- -— Cee eee ee ens aw) DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Angolan — Military Cooperation with African States (U) JANUARY 1984sone ANGOLAN MILITARY COOPERATION WITH AFRICAN STATES (U) DDB-1940-16-84, Information Cutoff Date: 1 June 1983 WARNING NOTICE Intelligence Sources or Methods. Involwed Pare Taio {s a Department of Di ace Docusent prepared by fe eee eas Senn yap ct nePREFACE 4O} This study catalogs the wide network of security-related ties established by Angola with other Africen states and African orgauizations since Andependence in 1975. It ie designed to provide a data base for other Fesearchers who say find euch a compendiua useful. It algo calls atteation to the fact that, despite Angola's heavy dependence on Soviet. Bloc mflicary assistance, Communtet relationships are by no meang Angola's only aflitary thes. (U) For conparat’ ve purposes or specific Order of Battle information see Ground Order of Battle: Angola (U), DDB-1100-A0-series; Naval Order of Battle Volume IV-Africa South of the Sahara (U), DDB~1200-10\-serice; Air Order ot Battle, Volume IV-Africa South of the Sshara (UJ), DDB-1300-10é-eerien; aad Military TatelTigence Summary, Volume 1V-Afriea South of the Sehara (0), DDB~ ‘Beb0-10l-aerion; and Forelgn AUlitary Aratatance. Wolise Vie titita Sone ee fhe Sahara (U), DDB~1940-I-series (U)_Word processing support was provided by Sea (@) Questions and coments conceratag th! in writing to the Defense Tatelligence Agenc gta te ee Des a ee at (Reverse Blank) SECREF1, EwmRopueTTON 26000 TI 2: ANGOLAN MILITARY AID TO APRICAN STATES .. 3. ANGOLAN MIETTARY AID FROM AFRICAN STATES eee eeenreere 4, OTHER ANGOLAN MILITARY RELATIONS WITH AFRICAN STATES .... 5. CONCLUSIONS «...s..eeseee APPENDIX Sumary of Angolan Military Cooperation with African Tneurgeat. Groups TLUSTRATION Map ~ Angolan ttilitary Cooperation {a Africa . ‘TABLE Formal Angolaw. Security Agreeneats with African States . (Reverse Blank) (Tis page ts UNCLASSIFIED) vidsoRMHaRY (@> Despite its dependence on foreign Communist military assistance, Angola also has established military tiea on the Afrfcan Continent. These Lavolve Angolan ance to African states, Angolan aid received from African states, and other military ties that do uot include military asatstance. To some extent these relationships reflect the Marxist orientation of the MPLA governnent in that they exist chiefly with leftfet African states. (2) ‘The closest bilateral aflitary relationships have beea formed with Zambia and Marxist Mozaabique, fellow members of the Front Line States (FLS); with the Congo, Like Angola « Marxist state, and'with which it shares a short coamoa border; and with Cape Verde and with Sao Toae and Principe, two distact, fellow Lusophone nations sharing the iapottaat common experience of « struggle against Portuguese coloalalisa. Lesser eecurity ties exist or have existed with numerous other states and within regional groupings. Military links have deen negligible with Ethiopia, aucther large Marxist state dependent on maseive amounts of Cuban and Soviet ascistance, indicating that these ties tend co center sore on regtonal and cultural affiliation than om political ideology. fey This network of African security ties—wide though {t is—does Little to mixigate Angola's dependence on the Soviet Bloc for sflitary assistance. And, che quantitative difference between Luanda's Communist and noa-Conmuaist nilitary relationships {9 staggering. While Soviet/Cuban aid is vital to the MPLA's aurvival, other nations’ ailitary links are significant aalaly for their regional political ramifications. Angola, however, may eee these ties as a step toward the distant goal of eventually reducing dependence on the Soviets. On the other hand, it 4s quite posetble that some of these ties have been encouraged by Angola's Soviet and Cuban geators tn order to reduce the appearance of Angola subservience to thea; in any case, auch links probably could not be pursued without Soviet/Cuban acquiescence, (0) It fs also toteresting to note that while links with Mozasbique and Zambia, fellow Front Line States, are to be expected, the reason for strong thes with the Congo and Cape Verde is less obvious and possibly even surprising. te) Finally, this network of Angolan ailitary ties in Africa may Allustrate the beginning of {ntra-African cooperation that will become significant later. Unless an outside power becusee a driving {afluence behind the ‘scenes, however, growth in such cooperation will be constrained by the Uaited finanefal and human resources and the conpeting interests of the cooperating states theaeelves. * €€% Angola also has provided eigalficant military assistance to African insurgent groups and received aid from then. Because chie paper {a concerned primarily with interstate military ties, assistance to and from insurgent groups {8 sumarized only in the appendix. vit SECRET(U) Angolan Military Cooperation: in Africa1. Dergopuctrow tortie) ‘The Angolan People's, Republic (RPA) {s, among African countrie one of the sost dependent on foreign military assistance. The regive of the Utne Fopular Movenent for the Liberation of Aagola--Labor Party (MPLA) tos installed in 1975 with dixect Cuban end Soviet military support thee vee Gructel in defeating rival contenders for pover ia a nearly year-long couflice, Sorreatty;, the MPLA is still dependent on 25,000-30,000 Cubsa troopes up to 500 Soviet allitary advisers, and an eatinated 500° East Geruan ailitary cot security personnel, as well as lesser numbers of military technictess feet fans” Gosmuntet tates. These advisers and troops ate necessary to prop up the wreatine in the face of fnternal disputes and staliov popularity, ‘te fxansfora the Angolan Araed Forces (FAPLA) fron entially guerrilla ary sate i goventional force able to use sophisticated veapona end capable et seen STARE, cOunterinsurgency operations; and co belp Angola defend’ agsiace South African attacks. Likewise, the Cubans and Soviets give eitiony aiged be matron FAFLA fm tte e£fores to contain the vigorous Aasurgency being waged by National Union for the. Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). 6%, Nevertheless, despite Angola's abject dependence on foretga Comuntet Reckeae consistence, Luanda is aot wiehout other security ties, uascly, on ine SEUIeTE continent. Stace independence, Angola has established ongoing securies seeaeggumnips or had at least transient security-related ties with’ smenne ereae aittes. (See apy" These Links fell easily toto three categorions sire nasi getstance provided by Aagola co other African erates; foecien Forel rtneaseance Feceived from African etates; and ailitary ties (iaclofig formal milttary agreenenta) that fall short of actual azeletence. 2. ANGOLAN MILITARY AID TO AFRICAN STATES ASSOLAN MILITARY AID TO AFRICAN STATES. ‘agola has provided notable mflitary esstataace to other Aitery asefatance vas provided by Angola during tte ft.00 PAPA copetntences suite naturally, since the civil war ao till rasiags indor caueuilittes vere fully taxed (few Angolaas bad received euough tearetes wee hein Fortuauese, Soviets, or Cubsas to serve av tastructore)s the Pass Trpebeins converted to a teguler armed force; and the large Sovice acd Catee sastecazce i Cyuantzation “vas still being eaplaced. — (iven today, Sane ind. Gotan {O,OtNer African states aay be provided in conjunction with Socios snatcrenty Peromnel 1a Angola-) Almost imaediately “after the RPA's tices anaiversary, hovever, the initial reports of euch Aagolas ef feted. In Decenber 1976, Mozanbican officera vere getting une Besenag QtNE Communist equipment vas belag provided-valbelt with Honan Blessing. | A year later, tn Naveaber 1977, Angola alo provided holding and Breton, MGreening facilities for Mozaabican. wilitary trainees ee eae, oS Goba. Wo recent aflitary aid to Mozambique has been noted. however, 1 SECREFSeSCRES (ee Another early provielon of arse ald invotved the ah{paent of Soviet arms to che Covernnent ef Chad Armed Forces prior to March 1977, The qulpsene, which Sactuded rocket Launchers, araored personel catttere, trucks tnd oallarce, aay have cone fro Angols,” Angola agein provided eecurtty aid 0 Chad vheo Angolan aircraft were requested by Congo in Noveaber 1979 to fly tea troopa to Chad to fola the Afeican peacekeeping force there, In March of the following year, Angolan aircraft returned those troope to Congo. There 4s reason to believe that other Angolan help aleo Gougo. By 1979, for inatance, the Congo apparently was receiving financial support for its ‘ail{tary budget, if not direct military assistance, froa Luanda, sad in November of that year an unkaowm number of Congolese soldiers were reportedly being trained ia Angola. Any aflitary equipaent supplied by Angola, of course, te not indigenously produced bet is being resold or transferred from items obtained abroad, chfefly tn Communist atates, Angola itself produces no military equipment. A raze example of a specific itea sold te Dassault Mystere-Falcon 20 light trunaport sade available to Guines-Bissau in 1978 by the Angolan Wintstry of Defence. Likewise, ailitary training provided by Angola to other African armed forces is undoubtedly given by combined Cuban~ Angolan instructor staffs tecause Angolan capabilities {n this area are still Limited. Bissau's former federation partner, Cape Verde, for tastance, Tecently sent to Angola. about 50 soldiers who could be receiving such training. Earlier security assistance to Cape Verde has involved the dispatch of Toyota vehicles from the Angolan Intertor Mintetry to its Cape Verdfan counterpart. Military afd exchanges between the two largest Herxtet armed forces in Africa-Angola and Ethiopia--have been slight. At some point between 1977 and early 1979, Cuban M{G-21 and helicopter pilots aad their atreraft (which were takers from the Angolan inventory) reportedly vere sent from Angola to Ethiopia, The nuaber of aircraft and leagth of deployment te uaknova but such deployments may have contiqued {a 1980. Earlier, in February 1978, the Angolan national airline was ordered to study the opening of @ scheduled air route to Ethiopia to obviate the neceseity of eecrecy in military flights betweea the two nations. In addition, duriag the 1977-78 Ogaden var, Cuban troops were transfecred from Angola to’ Ethiopia, and other Cubens ea. route to Ethiopia transited Angola. Although primarily a Cuban-Soviet Ethtoptan operation, there was obviously some Angolan cooperation, if not ‘support. (He) Angola's only other aflitary ald favolvement in East Africa case during the Tanzanian-Ugandian war of 1978-79, Angola sent arms and ammunition to Tanzania during the dispute; reports that Angola sent troops are erroneaus. =} vo reporced instances of Angola security afd seen quite defintely to involve the dispatch of troops, hovever. In 1980, for fnstance, @ combined FAPLA-FLNG (Nat-tonal Front for the Liberation of the Congo)* force Of 600-1,000 troops nay Rave traveled overland to Lusaka to deter an alleged coup attempt against Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda. * G6) The FINC to am insurgent group of Zatrtan exiles located ia Angola aad Zanbia and seeking to overthrow the regine of Zaitian President Mobutu Sese (Continued) 2 SECREFScore |The other such instance, and Angola's most significant extension of milftary afd, was the dispatch in 1978 of a atzable security force to Sao Tone and Principe. The Angalen troops, apparently led or advised by Cubans now total about 1,000. In addition to providing security for the regime, ae requested by Sao Tome President Henuel Finto da Costa, the ualt ie reportedly engaged in a “plan of reconnaiseance”—posstbly an aerial sucvey—of both the nation's islands. Trafaing for Sao Toaean forces {2 doubtless alec {avolved, ‘The Angolan force is thought still to be {a Sao Tome and will probably recata there until the nascent Sao Tonean unite are believed by their goverumedt to be capable of protecting the current regime. In the meantime, the Angolan unit fe the main guarantor of the Sao Tonean regine's stability. |The Sao Tomeane may also have sent sone trainees to receive pilot training from Ronaniag Anstructors at the Angolan aviation school. 3. ANGOLAN MELTTARY AID FROM AFRICAN STATES ‘j|Numerous Aftican states have provided military aselstence to Angola, beginning {mediately at tadependence in Noveaber 1975. At that point, assistance that had been provided by other African States to the MPLA as an insurgent movenent simply continued as state-to-state military afd. Angolan officials have wade numerous public reference over the years to military ald from Nigeris, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, the Congo, and Mozambique during the period straddling independence. The exact nature of the aid te aot knows, but Feportedly Nigeria provided monetary and unspecified military aid (probably some advisers); Guinea seat “a regiment” or battalion of “inadequate” commandos who nevertheless appatently did see coudat; Guinea-Bissau sent antiaircraft weapons and up to 400 troops who did ao Fighting (nor dtd 1,000 Congolese troops in-country at the time); and Mozambique sent military equipment aad possibly troops. An unconfirmed report indicates that Soualia my have sent @ few pilots and/or flight instructors to Angola at the aawe tine. The Congolese gesistance began before independence, ia fact, when that country provited a haven for MPLA personel directing their fight ‘againat Portuguese rule. Congo also served as a vital entrepot for Cuban troops and Cuban/Soviet supplies en Foute to the MPLA during the critical preindependence months when MPLA aod Cuban troops fought rival Angolan guerrilla groups for control. ere) In the intervening years, sone of these countries have continued to provide security assistance to Angola. Nigeria, for inataace, provided training to the Angolan People's Police from 1976 until possibly 1978. The training has been conducted both in Angola and fa Nigeria. Other ald is the Subject of tenuous reports: Nigerian military equipment seat to Angola since independence has probably been for the South-West Africa People's Organizatioe (SHAPO); allegations of Nigerian troops aseieting the FAPLA in the Late 19/00 are probably UNITA propaganda or distortions of the fact of police assistance mentioned above; and a press report in early 1982 that Nigeriane are afding the Angolan Navy seus. to have no factual basis. However, Nigeria aad the front (Continved) Seko. Angola provides the FLNC a aafchaven and Limited aflicary afd; ta Fetura, some FLNC personnel assist the FAPLA {u combating Angolan tteurgeate, See the appendix. *¢e) The African troops or advisers who were seat during this point were teferred to as an “Internatfonal Brigade,” but few saw combat. 3 SECREFsEGRe- Line States have discussed the poss{bility of creating an African military force to replace the Cubsns in Angola, but no decision has been made on the fssue. This and similar Moroccan (1978) and Liberian (1962) proposals for @ nult{lateral force are very ualfkely to develop because of the political and military coeplexities standing in the way. (Angola has, however, recetved multileteral assistance in the fora of refabursenent from the OAU L4beration Comntttee for Angolan costs In maintaining SHAPO camps.) (He) Other early military afd donors have also contiqued to offer aid. Guines~Biseau, for instance, agreed in 1980 to accept up to 50 Angolan military veterans annually for prosthetic treatment at a Bissau hoapitel. Congolese troops resained in Cabinda, guatding the Congo-Cabiada border area possibly as late as early 1976. Although unorthodox in that {t turned Angolan border Security duties over to a neighboring state, the Congolese effort would have freed Angolan and Cuban troops in the enclave for active operations ageinet the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (ELEC). Moreover, the border is an area of frequent FLEC activity which affected Congolese security a well (FLEC kidnapped several French technicians from Congolese territory in 1977), s0 Congo's assistance was in its own interest. Also, Angola's Guard was not created until the Congolese Mintstry of Defense also provided coastruction workers for an Angolan Defense Ministry project in 1978. Addittonally, in 1980 sone Angolan troops may have been receiving training in Congo. Further, vestiges of the pre-independeace logistic support received froa the Congo continue, as that country provides at any one tine billeting for up to 800 transiting and recuperating Cuban troops fron Cabinda. Cape Verde, another early afd donor, reportedly sent about 50 troops to Angola ia 1983, probably to be trained, but they could be meant as a gesture of solidarity with Angola in the face of South African threats and may perforn a security function there. Finally, Mozambique may have sold several used Notatles transports to Angola. @oney Very little military ald has been provided by African atates that were cot early aid donors. In 1977 Ghana apparently discussed vith Angola the provision of military afd, but nothing ever came of the offer. Tanzanian troops in Angola were reported in 1979, but there is no foundation for the report. A Malagasy offer of two MiG-21 fet fighter aieraft for use by Angola, ade during the 1982 OAU Suamit in Tripoli, did not materialize. 4, OTHER ANGOLAN MILITARY RELATIONS WITH AFRICAN STATES OTHER ANGOLAN MILITARY RELATIONS WITH AFRICAN STATES. €0) Angola's aflitary ties in Africa are defined not merely in terms of military assistance, but have teen manifested also in the exchange of working groups on security issues and of observers of ailitary maneuvers, as well ae fo the signing of formal defense pacts. (See table) Attache exchanges are not known between Angola and other African states, although there apparently are son-Communtst (a3 well as Soviet Bloc) mflitary attaches in-country. €6) Perhaps che earliest example of this kind of aflitary cooperation was a visit to Angola by the Guinean Minister of Defense barely a mouth after Angola's independence. The contents of the talks are uot kaowa, but may have dealt with the continuation of Guinean assistance that had been provided to the MPLA before independence or with aspects of Soviet naval aviation or eavcl deployments to West Africa. (Both Conakry, Guinea, and Luanda, Angola, have ‘been hose ports for portions of the Soviet West Africea maval force, and LuandaSEGREF Table Formal Angolan Security Agroesents With African States (U) Country Dee Deve Cape Verde General cooperation agreenent 15 dee 1976 with security coaponeat. (atgned); 3'Now 1980 (ratified) Cape verde Agreesent of cooperation on February defense and security. 1961 (signed) congo Agreenent between each state's Septeaber arsed forces. 1982 Front Line States Macual defense pact. Subject of 1979 Fis, seetings status saknown Zambia “Defense pact” favolving “Jotat May 1979, security force to fight Rhodesian Cetgnedy and South African raids” Presuaably effected) Soviet Tu~95/BEAR D long-range reconnaissance aircraft.) Distance and lack of STATE a dena aerate ie cece) tans ad cok Eins pli arnt ae"sofed niet nen fan See Ea SSE cate seme ie pected 6} By contrast, Cape Verde, also distant fro Angola but sharing a comion Janguage and colonial heritage, has had perhape the most contiauous formal security ties with Luanda, beginning with the signing of a general cooperation agreement, including a security component, in late 1976. The agreeuent vas eventually ratified in 1980. Tt was followed aleost iamediately by the efgaing of another agreement of cooperation on defense and security in early 1961; Since then, visits have been exchanged frequently between high-ranking delegations frou the Defense, Security, and Interior Ministries of the two states. Other than the preseace of a senfor Cape Verdean atiftary delegation observing Angolen asneuvers in 1979, however, Little gubsteantive bileterat Cooperation has been noted. There 18 reason to believe, however, that Angles” Cape Verdean security talks have not been mere formalities. In Noveabes 1980 the Governnent of Guines-Bissau, Cape Verde's federation partner, waa- SeeREF overthrown, Net only dd the coup oust Cape Verdeana fron their leadership role tn the federation and end prospects for continuing the federation, but the sudden {eolation of Cape Verde and the unclear poliey toward Cape Verde of the new Bissauan regine cast a pall of unease over moderate Cape Verdean leaders worried about their ovn tenure, The pact with Angola mentioned above, suddenly ratified 4 years after its 1976 signing, probably served to reassure the worried Cape Verdeans--although there {6 no direct evidence that the pact included mutual defense provisions, Angolaas and Cape Verdeans way alo-have discussed security issues in the coatext of meetings of che five African Lusophone states, held occasionally since they acquired independence in the atd-19708, (ore) The early outlines of bilateral security cooperation with Mozambique, another Lusophone state, are not kuowu, but by at least January 1976"Luanda vas serving as a stopover for deliveries of afittary equipaent ea Foute to Maputo. The folloving year Mozambique, too, sent observers to Angolan aaneuvers. By the fail of 1980, relations had progressed, probably because South African attacks on Cessinga, Angola, in 1978 and threats to Mozambique caused each country to look for possible regional defease partners, Tn August, Mozambique was to send several brigade comsandera to Angola on an exchange Progras. In October of that year a spate of visite exchanged by security and defense ministers, reportedly including four tripe in a 2-day period, beapoke extrese mutual concern with the security situation {a southern Africa. This vas folloved later that year by a joint Angolan-Hozanbican operation, possibly directed against the two states’ dissident elements in Europe, Since 1980, bilateral security exchanges seen to have tapered off, but cooperation continuing in regional security groups and possibly within acetings of African Lusophone states. #9 The Comgo {s a less obvious candidate for close aflitary partnership with Angola. Nedther Lusophone nor a senber of the FLS, the Congo 1s, however, @ fellow Marxist state whose armed forces are simtlarly heavily influenced by She Soviet Union. Moreover, approximately 100 ales of border are shared by the Congo and the Angolan enclave of Cabinda and a Cabindan separate group creates security probleas on both sides of the border. (GAP) Formal Angolan-Congolese postindepeadence cooperation began at Aeast as early as 1978 with a visit by the Congolese Miatster of Defense. Occasional cabfnet-level visits dealing with security topics have occurred since. After South Africa's Operation Protea into Angola in 1981, a Zaitian Feport indicated the Congolese Worker's Party, the Congo's aole political party, had decfded to establish a battalion to tntervene in Angola whenever Angola thought it necessary. The formation of the battalion has not been gonfirmed. Probably the most significant link, hovever, Judged on the baste of frequency of contacts, haa been working-level visite ty ailitia and, fepectally, aie force delegations, The content of this cooperation 16 not oa : tertte) Cooperation with Zanbia, now one of Angola's closest FLS partners, did not begin demedtately after independence. Mutual guspicions (of Zanbia'e support for UNETA before and after independence; of the HPLA's introduction of large numbers of Cubans into southern Africa) delayed cooperation, although Angola may have: joined Zanbia in regional security groupiage as early ag 1977, 6 SEGRESEGREF A repore that year indicated that Angola requested security assistance from Zambia, but the proviston of this atd cannot be confirmed. By at least May 1979, ‘however, Presidents Agostinho Neto and Kenneth Kaunda had signed a defense pact and decided to establish a jotat security force to defend agatust Rhodesian and South African raids on their territories. It fe unlikely that the force aoved beyond rhetorical stages, but the pact {e probably the baste for the frequent (possibly quarterly) afaisterial-level bilateral seccrity meetings that hed begun by August 1979 and continue to occur. The focus of these sessions is probably on geautnely bilateral probleas dealing with the security situation on their comsoa border, more than on the South African threat. Angola ie concerned that Zambia may be overlooking UNITA safehavens in sparsely patrolled western Zambia; Zenbia is bothered by FAPLA and UNITA Ancurstoos into western Zaubia and by the strain placed on Zaablan resources by refugees fleetng conflict in Angola, Angolan-Zambian security concerns are also addressed in the Southern African Interstate Defense and Security Gonnittee established by Mozambique and Tanzania, and which Angola had joined by November 1979. These concegus are also discussed among Angola, Zambia, end Zaire in tripartite security talks they have held occasionally folloving the 1978 tavasion of Zaire's Shaba Province. 5. onal EONS. €€3 Although Angola has been independent only 8 years, inherited no arsed forces from ite coloatal aduinistrator, and is itself heavily dependent on foreiga military aid, tt has already developed a surprisingly vide network of security ties with ‘other Sub-Saharan African states. These fovolve the provision by Angola of aflitary assistaace to other states, che receipt of African ailitary afd by Angola, and an increasing veb of security agreesents on the continent. @r Angolaa allitary afd to African states has beea modest, ta international texas. Although auch of the tnforaation Ze fragaentary and vague (as {s information on Angola generally), the dollar snounts involved sce probably quite saall. Angola could not provide large anounts of security assistance, because Angola's omm atlitary potential 1a etill being developed, but Angolan aid would probably be modest in any case, because of the preference of many African states for assistance froa developed countries vith a proven Fecord for adniatstering aid prograns. In terms of Sub-Saharan Africa, where all intraregional aid {s small, hovever, Angola's asetscance 16 worthy of note. A wide range of countries is involved’ and in one case, Sao Tome, Angola ie probably the chief military aid donor and guarantor of the regine's stability. €@) For simflar reasons, military assistance to Angola from other African states fe also enall. At least tvo generalizations can be dtawa froa the {nformation avafiable. First, most African afd donors to Angola have been West African states rather than southern African neighbors. This send logical because Angola's neighbors have been either ideological opponenta (Zeire, during Angola's early years of independence), colonies (Rhodesia, uatil 1980), or involved with internal security probleas of their om (Ziababue, Mozambique), as well as subject co South African retalfation. Second, gost aid donors to Angola began providing ald during the 1975-76 period of uhet the MPLA calls ir “second war of independence” againat South Africa and rival tneurgent groups. Few who did act aupport the MPLA then have sent eld since. “Ivo 7SEGRE reasons may apply: first, early donors aay have been motivated by a desire to forestall excessive MPLA’ dependence on Cuban/Soviet assistance; and second, they sav their aid as essential to defeating an fapending South African vietory. Since 1976, hovever, that latter urgency has diseppeared; it has alao becoue clear that no African m{litary aid ie needed to supplenent massive the jstance Angola receives froa irs main eupporters. Moreover, it would be Amposeible in any case for African assistance to supplant the MPLA‘s Comunter patrons. ty Equally interesting is the development by Angola of a web of security thes short of actual ailitary assistance—exchanges of exercise observer’ working groups, or ministerial delegations, ard even the eigaing of several military pacts. Nove of these ties is likely to reduce Angola's dependence on Guba or the Soviet Union any tine soon, but Angola may well gee then as proof of its continued sovereignty and the basis of an eventually genuine nou alignment. On the other hand, these ties probably could not have been established without Soviet/Cuban acquiescence—a measure of the haralesszese the ties pose to Angola's status as a Soviet client. Sone of these links, particularly those with Maraist or leftist regines, uay well be encouraged by the Soviet Unton and Cuba to mitigate the appearance of excessive Angolan dependence on thea, Over the long term, hovever, allitary ties euch as these among African states, supplencnted by assistance provided and received, are probably harbingers of 2 tread of regional interdependence that will continue fo grow slowly as African states ace a need for iaproved military capabilities. in this regard, such regional military cooperation could provide a framevork for explofeation by the Soviec Uator 4 it should decide to rally Aftican forces against South Africa.) Because the indicatora are such early ones, however, it is difficult to drav specific inferences about the growth of African regfonal taterdependence in security matters. Nevertheless, external actors will renain of major importance. The greatest constraint on the growth of African self-reliance will be posed by limited financial and other resources and by the coapeting interests of the cooperating atates theaselves.APPENDIX Summary of Angolan Military Cooperation with African Insurgent Groupe (U) (6) A large proportion of Angolé ailitary cooperation in Africa has been with African {neurgent groups rather than with other states, That {nvo.venent with Inurgent groups 1s summarized below. 9) SHAPO (South-West Africa Feople's Organtzatioa) Angola: Serves as a safehaven for SHAPO troops fleeing South African forces im Nasibia. Provides military canps and trafatng factlietes, as well as refugee camps. Sone of the latter aay have a{litary functions. Provides security for SWAPO camps, in sone cases by collocating SWAPO at PAPLA/Cuban camps but also by atteapting, to secure and protect, from South African ratds the Angolan territory vhere SWAPO 1s lecated. Storea arus and aflitery equipaent received from SWAPO suppliers. Facilitates travel of SWAPO combatants into and cut of Angola. Facilitates training aad advice to SHAPO by third country w{litary personnel in Angola (e.g., Soviets, Bast Germans, Cubana). Provides uaiforas and probably other quartermaater stores. In return, SUAPO troops have for several yeare augmented FAPLA end Cuban units in countertasurgency ead local security operations in southern Angel: 63 PLC (National Front for the Liberation of the Congo) Angola: Stores and distributes arms and military equipnent received from FLNC suppliers. Provides training, coubat experience subsistence for FLNC persoanel who ai personal weapons, aad iat or serve in FAPLA. For FLNC personnel who do not serve in or assiat FAPLA, provides uniforms, food, and training.SECREF ~ Factiitates Cuban ailttary advisory asatetance to FLNC. ~ Facilitates travel of FLNC personnel to Cuba. In return, sone FLNC persoanel aad possibly PLNC unite have joined FAPLA and participated in operations 42 Angola. Moreover, prior to independence, capable FLNC military forces provided daportant aid to PAPLA in ite’ struggle for doninance. (9) ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union) Angolan aid was provided chiefly before Zimbabwe's independence (1960), but reports faply sone assistance to ZAPU contiaues or hae bea, reinstituted. Angola: + Provided military training camps. = Pactlica! 4. 8} ANC (African National Congress of South Africa) ‘Aagol: ~ Provides m{litary training ceape and detention campo. ~ Stores arus received from ANC suppliers. @- (9 PRP (Popular Revolutionary Party} aod HNC (Congolese National Movement) Angola: ~ Provides mil{tary camp in Angola. ~ Provides military training by PAPLA and Cuban Snstructors, £. €@} Ic 18 possible that sual anounte of atlitary assistance are provided to other groups as well. 10DISTRIBUTION LIST TOTAL PRINT: 12 COPIES’ DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICEThis Notice is designed to provide intettigence in support of future decisions with respect to Becurity poliey or posture. ANGOLA SITUATION REPORT. i Lisbon's acting High Commissioner in :, Angola announced. on 14 August that Portugal had Fegumed administrative control over the war-torn Brovince. = “eh Citing the continued violence between the three warring Iiberation groups, Gen Macedo observed that the transitional government is incapable of functioning and that in accordance with the Alvor Agreement, pover in the territory would be exercised, until indopendence, by the High Commissioner. Although none of the liberation groups has yet commented on the move, it seens likely that UNITA and FNIA will accept it while the MPLA, which holds sway in Luanda ané reportedly was consider- ing proclaiming independence prior to 11 November, aay Object. The deciaration, which may zeflect the growth of moderate political strength in Lisbon, raises the possibility of conflict between MPIA troops and the Portuguese in Luanda. Meanwhile, on 14 August ‘a combined FNLA and UNITA force seized the port city of Lobito, 350 miles south of Luanda. MPLA troops are still holding out at Benguela, 12 wiles south of Lobito. FNIA plans call for their forces to continue to apply pressure on Luanda while simul- taneously, in conjunction with UNITA, enlarging their area of control in southern Angol: (continued) 1S Aug 75 DIADIN 2004-75 atop DTS] taire's President Mobutu is nov providing materiel to WNITA forces. On the 1ath, three airccaft loaded vith military equip Bont’ arrived in Nova Lisboa and another vas scheduled fo arrive the next day.” wobatu ig also continuing hie support to the PMA. "Besides receiving materiel and advisory support from tsize, the SNA reportedly inas approxinately 50 foreign commandos in the Anbriz area, this is in addition to the wome 40 or so Portuguese troops who reportedly served with NLA at the Luande fortress, twelve of the Commandos in Aabriz are anid to be Braziiion and further Bragitian aid-may be forthcoming. = (Amo In an unrelated development, South African troops have reportedly engaged FNLA and MPLA troops in separate incidents in the south. The South African troops are deployed to protect economic development projects in extreue southwestern Angola Ae} Rear the Namibia border. arse numbers of additional | ()% South African troops are rerorted deployed on the Namibia side for possible contingencies. (XGDS-2 i Declassify upon notification of originator) = i SOURCES: CIA TDFIRDB 315/086 646-75, and 315/08662-75 14 Aug 75. torte MSEPRGE |] Consul Toanda 1144 14 Aug 75 teh; Press (various, (U) DIADIN 2004-75 AS cP: 1400 EDT | 15 August 1975 Distribution “c*+ DIADIN 2076-75, * az august 1975 } @ DEFENSE | INTELLIGENCE | | NOTICE | | |2 we ro cusesr. iz (CAVEAT ABBREVIAS ger Te oc7 Sst ispentser sense Fees ten dor seenes ¢5°; SECRET (512 COPIZENTIAL (6) ko ToRnESN DIESEN HRD! = Originator Bas de mined forthe Letoenetien wast noe be celeane? Gebrfeens moe er ey portant 66 Eeslen so si 1350 SECAD (CDN) ~The, “itea by the ori cegnonn vas OuLY (2/51 ~ the Shed te, any otvar document c= perlication ee elie Zpptoval of ee originating ene puget (C0) = Linits aastribution to pocaSiral wishin she snvelligenes components of USER BeEgSO Lies Puch information will net by diss Seminaced eo costeactors. wars govice; SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE scURcES ‘ano SeeueDs TanoUléo Cassar) = The intert of tht ee eta eg engoeauzs the sensitivity of the, (2= "Eitian’ana the need fer special controls while SOERIE To, Gistibution eo individuals with 8 valle Exe bs howea : . This Wotice is designed to provide intetligence in support of future decisions with respect to security poliey on posture. ANGOLA SITUATION REPORT. NS ter Fighting is expected to escalate with the liberation movements' receipt of more foreign military assistance, =) 4@} The Front for the Liberation of Angola (PNLA) continues to hold Caxito, some 40 miles north of Luanda, but is apparently being pressed by forces of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). South of the capital at Lobito, FNLA assisted by the National (0NITA) is expecting reinforcements before trying to wrest control of the port city i } from the MPLA. The latter group also continues to/ strengthen its military domination over Luanda and areas to the east. sii In the capital itself, UNTTA and MPLA officials are meeting, presunably to discusr tentative arrangenents for a cease-fire. MPLA is beginning to establish paramilitary people's~. defense committees composed of arned civilians and is striving to tighten population control. | Meanwhile, food stocks are dwindling but have} not yet reached critical levels. In Lisbon, the government has announced the appointment of Col Goncalves Ribere as permanent high comissioner in Angola. He ia considered to be a political moderate ant is reportedly acceptable to the three liberation groups. The Portuguese are continuing to search for some method to achieve a compromise | in the territory and are said to have sent two (continvea) J } DIADIN 2076-75 Union for the Total Independence of Angola .envoys to Zambia to secure President Kaunda's assent to a peace plan, It would establish a five- or six-man junta leading a coalition government of the three movements instead of holding elections prior to independence in November. Other Zambian officials have rejected the proposal but Kaunda is expected to consider it. UNITA, which under the Portuguese proposal would be the | first group to declare a cease-fire, also opposes | the scheme, Similar delegations from Lisbon are being sent to heads of state in Zaire, Tanzania, and Wanda. Another initiative fron Lisbon report- edly includes the promotion of dialogue between the three groups, the reintroduction of Portuguese administration of defense, legislative power in a transitional government, and the evacuation of MPLA military from Luanda. the — [ former proposal appears to be more realistic REI | in other military developments, / two companies totaling 270 Zairian paratroopers were flown into Caxito to support the FNIA last Week. Fourteen were wounded and airlifted out to | Kinshasa on 14 August, and sone 70 were reportedly | killed in battle with the MPLA. Mortars, ammunition, uniforms, and jeeps with machine-gun mountings were anong the equiptent provided by Zaire to the FNLA by the 15th. UNITA has begun to receive Chinese small arms from Tanzania and Zambia |_ in addition to materiel already arranged for from | Zaire, and the MPLA is continuing to take delivery | Of large quantities of weapons from Moscow through Papas and the Republic of the Congo. “A sure | i 1975 Soviet arms shipment by way of Tanzania is raid to have included two tanks and an assortment of smail ordnance. A mid-August arms shipment fro: the USSR to the Congo for the MPLA is believed | to have included KALASHNIKOV assualt rifles } and ammunition, Additionally, a few Soviet | military advisers may have accompanied this I delivery. ~ (Continued) 22 Aug 75 DIADIN 2076-75-of-eniginetor? SOURCES: re Tens ae 73 tecamonooesse CIA 1912432 Aug 75 (S/NEDIX TOFIR 314/03993-75 19 Aug 75, _314/03989~75 and_314/04108-75 20 Aug 75 ‘TDPIRD 315/08860-75 20 Aug 7S pe 11205 20 Aug 75 4e[TSSoe DIADIN 2076~75 AS OF: 1410 gor 22 August 1975 Distribution *c* PREPARED BY: [@)@),(0)(3):10 usc 424~ DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE ‘ Y mn JA \ \ y tL \ e— ‘ \ . \ . . . | . . ‘ cory, 00718 | Le Ses Cs ant 129© SITUATION REPORT Ee por DIADIN 268-76 : (26JANUARY 1976‘This Kotice is designed to provide intettigence dn support of future decisions with respect to securéty policy or posture. | : g i ANGOLA SITUATION REPORT. (continued) 26 gan 76 DIADIN 288-76 = |!They are said to be training Popular Movement army officers and helicopter pilots as well as flight and maintenance crews. ‘They are also conducting an in- telligence course, raining naval gunners, and super- vising the unloading ara disposition of Soviet ma- teriel. They are not, however, believed to be in the field. This number of advisers is higher than the 170 we estimate to be in the country but is with- in the total -- 405 -- thought to be in Angola‘and the Congo. PREPARED BY. DIADIN 288-76 ((ey(3):10 Usc 42a AS OF: 1730 EST 26 January 1976 Distribution "F*VI MF LT LS LF AF FD MD LF MP DMF MF EP | | if SRB TOP-SECRET =" DEFENSE _ INTELLIGENCE " NOTICE Bae SS ea Sa O1ADIN 2958-75 NOVEMBE! < S a . a" bo ABA’ |This Motice is designed to provide intelligence in support of future decisions weth respect to Becunity policy on posture. USSR ~ ANGOLA SATELLITE PEOTOGRAPHIC COVERAGE. High-resolution photo- reconnaissance satellite coverage of Angola is Feocurring at an unusually high rate. (ro ST SIE resem) costes 779 has Covered four sites in the territory since 10 Nov | eabez. Camaza events on the 12th and 13th included coverage of reserve airfields at Cacolo and Rocados, respectively. Two other pictures taken on the 10th and 12th contained no known significant in- stallations. The activity on the 10th was dir- ected at an area in southeastern Angola that has been photographed at least four times since 20 April. The reascn for the high Soviet interest in this particular aite is not known. ay eel Since 7 Septenber, the Soviets have conducted at Igest 10 cemere events in Angola, further emphasizing the stepped- up rate of coverage there. Only four other missions were detected for the area earlier this year, three in April end one in May. a eo ET Theron Coverage in Septenber included Sa da ira, a former Portuguese light-bomber and fighter-capable airfield and barracks area that is controlled now by nationalist forces opposing the Popular Movenent for the Lib- eration of Angola (MPLA). ‘The MPLA base at Hen- rique de Carvalho, which "has a heavy bomber-capeble airfield, was also covered. Camaxilo, a reserve border in an MPLA-controlled area, was photographed on the 7th, (Continued) 24 Nov 75 DIADIN 2958-75Photographs obtained satellites indicate that the feasibility sites for support of logistic or air operations is being assessed, They also show tha the Soviets are closely monitoring the use of airfields in non-MPLA-controlled areas. (BN3):10 USC 424 aS OF: DIADIN 2959-75 | edo Est 2%. * 14 November 1975 jnn22) Distribution "D*” prabtlon pe= MRE Re 7 RON AGENCY MESSAGE TEFEAEE INTEULIGENCE NOTICE S=2E (aS OL i935 EST 22 NV 77) _ ras _ EUS] ous ays ameass anor Th ANGocar “ANgEL AGHAMONTE® SUNEHEG) REPORTS THAT THE MAIN PROSLE™ BESETTING HAWANA'S FORCES IN ANGOLA + WHICH KE | NUNBEES AT 20s220 =~ IS RACIAL DIFFERENCES SETWEEN CUBANS AND ANGOGANS, THE AMEASSADOR COMMENTED THAT FAROSKINNED | PEGGED gy NATIVES AS BEING IN THE SAME SIT1QN MS ANGOLAN MULATTOES IN THE COLONTAL YauSy RACIAL CONNOTATIONS KAVE INFLAMED RELATIVELY | MINCE INCI SEATS, 2 THE EUBAN CoMMENTED That THE ANSLINS THEVSELYES SEEM TC LACK “HATURITY AND . EXPERIENCE” IN THE TASK GF BUILDING a SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARY! GOVERNRENT. wz aNBAESADGR NONETHELESS SPOKE OF WaVANA'S./ RESOLVE TO MAKE ANGOLA A SUCCESS ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY BS ANCOUNTERWELGHT TG SPEEULATION TaAT CUBA HIGMT SOON GIVE | UP Ch TRANSFORRING THE COUNTRY. Goome —— 3. fe (RR te cugan oreLomat GPINEL THAT The SAVINBI-LED UNITA FORCES HaD BEEN PRESSING Fue NETO GOVERAMENT AND THAT FIGHTING WaS IN PROGRESS TuRgUGHOLT ANGOLA, THE AMBASSADOR DID NOT MENTION AN EARLY NOVEMBER IN E1DERT IN Muice 35 CUBAN SOLDIERS WERE KILEED By 2 GAZ00KAs THE INCIDEAT haS DESCRISED Sy ONE CUBAN SOURCE Ag HAVING a | SOO RECEIVED BY SELIOR CUBAN OFFICIALS WITH SADNESS AND EMOTION, SUCH ATTACKS + QUITE LIKELY EARAIED OUT BY UNITA AS PART OF AK AKT}=CUSAy CAMPAIGN wo HAVE HEALERED EUEAN MORALE. “ Joe cpa gRaMoNTE=SaNChER GAVE THE IMPRESSION That aLTHOUGH WE was NOT AKARE OF THE FUTURE POLICY LINE KaVANa HIGHT TAKE, ME CONCEDED THAT A SYMBOLIC WITHER ANAL OF FORCES FRCH ANGOLA MIGHT OCCUR. INWERENT IN THE DIPLOMATIS REWARKS WAS THE CONEEAN THAT CUBA WAS INVOLVED OV} THE LONG HAUL, AND COULD NOT REMOVE LARGE NUMBERS OF FORCES ReNEN AGENCY MESsusE Pace ba-t2 RE Tees TORL2203132 NOV 77 US Fas, — RePgRTS oF conTiNusD | UEEE THE SELT*Y oF CUBAN AFRICAN FOREIGN S UNFORESEEN AT THE TIeE ‘OF ThE INITIAL SeILE wavaya QUICKLY MANAGED ThE VICTORY My FRONT Teak INSTALLED THE NETO MPLA GOVERNS TE PRCELEM OF RESIDUAL PRESEACE vAS NEVER j DR PLANNED, News TH? LINGERING CUBAN | BRESENTE «+ AETLE EROy It5 QeVtQUS BALIN ON THE TECuNcLoGrCAL | BASE IN Cush aS NEGHTIVE POLITICAL AS WELL ag ECOORIC i SONSEQvENCES F : cme CASTa0 GOVERMENT, NMICH IS FACED KITH | MaRd CHOICES 1h aNGOUSL THE ANSKER TQ SUGRT=RANGE PROGLEVS i Ig To rai“aIn 4 SZGNIFLCANT PRESENCE THERE, Tug Mas POLITICAL HemcteatiinSs -UsEyERs AND WILL ACTUALLY KodK AGAINST cued So LONG 4ST a PRES ARETPS eseR sazsty CF ANGOLA (UAITAD® 9: GIVES] saviest azechTS TAT EVE IA Ta8 SALUNIC AN COMMAND TS SLANAING AN GPERATION YM2gRTANT LOCATIONS™ IN CUAADOATLEANSD TLaMaveLes LUPIRGs LONGO AND MAVINGL, Th: ‘BE INVOLVED IN THIS QPERATI Twat auay 720085. § CeeqaTiGA eRgzaguy xT T £DBE4R 72 REPRESENT ANY MORE OF A Ta TIVES. THE OPERATION WILL MOST LIKELY E [IZATION OF 7S C3yECTIVES ALONG & WILL SERMIT FHE CUBa% FORCES oY 33 LOSE? EONS WITH SUFFICIENT gan! AY P2SStaLE UNIT ATTACKS. NEVERTHE® § STte nave NET AS V DEVGNS TRATED THE OSGAN-| ¥ ST1CaL AND STRATEGIC UNDERSTANDING KECES UHrTa movement, Twls BOLSTERS wae usta afl to meer Tre cua. ENT OFFENSE SS1C GUERILLA ieugan roaces oegaatinb ‘out = unata 3 PAbieke hscor tase mer ee 1 keh AGENSY vessis: .*, eee vm a f : 2 72812326262 DEC 77 eo TN MUTLA fe ubaSVER, Tat UNITA WAS COM LUEROUND NGIVA a5 4 RESULT OF A Suv aSSistE2 ay PORES Foe THE SOUTH KEST, i sue. o Sax Suepcy AQUTE Te i Ree 1 LOCATION 18 | eeue. X AND ANGOLAN FORCES Cay BE PRES) AB ADvadead S LOCATIONs UNITa 1s KOT | : SEENGED IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA IW THE REAR | Om) SECENT EVENTS INDICATE THAT D SEW nE490\5 FROM ZAIRE THAT MAY BE PART, OF THE F MILITARY aNd YEDICAL EQULPYENT BEING SUPPLIE! SRE, wOROCEO REPORTEDLY MAS PROVIDED UNITA germ RALIQ ROADCAS? STATION FOR DELIVERY AFTER wICLOAS AVE GEE TECRUITED AND TRAINED IX MOROCCO, A SASS COV UNICETIONS CaBAgILITY KILL ALLOW SAVIMBI 12 TaKE Ab: ENSIVE ANIMOSITY THAT THE ANGOLAN PEOPLE Titer ‘ESE CIRCUMSTANCES INDI= EASINGLY TIFFICULT TIME FOR THE CUBAN COMMAND, KICK Ts} C S154 CARGE comgaT LOSSES AGAINST UNITA, HONEVER, IF Sha INCREASES 1°5 STF enaTo IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA, STICKS To ITS GPITV, OERECTS {75 OPERATIONS AGSINST UNITE wo KATHE? Twa ST*SLY OCCUPY ING TONS 4X3 VILLAGES wee\E acCES7S INCSEASEL LeSses, 17S COMSAT EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST uNITs RAY INCEEAEE, ONETUELESS, EVEN THESE POLICIES KILL NOT SIS THE STAUGCCE, THOUGH THEY May CONVINCE Saviva! THAT € TOTAL Sno ipiezee pec 77 CBA KTH SOVIET | NS Tre es4° DIADIN770.76 MARCH 1976 | | f Z. REY no GLASSIPICICION 199 ZANDLTYG, CAvENT SABREVERTZONS UIED IH DETER : Streutreenee acevey cubhewt twreLut= Gincr Peatieations ‘roe Secret (5S}7 SECRET (514 CONFIDENTIAL (C) So! wamenia worten ~ sensitive mereecicence souRces 2D METHODS |! fnevouten (NotwrELl thie aafking Will be proninenely dleplayed > ‘Quail infovertion and naterisis Plating to, sensitive ineellt Gence tourer and methods, Raterdais tovaarked will age be ¢ie~ ERURALSYSS" apy ananer outalae acencclzed chanveie without, the, sParnlision et the originating departrene andar aaceasoent by 28 Uaklor intel lugence officer in the dreseninaeing departmct. ge to ithe potential fink to the national security aad to the intelligence SNfoaeten ond muchos involved: ea passim MATION ato EYTRACTION OF 14FORUTION coNTROLLED' Be ‘emcinaton (ONeot «Take masking stelz be sed aber Graque source ceneitivity factors, xnown ea tha erizinacor, requlte strict com 2 plisnee witn third agency nila procesusesy ih aidition to a conti “Elag'knovdadge and suparvieion Sm ahe part of tre originator an t5) “Tee SS SS S S73074 VISIGOHY O41 aIThis Notice is designed to provide intetligence dn support of future decisions with respect to Security policy or posture. SOUTHERN AFRICA y SITUATION REPORT. ___te7Nomonnttocosnncenesieasty [O14 (Continued) - DIADIN 770-76womenomeensenguinrennge - etegrere sna eS RRR SA ae ot mm aS ena * = SEGRE manner. President Kaunda of Zambia has also indicated that any support to UNITA must be given in utmost racy. Gig hocowrmnerwnesterne) In South~ eastern Africa, Tanzania has offered to increase its support for Rhodesian nationalist guerrillas in Mozambique. Tanzania has agreed to furnish 60 army officers to Mozambique to train Rhodesian insurgents and to send an infantry battalion to help guard the border with Rhodesia. The Tanzaniaz Government haa aleo agreed to immediately furnish antiaircraft pone and is considering sending artillery, including SA-2/GUIDELINE missiles. President Hyerere has authorised, in principle, the dispatch of Tanzanian forces for’ combat in Rhodesia, but conditions for such deployment were not disclosed. ~¢80S92-Sechesrtty Spormnobiticattometosiginatost PREPARED BY: DIADIN 770-76 © SS (eN3):10 usc aa as or: 1630 Est: 9 March 1976 Distribution *F" ($eome } DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Intelligence — - Appraisal CUBA: THIRD-WORLD JOURNEY (U) 31 MARCH 1977er rrp nOFOKN concor usworay Nocontmact PROPIN waunTen stron Canto! Martnge Not Hetesuile 10 Foran Natonas ‘Davemnnation ant Extract 1 Intrmanon Convelied| tr Orayraroe SIE Denarments Anes ut Componente Only ( Comracor Constant, Gavin Propotary Waruna Notee Senstne Trirtnencr Sources rt Meron toate a tnoronaton as(CUBA: THIRD-WORLD JOURNEY (U) CUBA - AFRICACASTRO MAKES THIRD-WORLD JOURNEY (U} 10-20 chilians ALGIERS 10— 12 Mae Me ‘B50 milteey 350 eiviians txanrramaa ADEN 20.48 cishinns Busourr 2a Mae 18 Bae 10,600:12,000 miliary] io Cuban prawns 1,090-3,060 civiians 090-3 ANZIQAR LUANDA, E i. a roe oe 21 = 23 nar 00 maiitary ae 400-500 civilians MaPuTO ae ee . seerore 31 Nar CUBA: THIRD-WORLD JOURNEY. (U) summary tetereeee Prcaident Fidel Castno's monthtoag swing thaough Agaica and the Arabdéan Peninsula in- atudéd stops in Atgerca, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopie, South Yemen, Tanzania, Hozanbique, and Angola. TSHROPSRINIMENFERI His East African mission was notable in that potentiat adversaries were courted on conizeutive legs of the iténerary with- ont eagendering negative publecity. Public reaction dy Lia whintnind havels as uncgoanty effusive. He even engaged in shuttle dépfonacy ‘So- matic and Etadopia. whéze there is speculation that he may have been Looking for econonéc assistance fron Moath Agnican and Hid- dte Eastern States, it seems that the odyssey was designed to impress on the countries of the region ~~ which comprise a signégicant portion of the man- atigned movement -- Castro's revolutionary ereden~ téaks and, moae importantéy, a willingness to aid aegines with technology and materiel. Castro aso nay have wanted to evatuate Cuban presence in the area. Havana has personne? in Somatéa and Tanzania, but relations with Ethiopia have not yet developed Zo the point that advisers rave been posted. One motivation fon visiting Addis Ababa may have been to offer suck assistance. {SHMORORMTHOCOHERROEHEMEHEN Fon political 3 wekl as economce Acasons, Castro sees Africa as 4 fertite field fox assistance. Havana has taken pains not fo become enbagdted n regional rivalries, Raintelning {alendty ties with adversaries wherever possible. Cuba's message to Agaican states is very dikety embedZished with its not unimpressive track necond. It has maintained its opposition to the DIA Intelligence Appraisal aaecenceneaesUS for almost tuo decades and seers to be on the veage of gaining offcciaz acceptance tharugh Wash tigzon's wi€Lingness to consider rapprochement. Discussion North Africa castro nade a one-day stop in Algeria and then left for Libya to attempt a reconciliation witl that coun try's Chairman Col Gadhafi- He nade ceremonial ap- pearances at national celebrations, including the People's National Congress, which ratified Qadhafi as its secretary general. Llnteconenmensimemnemt) Cuban iaders were reportedly convinced that such na~ tions as Algeria, Libya, and Nigeria held promise for economic assistance for Havana's beleagured economy. To improve ‘chances for this, Castro first had to try to eradicate the residue of ill will == remaining fron 2 1973 incident in Algeria between himself and Qadhafi. At the 1973 nonaliga- 2d conference, the Libyan strong man made a public display of leaving the room when Castro began to speak, saying that the Cuban leader was a "puppet" of the Soviets and could not be a nenber of the nonaligned movement. This most recent Castro- Qadhafi meeting stressed the ability of the two nations to pursue different paths within tae move ment, an indication of their continuing disagree- ment. tonneronte No real change in the attitude of the Eibyan strong man to- ward Castro seems to have emerged from the visit. President Castro came to Tripoli convinced that Chairman Qadhafi was unbalanced and reportedly left with the same impression. Qadhafi quite likely still considers Castro a tool of the Soviets, al- though he may be willing to tolerate him, given Cuba's proven fighting ability in angole. Moreover, Qadhafi-is’ said to be anxious to establish links 31 Mar 77 DIA Intelligence Appraisal Page Senwith the small Caribbean states, and he would proo~ ably consider chis difficult unless he improves re~ lations with favana. Arabian Peninsula on 10 March, Castro the People's Denocratic Re~ public of Yemen (PDRE), apparently to make con- crete commitments to that regime. Cuba already has 350 military advisers aiding the poRY in mili- tia training; a similarly sized civilian contingent is also there. Cubam involvement with Aden began in 1972, and it has burgeoned into the largest of Havana's programs in the Middle East. The purpose of the visit to South Yemen was most lixely to dem- onstrate solidarity with tue needs of that govern- ment as well as to make an on-site inspecticn of Cuba's presence there. st_Africa Somalia castro made two consecutive stops to nations that have competing objectives in the subregion. Stopping first in Somalia, where Cuban presence complements a larger Soviet one, he very likely reviewed joint Somali-Cuban agreements, which have resulted in deployment of some 360 Cuban advisory zerscanel. Some of them have been training Issas tribesmen expelled from the neighboring French Tecritory of Afars and Issas (PTAI), which both Mogadiscio and Addis Ababa are anxious to gain control of, especially the Indian Ocean port of Djibouti. When the French leave the territory this summer, a struggle for control of the port will very like- ly ensue. Ethiopia ternerore| castro next flew to neighboring Ethiopia with the prob- able intent of offering aid to Addis Ababa as well DIA Intelligence Appraisal rage 3 SeSRSas getting both Somalia and Ethiopia to try to rec~ oncile their differences. Cuba's embassy there has only been stazfed for the past 10 months, although diplomatic relations were established in mid-1975. Recently, however, Cuba has stepped up its contact wath the military regime. In late February, short- ly after Ethiopian strong man Mengistu purged rival military officers, a five-man delegation visited Addis Ababa. During the well publicized visit, Arnaldo Ochoa, the Cuban general heading the dele- gation, was reported to have been sharply critical of the Eritrean guerrilla movement, a former recip- ient of limited Cuban aid. Panzania aaa Castro next Flew to Tanzania. Some 300 to 500 Cuban advisers, primarily providing civilian assistance to the Nyerere government, are in that country. They are helping the Tanzanians on sugar-harvesting technology at the Ruipa froject. One aspect the Castro-Nyerere talks might have been to in~ terest the east African leader in Cuban military advisory support to “Patriotic Front" guerrillas targeted against Rhodesia. Mozambique Cuban assistance to the guerrilla factions in Mozambique now totals about 1,000 personnel, including 600 military. Though President Castro and Mozambican President Samora Machel attempted to give the impression of mutual warmth and friendship, official communiques gave no details on specific Cuban assistance contemplated for the Maputo government. The joint statement covered a wide range of issues, including eriti- 2 cism of alleged US “colonialism” in Puerto Riso and che government of army Gen Augusto Pinochet in Chile. Argola +eAvononte In Angola, ceremonial visits were jade .o places associaced with the Angolan civ:1 war which, without the massive assistance rendered 1 Mar 77 DIA Irte-ligence Appraisal Page 4 SEGRES31 Mar 77 DIA Intelligence Apprais: by Havana, very 1ikely would have been lost by the Meta. tn’ a public adéress to Angolan throngs, Cas- tro stated vociferously that his country would aid Angola so long as Luanda needed it, reiterating that there would be "no limit" to the amount avaii- able to the administration of Agostinho Neto. The official portion of the Castro visit ended 30 March, and the Cuban leader left Angola the next day. 2Qut look only the third extended trip for Castro in his 12 years of rule, If he continues with a stopever in the ussR, it could be his longest ever. There is something of the showman in the Castro style this trip, perhaps an indication that he believed the time was right for such a sojourn and that the countries visited would welcome him with open arms. Had Cuban leaders made’ this sane journey a few years ago, the greetings might not have been so prolific.” gust four years ago, Castro was facing third world criticism that his’ revolucionary zeal had eroded and that he was only a “lackey” of Moscow. entee cape Ina large= sense, s trip demonstrates the success of his foreign policy, especially its af- rican approach. It appears that Havana is now more subtle and sophisticated in his dealings on the African Continent, apparently mindful of tensions there as well as regional and tribal rivalries. Turthermors, a coherency has evolved in that policy: most programs of assistance av: viewed by the Cubans in terms cf continental as- pects of the aid rather than being based solely on the need of a particular regime. feprorern |e! ocommenemamenmeny cukan orientation toward Gast Africa has another more ct benefit for the Castro government. In furthering the spread of Cuban presence through~ out the region, Havana also gains leverage in SEGREFthe third world nonaLigned ovement. Leaders like Julius Myerere and Samora Machel are formidable allies for the Cuban leader to have when he pre- sides over the next monaligned summit in Havana in 1979. Potential adversaries, such as Libya's Qad- hafi, have nct been neutralized, but at least now they might appreciate the Cuban revolutionary ,ro- gram, as a resuit of Castro's personal diplomacy. Moreover, it is hard to denigrate the impact of Cuban présence in areas of the third world, where Liberation movenents Rave succeeded against “im- perialist” forces. ar tepresenee 3:30 fs Part of the Cuban mission t0 Africa involves longer term plans for the eventual removal of the Tan Smith gov- ernment in Rhodesia. Last year, President Nyerere of Tanzania and president Machel of Mozambique were known to oppose large-scale Cuban participation in the guerrilla campaign against Rhedesia. Castro's visit to Tanzania nore than likely addressed the projected Cuban role in the Rhodesian struggle over the long haul. EA Tee) castro may have also attempted to make his African poli- cies more multinational to overcone possible crit icisn that he was intervening in internal African political mattezs. He would be hard pressed to Gisguise his Soviet alliances, however, and will at best only divert attention from the role Mos cow plays. soteronte i proconeen em) Most in- teresting about the Castro trip was the widespread acclain with which the Cuban President was greeted. Crowds were large —~ perhaps filled by governmental manipulation -- but, nonetheless, effusive in their praise. The ease with which he visited countries, at tines on very short notice, demonstrated that he has achieved something of a superstar status among Jeaders of the newly independent African states. Cuba's Angolan success and the renewed revolution- ary image that it has attained are the probable bases for these feelings. Mex 77 DIA Intelligence appraisal Page & steererAnother the Castro success was his attempts comacy between feuding regines niepia. One source suggests that the sole objective of the visit to Addis Ababa ‘was to promote reconciliation between those governments. Reportedly, ths two sides agreed to hold such telks at a later date and at a neutral site. On the larger aspects of Cuban diplomatic ano military initiatives in the East African region, Castro is Said to have: proffered his analysis of problems facing the “progressive” states there, suggesting that Cuba might aid the nations of the region in unising them against the threats of “imperialism.” tSrrerontmmeneren Fidel castro's journey to African and Middle Eastern menbers of the third world may mark the start of an increased effort to implenent his goal to present a united "anti-imperi- alist" front. “obviously, Cuba gains from these ini- tiatives, oromoting itself as the leader of the non- aligned movement. Nevartheless, it remains tied to the USSR in ats dealings with these nations, ané it ill have to eradicate the impression that it is merely Eronting for Moscow, Overall, Cuban and So- et objectives nerge in Africa, and it is difficult for Havana ‘to convince some governments that it is pursuing ats own interests. Whether Fidel Castro has had success in disnelling Joubts about his in- dependence from Moscow or whether this is an impedi- Gent to Cuban-African relations is still moot. in event, the Cuban leader apparcatly has now es- ished himself as an important force in the non- aligned movement. tye enema PREPARED BY: (DayTo USC ar DIA Intelligence Appraisal SCREs DIAIAPPR 194-77 ieQOFIEMED eae _Thi oral’ nas Authone! tr ele fo FA pM RRR SET TNE SIEANGOLA: NETO BESIEGED WITH PROBLEK'S (U)FIGHTING FOR SURVIVAL PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA PRESIDENT AGOSTINHO NETO UNCLASSIFIED TRCANGOLA: METO DESIEGED WITH PROBLEMS (0) Sumery AeHHOFORH Angolan Pacsident Agostinko Neto ds fighting for ils potitleat Life and the economic Survival of Angote, anc present indications show that he is Loséng.” His primary base of political Support in Luanda and within the Poputar Movement for the Liberation of Angote is deteriorating. This beeame evedent when he ousted Mito Atves from the Novement’s centaal committee, resulting sn @ revolt against his government that jeopardized bis political, wititary, and public support. HeWeFERH The economy continues its downiard slide, and public dissatisfaction £4 increasing. Revitatizing the economy, however, is dependent upon « satisfactory conclusion to the internal in- surgency being waged on three’ fronts. Neto has been unsuccessful in kis efforts against the Na- tonal Union for the Totat:independence of Angola, Urtéonal Front gor the Liberation of Angola, and Faont ga» the Laberation of the Enclave of Cabénda insungencies and, in fact, appears tobe Losing. Soviet nateniet aid and Cuban zroops and equipment have not been very effective in quetting the insur- geney. Consequently, Nete's prospests fox survival - as Pacsident of Angola are not good because of his eoutinaing toes of political support, unsuccess fut efforts against the insurgent groups, and his in- ability 20 get the economy moving. Background 2 4¢ftiepery- Neto's reaction to the revolt that took place in the capital of Luanda on 27 May indi- cates that he is losing control of the situation. Since the revolt was put down, there has been a countrywide purge of government officials, Popular Movenent for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) offic- ers, and other individuals. 15 gun 77 BIA Intelligence Appraisal Page 1OPPOSITION TO. NETO MOUNTING JONAS MALIIEIRO SAVING PRESIDENT: UNITA HOLDEN ALVARO ROBERTO PRESIDENT: FMLA ITO ALVES FORMER MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, MPLS, GOVERNMENT UNCLASstETEDtopinenrenproromnecenrtnenliis | the cat- 5 i alytic event that evolved into a revolt against : the Neto government was the ousting of former in~ . terior minister Nito Alves from the MPLA central committee. Reportedly, the “lower classes" were profoundly shocked by this action. Neto, however, is supposed to have anticipated the negative reac~ tion to Alves' explusion, but felt that he had no alternative. de reportedly believed that it was necessary to “supplant” Alves' appeal to the masses before the MPLA central committee meting set for this fall. aT Alves* xise to influence was said to have stemmed from his selection to accompany President Neto to the Lusaka conference of 1974, where the differences separating the central committee, dissident active revolt (RA). and the eastern revolt of MPLA were thrashed out. Although the conference failed to pull the rival factions together. Alves had new political stature and returned to Luanda where he was utilized to organize the poor through public appearances and later by radio broadcasts. In his efforts to win support.of the “fringe” ele ments of the Angolan population, Alves is reported : to have “encouraged racism, physical attacks on whits, and wealthy people, and forceful expropriation of the "ill-gotten" gains of private citizens during the colonial period.” FR Copnenererznoronr7NocONTeT7, Alves subsequently developed a strong following among the "lower classes” and eventually was chosen to be interior minister, which put him in contact with the people in neighborhood communities at the regional and provincial levels. In this ca~ . pacity, he continued his diatribes against whites, mulattoes, Portuguese, and property owners. Eventually, his encouragement of racism and a drive for power led him to speak out against Neto and other MPLA leaders, resulting in his position being abolished last October and final- ly to his ouster from the central committee on 20 May. 15 gun 77 DIA Intelligence Avpraisal Page 2 Reeser]AREAS OF INSURGENT OPERATIONSDiscussion sii] ALthough it can be argued that Alves presented the opportunity for Neto to consolidate his positicn, the combined political, economic, and military situation seemed ¥5 dictate that Alves’ ouster was a serious mistake, highlightea by the revolt on 27 May and the present purge. Reportedly, Alves support in Luanda and the Suter areas, a6 weil as in the military, is growing Stronger as conditions in Angola worsen. The extent Of bis support among the masses or in the military, however, is still not clear. ‘The RA faction of MPLA is also said to be getting stronger, with many peo- ple saying openly that RA leaders may weli be their Balvation in view of the growing chaos and “misadmin— istration." The news mia are now becoming more critical of what is happening. A provincial com- missar is reported to have attacked Neto's govern- nent, calling the ministers “corrupt and incompetent" and adding that visits by the “incompetent ministers and their lackeys have produced nothing but words.” Tt is further reported that the food situation is critical. Crops are not being planted, children are dying of malnutrition, and the educational sys- tem in Luanda is essentially only for the children of Bast European diplomats. “teyueremt> The base of Neto's political sup- port is in the capital and within MPLA, both of Which show signs of collapsing. Identified as supporters of the revolt were elements within MPLA, the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPZA), members of the MPLA Youth Organ- ization, the National Union of Angolan Workers, and the Angolan Wonen's Organization. This sug- gests the potential of "grassroot" elements unit ing with political and military factions against Weto's government in his own "backyard." Const quently, it is questionable as to whether he still has a power base there. He remains in contrel be- cause the revolt was not focused solely on "his overthrow" but to demonstrate against the regime for ith treatment of Alves. Another indicator of 15 gun 77 DIA Intelligence Appraisal Page 3 a]public discontent was an antigovernnent demonstra~ {ion in the northern town of Samba-Caju on 10 April touched of€. by the shooting of two popular defense comittee officials by PAPLA militiamen. The den- onstrators protested against harassment by FAPLA troops and demanded that Neto’ visit the town. Some of them are supposed to have chanted “down with communism". Although PAPLA units were ordered not to fire on the civilians, it is reported that they would do so in the event of a similar demon- stration in order “to make the people respect the Jaw.* In regards to the economy, its vi- tality is virtually nil. Recently, a Swedish dele~ gation led by Minister for Developzent Cooperation Gla Ulisten Heineback visited Iuand- and departed with an appreciation of Angola's “severe problems and need for assistance." Heineback commented that the upshot of the visit vas that the Angolans “needed everything." The central concern expressed by the Angolans, he said, "is to stabilize the country, to be left alone, and to get on with rebuilding en economy that they admit remains shattered." The economy has little mongntua of its on, except that provided by the Gulf O11 Company in the Cabinda en- Clave. It is stagnating because it lacks an infra- structure and cannot function with political insta- bility and internecine fighting. Even a stable An- golan xegime without an internal insurgency would face years of hardship in attempting to cope with the problems of merging African provincialism with modern technology. Consequently, Angola's economy will not reach a "take-off" position until the dis- tant future. Before it approaches that point, po- litical stability and termination of the internal insurgencies are needed. ae oa : ak ie cass 15 gun 77 DIA Intelligence Aporaisai Page 44@yNevent} In addition to the UNTPA insurgency, the FNEA continues to operate in northern Angola as does thie FLEC in the Cabinda enclave. oth groups exert considerable pressure on government forces and consequently prevent them from controlling their re~ spective areas of responsibility. In addition to the three-front insurgency invelving UNITA, ENIA, and FLEC, dissidence is developing near Luanda, an area previously believed secure for MPLA. Although there does not yet appear to be a formal organize- tion and membership cannot be determined, this fourth front sppears to involve government, military, and civilian factions. Qutlook AGyNOFORH- As Neto's position deteriorates, a sense: of futility and fatigue appears to be emerging within the military and among the popu- lece. Neto is no longer perceived as capable of 15 gun 77 DIA Intelligence Appraisal Page 5handling the problems facing Angola, if military efforts against the insurgents continue to fail and public discontent expands, Neto's survival ard perhaps even that of the MPLA'in its present form are doubtful. Soviet materiel aid and Cuba: troop and equipment support obviously are failing to meet the requirements necessary te defeat the three in- surgent groups confronting Neto. furthermore, the Soviets and Cubans have not been able to cope with the economic situation. Their efforts so far have been concentrated cn the military challenge while virtually ignoring the economic dislocations. The rapid state of economic decline suggests that the Soviet and Cuban comaitment will have to increase significantly in order to prevent further erosion of the MPLA's position and support for Netc. The recent deployment of additional Cuban forces prob- ably reflects this situation and indicates an en- phasis on seeking a military solution to whet es~ sentially is a political-economic problem. teAIOBORH Neto's ability to maintain his poli- tical support and to cohsolidete MPLA control over the countrysiée is doubtful. As his political sup- port continues to erode and the people become more Giscontented with the military and economic situa- tions, Neto will probably lose his ability to stay in power. ‘The USSR and Cuba apparently have not determined the extent of their pledge to Neto and may allow hin to fall from power asa natural course of events, while continuing their comitment to An— gola. Anew leader, however, would be £aced with the Sane problems, and, although there might be sone inital hope for a botter performance, no appreciable improvement is possible until some fundamental policy changes deat with resolving the military situation. (xcDS-7 Declassify upon notification by the originator) PREPARED BY: [eysyt0 USt 42a 15 gon 77 DIA Intelligence Appraisal Page 6 en EE IRE A SE EE TT EE SL I CEResDIAIAPPR 30:84 DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE (— AGENCY Insurgency (U) 15 MARCH 1984 Angola: Trends in the UNITADISSEMINATION CONTROL MARKINGS WNINTEL (WH ‘oncon (oc) NOCONTRACT (NC) PROPIN (PR) NOFORN (NF) REL. ‘Warning Natice-Inteligence Sources of Methods Involved. Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator. Not Releasable to Contractors/ ‘Consutans. Caution Proprietary laformation Involved. Not Reloasaible to Foreign Nationals Authorized for Releasa to...Intelligence Appraisal Angola: Trends in the UNITA Insurgency (U) DIAIAPPR 50-84 Prepared bn (Byayao Use 424 ‘This is a Department of Defense Publication Produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency |Angola: Trends in the UNITA Insurgency (U) Summary pe affects most of the Angolan countryside confirms often sketchy and biased reports on recent trends in the conflict between the rebel Na- tional Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the goverament’s Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA). Nearly all the figures used for this appraisal were taken from an equal number of insurgent and government reports. For the most part, specific numerical indications as well as general accounts ofthe in- temal Angolan situation describe a conflict in which the level of hostilities has continued to rise and which now affects even larger ex- anses of territory. Without dramatic military or diplomatic develop- ments, hostilities are expected to last for several years. Consequently, Luanda will quite likely urge its Soviet and Cuban allies to provide addi- tional materiel assistance and become more active in counterinsurgency operations. Discussion Casualties rm Ht One ofthe mos striking developments in the last $ years is the dramatic increase in FAPLA casualties. The growing ‘number of fatalities suffered by government forces confirms most reports from the same period, which pointed to consistent FAPLA reverses in encounters with UNITA. Neverthe- les, large discrepancies between the number of FAPLA killed and wounded remain unexplaio- ed. In military hostilities, wounded personnel are expected to outnumber those killed. eo (GeWAANPANE|EES |The number of FAPLA wounded seems abnormally lov, raising doubts about che accuracy of battlefield reports. In early 1980, a reliable source said UNITA leaders estimated the insurgents’ battlefield ac- ‘counts were about 75-percent accurate, noting, that the guerrillas’ reports were known to be ex- aggeraced occasionally. Where possible, UNITA’s imelligence coordinators tried to compare guerrlla-supplied statistics with information i bcained from intercepted FAPLA messages. If recent FAPLA casualties were adjusted down- ward to reflect this distortion, they would still represent a significant upward trend. Aiterna- tively, the guerrillas probably do not always know the precise number of wounded govern: ‘ment personnel, especially if the latter escape or retreat before an engagement is ended. Conse- quently, information on many more wounded FAPLA personnel may not have surfaced in some reports. FAPLA casualties for 1983 in- dicate the past year’s fighting has taken its toll ‘on about 18 percent of Angola's roughly 35,000- man army. The urgency with which Luanda spent the latter half of 1983 scouring the coun- try for recruits and recently called up 16-year- ‘old Angolan males to register for military service suggests these statistics, though in- complete, are reasonably acuraStatistics of the UNITA Insurgency Canuattion 118 tam] tat Angolan Armed Forces (FAPLA) ‘ed 64d 29511888708 Wounded Sst: 00) eco ae | er Captuced (By UNITAY a ow TB People's Mille (ODP) ‘ited sy sem Wounded Pe re a Captured 0 2 oe a te chvilana kite 7] Pr oo Wounded 30 S57 Sw Captured po tt UNITA tnauegonts ‘elled “sos ust Wounded 12) ees aay Captured ease cubens ‘Killed mom Wounded ee Captured ee = 182 1901 +1980 1973 Wonpons Cpured UNA FAPLA UNTTA FAPLA UNITA FAPLA_UNTTAFAPLA_UNITA—FAPLA Pistol, ies, S13] 39 31h LHS RD ‘machineguns Morar, APG, a ) 5 - 4 ecolless wespons ‘Axil pieces, wo- 7 = 7 1 B 1 = = "AAR SANE Mines, grenades «= «40529 S208 “Trucks, vehicles Ce en Radios wo 5 ow 7 mw = 8 a ee. wersowseFein rosoyrepecs, cv fan casualties would be a more worrisome statis- tic, especially for Luanda. Until 1985, trends in the civilian sector matched those experienced by Angola's armed forces. Nevertheless, the striking drop in the 1983 figures raises questions similar to those prompted by FAPLA statistics. ‘Whether the drop in civilian fosses simply re- fects changes in government and insurgent reports is not clear since they might have been released for propaganda purposes. Alterna~ tively, the 1988 civilian casualty figures may reflect changing UNITA tactics stemming from a politically motivated decision to reduce the frequency of its attacks on economically impor- tant civilian targets and to concentrate instead on military installations. Another explanation could be a large exodus from the countryside by Givilians seeking refuge in the cities, thereby reducing the number of civilians likely to be killed or injured in the i sUrgeRy. jcasualties sustained by ‘proportionately and as quickly as those by government forces and Cuban personnel. This trend confirms reports that UNITA has increased the frequency of its ‘operations and continues to deploy convention ally organized, battalion-size units in large attacks on isolated but bigger government outposts. In fact, the insurgents may have suffered as much as 10 percent of their 1983 castialties during the ‘August battle for Cangamba, where 3,000 in- surgents besieged and, after weeks of heavy ting, overran a 1,500-man FAPLA garrison. The site of UNITA’s losses at Cangamba has prompted speculation about the likelihood of the insurgents launching simi lar attacks in coming months. Insofar as known statistics are reliable, UNITA’s 1983. losses represent some 8 percent of an estimated 35,000- man armed force, which reportedly continues to be resupplied and enlarged by a steady stream of recruits, Moreover, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi recently said the insurgents plan to ‘mount attacks against larger towns and cities despite expectations that these assaults will take a heavier toll of guerrilla casualties. The lace January attack against the eastern town of Luau also underscores UNITA’s announced intentions. ‘Weapons Captured UNCLASSIFIED (U) Fleet of Soviet-Mads Vehicles Capeured by UNITA. = . {see|UNITA'S plans to ‘mount more frequent and larger operations will, __ greatly hinge oa the insurgents’ ability to ac- quire more weapons, whether captured from government forces or obtained from outside sources. During the late 1970s, France, Egypt, Iran, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, China, and South Africa were instrumental in providing UNITA with military and financial support. In recent years, most of these sources have report- ‘edly dried up, and UNITA’s external aid is now thought to come almost solely from South Africa. Pretoria probably has not compensated for the entire amount of assistance once provid- ed by six states formerly sympathetic to UNITA’s cause or for the vastly increased amount needed to sustain UNITA's expanded operations, Because of diminishing outside sup- port, UNITA in the late 1970s took measures to become more self-sufficient. In early 1981, a reliable source said, as of the previous June, UNITA was capeuring about half of its weapons and ammunition from FAPLA while the re- mainder was acquired from foreign suppliers.vane UNETA's Area (U) UNITA Coatinues to Expand its Area of Operations.By late 19RD, UNFTA was relying or captured pons for more than 50 percent of its needs. ‘This increase was reportedly due co both UNITA’s greater success against FAPLA and the cutbacks in weapons from outside sources. ‘Whether UNITA continues to obtain weapons at the same rate is not clear. If so, the acquisi- tions would help the insurgents keep pace with the growth in the number of their armed mem- bers, estimated co have increased by as much as 10,000 in the last 3 years, derveisncsnel For he let 2 years, he number of individual weapons captured by UNITA has very closely paralleled the number of FAPLA fatalities inflicted by the insurgents. Although this parallel may not have a bearing ‘on the reliability of various reports, it suggests WNCLASSIELED soine internal consistency over many years. Aa. equally striking, potentially more significant trend emerges {rom the growing number of ar- tilfery and antiaircraft weapons captured by UNITA forces in the last few years. Several sources indicate the insurgents are using these weapons wich their semiconventional battalions during attacks on larger government garrisons. The caliber of weapons covers a fairly large spectrum and includes guns up to at least 76 min. A more precise breakdown of weapons re: portedly captured in 1983 reveals 22 BM-21 GRAD 122-mm multiple rocket launchers, as well as $2 14,5-mm and 46 12.7-mm antiair- aft gun: Most, if not all, BM-21s were captured in 1985. No evidence, however, TTT ce wal ao { t { Fsuggests UNITA has used them. On the other hand, the insurgents quite likely have used the antiaireraft weapons to shoot down an undeter mined number of FAPLA helicopters and an coccasiomal transport over the last 2 years. UNITA recently downed what may have beea one of Luanda’s recently acquired Mi-24/ HIND hnelicopters. Whether antiaircrafe weap- ‘ons or one of several SA-7/GRAIL surface-to- air missile launchers captured by the insurgents brought down the helicopter is not clear. More- over, some recent UNITA successes against FAPLA tanks and armored cars may be due to the use of captured B-10 82-mm recoilless weapons, RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, or antitank mines — all of which the insurgents have acquired in past years. Never- theless, UNITA will have to obtain more ad- vanced antitank and antiaircraft weapons before ic can pose a serious threat to heavily de- fended provincial capitals. Current crends suggest they could soon acquire the necessary capabi Outlook use" Most recent assessments Of che Angolan inszrgency predict a continua: tion of the generat trends prevailing over the past few years. The most important crend isFAPLA's persiscent inability to locate, engage, or defeat great numbers of UNITA guerrillas. Despite occasional, unconfirmed government reports, FAPLA has yet to inflict a single major defeat on the insurgents in recent years. More- ‘over, Cuban forces have been augmented in each of the last 3 years, and Soviet arms deliveries in 10985 far exceeded those of previous years. lif casualty and weapon statistics continue to mount, Moscow will come under increasing pressure to provide Luanda with additional military assistance. Likewise, Havana's 30,000-man. expeditionary force is likely to asstime an even more active role in counteringurgency operations. Barring 3 coup in Luanda, major battlefield reversals for FAPLA or UNITA, or a diplomatic break: through, hostilities ia Angola are expected to last for several years. Despite the shortcomings inherent in relying on combat statistics, a fur- ther monitoring of these reports can supple ment verification of what are otherwise likely to be biased accounts of the ebb and flow of the Angolan insurgency. (Classified by DoD Dir $-5200.17 (M2); declension OARTERIA [Two pages are denied in 214 Hull and are not included, The Angola-Namibia j Border Region: Potential For Military Movement-(U) Defense Research Assessment Defense Intelligence Agency = 0DB-2000-161 29 ‘March 1989 Seeret- rs 30 _ gnc ee ne REAPER hae DISSEMINATION CONTROL MARKINGS weunreL cv Warng Notce-n Sowees ritethogs sobs ‘oncon (oc) ssamunatan and Esrcton of Ielomaton Corwoted by Grginnoe NOCONTRACT (NC) Mot Ratausble 0 Contraiot/ ensans PROP (PR Caaven-Proprieary Infemaven Involved NOFORN (wry Not Releasable to FoeignNatonate ‘ ree ‘Autronted to Retest. j rat oingn Govern nfomavonThe Angola-Namibia Border Region: Potential for Military Movement (U) Preored b Information Cutoff Date: 17 October 1988 008-2000-141-89,the Angoli Namibia Border Region: otential for Military Move: REY JUDGMENTS 7 Current, andtary forces the Culun Hopular Armed Koeces tor the Liberation ot Angola (EAPLAD the National Union forthe Total fadepenalence af Angola (UNITA).the south. Wen Af feopley’ Organization (SWAPO), and Sonal Aiea al are ought to be preset in the Ans Nambia bunler repson Movement of these forces wil be eonstesined by he nature of the terrain and hy ‘hmatie conditions as well a by existing lines of communication and availablity of airacls ‘movement. Large-scale military mavements are largely dependent upon existing linen ‘of communication (LOCS). Any Cutan movements will ikely use existing LOCS ‘¢ Hnder ewan LOC are sparse, most are unable 19 sustain continuous dF esky miovenient, and are subject te seasonal fooding and washout which render them impacsble, 1 | ' About “0 percent of the border region terrain is unfavorable for vehicular crosscountty ‘© Oppressve desert climate and onslaught of the wet season (October oF November: April) are addtional factors limiting por tial military operations. 1 Border region LOCs are sparse; mast are unable {0 sustain continuous oF heavy movement, and are subject to seasonal fooding. and washout which render them impassable, i * Cuban mosement from southwestern Angots, ether southward into Namibia, or ‘easward into UNITAheld teritory, i considered unlikely. ‘© Angolan sciclds in the region are ting upgraded and would play an important ‘ole in supporting any Cuban’ FAPLA moxement sutlward © Cuban movement eastward along the Angata side of the border is unlkely due to unfavorable terrain and lack of ruaels. Cuban movement southward, then eastward ‘through Namibia s unlikely for paliical-miltary reasons and because of inhospitable terran, athough existing LOCs are more favorable in this area, Reverse tankTABLE OF CONTENTS, Coben Theeat fom Aagoli: An Earvard Move Against UNETA or ‘Southward Into Namibia... . sFigure 1. 104 Angole-Namibia Border Study Region. SecretThe Angole\antibia Harder Re Inueoduction eee Cems aang te Ale Nana hance have dmuinscated the anpertance a he Femmate area CUTE, teapot the Cau ap silat Armed terees toe the Uibetata at Angols AVAPLAD, the Saownal Union for the Tonal fn dependcivce ot Angi (SITAR he South Went trian Peuples’ Onganizaton (SWAPO and South Ania forces are thought ta be presente the bordce regnm Ane mewement of these tances Mull be gmemed By the nuture of the terran ul the peneatal this aloes fe velar ceone ute, mene ment as well as fy climatic cont atkins exNtay ines of coimmuducation, and availabilty of airhekds For purposes of this aes ment, the study area all canst of the region featending from 15 degrees South latitude to 20 degrees South laude. The study atea extends north-south approximately 560 kilameters, and fom the South Atlantic coastline snland and east- ward for approximately 140 kilometers through the Caper Step (igure 1). (Cros Country Movement (2 Overall, conditions for cros-country ‘monement (CCM) uf tracked of wheeled vehi cles wer unprepared terrain surfaces across “0 percent or more of the study area are most unt Yorahle (This assesment equaten (0 rating Cate. goes of POOR and UNSUITED on Crons-Country ‘Movement Map, figure 2). In addition, mest of the mare favorable terran surfaces comprising at te olliag incerive plans become seawinally ithe and locally impassable due wo wet soils and ood fn Yo mont areas. prevailing terrain conditions ‘wall require a heavy dependence upwn existing fads for Targe-seale through menement a euners theoughaut musta the year lor Military Movement (1) fp) tte count atce Ot Angle Tonle atte Naat, sac cuet B ttle cr reacts ot the Nuts Desert Las an. te aout 80 hikers, she tet Sais mame ot tow feume sand ‘which have short weep Slopes The mterdune se cs are neal’ cough and ten canta fa Vegetatin 1 generally lacking, The eneratl po ental tor CCM in this area would he eumdered HOR Slopes are generally 40 percent or sweeper “Tracked selucles would e awed by fone sind and the sweep supe ofthe dunes, but sone mune feat wll be pensible in the interdine areas ‘he peatentual bar CCM al whceted ceils war be some eat similar te tht of trachea vel, hut would Ie linited «9 pats al daterdune ar ‘ex unley dhe vehicles were equipped with ape cial tres, Movement of foot ronps cress county would be fae easy. bat could be slowed by the loane sand sociated with the dunes 44 From approximately $0 40 250 kilometers {ntand from the Angola coast, the terrain consists ‘of variable, mostly ieegular ele that includes es ‘carpments, severely disected plains, cugged a rorcliet, and numerous ell. This ates is largely UNSUITED far all vehicular CCM. Slopes are geo: erally 45 percent or steeper. The arca b cruaed by a few widely spaced streams and many saler reams, all of which tive steep banks. Seeams muy fe food fora few hours to a day 0 two. Soltowing heary rainy Soils tend t be fem mont ‘of the year. bat become soft oe miry for biel pe ries fallawing heavy evins. Vegetation tends be chiefly savanna (grassland with scattered trees and shrubs) or deciduous forest Atemipted COM ‘of tracked vehicles would be severely resticted by stecpphanked streams i areas of low ta td crate eehet Mosement wal peal be eo famed ty wate strea ates, fut wild he eredzimanewe NAMIBIA (souTHwest AFRICA) (CROSS-COUNTRY MOVEMENT Figuee 2 oor seath acresen ty [esaalea beat Site Dah ati hades ste as Tes areas ot saierat Go hgh tect mmc Tout ceneait he pveckke fn steep slopes wt oad BC halle fesse alle CMa Gul vehi les 8 preball peectied an mst places tat nas befell Acasa small ating ACR Sow eminL ot ond ttn cr cant, oul be skated the steep slapes ut the ds Sected tera and in seme pases presley escarpencat. (Per Write Angola a the atca eatending east Mand trom approximatels 250 balometers lard and south ta the harder. the terrain omits funy of his. extensive disected upland plains, Scattered mountains. numerias low excarpmeats and some ateas of eugged microrchct. The ewerall Potential for vehicular cross-country movement tn his area ® POOR, Vegetation consists primarily ‘uf seatered grasses, thick spiny shrubs, and trees ‘that range in size feam scr te fall grown (gen craly less than 10 mictets high) Vegetative spa ing ranges from scattered 10 moderately dense COS or tracked sehucles would be moderately to severely hindered by trees and shrubs and pe ‘lade in some places by dense vegetation Mave: ment would be fairy easy in gras-cowered areas. Many afullow. closely spaced drainageways can ‘be found ia this ares. Drainageways tend 10 be Aooded ur to have soft soils moat years from De- ‘cember 1o June. Soils are generally firm the re- mainder of the year. From December to junc, movement would be orecluded by the closely spaced drainageways that are either Nooded or ‘contain miry conditions. CCM of sehecled vehi: ‘les would be severely hindered o¢ precluded. Movement of foot troops crass countey wuld be slowed by scrub, thorns, and sping shrubs On. foot movement is dificult or impossible when rainageways are flooded, but when dy, the eainageways can be utilized 25 axes for move: ment Overall CCM conditions are perennially UNSUITED along aumeraus lager Mtcams and sivers including the Rio Cuando ‘FEF South of the border, extending up to 250 filometers inland feom the Namibian coast, is Jband of terrain that is largely USSUTTED for seb ava ec st tA aap fe Nah eset Somme tctlae aceasta fue Sanat atl geavet sarc es Larthos cast tbe Tear aneludes mountains Mee fle time as rE escaraments deep Valles snd gongs te Aa slopes ace sss 31 fesse 0 percc a ai us exceed 1S percent COME of trac het amd Usheetel vel les woul! general te pes lke I Teane sund and stecp apes COM ght fe focally teawble wn the ttm surtaccs of snerdane teas The menerent of foot traps cs cones ‘would be severely slated by louse san ana tee slopes fe In Namibia, CCA conuitions enetall are POOR an an area extending south fut the bor: Aer and eastward fram 250 kilometers inland, finely. the Capeist Strip and porns af northern Hoswana, ‘Terrain in thks extensive area comists of moderately t0 steeply sloping plains and hill with stort escarpments, ravines and deep stream valleys Slopes are yenerall 10 te 30 percent, some locally greater Numer: fouy shallow, geassy drainageways are extensively flooded or contain miry sols most year, fant ‘early January through May. Crosscouniey move: ment will be hindered, if not peccluded, sehen drainageways are flooded. "Vegetation consists malady of grasslands, saeanna, exoplands, and io same locales dense forest patches and thick thora Senub. CCM of tracked vehicles would be hin: dered by trees, serub, loose sands, and dunes. Movement would be precluded in patches of thick vegetation, in loose sandy areas, and when soils are wet and soft. CCM of whecled ve: hicles would he severely hindered by trees oF ‘scrub and preciuded in patches of thick vepets tian, in Wane sandy areas, and when desinage ways are Headed. Mosement af fat (raaps ‘erons-cuuntry would be severely hindered oe pee cluded along deainageways when flooded Areas suchs as the Ftosha Pan (Namibia) the Okuean swamp (Botswana), and the Makgadigadi Sal Pansfioesana) are all perennially UNSETED for te wittun the study area, io Namba, sable areas in the west and along the southern Ginges have: tavurable conditions for vehicular crs~ nye t the at Sta sn i eat AMEN and Walls spaced Legation comes fears ot quese hast sory Sry. hese Shrubs and yeasses Ment sapes ary lean tha Percent Sots are gence em Bat smc asians snus become Suppers tar a fe dle ater eau wom carls Newesnber through March COME at tacked vehicles generat unresirated in die thom for fang stances Osa es stl a hillock a Be cass bapasse Ce Mba stl Be ean actins dev pany but hundred mn paves fy lemme ‘ands and tn trees x open test patches. Move ment woul be severe: hindered focally when Male are wet COME of whecled vehicles woul ar be ponte mont places for tong distaacen Movement would be restricted hy thorn scrub, serub. and patches of upen forest, and severely restrict foca by lox sand and wet sls The enement of to loops eromrcouniey woul xeneraly be uneestncted, although derately Slowed in areas of thorn serub and soft sails. imate (9 There are eee climatic types within the Angoln-Namibian border region A band af how Hautude desert extends apeoximately 200 kilame: ter inland from the coast. To the east, 3 hand of Jowlautude steppe accupies must ofthe remain dct of Namibia and partions of western Angola feat of the desert The third hand has a trop sl savanna climate that encompasses the Caprivt ‘rip of Namibia and extends northward to cover the eastern half of Angola, (#9 Within Angola there isa distinct wet sea ‘on (Geter a Nusember through April) and 2 dir season (Otay theough September oF October The three winter month une, July. and August) are virtually rantess. Rainfall along. costal areas ‘5 usually leas than 50 mlineters per year. Rain {allan steppe arcan ranges from 250 Uo $00 ei limeters ar locally more, per year In the trop fea savanna arean, rainfall may reach o exceed 11000 mailimeters per year. Afternoon tempers: ‘ures are generally warm to hot throughout the seer ati, Ce wit amas en eam stat surunanes ae als Hewett Radavel 1 to the conte esa akong the «vest an drag the eae sane le where Chaidiness at a muavtn Ht Nine ber dhirouh March averaging 50 ts 98 pers ett ‘Duemy the wanter toeuliiess esteem the caus. but mtorr feyiuns have clear shies Thunderstorits along she east ce aE Hee than 5 dys per veur hut thunderstorm ati does ‘cur mure frequently a anteian exit. ee lable 1 for climatic eundions representative the southern region a Angi.) 46) Whi Namibia, de usual winter weather (ane through August) is pleasant and dey Vis bility is generally ood lt year, but fs restceiged aC times by fog along the coast. Precipitation in caasal areas (most occurs November dheuugh ‘March) ws usualy fess than 125 millimeters, while areas in the interior steppe may receive 250 ta 500 millincters o¢ mace per yeas, Daring the summter (December dheaugls Febracy skies ate generally cloudy io wartheastera Namibia, at cchewhiere sumshine is abundant, Skies are pee. dominantly clear during the winter. ‘Thunder. orm are rae along the coast but become more feequent to the east. Summer is the period of ‘maximum cloudiness and peciplttion in most. cea. Relative humidity is consistently high along, the coast throughout the year, bu decreases to: ‘wards the intrior, where humidities are low dur- ing the winter. (See table 2 for ciate conditions fepeesentative of the northern region of Nani) Lines of Communication 449) The 1345-klometer Angola Namibia fr. det hes midway between 15 degrees and 20 de sprees South latitude, and encompases 4 wide Variety of terrain, eexetation, and extrenten of ‘te and rainfill “This, ager with the sparse LOC network and lack of allweather aids ake aSeeree Tablet Ciunate of Xangongo (Vila Rocadas) Angola (U) er) Mya as oe wo wan Moat teeter ab om 9 8 wy ow Maan Mate 6s a rs arate wos 6 we tum OmeMan 80°F 1? 2 Ww 138 Mas Aout in) 9 135 109 222 8 69 a Maan Amount od 54 $5 ot a ee aa) 37) an Amaoet (a) 74 6 ° 27 15 Max 24Hout ln) 4327 32 2018 18 27 a8 um Days: 0604 (a) 1a 129 8 @ Nam Baye w.thundonioms 7 8 ot oe ce urmiicy (4) Maan Palate = O7L Bo 8 8 ne wo HH om oF m0 o 6 @ a aww ey OM Ctoudiness Maan (3) = O71 non even n a a3 6 s¢ ss 53 23 19 13 10 5 me et oF Calling Vite (6) fas sooraeMon 2 2 § 0 6 4 © 20 0 « 2 2 fm Oe Oe 0 oo ut al ol oe fea ssorn2Mon 2 2 «6 9 8 1 0 1 9 0 o + + m © © 0 0 0660900 5 0 0 OTE X = Less than 005 eh es than 05 day of ass than 05 percent 7 scene inided amv tour distinct geupraphic sects as Anes (see gure 3). Sector 1: Cunene River Sector ‘€0) This region ntl cecently has heen rete tively insignificant politically and militarily The terran consists of inhospitable cuastal desert and aid interior mountains. ‘There ae few rads ths sector. and these ate menily anvurtaced and 1 poor 10 faie condidon A major nurdh-seuth fu, paved and in tir condition, which extends from Lubango, crenses the Cunene River at Reo ‘caday (2 major boueneck) and passes theeugh Nova lato Namibia #4 On the Naqubian side there are ne sa faced roads the few unimproved tracks are tra ficable by comentional vehicles nly with ditheutey. Raita is generally light, and there te seasonal change in traicably. although road sepments may be washed out in the rainy scm (Goro Navemiber Ape, 09 Sector 1 is unsuited for either insurgent ‘or cusunterinsurgent operations, Other than in the eastern part of Angola, advene terrain ad lack af rads Kimi est ground miliary activities Aside from tracked equipment. few LOCS cotkd be uned by seicfen, Including these with for wheetalive Sector 2 Central Straight Line Sector ‘He? This replan i the most signiticant poli ‘cally and uiaely “The train camists fa aling.vavanoa with low-Iying deainajewae th ing. during, NovemberApeit The wal networkSeoret Table 2 Climate of Tsumeb Nannbya {U) Mave Mas nen woe tate oo um Bay Mat 90°F wo o8 7 Precipnation Man Amount ue us 10 73 Maan Amount in) 460 51 32 16 ser Aout tla) ee eo Ma 24-Hou la) 29 48 31 48 Mum Daye 2 0004) 15K. Num Onyewittunceatoms 11° 873 omit (4) aan Ralaine a loudness Maan (3) 084 © © 0 2% uae re) ‘cating Vien (6) Frog © SOOM 19S fra < Joon 82 10 20 OTE X + Lass han 0.08 ch, as than 0 day oF less than 0 percent. fm the Angolan side is sparse andl in poor com. latin. although the euad from Luang theotgh Ngoa into Nambia paved Two other roads ‘of sygniicance, are an improved earth ad fear (Capelongo through Cassinga to Ngiva, and an im [proved cart road frum Menongue paralleling the Cubango River. The road south from Menangue, along the Okavanga Rive, ls ao 4 major LOC. (69 On the Namibian side, the road network {3 good and can suppor heaey trafic. A paved road, extending from the border at Oshikango. via, ‘Ondangua to Grootfoatein, is ia good condition and can sustain heavy trafic year-round. Abo in, ‘ery good condition is the road from Ondangus ‘west to Oshakat! and Ruacana Elsewhere on the ‘Namibian side. roads are impreved or unimproved dart and often impassable during November. Apel 49 Sector 2 Is suited for insurgent and coun: tenimsurgent operations. However, the marked seasonal difference during the pronuunced ct « et ee sel Be aT we 8 0 3 9 ts Soa x 0 32 a6 82 m2 xox x 1 7 an 36 ot oo oo ot a 204 xX 6 32 27 32 a8 xxx 1 8 9 BOB XX xX 1 5 7 on ss uouD me me 4 10 10 1 1 20 2s wo ww 3 4 Es eo 0 00 1 4 ws 00 0 0 6 oO x serena and dey seasons affects operations, During the dey sean mniitary trafic on the reads, ay well 4 cross-country mocement gn foot oF In four ‘wheet-drive and tracked vehicles, is generally Git {0 good. in wet weather, all mavement i ce: siricted wien many roads become impassable, sails muddy, and tow areas Booded, Sector 3: Okavango River Sector ‘€ This region isthe site of considerable in- surgent and counterinsurgeat activity. The ter ‘ain consists sity of fat to rolling savanna. Dit ‘oad parallel the Okavanga River on both sides of the border. The road on the Angolan side is ia ex {temely poor condition, and tavel, even ia fou. wheelaleve vehicles, arduous and time consun ‘ng. and noc possible at all during Nuwemer April Away from the river, must of che ¥ery sparse Net ‘work coasts ef Utie are than dit teakAOU, : . . ie] Sovsmntant Border Sectors Horerolind : Figure 3.(U) Border Sectors and Lines of Communication. (#64 On the Namibian side, the rad meteor 1s adequate for maderste levels of wage The ‘Rundu-Gractfantcin road is paved it fs an all weather road able 10 carry heavy miliary traf fhe There are no physica harriers to crossing the (Okavango River 2 any time of year +40) Sector 3 is similar to Sector 2 with regard twon-raad and cross-country movement, although rainy season flooding is less pronounced. Sector 4: Capri! Sector 4 This region is the ste of intermittent ia: urgent and counterinsungent activity. The terrain ‘censuses of at savanna, dry in the west and wet fa the east, where loading & prevalent Kewemher Apri. On the Angolan ste, the dirt road along the Okavanga River ends 2¢ Macusse There ts diet ud ia pone condition slong the Cuando River fn Angola, and a ravel oad alone the Zamberi River, an Zambia 49 On the Namibian side, 2 paraly paved all ‘weather road links Katima Mulllo with Rundu, All ‘other ruads a the sector ate uasurficed and sub Jeet 10 flooding. 49) The effect of seasonal extremes an host oad and cross-country ynovemeat is more pro ‘nounced ja Sector «. Cross-country movement ‘on foo oF by vehicle Is severely restricted during the rainy season as large arcas of this sector are lunder water when the Zambezi River foods, Aicfietds rene Aicilda Gace gure “turd le 0) ‘would play an important suppvirting ole ia any fargeseake movement of CuhaniFAPLA toecrsANH A fart + Oe cages Fogo : sou ite — YoMOnoe : ZAMBIA wt once ent uno BOTSWANA South-West Africa ‘Ceara sum + Figuee 4. (U) Selected Angola and Hemibia Airfields. south of 15 degrees latitude. Angola has upgraded five airfields in the vicinity of the Mocamedes ‘Menangueralseay: Three of thene — Mocamedes ‘uhango, and Menongue —- weee well-established fet figiner bases but lacked factitles, and pas sive and active protection. These deficiencies have been remedied with revetment for alccraft and equipment, and 2 range of ADA and SAM sites. Two ather airfields, Matala and Cuito Cu navale, have been upgraded to similar standards, and 40 close 2 gap in the chain and extend ait support operations further into UNITA territory fn the southeast. Rapid improvements 0. air- fields along the Lubango-Ngiva read have also taken place. A sixth jetsighter-capable aiccld has been established 2¢ Cahama, less than 140 fautical miles fram the South African airbase at ‘Ondanga. Cahama will permit interceptor and ‘round -atack airerak considerably longer opera ‘onal tme over targets in seuthacest Angola Two additional forward bases at Ngiva and Xangongo ‘could support resupply, ground attack, and at ‘ack helicopter operations ia the Gunene Dam arca and black any advancing South Altican forces along the Lubango-Nglva LOC. Having been deci sively defeated in past FAPLA offensives against UNITA by South African Ai Force (SAF) tater- vention, the Angolan government has developed a line of acids intended to reduce the impact ‘of any invervention by the SAAF on future FAPLA “operations. ‘Cuban Threat From Angola: An East: ‘ward Move Against UNITA or South- ‘ward into Namibia ‘tevtrer Cuban ground forces in southwentern Angola have heea augmented since Devenher 1987 and none are easy armor and mechanized Seeree toonSeo Table 3 Selected Airfields (U} Aisi Name Lattuse Elevation tangth Wath unsesy BEWomber”™ —Langitode intetars Titerare Capacny Chere re rsoxs 1889, guna ow H79ckwoos a YY a x 0000 Cann Sot eo Stat Hs Cuto Cosmas 151005 1250 2585 due eno Hist os0c8 19 Y0 ost io s0098 utara Mes5.285 17 220 Asha cu Meodeo = gtg-ae abe 5 0080 Matte teasaos * 1256 2669 cohate oo Mst-oas iso 22 a Bot06 Manongse tat 14.90-208 —1407 3500 Aaphat cus Viscene oh 43 SOE 3 008s Mocamadin New 18:15-235 2525 Aca cae Meo.ceest ™ — @32.08 Set is 0088 Nowe s707355 1119 205 Aaah e120 Hye.o800s —_oy5:4)-308 ES 00a Xangongo 1645158 108 2000 10 A700 O14. 88-07 3 e0t08 Namie Grootonen 3.36.08 1413 3509 Asghate ous 78-00001 16-07-33 « 008 Moache vems os 2286 Aaphate Wir-ceosy—ga4to-80E B 082 Orgs we-or-sos 14 1695 Ahath c1m0 Timossss gaat 2a 2 20090 Oncangwa 47-82-45 1098 2072 achat, o Miyepooe O16 7-08 2 0089 Spare ve2sa2s 1007 1367 soma ce [riecoeeos 47-05-18 8 aotoe Oeskan w7-47-555 1098 1551 Aaphaty 10 Hire.oae27 oyu 05 2 ana uscane 17.25.05 148 2210 Asghal, 130 Sfocoseot 934-2320 3 0082 Panda 1757-105 1097 2790 Asghae Sireoa0s oss 2 2 (ray mervemest 0092" mpomess) sreonen 6Sse Wat se alta ttt at 2UUSHIID Mie Se ThOut AT an MW Seo HNE eat cata tite fete ate thee maleate far cash ose and west Go ast teen Bete tan Keygens § and e cngure SY Rese are abn the Jamba Menorgue ras and road meter, be means of craw etuntes manement or sa ae sng Nanubus and then along east west Nast Inhasys Cuban quay “Bknenient of forces fram west ast and from east ta went between ‘Waar Reyuons 8 and 6 has been constrained bs rt factors the Fl and coat network. and the ‘vernding need 9 provide convoy escorts and ‘ar cover te all ral and road marches Cuban forces 19 Angola customary have 0 traveled ‘ross countey an itary maneuvers, primary be- cause the Catan defensive tale has tt required any lange scale cross country campges in thiy regard. Gautan doctrine requires Cuban forces 40 pronde adequate logistical support to Cuban rund elements and aie superioris in support of Cohan tactical units Premugmentation of Cuban ai and air defense forces since December 1947 ‘was designed to provide these ewo elements to Cuban ground units, which have been reinforced and moved nto the southwestern area of Angola ra During 1988 Cubsn troop movements supported Cuban political objectives. which were fovused un desing South Afoean forces aut a southesn Angola Cuhan objectives since the ine lia involvement of Cuban forces in Angola have ‘encompassed defense of Angolan or Cuban forces against South African and UNITA stacks, and not ‘losing with or destruying UNITA forces. Cuan round forces were nat diecetly involved in the Siete campaign ayainst Mavinga during late 198° Gun au forees were commuted in ignicant umber to the defense of Cats Cuan say afte the Angolan offensive had been turned hack and south African forces had moved on Cult Cat navale In this defense, Cuban forces were moved 4 Canto Caanavale Ate the situation there had been stabi. Cuban lorces were muncd West Hab ou touh ie tas pt aad posse pnt tush ve a 4 Maso all against Soule Aiea ety ‘abun tes ene 49 hak Nanas sd the tin Cis tomar Maing ant ¢ MU cE ee fon “Cadre statade as ote sl oa al would Be chance ut dhe etange a ee Tron protectoe to spereso send cane apis mune pablems toe Tsans Cub legion 8 A delender against Seu Arca sper ‘would he challenged at some Thar Wark cap Lule Adtwmaly there peat sell ea et rat Sty Atecan mbit an lla mi tary geome atest supe. fenibtee Two factors that mingate against 3 croweuuntey Cuban dive toward Mavings oe ‘ouhee UNTAheld cersicory in the southesst are ‘current reaurce eonsicanes an iostie support and A cower toe sels 3 me Cubes le aterm «ia place 0 seppoet mumetens sane the Jamioz-to Menongue ais fa addtuon, titer ‘capable airfields at Mata and Sesongue would Provide staging areas fr aie cover of Cuban mene ‘ments along this axis ent The most probable axis of advance for any major movement of Cuban forces fom the southwest to the southeast would be along the Jambate-Menongue axis. The likelihood of Cuhan movement crowcountry toward Mavi and UNTTAheld teritory the southeast fe ‘The Uketthood af erajor Cubaa movement inte ‘Namibia to use the Namibian road net in at at {ack un CINTTA teeitony aso kine ‘tp Cuban pica and etary objectives {to date have not incladed offensive action against UNITA, and Cuban forces ace therefore noe cx pected to turn eastward toward Mavinga or to ward UNTTAcontroled territory. The sincera ature of Cuhan lexistic resources and aie supe forty cat and south of Calo Cstaale adds 0 the uolikelinood of sich an stack. Finly. pre- valli tezrain and ted tines of communes on would make any such eastward muvee tahtcuanzancine — .MALANOE uno oo Sem uaneo soxco run uocaneoes ccunene CCunNDo-cUBANGO Figure 6. (U) Angolan Miltary Regions.PS TRS (0) Each classed title and beading ia this eeport has been properly marked; al those unmarked ace unclasife. oDIAIAPPR 382-77 INTELLIGENCE APPRAISAL CUBA: AFRICAN POLICY (U) 16 DECEMBER 1977 {ayCUBA: AFRICAN POL:CY (U) COSTA RICA DIAIAPPR 382.77, 16 DECEMBER 1977 DISTRIBUTION “W" StCrerCUBA: AFRICAN POLICY (U) Summary, “fer Somatian Pacsident Maj Gen Mohammed Sind Barne's deecscon on 13 November to break ale diplo~ matic ties with Havana, 20 reduce drasticat2y the Soviet déptomatic persennee in kis country, and to expel all Sovdet military and Cuban advisers, is a setback for the African policies of Cuba and’ the USSR. Wth Strong Soviet suppor. Cuba has peréued a poticy in sub-Saharen Afaiea so close to perceived Soviet diplomatic goats tiat many observers oelieve the Cubans ane acting as Soviet surrogates. Hh Cuba has become & aayor ingluence in Africa since if boedty indeavence in Ango2a in Late 1975 with the dispatch of thousands of combat troops. Cuba wi2l continue as a majer padtecipant in the effort to construct anti-inpertalist and socdalist countries throughout the ecrciuent a£though, as @ result of increasing internatioxal and domestic consznainzs, ét hes Lost sone grzedom of action goanenty enjoyed. Discussion Cuban Perceptions (U) President Fidel Castro believes that it is possible to build socialist societies without the necessity of passing through the various capitalist stages. He believes this to be particularly true in sub-Sahara Africa, Castro also constantly stresses his country's distinctive ties to Africa with spe- cial reference. to the debt owed for the cultural heritage received from those African slaves who were shipped to Cuba. An avowed’ lifelong revolutionary, Castro considers it a personal duty to help build socialist societies in %frica, thus freeing the continent ‘rom colonia: imperialist bonds, using Cuba's ouster of US "imperialists" as the model. 16 Dec 77 OIA Intelligence Appraisal Page 1 “SESREF(v) Cuba professes that its interest in sup- porting socialist movements is solely based on in- ternationsi sclidarity. It simultaneously disclains all rational ur colonial exploitative interests. Nevertheless, the naticn undoubtedly has an ultimate ome African resources, par- indian oil, to bolster its own falter- omy, which currently depends principally on one sow-yield product, sugar. 43) High Cuban officials frequently have de~ clared publicly that Havana has a right to conduct s foreign policy, to make agreements, and tc give assistance, both technical and military, to friendly governments and groups. Furthermore, Cuban officials have steadfastly maintained Cuba's right, as a sov- exeign nation, to support revolutionary governments - and movements. Havana wants to demonstrate its com mitnent to these causes, and above all it has re- sisted pressure from any quarter to lessen the Cuban Presence in other nations. (0) Many countries in the nonaligned movement are increasingly perceiving Cuba, also a member of the movement, as a promoter of Soviet policies. Vis~ ible proof of the country's close ties to the USSR is evidenced by its numerous high-level visits to Moscow for consultations on a wide range of issues, by its unreserved public support for the USSR, and by its heavy dependence on the USSR for daily ex- istence. Castro, however, constantly stresses the generous aid provided without strings by Moscow and has strongly denied that Cuba is a Soviet surrogate. Indeed, the relationship is apparently wore a matter ‘of Moscow asking the cooperation of its ally, Fidel Castro. While ideologically disposed to render aid to revolutionary governments and groups, Castro, be~ cause of financial and logistic limitations, is’ un- able to do so. Although it is not possible to determine if any substantial differences on African policy exist between Cuba and the USSR, based on past events, the Cubans appear more predisposed to support 16 Dec 77 DIA Intelligence appraisal Page 2 errevolutionary movements than do the Soviets. Yor cultural and revolutionary reasons, the Cubans re~ portedly consider themselves better suited to ad~ vance the socialist cause throughout Africa. The Cubans, backed by Sovier economic, diplomatic, and materiel support, confidently expect to be in the forefront in the wars for liberation in Africa. (0) The difficulties that are currently being experienced in Angola have made Havana way of di- rect involvement in other similar situations such as the intensely bitter dispute between Somalia Sthiopia. In Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia, ané atries that are fighting for black liberation fucces, Havana has realized the enormous and long- term croblens involved in building socialist eco- nomic and political structures within man-made na~ tional houndaries. The -very low levels «f indigenous educational, economic, political, and technical skills that exist in such countries compound these nation— building difficulties. International Constraints (9) In 1975, Cuba had a relatively free hand to intervene in Angola. Among other factors, very few obsewvers expected Havana to be able to react as decisively as it did. The Cubans correctly as- sessed that Western powers, particularly the United States, would not be able to respond in time to stop Havana's actiors. In addition, South Africa, the only power that could have successfully opposed the intervention, was receiving heavy diplomatic pres~ sures from all sides. As a result, South Africa had to withdraw from active military participation in Angola by early 1975. (u) Cuba can also be influenced by two groups of countries -- the Organization of Agrican states (OAU) and the nonaligned movement. Should conser- vative and moderate forces within the OAU muster enough support to condemn Cuban involvement in Africa, particularly of a military nature, then Havana will have lost the important acquiescence DIA Intelligence Appraisal Page 3 acnencetesHerds of « 20-77 Pehewary Eartpaid Joly eration Movecsats, Foreign simistors, and frgetovel Pars “9ethcvale BEI tes eee tur Coumtey vested Gas Corranast Pacey (80) vttzeials sesso Kigiist (rover, Secretaria! and Acsenco" doctta, a key sftisiat who as Dayuty Ghee! of ho Cenesal conmitese'a (ees beparicene of ase stratioasy wisited Yaycce, hotamougues eo tne iid congress of the vocamique fone. on 13 Teoraary, eney sear, eneed they aet wa: high SEI. Soi MSer Sp ciara tinaeead og foram agree Fides Cascro and arise Rodsiguez, Vice Arsunto Acosta and tay Go Aenalde Genoa, thea sia acm foe (G01? Masenl jose (18-13 Maen) ? santa ( wais2t suscey angola 12 Piga Maat ine Gen Gas aeli. in Bieste Sonbe vissted Guintas Yresidest Aces Sotcs Tuure escerved a Cuban jelcjatien ncsded oy Pco=ce enbor Facuace Nazsone? Cuban Foreign vinaster ta:éoro Nalalerca visited Sugeest, where he also nat Gan Nejoas President bithe Southeiase Atzican People*s Organisation (suapn) 7 Benin: Guiscsy aad Soabia. shag taco Praesent Amy Geo Raul castro made 4 Suck vise to angola after the Angotis Goverment Supesssed 3 rowit on I itays oeiea sono, exeeidens cf he Binbabee Agcican, toples Unsos snd egedees:dant Of the finsabe eacriotue Front, visited Cabs wore fe tee Fidel Sastre and other highsievel Cuban stelefai. \H,Gen Rast, Gusto seeped off An Luanda atte: tho USSR, she Gesvan Dexoecsere Repuetic, S57 feet eves to. Gaba, Ro BeauneLate auguse September 9-13 septenber 15-18 october 17-26 octobee 27-29 octobes End of October Late october Early sovenber early toverber mad-late Novenber Barly ceceaber serde! the In hele ia cubs ternacsona: conser Usgos, Migeria. nee Agazase aperd Angola President Agostthe Bezo nage a lowieay un Sefisiat cists co Supa gor fee Gays. 4 cuban selegataon lod by Raci Valdes Vivo, = key Sezal who 12 cate! of che PCe-Ce"s General De- parteene o¢ Foroia Relacvone, wane to Ethiopia in Sarly= ee att-septenver to sac pare in the cere SSnise for that country's thre ennuversary. In iete Sapeauber, he vent co Madagascar. Senora Machel, President of the Nozambigue Libers- fon Prone and of the Peoples Repeblic of Hozasbique ited Cuba. He Gee wick Fidel Catsro and other rovel Cuan officials. ETC Feieke calle ciorgis, Eemiopien Minister of reign seiseions, nade a low-key vasit to Cubs. Be sor with File! Casero ant other key offlelais. Olver Tasbo, Cnaicnan of the: African ational Con grace of south Africa, visited Cuba. ue receives aivare reception and net with Fidel Castro and other Risheievel ofeictais. Zambian Foreign Minster sitexe ‘wale male @ low-key Higie so Cuba: He net with Foreign Minster Malaierea and Fidel cazsxo. Sen mujosa, Prasident of SHAD, vieited Cube, Be Bet dite Figal Castvo. Cubs agioed to the openitg of SukBo czeice in Caba. ITC Mengiste Halle Marian, Peasidene of Ethiopia, face 4 secret visit to Havens, Saverel high-level Cuban officials visited angola fo ciscuss Cuban aid to Angola. Gn 5 Novenber, the Cinan and Anyolan ministers signed several agrée seats, Th one of which the Cubans promised to double the pinber ef civilsaa advisers En Angola during 1978, Cuban oaputy Foreign Hinister: Jose Femnande: de Goesio visited Zansla and Hozambique, In Hozambique he hela severa! meetings to begin isplenontiag & ‘Gubsn-Hozanbican cooperation agrecuent that vas Signed in Septerber by Prosidants castro and sanoca aathel. haul Valdes Vivo visieed Zasbia, uhore he net with Prasidene Kenneth Sauna; and Tanzania, where he set Sth president Juice Svarere Saul caateo attzeds First: MPLA Congeess in Luanda ae seeRee err re cess nisSttntmihiaer .16 Dec 77 DIA Intelligence Appraisal od it has received from that group. In an effort to forestall such an eventuality, Cuba has been actively currying favor among most African countries and move- ments. Fidel Castro, Foreign Minister Isidoro Mal- mierca, and other key foreign policy officiais, have met vith almost all the major moderate and radical leaders. Purthe=more, several technical and medical teams have been dispatched to countries requesting such assistance. -4@h The Nonaligned Conference scheduled for the summer of 1979 in Cuba is receiving renewed attention. As an enthusiastic practitioner of per- sonal diplomacy, President Castro undoubtedly views the selection of Havana for the ccnference site as a personel recognition of his position as a pre- eminent leader in the nonalignad movement. However, recen+ public pronouncements suggest that the Non aligned Conference be moved to a mcre neutral country. Should many member countries publicly question Cuba's nonaligned credentials, the nation's image will be severely tarnished. To prevent this, Cuba recently has been actively seeking support from African mod~ erate and revolutionary countries for holding the conference in Havana. Domestic Constraints ACP since no significant donestic or external threats to Cuba currently exist, the country's mili- tary forces deployed abroad could probably be at least doubled above present levels. Nevertheless, Cuba's foreign policy is nov restrained by economic and other donestic factors. Cuba's merchant marine hrs been seriously affected by the haticn's commitments to Angola and Ethiopia. Most of the chips have been diverted to transporting men and supplies to and from Angola and Ethiopia, which has strained the merchant marine and further congested the Cuban forts, already seriously overcrowded before Angola. ‘The importation of consumer goods has suffered ac- cordingly. The value of the consumers’ ration card Page 4 ee atin et aan sbLatat nn eecn net rman ahas dropped by one~half during the past six months ~~ a sharp contrast to Fidel Castro's frequent speeches stressing the nation's allegedly good eco- nomic conditions and downplaying the economic con- sequences of foreign intervention. Se Although the ussR is trying to lessen the impact on the deuestic economy by re- imbursing Havana for its invoivement, an existing manpower drain cannot be so easily rectified. Taou- sands of reservists and civilians who are being sent abroad are also needed tor developing the country's failing agricultural and industrial programs. ‘the more diligent and patriotic Cubans probably filled the initial inerements going to Angola; thus, the Joss of these more motivated personnel was more than “one man, one job” in a country where workers have been criticized for not working hard enough. The consequences of this loss will increase as the Jazge-scale Cuban involvement continues. For ex- ample, according to one press report, Cuba's 5 November agreement to double its civilian advisers in Angola in 1978 over the previous year's levels elicited the comment from a high-level Cuban of- ficial that the commitment will be met with difti- culty. ‘sesiat# While internal popular opin~ ion before 1975 had not inhibited Cuban foreign policy, the nature of the Angolan commitment, en- compassing for the first time lerge-scale ove-seas participation, is such that reportedly the public pow views the country’s extensive involvement as a. considerable drain. Many Cubans now are reluctantly and some openly ~~ refusing to serve in military units in Angola, despite personal consequences such as arrest and loss of jobs; morale is said to be very low among the vast majority of Cubans in Af- rica, Casualties have added to this existing iow morale; reports indicate the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola {UNITA) has specifically targeted Cubans in the field. 16 Dec 77 DIA Intulligence appraisal Page 5 SEGRE —a—teftioreni- Castro realizes the dangers of ex- panding foreign commitments, both military and eco nomic, in the face of rising resentment on the part of citizen-soldier reservists, who constitute some 70 percent uf the Cuban forces in Angola. Willing to defend their homeland, Cubans find it much more difficult to justify the defense of "international solidarity" on a distant and comparatively backward continent when basic returns are not apparent for the foreseeable future. Qutlook = Wie Cuban sources have made clear in private and public. statements that until the pres~ ent time, the large-scale Cuban military involvement in Angola is an exception. The Angolan involvement was impelled in large part because Cuba had given extensive support to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) since 1965 and there- fore the leadership had close personal ties with the MPLA leaders. Castro has publicly declared that the only condition under which he vould send additional large numbers of combat troops would be an attack on Angola by a foreign country, and that his nation would regard such an action as an attack against itself. “Cuban caution about greatly expanding its military commitments is indicated by Havana's de~ cision to respond to only a few of many requests that have been received for technical military aid. The overall goal of Cuba's African policy remains the same ~~ that of "liberatzng" the continent from all "imperialist" and “colonialist” Powers. Cubans are actively participating in a large number of activities in sub-Sahara Africa. Clandes~ tine sources report that the Cukans are choosing Sides anong the contending black liberation forces and that Cuban military training hac increased, particularly for the South-West African Peoples Organization. The net result is that the A‘-ican Liberation movements will be more capable militarily to pursue their goals. “Whereas Havana in the past apparently donated military and technical assistance 16 Dec 77 DIA Intelligence Appraisal Page 6to recipient countries, in the future a cnarge will be made for at least téchnical aid. Furthermore, the Cubans continue to give the anti-apartheid and anti-Western forces onlimited propaganda and moral support, particularly in such forums as the Inter- national Conference on Avartheid and the United Nations. Thi continue to pursue wnat it views as its mission -- to hecome a primary porticipant in the struggle that will determine the future of the African subcortinent. “(REDS = iyimmezt PREPARED BY: (evapo USC aaa 16 Dec 77 DIA Intelligence Appraisal Pace 7SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN, ‘SUSAHARAN AFRICA (U) i MICROFILMED ) DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INTELLIGENCE APPRAISALisger"wmen 2 43SOVIET INVOLVEKENT IN SUBSARIARAN AFRICA (U)‘SOVIET AND CHINESE MILITARY TRAINING AND MATERIEL, ASSISTANCE TO BL/.CK AFRICA IN 1975 at de Woscscon tie 1H cunese Hr sovier F™ soviet ANO CHINESE NS cusan FIGURE t “SECREPSOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (U) Summary, {orwereRth During 1975, there has been a shift toward greater Soviet involvement in Sub-Saharan Af- nica. The USSR has developed naval and air facilities dn Somalda and has continued deployments of naval Reconnaissance airchat to Guinea. A substantial ship- ment of aams and military equipment to the Poputar Movement {or the Léberation of Angola kas also dexon- strated an inckeasing Soviet resolve and wittingness to ‘support their clients and to pursue objectives in the anea. Overall, Moscow kas demonstrated an alertness to the opportunities oa extended influence and currently is providing mititany aid in sone form to, 17 Stack Agnd: Can countries. This effort, which 18 bedag continued at a relatively Low cost to the USSR, has met some success. ~stHoreRHh Past Soviet efforts have often been marked by insensitivity end ineptitude, but their re~ cent activity reflects greater professionatiom, « sense af angeney, and an inckeased miditary presence. AL- ough the shont-tean outtook appears fcvorable to the USSR, nevty independent African states are wany of foreign domination, and Voscow wit very Likely sugger dome setbecks 25 it seeks greoter ingtuence in the highty nationalistic environment of Sub-Saharan Africa Discussion 46} Current Soviet ~!litary involvement in Africa is the outgrowth of Mosc. 6 long-range policy of using military assistance to gain military, politica?, and economic objectives in the region. These include ac~ ceas to strategic military facilities, an increase in Soviet political influence to the detriment of Caina and the West, and access to raw materials. Further- more, these goals are being met with some success at a relatively low cost in terms of Soviet money, materiel, and manpower. 9 Jan 76 DIA Intelligence Appraisal Page 1| SOVIET AND CHINESE MILITARY EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES FROM 1974 TO 1975 (Million US Dollars) ANGOLA BURUNDI ‘CAMEROON CENTRAL AFR REP. CHAD conco EQ. GUINEA GABON GAMBIA GUINEA GUINEA-BISSAU MALT MOZAMBIQUE WIGERTA. SOMALT REP. SUDAN TANZANIA : UGANDA ZAIRE ‘ZAMBIA “thie figure is only for 1975. FIGURE 2 PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINAte7NeroRty At the present time, the Soviets are providing military assistance in vome form to 17 sub- Saharan countries (figure 1). More than $340 million worth of military hardware has been delivered to these countries since January 1974 (figure 2). In addition, more than 2,009 Soviet military advisors are located in Black African countries (figure 3). Cuba, the USSR's ally and surrogate, also has 7,900 advisors and troops in Black Africa, mainly in the Angolan area. ~eynepentr Sino-Soviet competition also provides additional rationale for the growing Soviet presence in sub-Saharan Africa. ‘The People's Republic of China is currently providing military equipment and training ag- sistance to 14 nations (figure 1), Nearly 1,000 chi- nese military advisors are in sub-Saharan countries, and $28 million in military hardware has been delivered there since January 1974. xesseeerir A comparison of Soviet and Chinese military aid programs for 1974 ~~ the most recent year with complate data -- shows the USSR to be Glearly the leader in military assistance, but the Chinese lead the Soviets En economic aid.’ In comparison to total Soviet aid tc less developed nations, last year's assistance to sub-Saharan Africa was at snail cost to Moscow. Military deliveries there were less than five percent of Moscow's total military assistance to all iess developed nations in 1974. Hcwever, the Soviet effort in Angola will substantially increase Moscow's military assistance to Black Africa; Peking's aid to Angola has been minimal. tefwerenity Soviet economic and military involve- ment in sub-Saharan Africa focuses on three countries ~~ Guinea, Somalia, and Angola. Guinea is the recipient of Moscow's largest economic aia progran in the region, a $92 million bauxite project. An estimated 110 Soviet military advisors are currently in this West African Country, and $48 million im arma have been delivered since 1565. 9 gan 76 DIA INtelligence Appraisal Page 2008 geu'z peoxqy soouteay AxeaTT TW. ueoyagy xORT FEGURE 3 696 . 900’ sofaqunoD weSTAzy uvavyes=qns UT excayapy AzeaTTIH —WiTHD a0 ws prTanamd saTaoad SL6T NI SWWUOONA ONINTVUL ASANIHO GN LETAOSxeforent} ‘The USSR has been accorded certain military privileges in Guinea in return for its assistance. Since the summer of 1973 the Soviets have made repeated deployments of TU-95/BEAR D naval reconnaissance aircraft, consisting of two aircraft each, to the Conakry airfield. This has provided the USSR with a reconnaissance capability over the entire Middle and South Atlantic, which is particularly effective when carried on in conjunction with simi- lar aircraft deployed from Cuba. Since November 1970, the USSR has also maintained an almost. con- tinuous naval presence near the port of Conakry. de- 4eANePePH} In East Africa, Somalia is the main center of Soviet activity. This country, which has received $165 million ih military equipment since 1961, is Moscow's single largest military invest ment in sub-Saharan Africa. Soviet military advi~ sors have increased from 300 in 1972 to the current number of 1,000 in 1974, The USSR is continuing the velopment of facilities in the Berbera area for both Sonali and Soviet use, and Soviet naval recon- raigeance a‘reraft operating from Somali airfields, Including tue one under construction at Berbera, give Moscew the potential to cover the entire In- dian Ocean area. Substantial Soviet military as~ sistance to Uganda and recent initiatives in Tan- zania have also enhanced Moscow's presence in East Africa. In Southern Africa, the USSR is actively supporting Popular Movement for the Lib- eration of Angola (MPLA) forces in the Angolan civil war. As a part of this effort, some 44 So- viet flights involving both civil and military air- eraft have taken place since 1 November. Addition- ally, at least nine Soviet ships nave delivered sub- stantial quantities of arms and equipment to Pointe Noire, Republic of the Congo, as well as Luanda since Angola drifted into independence on 11 Novenber. teravenent> Soviet political and military support for thu MPLA's bid for power and the introduction of 9 Jan 76 DIA Intelligence Appraisal Page 3i i ' an eatimated 7,500 Cuban personnel is unprecedented in modern African history. Moscow apparently considers the benefits to be well worth the danger inherent in its open involvement. Soviet presence and influence in Angola would not only permit the USSR to threaten vital lines of communication and gain acess to a wealth of natural resources but would also establish a base for Soviet exbversion, which would present a clear dan- ger to the remaining white minority regimes in south- ern Africa. Use of Angolan faciiities would enhance Moscow's strategic position and project a Soviet pres~ ence into the South Atlantic. “hr Soviet involvement in sub-Saharan Africa has not been a complete success. Soviet activities have frequently been marked by insensitive treatment of Africans both on the continent and in the USSR, a preoccupation with Chinese penetration, small and in- efficient aid programs, and inept clandestine ventures The Soviets have often projected a negative image that continues to cause several major African leaders to distrust their motives. Moecow is somewhat aware of these failimgs, and its recent activities have re~ flected greater professionalism, a sense of urgency, and a growimg military presence, In the words of President Nyerere of Tanzania, “the second scramble for Africa is under way." ‘Outlook 4@) While the Soviets appear to have gained some short-term advantages, African states have traditicn~ ally turned against foreiga powers seeking influence no matter how attractive their aid programs. In the highly nationalistic environment of sub-Saharan Af- rica, the Soviets will very likely continue to suffer 9 gan 76 DIA Intelligence Appraisal Page 4Le St ae , . Loe some setbacks. Angola is undoubtedly a test case that could determine future Soviet policy in Africa and to other areas of the Third World. ARED_BY USC a24 [The following page is denied in full and is not included. 9 gan 76 DIA Inte!.ligence Appraisal Page 5 “SEER —_—- - — +INTELLIGENCE APPRAISAL| I Givers Konavinrions cren 08 Siereebzaenor avec CURRERT? 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Lp SEEMS IDEag TTT ie’ Slesaniease? Srpond ths ten iguarters ougmeate fo eee BERS Le dcet Srnant tations ant the enforrat cay cowsatned Enete= > eS $5 Shai ot Se extenceed and! ancorpaeated inva oenez fenoeta with ts Jee thLt Semssioe St and wnter sonbit ions prescrined be tbe ue Sriginseor” et eer USI DePARTIEATE ONLY (UEISINY) «_ Foruicn inte? rence 49 necked will not be dizeaaign!ad Le angartrente and aoencirg 208 Topeenonted on the Us Intel license Gear withers the wertaaton BEERS Seiginasing syencys, che Separteent of Detense 17 = WSIS Eeebers theesfore, igang with this sarking can bv dlasaminated to ‘11 bed components. NOT PELEAGABLE 1 CONTRACTOAS OR CONTRYTTON/CONOLLTNNTS, (Woco Aces Persign Intel iinenes. so narved shall not te dla= UEIREE te conteacrors or continstor consultant’ wichowe the Permladian of the originating ejency.. This fratriseinn shall, PeEtaiy" es those coneul tance nivel ater civil Service Carmie~ Tien" Pe ctedaeses oe canpesabie procednees dation’. from authoct~ Lee. fected in fwads ef denactnenes eva ngracio by Lay, and who Ste ootaaliy considered on axtanaton of the ottion by walen thay tte employed. ” CAUTION ~ PAOPRIRTARY KePWMATION THVOLVED feroRtE «thin marking iat bet syed sn conjuncrion wan focelqn intelligence Sotelne? tron various soursen [i the Und. private buslness geo Sor'ae the inforention may bea" ube proplatacy intarests af the Sotces Sr'nay otherwise Be oral to ehe amuee'h detetwent. Ren Ziplores of Fopnets bearing this mireing stall exe every Cearon= Sle precaution to sneure that the inforration fa not wont to the deeriene of the sources.” (thin control aarkiga cinnot be wseds Slones "nen Le ke used, the control acting “WOGONTRACT® Saat” fo bo weed.) - aeeshQh ARENEMMLE TO ronEEC! SIE“OIALS (rom Foran laceligrnce to sathed Involves spnctat conaite cations roget= Kegrehad (ence Borakoated tn ety fom to fore ay ‘governamaeae {Gfeign nationale, of nonlh.f. cliesena Without. the perminaton Of the orisinating agency. a ARTO ION WAS EEN ACTHOSEETD, ELEN TD ‘Shunetlasl (REL spactfing couesiael ane wark3ne se vant uhon ty ottpinat tng apency pts loteminet eae te Jolnation can be kelaasod £0 speci! inl (orci quvernaenty + sgh Pal ae. “