
CA erred in finding Natividad psychologically incapacitated.
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RATIO:
Based on the evidence presented, there is insufficiency of factual or legal basis to conclude that Natividads emotional
immaturity, irresponsibility, or even her sexual promiscuity can be equated with psychological incapacity. The Court in Santos v
CA enumerated the guidelines in applying FC 36, it must be characterized by (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3)
incurability.
Petition is GRANTED!
CA decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE!
Complaint for nullity is DISMISSED!
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Ninal v. Bayadog
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000
TOPIC: FC 36, FC 39, FC 40,Sec. 2, A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, Who can invoke nullity
FACTS:
On Sept. 26, 1974, Pepito Ninal married Teodulfa Bellones and as result, they had petitioners as children. Teodulfa was
shot by Pepito w/c she died from.
On Dec. 11, 1986, Pepito married respondent Norma Bayadog w/o a marriage license. They supported their marriage w/
an affidavit that they have lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years already to which they believed they
didnt need a license.
On Feb. 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident and after which, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito and respondent for being void due to lack of license. This was filed because their successional rights
were going to be affected.
Respondent, as defense, states FC47 for petitioners do not fall under such provision as the persons who can file an action
for annulment of marriage.
RTC ruled in favor of respondent.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners can invoke the nullity of the marriage of Pepito and respondent. YES.
HELD:
First and foremost, SC found out that they havent lived w/ each other as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to
their wedding day:
a. From the time Pepitos 1st marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about 20 months
or 1 year and 8 months had elapsed;
b. With that said, the 5 year period cohabitation of Pepito and Norma was not the cohabitation contemplated by law
because Pepito had a subsisting marriage (With Teodulfa) at the time when he started cohabiting with her; and
c. The fact that they (Pepito-Norma) lived w/ each other becomes immaterial due to the subsistence of the marriage
between Pepitos 1st wife Teodulfa. Therefore, makes the Pepito-Norma marriage void ab initio.
After establishing that the marriage of Pepito and Norma is void ab initio, SC says FC47 is not applicable. It pertains to the
grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. FC is silent
as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Also, a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be
attacked collaterally. With that said, only the parties (Which is either Pepito or Norma) to a voidable marriage can assail it
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but any proper interested party (Like petitioners) may attack a void marriage.
Also, this action is for declaration of nullity of Pepito-Norma marriage. But it was already established above that the
Pepito-Norma marriage was already void ab initio, therefore, it only follows that such action cannot be made already
pursuant to FC40.
But SC states that for purposes other than remarriage, such as it would prejudice the successional rights of petitioners, SC
may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity so long as it is
essential to the determine the case.
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Ablaza v. Republic
[G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010]
TOPIC: Who can invoke nullity


- December 26, 1949: Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato got married.
- October 17, 2010: Isidro Ablaza (Cresencianos brother) filed in RTC a petition for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of the marriage of Cresenciano and Leonila.
- He alleges that the marriage was void ab initio because the marriage was celebrated without a marriage license (the
license was only issued on Jan. 9, 1950)
- He also alleges that he is a real party in interest because he is the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died w/o
any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties of Cresenciano before his death.
- RTC and CA dismissed his petition
ISSUE(S): WON the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his
deceased brother
HELD: Yes
RATIO:
- Sec. 2, par. (a), of A.M. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages) states that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
wife.
- The A.M. being a procedural rule, prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15,
2003 and had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
- The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage
- According to Carlos v. Sandoval, the petitioner must still be party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Only the party who can demonstrate a proper interest can file the action
- The petitioner has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the
suit.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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MALCAMPO-SIN v SIN
[G.R. No. 137590. March 26, 2001]
TOPIC: Safeguards against collusion
PONENTE: Pardo, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN

After 6 years of marriage, Florence filed with RTC a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage against Philipp
(Portuguese).
Trial commenced and both parties submitted their evidence.
The State did not participate in the trial.
RTC dismissed the case (full text didnt say why). CA affirmed.
Florence filed for certiorari.
ISSUE(S): WON the case was prematurely decided when the State failed to intervene in the case.
HELD: Yes it was prematurely decided. CA decision set aside and remanded back for proper trial.
RATIO:
Article 48 mandates: In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
There is no evidence that the State participated in the trial. Besides the fiscals manifestation that he found no collusion
between the parties, the State did not file any pleading, motion, or position paper at any stage of the proceedings.
Also, the presiding judge did not take any step to encourage the fiscal to contribute to the proceedings.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
In annulment cases, the State must intervene to prevent collusion between the parties and to ensure that evidence presented
are not fabricated or suppressed.
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Tolentino v. Villanueva
[No. L-23264, March 15, 1974]
TOPIC: Procedure in Actions for Declaration of
Nullity
PONENTE: Makasiar, J.

NOTES:
FACTS:
Petitioner Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for annulment of his marriage to respondent Helen Villanueva. His reason, among
others, was that his consent was obtained through fraud because he discovered that Helen was pregnant shortly after
they were married, despite not having any sexual relations with her prior to the ceremony.
Helen was served with a summons, but she failed to file a responsive pleading. Because of that, Romulo filed a motion to
declare her in default, and to set a date for his presentation of evidence. Respondent Judge Corazon Agrava declared
Helen in default, but referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila in order to determine whether or not collusion exists
between the parties. This was pursuant to Arts. 88 and 101 of the Civil Code.
The fiscal, upon receipt of a copy of the complaint, had 60 days within which to submit his report. Romulo submitted the
copy on July 3, 1962.
The Asst. City Fiscal then subpoenaed Romulos counsel, requiring him to bring Romulo and copies of other documents
pertaining to the annulment case on August 27, 1962. However, on August 24, 1962, petitioners counsel said that he
could not comply with the subpoena because it would expose his evidence.
On Oct. 29, 1962, Romulo prayed that Judge Agrava set the date for reception of his evidence because the City Fiscals
60-day period had elapsed without the submission of a report. On Nov. 6, 1962, Judge Agrava denied the motion
because Romulo would not submit himself for interrogation by the fiscal. On July 29, 1963, Judge Agrava dismissed the
complaint because Romulo still would not submit himself for interrogation.
ISSUE(S):
WON Romulo may compel Judge Agrava to receive his evidence without submitting himself to the City Fiscal for interrogation.
HELD:
No, the City Fiscal must file a report ensuring no collusion between the parties.
RATIO:
Arts. 88 and 101 of the Civil Code direct that, if the defendant in an annulment suit does not appear, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if none, said
prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the state to prevent fabrication of evidence for the plaintiff.
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When the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting officer to intervene for the State
in order to preserve the integrity and sanctity of marital bonds This means that an annulment proceeding cannot be
one-sided there must always be someone defending the existence of the marriage from the annulment.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
In annulment suits where the defendant does not appear, the prosecuting attorney must always inquire whether or not collusion
exists between the parties, and if none, intervene on behalf of the State and ensure that the plaintiffs evidence is not
fabricated.
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Mendoza v RP
TOPIC: Participation of the OSG

Note:

Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA
1989 Arabelle Mendoza and Dominic Mendoza met as they were next door neighbors while they were still in college
After a month of courtship, they became intimate and this resulted into Arabelle becoming pregnant
Jun. 24, 1991 on her eight month of pregnancy, they got married in civil rites, then they moved to her place and was
supported by Arabelles parent
When Arabelled gave birth, Dominic had to borrow from his friend and remained jobless and dependent on his father
until he finished his college course
Arabelle took on various jobs to make ends meet and she shouldered all of the familys needs, as for Dominic he started
to sell Colliers Encyclopedia for 3 months after his graduation before he started to work for Toyota as a car salesman
Ironically, Dominic spent his first sales commission on a celebratory bash with his friends
Sept. 1994 Arabelle discovered Dominics illicit affair with his co-employee and they started to sleep in separate rooms
affecting their sexual relationship
Dominic then got fired from his employment and was criminally charged with the violation of B.P. 22 and estafa
ISSUE(S):
(1) WON marriage is null and void on ground of Dominics psychological incapacity
(2) WON OSGs appeals (RP appeal through OSG) is no longer required under A.M. No. 02-11-10
HELD:
(1) NO. Marriage is not null and void.
(2) NO. Nowhere in the Resolution does it state that the appeals by the OSG are no longer required.
RATIO:
(1) CA correctly ruled that the ill feelings of Arabelle against Dominic is the basis to doubt the findings of the expert witness,
that the findings were one-sided and that Dominic did not participate in the proceedings. The findings were solely based on
Arabelles testimony, and it does not sufficiently prove that Dominic is psychologically incapacitated.
(2) The Resolution (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) explicitly required the OSG to participate in all the stages of proceedings pertaining to
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declarations of absolute nullity of marriage and the annulment of voidable marriages. The Resolution clearly intended for the
OSG to appear as the counsel for the State to oppose petitions for, and to appeal judgments in favor of declarations of nullity of
marriage under FC 36. It is to ensure that only meritorious cases for the declaration of nullity of marriages based on
psychological incapacity, those characterized by (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3) incurability would succeed.
Petition is DENIED!
CA decision is AFFIRMED!
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC - RE: PROPOSED RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
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Aurelio v. Aurelio
G.R. No. 175367. June 6, 2011
TOPIC: Procedure in actions for declaration
of nullity, no motion to dismiss
PONENTE: Peralta, J.
FACTS:
On March 23, 1988, petitioner Danilo Aurelio married respondent Vida Aurelio.
On May 9, 2002, Vida filed a declaration of nullity of her marriage to Danilo alleging:
a. They were both psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying w/ their respective marital obligations;
and
b. Such incapacity was present prior and even during their marriage.
Danilo filed a motion to dismiss because Vida did not state a cause of action and it failed to meet the standards of the
Molina doctrine pursuant to FC36.
But RTC and CA denied his motion to dismiss Vidas petition and granted the declaration of nullity for complying w/ the
Molina doctrine.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying Danilos motion to
dismiss. NO.
HELD:
SC points out that if Vidas complaint had been filed after March 15, 2003 (Because Vidas petition was filed in on May 9,
2002), this motion to dismiss would have been denied since the Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10
prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss in. actions for annulment of marriage:
a. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (RE: PROPOSED RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID
MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES)
Section 7. Motion to Dismiss.No motion to dismiss the petition shall be allowed, except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter or over the parties; provided, however, that any other ground that might warrant a dismissal of the case
may be raised as an affirmative defense in an answer.
SC also defines grave abuse by capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. x x x It
must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in a manner by reason personal hostility, and must be
so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law.
With that said, SC states that the RTC judgment is merely an error of judgment which is correctible by appeal and not an
abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari because as a general rule, denial of a motion to dismiss, which is an
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interlocutory order, is not reviewable by certiorari.
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Chan v. Chan
[702 SCRA 77, 2013 ]
NOTES: subpoena duces tecum - a writ ordering a person to attend a
TOPIC: Kinds of Voidable Marriages Other Matters
court and bring relevant documents.
PONENTE: Abad, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before the RTC of Makati City a petition for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage to respondent Johnny Chan (Johnny), the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of
custody of their children to her.
Josielene claims that Johnny failed to care and support his family. She alleged that psychiatrist diagnosed him as
mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs.
To save their marriage, Johnny agreed to marriage counseling but when he and Josielene got to the hospital, two men
forcibly held him by both arms while another gave him an injection.
Pre trial conference - Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form that Johnny attached to his answer as proof that he
was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital but the form carried a physicians handwritten note that
Johnny suffered from methamphetamine and alcohol abuse.
Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical City, covering
Johnnys medical records when he was there confined. The request was accompanied by a motion to be allowed to
submit in evidence the said records in which Johnny opposed as he attests that it is covered by physician-patient
privilege. RTC was in favor of Johnny.
CA also denied Josielenes petition. It presented that if courts were to allow the production of medical records, then
patients would be left with no assurance that whatever relevant disclosures they may have made to their physicians
would be kept confidential. The prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also affidavits, certificates, and pertinent
hospital records. Also, Johnny can waive such privilege but he did not do so in this case as seen when he attached the
Philhealth form to his answer to show his alleged forcible confinement.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the CA erred in denying the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
HELD: NO. the CA and the RTC were justified in denying Josielene her request for the production in court of Johnnys hospital
records.
RATIO:
The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets information while
professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined, without the patients consent, as to any facts which would
blacken the latters reputation. This rule is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, gives importance to
the health of the patient. SC said that:
1. Josielenes request for subpoena duces tecum is premature since the offer of evidence is made at the pre trial. She
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will have to wait for trial to begin to make a request since it is when those records are produced for examination at
the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure.
(Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence)
2. Josielene can file motion for production of documents but it is only for non privileged documents, the documents in
question are privileged in nature.
3. Johnny has not waived his right by giving the PhilHealth form but it is to show that he was forcibly admitted to the
hospital. The trial in this case has not yet begun therefore making this action premature.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.The following persons
cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: (c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery
or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him
or any information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was
necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient.
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MALLION v ALCANTARA
[G.R. No. 141528. October 31, 2006]
TOPIC: Effects of res judicata
PONENTE: Azcuna, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Mallion filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against his wife Alcantara on the ground of
RTC dismissed the case for lack of evidence. CA affirmed the decision and it became final.
Mallion then filed another petition to declare their marriage null and void for lack of a marriage license.
RTC dismissed the case on the ground of res judicata and forum shopping.
Mallion filed for certiorari
ISSUE(S): WON the previous final judgment dismissing the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological
incapacity bar the subsequent similar petition but having a different ground (lack of marriage license).
HELD: Yes. Petition denied. Mallion is barred by res judicata from filing the subsequent petition, despite having a different
ground.
RATIO:
Mallion is barred by res judicata from filing the subsequent petition, despite having a different ground.
A party cannot evade or avoid the application of res judicata by simply varying the form of his action or adopting a
different method of presenting his case.
Res judicata requires the following requisites: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the
merits; and (4) there isbetween the first and the secondidentity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
Mallion disputed No. (4), but SC held that If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are
considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties
involving a different cause of action.
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Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy
[No. L-53703, August 19, 1986]
TOPIC: Effects of Final Judgment Declaring Nullity
on Remarriage
PONENTE: Paras, J.

NOTES: You know what to do with that big, fat butt (Srsly tho, ang labo
nang kasong ito kahit na halos 3pp lang.)
FACTS:
Respondent Karl Wiegel sought a declaration of nullity for his marriage to petitioner Lilia Wiegel because she had a prior,
existing marriage to Eduardo Maxion.
Lilia acknowledged the marriage to Eduardo, but claimed that both of them were forced to marry each other, rendering
the marriage void.
In the pre-trial, both parties agreed that the issue to be ruled upon by respondent Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy was whether
Lilias first marriage was void or voidable; but Lilia contested this, asking for an opportunity to present evidence that a)
she and Eduardo were forced to marry, and b) Eduardo was already married to someone else when he married Lilia.
Judge Sempio-Diy denied the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted upon both Lilia and
Eduardo had already been agreed upon.
ISSUE(S):
WON Lilia Wiegel should be allowed to present evidence proving the existence of force in her first marriage.
HELD:
No, Judge Sempio-Diys Orders affirmed. Marriage between the Wiegels (hehe) VOID.
RATIO:
Even if Lilia is allowed to present evidence, the presence of force would only render her marriage to Eduardo voidable,
not void. When she married Karl, her marriage to Eduardo was still valid and subsisting.
If Lilia was able to prove that Eduardo was already married before he married her, she would still need a judicial
declaration of nullity for that marriage before she could validly marry Karl.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Even if a previous marriage is deemed void, a party from that marriage needs a judicial declaration of nullity before contracting
another marriage. Otherwise, that party would still be deemed married.
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Terre v. Terre
TOPIC: Effects of final judgment declaring nullity (b)
on remarriage FC 40-41
PONENTE: Per curiam

Note:
Administrative case in the SC grossly immoral conduct

Dec. 24, 1981 Dorothy Terre (complainant) charged Atty. Jordan Terre (respondent) with grossly immoral conduct for
contracting a 2nd marriage and living with another woman while his marriage was still subsisting
Atty. Terre successfully evaded 5 attempts to serve a copy of the Courts Resolution and of the complaint by moving
from one place to another
Apr. 24, 1985 3 years after still no answer, the Court resolved to suspend Atty. Terre from his practice of law until
after he appears and/or files his answer to the complaint against him
Sept. 28, 1985 Atty. Terre finally responded, he avers that he had contracted marriage with Dorothy on June 14, 1977
upon her representation that she was single, he then learned that Dorothy was married to a certain Merlito A. Bercenilla
(1986)
When he confronted Dorothy, she drove him out of the conjugal residence and had mockingly told him of her private
meetings with Bercenilla and that the child she was carrying then (Jason) was Bercenillas son
Atty. Terre believing in good faith that his marriage with Dorothy was null and void, contracted a 2 nd marriage with Helina
Malicdem
In Dorothys reply she denied that Jason Terre was Bercenillas child, she explained that she only registered Jason as
Bercenillas dependent out of extreme necessity as Jordan had already abandoned them
She testifies that she met Jordan when they were still in high school and she was still married to Bercenilla while Jordan
was single, he started to court Dorothy
They then both moved to Manila where they studied and Jordan again courted her and explained to her that her marriage
to Bercenilla was null and void because they were 1 st cousins, convinced of this explanation she agreed to marry him and
despite her objection, Jordan wrote single as Dorothys status on the marriage license
He explained that since it is null and void, there was no need to go to court to declare it
Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith that his marriage to Dorothy was
null and void and that no action for a judicial declaration of nullity was necessary
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ISSUE(S): WON judicial declaration of nullity was necessary for the purpose of remarriage
HELD: YES!
Judicial declaration is necessary
RATIO:
As a lawyer, Jordan should have known that for purposes determining whether a person is legally free to contract a 2 nd marriage,
a judicial declaration that the 1st marriage was null and void is ESSENTIAL! For failing to get judicial declaration and
subsequently contracting a 2nd marriage, Terre committed a gross immoral conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar.
Terre is DISBARRED!
Name STRIKE OUT of roll!
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Valdes v. RTC of QC
G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996
TOPIC: Effects of final judgment declaring
nullity on the marriages property regime,
FC147-148
PONENTE: Vitug, J.
FACTS:
On Jan. 5, 1971, Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez got married and had 5 children.
On June 22, 1992, Valdes filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Consuelo pursuant to FC36 which was
granted by the RTC of QC.
In such ruling, RTC states that (3) the petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of
their common properties as defined by FC147, and to comply with FC50-52, within thirty (30) days from notice of this
decision.
Dahil hindi maintindihan netong si Consuelo, nag file pa ng clarification regarding the provisions and even asserted that
the FC contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage.
And so, when the RTC clarified, Valdes moved for reconsideration of the ruling but it was denied. He then argued that:
a. FC147 does not apply to cases where the parties are psychologically incapacitated;
b. FC50-52 in relation to FC102 and FC129 govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is
declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses;
and
c. Assuming arguendo that FC147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the psychological
incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently w/ FC129.
ISSUE:
WON FC147 applies. YES.
HELD:
In void ab initio marriages such as the Antonio-Consuelo marriage, regardless of the cause, the property relations during
the period of their cohabitation is governed by FC147 or 148.
FC50-52 only applies to voidable marriages in which does not apply to this case because it is not the same w/ void
marriages where in it is void or inexistent. Voidable marriages, like valid marriages, are also valid until annulled and the
governing provision is either FC102 or 129.
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Dino v. Dino
[G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011]
TOPIC: Property regime of the marriage (FC 147,
148)
PONENTE: Carpio, J.


- 1984: Alain (petitioner) and Caridad (respondent) started living together.
- 1994: they decided to separate
- 1996: they decided to live together again
- January 14, 1998: They got married
- May 30, 2001: Alain filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Caridad under Art. 36 of FC
- October 5, 2001: Caridad got married with Manuel V. Alcantara
- RTC granted the petition and decided that the Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage shall be issued after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties properties under Art. 147 of the FC.
ISSUE(S): WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Art. 147 of FC
HELD: Yes
RATIO:
- In Valdes v. RTC, a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by either 147 or 148.
- Art. 45 refers to voidable marriages and the marriages are governed wither by ACP or CPG
- Petitoners marriage was declared void under Art. 36 and not under Arts. 40 or 45. The liquidation of properties owned in
common of the spouses are governed by the rules on co-ownership and should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil
Code.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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YU v REYES-CARPIO
[G.R. No. 189207. June 15, 2011]
TOPIC: Effects of declaration of nullity on property
regime
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Eric Yu filed a declaration of nullity of marriage in RTC against Caroline due to psychological incapacity.
Judge Suarez issued an order that the Partial Offer of Evidence be submitted for resolution. These evidence
pertain only to the nullity of marriage, not including custody, support or property relations.
Caroline moved to submit the above incident for resolution, even when they have not settled on custody, support
or property relations yet. She reasoned that these are mere consequences of the petition.
Eric opposed the motion and claimed that the declaration of nullity cannot be solved without presenting evidence
for the incidents on custody, support and property relations.
Judge Suarez agreed with Eric. Caroline moved for the inhibition of Judge Suarez. She succeeded and Judge ReyesCarpio took over.
Caroline filed an Omnibus Motion to (1) strictly observe the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages (AM No. 02-11-10-SC); (2) that the case be already submitted for resolution.
Eric opposed, arguing that Judge Suarez has already resolved the issue of the motion.
Reyes-Carpio granted the motion. Eric appealed. CA affirmed. Hence, the certiorari.
ISSUE(S): WON the incident on custody, support and property relations must be resolved simultaneously with the incident on
declaration of nullity.
HELD: No. SC dismissed the petition.
RATIO:
Reyes-Carpio did not disallow the resolution of the incident on custody, support and property relations. She only deferred
its resolution and went ahead resolving the declaration of nullity first.
SC agreed with the lower courts ruling that it is more prudent to rule first on the incident of psychological incapacity. If
the court finds it meritorious to declare their marriage void, then the parties shall proceed to comply with FC Art. 50
(partition of conjugal properties, custody, etc.) and FC Art 51. (computation of the previous) before a final judgment has
been decreed.
As for AM No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 19: it allows the reception of evidence on custody, support, etc., after the trial court
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grants the petition on declaration of nullity.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Procedural law dictates that incidents on custody, support and property relations shall be tried after the lower court grants the
petition for declaration of nullity, but before a final judgment on the said petition.
Art. 50. Provides that the final judgment shall provide for the liquidation of property, custody and support of the common
children.
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CABREZA v. CABREZA
[G.R. No. 171260, 2009]
TOPIC: On the property regime of the marriage


Ceferino S. Cabreza, Jr. (respondent) filed with the RTC Pasig City a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Amparo Robles Cabreza (petitioner). The petition was granted. It also dissolved and liquidated the conjugal partnership.
Ceferino filed with the RTC a Motion for Execution (Re: Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership). He sought to implement the
order for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. He moved that said property be sold and the proceeds be divided
and distributed. RTC granted the petition.
RTC issued another order granting Ceferinos motion which prayed for the approval of the deed of absolute sale, for the
authorization for respondent to sign said deed in behalf of petitioner, and for an order requiring the occupants to vacate
the property.
Amparo filed a Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate arguing that Article 129(9) of the
New Civil Code provides that, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and lot on which it is situated shall
be adjudicated to the spouse with whom majority of the children choose to remain. Hence, since the majority of the
children opted to stay with her, she asserted that the family home should be given to her.
RTC Her petition was denied as the decision before was final and executory.
There was a notice to vacate the property. Amparo filed for certiorari before CA, it was denied.
ISSUE(S): Is Amparo right in arguing that Art. 129(9) of the Civil Code is applicable in this case?
HELD: No. Petition is denied. The sale is valid.
RATIO:
The decision by the RTC was already final and executor. Hence, Amparo cannot question the decision anymore. The
original decision on their nullity of marriage presented: Further, the conjugal partnership is hereby dissolved and must
be liquidated in accordance with Art. 129 of the Family Code, without prejudice to the prior rights of known and unknown
creditors of the conjugal partnership.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Art. 129(9) of the Civil Code provides: In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and lot on which it is situated
shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain.
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Yasin v. Sharia District Court
[G.R. No. 94986, February 23, 1995]
TOPIC: Effects of final judgment declaring nullity on
use of surnames
PONENTE: Bidin, J.


- Hatima C. Yasin, formerly married to a certain Hadji Idris Yasin (divorced), filed in the Sharia Ditrict Court in
Zamboanga City a petition to resume the use of her maiden name.
- The petition was denied
- According to the Sharia District Court, the petition filed is in accordance to Rule 103, Rules of Court and the
residence of Hatima Yasin and the name sought to be adopted is not properly indicated.
ISSUE(S): WON in case of annulment of marriage, or divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippine, and the
former wife desires to resume her maiden name or surname, is she required to file a petition for change of name under Rule 104
of the Rules of Court.
HELD: No
RATIO:
- The petition to resume the use of her maiden name filed before the Sharia District Court is unnecessary since the law
requires her to do so as her former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce in
accordance with Muslim laws.
- The requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name should not be applied to judicial confirmation of
the right of a divorced woman to resume her maiden name and surname.
- Petition for confirmation of change of civil status and/or to resume the use of maiden name must be given due course
and summarily granted as in fact it is a right conferred by law.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Yu v. Reyes-Carpio
G.R. No. 189207. June 15, 2011
TOPIC: Effects of final judgment declaring
nullity on the marriages property regime,
and on legitimes of the common children
FACTS:
This petition stemmed from a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner Eric Yu against respondent
Caroline Yu.
On May 30, 2006, the RTC granted Erics Partial Offer of Evidence regarding the issue on the declaration of nullity of the
marriage. But it also noted that it is only for that issue alone.
So on Sept. 12, 2006, Caroline alleges that the issue on the declaration of nullity of marriage, considering that the issues
on custody, support, and property relations (C.S.P.R.), were mere consequences of the declaration of nullity of their
marriage.
Eric opposed the motion claiming:
a. That the case on the declaration of nullity cant be resolved w/o presentation of evidence for the issues on C.S.P.R.;
and
b. That the case on nullity of marriage, and the issues on C.S.P.R., on the other, should both proceed and be
simultaneously resolved.
Eric was successful in opposing it. But later on, this case was tried by another RTC-branch w/c was presided by
respondent judge Reyes-Carpio. He ruled in favor of Carolines subsequent Omnibus Motion (O.M.) pursuant to the strict
application on the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages or A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Such O.M. of Caroline prayed that the issue on the declaration of nullity of marriage be resolved ahead of the issues on
C.S.P.R., and not simultaneously.
Such O.M. was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming the O.M.
regarding w/c issue to be resolve first. NO.
WON the reception of evidence on C.S.P.R. is necessary for a complete and comprehensive adjudication of the parties
respective claims. NO.
HELD:
SC notes that judge Reyes-Carpio did not disallow the presentation of evidence on the issues on custody, support, and
property relations. It is clear in the RTC orders that the judge merely deferred in admitting evidence relating to C.S.P.R.,
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to wit:
a. If the Court eventually finds that the parties respective petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage is indeed
meritorious on the basis of either or both of the parties P.I., then the parties shall proceed to comply w/ FC50-51
before a final decree of absolute nullity of marriage can be issued. Pending such ruling on the declaration of nullity of
the parties marriage, the Court finds no legal ground, at this stage, to proceed with the reception of evidence in
regard the issues on C.S.P.R., since these are mere incidents of the nullity of the parties marriage (August 4, 2008
Order);
b. Oct. 24, 2008 order reiterates the order above
Judge Reyes-Carpio based such orders on the A.M. Sec.19 and 21 where both sections states that the issue on the
declaration must 1st be resolved before the issues on C.S.P.R.
Hence, the A.M. allows the deferment of evidence on C.S.P.R. Despite that being said, the RTC may receive evidence on
such issues BUT only AFTER a judgment granting the petition BUT BEFORE the decree of nullity or annulment of marriage
is issued.
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JOSEPHINE P. UY-TIMOSA
[BM No. 1625, July 18, 2006]
TOPIC: Effects of final judgment on declaration of
nullity on use of surnames
PONENTE: En banc
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Josephine is married but has continuously used her maiden name in all her transactions. Her records in UST also
reflect her maiden name.
Josephine petitioned that she be allowed to use her maiden name in her application to take the 2006 bar exam.
She alleged that she and her husband have been separated since 2000 and that a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage is already pending in Manila RTC.
She requests that she be allowed to use her maiden name because of lack of time in amending her records to
reflect her husbands surname.
ISSUE(S): WON she can use her maiden name even if she is married
HELD: Yes.
RATIO:
NCC Art. 370 states that: A married woman may use:
(1) her maiden first name and surname, and add her husbands surname or;
(2) her maiden first name and her husbands surname or;
(3) her husbands full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as Mrs.
The provision indicates that the wifes use of her husbands surname is optional not obligatory.
When Josephine married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status.
She was not required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage as no law
requires it.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The use of husbands surname during the marriage (Art. 370), after the marriage (Art. 371; use of surname after annulment),
and after the death of the husband (Art. 373; use of surname upon death of husband) is permissive and not obligatory.
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Remo v. DFA
[March 5, 2010]
TOPIC: Effects of Final Judgment Declaring Nullity
on the Use of Surnames
PONENTE: Carpio, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Virginia Remo is married to a Francisco Rallonza. In her passport, her entries were: Rallonza for her surname,
Maria Virginia for her given name, and Remo for her middle name.
Virginias passport was expiring, so she was having it renewed. However, she also requested from the Philippine DFA
office in Chicago to revert to her maiden surname in the passport, i.e. Remo.
The request was denied by (in order) : DFA office in Chicago, main DFA office in the Philippines, the Office of the
President of the Philippines, the Court of Appeals.
Virginia cited both Yasin v. Honorable Judge Sharia District Court and Art. 370 of the Civil Code in her petitions. Art. 370
of the Civil Code states that a married woman may use her full maiden name + husbands surname; her first name +
husbands surname; or her husbands full name with something like Mrs. at the beginning; or, she may simply continue
using her full maiden name, period.
ISSUE(S):
WON Virginia Remo may revert to the use of her maiden name in her passport, even though she previously used her
husbands surname.
HELD: No, she may not. Petition DENIED.
RATIO:
5(d) of RA 8239 (The Philippine Passport Act of 1996) provides the only instances when a (formerly married) woman
may revert to the use of her maiden name, and these are:
o divorce
o annulment of marriage
o declaration of nullity of marriage
o death of the husband
Said provision is not in conflict with Art. 370 of the Civil Code.
Unlike in Yasin, where the woman was divorced, Virginias marriage is still subsisting. Also, Virginia requested to use her
maiden name in a replacement passport, while in Yasin, it was a request to use her maiden name in general, again.
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If Virginia used her maiden name in her passport from the start, there would be no problem. However, since she already
used her husbands surname, she cannot revert to the use of her maiden name without meeting the requirements of RA
8239.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
A married woman is not required to use her husbands surname upon marriage. However, when she does use it on
official documents, she must follow certain guidelines in order to revert to the use of her maiden name.
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Heirs of Go v Servacio
TOPIC: Effect of death

Note:
Petition for review on certiorari of a CA decision

Feb. 22, 1976 Jesus B. Gaviola sold 2 parcels of land to Protacio Go Jr.
Nov. 25, 1987 Marta Go (wife of Protacio Sr died)
Mar. 29, 1999 Protacio Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation & Waiver stating that it was his father who purchased
the land
Dev. 28, 1999 Protacio Sr, son Rito Go sold a portion of the property to Ester Servacio
Mar. 2, 2001 Petitioners (Protacio Sr heirs) demanded the return of the property but Servacio refused
After barangay proceedings failed to resolve the dispute, petitioners sued Servacio in RTC for the annulment of the sale
Petitioners aver that following Protacio Jrs renunciation, the property became conjugal property and the sale without
prior liquidation was null and void
Oct. 3, 2002 RTC declared the property was the conjugal property of Protacio Go Sr. and Marta Go
RTC affirms the validity of the sale and held that as long as portion sold does not encroach upon the legitimate of the
other heirs, it is valid
ISSUE(S): WON sale of land without prior liquidation is valid

HELD: YES!
RATIO:
Under FC 130, if the marriage is terminated by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be LIQUIDATED in the same
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. Any disposition (alienation) without liquidation shall be VOID!
Protacio and Marta were married prior to the affectivity of the FC so their property regime is CPG, following the death of Marta in
1987the CPG was dissolved and implied co-ownership ensued. Under CC 493, co-owners may alienate but only limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-ownership, if it turns out that the property
alienated really would pertain to the share of the surviving spouse then it is VALID!
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Petition is DENIED!
RTC decision is AFFIRMED!
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy
No. L-53703. August 19, 1986
TOPIC: Effects of final judgment
declaring nullity on remarriage, FC4041
PONENTE: Paras, J.
FACTS:
On July, 1978, respondent Karl Wiegel married Lilia Wiegel.
However, Karl filed for a declaration of nullity of his marriage w/ Lilia due to Lilias prior existing marriage w/ Eduardo
Maxion. It was alleged that Lilia and Eduardo got married on June 25, 1972.
Lilia, as defense, states:
a. That her marriage w/ Eduardo was null and void due being vitiated by forced to enter in such marriage; and
b. That Eduardo was married to someone else
Respondent judge Sempio-Diy denied Lilias petition and ruled in favor of Karl.
ISSUE:
WON the marriage of Karl and Lilia is void for being bigamous. YES.
HELD:
There is no need for Lilia to prove that her marriage w/ Eduardo was vitiated by force because assuming arguendo, the
marriage will not be void but merely voidable (Art. 85, old Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled.
But since no annulment has yet been made regarding that marriage, her subsequent marriage to Karl is void.
SC also states that there is also no need for Lilia to provide evidence in proving that Eduardo was married to someone
else because even if her marriage to Eduardo is void due to Eduardos marriage to someone else, there is still a need of
judicial declaration for purposes of remarriage (such as when she married Karl).
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Terre v. Terre
[A.C. 2349, July 3, 1992]
TOPIC: Effects of final judgment declaring nullity on
remarriage
PONENTE: Per Curiam


- Dorothy was first married to Merlito Bercenilla (her first cousin).
- July 14, 1977: Dorothy and Jordan Terre got married (Jordan explained to Dorothy that her marriage with Merlito was
void ab initio therefore they can get married)
- 1981: Jordan disappeared
- May 3, 1981: Jordan and Helina Malicdem got married.
ISSUE(S): WON Jordan Terres second marriage with Helina Malicdem is bigamous
HELD: Yes
RATIO:
- Jordan Terres marriage with Dorothy Terre was still subsisting when he contracted his second marriage with Helina
Malicdem. He neither initiated nor obtained any judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage when he contracted his
second marriage.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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KATIPUNAN v TENORIO
[38 OG 172, 1937]
TOPIC: Grounds for annulment - insanity
PONENTE: Imperial, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Katipunan married Tenorio and had 4 children.
On the birth of their last offspring, Tenorio manifested signs of insanity. Later on she was medically diagnosed and
that her condition is incurable.
Katipunan filed for the annulment of his marriage with Tenorio. He alleged that he only courted Tenorio for 4 days
and was only able to see signs of insanity after the wedding. His sister Leonora attested this. Katipunan also
presented Faustina as witness, an acquaintance of Tenorio before the marriage. She alleged that Tenorio showed
signs of insanity uttering incoherent words from time to time.
Tenorios mother belied Tenorios claim and alleged that he had been making love with her daughter for 2 years
before the marriage. Tenorio and her mother defended that she was of sound mind during the wedding, that she
was not insane prior to it and that she had only manifested signs of insanity after her fourth pregnancy, 7 years
after the wedding.
ISSUE(S): WON Tenorio was mentally sound during the wedding
HELD: Yes. Judgment by CFI affirmed.
RATIO:
The evidence presented by Katipunan was doubtful and unsettled.
Every presumption goes in favor of the validity of the marriage. The causes should be established clearly, unequivocally,
and convincingly.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Insanity of one of the spouses occurring after the celebration of the marriage cannot constitute a cause of nullity.
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Oropesa v. Oropesa
[April 25, 2012]
TOPIC: Insanity as a Ground for Annulment
PONENTE: Leonardo-De Castro, J.

NOTES: Not sure if this case should be under this topic, as it talks about
incompetence in relation to guardianship, not insanity in relation to
marriage/annulment.
FACTS:
Petitioner Nilo Oropesa filed a petition for guardianship over his fathers, respondent General Cirilo Oropesa, properties.
Nilo claims that his father is not fit to manage his own properties because, after two strokes in 2003 or even before that,
his judgment and memory are impaired.
A social worker was sent by the court to assess Gen. Cirilo, but he refused to see her, so her report contained no findings
on him. Gen. Cirilo then filed an Opposition.
Nilo presented testimonial evidence from himself, his sister, and Gen. Cirilos former nurse, and some documentary
evidence, but he did not file a written formal offer of evidence. Gen. Cirilo then filed an Omnibus Motion to:
1. declare Nilo to have waived the presentation of his evidence,
2. to expunge Nilos documents from the record, and
3. to grant leave to Gen. Cirilo to file demurrer for evidence.
The Omnibus Motion was granted, and Gen. Cirilo filed his Demurrer, which was also granted. The CA dismissed Nilos
appeal.
ISSUE(S):
WON Gen. Cirilo is considered incompetent, as defined under 2, Rule 92 of the RoC, who must be placed under
guardianship.
HELD: No, he is not. Petition DENIED.
RATIO:
Guardianship is a relationship between a guardian and a ward, whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own
affairs. The court may appoint a guardian if the prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an incompetent.
o 2, Rule 91 of the RoC defines and enumerates who are incompetent persons, which includes persons not being
of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes who cannot take care of
themselves and manage their property without outside aid.
Finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive, and definite evidence.
o The only medical document presented by Nilo failed to prove incompetence, and actually showed that Gen. Cirilo
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was sharp, alert, and able.
o The testimonies were given by Nilo, his sister (both of whom claimed interest in their fathers properties), and
Gen. Cirilos former nurse (who admitted to acting under their direction). There was no expert medical testimony.
Because the CA affirmed the factual findings of the trial court, the SC adopted those findings and found the grant of the
demurrer to be proper. (A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one party in an action when he believes that the
evidence presented by the other party is insufficient and does not entitle that party to the relief sought.)
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Incompetence must be proven through clear, positive, and definite evidence. Expert testimony is not necessary, as the
judges observation, in addition to the evidence, should suffice.
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Hernandez v CA
TOPIC: Grounds for annulment fraud FC 45 (3),
46, 47 (3)
PONENTE: Mendoza, J.

Note:
Petition for review on certiorari of a CA decision

Jan. 1, 1981 Lucita Estrella Hernandez & Mario C. Hernandez were married, they had 3 children
Jul. 10, 1992 Lucita filed with the RTC a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity of Mario
She alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the time of the filing of the suit Mario failed to perform his
obligation to support the family and devoted most of his time engaging in drinking sprees with his friends
She also alleges that Mario cohabited with another woman, and because of his promiscuity, Mario endangered her health
by infecting her with STD
Oct. 1992 Petitioner learned that Mario left for the Middle East and since then his whereabouts has been unknown
Apr. 10, 1993 RTC dismissed the petition citing the grounds Lucita enumerated do not fall under FC 36 nor as grounds
for declaration of nullity/annulment but falls under LegSep (FC 55)
No dispute to the fact that gonorrhea transmitted to Lucita occurred 5 years after marriage was celebrated
Reading 45 (3), 46(3) carefully, it is clear that the law requires the existence of the ground of FRAUD at the time of the
celebration of the marriage
ISSUE(S):
WON marriage of petitioner and respondent should be annulled on the ground of respondents psychological incapacity
HELD:
NO.
RATIO:
Court finds that other than Lucitas self serving declarations, she failed to establish the fact that at the time they were married,
Mario was suffering from a psychological defect. It was not sufficiently proved that Mario was really incapable of fulfilling his
duties due to some incapacity of a psychological nature.
CA decision is AFFIRMED.
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CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Buccat v. Buccat
G.R. No. 47101, April 25, 1941
TOPIC: Ground for annulment, Fraud, NCC
1338-1344
PONENTE: Horrilleno, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Godofredo Buccat met respondent Luida Buccat on March, 1938. They got married on Nov. 26 of the same
year.
However, on Feb. 23, 1939, Luida gave birth to a son. After knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned to her.
On March, 23, 1939, he filed this petition for annulment of their marriage on the ground of fraud, that when he agreed to
married Luida, she assured him that she was still a virgin.
RTC ruled in favor of Luida, denying Godofredos petition.
ISSUE:
WON the marriage should be annulled on the ground of concealment of pregnancy. NO.
HELD:
SC states that it did not find sufficient proof that there was concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud. It was unlikely
for Godofredo, who is a first-year law stundent, to not suspect anything about Luidas condition considering that she was
in an advanced stage of pregnancy (Malaki na tiyan) when they got married.
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VILLANUEVA v CA
[G.R. No. 132955. October 27, 2006]
TOPIC: Grounds for annulment force, intimidation,
and undue influence
AUTHOR: PARIAN
Villanueva has a pending bigamy case prior to the petition. SC thinks it
was filed hoping that it will get Villanueva a favorable judgment that will
lead to his acquittal from his bigamy case. (He was found guilty of
bigamy prior to SCs review.)

1988: Villanueva married Lilia in Palawan while she was pregnant.
1992: Villanueva filed a petition for annulment of their marriage.
He alleged that his consent was vitiated due to harassments, threats and intimidation imposed by Lilias camp
forcing him to marry Lilia. He further alleged that he did not get her pregnant, and that he never cohabited with
her.
She defended that he freely and voluntarily married her; that he knew about the pregnancy, which later on ended
with a miscarriage; that he stayed with her for months before he returned to Manila; and that he sent letters to
her while he was in Manila.
Lower court ruled in favor of Lilia. CA affirmed. Hence, the review.
ISSUE(S): WON there was intimidation or undue influence which vitiated the consent of Villanueva to the marriage
HELD: There is none. SC affirmed CAs decision but deleted the awarding of moral and exemplary damage.
RATIO:
SC was not persuaded that the danger to Villanuevas person is so overwhelming that his consent was vitiated, given
that he was a security guard during that time; that he is knowledgeable of self defense or at least, to keep himself out of
harms way.
It is even doubtful that the threats exist because he never reported it to the police, or to the solemnizing officer during
the wedding; that in fact, it took him 4 years to act on it.
Instead of proving that he was tricked into marrying his wife, he resorted to undermining the credibility of Lilia.
Villanueva was not able to convincingly prove that his consent was vitiated.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Allegations (vitiated consent) must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Case focused on moral damages and exemplary damages where: there must be evidence that there was in fact moral damage
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for it to be awarded. There was none in the case.
Case also ruled: lack of cohabitation is not a ground for annulment of marriage. (Off topic, though.)
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Alcazar v. Alcazar
[Oct. 13, 2009]
TOPIC: Physical Incapacity/Impotence as a Ground
for Annulment

NOTES: This digest only includes the courts discussion on the relevant
issue because it was already digested before.
FACTS:
This is a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage by Veronica Alcazar. She was married to respondent Rey
Alcazar.
When they went back to Manila after the wedding, Rey did not live with Veronica. He left for Saudi Arabia to work.
The couple did not communicate the whole time Rey was abroad despite numerous attempts by Veronica to call him. She
only learned he was coming home to the Philippines from a co-teacher about a year and a half after Rey left for Riyadh.
Veronica further averred in her Complaint that when Rey arrived in the Philippines, he did not go home to Veronica in
Manila; instead, he proceeded to his parents house in Occidental Mindoro. She asserted that from the time Rey arrived
in the Philippines, he never contacted her.
Thus, Veronica concluded that Rey was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient
cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family
Code).
There was also no more possibility of reconciliation between Veronica and Rey. RTC of Malolos City dismissed the
Complaint, a decision later affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE(S):
WON Rey is psychologically incapacitated.
HELD: No, he is not. Petition DENIED.
RATIO:
It is important to note that the initial Complaint filed by Veronica was for ANNULMENT of marriage (voidable) based on
Art. 45(5) of the Family Code physical incapacity.
o Said article refers to lack of power to copulate. It is a permanent inability to have sex with each other, caused
by a physical defect, an illness, or even fear arising from psychophysical conditions in either or both parties.
o Veronica admitted to having intercourse with Rey after their wedding, and before he left. It appears that he was
not physically incapable, hence, there was no ground for annulling the marriage. This is why the initial complaint
was dismissed.
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(For further discussion on Psychological Incapacity, please see PAMS DIGEST on this case.)
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Physical incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage refers to the permanent inability of either party to fully have
sex with the other.
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Republic v Albios
TOPIC: Grounds for annulment others
PONENTE: Mendoza, J.

Note:
Petition for review on certiorari of a CA decision affirming the RTC decision declaring marriage of Fringer and Albios as
void ab initio
Oct. 22, 2004 Daniel Lee Fringer (American citizen) and Liberty Albios got married
Dec. 6, 2006 Albios filed with RTC a petition for declaration of nullity other marriage with Fringer
She alleges that after the marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never had any
intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligation, she describes that
their marriage was a marriage made in jest so null and void
Apr. 25, 2008 RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, RTC was of the view that the parties only married for
convenience
Albios stated that she married Fringer to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2000
OSG filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied this, the OSG then filed an appeal to the CA
CA affirmed the RTC ruling and found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking
ISSUE(S):
WON marriage contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2000 is void ab initio on
ground of lack of consent
HELD:
NO. This does not render the marriage void ab initio
RATIO:
Under FC 2, consent is an essential requisite of a marriage. For consent to be valid, it must be freely given, made in presence of
solemnizing officer, must be real and not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vices of consent. It must also be conscious and
intelligent; parties must be capable of understanding the nature and consequences of their acts.
Albios and Fringer freely gave their consent, it was not vitiated, it was also conscious and intelligent, as they understood the
nature of it. They willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage with the intention to enter into a real and valid marriage,
which is required to accomplish Albios goal of acquiring American citizenship. Consent was not lacking, so marriage is valid.
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CA decision is ANNULLED!
Civil case is DISMISSED!
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Barcelona v. CA
G.R. No. 130087. September 24, 2003
TOPIC: Procedure in actions for
annulment, FC48 and A.M. No. 02-1110-SC
PONENTE: Carpio, J.
FACTS:
This case involved 2 petitions:
a. Same parties, petitioner Diana Barcelona and respondent Tadeo Bengzon; and
b. Same cause of action, annulment under FC36.
However, the 1st petition was withdrawn w/o prejudice by Tadeo and later on filed this current/2nd petition at the RTC.
Diana states that the 2nd petition should be dismissed because:
a. It fails to state a cause of action; and
b. Violates Circular No. 04-94 hence guilty of forum shopping.
However, the RTC ruled in favor of Tadeo stating:
a. That the facts of his petition sates that Diana violated Tadeos right which gave rise to a cause of action; and
b. Tadeo is not guilty of forum shopping because the 1st petition was dismissed w/o prejudice. Hence, no longer pending
when he filed the 2nd petition.
CA affirmed the RTC decision:
a. The allegations in the 2nd petition state a cause of action sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven to be true;
and
b. There was no violation of Circular No. 04-94. To determine if theres forum shopping, the elements of litis pendentia
must exist or a final judgment in one case must amount to res judicata in the other. In this case, there is no litis
pendentia because Tadeo already dismissed w/o prejudice the 1st petition before filing the 2nd petition. Neither is
there res judicata because there is no final decision on the merits, only basis was it was w/o prejudice.
ISSUE:
WON Tadeo has cause of action. YES.
WON Tadeo committed forum shopping. NO.
HELD:
SC affirms CA decision, defines cause of action as the act or omission of the defendant that violates the right of the
plaintiff.
Tadeos petition contained facts that:
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a. When Diana was pregnant, she wanted Tadeo to leave the conjugal home to be from his marital authority and
influences. This prompted Tadeo to live in their condo in GH w/c resulted to a separation de facto;
b. She came from a rich family and was a disorganized housekeeper;
c. Always out of the house for she was always w/ her friend to play tennis;
d. Frequent quarrels and refusing to talk to Tadeo; and
e. That she was already P.I. to comply w/ the marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage up to the
present. This was based on the psychological examination conducted upon them.
But Diana relies on Santos v. CA (definition of P.I.) and Republic v. Molina (guidelines). She contends that it falls short to
follow the guidelines and it failed to allege the P.I.s:
a. Root cause:
b. If it existed at the of the celebration of their marriage; and
c. If it was permanent and incurable.
However, SC states the A.M. Sec. 2 (Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages). Such rules says that expert opinion need not be alleged in the petition and that there is also no need to
allege the P.I.s root cause. What is needed is to allege the physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity
w/c Tadeo did in the 2nd petition.
On forum shopping, the 1st petitions dismissal did not amount to litis pendentia or res judicata:
a. No litis pendentia for the dismissal happened before service of answer or any pleading; and
b. No res judicata because the dismissal was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal w/o prejudice.
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Chan-Tan v. Chan
G.R. No. 167139, Feb. 10, 2010
TAKE NOTE: The days of the decisions
TOPIC: Effects of annulment, FC 50-54, 43,
102, 129, 213
PONENTE: Carpio, J.
FACTS:
On June, 1989, petitioner Susie Chan-Tan and respondent Jesse Chan got married. But on 2001, after 12 yrs. of their
marriage, Susie filed for an annulment of their marriage under FC36. And so, they made a compromise agreement
(Regarding the dissolution property, support and custody of children, etc.).
Custody of the minor children were given to Susie and Jesse was given visitation rights. The compromise agreement was
only partially approved by the RTC on July 21, 2003. But nevertheless, declared the marriage void under FC36 on March
30, 2004.
However, subsequently, Susie left the country w/ their minor children w/o the consent of Jesse. Because of this, he was
prompted to file w/ the RTC main custody w/c the RTC granted on May 17, 2004.
Then on June 28, 2004, Susie alleged as defense:
a. That she was denied due process and to present evidence because of the negligence of her counsel and her own fear
for her life and the future of the children (She left the country because of Jesse beating her); and
b. That the RTC erred in solely relying on the testimony of Jesse.
RTC denied Susies defense for it was already beyond the 15-day reglementary period and held her in contempt for not
complying w/ the July 21, 2003 compromise agreement and the May 17, 2004 judgment (Main custody).
Susie then stated in another petition that events in her life had led her to the conclusion that withdrawing the petition
under FC36 was for the best interest of the children. She prayed that an order be issued vacating all prior orders and
leaving the parties at the status quo ante the filing of the suit.
RTC ruling:
a. Denied Susies motion to dimiss; and
b. March 30, 2004 (their marriage void under FC36) and May 17, 2004 (main custody given to Jesse) decisions were
already final and executory after the 15-day reglementary period.
ISSUE:
WON the March 30 and May 17, 2004 judgements were already final and executory despite the alleged denial of due
process. YES
HELD:
In Tuason v. CA:
a. After the 15-day reg. period after the declaring their marriage void, the husband was deemed to have waived his
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right to present evidence w/c prompted the court to rely on the testimony; and
b. Also, notice was sent to the counsel and it is binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of the counsel to
inform the client of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of the clients right to appeal is not a ground for setting
aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.
In this case, the decisions for their marriage being void (March 30, 2004), and main custody to Jesse (May 17, 2004) were
already final and executory upon after 15 days. Susie only filed a motion regarding the May 17, 2004 decision but it was
only received by the RTC on June 28, 2004 w/c is already beyond 15 days. Therefore, the alleged negligence of counsel
resulting in Susies loss of the right to appeal is not a ground for vacating the RTCs judgments.
With regard to the allegation of denied due process, SC states:
a. That she was not denied due process and not because of her counsels negligence. She was even absent in the nullity
proceedings and her counsel was the one who appeared on her behalf;
b. That this prompted the SC to view her non-interest in such proceedings and also to the other issues like the
compromise agreement w/c she violated;
c. That this was the reason they solely believed Jesses testimony.
There was also an issue on procedure regarding the Rules on declaration of void and voidable marriages (A.M. 02 bla
bla bla) but the SC still stated that the motions she filed was beyond the 15-day reglementary period, therefore, her
petition for review has no merit. RTC decision affirmed.
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QUIAO v QUIAO
[G.R. No. 176556. July 4, 2012]
TOPIC: Effects of annulment on property regime
PONENTE: Reyes, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN
Effectivity of NCC: Aug 30, 1950
FC: Aug 3, 1988

Brigido and Rita were married on January 1977.
2000: Rita filed for legal separation.
RTC found that the spouses dont have separate properties. And because theyre married before Aug 3, 1988, CPG
governs their property relations.
RTC granted the legal separation and ordered that properties be separated equally. But since Brigido is the guilty
spouse for cohabiting with another woman, he is forfeited to receive his share from the net profits earned by
the conjugal partnership, and that it will be awarded to his children with Rita.
Brigido did not appeal and the decision became final and executory.
The writ was partially executed. However, Brigido filed a motion for clarification to define the term net profits
earned.
As per RTC: It is the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each of
the spouse and the debts.
ISSUE(S): What is net profits earned?
How do you compute for it with respect to ACP, with respect to CPG?
HELD/RATIO:
FC Art. 102 (4) provides: Net profits earned - shall be the increase in value between the market value of the
community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
For the purpose of dissolution and liquidation, the definition of Art 102 (4) shall govern; both for ACP (Art. 102) and CPG
(Art. 129)
ACP Art 102:
(1) Find the market value of the properties at the time of the communitys dissolution.
(2) Total market value of all the properties - Debts and obligations of the absolute community = Net assets or net
remainder of the properties of the absolute community
(3) Net assets or net remainder of the properties of the absolute community - market value of the properties at the time
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of marriage = Net profits earned
(4) Net profits earned 2
CPG Art. 129:
(1) Conjugal properties + Reimbursements for benefits received by a spouse from the
conjugal partnership Reimbursements to spouse/s for benefits received by conjugal partnership = Total assets of conjugal
partnership
(2) Total assets of conjugal partnership - Debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership = Net profits earned
(3) Net profits earned 2
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Net profits earned shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
Note: The definition was not used in computing for CPG. There was no computation of market value, etc. They strictly used Art.
129, and only provided Art 102 (4) as the definition of net profits earned to clarify the dispositive portion of RTC.
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Remo v DFA
TOPIC: On use of surname (NCC 371, 364, 369)
PONENTE: Carpio, J.

Note:
Petition for review on certiorari of a CA decision and resolution affirming DFA decision denying Maria Virginia Remos
request to revert to the use of her maiden name in her replacement passport
Remos (married Filipino citizen) Philippine passport was then expiring on Oct. 27, 2000
Remo being then married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the ff. entries appear on her passport; Rallonza (surname), Maria
Virgina (given name), Remo (middle name)
Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport, and while her marriage was still subsisting, she requested to revert to
her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport (DFA Chicago), this was denied
Petitioner then wrote to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo Siason, this was also denied
She then filed an appeal with the Office of the President but it was dismissed, ruling that RA 8239 (Philippine Passport
Act) only cites 4 instances where a married woman may revert to her maiden name; (1) divorce, (2) annulment, (3)
declaration of nullity of marriage, and (4) death of husband
Remo then moved for reconsideration before the CA but this was also denied, hence the present petition
ISSUE(S):
WON Remo (who originally used her husbands surname in her expired passport) can revert to the use of her maiden name in
replacement passport
HELD:
NO. Remo may not revert to the use of her maiden name in her passport.
RATIO:
RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act) cites only 4 instances where a married woman may revert to the use of her maiden name in
the passport. These are; (1) divorce, (2) annulment, (3) declaration of nullity of marriage, and (4) death of husband. Clearly
Remo does not fall within any of the categories, so her petition must fail.
Truthfully, Remo could have used her maiden name in the passport but she chose to use her husbands surname in her expired
passport. Once a married woman opted to adopt her husbands surname in her passport, she may not revert back to the use of
her maiden name anymore.
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Petition is DENIED!
CA Decision and Resolution is AFFIRMED!
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

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Valdez v. Republic
G.R. No. 180863. September 8, 2009
TAKE NOTE: CC83 and CC390
TOPIC: Marriage when one spouse is
absent , FC 41-44
PONENTE: Nachura, J.
FACTS:
On Jan. 11, 1971, petitioner Angelita Valdez and Sofio got married. However, they argued constantly because Sofio was
unemployed and does not bring home any money. So on March 1972, Sofio left the conjugal home w/c prompted Angelita
to go back to her parents in Camiling.
On 1975, Sofio showed up to Angelita and talked about getting separated. They made a document to effect the
separation and this was the last time Angelita saw him and heard from him.
On June 20, 1985, with the belief that Sofio was already dead, Angelita married Virgilio Reyes. Virgilio was about to be a
naturalized US citizen but it did not happen because of Angelitas marriage to Sofio.
So this gave rise to this petition for the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio. But the RTC held:
a. That Angelita failed to prove her well-grounded belief that Sofio was already dead pursuant to FC41;
b. She did not exert diligent efforts to find her husband in light of their agreement to live separately;
c. Angelitas daughter, Nancy, testified that she was prevented by her mother to look for Sofio;
d. Despite Sofio being 61 yrs. old by now, upon reaching 60s have not become evident that people of such age are low
in health and spirits;
e. Assuming arguendo the allegation that Sofio was a chain-smoker and drunkard, theres no evidence he still is up to
now.
Angelita now files a motion for reconsideration contending that it is the old CC that applies, not FC. Applying FC would be
prejudicial to Angelitas vested rights under the old CC. E dineny pa rin ng RTC.
ISSUE:
WON the petition should prosper. NO.
HELD:
SC affirmed RTCs decision but on different grounds:
a. Only cases of pure question of law can be directly appealed to SC, not question of facts. But the facts of the case was
not disputed because of the motion (w/c the OSG agreed to) was WON it is the old CC or FC that applies;
b. In the Szatraw case, the petitioners husband was missing for more than 7 yrs. and was already presumed dead
pursuant to CC83 and CC390. The petition for a declaration that her husband is presumptively dead was
denied because such declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve her situation because such
presumption is already established by law (CC390);
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c. In Lukban v. Republic, petitioner Lourdes Lukban filed a petition in 1956 for a declaration of presumption of death of
her husband, Francisco because he was already missing for more than 20 yrs. after a quarrel on Dec. 27, 1933;
d. In Gue v. Republic, petitioner Angelina Gues husband, William, left Manila to go to Shanghai and after 11 yrs.,
nothing was heard from him despite effort to find him, hence, prompted her to file a petition for a declaration of the
presumption of death of Willian Gue pursuant to CC390.
In both cases mentioned ([c] and [d]), the Szatraw ruling was reiterated. These marriages, like the Angelita-Sofio and
Angelita-Virgilio marriages, were all celebrated under the old CC.
With all that said, proof of well-founded belief is not required with regard to Angelitas case. She could not have been
expected to comply with this requirement since the FC was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. So
Sofio was presumed dead since October 1982 and therefore making Angelitas marriage to Virgilio legal and valid.
TAKE NOTE:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with
any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
a. The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
b. The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, of if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven
years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so
contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed
dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he
disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be
opened.
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Arca v. Javier
No. L-6768. July 31, 1954
TOPIC: Marriages dissolved by foreign
judgment, NCC 15, 17(3) FC 26
PONENTE: Bautista Angelo, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Alfredo Javier was a Filipino citizen, who married petitioner Salud Arca, who is also a Filipino citizen, on 1937.
But on 1927, Alfredo was enlisted in the US Navy and was only deployed on 1938, hence, leaving his wife.
On Aug. 13, 1940, Alfredo filed for a divorce in Alabama alleging that he was abandoned by Salud (petitioner-wife).
Salud, as defense, alleged:
a. That Alfredo was not a resident of Alabama but of Cavite, PH; and
b. That it was not true that the cause of their separation was abandonment on her part but because he was then
enlisted in the US Navy.
Alabama court still issued the divorce decree.
ISSUE:
WON the divorce decree is valid and binding. NO.
HELD:
SC states that for the divorce decree to attain validity, the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and in
order that this may be acquired, plaintiff (Alfredo, in the divorce case) must be domiciled in good faith in the State in
which it is granted (Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer).
In Sikat vs. Canson:
a. John Canson had legal residence in Nevada and was also an American citizen, although it was proven that his wife
never accompanied him there but has always remained in the Philippines, and so it has been held that it is not * *
* the citizenship of the plaintiff for divorce which confers jurisdiction upon a court, but his legal
residence within the State."
b. The court further said: "Assuming that John Canson acquired legal residence in the Nevada through the approval of
his citizenship papers, this would not confer jurisdiction on the Nevada court to grant divorce that would be valid in
this jurisdiction (PH), nor jurisdiction that could determine their matrimonial status, because the wife was still
domiciled in the Philippines. The Nevada court never acquired jurisdiction over her person."
There are also other cases cited (2-4 cases was cited about this) that says:
a. That both citizenship and residence acquired by either spouse from a foreign country is insufficient, especially if the
purpose was only to obtain a divorce decree.
b. It must be noted that if he/she has no intention of returning there (In the foreign residence), and the domicile is in the
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PH, then such foreign residence is insufficient to confer jurisdiction.
c. In short, both spouses must have bona fide residence and citizenship to acquire jurisdiction in such foreign state,
hence, to also acquire jurisdiction and recognizable by the PH courts.
TENCHAVEZ v ESCAO
[15 SCRA 355, 1965]
TOPIC: Marriages dissolved by a foreign judgment
PONENTE: Reyes, JBL., J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN
The complaint against the parents were dismissed for lack of
evidence.

1948: Pastor Tenchavez married Vicenta Escao in Cebu. They made it a secret from Vicentas parents. When they
found out, they wanted the couple to remarry in a church to make the wedding valid from the standpoint of the
Church.
However, Vicenta received a letter alleging that Pastor has an ongoing affair with Vicentas friend. Vicenta did not
push through with the church wedding.
Vicenta continued to live with her parents while Pastor had to go back to his job in Manila.
Vicenta then moved to Misamis Occidental to escape the shame from the marriage. There, a lawyer filed a
petition for annulment for her but she did not sign the petition and did not appear at the hearing.
1951: Vicenta went to US and had her marriage divorced there.
1954: She married Russell Moran, an American, and stayed with him in the US. In 1958, she became a US citizen.
But in 1955, Pastor filed for legal separation (and a complaint against her parents for dissuading and discouraging
Vicenta from joining him to be his wife. He filed for moral damages worth P1M.).
Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo
Moran (while her parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed
for moral damages.).
CFI did not grant the petition.
ISSUE(S): WON Pastor and Vicenta should be legally separated.
HELD: Yes. Petition granted. (But Pastor was ordered to pay damages to Vicentas parents.)
RATIO:
The marriage between Tenchavez and Escao remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding
the decree of absolute divorce that Escao sought and obtained from Nevada.
At the time the divorce decree was issued, Escao, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to
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Philippine law.
Her marriage to Tenchavez was never declared null and void, as well. Vicenta Escao's divorce and second marriage are
not entitled to recognition as valid; (1) for she was still a Filipino citizen when the divorce decree was obtained, and; (2)
for her previous union to Tenchavez is still existent and undissolved.
Her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her husband" from the
standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of
adultery".
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Foreign divorce decree obtained by a Filipino citizen is not recognized under the Philippine law.
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera
[June 30, 1989]
TOPIC: Marriages dissolved by a foreign judgment
PONENTE: Regalado, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Pilapil and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German, were married in Germany sometime in 1979.
They lived in Manila and had a child one year later.
In 1983, Erich initiated divorce proceedings in Germany. Around the same time, Imelda filed for legal separation in
Manila. In January 1986, the divorce in Germany was granted. The divorce was validly recognized here.
June 27, 1986 in Manila, Erich filed two complaints for adultery against Imelda one for an affair with a William Chia
beginning in 1982, and the other for an affair with Jesus/James Chua in 1983.
o Initially dismissed, the cases were each raffled to two different RTC branches: Imeldas and Chias to respondent
Judge Ibay-Someras branch, and Imeldas and Chuas to Judge Cruz.
Imelda and Chua filed petitions with the Secretary of Justice to have the cases dismissed. The SoJ, through the Chief
State Prosecutor, directed the respondent City Fiscal Luis Victor to defer proceedings if the accused were not yet
arraigned, and to elevate the records to his office for review. Pursuant to this, Imelda filed a motion in both cases to defer
her arraignment and suspend further proceedings.
Judge Cruz suspended proceedings, but Judge Ibay-Somera only reset the date of the arraignment. Imelda moved to
defer and suspend again, and to quash Judge Ibay-Someras order for lack of jurisdiction. Judge Ibay-Somera then denied
the motion, and ordered the arraignment of Imelda and Chua.
Chia pleaded not guilty, while Imelda refused to be arraigned. After being fined and detained for contempt, Imelda also
pleaded not guilty. Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking to annul
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the denial of her motion to quash.
ISSUE(S):
WON Judge Ibay-Somera/the RTC has the jurisdiction to proceed with the case.
o WON Erich Geiling is an offended spouse (under Art. 344 of the RPC) who may file a case of adultery against
Imelda, despite his German divorce.
HELD: No, there is no jurisdiction because Erich has no standing due to his valid divorce. Petition GRANTED, denial of quash
SET ASIDE, complaint in criminal case DISMISSED, TRO made permanent.
RATIO:
The requirement that adultery may only be prosecuted upon a sworn written complaint by the offended spouse is a
jurisdictional issue, not merely a formal one. In other words, the RTC will have jurisdiction if Erich is an offended spouse
under Art. 344 of the RPC.
o Erich is not an offended spouse under the aforesaid provision because he was validly divorced from Imelda
when he initiated proceedings. The accusing spouse must be married AT THE TIME of the filing of the complaint.
o The State may not prosecute because adultery is considered a private crime, meaning only the offended party
may initiate.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
A complaint for adultery cannot stand if a marriage is VOID. For VOIDABLE marriages, however, the complaint will stand
if it is made before the annulment is granted.
Regarding foreign divorce: It must be proven that the international court that granted the divorce was
locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding, under the laws of that courts country;
and that the dissolution of the marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of
that foreign jurisdiction for it to be binding upon the Filipino in a marriage with a foreigner.
Paras, J.: Regardless of whether or not the divorce is recognized as valid in the Philippines, the act of obtaining a divorce
disqualifies the obtainer from being the offended party in crimes such as adultery.
in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. (Note: WTF, man?)
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Corpus v Sto. Tomas
TOPIC: Marriages dissolved by foreign judgment
PONENTE: Brion, J.

Note:
Petition for review on certiorari of an RTC decision

Nov. 29, 2000 Gerbert Corpus acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization
Jan. 18, 2005 Gerbert married Daisylyn Sto. Tomas in Pasig City, Gerbert soon left for Canada
Apr. 2005 Intending to surprise Daisylyn, Gerbert went home from Canada but was shocked to discover Daisylyn having
an affair with another man
Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for decree, this was granted and took effect a month later (2006)
2 years later, Gerbert having moved on met another Filipina, desiring to marry her he went Pasig City Civil Registry Office
and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate
An NSO official informed Gerbert that his marriage with Daisylyn was still subsisting under PHL law, and for the foreign
divorce to be enforceable, it must first be judicially recognized by a competent court
Gerbert then filed a petition for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved
before the RTC but this was denied
RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute an action for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen, the trial court ruled that under FC 26 (2), only the Filipino spouse can
avail of the remedy
ISSUE(S):
WON FC 26 (2) extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree
HELD:
NO. FC 26 (2) does not extend to aliens.
RATIO:
FC 26 (2) only offers remedy to Filipino spouses. No court of this jurisdiction can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse
as their own national law governs them. However, this conclusion is still insufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition. Pursuant
to Sec. 48 of Rule 39 of ROC, for a foreign divorce judgment to be recognized its authenticity must first be proven by facts and
alien spouses applicable national law.
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Sec. 24 of Rule 132 of ROC must also be taken into account; this requires proof of either (1) official publications, or (2) copies
attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. Records showed that Gerbert attached a copy of the divorce
decree and the required certificate proving the authenticity but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.
SC deems it proper to remand the case to RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with Canadian divorce law.
RTC Decision is REVERSED!
Case is REMANDED to RTC!
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Villanueva v. Chiong
G.R. No. 159889. June 5, 2008
TOPIC: Separation in fact, FC 238-248,
101(3)
PONENTE: Quisumbing, J.
FACTS:
Respondents Florentino and Elisera Chiong (Chiong sps.) were married on Jan. 1960 but were separated in fact since
1975.
During their marriage, Chiong sps. bought a lot in Dipolog City and w/c Florentino sold to petitioners Walter and Aurora
Villanueva (Villanueva Sps.) 1/2 part of it for the consideration of 8k in installments. And so, they executed a MOA to
effect this.
After the last installment was paid, Villanueva sps. demanded Chiong sps. to execute the absolute deed of sale but
Elisera refused to do so. Florentino, however, still executed the deed of sale.
The parties filed their respective petitions (w/c prompted 2 cases but RTC consolidated it) but the RTC annulled the deed
of sale and dismissed their petitions and ordered them to restore what they received from each other pursuant to
NCC1398.
CA affirmed the RTC decision and it considered the lot as conjugal property.
But Villanueva sps. contend:
a. That Chiong sps. were already separated in fact at the time they bought the lot, hence, it belongs exclusively to
Florentino; and
b. Assuming arguendo that the lot is still conjugal, the transaction should not be entirely void as Florentino had 1/2
share over it.
Elisera states as defense:
a. That it is conjugal. She provided a real property tax declaration that they were both owners of said lot; and
b. The sale was w/o her consent therefore void.
ISSUE:
1. WON the CA erred in concluding that the disputed lot is conjugal property. NO.
2. WON the sale w/o the wifes consent is void. NO.
HELD:
1. SC cited CC178 w/c provides the separation in fact w/o judicial approval does not affect the conjugal nature of the lot nor
Eliseras interest over it.
a. Also, CC160 provides that all property acquired by the sps. during the marriage is presumed to belong to the CPG,
unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
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b. Aside from Eliseras evidence as defense (a), Florentino and Elisera declared in the MOA that the lot is conjugal and
when he executed the deed of sale, he declared his capacity to sell as co-owner.
2. SC states that said sale w/o the wifes consent, prior to the effectivity of the FC (Aug. 3, 1988) is not void, but merely
voidable pursuant to CC166 (w/o consent, voidable) and CC173 (prescription of 10 yrs.).
a. When Villanueva sps. contend (b), SC stated that the rationale for the annulment of the whole transaction is the
same (Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes v. Mijares citing Bucoy v. Paulino, et al.)
ESPINOSA v. OMAA
[A.C. No. 9081. October 12, 2011]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Agreements to separate
PONENTE: Carpio, J.
FACTS:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Rodolfo A. Espinosa and Maximo A. Glindo against Atty. Julieta A. Omaa. They
are charging Omaa with violation of her oath as a lawyer, malpractice, and gross misconduct in office.
Espinosa and his wife sought Omaas legal advice on whether they could legally live separately and dissolve their
marriage. She then prepared a document entitled Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay. They were convinced that the
document dissolved their marriage.
However, his wife took their children and the property obtained in the duration of the marriage. He then sought the
advice of his friend and co-petitioner in this case, Glindo, who graduated with a law degree who told him that such
contract is not valid. They then filed a complaint against Omaa before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission
on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
IBP-CBD Omaa violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Omaa also failed to exercise due diligence in the
performance of her function as a notary public and to comply with the requirements of the law.
ISSUE(S): Is the Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay valid?
HELD: No. Omaa is suspended from the practice of law for a year and two years as notary public.
RATIO:
An extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void.
A notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the
spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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LLAVE v REPUBLIC
[G.R. No. 169766. March 30, 2011]
TOPIC: Divorce under the Muslim Code
AUTHOR: PARIAN
MC Art. 186 (2) A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the
effectivity of this Code in accordance with non-Muslim law shall be
considered as one contracted under Muslim law provided the spouses
register their mutual desire to this effect.

1993: 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Llave under Islamic laws and traditions and
subsequently, under a civil ceremony in Lanao RTC. In their marriage contract, Tamanos civil status was
divorced. Since then, Llave has been representing herself as the wife of Tamano.
1994: Private respondent, Zorayda Tamano filed a declaration of nullity of marriage between Llave and Tamano
for being bigamous.
Zorayda alleged that she was married to Tamano in 1958 under civil rites; that it was subsisting when Llave
married him in 1993. Therefore, the subsequent marriage with Llave is void ab initio for being bigamous.
Llave defended that the prior marriage has been divorced under PD 1083 (Muslim Code).
Zorayda countered that Tamano did not and could not have divorced her by invoking the provision of PD 1083
(Muslim Code), because their marriage of the deceased was never deemed to have been contracted under Muslim
law as provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they did not register their mutual desire to be covered by
this law. (Although in Zoraydas disbarment case against Tamano, she declared that they were married under both
civil and Muslim rites. SC took note of this.)
Nonetheless, RTC declared it void ab initio. CA affirmed.
ISSUE(S): WON Tamano divorced Zorayda.
WON the marriage between Tamano and Llave is valid.
HELD: No. Zoraydas marriage was still subsisting when Llave married Tamano. Therefore, the second marriage is void ab initio
for being bigamous. Petition dismissed. SC affirmed CA and RTC.
RATIO:
Zoraydas marriage is governed by NCC; the only law governing marriages between Muslims and non-Muslims in 1958.
Under NCC only one marriage can exist at any given time.
The Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which
already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda.
Llave argued that MC is still applicable to the first marriage since it was solemnized under Muslim rites.
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MC Art. 13 (1) provides that the code applies to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein
only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any
part of the Philippines.
BUT SC already ruled in Tamano v Ortiz (complaint of Llave against the jurisdiction of RTC in the instant case) that
Article 13 of MC does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.
Therefore, MC cannot apply to the first marriage since it was celebrated under both civil and Muslim rites; and that
Zorayda and Tamano did not register their mutual desire to have their marriage be covered under MC.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The law in effect at the time of the marriage is the law that governs the personal status of the spouses.
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CAMPOS v. CAMPOS
[A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761. February 8, 2012]
NOTES: This is an administrative case on serious misconduct, immorality
TOPIC: Legal separation Drug addiction, habitual
and dishonesty filed by complainants against Judge.
alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
*yung naka bold lang yung related sa topic ;)
PONENTE: Carpio, J.
FACTS:
Complainant Aida Campos married respondent Eliseo Campos who is a former Municipal Trial Court Judge of Bayugan,
Agusan Del Sur. They begot two children: Alistair and Charmaine who are also complainants in this case.
Eliseo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage before RTC Bayugan, Agusan Del Sur. He alleges that he
and Aida were both psychologically incapacitated to perform their marital obligations because he is a homosexual and
cannot be intimate with his wife. This led to her wife having sexual relationships with other men that he did not bother to
stop.
Aida denied Eliseos allegations. She alleges that he only wants to marry another woman and he cannot be
homosexual since he had children. She opposed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and instead filed
for legal separation.
Also, Aida alleges that Eliseo executed an affidavit of loss claiming that the title covering a parcel of land under the name
of their son Alistair was lost in his possession. She claimed that when Eliseo did the affidavit of loss, the title was in
Alistairs possession. She alleged that respondent wanted the property back in the event his petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage would be granted by the court. She alleged that he claims that he was the real owner of the property
and was wrongly registered in the name of Alistair.
Eliseo admitted that he executed the affidavit of loss to protect his interest. Right after the filing of then petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage, he learned that Aida and Alistair wanted to use the property as collateral for a loan.
RTC - The Court stated that the fact that respondent had children with Aida was not a proof that he was not
a homosexual and thus he was lying in his petition and his admission does not make him immoral. However,
it was found that he is guilty of misconduct in causing the registration of the land in the name of Alistair despite the fact
that Alistair was still a minor at the time of the registration. According to the Court, they (in conspiracy with Aida)
manipulated the transaction in such a way that the title ended up with Alistair despite his lack of legal capacity to enter
into the transaction. The action was clearly intended to defraud a possible judgment-obligee. They referred this report to
the Office of the Court Administration (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
OCA Eliseo is guilty of simple misconduct in allowing the title of the property to be registered in the name of then minor
Alistair.
ISSUE(S): Is Eliseo guilty of simple misconduct?
HELD: Yes. He was fined 20,000 pesos deducted from whatever benefits he will get.
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RATIO:
Not guilty of immorality (homosexuality) - The fact that respondent got married and had children is not proof
against his claim of homosexuality. As pointed out by the investigating judge, it is possible that respondent was only
suppressing or hiding his true sexuality.
Not guilty of dishonesty (changing the owner of the deed) It was alleged that the title was kept by respondent in his
drawer. He then executed an affidavit of loss. Alistair also testified that his father was the owner of the land even if the
title was in his name which is why the deed should be in Eliseos possession.
Guilty of simple misconduct (for originally registering the land under the name of Alistair) - The action was clearly
intended to defraud a possible judgment-obligee.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Republic v. CA (Quintos)
G.R. No. 159594. November 12, 2012
TOPIC: Sexual infidelity or perversion,
FC55(8), Abandonment, FC55(10)
FACTS:
On March 16, 1977, respondent Eduardo Quintos married Catalina in civil rites. However, they did not have children
because Catalina had hysterectomy.
This prompted Eduardo to file a petition for nullity of their marriage under FC36 alleging:
a. That she always leaves the house w/o his consent;
b. That she spent most of her time gossiping w/ neighbors instead of doing chores and caring for their adopted
daughter;
c. That they always have petty arguments;
d. That she squandered money by gambling; and
e. That she abandoned the conjugal home to live w/ her paramour Bobbie Castro
He also presented an expert opinion by Dr. Reyes, a psychiatrist, who concluded that Catalina had Borderline Personality
Disorder w/c not treatable based on the tests and neuro-psychiatric evaluations she made on Catalina.
Catalina did not oppose this and instead, just wanted to get her share of the conjugal house.
RTC granted the petition annulling the marriage. It ruled that Catalinas infidelity, her spending more time w/ friends
rather than w/ her family, and her incessant gambling constituted P.I.
The State appealed to the CA but the CA affirmed the RTCs decision concluding that the evaluation by Dr. Reyes
sufficiently proved Catalinas P.I.
ISSUE:
WON there was sufficient evidence warranting the annulment of the marriage. NO.
HELD:
Regarding the topic only, Catalina admitted that she abandoned the conjugal home to live w/ another man. Yet, SC states
that abandonment does not constitute P.I. because FC55(10) provides that it is a ground for legal separation.
Sexual infidelity, as well, is not a valid ground for the nullity of their marriage, unless such infidelity was a manifestation
of a disordered personality that made Catalina completely unable to comply w/ the marital obligations. But Eduardo did
not produce sufficient evidence regarding Catalinas infidelity hence, lacks basis. Also, such infidelity is a ground for legal
separation pursuant to FC55(8).
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KALAW v. HERNANDEZ
[G.R. No. 166357. September 19, 2011]
NOTES: Atty. Ayo provided we read the 2011 decision. But there is a new
TOPIC: Other grounds of legal separation
decision, January 2015
FACTS:
1973 Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) got married in Hong Kong and
had four children.
1983 Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano (Jocelyn), who gave birth to a son.
1985 Malyn left the conjugal dwelling and left her children with Tyrone. He then started living with Jocelyn who bore him
more children.
1990 Tyrone went to USA with Jocelyn and their children. He left his children with Malyn with the househelp. They would
only call on Malyn if one of the children got sick. The children get to stay with Malyn during the weekends.
1994 The two older children went to Japan but Malyn knew that they went to Tyrone in the USA. The older child went
back to the Philippines and chose to stay with Malyn.
Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Art. 36 FC. This is seen through: (1) 1. she left the
children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all night; (2) she left the house to party
with male friends and returned in the early hours of the following day; and (3) she committed adultery which Tyrone
discovered in flagrante delicto.
Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Gates, and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Healy, to testify on Malyns psychological
incapacity.
Dr. Gates presented that Malyns sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and her frequent nights-out with
friends may constitute Narcissistic Personality Disorder. It is rooted in her family upbringing since she was
deprived and lacked maternal figure as a child therefore it might be present before their marriage. The diagnosis
was based on the facts revealed by her interviews with Tyrone, Trinidad Kalaw (Tyrones sister-in-law), and the son
Miggy. She also read the transcript of Tyrones court testimony.
Fr. Healy corroborated with Dr. Gates that Malyns psychological incapacity is rooted in her role as the
breadwinner of her family. This role allegedly inflated Malyns ego to the point that her needs became priority,
while her kids and husbands needs became secondary. He based his opinion on his interview with Tyrone, the
trial transcripts.
Malyn denied being psychologically incapacitated. She claims that she does not play mahjong as often as Tyrone alleges.
She also said that she left the conjugal home because Tyrone was an abusive husband.
She presented Dr. Dayan as her expert witness who interviewed the children. Dr. Dayan determined that both Tyrone and
Malyn were behaviorally immature. Tyrone found Malyn a lousy mother because of her mahjong habit, while Malyn was
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fed up with Tyrones sexual infidelity, drug habit, and physical abuse.
The social worker recommended that the custody of the minor children be awarded to Malyn. Based on the interviews of
family members themselves, Malyn was shown to be more available to the children. It was noted that even after Malyn
left the conjugal home, she made efforts to visit her children in their schools and on weekends, it appeared that she
made efforts to personally attend to their needs and to devote time with them.
RTC Both parties are psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations under the Family Code,
marriage declared void ab initio.
CA Reversed the decision. Both parties allegations and incriminations against each other do not support a finding of
ISSUE(S): Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological incapacity.
HELD: No. The petition is denied. Affirmed with the decision of CA.
RATIO:
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations.
In the case at bar, Tyrone failed to prove that Malyn suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies
of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions
of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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KALAW v. HERNANDEZ
[G.R. No. 166357. January 15, 2015]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Other grounds of legal separation
FACTS:
Same facts.
This is Tyrones motion for reconsideration. He prays for the Court to have a thorough second look into what constitutes
psychological incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial court as supported by the testimonies of three expert
witnesses; and consequently to find that the respondent, if not both parties, were psychologically incapacitated to
perform their respective essential marital obligation.
ISSUE(S): Whether their marriage is void due to psychological incapacity.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO:
The guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance practically condemned the
petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. One should not strictly or literally read the law. Thus,
the Courts should rely on the opinions of experts. (Molina and Santos doctrines are still binding)
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on a partys psychological incapacity should be final and binding for as long
as such findings and evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses and other evidence are not shown to be clearly and
manifestly erroneous. The Trial Court is tasked to evaluate every case of psychological incapacity. With this, they have
firsthand knowledge on the matter being discussed. The trial court deserves credence because it was in the better
position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. It must also be noted to give
respect to the evidence appreciated by the Trial Court judge.
The frequency of the respondents mahjong playing is not important our determination of the presence or absence of
psychological incapacity. Instead, what should be noticed is her obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and
responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made her marital vows by excessive playing of mahjong, spending time
with friends, and adultery.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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PEOPLE v ZAPATA
[88 PHIL 688, May 16, 1951]
TOPIC: When may petition for legal separation be
filed
PONENTE: Padilla, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN
Case did not mention anything about legal separation. Im assuming this
is related to grounds for legal separation
[Art. 55 (8): Adultery] in relation to Art. 57: An action for legal separation
shall be filed within five years from the time of the occurrence of the
cause.

Andres filed for adultery with CFI against his wife Zapata and Bondoc for cohabiting and having sex repeatedly
from 1946 to March 14, 1947, the date of the filing of the complaint.
Bondoc knew that Zapata was married.
Zapata pleaded guilty.
Sept 17, 1948: Andres filed another complaint for adulterous acts committed by the same persons from 15 March
1947 to 17 September 1948, the date of the filing of the second complaint.
Zapata and Bondoc filed a motion to quash the complaint on the ground of double jeopardy.
CFI granted the motion and held that the adultery in complaint 1 and 2 is only one continuous act.
OSG appealed.
ISSUE(S): WON the adultery committed is only a one continuous act
HELD: No. CFI order set aside. Complaint 2 remanded back for trial.
RATIO:
It does not violate the double jeopardy clause:
After the last act of adultery had been committed as charged in the 1st complaint, the defendants again committed
adulterous acts not included in the 1st complaint and for which the 2nd complaint was filed.
If the two adulterous acts will be deemed as one continuous act, should Zapata and Bondoc be acquitted, the second act
will remain unpunished.
Should they be acquitted for the first complaint, the same defense from the 1st complaint is no longer available for the
2nd complaint since Bondoc is now sure that Zapata is married when they had sex for the 2 nd time.
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CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Adultery is not a continuing offense when unity of criminal intent or purpose is not present.
As for legal separation:
Petition may be filed from the time of the occurrence of the cause.
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Pacete v Carriaga
TOPIC: Court procedure in Legal Separation (FC 5860)
PONENTE: Vitug, J.

Note:
Petition for certiorari to annul a decision of Court of First Instance in declaring a decree of Legal Separation to Enrico
Pacete and Concepcion (Conchita) Analis & declaring marriage of Pacete and Clarita de la Concepcion null and void ab
initio
Oct. 29, 1979 Alanis filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between Pacete and Clarita, as well
as for the legal separation between her and Pacete and for the accounting and separation of property
Apr. 30, 1938 Pacete and Alanis married and had 1 child
1948 Pacete married Clarita de la Concepcion
Aug. 1, 1979 Alanis learned of the 2nd marriage
Alanis avers that during her marriage to Pacete, he acquired several properties (lands, fishponds, motor vehicles) which
he fraudulently placed in his name, Claritas, their childrens and other dummies
Pacete ignored her efforts for settlements and reconciliation is impossible since Pacete evidently preferred to continue
living with Clarita
Nov. 15, 1979 Pacete and Clarita were served with summons, they filed for extension 3 times
1. 20 days from Nov. 30, 1979 GRANTED!
2. 30 days from Dec. 20, 1979 GRANTED ONLY FOR 20 DAYS!
3. 15 days from expiration of 30 day period previously requested DENIED!
rd
3 extension was denied on ground that defendants filed after the original period given, as 2 nd extension had expired
Alanis filed a motion to declare the defendants in default GRANTED!
Mar. 17, 1980 the court declared the LegSep of Alanis and Pacetes marriage, and properties were declared as their
conjugal ownership, as well as declared the marriage of Pacete and Clarita as void
Hence, the petition
ISSUE(S):
WON Court of First Instance gravely abused its discretion in denying Pacete and Claritas motion for extension of time and
declaring them in default
HELD:
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YES! CFI gravely abused its discretion
RATIO:
Under normal circumstances, petition would have been dismissed because the proper remedy was to appeal form judgment by
default or to file for a petition for relief from judgment. This rule is not inflexible, a petition for certiorari may be allowed when;
(1) default order is improperly declared, (2) even when properly declared, is attended by grave abuse of discretion.
The default order was not legally sanctioned, FC 58 and 60 mandates for the intervention of the state and to provide for a
cooling off period of 6 months before a decree of legal separation may be tried; court will also take steps to reconcile the
parties. Rule 18, Sec. 6 of the Rules of Court also provides that if the defendants fail to answer, the court will investigate for
possible collusion.
Other remedies prayed for, will not excuse anyone from compliance with provisions mentioned/procedures
Mar. 17, 1980 decision is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE!
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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DE LA VIA v. VILLAREAL
[41 Phil 13, July 31, 1920]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Administration of property
PONENTE: Johnson, J.
FACTS:
Narcisa Geopano, the wife of Diego De La Via (petitioner), filed for divorce before Hon. Villareal (respondent) of CFI Iloilo
and the partition of the conjugal property.
Narcisa contends that she was a resident of Iloilo, and that Diego was a resident of the municipality of Negros and she
was the legitimate wife of Diego. During their marriage plaintiff and defendant had acquired property, real and personal,
the value of which was about P300,000 and all of which was under the administration of Diego. Since the year 1913 and
up to the date of the complaint, the defendant had been committing acts of adultery with one Ana Calog. Diego then
ejected Narcisa from the conjugal home, for which reason she was obliged to live in Iloilo.
Narcisa then amended her petition including a preliminary injunction to be issued against the defendant restraining and
prohibiting him in the premises of their conjugal properties. She learned that since her filing of the complaint, Diego was
trying to alienate or encumber the property which belonged to the conjugal partnership
De La Via claims that: (1) Respondent-judge exceeded his authority through the issuances a preliminary injunction
against him in prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of
the action and (2) that all proceeding in his Court was null and void.
The preliminary injunction against Diego was granted. Diego then filed petition for certiorari upon the ground that the
respondent judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action in question, and had exceeded his power and
authority in issuing said preliminary injunction.
ISSUE(S):
1. May a married woman ever acquire a residence of domicile separate from that of her husband in the existence of their
marriage?
2. Can Diego be issued a preliminary injunction?
HELD:
1. Yes. Narcisas case is an exception to the rule
2. Yes. Diego falls under the conditions on which preliminary injunction can be issued.
Petition denied. The wife may obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband, prohibiting the latter from alienating or
encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action.
RATIO:
The wife may acquire another and separate domicile where the husband has given cause for divorce. In one case it was
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held that if the wife is justified in leaving the husband because his conduct has been such as to entitle her to a divorce,
and she really does leave him and go into another state for the purpose of there permanently residing, she acquires a
domicile in the latter state. Diegos unlawful act of evicting her is considered consenting to Narcisas leaving; therefore
her acquiring of a new domicile is really justified and an exception.
The right of the husband under the law which makes him the sole administrator of the property of the conjugal
partnership is curtailed during the pendency of the action, insofar as alienating or encumbering the conjugal property is
concerned; which is only just and proper, in order to protect the interests of the wife
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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SABALONES v CA
[G.R. No. 106169. February 14, 1994]
TOPIC: Effects of pendency of legal separation
administration of properties
PONENTE: Cruz, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Samson Sabalos was an ambassador. While out of the country, Remedios was the administrator of their conjugal
properties.
After retiring in 1985, Sabalones returned to the Philippines but not to his wife, Remedios.
He filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership; for his
medical expenses.
Remedios opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She alleged that she and her
six children with him are living in the said property; and that their residence in Forbes Park was on lease; and that
they depend for their support on such lease revenues. More over, that when he returned, he instead cohabit with
Curameng and their children.
Because of this, Remedios prayed for legal separation, the liquidation of the conjugal properties, and that
Sabalones is forfeited of his share because of his adultery. She also prayed to enjoin him from disturbing the
tenants in Forbes Park and from disposing any of the conjugal properties.
The lower court decreed the legal separation and the forfeiture of Sabalones share in the conjugal properties.
Sabalones appealed this decision. While the case was pending, Remedios filed a writ of preliminary injunction to
prevent Sabalones from interfering with the administration of their properties alleging that Sabalones was
harassing the tenants in Forbes Park.
The Court of Appeals granted the preliminary injunction.
Sabalones filed for petition for review of this order arguing FC Art. 124 provides that the administration and
enjoyment of the conjugal properties belong to both spouses jointly. Therefore, no injunctive relief can be issued
against him.
And that the court failed to appoint an administrator of the conjugal assets after the filing of the petition for legal
separation, as mandated by Art. 61.
ISSUE(S): WON the injunctive relief should be issued despite FC Art 124.
HELD: Yes. Petition denied. Injunction affirmed.
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RATIO:
It is true that there was no formal designation of administrator, but the designation was implicit when the lower court
denied Sabalones of his share in the conjugal properties. Thus, disqualifying him as well to be an administrator.
There is enough evidence to raise doubts that entrusting the properties to Sabalones may result to the detriment of his
wife and children.
The Supreme Court agrees that it would be prudent not to allow him in the meantime to participate in its management;
given that he harassed the tenants and that he issued a quit claim regarding a conjugal property in US in favor of
Curameng.
Therefore, injuctive relief is proper to protect Remedios and their children.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The right of a spouse to administer the conjugal property is also forfeited when his or her share to it was forfeited as a result of
a petition for legal separation.
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Lerma v. CA
[December 20, 1974]
TOPIC: Support and custody pendente lite
PONENTE: Makalintal, C.J.

NOTES: hindi nakontento sa isang Teodoro (used surnames because two
guys are named Teodoro); magulo ang facts ng kaso, kaya medyo
magulo din dito
FACTS:
Petitioner Teodoro Lerma and Respondent Concepcion Diaz are married.
August 22, 1969 Lerma filed a complaint for adultery against Diaz and a Teodoro Ramirez.
November 18, 1969 Diaz filed a complaint against Lerma for legal separation, with an urgent petition for support
pendente lite (PL) for her and the youngest son, who was in her custody; her grounds were concubinage and attempt
against her life.
In opposition to the PL, Lerma used the adultery charge against Diaz as his defense; but the judge granted the
application for PL, then modified it later, lowering the amount.
Lerma then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prelim. injunction to annul the grant of PL
because they were issued with GAD. The CA complied, and later granted Lerma the opportunity to present evidence (to
the lower court, not CA) in support of his defense against the application for PL.
Diaz moved to reconsider this decision because Lerma did not ask for permission to present evidence to the lower court.
The CA sided with her, and dismissed Lermas petition.
January 23, 1974 Lerma filed an urgent motion for prelim. injunction and/or restraining order because during the
pendency of Lermas appeal until Dec. 5, 1973, Diaz never sought enforcement of the orders granting PL, and only
sought enforcement now because Lerma filed a second adultery complaint against her. Diaz and Ramirez were convicted
of adultery (first case) by the CFI on Sept. 26, 1972, though it was then brought up to the CA.
Diaz argued that an order granting PL, though interlocutory, is immediately executed, even if appealed, unless enjoined.
ISSUE(S):
1. (Procedural) WON Petitioner should be allowed to present evidence of Diaz adultery in the lower court in support of his
defense.
2. (Substantive) WON adultery is a good defense against claims for support pendente lite.
HELD: Petition GRANTED.
RATIO:
1. Moot.
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5, Rule 61 of the Revised RoC provides for the procedural law regarding PL. It says that the court will determine
provisionally the pertinent facts, and will render an order based on equity and justice, looking at the necessities of
the applicant, and the means of the intended supporter.
In this case, it became moot because Diaz was convicted of adultery by the CFI, and this conviction was never denied
by the respondent (petition with the CA is not a denial, in itself, of conviction).
2. Yes it is.
The CA cited Art. 292 of the Civil Code, saying that adultery is only a defense if the support is coming from the
husbands personal funds, and not from the CPG. This is wrong. Art. 292 is not the source of the legal right to support
it only states where it shall come from.
Art. 292 also contemplates pendency of a court action and a prima facie showing that the action will prosper. If the
action is groundless, mere filing will not set Art. 292 in operation. This is the same as 5, Rule 61 mentioned above,
because in that rule, the court will determine the probable outcome of the case.
Lerma should not need to support Diaz because she is the guilty spouse, at least provisionally. This
means that she cannot claim legal separation; and because she cannot claim legal separation, it would
be unjust to order Lerma to pay PL simply because Diaz filed the legal separation complaint.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The right to support, whether from separate properties or from the CPG, presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause
on part of the innocent spouse who wants separation.
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MATUBIS v. PRAXEDES
[109 Phil 789, October 25, 1960]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Defenses in actions for legal separation Consent
PONENTE: Paredes, J.
FACTS:
Socorro Matubis (Petitioner) filed with the CFI of Camarines Sur a complaint for Legal Separation and change of surname
against her husband Zoilo Praxedes (Respondent) as she alleges abandonment and concubinage.
Praxedes denies the allegations. He alleged that it was Matubis who left the conjugal home.
Matubis gave documentary and testamentary evidence that after they were legally married, they failed to agree to live
together as husband and wife which led them to live separately. They entered into an agreement which included: (1)
They can get another mate and live with them as husband and wife without prosecuting one another for adultery or
concubinage; (2) Matubis is no longer entitled for support from Praxedes; and (3) Neither can claim anything from one
another.
Praxedes cohabited with one Asuncion Rebolado who gave birth to their child.
Without Praxedes giving evidence, CFI held that his acts constitute concubinage and is a ground for legal separation.
However, CFI dismissed the complaint on two grounds: (1) Under Art. 102 of the New Civil Code, an action for legal
separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the
cause and within five years from and after the date when the cause occurred. Matubis became aware of the illegal
cohabitation of her husband with Asuncion Rebulado in January, 1955. The complaint was filed on April 24, 1956. The
present action was, therefore, filed out of time and for that reason the action is barred. (2) Art. 100 of the New Civil Code
provides that the legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation
of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. In the case, they gave consent to one another.
ISSUE(S): Did CFI err in ruling that the period to bring the action has already elapsed and that there was consent on the part of
the plaintiff to the concubinage?
HELD: No. Affirmed the decision of the lower court.
RATIO:
The complaint was filed outside the periods provided for by Art. 102 of the New Civil Code. By the very admission of
plaintiff, she came to know the ground (concubinage) for the legal separation in January, 1955. She instituted the
complaint only on April 24, 1956.
The condonation and consent on the part of Matubis are seen in the agreement. The condonation and consent here are
not only implied but expressed.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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People v Schneckenburger
TOPIC: Defenses in actions for Legal Separation
consent (FC 56(2))
PONENTE:Locsin, J.

Note:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila

Mar. 16, 1926 Rodolfo A. Schneckenburger and Elena Ramirez Cartagera married, after 7 years, they separated for
reason of alleged incompatibility of character and agreed to live separately
Mar. 25, 1935 Schneckenburger and Cartagera executed a document stating that they agree to live apart for the rest of
their lives, not to intervene in public/private life, and to give freedom to each other to perform any act in all concepts =
CONSENT!!!
June 15, 1935 Schneckenburger secured a decree of divorce from a civil court in Mexico WITHOUT leaving the PHL
May 11, 1936 Schneckenburger married Julia Medel
Because of the nullity of the divorce decreed in Mexico, Caratagera instituted two actions against Schneckenburger; (1)
bigamy, (2) concubinage
For the bigamy case, Schneckenburger was convicted
For the concubinage case, Schneckenburger interposed the plea of double jeopardy and the case was dismissed, upon
appeal by the fiscal, the court held the dismissal as premature and remanded the case to the trial court WITHOUT
discussing the issue of double jeopardy
Schneckenburger was then convicted of concubinage, hence the appeal
ISSUE(S):
WON Schneckenburger should be acquitted of the crime of concubinage in view of the agreement between him and Cartagera
HELD:
YES! Agreement serves as consent, so Schneckenburger should be acquitted!
RATIO:
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The Court believes that Schneckenburger should be acquitted of the crime of concubinage in view of the agreement that he and
Cartagera executed. Although it is illegal for the purpose it was executed, it still constitutes as valid consent under RPC 344, and
under FC 56 (2). The Court holds that the consent of Cartagera prior to the 2nd marriage of Schneckenburger serves as a bar
against her proecuting Schneckenburger for concubinage.
AS TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY ISSUE
Concubinage and Bigamy does not constitute the same crime, so no double jeopardy!
Judgment is REVERSED!
Schneckenburger is ACQUITTED!
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

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Bugayong v. Ginez
No. L-10033. December 28, 1956
TOPIC: Defense against legal separation,
Condonation FC56(1)
PONENTE: Felix, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Benjamin Bugayong was a serviceman in the U.S. Navy who married respondent Leonila Ginez on Aug. 27,
1949 at Pangasinan, while on leave. After celebrating the marriage, they lived w/ Benjamins sisters in Pangasinan and
had an agreement that when Benjamin already leaves for duty, Leonila is to stay w/ his sisters. But they eventually
moved so Sampaloc, Manila.
But on July, 1951, Leonila left the home of Benjamins sisters and lived w/ her mother in Pangasinan. Later on moved to
Dagupan for her to study there.
On same date, July, 1951, Benjamin was already receiving letters from Leonilas sister, Valeriana Polangco, and other
anonymous writers, alleging that Leonila is committing acts of infidelity, and kissed a certain Eliong.
So Bejmain sought advice from the Navy Chaplain about legal separation. Also, on Aug., 1952, he went to Pangasinan to
look for Leonila and found her. He persuaded Leonila to go to Pedros house (Benjamins cousin) where they slept there
for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. And later on slept in Benjamins house for another night as husband and
wife.
After sleeping 1 night in Benjamins house, he asked Leonila about this adulterous acts but instead of Leonila answering,
she just left, w/c prompted Benjamin to build a belief that such adulterous acts are true. Despite such belief, he tried to
find her but failed to do so. He instead went to Ilocos Norte to soothe his wounded feelings.
Later on, he filed w/ the CFI of Pangasinan this petition for legal separation on the ground of sexual infidelity by Leonila
and presented 6 witnesses to support his claim.
Leonila, as defense, states, that assuming arguendo that such acts of infidelity are true, Benjamin already condoned to
it.
CFI ruled in favor of Leonila and dismissed the case based on condonation. CA passed it to SC because the issue was a
question of law.
ISSUE:
WON Benjamin condoned the alleged acts of infidelity of Leonila. YES.
HELD:
SC noted;
a. That when he went back to Pangasinan in Aug. 1952 to find out the truth of the alleged infidelity, he had slept w/ his
wife for 2 nights and 1 days but failed to do so because Leonila left when Benjamin confronted her about it;
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b. That after running away, he tried to find her; and
c. That, also, in the hearing while the case was still in the CA, that was when he admitted that he had slept w/ Leonila.
SC agrees w/ the CFI that the conduct of Benjamin despite his belief that Leonila was unfaithful, deprives him, as alleged
the offended spouse, of any action for legal separation against the offending wife.
SC cites American jurisprudence as support to their conclusions because it is said that one voluntary act of marital
intercourse between the parties is sufficient to constitute condonation, and where the parties live in the same house, it is
presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation:
a. In Land v. Martin and Day v. Day, a divorce suit will not be granted for adultery where the parties continue to live
together after it was known;
b. In Rogers v. Rogers, sexual intercourse after knowledge of adultery constitutes condonation; and
c. In Toulson v. Toulson, citing Phinizy v. Phinizy, merely sleeping together for a single night.
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ONG v ONG
[G.R. No. 153206. October 23, 2006]
TOPIC: Defenses in actions for legal separation recrimination
PONENTE: Austria-Martinez, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN
Recrimination the accuser is as guilty as the accused.

1996: Lucita filed a petition for legal separation against her husband, William. She alleged that William is a wifebeater and had inflicted physical violence against her for the last 20 years of their marriage.
That in 1995, after a violent quarrel with William, she had to leave the conjugal house and stay with her parents.
This incident prompted her to file the petition.
Her sister and the doctor that treated her injuries after the violent quarrel attested to her allegations.
William denied everything but did not present evidence to support his counterclaim.
RTC granted the petition and CA affirmed in toto.
William filed for certiorari, raising recrimination as a defense - that the petition should be denied since they both
have grounds to file for legal separation (Art. 56 (4)).
That his ground is that Lucita abandoned him.
ISSUE(S): WON there is recrimination when Lucita abandoned William.
HELD: There is none. SC affirmed CA and RTC in toto.
RATIO:
Abandonment as a ground for legal separation under Art. 55 (10) should be without a justifiable cause.
Lucita left the conjugal dwelling because of Williams repeated physical violence and grossly abusive misconduct against
Lucita.
These allegations were proven in trial from testimonies and evidence presented by Lucita. William did not attempt to
disprove the allegations and only presented a general denial of the accusations.
Therefore, Lucitas abandonment was justified. William has no ground for legal separation against Lucita.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Abandonment with justifiable cause is not a ground for legal separation.
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MATUTE v. MACADAEG
[99 Phil. 340. May 30, 1956]
NOTES:
TOPIC: On the custody of children
FACTS:
Armando Medel brought an action for legal separation against Rosario Matute, upon the ground of adultery committed
with his brother, Ernesto Medel. The decision found Rosario guilty of the charge against her, decreeing said legal
separation, and awarding to Armando the custody of their four (4) minor children.
Armando went to the US, leaving the children in the City of Davao under the care of his sister Pilar Medel, in whose
house Rosario subsequently lived in order to be with her offspring. Armando returned to the Philippines late in 1954.
With his permission, Rosario brought the children to Manila to attend the funeral of her father. Armando alleges that he
only consented on the condition that she would return the children to him within two (2) weeks. However, Rosario did not
do so.
Rosario filed a motion for praying for the awarding the custody of her children and Armando be obligated to support the
children in their studies and give them a monthly allowance. It was alleged that three of the children did not want to live
with their father because he is already living with a woman other than their mother.
Armando opposed this motion and countered with a petition to declare and punish Rosario for contempt of court,
because of her failure and alleged refusal to restore the custody of their children to him.
CFI Manila, presided over by respondent judge, issued an order absolving Rosario from the charge of contempt of court
as she secured Armando's consent before bringing the children to Manila. On the other hand, the Court denied her
motion for the custody of the children and ordering her to deliver them to Armando within twenty-four hours from notice.
Rosario instituted this action of certiorari and prohibition on Armando and respondent judge.
ISSUE(S): Can Rosario obtain custody of her children?
HELD: No. Petition is dismissed.
RATIO:
She merely obtained his permission to bring them to Manila, for the purpose of attending the funeral of their maternal
grandfather. She obtained and has the physical possession of the minors in a precarious manner. He may, therefore,
demand their return at any time, and she is bound to comply immediately with such demand.
Again, it is conceded that children over ten (10) years of age, whose parents are divorced or living separately, may
choose which parent they prefer to live with, unless the parent chosen is unfit to take charge of their care by reason of
moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity or poverty (Rule 100, section 6, Rules of Court).
The fact remains that she is without means of livelihood and, according to her own admission, she lives on the charity of
her brothers. She has no home of her own to offer to her children, but only she would shelter them under the roof of her
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brothers. Poverty, among other causes, rendered her unfit to take charge of her children or made it unwise to place
them under her care.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Laperal v. Republic
G.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962
TAKE NOTE: This is only legal separation, not annulment or divorce
TOPIC: Effects of decree of legal separation
on the use of surname, NCC372
PONENTE: Barrera, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Elisea Laperal filed this petition for change of name or resume using of maiden name w/ the CFI of Baguio. She
alleged the facts below as support of her petition:
a. Her maiden name was Laperal;
b. She married Enrique Santamaria on March 24, 1939 and used Enriques surname during marriage;
c. On Jan. 18, 1958, her marriage to Enrique Santamaria was given a decree of legal separation;
d. After the legal separation case, she ceased to live w/ Enrique for many years now.
This was opposed by the Baguio city attorney and her petition was denied.
But upon her motion, the CFI, treating the petition as change of name, granted it because she stated in such motion that
it would confuse in her finances and eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.
Hence, the State appeals to CA.
ISSUE:
WON Elisea can resume back using her maiden name. NO.
HELD:
SC cites NCC372 and notes that the language in such article is mandatory. Hence, her petition for change of name
cannot given due course. This is so because her married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no
severance of the marriage tie.
With regard to her granted motion, these were not the alleged causes upon which the petition was based. Hence,
obviously no evidence to this effect had been adduced.
Secondly, the conjugal partnership of Elisea and Enrique had already been dissolved by the decree of legal separation in
1958. Consequently, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.
CFI decision reversed and set aside, Eliseas petition dismissed.
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MACADANGDANG v CA
[No. L-38287. October 23, 1981]
TOPIC: Legal separation - effects of death of one of
the parties
PONENTE: Makasiar, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Antonio married Filomena in 1946. Their lives went from rags to riches, but their fortune took a toll on their
relationship. Both accused each other of having extramarital affairs.
They separated in 1965. Filomena moved to Cebu.
1971: Filomena was able to confirm Antonios illicit affairs. She then filed for legal separation and a motion for
appointment of administrator of the conjugal partnership.
January 1973: CFI granted the petition finding Antonio guilty of concubinage; ordering the dissolution and
liquidation of the conjugal properties. But there was no division yet since the list of the conjugal properties to be
divided is not yet complete.
Antonio did not appeal, making the decision final and executory.
October 1973: Filomena filed another motion for appointment of administrator and submission of complete list of
conjugal assets by Antonio.
Antonio filed for a motion for reconsideration. Denied.
He submitted a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to the Court of Appeals;
praying to set aside the October 1973 decision and prohibiting the lower court to treat the January 1973 decision
as final and executory, and enforcing the same.
CA ruled that the January 1973 decision has been final and executory and that the October 1973 decision is valid,
and that Antonio has no valid cause to impugn the decision.
Antonio appealed. But while the case was pending in SC, Antonio died.
ISSUE(S): WON Antonios death renders the case moot and academic
How to resolve the division of properties?
HELD: No. But the petition was dismissed (not denied, I guess because they still rendered a resolution on the division of the
conjugal property) for lack of merit. Although, SC affirmed that January 1973 decision is final and executory. (Hence, the lack of
merit.)
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RATIO:
Legal problems do not cease simply because one of the parties dies. SC felt bound to resolve on how to divide the
conjugal properties.
The rules on dissolution and liquidation under NCC (this was 1981) would be applied effective January 1973, when the
decree of legal separation became final.
Then, the properties that may be allocated to Antonio as a result of the liquidation of the conjugal assets, shall be
distributed in accordance with the laws of intestate succession.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Death of one of the spouses does not render the petition for legal separation moot and academic with regard to the dissolution
and liquidation of the conjugal properties.
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Ilusorio v. Bildner
[May 12, 2000]
TOPIC: Obligation to live with the other spouse
PONENTE: Pardo, J.

NOTES: the case consists of two consolidated petitions:
a) Wife Ilusorio v. Daughters (incl. Bildner), John and Jane Doe
b) Husband Ilusorio, Daughters (incl. Bildner) v. CA and Wife Ilusorio
- might be interesting to note that Erlindas application for habeas corpus
included a prayer to enforce consortium
FACTS:
Erlinda Kalaw and Atty. Potenciano Ilusorio (Atty. P) (Chairman and Pres. Of Baguio Country Club) were married and lived
together for 30 years, after which they separated in fact for undisclosed reasons. Erlinda lived in Antipolo, while Atty. P
lived in different, high-end places.
They had six children, incl. Erlinda Bildner (Bildner) and Sylvia Ilusorio-Yap.
Once, after arriving from the US, Atty. P lived with Erlinda for 5 mos. In Antipolo. Sylvia and Bildner alleged that, during
this time, Erlinda gave Atty. P an overdose of Zoloft, which caused deterioration in his health. Erlinda then filed a petition
for guardianship over Atty. P due to his deteriorated state.
Later, after coming from a meeting in Baguio, Atty. P did not return to Antipolo but lived at Cleveland Condominium,
Makati. It was because of this that Erlinda filed a petition with the CA for habeas corpus to have custody of Atty. P,
alleging that Bildner and Sylvia refused her demands to visit him, and prevented him from visiting her.
The CA rendered a two-part decision:
o That Bildner, Sylvia, the staff of Cleveland Condos, etc., allow Erlinda to visit Atty. P for humanitarian
consideration. (Hence, Atty. P and his daughters petition to nullify this, and enjoin enforcement of visitation)
o Recalling the previous issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, and dismissing it entirely. (Hence, Erlindas petition
to reverse the CAs dismissal of the application for the writ)
ISSUE(S): (#2 may be subsumed under #1)
3. WON Erlinda may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel Atty. Potenciano to live with her.
4. WON Erlinda should be granted visitation rights.
HELD: No to both. Erlindas petition DISMISSED; Atty. Potencianos petition GRANTED.
RATIO:
1. No, she may not.
A writ of habeas corpus is only a remedy in cases of involuntary and illegal restraint that must be actual and
effective, not nominal or moral. It extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful
custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled to that custody.
In this case, Atty. P was able to prove that he was capacitated and still mentally able, despite being 86 years old,
meaning it was his full and free choice to live away from Erlinda. In addition, he never asked the condominium to
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prevent Erlinda from visiting him.
2. No, she may not be.
With full mental capacity and right of choice, Atty. P may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice.
Otherwise, he would be deprived of his right to privacy.
The CA exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights (under penalty of contempt in case of violation) in a
petition for habeas corpus when Erlinda never even asked for such rights. The CA also missed the fact that the case
did not involve the right of a parent to visit a child, but the right of a wife to visit her husband.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by
compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus. It is a matter beyond judicial authority and left to the man and womans free
choice.
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Calderon v Roxas
TOPIC: Joint obligation to support FC 70, 194,
94(1), 94 (last par.), 121, 122(1), 146
PONENTE: Villarama, Jr., J.

Note: I SERIOUSLY DONT GET THIS CASE. Take this with a grain of salt
(and vodka)
Added 4th line onwards on Answer #2 for extra pa-pogi. Highlighted the
texts as well for emphasis. -Arjay

Petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the order of
the Regional Trial Court granting Roxas motion to reduce his support pendente lite, and denied Calderons motion for
spousal support and increase of the childrens monthly support pendente lite
Dec. 4, 1985 Ma. Carminia C. Calderon and Jose Antonio F. Roxas married they had 4 children
Jan. 16, 1998 Calderon filed an Amended Complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity under FC 36
May 19, 1998 the trial court granted petitioners application for support pendente lite requiring Roxas to contribute Php
42, 292.50 per month
Feb. 11, 2003 Roxas filed a Motion to Reduce Support on ground that the Php 42, 292.50 support was even higher than
his Php 20, 800.00 monthly salary as City Councilor
Mar. 7, 2005 the trial court granted Roxas motion to reduce his support pendente lite and denied Calderons motion
for spousal support, and the increase of the childrens support pendente lite
The trial court considered the ff. evidence in granting the reduction of the support pendente lite
o Eldest child is already earning as an SK Chairman
o All of the children stay at Roxas house during the weekends
o Roxas has no other source of income except his salary and benefits as city councilor
o Various documents, receipts, billings substantiate Roxas claim that he is fulfilling his obligation to support his
minor children
o No proof that Calderon is not gainfully employed both of them are medical doctors
May 4, 2005 Calderons motion for partial reconsideration was denied
May 16, 2005 the trial court declared Roxas and Calderons marriage null & void and ordered Roxas to provide support
in the amount of Php 30,000.00 from previous Php 42, 292.50 per month
Jun. 14, 2005 Calderon filed a Notice of Appeal from Mar. 7 & May 4 Orders before the CA, she emphasized that she is
not appealing from the May 16 Decision which had become final but that she is appealing the RTC Order of Mar. 7 that
denied her motion for partial reconsideration
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Sept. 9, 2008 the CA dismissed her appeal on ground that granting her appeal would disturb the RTC decision of May
16 which has long become final and executory
Calderon filed several motions for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA, hence this appeal
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether Mar. 7 & May 4 Orders on the matter of support pendente lite are interlocutory or final
2. WON RTC was correct to reduce Roxas support pendente lite from 40k to 30k
HELD:
1. Mar. 7 & May 4 Orders are Interlocutory
2. Yes, the court was correct to grant his motion to reduce his support pendente lite.
RATIO:
1. Since Mar. 7 & May 4 Orders were issued pending the rendition of the decision on the main action for the declaration of
nullity of marriage the orders are INTERLOCUTORY!
A distinction between Interlocutory and Final judgment must be made;
- INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS are those that do not dispose the case, this indicates that other things still remain to be
done by the court
- FINAL JUDGMENTS are those that dispose of the case, and leaves nothing more to be done by the court
The assailed orders are only incidental to the main action (declaration of nullity of marriage), the fact that a few years after the
original action was filed, both Roxas and Calderon filed for different remedies emphasize the provisional nature of the order
granting the support pendente lite. Under Sec. 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, no appeal may be made
against an interlocutory order. Since Calderon chose the wrong remedy, the CA correctly dismissed her case.
2. Yes, the court was correct to grant Roxas motion to reduce the support pendente lite. As evidenced by the
documents, receipts, billings he presented it is clear that Roxas has been duly providing the support
pendente lite to his minor children. (REFER TO DOCTRINE FOR FURTHER EXPLANATION)
The reduction of the support pendent lite is also evidenced by the fact that: Roxas has no other source of income
other than his salary as city councilor; there was no proof that Calderon is not grantfully employed since she is
also a medical doctor; and that Calderon failed to prove that Roxas was in arrears of his support payments, in
fact, Roxas overpaid his child support.
Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Support pendente lite - It is a provisional remedy which grants a person entitled to support an amount enough for his
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation (Art. 194, Family Code) while the action is
pending in court. It may be availed of by any of the parties in the action for support or in a proceeding where one of the reliefs
sought is support for the applicant. It can be availed of at the commencement of the action or at any time before the judgment
or final order is rendered in the action or proceeding.
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FROM FC 202
The capacity of the person who will provide the support and the needs of the one entitled to be supported are
taken into consideration in setting the amount of support to be granted. (NOTE FROM AUTHOR: Please note that I got
my answer to Issue #2 based on this, since Roxas only earns 20k per month, the court reduced his monthly support from 40k to
30k since that is the extent he can provide)
Tua v. Mangrobang
G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014
TOPIC: Enforcement of Rights of
Women and Children R.A. 9262 (AntiViolence Against Women and Children)
FACTS:
On Jan. 10, 1988, petitioner Ralph Tua and respondent Rossana Honrado-Tua got married. They had 3 children, namely,
Joshua, Jesse, and Jezreel.
Rossana filed a petition for a temporary protection order (TPO) on her behalf and her children against her husband Ralph
pursuant to R.A. 9262. She alleges:
a. That Ralph went to her room and cocked his gun and pointed it to his head as he wanted to convince her not to
proceed with the legal separation case she filed;
b. That Ralph fed their children w/ the fried chicken that the youngest daughter had chewed and spat out;
c. That Ralph threatened their son in order to stop crying;
d. That when she told Ralph that she felt unsafe and insecure w/ his presence and asked him to stop coming to the
house as often as he wanted or she would apply for a protection order, Ralph got furious and threatened her of
withholding his financial support and even held her by the nape and pushed her to lie flat on the bed; and
e. That on May 4, 2005, while she was at work, Ralph w/ companions, went to her new home and forcibly took the
children and refused to give them back to her.
RTC issued the TPO against Ralph.
But Ralph denied the allegations stating:
a. That he had been maintaining a separate abode from Rossana since Nov. 2004;
b. That it was Rossana who verbally abused and threatened him whenever their childrens stay w/ him was extended;
c. That Rossana had been staying with a certain Rebendor Zuiga despite the impropriety and moral implications of
such set-up;
d. That despite their written agreement that their minor children should stay in their conjugal home, she violated the
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same when she surreptitiously moved out of their conjugal dwelling with their minor children and stayed with said
Zuiga; and
e. That Rossana is mentally, psychologically, spiritually and morally unfit to keep the children in her custody.
f. Also, the issuance of the TPO was unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause of the Constitution.
W/o waiting for another decision of the RTC regarding his allegations, he filed w/ the CA for a preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) assailing the TPO issued by the RTC be restrained. But the CA found:
a. That Ralphs petition is w/o merit because the petition under R.A. 9262 filed by Rossana was still pending in the RTC;
and
b. That the issuance of the TPO was validly issued.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in ruling that the TPO was validly issue. NO.
HELD:
Ralph attacked the constitutionality of the R.A. 9262 particularly Sec. 15. He alleges that it encourages arbitrary
enforcement repulsive to basic constitutional rights which affects his life, liberty and property.
But SC states that the purpose of a TPO pursuant to R.A.9262 is to prevent further acts of violence against women and
their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Also, it is to safeguard the
offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to
regain control of their life.
It is clear from the alleged actions of Ralph that there is sufficient basis for the issuance of the TPO. Ralph violated Sec. 5
a, d, e (2), f, h, and i of R.A.9262. Hence, the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TPO.
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GARCIA v DRILON
[G.R. No. 179267. June 25, 2013]
TOPIC: Enforcement of rights of women and
children - VAWC
PONENTE: Perlas-Bernabe, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Rosalie filed for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order against her husband Garcia pursuant to RA 9262
(VAWC); alleging that her husband is abusing her physically, emotionally, mentally, and economically as a result
of Rosalies discovery of Garcias infidelity. Garcia allegedly threatened her to deprive of custody of their children
and financial support.
Judge Drilon of RTC granted the TPO; ordering Garcia to stay away from Rosalie and their children from a distance
of 1km, deliver a monthly financial support of P200,000, continued use of their company vehicle, and not to
dissipate, encumber or alienate the conjugal properties.
Garcia filed for an opposition 2 days later. It was denied.
RTC renewed and extended the TPO for another 30 days, twice. RTC sends a notice to Garcia to submit an
opposition every time the TPO is renewed.
Garcia filed with the CA for prohibition, with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order of the TPO,
challenging the constitutionality of VAWC for being violative of the due process and the equal protection clause.
CA issued a TRO but subsequently dismissed the case for failure of petitioner to raise the issue of constitutionality
in his pleadings before the trial court (in re: question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity).
Garcia filed for certiorari alleging that the TPO (as promulgated in VAWC) deprived him of due process as he was
not given the opportunity to file for an answer regarding it; and that the VAWC is gender-biased.
ISSUE(S): WON VAWC violates the equal protection clause and due process clause, making the statute unconstitutional.
HELD: No. Petition dismissed.
RATIO:
On equal protection clause:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all
citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
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inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute.
It guarantees equality, not identity of rights.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality
in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality.
All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; (1) that it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; (2) that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; (3) and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class.
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence
committed against women and children.
SC held that the standard is satisfied; that the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
On due process:
A writ of preliminary attachment, just like a TPO, which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in
which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property.
In the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her
tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented.
It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of women and children from violence
and threats to their personal safety and security.
When the TPO is issued ex parte (decided without the presence of the other party), the court shall likewise order
that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days from
service. Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and service of
the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service.
The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice.
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
RA 9262 (VAWC) complied with the guidelines of valid classification as per the equal protection clause; and does not violate the
right to due process as it provides procedures on submission of an opposition by the defendant to the petition.
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Ang v. CA
[April 20, 2010]
children
PONENTE: Abad, J.

NOTES: While Rustan was being questioned at the police station, he
shouted at Irish: Malandi ka kasi!
- try and read Rustans defenses in detail. So funny.
FACTS:
Private respondent Irish Sagud and petitioner Rustan Ang were classmates in college and became on-off sweethearts
towards the end of 2004. When Irish later learned that Rustan had a live-in partner (current wife) whom he impregnated,
she broke up with him.
Before getting married to wifey, Rustan tried to convince Irish to elope with him, saying that he did not love wifey. Irish
told him to take responsibility, and changed her number, but Rustan found it somehow. He would text her, but she would
ask him to leave her alone.
Rustan then sent Irish an MMS picture of a naked woman with spread legs with Irishs face superimposed on it. He
threatened that he could easily make more, similar pictures, and spread it on chatrum in Tarlac.
Irish went to the vice mayor (why?!) and was referred to the police. They began an entrapment operation, and Rustan
was caught, and his cell phone and SIM cards were taken. While being questioned at the police station, Rustan
shouted at Irish, Malandi ka kasi!
Rustan presented an alternate version of the facts, which included the allegation that Irish asked to meet him to get his
help in identifying a prankster, among other things. He pretended to be Irish and contacted the prankster through his cell
phone, but the prankster sent the lewd photos, which Rustan then forwarded to Irish (hence, the photos coming from his
number).
The RTC found Irishs testimony completely credible because it was spontaneous and because she cried (Seriously. They
cited the crying as proof of credibility, complete with an explanation why they did.), and found Rustan guilty of violating
5(h) of R.A. 9262 (Anti-VAWC). The CA affirmed this decision.
ISSUE(S):
WON Rustan sent Irish the photos, which caused anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation on her, in violation of
5(h) of R.A. 9262.
HELD: Yes he did. Petition DENIED; CA decision AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
The elements of the crime are present:
o Rustan and Irish had a sexual or dating relationship (3(e) and (f))
o One act of sending an offensive picture is an act or series of acts that constitutes violence. (3(a))
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Rustan says that his items were seized without a warrant, but these items werent actually used as evidence (e.g.,
Rustan admitted to owning the phone seen in a photograph, not the actual phone, presented by the prosecution). Also,
the bulk of the prosecutions evidence really was just Irishs testimony.
Rustan also claims that the lewd photo sent to Irish is an electronic document that requires an electronic signature
for authentication, as provided under 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC) However, because
he only brought this up with the SC and not with the lower courts, his right to object to evidence was deemed waived. In
addition, the A.M. mentioned only applies to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Read R.A. 9262
Her tears were tangible expression of pain and anguish for the acts of violence she suffered in the hands of her former
sweetheart. The crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of her charges with the verity
borne out of human nature and experience. RTC (verbatim)
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PEOPLE v. GENOSA
[G.R. No. 135981. January 15, 2004
NOTES: The husband was sleeping when wife killed him, therefore there
was no harm!!!!!
children - VAWC
FACTS:
Marivic Genosa is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Parricide. She killed her husband, Ben Genosa.
She suffered maltreatment from her husband for over 8 years. She was 8 months pregnant when, one evening, her
husband came home drunk and started to beat her. The husband kept on shouting that his wife "might as well be killed
so there will be nobody to nag" him, he dragged her towards a drawer where he kept a gun, but was not able to open the
drawer because it was locked. So he got out a cutter from his wallet, but dropped it. She was able to hit his arm with a
pipe and escape into another room. The wife was afraid that her husband will kill her and the unborn child so she
destroyed the drawer and got the gun. She shot her husband while he was asleep.
RTC found her guilty of parricide. On appeal, she alleged "battered woman syndrome" as a form of self-defense.
Having been interviewed by the specialists, she has been shown to be suffering from Battered Wife Syndrome.
ISSUE(S): May "battered woman syndrome" be regarded as a form of self-defense to exempt the accused from criminal
liability?
HELD: NO. She is still convicted of Parricide but her penalty is reduced. Prision mayor minimum to reclusion temporal
maximum, instead of reclusion perpetua.
RATIO:
Since self- defense since the existence of Battered woman syndrome, which the appellant has been shown to be
suffering in the relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence
must still be considered in the context of self-defense.
In the present case, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of the husband and her fatal
attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children's
bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the
danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or
safety.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior
by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include
wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the
couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man
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once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.
Cycles of self defense arising from battered wife syndrome: First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be
proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final
acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of
an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the
time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused,
based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could
satisfy the requisites of self-defense.
Requisites of self-defense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
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