Running head: The Recruitment of the Islamic State

The Recruitment of the Islamic State is More

Effective than Al-Qaeda
Cheung Chun Pong (Derek)
Organized Crime
April 28, 2015

1|9

Running head: The Recruitment of the Islamic State

The Recruitment of the Islamic State is More Effective than Al-Qaeda

The Islamic State (also known as ISI, ISIS and ISIL) and Al-Qaeda are active terrorist
organizations well-known to the world. They have long history and deep ties with each
other. In fact, the Islamic State was informally known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq when the group
pledged allegiance with Al-Qaeda in 2004, fighting against the American troops in Iraq
(Beauchamp, 2014). Both terrorist groups share a lot in common, such as the governmentlike hierarchical structure of the organizations and the diversion of labors (Thompson, 2015;
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States, 2004). There is no
surprise of such structure because the ultimate goal of both social political organize crime
(OC) groups is the ideology of the establishment of caliphate, which is to form a state
governs under strict Islamic Law (Bowering, 2013). Moreover, both group are willing to
achieve their ideology by force. They would kill Christians, Americans, Westerners, nonMuslims and even Muslims who they consider not devout enough (Lister, 2014). Despite
the common value both group share, the groups are actually under power struggle to be
the leader of global jihadist leader. Al-Qaeda cut all ties with the Islamic State since the
February 2014, reportedly for the Islamic States brutality and disobedience (Kapoor, 2015).
While it is quite ironic to see Al-Qaeda to claim other groups to be too brutal, there is a
difference in their degree on the use of force and violence. Moreover, the tactics used by
each group as their mean to achieve caliphate are quite different. Effective recruitment is
one of the main factors of the fast and continuous growing of the Islamic State. I would
consider the recruitment of the Islamic State much more effective than Al-Qaeda because
the tactics that the Islamic State has used help them to build up their reputation, gain more
resources and broaden their source of recruitments.
The Islamic State certain knows better on how to build up their reputation,
especially to the younger generation and the local people than the Al-Qaeda, hence takes
over large amount of local territory to build up their reputation. The Islamic State always
uses excessive amount of violence such as killing and raping to deter those disagree with
them, especially effective on the local people. Moreover, the Islamic State takes photos and
videos and spread them by Twitters and other online social media, where the younger
generation may receive them almost immediately. One of the most frightening video
emphasizing power, posted by the Islamic State, shows the Islamic State soldiers mass
executing hundreds of Syrian prisoners of war (POWs) in the desert (LiveLeak, 2014). This
February, another mass killing video made by the Islamic States shows they not only mass
killed, and also beheaded dozens of Egyptian Coptic Christians in Libya (CNN, 2015). The
supporters of the Islamic State are also encouraged to spread their message by re-twiting
and forwarding their online social media post. In fact, there are around 500 to 2,000
accounts of the Islamic State supporters, who send more than 50 tweets on average every
day (Walker, 2015). The Islamic State also govern the land they took over and strictly
enforce the Islamic Law barbarically and openly. Amputation of crimes and public
execution is common. For example, the Islamic State soldiers publicly executed a man for
having homosexual affair by throwing him off from the seventh floor of a building in the
town of Tal Abyad (Glanfield, 2015). The local people quickly recognize the power of Islamic
2|9

Running head: The Recruitment of the Islamic State

State and may comply with them out of fear. Baghdadi, the leader of Islamic State, openly
suggests the purification of Islamic community, and seeks to kill all other Muslim sub
branch other than Sunni (Baghdadi, 2014). For that, he threatened Saudi-Arabia, and
launched attack against Shia, other religious minorities as well as rival jihadist groups
(Byman & Williams, 2015). In fact, research finds that people may join terrorist group for
a sense of security (DeAngelis, 2009), especially under extreme situations like this.
Propaganda videos such as the fifty-five minutes long Flames of War was made intended
for recruitment (Jones, 2014). The video features with rousing music, dramatic explosions
and graphic, blood-soaked images of dead enemies (Byman & Williams, 2015), attracting
hot blooded teenagers to join them. Despite whether people are forced, lured or voluntary
to join the Islamic State, the Islamic State certainly utilize their reputation in their
recruitment. The Al-Qaeda on the other hand, uses a far emery strategy approach. The
logic of the far emery approach is that they believe the root cause of all the problem in the
Middle East is the West. They think that the support of corrupted dictators, such as the
leaders of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are only able to withstand being overthrown by the
military and economic support of the United States (Byman & Williams, 2015). Therefore,
Al-Qaedas primary target is the United States. The well-known tragedy of September 11 in
2001 was one of Al-Qaedas most successful and iconic terrorist attack, killed close to 3000
people on American soil (National Geographic Channel, 2015). However, also due to the 911 attack, Al-Qaeda became the primary target of the United States. Our war on terror
begins with Al-Qaeda, but it does not end there (Bush, 2001). American troops were sent
to the Middle East particularly to target the Al-Qaeda. Over time, that effort degraded Al
Qaedas core capabilities and eventually led to Osama bin-Ladens death (Walt, 2011) in
2011. The death of Osama bin-Laden, who was a symbolic leader of Al Qaeda, certain had
an impact on Al Qaedas reputation. It may causes potential recruits to question the power
of Al Qaeda, whether Al Qaeda has the power to fight against the United States. Moreover,
Al Qaeda believe in Muslim-masses, an idea to include all Muslim as a whole. Although
Al Qaeda also considers that Shia Muslims are apostates, they view that killing sprees
against Shia are also against Muslim (Byman & Williams, 2015). The death of Shia weaken
the Muslim power; therefore, it is harmful for the caliphate. This act of accepting Shia may
be viewed as soft and a sign of weakness from the potential recruits of Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda
also produces propaganda video to attract recruitment; however, most of their productions
are contain the same content as those produced since 2001 -- Long videos of senior AlQaeda ideologues talk about various aspects of jihad and quoting extensively from the
Koran (Byman & Williams, 2015). This kind of lecture-like productions are much less
attractive to young teenagers than the Islamic States exciting action movie-like
productions. Al-Qaeda failed to build up an attractive reputation for their potential recruits.
Islamic State took over large amount of land, and they govern it. Reported from
November 2014, the Islamic State controls a third of Iraq and a third of Syria, similar to the
size of Britain (Landis, 2014). There are estimated eight to nine million people live on those
land. By implementing taxing, also known as extortion, the Islamic State makes money
to support their activities. People must pay taxes in order to get anything done, or to survive
(Fantz, 2015). All business need to pay heavy tax for essential needs, such as electricity and
3|9

Running head: The Recruitment of the Islamic State

security. Drivers need to pay tax when they pass through any checkpoint. People
withdrawing money from their bank account must make a voluntary donation to the
Islamic State. The Islamic State also allows locals to dig up materials at excavation sites
and collect taxes (Gordts, 2014) on their profit. Sometimes the Islamic State may just
openly rob and loot what they want. There are reports that in June 2014, the group raided
several banks in Mosul and stole an estimated US$500 million (Fantz, 2015). The Islamic
State also take over oil facilities on the land it controls as their largest source of income.
They sell crude oil that were pumped out from the oil fields they control directly, or send
it to small refineries producing low quality fuels (Gortz, 2014). Up to 25,000 to 40,000
barrels of oil were smuggled to the black market of Turkey or Syrian regime every day,
making around US$1.2 million dollars daily. Part of the Islamic State income is from
kidnappings and human trafficking. It is not rare to see that the Islamic State kidnaps
foreigners and demand ransoms from their company and government openly. For example,
the Islamic State kidnapped two Japanese journalists in 2014, demanding US$2 million
ransom from the Japanese government (Yan & Almasy, 2015). The Japanese government
refused to negotiate with the Islamic State and those men were beheaded. Although some
countries refused to pay ransoms to the Islamic State, several European governments have
paid millions to captor in order to save their citizens (Gordts, 2014). Altogether, the Islamic
State makes estimated US$3 million daily, making them one of the wealthiest terrorist
organization in the world (Gordts, 2014). With all these resources, it is easy for them to get
whatever they need to attract and train their new members. On the other hand, Al-Qaedas
financial incomes were under strict surveillance by the United State ever since 9/11. Before
the 9/11, Al-Qaedas main income was zakat and sadaqa donations from Muslim
charitable organizations and business all over the world (Comras, 2005). By establishing
and infiltrating a series of international Muslim charities, Al-Qaeda has a channel to collect
and mask the funding they need to maintain their operation (Comras, 2005). The funding
collected are used on both legitimate humanitarian operation and supporting Al-Qaedas
radical Islamic operations. Ordinary donors may not know that their money will go into
hands of terrorists. There are also wealthy individuals donate to Al-Qaeda to show their
support. For example, the princes of Saudi had donated money to Al-Qaeda before the 9/11
(Foster, 2015). Following the event of 9/11, the United States started military activities, as
well as financial investigations and measures to track and tackle terrorist groups, with AlQaeda as their primary target. The Executive Order 13224 ordered by President Bush,
significantly expanding the scope of then-existing U.S. sanctions against terrorists and
terrorist organizations (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2013). The United States focus
extensively to gather intelligence and target at Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups sources
of income. The United State had develop a list of business and donors of Al-Qaeda and
other terrorist groups, and they share it with financial institutions all over the world. These
financial institutions which want to maintain their reputation would then filter them out
by their filtering software, procedures and policies, making Al-Qaeda and other terrorist
groups business and transfer of money a lot more difficult (U.S. Department of the
Treasury, 2009). Furthermore, a number of countries have react to impose new charity
oversight procedures (Foster, 2015). Within the Gulf counties, around fifty charities were
4|9

Running head: The Recruitment of the Islamic State

shut down, and more than forty charities were placed under official surveillance. Saudi
Arabia government claimed that they has audited 245 domestic charities and frozen their
external offices (Foster, 2015), and they also shut down twelve charities and forbidden
donation boxes at commercial stores. A 130-man Saudi financial investigative unit has been
set up, and 96 suspected terrorist financiers have been arrested (Vardi, 2010). The effort of
the United States trying to limit the income of Al-Qaeda by coordinated strategies across
countries had paid off. The traditional funding sources of Al-Qaeda had been disrupted,
and their financial condition had been weaken severely (U.S. Department of the Treasury,
2009). Al-Qaedas central command is no longer funding operations as it has previously
(The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2009). In June 2009, one of the Al-Qaeda
leaders said that they have a shortage of food and supplies in Afghanistan (The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, 2009), If a holy fighter does not have the money to get
weapons, food, drink and the materials for jihad, he cannot fight jihad. The recruitment
of Al-Qaeda had been affected severely by the financial crisis of Al-Qaeda. Reported by the
Guardian, European Muslim recruits faced a chaotic reception, a low level of training, poor
conditions and eventual disillusionment (Black & Taylor, 2009). Al-Qaedas recruits
complain that they were being forced to pay for the training and supplies. For example, a
case was reported that Al-Qaeda billed their recruits US$1200 for AK-47 rifles, ammunitions
and grenades (Bruno, 2010). With a lack of resources, it is difficult to attract new members
to join the Al-Qaeda.
We need the engineers, we need doctors, we need professionals. Every person can
contribute something to the Islamic State. (Banco, 2014) The Islamic State is recruiting
anyone who wish to join them in any way they could. Local children and teenagers under
18 year-old were welcome to join the Islamic State. In fact, they are lured with money,
driving and shooting lessons, things that elevate their status among peers (Abu-Nasr, 2015).
The Islamic State also recruits foreigners extensively on social media, such as Facebook and
Twitter. The Islamic State reportedly controls around 90,000 Twitter accounts, in addition
to thousands of other social media accounts (CBS DC, 2015). With estimated 90,000 tweets
a day, the Islamic State is able to spread its propaganda, especially influential to teenagers
who are more familiar with online social media. Moreover, the Islamic State would try to
reach their target audiences in the audiences own language. One of the method for the
Islamic State to disseminate their messages is by exploiting popular hashtags on Twitters
(Mullen, 2015). The new recruits can be any ordinary people, who do not have to be
religious fanatics, but who give their pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State (Masi, 2014).
Their sophisticated use of social media attract teenagers and adults from all over the world
to join them. The Islamic State has managed to recruit up to 20,000 foreigners from over
40 countries, some are from non-Muslim countries, such as Canada, United Kingdom and
United States (Masi, 2015). It is to believe that the Islamic State can appeal to young
peoples religious idealism and to a desire to escape their frustration life in the Western
countries (Mullen, 2015). The Islamic State also promise a good life for those who join them,
and use foreign recruits themselves as propaganda tools. For example, Aqsa Mahmood, a
British teenage girl who joined the Islamic State in 2013 shared that she was provided with
a house with free electricity and water provided to you due to the Khilafah [which is the
5|9

Running head: The Recruitment of the Islamic State

caliphate or state] and no rent included (Mullen, 2015). Moreover, the Islamic State is more
aggressively recruiting women than any other terrorist groups have (Fantz & Shubert, 2015).
Whereas western men join the Islamic State to fight, women aim to start a family (CBC,
2014). In February 2015, three British girls age 15 and 16, were reported leaving home to go
to Syria to join the Islamic State (Ford, 2105). A recently established hotline in France for
reporting jihadist radicalization reported 45% cases being involved with women, showing
a sign of increased female involvement related to jihad (Baker, 2014). There are even reports
on the Islamic State recruiting female Indonesian domestic helpers in Hong Kong (Want
China Time, 2015). With a broad sources of recruitment, the Islamic State open themselves
up to many options. Comparing to the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda seems to have a much
narrower sources of recruitment. Regardless of nationality and ethnicity, recruits must be
Muslim, and the devotion to Islam must supersede all other factors forming their identity
(Sparago, 2007). Local unemployed, potential extremist ideologists are Al-Qaedas primary
potential target of recruits (Softness, 2014). Al-Qaeda also recruit foreigners to join them
through the internet; however, the group relies heavily on older platform, such as online
forum and website (Ryan, 2014). This kind of older platform is considered less attractive to
younger generations than Facebook and Twitter. Not only that, most foreigners intended
to join Al-Qaeda as fighters were pressured to be suicide bombers (Selby, 2008). Al-Qaeda
do not view women as an important source of recruits. Female members may have a major
role in collecting donations and convince other females to encourage their husbands and
sons to join the holy war (Dubai, 2010). Al-Qaedas sources of recruitment is quite narrow
compare to the Islamic State.
As the Islamic State has more powerful reputation, more resources and broader
sources for recruitments, there is no doubt that their recruitment is more effective than AlQaeda. In fact, potential recruits of terrorist groups are not psychopathy as many thought
they were. Terrorist groups most likely select new members who are able to demonstrate
persistence, loyalty, and adaptability traits that are not displayed by psychopaths (Moscoe,
2013). As rational people, potential recruits of terrorist groups that carry similar aim, are
likely to choose the group that is more powerful, richer and has less requirements. The
propaganda created by the Islamic State definitely able to create that kind of power, rich,
and welcoming image to any potential recruits. The Islamic State has good reason to spend
so much resource on their propaganda -- they are in need of new recruits as they took over
so much land. They need people to secure, control and manage the land. Moreover, they
are having active warfare with the Iraq and Syria government. They need the manpower to
join the fight. Al-Qaeda on the other hand, does not control such large area of land, and
does not want to expand it. Al-Qaeda focus on carrying out lone wolf terrorist attack on
western countries, which only require small amount of individuals (Ryan, 2014). Therefore,
Al-Qaeda may not need so as many new recruits as the Islamic States after all. In fact, AlQaeda may not even have the resources to train many recruits. In conclude, the Islamic
State has a much more effective recruitment than Al-Qaeda due to the approach they use
and the condition they are in, enable them to expand and growth rapidly.

6|9

Running head: The Recruitment of the Islamic State

References:
Baker, A. (2014, September 6). How ISIS is Recruiting Women From Around the World. Time.
Retrieved from http://time.com/3276567/how-isis-is-recruiting-women-from-around-theworld/
Banco, E. (2014, September 5). Why Do People Join ISIS? The Psychology Of A Terrorist.
International Business Times. Retrieved from http://www.ibtimes.com/why-do-peoplejoin-isis-psychology-terrorist-1680444
Beauchamp, Z. (2014). ISIS used to be al-Qaeda in Iraq. Vox. Retrieved from
http://www.vox.com/cards/things-about-isis-you-need-to-know/what-is-isis
Black, I. & Taylor, R.N. (2009, September 10). Al-Qaida Faces recruitment crisis, anti-terrorism
experts say. The Guardian. Retrieved from
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/10/al-qaida-recruitment-crisis
Bush, G.W. (2001, September 20). Sept. 20, 2001: President Bush Declares War on Terror.
About
News.
Retrieved
from
http://middleeast.about.com/od/thisdayinmideasthistory/ig/September-18-to-September24-i/Bush-Declares-War-on-Terror.htm
Bruno, G. (2010). Al-Qaedas Financial Pressures. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from
http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/al-qaedas-financialpressures/p21347
Byman, D. & Williams, J. (2015, March 27). Al-Qaeda vs. ISIS: The Battle for the Soul of Jihad.
Newsweek. Retrieved from http://www.newsweek.com/al-qaeda-vs-isis-battle-soul-jihad317414
CBS DC. (2015, March 6). FBI Issues Warning: ISIS Using Socail Media To Recruit Young
Americans. CBS DC. Retrieved from http://washington.cbslocal.com/2015/03/06/fbiissues-warning-isis-using-social-media-to-recruit-young-americans/
CNN. (2015, February 16).ISIS video appears to show beheadings of Egyptian Coptic Christians
in Libya. CNN. Retrieved from http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/15/middleeast/isis-videobeheadings-christians/
Comras, V. (2005) Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Group. Strategic Insights.
Retrieved
from
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/11147/comrasJan05.pdf?sequence=1
Deangelis, T. (2009). Understanding terrorism. American Psychology Association. Retrieved
from http://www.apa.org/monitor/2009/11/terrorism.aspx
Dubai, A. (2010, October 17). More women recruited for Qaeda terrorist attacks. Al Arabiya
News. Retrieved from www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/02/11/100088.html
Fantz, A. (2015, February 20) How ISIS makes (and takes) money. CNN. Retrieved from
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/19/world/how-isis-makes-money/
Fantz, A. & Shubert, A. (2015, February 24). From Scottish teen to ISIS bride and recruiter: the
Aqsa
Mahmood
Story.
CNN.
Retrieved
from
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/23/world/scottish-teen-isis-recruiter/index.html
Ford, D. (2015, February 25). Who are the missing UK girls thought to be in Syria?. CNN.
Retrieved
from
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/24/europe/uk-missing-girlssyria/index.html
Foster, P. (2015, February 4) Saudi princes supported al-Qaeda before 9/11 claims twentieth
7|9

Running head: The Recruitment of the Islamic State

hijacker.
The
Telegraph.
Retrieved
from
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/saudiarabia/11390705/Saudiprinces-supported-al-Qaeda-before-911-claims-twentieth-hijacker.html
Glanfield, E. (2015, February 3). Killed for being gay: ISIS savages blindfolded man and threw
him off tower block then stoned him to death when he SURVIVED the fall. Mail Online.
Retrieved
from
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2937217/Killed-gay-Manblindfolded-thrown-tower-block-Syria-stoned-death-SURVIVED-fall.html
Gordts, E. (2014, September 23). This is How ISIS Makes $3 Million A Day. The Huffington
Post. Retrieved http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/22/isis-funding_n_5850286.html
Jones, A. [The Alex Jones Channel] (2014, September 20). Analysis: FLAMES OF WAR, New
ISIS
Video
Released
[Video
file].
Retrieved
from
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sai2gqP2tJU
Bowering, G. (2013). "Caliph, caliphate". The Princeton Encyclopedia of
Islamic Political Thought. Princeton: New Jersey. Princeton University Press.
Kapoor, V.K. (2015). The Islamic State Self-styled Caliphate. Press Reader. Retrieved from
http://www.pressreader.com/india/sps-landforces/20150210/281655368517463/TextView
Landis, J. (2014). ISIS controls an area the size of Britain: Syria expert. Al Arabiya News.
Retrieved
from
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/11/28/ISIScontrols-an-area-the-size-of-Britain-Syria-expert.html
LiveLeak. (2014). ISIS terrorists film mass execution of hundreds of Syrian soldiers. Live Leak.
Retrieved from http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=8b0_1409276034
Lister, T. (2014, September 10). Al Qaeda battles ISIS for global jihadist leadership. CNN.
Retrieved from http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/10/world/meast/isis-vs-al-qaeda/
Masi, A. (2014, September 8). ISIS Recruiting Westerners: How The Islamic State Goes After
Non-Muslims And Recent Converts In The West. International Business Times. Retrieved
from
http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-recruiting-westerners-how-islamic-state-goes-afternon-muslims-recent-converts-west-1680076
Masi, A. (2015, February 28). ISIS Foreign Fighter Recruitment, Social Media Undeterred By
New Security Crackdowns. International Business Times. Retrieved from
http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-foreign-fighter-recruitment-social-media-undeterred-newsecurity-crackdowns-1831764
Moscoe, A. (2013). Why Do People Join Terrorist Groups?. Academia. Retrieved from
http://www.academia.edu/5585121/Why_Do_People_Join_Terrorist_Groups
Mullen, J. (2015, February 25). What is ISIS appeal for young people?. CNN. Retrieved from
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/25/middleeast/isis-kids-propaganda/
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States. (2004). Staff Statement
no.15,
Overview
of
the
enemy.
Retrieved
from
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-qaida-structure.htm
National Geographic Channel. (2015). The 9/11 Attack. Retrieved from
http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/remembering-911/videos/the-911-attacks/
Ryan, L. (2014, October 9). Al-Qaida and ISIS use Twitter Differently. Heres How and Why.
National Journal. Retrieved from http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/al-qaida-and-isisuse-twitter-differently-here-s-how-and-why-20141009
Selby, S.W. (2008) Detained Terrorists Reveal Al Qaeda Recruiting Process. U.S. Department of
Defense. Retrieved from http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=49310
8|9

Running head: The Recruitment of the Islamic State

Softness, N.A. (2014). Determining a Foreign Policy of Interdiction Towards Al Qaeda, A Story
of
Recruitment
Strategy.
Retrieved
from
http://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2224&context=etd_hon_thes
es
Sparago, M. (2007). Terrorist Recruitment, The Crucial Case of Al Qaedas Global Jihad Terror
Network.
Center
for
Global
Affairs.
Retrieved
from
http://www.scps.nyu.edu/export/sites/scps/pdf/global-affairs/marta-sparago.pdf
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. (2009). Staying solvent. Assessing Al-Qaedas
financial portfolio. Janes Strategic Advisory Services. Retrieved from
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/staying-solvent-assessing-alqaedas-financial-portfolio
Thompson, N. (2015, February 10). ISIS: Everything you need to know about the rise of the
militant group. CNN. Retrieved from http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/14/world/isiseverything-you-need-to-know/index.html
U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2009). Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing David S
Cohen Remarks to ABA/ABA Money Laundering Enforcement Conference. Washington
DC. Retrieved from http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg317.aspx
U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2013). Terrorist Assets Report. Twenty-second Annual Report
to the Congress on Assets in the United States Relating to Terrorist Countries and
International
Terrorism
Program
Designees.
Retrieved
from
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/tar2013.pdf
Vardi, N. (2010) Is al Qaeda Bankrupt?. Forbes. Retrieved from
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0301/terrorism-funds-finance-osama-al-qaedabankrupt.html
Walker, L. (2015, March 6). Inside the ISIS Social Media Campaign. Newsweek. Retrieved from
http://www.newsweek.com/inside-isis-social-media-campaign-312062
Walt, S. M. (2011). The United States vs Al Qaeda: Whos winning?. Power & Policy. Retrieved
from http://www.powerandpolicy.com/2011/09/09/the-united-states-vs-al-qaeda-whoswinning/#.VS-FENyUdqI
Want China Time. (2015). ISIS flyers hit HK; recruits to carry out missions in Xinjiang.
Retrieved
from
http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclasscnt.aspx?id=20150320000067&cid=1101
Yan, H. & Almasy, S. (2015, February 3). Japan: We will never, never forgive ISIS for
apparent
beheading.
CNN.
Retrieved
from
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/01/middleeast/isis-japan-jordan-hostages/

9|9