What was the United States response

towards Jewish refugees and eventually

the Holocaust?
What Historians Think
Most Americans did not recognize the moral imperative of Jewish immigration
during the 1930s and 40s. Instead, they viewed immigrations potential impact
on the economy. At this time, the United States was coming out of the worst
depression ever experienced; jobs were scarce and Americans did not want to
compete with cheap foreign labor coming into the country. Most Americans
firmly believed that every new refugee admitted into the United States would
cost some American their precious job. 1Over 70% of the Jewish immigrants
would have been over the age of forty and in management
positions.2 Americans thought it would not be wise to have older generation
skilled immigrants competing with Americans. One New York Times article
said, The United States cannot be expected to perform today the historic
service it previously performed.3 Many Americans in general felt strongly that
immigration numbers should not increase. Any politician who campaigned for
increasing immigration for refugees was condemning himself politically.4 Some
American Jews were against immigration themselves, fearing that the new Jews
entering into America would do a disservice to the Jews already here.5 They
worried new immigrant Jews would disrupt the already complacent assimilated
Jewish relationship with the rest of the United States, triggering an anti-Semitic
backlash.6 Nativists and anti-immigration advocates, such as the editor of the
Defender Magazine, wrote in May of 1938, Let us stop immigration
completely for a while and give our present alien population an opportunity to
become Americanized first before they foreignize us. 7
Historian, Peter Novick, claims the reason the American government did not
lift the strict immigration law was because no one knew the severity of Jewish
plight. Yes, they were escaping religious persecution, but certain death? Novick
argues that this ignorance contributed to the enforcement of restrictionist laws
despite the urgent exodus from Europe during this period.
Rabbi Haskel Lookstein contends the United States should have created
temporary havens for Jewish refugees in other countries. Indeed, there were
over six hundred resettlement schemes examined by the Roosevelt

administration.8 The Wagner-Roger Bill was introduced to allow 20,000

refugee children to enter the United States twice a year. This bill was supported
by many Americans because they believed that children, being young and
easily influenced, could still Americanize. The bill failed at the committee level
and was never passed.9 One newspaper argued against the suggestion to
relocate them to the African jungle. The newspaper retorted that settling a
population of intellectual urban people into a land of jungle and wild animals
was highly improbable.10 A Baltimore Jewish Times article suggested to
distribute them throughout the country so they dont centralize in the urban
cities.11The Dominican Republic offered to accept 150,000 political refugees
but only five hundred were able to land near Puerto Plata on the northern side
of the island.12 Historian Henry L. Feingold argues that a simple plan -increasing immigration numbers during the war years and decreasing the
numbers in later years -- would have been sufficient to save many European
Jews while still allowing the quota system to stay in place.
The turning point in mobilizing American Jewish opinion came in 1939 when
the St. Louis, a refugee ship carrying close to a thousand Jews fleeing the Nazis
terror in Europe, was denied admittance into the United States.13 Trying to find
a harbor at which to dock along the Florida coast and Cuba, they looked
without success for a place that would allow them entrance. With no help from
the United States, they eventually were able to find refuge in Belgium, Holland,
France and England.14

The St. Louis in the port of Havana, Cuba. Havana was one of the many ports that the St. Louis docked at in order to find a home for
the many Jewish refugees aboard.

News of this reached American opinion. A New York Times article from June 1,
1939 headed, Fears Suicide Wave On Refugees Ship, and article, Refugee
Ship Idles Off the Coast of Florida, informed Americans of the severity of St.
Louis ship.15 News of the St. Louis passengers crying desperately for
admittance and attempts of suicide by slashing wrists and jumping
overboard, did not change the publics stance on protecting United States
borders from immigrants and fleeing refugees.16 Many Americans upheld their
anti-immigration attitude due to their nativists and isolationists views;
unemployment was at its peak and America was not willing to give an
immigrant a job when Americans needed it first. The St. Louis situation was not
viewed as a life or death matter at this time; it was merely a domestic issue of
upholding American policy.17 There was no knowledge of the extent of the
holocaust to come.18 Roosevelt could not allow his policies to appear as being a
tool of the Jews, for their special interest. 19American national interest must

focus on self defense, not some globalist do-gooding. 20 Hitler mocked the
American government about their immigration policy stating,
It is a shameful example to observe today how the entire democratic world dissolves into tears of pity but then, in spite of its
obvious duty to help, closes its heart to the poor, tortured people.21

After the embarrassment due to the lack of Jewish organizations rallying efforts
for the St. Louis, Jewish publications, such as the Contemporary Jewish
Record, defended America stating that worldwide unemployment makes it
difficult to find places anywhere for impoverished immigrants, and that this
situation, aggravates immeasurably the situation of the native Jewish
populations in the countries to which these emigrants have gone. 22 Historians
suggest that the lack of protest by Jewish American leaders was due to the fear
that pushing an immigration issue when popular opinion was already antiimmigration, would stir up anti-Semitism.23
After the St. Louis event, Jewish organizations rallied for a single all-inclusive
Jewish defense agency. They believed the St. Louis tragedy told the world that
American Jews were not integrated and had such division that saving refugees
was not attempted. This admission pushed Jewish organizations to come
together for the greater cause of saving victims. The Congress Bulletin
responded to their plea by arguing, [The St. Louis incident] was not because
the Roosevelt Administration is any less friendly to the Jews. The plain fact of
the matter is that the government was simply afraid of the demagogic political
agitation of the fascists.24Ironically, the Reform Judaism Central Conference
of American Rabbis met when the St. Louis was heading back to Europe, and
not a word was spoken about the ship.25
President Roosevelt was placed in a precarious situation. Roosevelt faced
criticism by anti-Semites, Republicans and other critics claiming he had too
many Jews in his cabinet and other anti-Semitic accusations. 26 The Jew Deal
and President Rosenfeld were two derogatory labels thrown at his
administration.27 Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, was highly
criticized for his suggestions to Roosevelt over the course of Roosevelts
term.28 Even Roosevelts administration had many anti-Semites in his cabinet
who were educated at universities such as Georgetown University, which were
notoriously anti-Semitic.29 FDR was stuck between appeasing the Jewish
community but placating the anti-Semites, the nativists and the isolationists
with the goal of United States joining the war.
David Wyman, author of Abandonment of the Jews, makes lengthy accusations
regarding FDRs lack of interest and inactivity in the Jewish cause. He
mentions Roosevelts reluctance to meet with Jewish leaders to discuss the

problems. Roosevelt fled the White House when news reached him that
Orthodox rabbis were making a pilgrimage asking for his help and guidance.
Wyman argues that Roosevelt purposefully took minimal role in the Bermuda
Conference which was organized in 1943 to discuss rescue options for the
victims. Many prominent politicians and social leaders declined invitations to
the conference and although FDR expressed support for relief in letters, he was
indifferent at the conference. Roosevelt maintained his stance; if victory at war
was possible, then the Jews would have their triumph by the defeat of the Nazi
regime.
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