Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
July 2015
[G.R. No. 207639. July 1, 2015.]
BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES, INC. and/or V-SHIP NORWAY and/or CYNTHIA C. MENDOZA,
petitioners, vs. CARLOS L. FLORES, JR., * respondent.........................................................................4
[G.R. No. 189262. July 6, 2015.]
GBMLT MANPOWER SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. MA. VICTORIA H. MALINAO, respondent.........5
[G.R. No. 183735. July 6, 2015.]
SEGIFREDO T. VILCHEZ, petitioner, vs. FREE PORT SERVICE CORPORATION and ATTY. ROEL
JOHN T. KABIGTING, President, respondents........................................................................................8
[G.R. No. 187491. July 8, 2015.]
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. LILIA S. CHUA, respondent........................10
[G.R. No. 199660. July 13, 2015.]
U-BIX CORPORATION and EDILBERTO B. BRAVO, petitioners, vs. VALERIE ANNE H. HOLLERO,
respondent............................................................................................................................................ 12
[G.R. No. 212049. July 15, 2015.]
MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION, PRINCESS CRUISE LINES, MARLON R. ROO and
"STAR PRINCESS," petitioners, vs. ROMEO V. PANOGALINOG, respondent.....................................14
[G.R. No. 205575. July 22, 2015.]
VISAYAN ELECTRIC COMPANY EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU-TUCP and CASMERO MAHILUM,
petitioners, vs. VISAYAN ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC. (VECO), respondent........................................15
[ G.R. No. 188464. July 29, 2015. ]
ALBERTO J. RAZA, petitioner, vs. DAIKOKU ELECTRONICS PHILS., INC. and MAMORU ONO,
respondents.......................................................................................................................................... 18
[G.R. No. 211882. July 29, 2015.]
ELBURG SHIPMANAGEMENT PHILS., INC., ENTERPRISE SHIPPING AGENCY SRL AND/OR
EVANGELINE RACHO, petitioners, vs. ERNESTO S. QUIOGUE, JR., respondent..............................19
[G.R. No. 215555. July 29, 2015.]
CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE BAIS, INC. and ANTONIO STEVEN L. CHAN, petitioners, vs. JANET T.
SIASON, respondent............................................................................................................................. 21
August 2015
[G.R. No. 206612. August 17, 2015.]
TOYOTA ALABANG, INC., petitioner, vs. EDWIN GAMES, respondent................................................22
[G.R. No. 190984. August 19, 2015.]
ACOMARIT PHILS., and/or ACOMARIT HONGKONG LIMITED, petitioners, vs. GOMER L. DOTIMAS,
respondent............................................................................................................................................ 23
September 2015
[G.R. No. 202090. September 9, 2015.]
ICT MARKETING SERVICES, INC. (now known as SYKES MARKETING SERVICES, INC.), petitioner,
vs. MARIPHIL L. SALES, respondent....................................................................................................24
[G.R. No. 201536. September 9, 2015.]
GRACE MARINE SHIPPING CORPORATION and/or CAPT. JIMMY BOADO, petitioners, vs. ARON S.
ALARCON, respondent......................................................................................................................... 27
October 2015
[ G.R. No. 201535, October 05, 2015 ]
NEC SYSTEM INTEGRATED CONSTRUCTION (NESIC) PHILS., INC., petitioner, vs. RALPH T.
CRISOLOGO, respondent..................................................................................................................... 29
[ G.R. No. 186114, October 07, 2015 ]
CHEVRON (PHILS.), INC., petitioner, vs. VITALIANO C GALIT, SJS AND SONS CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION AND MR. REYNALDO SALOMON, respondents.......................................................30
[ G.R. No. 213696, December 09, 2015 ] QUANTUM FOODS, INC., petitioner, vs. MARCELINO
ESLOYO AND GLEN MAGSILA, respondents......................................................................................66
[ G.R. No. 202215, December 09, 2015 ] VICMAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, et al., petitioners,
vs. CAMILO ELARCOSA, MARLON BANDA, DANTE L. BALAMAD, et al., respondents.....................68
[ G.R. No. 209418, December 07, 2015 ] W.M. MANUFACTURING, INC., petitioner, vs. RICHARD R.
DALAG AND GOLDEN ROCK MANPOWER SERVICES, respondents................................................70
January 2016
[ G.R. No. 203882, January 11, 2016 ] LORELEI O. ILADAN, petitioner, vs.
LA SUERTE INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER AGENCY, INC., and DEBBIE LAO, Respondents..........72
[ G.R. No.214092, January 11, 2016 ] ENRIQUEZ, LEONORA K. BENEDICTO vs. OBRERO FILIPINOECHO 2000 CHAPTER......................................................................................................................... 74
[ G.R. No. 178510, January 11, 2016 ] NILO S. RODRIGUEZ, et al., petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES, INC., AND NLRC, respondents...........................................................................................76
[ G.R. No. 187691, January 13, 2016]
OLYMPIA HOUSING, INC. vs. ALLAN LAPASTORA AND IRENE UBALUBAO....................................79
[ G.R. No. 209921 January 13, 2016 ]
QUIRO-QUIRO vs. BALAGTAS CREDIT COOPERATIVE & COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, INC......80
February 2016
[ G.R. No. 199683, February 10, 2016 ]
ARLENE T. SAMONTE, et al., petitioners, vs. LSGH, BRO. BERNARD S. OCA, respondents.............81
[ G.R. No. 208986 January 13, 2016 ] HIJO RESOURCES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
EPIFANIO P. MEJARES, et al., respondents.........................................................................................82
[ G.R. No. 202885, January 20, 2016 ]
WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES, INC., et al., petitioners, vs. EDWINITO V. QUILLAO, respondent....83
[ GR No. 212070, January 27, 2016 ] CEBU PEOPLE'S MULTI-PURPOSE
COOPERATIVE, petitioner, vs. NICERATO E. CARBONILLA, JR., respondent....................................85
[ G.R. No. 203642, January 27, 2016 ]
THOMASITES CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES vs. RODRIGUEZ, PADRIGON AND
RILLERA............................................................................................................................................... 87
[ G.R. No. 194134, February 1, 2016 ]
JOSE ROMULO L. FRANCISCO vs. LOYOLA PLANS CONSOLIDATED, INC., ET AL........................88
[ G.R. No. 212878, February 01, 2016 ] MARLOW NAVIGATION PHILS., INC. et al., petitioners, vs.
WILFREDO L. CABATAY, respondent...................................................................................................90
[ G.R. No. 208451, February 3, 2016 ]
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY, INC., petitioner, vs. EZARD D. LLUZ, et al., respondents.. . .91
[ G.R. No. 201073, February 10, 2016 ]
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. PAL EMPLOYEES SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC.............92
[ G.R. No. 206256, February 24, 2016 ]
GILBERT C. AUSTRIA, petitioner, vs. CRYSTAL SHIPPING INC, respondent......................................93
In May 2005, respondent applied to petitioner for a job as teacher for deployment abroad. She was
interviewed by an Ethiopian university president and endorsed for the post of accounting lecturer with a
monthly salary of USD 900.
Respondent paid petitioner the required fees, signed a POEA-approved Contract of Employment for
Foreign Academic Personnel covering a period of two academic years. Upon arrival in Ethiopia in December
2005, she was informed that her credentials have to be re-evaluated because it appeared that she did not
have a master's degree. Respondent was given a new contract which she refused to sign at first but upon
reading it as a duplicate of the original contract signed the same.
Respondent was assigned to teach at the Alemaya University but she decided on January 10, 2006 to
discontinue teaching the cooperative accounting course assigned to her saying that auditing, not accounting,
was her specialization. Another lecturer took over the course and she spent the rest of the semester without a
teaching load.
Alemaya University VP Alamirew circulated a memo on the Ministry of Education requirement to evaluate
the credentials of the Filipino teaching staff and suggest an academic rank for them pursuant to the national
norm. Another memo was issued lowering the ranks of most of the Filipino teaching staff and asking them to
sign a new contract reflecting a change in rank and salary. Respondent's designation was lowered from
lecturer to assistant lecturer with a USD 600 monthly salary.
Respondent refused to sign a new contract and together with affected Filipino colleagues, she went to the
Ministry of Education to protest the re-ranking. She later requested in a letter to the VP to issue a notice of
termination to her "in order not to prolong [her] agony" after a misunderstanding with the VP during a meeting
following the protest.
Respondent was again replaced by another instructor in Auditing II and left idle due to a students' petition.
Dean Kassa of the University questioned her qualification alluding to her bachelor's degree. Respondent was
offended insisted she was a CPA and law graduate. Her response stated that in the Philippines, a person with
a law degree and who passed the bar examinations has a degree more than a master's, but less than a
doctorate. She recognized the universitys right to terminate her at any time, but insisted there was no need to
discredit her.
On 6 April 2006, VP Alamirew issued the notice of termination to respondent. The notice alluded to the two
instances when the Department of Accounting had to replace respondent in her course assignments. She was
said to be incompetent and have insulted students, the staff and the management in particular and Ethiopians
in general in the class. She was given three months advance notice as regards the contract termination.
Respondent replied with a letter stating that the last sentence on the notice of termination is provocative,
malicious and defamatory. While waiting for the three-month period to expire, respondent was offered a post
at the Internal Audit Department by the University President which she accepted the job through a letter.
However, she changed her mind and through a letter dated 27 April 2006 addressed to the President,
respondent rejected the offer stating that she was treated rudely and assigned to work under the acting head,
a mere diploma holder making her feel insulted.
Respondent was repatriated on 27 June 2006. She later signed a Quitclaim and Release dated 5 July
2006 in favor of petitioner.
On 18 July 2006, respondent filed a complaint before the LA against petitioner as local agency and
Alemaya University as foreign principal seeking full payment of the unexpired portion of the two-year contract,
moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
which the amount paid to her under the Quitclaim and Release had already been deducted - Php 30,000 as moral
damages, Php 20,000 as exemplary damages, plus costs.
Respondent did not hide that she had no master's degree because she was a holder of a bachelor of laws
degree. Alemaya University should have allowed respondent to finish her two-year employment contract instead
of forcing her to sign a new contract with lower pay, just because she did not have a master's degree.
The labor arbiter found that respondent had been constructively dismissed. She was supposedly forced to quit
because continued employment became unbearable, not only due to demotion in rank and diminution in pay, but
also due to the discrimination and disdain on the part of her employer. No procedural due process was accorded
to respondent because no panel of her peers was ever formed to review her performance. The only basis for the
charge of unsatisfactory teaching was the alleged students' petition, which was found to be questionable.
Ruling of the NLRC
The NLRC issued a Decision dated 30 July 2008 dismissing respondent's complaint, because her claims had
been the subject of a valid release, waiver and quitclaim.
The NLRC ruled that respondent could no longer question the termination of her contract of employment after her
acceptance of the new offer of President Kassa to work at the Internal Audit Department. When respondent later
wrote to President Kassa that she did not want the new post after all and requested to be repatriated, it was she
who terminated the contract. Contrary to the LAs ruling, respondent was not constructively dismissed.
The NLRC also sustained the validity of the Quitclaim and Release. It held that respondent was a certified public
accountant and bachelor of laws graduate who could hardly be "duped into signing any document that would be
detrimental to her cause, if she was not willing [to agree] to the terms and conditions [provided in] what she was
signing [or] entering into."
After her MR was denied, respondent filed a petition before the CA ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the NLRC.
Ruling of the CA
The CA reinstated the LAs Decision with modifications. The appellate court ordered petitioner and Alemaya
University to reimburse respondent for the full amount of the placement fee she had paid, with interest at the rate
of 12% per annum, as well as her airfare from Dire Dawa to Addis Ababa in Ethiopia. The awards of moral and
exemplary damages were both increased to Php 50,000, plus attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the monetary
award.
The appellate court observed that while respondent accepted the offer of President Kassa to work at the Internal
Audit Department, such arrangement was in the purview of a new contract of employment. A new contract was
invalid without the approval of the POEA.
After its MR was denied, petitioner filed the instant petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent was illegally dismissed
2. Whether the Quitclaim and Release was valid
RULING:
1. NO. Respondent was not illegally dismissed.
Under Section 10 of R.A. 8042, workers who are illegally terminated are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired
portion of their employment contracts or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less,
in addition to the reimbursement of their placement fee with interest at the rate of 12% per annum.
This applies only to an illegally dismissed overseas contract worker or a worker dismissed from overseas
employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract. Respondent was not illegally
dismissed.
Article X of the POEA-approved Contract of Employment, as well as the second contract given to respondent for
signing upon her arrival in Ethiopia, provides: This contract may be terminated by either party, at any time
and for no cause by giving three months notice to the other party. In such an event[,] the Employee shall be
entitled to his/her salary and allowances only up to the date of termination specified in the said notice of
termination. However, the employee shall be fully engaged in his/her duty in the period notified and up to the last
date of termination.
Based on the provision, the Contract of Employment may be terminated by either party for cause or at any time
for no cause, as long as a three-month notice is given to the other party. Stipulations providing that either party
may terminate a contract even without cause are legitimate if exercised in good faith.
The misunderstanding on respondents masters degree was not the result of bad faith on the part of either party.
The demotion did not materialize, and respondent maintained her salary and benefits until she was repatriated.
The Court did not impute bad faith on the part of Alemaya University in the exercise of its right to terminate the
Contract of Employment at will.
It is well to note that the right to terminate the Contract of Employment at will was also available to respondent,
who exercised that right when she signified her change of mind and rejected the job at the Internal Audit
Department.
The NLRC was correct in finding that the logical conclusion is that the parties had agreed to let her employment
continue in the university under the Contract of Employment in a different capacity. When respondent later
decided that she did not want the new job for personal reasons, she exercised her right to terminate the Contract
of Employment.
2. YES. The Quitclaim and Release is valid.
Where a person executing a waiver or quitclaim has done so voluntarily with a full understanding of its terms and
conditions, coupled with the other person's payment of credible and reasonable consideration, the transaction is
valid and binding.
Respondent admits that she had a full understanding of the terms and conditions of the Quitclaim and Release
and voluntarily signed it. The bone of contention is the reasonableness of the amount of USD 900 as
consideration for the waiver of all other purported claims against petitioner. Since respondent was not illegally
dismissed, she is not entitled to salaries in excess of the amount given.
CA decision and resolution were revered and set aside. NLRC decision reinstated.
Respondent Chua was employed by Far East Bank rising from the ranks to AVP until her termination of
employment. Dismissal was due to a finding that she engaged in multiple kiting transactions which was a
serious violation of Far East Bank's Code of Conduct. This involved drawing of money from a bank account
that does not have sufficient funds in order to cover a check.
Chua filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and monetary claims before the Regional Arbitration Branc XII in
Cotabato City. Parties were ordered to submit respective Position Papers but despite the extension, Far East
Bank failed to timely filed its Position Paper. The Bank filed Motion to Admit its Position Paper which was
denied.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that there was illegal dismissal. LA held that Chua is entitled to reinstatement and full
back wages inclusive of allowances and other benefits in the amount of P1.81M.
Far East Bank directly filed its Notice of Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal before the NLRC. NLRC
reversed the decision of the LA holding that the few days delay in filing of its Position Paper was excusable
considering its counsels were based in different cities and that Chua committed irregular acts as AVP. Chua
filed an MR which was denied by the NLRC.
Chua filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. The CA reversed NLRC's ruling stating that
Far East Bank's appeal before the NLRC was not perfected. Petitioner filed MR that was denied by the CA,
hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the LAs Decision has attained finality in light of petitioners direct filing of its appeal before the
NLRC instead of the Regional Arbitration Branch XII in Cotabato City.
RULING:
YES.
Art. 218 on the Powers of the Commission provides that it shall promulgate rules and regulations governing
the hearing and disposition of cases before it and its regional branches, as well as those pertaining to its
internal functions and such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Code.
Rule VI, Section 3 of the 1999 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC that were in effect when petitioner appealed
from LAs Decision provides for the requisites that must be satisfied for an appeal from the LAs decision may
be perfected:
(a) The appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period; under oath with proof of payment of the required
appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond; accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which shall
state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of
the date when the appellant received the appealed decision, order or award and proof of service on the other
party of such appeal.
(b) The appellee may file with the Regional Arbitration Branch, Regional Office or in the POEA where the
appeal was filed, his answer or reply to appellant's memorandum of appeal, not later than 10 calendar days
from receipt thereof. Failure on the part of the appellee who was properly furnished with a copy of the appeal
to file his answer or reply within the said period may be construed as a waiver on his part to file the same.
(c) Subject to the provisions of Article 218, once the appeal is perfected in accordance with these rules, the
Commission may limit itself to reviewing and deciding specific issues that were elevated on appeal.
Rule VI, Section 4 of the same rules stipulates that appeal shall be filed with the respective Regional
Arbitration Branch, the Regional Office, or the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration where the
case was heard and decided.
The CA was correct in saying that the memorandum on appeal must be filed with the Regional Arbitration
Branch which rendered the decision sought to be appealed." Thus, "no appeal before NLRC could have been
perfected." The logical consequence is that the LAs Decision "has attained finality."
While the Court held that petitioner violated the rule on venue for filing an appeal, a mere procedural
lapse in the venue where petitioner filed its Memorandum of Appeal is not fatal to its cause. Since respondent
is estopped for failing to raise the issue of jurisdiction while petitioner's appeal was pending before the NLRC,
respondent is bound by her inaction and cannot belatedly invoke the issue of jurisdiction on certiorari before
the Court of Appeals.
The Court has held that "[a]lthough the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings
as the same is conferred by law, it is nonetheless settled that a party may be barred from raising it on ground
of laches or estoppel."
A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. After voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question
the jurisdiction or power of the court.
Also, the error of petitioner pertains to the place for filing appeals and not the requisites for perfecting an
appeal which Rule VI, Section 3 enumerates as:
(1) Filing within the applicable reglementary period as provided by Section 1;
(2) That the appeal was under oath;
(3) That the appeal fee must have been paid;
(4) That the appeal bond must have been posted;
(5) A memorandum of appeal which states:
a.
the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support of the appeal;
b.
the relief sought; and
c.
a statement of the date when the assailed decision was received; and
(6) Proof of service of the appeal on the adverse party.
The same rules allow for the liberal application of procedural rules. In Rule VII, Section 10: The rules of
procedure and evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling and the Commission
shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without
regard to technicalities of law procedure, all in the interest of due process.
As the agency statutorily vested with jurisdiction over petitioner's appeal, petitioner could very easily have
mistaken that the filing of its Memorandum of Appeal was rightly made before the NLRC. The NLRC could
have very easily advised petitioner if there was anything irregular with its direct filing of a Memorandum of
Appeal.
The matter of the propriety of the NLRC's assumption of jurisdiction was never raised by respondent before
the Commission. Even after petitioner's appeal had been initially decided against her and she filed her MR,
respondent totally overlooked this matter.
Respondent cannot profit from her own inaction. She actively participated in the proceedings before the
NLRC without the slightest indication that she found anything objectionable to the conduct of those
proceedings. NLRCs findings that the requisites of substantive and procedural due process were satisfied in
terminating respondent's employment now stand undisturbed.
Petition is granted, CA decision was reversed and set aside and NLRC decision was reinstated.
admit this in their Petition by stating that they no longer attached a separate document of security deposit or
collateral securing the bond because Mapfre did not find it necessary to require them to give a security deposit
and/or collateral. According to them, Mapfre finds it sufficient that the Indemnity Agreement attached to the
Memorandum of Appeal was signed by petitioner Bravo, the president of petitioner U-Bix, in his personal
capacity. Petitioners are clutching at straws in impressing upon this Court that petitioner Bravo, in signing the
Indemnity Agreement in his personal capacity, has already bound himself to be jointly and severally liable with
Mapfre for the monetary award and this has the effect of securing the bond. Suffice it to say that "[t]he obvious
purpose of an appeal bond is to ensure, during the period of appeal, against any occurrence that would defeat or
diminish recovery by the aggrieved employees under the judgment if subsequently affirmed." To the Court's mind,
the intention in requiring a security deposit or collateral to secure the bond, apart from the indemnity agreement
between the employer-appellant and the bonding company, is to further ensure recovery by the employee of the
judgment award should the same be affirmed, in any and all eventualities. This is also in keeping with the purpose
of the bond requirement, which is to "discourage employers from using the appeal to delay, or even evade, their
obligation to satisfy their employee's possible just and lawful claims.
compulsory arbitration.34 Consequently, the strike was enjoined; Mahilum was ordered reinstated in the payroll;
and the parties were directed to refrain from committing any act that would exacerbate the situation.
NLRC : NLRC found VECO to have acted within the bounds of law when it administratively investigated the
suspended or terminated employees and union officers/members, instead of subjecting their respective cases
to the grievance machinery procedure provided in the CBA.
The administrative investigations conducted by VECO were found to have complied with procedural due
process requirements, there was no unfair labor practice to speak of.
Mahilum's dismissal and the filing of criminal cases against the union officers, the NLRC found no substantial
evidence to prove the imputation of union busting.
VECO's alleged modification of the electricity privilege, which the Union claimed as violative of the CBA, was
declared mooted by the MOA entered into between the parties, with the assistance of the NCMB, providing
for, inter alia, electricity privilege conversion to basic pay.
NLRC ruled that Mahilum was terminated for a just and valid cause under Article 282 (c) of the Labor
Code,when he, together with some other union officers, caused the publication of a document which was
deemed to have dishonored and blackened the memory of former corporate officer Luis Alfonso Y. Aboitiz,
besmirched VECO's name and reputation, and exposed the latter to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule.
CA: deemed as not filed the Manifestation/Explanation filed by Atty. Asis, and dismissed the certiorari petition
for failure of Atty. Saladero to comply with the Resolution dated February 29, 2012.
ISSUE/S:
1.
2.
WHETHER THE FILING OF THE PETITION MAY BE ALLOWED DESPITE ONE-DAY DELAY?
WHETHER NLRC COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN ABSOLVING VECO FROM THE CHARGE OF
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE AND ILLEGAL DISMISSAL OF MAHILUM?
RULING
Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, certiorari should be filed "not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment, order or resolution" sought to be assailed.
The Union admittedly57 received on August 18, 2011 the NLRC's July 29, 2011 Resolution, which denied their
motion for reconsideration of the NLRC's June 30, 2011 Decision.
Therefore, the 60-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari ended on October 17, 2011. But the
certiorari petition was filed one day after, or on October 18, 2011.
The Court cannot subscribe to the theory that the ends of justice would be better subserved by allowing a petition
for certiorari filed only one-day late. When the law fixes sixty (60) days, it cannot be taken to mean also sixty-one
(61) days, as the Court had previously declared.
Petitioners failed to satisfactorily show that the refusal of VECO to follow the grievance machinery procedure
under Section 4, Article XVII of the CBA in the suspension and termination from employment of the other union
officers and members constituted unfair labor practice.
Fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law between the parties and they are obliged to comply with
its provisions.
As in this case, when general and specific provisions of the CBA are inconsistent, the specific provision shall be
paramount to and govern the general provision.
Section 4, Article XVII of the CBA states that "(a)ny difference of opinion, controversy, dispute problem
or complaint arising from CompanyUnion or Company-Worker relations concerning the interpretation
or application of this Agreement or regarding any matter affecting Company Union or CompanyWorker relations shall be considered a grievance." 65 On the other hand, under Section 13, Article XIV,
"(t)he Company agrees that henceforth there shall be a fair and uniform application of its rules and
regulations. It is understood that disciplinary actions imposed on employee or laborer shall be
governed by the rules and regulations promulgated by the Company as well as those provided for by
existing laws on the matter."
Thus, the NLRC correctly ruled that VECO acted within the bounds of law when it proceeded with its
administrative investigation of the charges against other union officers and members.
Consistent with jurisprudential rulings supporting an employer's free reign and "wide latitude of discretion to
regulate all aspects of employment, including the prerogative to instill discipline in its employees and to
impose penalties, including dismissal, upon erring employees.
Delving now into the merits of Mahilum's dismissal, the Court holds that the two requisites for a valid dismissal
from employment have been met, namely: (1) it must be for a just or authorized cause; and (2) the employee must
be afforded due process.
VECEU-ALU President, Casmero A. Mahilum, said that since 2004 up to present the new VECO Management
under the administration of the Aboitizes unceasingly attack the local Union by continuously limit (sic) its
membership and diminish (sic) and/or abolish (sic) worker's benefits and privileges stipulated in the CBA
It is clear from the foregoing that Mahilum was not an ordinary rank and-file employee. His job entailed the
observance of proper company procedures relating to processing and determination of electrical service
applications culminating in the signing of service contracts, which constitutes the very lifeblood of VECO's
existence. Mahilum's job involved a high degree of responsibility requiring a substantial amount of trust and
confidence on the part of his employer.
The derogatory statements issued by Mahilum that were intended to incite, not just public condemnation of
VECO, there can be no dispute that VECO, indeed, had lost its trust and confidence in Mahilum and his ability to
perform his tasks with utmost efficiency and loyalty expected of an employee entrusted to handle customers and
funds.
Settled is the rule that an employer cannot be compelled to retain an employee who is guilty of acts inimical to the
interests of the employer. A company has the right to dismiss its employee if only as a measure of self-protection.
Mahilum was terminated for a just and valid cause. VECO complied with the procedural due process requirements
of furnishing Mahilum with two written notices before the termination of employment can be effected.
On May 8, 2009,83 Mahilum was apprised of the particular acts for which his termination was sought; and, after
due investigation, he was given a Notice of Decision 84 on October 28, 2010 informing him of his dismissal from
service.
The fact that Mahilum served the company for a considerable period of time will not help his cause. The longer an
employee stays in the service of the company, the greater is his responsibility for knowledge and compliance with
the norms of conduct and the code of discipline in the company.
The state's responsibility to afford protection to labor, this policy should not be used as an instrument to oppress
management and capital. In resolving disputes between labor and capital, fairness and justice should always
prevail. Social justice does not mandate that every dispute should be automatically decided in favor of labor.
Justice is to be granted to the deserving and dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law
and doctrine.
The fact that Quiogue was declared "fit to work" by the company-designated physician (with whom he underwent
treatment and therapy from November 2010 to April 2011) on April 13, 2011 does not matter because the
certification was issued beyond the authorized 120-day period.
As aptly ruled by the CA, the assessment of fitness to return to work by the company-designated physician
notwithstanding, his disability was considered permanent and total as the said certification was issued after the
lapse of more than 120 days from the time of his repatriation.
There is no merit in petitioners' argument that Quiogue's entitlement to permanent total disability benefits was
merely based on his inability to return to work for 120 days. He was entitled to permanent and total disability
benefits not solely because of his incapacity to work for more than 120 days, but also because the companydesignated physician belatedly gave his definite assessment on Quiogue medical condition, without any justifiable
reason therefor.
Significantly, as aptly found by the NLRC, he remained unemployed even after the time he filed the complaint to
recover permanent total disability compensation. In the aforecited case of Carcedo, it was stated that should the
company-designated physician fail to give his proper medical assessment and the seafarer's medical condition
remains unresolved, the seafarer shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled.43
The Court likewise finds no basis for petitioners' contention that Quiogue's previous award of permanent disability
benefits bar his present claim for disability benefits against petitioners.
The CA was also correct when it deleted the award for attorney's fees for failure of the LA to explain Quiogue's
entitlement thereto. It must be stressed, as correctly observed by the CA, that there must always be a factual
basis for the award of attorney's fees. In fine, the factual, legal or equitable justification for the award must be set
forth in the text of the decision. The matter of attorney's fees cannot be touched once and only in the fallo of the
decision or else, the award should be thrown out for being speculative and conjectural. In the absence of a
stipulation, the attorney's fees are ordinarily not recoverable; otherwise a premium shall be placed on the right to
litigate.
While the prerogative to transfer respondent to another account belonged to petitioner, it wielded the same
unfairly. The evidence suggests that at the time respondent was transferred from the Washington Mutual account
to the Bank of America program, petitioner was hiring additional CSRs/TSRs. This simply means that if it was then
hiring new CSRs/TSRs, then there should be no need to transfer respondent to the Bank of America program; it
could simply train new hires for that program. Transferring respondent - an experienced employee who was
already familiar with the Washington Mutual account, and who even proved to be outstanding in handling the
same - to another account means additional expenses for petitioner: it would have to train respondent for the
Bank of America account, and train a new hire to take her place in the Washington Mutual account. This does not
make sense; quite the contrary, it is impractical and entails more expense on petitioner's part. If respondent
already knew her work at the Washington Mutual account very well, then it is contrary to experience and logic to
transfer her to another account which she is not familiar with, there to start from scratch; this could have been
properly relegated to a new hire.
There can be no truth to petitioner's claim either that respondent's transfer was made upon request of the client. If
she was performing outstanding work and bringing in good business for the client, there is no reason - indeed it is
beyond experience and logic - to conclude that the client would seek her transfer. Such a claim could only be
fabricated.
Moreover, as the appellate court correctly observed, even if respondent had attendance and punctuality issues,
her overall performance as a CSR/TSR was certainly far from mediocre; on the contrary, she proved to be a top
performer. And if it were true that respondent suddenly became lax by way of attendance in July 2007, it is not
entirely her fault. This may be attributed to petitioner's failure to properly address her grievances relative to the
supposed irregularities in the handling of funds entrusted to petitioner by Washington Mutual which were intended
for distribution to outstanding Washington Mutual CSRs and TSRs as prizes and incentives. She wrote petitioner
about her complaint on July 3, 2007; however, no explanation was forthcoming from petitioner, and it was only
during these proceedings - or after a case had already been filed - that petitioner belatedly and for no other useful
purpose attempted to address her concerns. This may have caused a bit of disillusionment on the part of
respondent, which led her to miss work for a few days in July 2007. Her grievance should have been addressed
by petitioner; after all, they were serious accusations, and have a bearing on the CSRs/TSRs' overall performance
in the Washington Mutual account.
The managerial prerogative to transfer personnel must be exercised without grave abuse of discretion, bearing in
mind the basic elements of justice and fair play. Having the right should not be confused with the manner in which
that right is exercised. Thus, it cannot be used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an undesirable
worker. In particular, the employer must be able to show that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient or
prejudicial to the employee; nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, privileges and
other benefits. Should the employer fail to overcome this burden of proof, the employee's transfer shall be
tantamount to constructive dismissal, which has been defined as a quitting because continued employment is
rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; as an offer involving a demotion in rank and diminution in pay.
Likewise, constructive dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer
has become so unbearable to the employee leaving him with no option but to forego with his continued
employment.
In placing respondent on "floating status," petitioner further acted arbitrarily and unfairly, making life unbearable
for her. In so doing, it treated respondent as if she were a new hire; it improperly disregarded her experience,
status, performance, and achievements in the company; and most importantly, respondent was illegally deprived
of her salary and other emoluments. For her single absence during training for the Bank of America account, she
was refused certification, and as a result, she was placed on floating status and her salary was withheld. Clearly,
this was an act of discrimination and unfairness considering that she was not an inexperienced new hire, but a
promising and award-winning employee who was more than eager to succeed within the company. This
conclusion is not totally baseless, and is rooted in her outstanding performance at the Washington Mutual account
and her complaint regarding the incentives, which only proves her zeal, positive work attitude, and drive to
achieve financial success through hard work. But instead of rewarding her, petitioner unduly punished her; instead
of inspiring her, petitioner dashed her hopes and dreams; in return for her industry, idealism, positive outlook and
fervor, petitioner left her with a legacy of, and awful examples in, office politicking, intrigue, and internecine
schemes.
With the foregoing pronouncements, an award of indemnity in favor of respondent should be forthcoming. In case
of constructive dismissal, the employee is entitled to full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or
their monetary equivalent, as well as separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. The readily determinable amounts,
as computed by the Labor Arbiter and correspondingly reviewed and corrected by the appellate court, should be
accorded finality and deemed binding on this Court. Settled is the rule that that an employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and to
his full backwages, inclusive of allowances and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from
the time his compensation was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement. If reinstatement is not possible,
however, the award of separation pay is proper.
issued. [A]n employees disability becomes permanent and total when so declared by the company-designated
physician, or, in case of absence of such a declaration either of fitness or permanent total disability, upon the
lapse of the 120 or 240-day treatment period under Article 192 (c) (1) of the Labor Code and Rule X, Section 2 of
the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation Commission, while the employees disability continues and he
is unable to engage in gainful employment during such period, and the company-designated physician fails to
arrive at a definite assessment of the employees fitness or disability. This is true regardless of whether the
employee loses the use of any part of his body or if the injury or disability is classified as Grade 1 under the
POEA-SEC.
The evidence further suggests that before respondent was employed by petitioners, he did not suffer from
psoriasis and nummular eczema; if he had been afflicted with these ailments prior to employment, surely he would
not have been taken in. He was given a clean bill of health through the standard pre-employment physical
examination. Besides, in any of their pleadings, petitioners did not contest this fact; nor did they claim that
respondent had these conditions prior to his employment.
treatment would address his temporary total disability [even if the period is extended] to 240 days;
(b) 240 days had lapsed without any certification being issued by the company-designated physician;
(c) the company-designated physician declared that he is fit for sea duty within the 120-day or 240-day
period, as the case may be, but his physician of choice and the doctor chosen under Section 20-B(3) of the
POEA-SEC are of a contrary opinion;
(d) the company-designated physician acknowledged that he is partially permanently disabled but other
doctors x x x he consulted, on his own and jointly with his employer, believed that his disability is not only
permanent but total as well;
(e) the company-designated physician recognized that he is totally and permanently disabled but there is a
dispute on the disability grading;
(f) the company-designated physician determined that his medical condition is not compensable or workrelated under the POEA-SEC but his doctor-of-choice and the third doctor selected under Section 20-B(3)
of the POEA-SEC found otherwise and declared him unfit to work;
(g) the company-designated physician declared him totally and permanently disabled but the employer
refuses to pay him the corresponding benefits; and
(h) the company-designated physician declared him partially and permanently disabled within the 120-day
or 240-day period he remains incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties after the lapse of the said
periods."
Unfortunately for Saso, none of the above instances justifies his claim for total and permanent disability benefits.
As may be recalled, he filed his Complaint on August 3, 2010 or after a mere 105 days from his repatriation on
April 20, 2010. Clearly, the 120-day period had not yet lapsed at that time. Moreover, the company-designated
physician had not yet issued any declaration as to his fitness or disability. This is considering that at the time of
such filing, Saso was still under the care of Dr. Recto as shown by the fact that he was subsequently seen by the
said doctor on September 3, 2010.
Indeed, a seafarer has the right to seek the opinion of other doctors under Sec. 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC but this
is on the presumption that the company-designated physician had already issued a certification as to his fitness or
disability and he finds this disagreeable. Under the same provision, it is the company-designated physician who is
entrusted with the task of assessing a seafarer's disability and there is a procedure to contest his findings
3. The Court earlier declared that the absence of post-employment medical examination does not bar Saso from
claiming the benefits that are rightfully due him. Nevertheless, his claim for reimbursement of medical expenses in
the amount of P25,857.00 must be disallowed for being not supported by receipts. At any rate, the records show
that respondents already reimbursed him the amount of P3,849.50 for his medical expenses. With respect to
sickness allowance, Saso admitted in his Reply with the LA that he already received the amount of NT$51,200.00
which is equivalent to his salary for three months. Reckoned from his arrival in the Philippines on April 23, 2010,
the said amount covers his compensation for only until July 23, 2010. Therefore, Saso is still entitled to receive
from respondents sickness allowance covering the period July 24, 2010 to September 23, 2010 when the
company-designated physician issued an assessment of his disability, or equivalent to his two months'
salary amounting to NT$34,560.00. Finally, while it is true that Saso's claim for total and permanent disability
benefit is premature, the fact remains that he sustained a work-connected injury that did not only impair his
physical appearance but also his earning capacity which, thus, needs to be compensated. Even
respondents acknowledged this in their Position Paper with the LA when they asserted that Saso is entitled to
disability compensation commensurate to Impediment Grade 13 under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC. On this
score, the Court deems it proper to award Saso partial disability benefit in accordance with the findings of the
company-designated physician. Under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC, the disability allowance for Impediment
Grade 13 is US$50,000.00 multiplied by the degree of impediment which is 6.72%. Saso is thus entitled to
US$3,360.00, to be paid in Philippine Currency equivalent to the exchange rate prevailing at the time of payment.
Attorney's fees cannot, however, be granted since in the light of the factual milieu of this case, respondents were
well within their rights to deny Saso's claim for total and permanent disability benefit.
alleged authorized cause of termination. In fact, the Court has considered as a fatal error the employer's failure
to give a written notice to the DOLE as required under Article 283 of the Labor Code.
While it is true that the characterization of an employee's services as superfluous or no longer necessary and,
therefore, properly terminable, is an exercise of business judgment on the part of the employer, the exercise of
such judgment must not violate the law, and must not be arbitrary or malicious. An employer cannot simply
declare that it has become overmanned and dismiss its employees without adequate proof to sustain its claim of
redundancy. To dispel any suspicion of bad faith on the part of the employer, it must present adequate
proof of the redundancy, as well as the criteria in the selection of the employees affected. The following
evidence may be proffered to substantiate redundancy, to wit: the new staffing pattern, feasibility studies/proposal
on the viability of the newly-created positions, job description and the approval by the management of the
restructuring.
In this case, petitioners were able to establish through Ocean East's Quality Procedures Manual that Lopez'
position as a Documentation Officer was redundant because its duties and functions were similar to those of the
Documentation Clerks in its operations department. However, they failed to prove by substantial evidence their
observance of the fair and reasonable criteria of seniority and efficiency in ascertaining the redundancy of the
position of Documentation Officer, as well as good faith on their part in abolishing such position. Petitioners were
unable to justify why it was more efficient to terminate Lopez rather than its two other Documentation Clerks,
Reynolds and Hing. Also, while Reynolds was supposedly retained for being more senior than Lopez, petitioners
were silent on why they chose to retain Hing who was hired in 1996, instead of Lopez who was hired about eight
(8) years earlier in 1988.
choose whether to form a union for purposes of collective bargaining or a workers' association for purposes of
providing mutual aid and protection.
In this case, Samahan's registration was cancelled not because its members were prohibited from forming a
workers' association but because they allegedly committed misrepresentation for using the phrase, "KAMI, ang
mga Manggagawa sa HAN JIN Shipyard."
Misrepresentation, as a ground for the cancellation of registration of a labor organization, is committed "in
connection with the adoption, or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of
ratification, the list of members who took part in the ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments
thereto, and those in connection with the election of officers, minutes of the election of officers, and the list of
voters.
The Court concludes that misrepresentation, to be a ground for the cancellation of the certificate of registration,
must be done maliciously and deliberately. Further, the mistakes appearing in the application or attachments must
be grave or refer to significant matters. The details as to how the alleged fraud was committed must also be
indubitably shown.
The records of this case reveal no deliberate or malicious intent to commit misrepresentation on the part of
Samahan. The use of such words "KAMI, ang mga Manggagawa sa HANJIN Shipyard" in the preamble of the
constitution and by-laws did not constitute misrepresentation so as to warrant the cancellation of Samahan's
certificate of registration. Hanjin failed to indicate how this phrase constitutes a malicious and deliberate
misrepresentation. Neither was there any showing that the alleged misrepresentation was serious in character.
Misrepresentation is a devious charge that cannot simply be entertained by mere surmises and conjectures.
Even granting arguendo that Samahan's members misrepresented themselves as employees or workers of
Hanjin, said misrepresentation does not relate to the adoption or ratification of its constitution and by-laws or to
the election of its officers.
Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the BLR that "Hanjin Shipyard" must be removed in the name of the
association. A legitimate workers' association refers to an association of workers organized for mutual aid and
protection of its members or for any legitimate purpose other than collective bargaining registered with the DOLE.
Having been granted a certificate of registration, Samahan's association is now recognized by law as a legitimate
workers' association.
According to Samahan, inherent in the workers' right to self-organization is its right to name its own organization.
It seems to equate the dropping of words "Hanjin Shipyard" from its name as a restraint in its exercise of the right
to self-organization. Hanjin, on the other hand, invokes that "Hanjin Shipyard" is a registered trade name and,
thus, it is within their right to prohibit its use.
As there is no provision under our labor laws which speak of the use of name by a workers' association, the Court
refers to the Corporation Code, which governs the names of juridical persons. Section 18 thereof provides:
No corporate name may be allowed by the Securities and Exchange Commission if the proposed name is
identical or deceptively or confusingly similar to that of any existing corporation or to any other name already
protected by law or is patently deceptive, confusing or contrary to existing laws. When a change in the corporate
name is approved, the Commission shall issue an amended certificate of incorporation under the amended name.
[Emphases Supplied]
The policy underlying the prohibition in Section 18 against the registration of a corporate name which is "identical
or deceptively or confusingly similar" to that of any existing corporation or which is "patently deceptive" or
"patently confusing" or "contrary to existing laws," is the avoidance of fraud upon the public which would have
occasion to deal with the entity concerned, the evasion of legal obligations and duties, and the reduction of
difficulties of administration and supervision over corporations.
For the same reason, it would be misleading for the members of Samahan to use "Hanjin Shipyard" in its name as
it could give the wrong impression that all of its members are employed by Hanjin.
.
Under this construct, abandonment is a defense available against the employee who alleges a dismissal. Thus,
for the employer "to successfully invoke abandonment, whether as a ground for dismissing an employee or as a
defense, the employer bears the burden of proving the employee's unjustified refusal to resume his employment."
This burden, of course, proceeds from the general rule that places the burden on the employer to prove the
validity of the dismissal.
In cases where no dismissal took place, the proper award is reinstatement, without backwages, not as a relief for
any illegal dismissal but on equitable grounds. When, however, reinstatement of the employee is rendered
impossible, as when the employee had been out for a long period of time, the award of separation pay is proper.
shut down its business operations or a particular undertaking, incidentally resulting to the temporary lay-off of its
employees.
In an award, dated May 28, 2013, the VA ruled that Olidanawas entitled to permanent total disability benefits
under the loss of profession clause in their CBA. The VA opined that it was unlikely that Olidana could have
concealed his Diabetes Mellitus because he had been working for Jebsens for five (5) years with constant medical
examinations. Even assuming that Olidana concealed his Diabetes Mellitus, he was still entitled to disability
benefits because such disease was not connected with Tendinitis.
The VA continued that Olidana suffered from a permanent total disability because he had not been employed
since his medical repatriation on November 18, 2011. Also, the test of whether an employee suffered from a
permanent total disability depended on the capacity of the employee to continue performing his work
notwithstanding the disability incurred. Thus, if by reason of injury or illness, the employee was unable to perform
his customary job for more than 120 days, then the said employee undoubtedly suffered from total permanent
disability regardless of whether he loses the use of any part of his body.
Jebsens filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals.
In its assailed decision, dated September 3, 2014, the CA modified the award of the VA by reducing Olidana's
disability benefits. At the outset, the CA agreed with the VA that Olidana'sDiabetes Mellitus did not negate his
claim for disability benefits. Notably, the said disease was never indicated in the company-designated physicians'
diagnosis. What was specified in their medical reports was that Olidana suffered from Central Space Abscess,
Palmar Aspect of Left Hand. Yet, the CA held that Olidana's disease did not merit the award of total permanent
disability benefits because he only suffered a Grade 10 impediment based on the company-designated
physicians' disability report. The CA relied on Splash Philippines, Inc., v. Ruizo stating that the seafarer should be
compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits and governed by the rates and rules of compensation
applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted.
Hence, this petition.
RULING:
Permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether
he loses the use of any part of his body. Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee
to earn wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any
kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do.
Accordingly, permanent total disability does not mean a state of absolute helplessness but the inability to do
substantially all material acts necessary to the prosecution of a gainful occupation without serious discomfort or
pain and without material injury or danger to life. In disability compensation, it is not the injury per se which is
compensated but the incapacity to work.
To determine whether a seafarer is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits, the Court takes into account
both the law and the contract which govern his overseas employment. Recently, amendments were placed in the
POEA-SEC which is the primary contract that regulates a seafarer's employment. Section 20 (A) (6) of the 2010
POEA-SEC now provides that "[t]he disability shall be based solely on the disability gradings provided under
Section 32 of this Contract, and shall not be measured or determined by the number of days a seafarer is under
treatment or the number of days in which sickness allowance is paid.
The Court, nevertheless, is of the view that before the disability gradings under Section 32 should be considered,
these disability ratings should be properly established and contained in a valid and timely medical report of a
company-designated physician. Thus, the foremost consideration of the courts should be to determine whether
the medical assessment or report of the company-designated physician was complete and appropriately issued;
otherwise, the medical report shall be set aside and the disability grading contained therein cannot be seriously
appreciated.
The company-designated physicians issued two medical reports, both dated March 27, 2012. The disability report,
on one hand, stated that Olidana only suffered loss of grasping power for small objects between the fold of the
finger of one hand, which was a Grade 10 disability or a partial disability rating. The company-designated
physicians' final medical report, on the other hand, recommended that Olidana was unfit for duty. Glaringly, these
two medical reports contradicted each other. Interestingly, the final medical report, which stated that Olidana was
unfit for duty, concurred with Dr. Runas' medical evaluation report. The latter report stated that Olidana was
physically unfit to continue with his job as a seaman or cook, or in whatever capacity, due to his permanent
disability.
In the recent case of Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc. v. Quiogue, Jr., the Court summarized the rules
regarding the company-designated physician's duty to issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's
disability grading, as follows:
1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's disability grading
within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him;
2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without any
justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total;
3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with a sufficient
justification (e.g. seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of
diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove that the companydesignated physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and
4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240 days,
then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification.
Here, Olidana was repatriated on November 18, 2011. Within three (3) days, he was referred to the companydesignated physicians. It was only on March 27, 2012, or after a period of 130 days, that the company-designated
physicians issued the questionable disability report beyond the 120-day period. Although Section 20 (A) (6) of the
2010 POEA-SEC instructs that disability shall not be measured or determined by the number of days a seafarer is
under treatment, equally significant is our pronouncement in Carcedo v. Maine Marine Phils., Inc., that while "the
determination of the fitness of a seafarer for sea duty is the province of the company-designated physician, it is
still subject to the periods prescribed by law.
Even assuming that Jebsens properly raised the extended 240-day period due to prolonged physical therapy
sessions, Olidana still has a valid claim against his employer.
In the present case, it has been established that, in spite the lapse of the extended 240-day period, Olidana was
still incapacitated to perform his sea duties. Due to the injury he sustained, he could no longer perform his usual
tasks as chief cook in any vessel. Thus, it resulted to his unemployment until this very day. As correctly held by
the VA, this clearly indicate Olidana's permanent disability.
In addition, it must be reiterated that the company-designated physicians' disability report should be set aside for
being contradictory. Necessarily, it cannot be said that the company-designated physicians issued a valid and final
medical assessment within the 120-day or 240-day period. The Court in Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar held
that the declaration by the company-designated physician is an obligation, the abdication of which transforms the
temporary total disability to permanent total disability, regardless of the disability grade
In fine, it cannot be said with certainty whether Olidana could resume his seafaring profession in the future. He
must accept the inevitable that his distressing injury had practically ruined his career and he must carry its burden
for the rest of his life. Nevertheless, at present, it is clear is that Olidana suffered from a permanent total disability
resulting in a loss of earning capacity, which should be compensated accordingly.
In addition, as a rule, once the employee has asserted with particularity in his position paper that his employer
failed to pay his benefits, it becomes incumbent upon the employer to prove payment of the employee's money
claims. In fine, the burden is on the employer to prove payment, rather than on the employee to establish nonpayment.
While a notarized document is presumed to be regular such presumption is not absolute and may be overcome
by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. The fact that a document is notarized is not a guarantee of the
validity of its contents. Petitioner is an unlettered employee who may not have understood the full import of his
statements in the affidavit. Notably, petitioner, along with a co-worker did not state the specific amount of what
they referred as salary above the minimum required by law.
As found by the LA, respondent did not present substantial evidence that it paid the required minimum wage,
13th month pay and holiday pay in favor of petitioner. Respondent's mere reliance on the foregoing affidavit is
misplaced because the requirement of established jurisprudence is for the employer to prove payment, and not
merely deny the employee's accusation of non-payment on the basis of the latter's own declaration.
However, not every inconvenience, disruption, difficulty, or disadvantage that an employee must endure results in
a finding of constructive dismissal. Jurisprudence has long recognized that a transfer of employee done fairly and
in good faith is a valid exercise of management prerogative.
In this case, petitioner was transferred by Fr. Taborda instead of dismissing her for being found guilty of the
charges was a valid exercise of management prerogative. Petitioner should be reminded that even if the charges
against her was outside of her capacity as a faculty member of the Accounting Department, the fact that she
violated the ethical standards of her profession made her unfit to teach Accounting.
ISSUES
1. Whether the factual findings of both the NLRC and the LA were supported by substantial evidence YES
2. Whether respondent was validly dismissed YES
3. Whether respondent was deprived of his right to due process NO
RULING:
The factual findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter were supported by substantial evidence
Affidavits may be sufficient to establish substantial evidence. Substantial evidence means "that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."
In Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, the respondents failed to adduce
substantial evidence that the said affiants were coerced into executing the said affidavits. The bare fact that
some portions of the said affidavits are similarly worded does not constitute substantial evidence that the
petitioner forced, intimidated or coerced the affiants to execute the same.
In INC Shipmanagement, Inc., et al. v. Moradas, the corroborating affidavits and statements of the vessel's
officers and crew members must be taken as a whole and cannot just be perfunctorily dismissed as selfserving absent any showing that they were lying when they made the statements therein.
CAB: Respondent did not adduce evidence to show that the affiants, including Nanola, Ganhinhin, Verdida,
and Diano, all of whom were employed by P&A, were coerced to execute an affidavit prejudicial to
respondent. Respondent never questioned the evidentiary value of the affidavits at any stage of the
proceedings. There was no single evidence submitted showing that petitioners have exerted undue pressure
on the affiants.
The affidavits constitute substantial evidence to prove that respondent committed acts breaching the trust and
confidence reposed on him by P&A. The colleagues and subordinates of respondent executed the affidavits
based on their personal knowledge, and without any proof of coercion. Their statements, as discussed below,
corroborate each other and leave no room for doubt as to the acts committed by respondent.
The affidavits of his co-employees are sufficient basis for P&A's loss of trust and confidence.
An employer may terminate an employee for willful breach by the employee of trust reposed in him by his
employer or duly authorized representative [Art. 297(c), Labor Code]. While the right of an employer to freely
select or discharge his employees is subject to regulation by the State in the exercise of its paramount police
power, there is also an equally established principle that an employer cannot be compelled to continue in
employment an employee guilty of acts inimical to the interest of the employer and justifying loss of
confidence in him.
The following requisites must be satisfied to justify a valid dismissal based on loss of trust and confidence, to
wit:
(1) The employee concerned must be one holding a position of trust and confidence; and (2) There must be
an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence.
The two requisites are present in this case.
Respondent was a managerial employee. At the time of his termination, he was the Manager-in-Charge of
the Cebu operations and Director of the Visayas-Mindanao operations of P&A. Respondent failed to
dispute that his position, as the highest ranking officer of P&A's Visayas-Mindanao operations, demanded
utmost trust and confidence.
P&A's loss of trust and confidence is based on a willful breach of trust, and is founded on clearly
established facts.
Degree of Proof Required: In Mendoza v. HMS Credit Corporation, the Court distinguished the degree of
proof required in proving loss of trust and confidence in a managerial employee and a rank and file
employee With respect to RANK-AND-FILE PERSONNEL, loss of trust and confidence as ground for
valid dismissal requires proof of involvement in the alleged events in question, and that mere
uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer will not be sufficient. But as regards a
MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEE, the mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has
breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal. Hence, in the case of managerial
employees, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, it being sufficient that there is some
basis for such loss of confidence, such as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that
the employee concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct, and the nature of his participation
therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position.
CAB: Respondent breached the trust reposed in him by committing the following acts: (1) negotiating to
transfer to a competing firm while still employed with P&A; (2) enjoining a number of P&A's clients to transfer
their audit business to a competing firm; (3) inviting P&A's staff to join him in his transfer to a competing firm;
and (4) enjoining P&A's staff to engage in a sympathy strike during his preventive suspension.
The affidavits of Nanola, Ganhinhin, Verdida, and Diane show respondent's commission of these acts
which are all in breach of the trust and confidence reposed in him by P&A.
Respondent was validly dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence
In Elizalde International (Philippines) Inc. v. CA: One who asserts an interest, or performs acts adverse or
disloyal lo one's employer commits a breach of an implied condition of the contract of employment which
may warrant discharge, e.g., where one secretly engages in a business which renders him a competitor and
rival of his employer. An employer has the right to expect loyalty from his employees as long as the
employment relationship continues. When an employee deliberately acquires an interest adverse to his
employer, he is disloyal, and his discharge is justified.
In Molina v. Pacific Plans, Inc.: An employer has a protectable interest in the customer relationships of its
former employee established and/or nurtured while employed by the employer, and is entitled to protect itself
from the risk that a former employee might appropriate customers by taking unfair advantage of the contract
developed while working for the employer. While acting as an agent of his employer, an employee owes
the duty of fidelity and loyalty. Being a fiduciary, he cannot act inconsistently with his agency or trust.
He cannot solicit his employer's customers or co-employees for himself or for a business competitor
of his employer.
CAB: While respondent may have the liberty to express his views of the proposed merger, he was not
justified when he told clients of P&A that the latter's reputation as provider of quality service is expected to
deteriorate due to the merger and further induced them to patronize the rival firm he intended to join. As the
Director of P&A's Visayas-Mindanao operations, owed duties of loyalty to P&A, his employer, to inform its
clients about P&A's business decision to merge, for as long as he was still employed by P&A.
Respondent's act of inviting P&A's staff to conduct a sympathy strike is inconsistent with respondent's
duty of fidelity and loyalty to P&A. In doing so, respondent urged his colleagues and subordinates to
disregard their responsibilities as employees of P&A and sought to disrupt the latter's operations. Thus,
P&A merely acted within its right as employer when it dismissed respondent. The acts he committed are
sufficient basis for the loss of trust and confidence of P&A.
Respondent was not deprived of due process; Ample Opportunity to be Heard
Article 292(b) of the Labor Code, in relation to the then applicable Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing
Rules of Book VI, as amended by DO No. 10, s. of 1997, requires the employer to give the employee two
written notices prior to his termination for just cause.
First notice must contain a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the employee ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of a representative if he so desires.
Second notice (notice of termination) must indicate that upon due consideration of all the circumstances,
grounds have been established to justify the employee's termination.
P&A complied with the two-notice rule.
In Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company, the Court explained the meaning of "ample
opportunity to be heard" under Article 292: To be heard "does not mean verbal argumentation alone
inasmuch as one may be heard just as effectively through written explanations, submissions or pleadings .
While the phrase "ample opportunity to be heard" may in fact include an actual hearing, it is not limited to a
formal hearing only. The existence of an actual, formal "trial-type" hearing is not absolutely necessary
to satisfy the employee's right to be heard.
(a) "ample opportunity to be heard" means any meaningful opportunity (verbal or written) given to the
employee to answer the charges against him and submit evidence in support of his defense, whether
in a hearing, conference or some other fair, just and reasonable way.
(b) A formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory only when requested by the employee in writing or
substantial evidentiary disputes exist or a company rule or practice requires it, or when similar circumstances
justify it.
(c) The "ample opportunity to be heard" standard in the Labor Code prevails over the "hearing or conference"
requirement in the implementing rules and regulations.
Despite the lack of formal hearing or investigation, respondent was given ample opportunity to be heard. He
was given the opportunity to refute the charges against him. In fact, his reply thoroughly discussed his
justifications and defenses to the accusations imputed on him.
In view of the foregoing, respondent's dismissal from employment is valid. Thus, respondent's monetary
claims against P&A and petitioners have no legal and factual basis.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated February 15, 2006 is hereby REVERSED.
New Filipino Maritime Agencies, Inc. (NFMA), for and on behalf of St. Paul Maritime Corp., employed Simon
Vincent Datayan II (Simon) as deck cadet on board the vessel Corona Infinity. Simon was declared fit for sea
duties and on 8/17/2007, he boarded the vessel.
On 12/30/2007, the crew were in the mess hall for a birthday celebration. Simon was invited by the Master to
join the party but he refused.
At 12:40 a.m., the Master ordered the conduct of a fire and emergency drill. After, a crew meeting was
held where Simon was reprimanded by the Master for poor performance. Simon left even before the
meeting was concluded.
The Master ordered the crew to search for him. At about 1:25 a.m. to 1:30 a.m., Raymond Ocleasa saw
Simon jump overboard.
A futile search-and-rescue operation ensued. After a few weeks, Simon was declared missing and was
presumed dead.
Simon's father (respondent) went to NFMA to claim death benefits but his claim was unheeded. He filed a
complaint against Petitioners. He averred that
Simon died during the term of his employment, thus the provisions of the CBA among All Japan Seamen's
Union, Associated Marine Officers' and Seamen's Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP), and the
International Mariners Management Association of Japan, must be applied in the grant of death benefits
and burial assistance in his favor, being the heir of Simon.
Petitioners were presumed to be at fault or had acted negligently, unless they could prove that Simon's
death was due to causes not legally compensable.
There was no evidence that Simon committed suicide and maintained that his death was a result of
negligence and reckless instruction of the Master.
Petitioners argued that Simon's death was a result of Simon's deliberate act. Based on the POEA Standard
Employment Contract (SEC) and CBA, a complainant is not entitled to death benefits when the cause of the
seaman's death was the latter's willful act.
Evidence Presented: The Master's Report, Statement of Facts, Marine Note of Protest and Investigation
Report conclusively proved that Simon committed suicide, bolstered by the suicide note found on the
vessel, signed by Simon.
The LA dismissed the complaint and the NLRC affirmed the LA Decision. Both of the tribunals gave weight to
the suicide note, the Master's Report, along with other pieces of documentary evidence adduced, to establish
that Simon committed suicide.
On Petition for Certiorari, the CA found for respondent. Ruling that petitioners' evidence failed to prove
suicide; and that the Master who executed and signed the Master's Report, Marine Note of Protest and
Statement of Facts failed to give positive testimony ascertaining Simon's actual suicide. It further pointed out
that the crew members who signed the Investigation. Report had no personal knowledge of Simon's suicide. It
added that Ocleasa, the alleged witness of the incident, did not sign the report or issue a sworn statement on
the matter.
ISSUE: Is the CA correct in finding that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying respondent's
claim for death benefits? NO
RULING:
As claimant for death benefits, respondent has the burden to prove by substantial evidence that his son's
death is work-related and that it transpired during the term of his employment contract.
In this respect, respondent has discharged his burden. Simon died during the term of his contract. The next
question is whether Simon's death was due to his deliberate act. That Simon's death was a result of his willful
act is a matter of defense. Petitioners have the burden to prove this circumstance by substantial evidence.
The Court finds that petitioners discharged their burden to prove that Simon committed suicide.
In Unicol Management Services, Inc. v. Malipot, the Court considered the Master's Report and the
Investigation Report, among others, in ruling that the seaman's beneficiaries were not entitled to death
benefits. It noted that these documents completely detailed the events that transpired prior to and the
circumstances leading to the discovery of his death by suicide.
CAB: The Master's Report and the Statement of Facts described the events that occurred prior to, during and
after the incident when Simon went overboard. In particular, Simon declined the Master's invitation for him to
join the party; thereafter, the Master reprimanded him because he performed poorly in the drill; Simon left the
meeting and was later seen to jump overboard by Ocleasa. Added to this narration is the statement of the
crew in the Investigation Report that Simon was a "very sensitive" person.
The Investigation Report addressed the question on why Ocleasa did not sign said report. As stated
therein, he already disembarked from the vessel when the report was executed and was investigated at
the (local) office, where he stated that he saw Simon jump overboard.
More importantly, the fact that Simon committed suicide is bolstered by the suicide note that he executed.
As such, to refute petitioners' position that Simon committed suicide, the burden of evidence shifts to
respondent.
In this regard, respondent failed to discharge his burden and only relied on the alleged negligence of the
Master in ordering the conduct of the drill. Respondent argues that Simon could not have written a suicide
note because of the proximity of the time when the drill was conducted and the time when Simon jumped
overboard.
No proof was presented indicating that said suicide note was fabricated, as no specimen of Simon's
handwriting was submitted to prove that it was not written by him.
On the contrary, the signature in the suicide note and the signature of Simon in his employment contract
appear to be the same. Hence, by substantial evidence, there are adequate reasons and proof that Simon
committed suicide.
Under Section 20(D) of the POEA SEC, no compensation or benefits shall arise in case of death of a seafarer
resulting from his willful act, provided that the employer could prove that such death is attributable to the
seafarer.
Although Simon died during the term of his contract with petitioners, still, respondent is not entitled to receive
benefits arising from his death. As clearly established, Simon died by his willful act of committing suicide and
death under that circumstance is not compensable under the POEA SEC.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The February 22, 2012 Decision and July 24, 2012 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 119775 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
FACTS:
Respondent is an independent contractor engaged in landscaping and the operation and maintenance of a plant
nursery under the business name "Cherry Alfonso Plant Nursery." Petitioners were employees of respondent
having been hired on various landscaper/designer, leadman, laborer, and driver.
They filed a complaint against the employer for illegal dismissal wherein they alleged that they were not paid their
salaries, overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, 13th month pay and service incentive
leave pay and that there was termination of employment without valid cause.
ISSUE: w/n the employees are entitled to reinstatement with full backwages
RULING: YES
RATIO:
There was no habitual neglicence on their part. In termination cases, the employer bears the burden of proving
that the dismissal of the employee is for a just or an authorized case. Failure to dispose of the burden would imply
that the dismissal is not lawful and that the employee is entitled to reinstatement, backwages and accruing
benefits.
FACTS:
Petitioners were employees of Napar, a recruitment agency owned and managed by respondent Lacsamana.
Napar assigned petitioners at respondent Jonas, a corporation engaged in the manufacture of various food
products with respondent Young as its President to work as factory workers, machine operator, quality control
inspector, mixer, and warehouseman.
The employees filed before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC a complaint for wage differentials. The agency and
the employees entered into a compromise agreement wherein the employees were to submit bio data and several
documents for job application requirements. However, there was a failure on Napar's part to comply with the
agreement which is to reinstate them work in consonance with the terms of the Joint Compromise Agreement.
Thus, such action constitutes illegal constructive dismissal. They prayed for backwages plus separation pay in lieu
of reinstatement.
ISSUE: whether they are entitled to backwages due to the illegal constructive dismissal
RULING: YES
RATIO:
Petitioners, as regular employees, are deemed to have been constructively and illegally dismissed by
respondents. Being on floating status and off-detailed for more than six months, not having been reinstated and
reassigned by respondents, petitioners are considered to have been constructively dismissed. Settled is the rule
that an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement, or separation pay if
reinstatement is no longer viable, and to his full backwages.
the case may be, or upon the expiration of the said periods without a declaration of either fitness to work or
disability assessment and the seafarer is still unable to resume his regular seafaring duties.
Beja was repatriated on November 21, 2007. Roughly a month after his right knee operation, Dr. Cruz rendered a
Grade 10 and 13 partial disability grading of his medical condition. Although he was given grades 10 and 13
combined disability rating by Dr. Cruz, this assessment may only be considered as tentative because he still
continued his physical therapy session, which went beyond 240 days.
There was no assessment that Beja was found fit to resume sea duties before the end of the 240 day period.
Bejas allegation that he has not been able to perform his usual activities has not been contradicted by petitioner
or by contrary documentary evidence. In fact, in his medical report, Dr. Matias opined that there was still difficulty
in Bejas knee movements. Beja should be deemed to be suffering permanent total disability.
In the case at bar, Beja filed the complaint on May 15, 2008. Dr. Cruz issued his assessment only on May 26,
2008 or 187 days from Bejas repatriation. Due to Dr. Cruzs failure to issue a disability rating within 120-days
period, a conclusive presumption that Beja is totally and permanently disabled arose. There was no need for Beja
to secure an opinion from his own doctor or resort to a third doctor as prescribed under Section 20 B (3) of the
POEA-SEC.
The CA is correct in affirming the NLRCs award of permanent total disability benefit to Beha. It erred in pertaining
to the CBA in granting the award relative to the amount due.
[ G.R. No. 199314 [Formerly UDK No. 14553], December 07, 2015 ]
TAMBLOT SECURITY & GENERAL SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. FLORENCIO ITEM, LEONARDO PALM
A, et al., respondents.
FACTS:
Respondent were employed by petitioner as security guards and were deployed at Marcela Mall. Respondent
Florencio Item had a misunderstanding with the security officer at Marcela Mall, thus, he was recalled and
relieved from duty by the petitioner. Florencio consulted a lawyer who told him that he was also underpaid. He
shared this information to his co respondent which prompted the rest of them to file a letter commplaint to the
DOLE. During the meeting for the said case, petitioner representatives tried to convince them to withdrew their
complaint but they refused. As a result of their refusal they were also relieved of their duty at Marcela Mall.
Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. Petitioner contends that they did not
dismissed the employees and that they are the one who did not report for work.
ISSUE: Whether or not the employees were illegally dismissed.
RULING:
Respondents were illegally dismissed. Petitioner utterly failed to establish the requisite for abandonment of work
1) that the employees has failed to report for work or must be absent without valid or justifiable reasons 2) that
there must have been a clear intention to severe th employee-employer relationship by some overt acts
In this case there were no showing of any overt act of the respondents that would point of an intention to abandon
their work.
FACTS:
On August 19, 2009, Verzo was hired by Enchanted to work as Section Head Mechanical &
Instrumentation Maintenance (SH-MIM) for its theme park, for a period of six (6) months on
probationary status. He was tasked to conduct mechanical and structural system assessments, as
well as to inspect and evaluate the conditions, operations and maintenance requirements of rides,
facilities and buildings to ensure compliance with applicable codes, regulations and standards. He was
also provided with a detailed list of responsibilities that he should fulfill.
During the probationary period, Enchanted assessed Verzos performance as not up to par. On
February 3, 2010, Enchanted furnished Verzo a copy of the Cast Member Performance Appraisal for
Regularization which reported that he only obtained a score of 70 out of 100. Aside from indicating the
numerical score, Enchanteds evaluation of his performance contained the following notations under
Supervisors Over-All Assessment:
- Lacking in supervisory skill;
- Incompetent technically;
- Lacking in initiative/sense of responsibility.
On February 15, 2010, Enchanted formally informed Verzo that he did not qualify for regularization
because his work performance for the past five (5) months did not meet the requirements of the
position of Section Head for Mechanical and Instrumentation Maintenance.
Verzo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, damages and attorneys fees before the LA. In his
complaint, Verzo claimed that it was only after he was formally hired by Enchanted that he was
informed of his probationary status. And even after despite being placed on a probationary status, he
was not advised as to the standards required for his regularization.
LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The LA explained that his status being probationary, his
employment was only temporary and, thus, could be terminated at any time. The LA stated that as long
as the termination was made before the end of the six-month probationary period, Enchanted was well
within its rights to sever the employer-employee relationship with Verzo.
The NLRC issued a resolution denying Verzos appeal for lack of merit. The NLRC opined that Verzos
position as SH-MIM was not highly technical as to require that his contract with Enchanted specify the
reasonable standards for regularization. Assuming that it was required, the NLRC considered the fact
that he signed his employment contract detailing the standards expected of him. The NLRC stated that
as a licensed engineer, Verzo had a better comprehension of things compared to an average worker.
Thus, the NLRC found it incredible that he was unaware of what was professionally expected of him for
his regularization.
In concluding that Verzo was rightfully severed from his employment, the NLRC took into consideration
the Cast Member Performance Appraisal for Regularization which showed that he failed to meet the
qualifications or requirements set by Enchanted. The NLRC concluded that Enchanted acted within its
rights when it dismissed him, considering that his inability to perform his job concerned the very safety
and security of Enchanteds patrons.
CA reversed the decision of La and NLRC. The probationary contract between the parties failed to set
the standards that would gauge Verzos fitness and qualification for regular employment.
The NLRCs supposition that Verzo may not be apprised of the standard for regularization on the
assumption that given his itinerary and education, he has wider comprehension of what is expected of
him professionally is misplaced. For said reason, the CA opined that he should be considered a
regular employee of Enchanted.
ISSUE:
Whether the dismissal was legal?
Whether Verzo was properly apprised of the standards for his regularization?
RULING:
The Court finds that Enchanted had basis when it decided not to continue with the services of Verzo as
SH-MIM.
First, while the CA leaned heavily on the fact that the performance evaluation given by Enchanted did
not specify the instances of Verzos unfitness, it should be pointed out that Verzo himself admitted that
the performance evaluation he received on February 3, 2010 was accompanied by the respective
reports of Schoefield, Montemayor and Velesrubio. As earlier stated, these reports detailed the reasons
why Verzo failed to meet the standards set by Enchanted and compromised the safety of its patrons.
Second, granting that Verzo was not informed of his specific duties and responsibilities, nonetheless,
his dismissal was valid because he failed to adhere to the dictates of common sense which required
that he act in accordance with the necessary work ethics and basic skills required by his position as
SH-MIM and by his profession as licensed engineer.
Third, while the CA considered the fact that Velesrubio advised Verzo to resign because he was not
going to be regularized even before his performance appraisal, the Court finds that such should not be
taken as an indication of bad faith on the part of Enchanted. For this Court, the same could only be
Velesrubios own opinion of Verzo, because he was the one supervising his performance. Whether
Enchanted had decided to discontinue Verzos employment cannot, at that point, be said to have been
a foregone conclusion.
Suffice it to state that Enchanted was able to substantially comply with the requirement of the law in
apprising him of the standards for his regularization. Verily, the purpose of the law in requiring that an
employee be notified of the standards for his regularization during his probationary employment is to
simply afford him due process, so that the employee will be aware that he will be under close
observation and his performance of his assigned duties and functions would be under continuous
scrutiny by his superiors.
Moreover, while it may be argued that ideally employers should immediately inform a probationary
employee of the standards for his regularization from day one, strict compliance thereof is not required.
The true test of compliance with the requirements of the law is, of course, one of reasonableness. As
long as the probationary employee is given a reasonable time and opportunity to be made fully aware of
what is expected of him during the early phases of the probationary period, the requirement of the law
has been satisfied.
Petitioner filed a case for illegal dismissal against respondents before the NLRC.
Respondents appealed to the NLRC which was initially denied but was subsequently reversed
upon a timely MR.
Petitioner appealed the case to the CA via Rule 65
The CA dismissed the petition on the ground that it suffered from the following congenital infirmities:
o
o
o
o
o
There was no proper proof of service of summons. Post office receipt is not the required proof of
service by registered mail.
Petition failed to incorporate in the petition a written explanation why preferred personal mode of
service to the agency was not availed of
Petitioners counsel failed to indicate his Roll of Attorneys Number
The Notarial Certificate in the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping did not
contain the province or city where the notary public was commissioned
There was failure to implead the NLRC as public respondent as required under section 5, Rule
65.
Essentially, the purpose of this service is to apprise such party of the pendency of an action in the CA.
Thus, if such party had already been notified of the same and had even participated in the proceedings,
such purpose would have already been served.
o
In this case, respondents were informed and even filed their Comment to the petition. Thus, the
purpose of the rule had been achieved. It would have been "more prudent for the Court [of
Appeals] to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a substantive review of the case in
order to attain the ends of justice than to dismiss the same on mere technicalities."
Written Explanation
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on account of petitioner's failure to incorporate a written
explanation on why the NLRC's copy was not personally served to the agency.
o
Petitioner explained in her Motion for Reconsideration that her former counsel had died, which
gave her little time to find and engage the services of her present counsel before the lapse of the
period for filing the petition. That day that the pleadings were sent via registered mail was already
the last day of filing, and with heavy rains at that time, her counsel had anticipated that they
would not be able to beat the deadline in filing the petition before the Court of Appeals, prompting
her counsel to resort to registered mail.
As to the supposed failure to implead the NLRC, the Court finds that the NLRC was, in fact, impleaded in
the case, based on the body of the petition. Under the section on Parties, the NLRC was named as one of
the parties to the case.Clearly, the failure to include public respondent's name in the title was mere
inadvertence.
The other ground cited by the Court of Appeals, i.e., counsel's failure to indicate his roll number and the
place of the notary public's commission, does not affect the merits of the petition. The appellate court
could have simply asked petitioner's counsel to submit the information instead of dismissing the case
outright. Likewise, we deem that petitioner should not be penalized for the omissions of her counsel and
deserves to have her case properly ventilated at the appellate court.
A last word
Counsel's actions are binding on his client. Petitioner in this case would have had her entire case thrown
out, with all hope for proper review and determination lost, through no fault of her own but merely
because of her counsel's carelessness in preparing and filing the pleadings. It is only the Court's
discretion that petitioner's cause needs a chance to be properly reviewed and reevaluated that has kept
this case alive. Counsel is therefore reminded of his duty to "serve his client with competence and
diligence" and ensure that the pleadings he files comply with all the requirements under the pertinent
rules.
controversies on the merits, or (4) the appellants, at the very least, exhibited their willingness and/or good
faith by posting a partial bond during the reglementary period.
Here, Quantum posted a partial bond in the amount of P400,000, or more than twenty percent (20%) of the
monetary judgment, within the reglementary period to appeal, together with the Motion to Reduce Bond anchored
on its averred difficulty in raising the amount of the bond and searching for an insurance company that can cover
said amount within the short period of time to perfect its appeal. Before the NLRC could even act on the Motion to
Reduce Bond, Quantum posted a surety bond from an accredited insurance company covering fully the judgment
award.
As to what constitutes a reasonable amount of bond that must accompany the motion to reduce bond in order to
suspend the period to perfect an appeal, the Court, in McBurnei vs. Ganzon, pronounce:
To reduce that the provisions of Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure that give
parties the chance to seek a reduction of the appeal bond are effectively carried out, without however
defeating the benefits of the bond requirement in favor of a winning litigant, all motions to reduce bond
that are to be filed with the NLRC shall be accompanied by the posting of a cash or surety bond
equivalent to 10% of the monetary award that is subject of the appeal, which shall provisionally be
deemed the reasonable amount of the bond in the meantime that an appellants motion is pending
resolution by the Commission. ..
Hence, the posting of a P400,000 cash bond equivalent to more than 20% of the monetary judgment, together
with Motion to Reduce Bond within the reglementary period was sufficient to suspend the period to perfect the
appeal. The posting of the said partial bond coupled with the subsequent posting of a surety bond in an amount
equivalent to the monetary judgment also signified Quantums good faith and willingness to recognize the final
outcome of its appeal.
It should be emphasized that the NLRC has full discretion to grant or deny the motion to reduce bond, and its
ruling will not be disturbed unless tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Verily, an act of a court of tribunal can
only be considered to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, which clearly is not extant with respect to the NLRCs
cognizance of Quantums appeal. Far from having gravely abused its discretion, the NLRC correctly preferred
substantial justice over the rigid and stringent application of procedural rules.
service, whether such service is continuous or broken, with respect to the activity for which he is employed and
his employment continues as long as such activity exists. 66
The test to determine whether an employee is regular is the reasonable connection between the activity he
performs and its relation to the employer's business or trade, as in the case of respondents assigned to the boiler
section. Nonetheless, the continuous re-engagement of all respondents to perform the same kind of tasks proved
the necessity and desirability of their services in the business of Vicmar. 72 Likewise, considering that respondents
appeared to have been performing their duties for at least one year is sufficient proof of the necessity, if not the
indispensability of their activities in Vicmar's business.73
On the second issue, to determine the existence of independent contractorship, it is necessary to establish that
the contractor carries a distinct and independent business, and undertakes to perform work on its own account
and under its responsibility and pursuant to its own manner and method, without the control of the principal,
except as to the result; that the contractor has substantial capital or investment; and, that the agreement between
the principal and the contractor assures the contractual employees to all labor and occupational safety and health
standards, to right to self-organization, security of tenure and other benefits.
Other than their respective Certificates there was no showing that the contractors have substantial capital or
investment, tools and the like. Neither was it established that they owned equipment and machineries for the
purported contracted job. Also, the allegation that they had clients other than Vicmar remained to be bare
assertion without corresponding proof. More importantly, there was no evidence presented that these contractors
undertook the performance of their service contracts with Vicmar pursuant to their own manner and method,
without the control and supervision of Vicmar.
repeated machine breakdowns that caused production and delivery delays, and lost business opportunities for the
company.
Petition granted.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Iladans resignation was voluntary
2. W/N placement fee was paid
RULING:
Iladan's resignation was voluntary;
there was no illegal dismissal
In illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of proving that the employee's dismissal was legal.
However, to discharge this burden, the employee must first prove, by substantial evidence, that he had been
dismissed from employment. Iladan did not adduce any competent evidence to prove that respondents used force
and threat.
In the instant case, Iladan executed a resignation letter in her own handwriting.
She also accepted the amount of P35,000.00 as financial assistance and executed an Affidavit of Release,
Waiver and Quitclaim and an Agreement, as settlement and waiver of any cause of action against
respondents.
o
The affidavit of waiver and the settlement were acknowledged/subscribed before Labor Attache
Romulo on August 6, 2009, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate. An affidavit of waiver
duly acknowledged before a notary public is a public document which cannot be impugned by mere
self-serving allegations. Proof of an irregularity in its execution is absolutely essential. The Agreement
likewise bears the signature of Conciliator-Mediator Diaz. Thus, the signatures of these officials
sufficiently prove that Iladan was duly assisted when she signed the waiver and settlement.
No placement fee was paid.
Iladan and her mother's affidavit attesting to its payment are self-serving evidence and deserve no
weight at all. Neither did the mortgage loan and deed of transfer executed in favor of third persons as
well as the letter from Nippon prove that placement fee was paid to respondents. These documents
merely show that Iladan is indebted to certain persons and to Nippon; however, they do not prove that
these indebtedness were incurred in connection with the placement fee she purportedly paid to
respondents. As aptly ruled by the CA, Iladan has the burden of proving, with clear and convincing
evidence, the fact of payment.
exemplary damages in their favor. Echo merely imposed disciplinary penalties upon the respondents
intransigence.
The court further ruled that there was no Unfair Labor Practice in this case. Unfair labor practices violate the
constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization. The respondents allege that their
transfer/promotion was intended to deprive the Union of leadership and membership. However it lack
substantiation. Unfair labor practice is a serious charge, and the respondents failed to show that the petitioners
conclusively interfered with, restrained, or coerced employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization.
FACTS:
The Rodriguez et al. are former pilots of Philippine Airlines Inc. (PAL) which were deemed to have lost
their employment status for taking part in the illegal strike in June 1998.
1st ALPAP Case:
On December 9, 1997, the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALPAP) filed with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a Notice of Strike, on the grounds of unfair labor practice and
union-busting by PAL.
By virtue of the authority vested upon him under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, the Secretary of
Labor assumed jurisdiction over the Strike Case, and issued an Order on December 23, 1997
prohibiting all actual and impending strikes and lockouts. On May 25, 1998, the DOLE Secretary issued
another Order reiterating the prohibition against strikes and lockouts.
Despite the abovementioned Orders of the DOLE Secretary, ALPAP filed a second Notice of Strike on
June 5, 1998 and staged a strike on the same day at around 5:30 in the afternoon. The DOLE
Secretary immediately called PAL and ALPAP for conciliation conferences on June 6 and 7, 1998 to
amicably settle the dispute between them. After his efforts failed, the DOLE Secretary issued a Returnto-Work Order on June 7, 1998.
On June 26, 1998, the members of ALPAP reported for work but PAL did not accept them on the
ground that the 24-hour period for the strikers to return set by the DOLE Secretary in his Return-toWork Order had already lapsed, resulting in the forfeiture of their employment.
Consequently, ALPAP filed with the NLRC on June 29, 1998 a Complaint for illegal lockout against PAL.
ALPAP averred that after its counsel received the Return-to-Work Order on June 25, 1998, its members
reported back to work on June 26, 1998 in compliance with the 24-hour period set in the said Order.
ALPAP prayed that PAL be ordered to unconditionally accept its members back to work and pay the
salaries and other benefits due them. On August 21, 1998, the Acting Executive Labor Arbiter ordered
the consolidation of the Illegal Lockout Case with the Strike Case pending before the DOLE Secretary.
The DOLE Secretary issues a resolution declaring the strike conducted by ALPAP on June 5, 1998 and
thereafter illegal for being procedurally infirm and in open defiance of the return-to-work order of June 7,
1998 and consequently, the strikers are deemed to have lost their employment status and also
dismissed the complaint for illegal lockout for lack of merit.
ALPAP assailed the foregoing Resolutions of the DOLE Secretary in the consolidated Strike and Illegal
Lockout Cases in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. The appellate court dismissed
said Petition. ALPAP elevated the case to this Court by filing a Petition for Certiorari. However, he Court
dismissed the Petition of ALPAP in a minute Resolution for failure of ALPAP to show grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the appellate court. Said Resolution dismissing the 1st ALPAP case
became final and executory on August 29, 2002.
The 2nd ALPAP Case:
Thereafter, 32 ALPAP members with varying ranks of captain, first officer, and second officer filed with
the NLRC on June 7, 1999 a Complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL (Illegal Dismissal Case). The
32 ALPAP members alleged that they were not participants of the June 5, 1998 strike of ALPAP and
that they had no obligation to comply with the Return-to-Work Order of the DOLE Secretary.
PAL terminated complainants from employment together with the strikers who disobeyed the Return-toWork Order, even though complainants had valid reasons for not reporting for work. They further
asserted that PAL did not observe the twin requirements of notice and hearing in effecting their
termination; that PAL refused to admit them when they reported for work on June 26, 1998; and that
PAL, which long planned to reduce its fleet and manpower, took advantage of the strike by dismissing
its pilots en masse. Complainants thus prayed for reinstatement to their former positions without loss of
seniority rights; backwages and other monetary claims; and moral and exemplary damages, and
attorneys fees.
PAL averred that the Complaint for illegal dismissal is an offshoot of the Strike and Illegal Lockout
Cases wherein the DOLE Secretary already adjudged with finality that the striking pilots lost their
employment for participating in an illegal strike and/or disobeying the Return-to-Work Order. Hence,
PAL argued that the Complaint was already barred by res judicata.
LA found the dismissal of the 32 ALPAP members illegal and ordered PAL to reinstate complainants to
their former positions without loss of seniority rights, privileges and benefits and to pay complainants
their full backwages from June 9, 1998 up to date of reinstatement.
The NLRC reversed the LAs decision on November 6, 2001. According to the NLRC, the strike was not
a one-day affair. It started on June 5, 1998 and lasted until the later part of June 1998. Complainants
assertion that they were not strikers was controverted by the photographs submitted as evidence by
PAL showing that several complainants were at the strike area on June 9, 1998, some even holding a
streamer saying: WE ARE ON STRIKE. The NLRC gave weight to the finding of the DOLE Secretary,
affirmed by the Court of Appeals that ALPAP was served a copy of the Return-to-Work Order on June
8, 1998, thus, the ALPAP strikers had 24 hours, or until June 9, 1998, to comply with said Order.
However, based on the logbook, the complainants only reported back to work on June 26, 1998. As a
result of their defiance of the DOLE Secretarys Return-to-Work Order, complainants lost their
employment status as of June 9, 1998. Even if complainants were supposedly on official leave or offduty during the strike, records revealed that their official leave or off-duty status had expired at least two
weeks before June 26, 1998. The logbook establishing that complainants reported for work only on
June 26, 1998 must prevail over the complainants unsupported allegations that they called PAL offices
upon the expiration of their respective leaves or days off to verify the status of their flights.
CA reversed the NLRCs decision and upheld the LAs decision that the ALPAP members were
dismissed illegally.
In the meantime, during the pendency of the instant Petitions, the Court decided on June 6, 2011
[Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines v. Philippine Airlines, Inc,.] (2nd ALPAP case). The 2nd
ALPAP case arose from events that took place following the finality on August 29, 2002 of the
Resolution dated April 10, 2002 which dismissed the 1st ALPAP case.
ISSUE: Whether the Decision in the 1st case constitutes res judicata to the present case [2nd case]?
RULING:
The Court, in the 2nd ALPAP case, acknowledged the illegal dismissal cases instituted by the individual
ALPAP members before the NLRC following their termination for the strike in June 1998 (which were
apart from the Strike and Illegal Lockout Cases of ALPAP before the DOLE Secretary) and affirmed the
jurisdiction of the NLRC over said illegal dismissal cases. The Court, though, also expressly
pronounced in the 2nd ALPAP case that the pendency of the foregoing cases should not and could not
affect the character of our disposition over the instant case. Rather, these cases should be resolved in a
manner consistent and in accord with our present disposition for effective enforcement and execution of
a final judgment.
The Petitions at bar began with the Illegal Dismissal Case of Rodriguez, et al. and eight other former
pilots of PAL before the NLRC. Among the Decisions rendered by Labor Arbiter Robles, the NLRC, and
the Court of Appeals herein, it is the one by the NLRC which is consistent and in accord with the
disposition for effective enforcement and execution of the final judgments in the 1st and 2nd ALPAP
cases.
The 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases which became final and executory on August 29, 2002 and September
9, 2011, respectively, constitute res judicata on the issue of who participated in the illegal strike in June
1998 and whose services were validly terminated.
The elements for res judicata in the second concept, i.e., conclusiveness of judgment, are extant in
these cases.
There is identity of parties in the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases, on one hand, and the Petitions at bar.
While the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases concerned ALPAP and the present Petitions involved several
individual members of ALPAP, the union acted in the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases in representation of its
members. In fact, in the 2nd ALPAP case, the Court explicitly recognized that the complaint for illegal
lockout was filed by ALPAP on behalf of all its members who were returning to work. Also in the said
case, ALPAP raised, albeit belatedly, exactly the same arguments as Rodriguez, et al. herein. Granting
that there is no absolute identity of parties, what is required, however, for the application of the principle
of res judicata is not absolute, but only substantial identity of parties. ALPAP and Rodriguez, et al.
share an identity of interest from which flowed an identity of relief sought, namely, the reinstatement of
the terminated ALPAP members to their former positions. Such identity of interest is sufficient to make
them privy-in-law, one to the other, and meets the requisite of substantial identity of parties.
There is likewise an identity of issues between the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases and these cases.
Rodriguez, et al., insist that they did not participate in the June 1998 strike, being on official leave or
scheduled off-duty. Nonetheless, on the matter of determining the identities of the ALPAP members
who lost their employment status because of their participation in the illegal strike in June 1998, the
Court is now conclusively bound by its factual and legal findings in the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases.
In the 1st ALPAP case, the Court upheld the DOLE Secretarys Resolution dated June 1, 1999
declaring that the strike of June 5, 1998 was illegal and all ALPAP officers and members who
participated therein had lost their employment status. The Court in the 2nd ALPAP case ruled that even
though the dispositive portion of the DOLE Secretarys Resolution did not specifically enumerate the
names of those who actually participated in the illegal strike, such omission cannot prevent the effective
execution of the decision in the 1st ALPAP case. The Court referred to the records of the Strike and
Illegal Lockout Cases, particularly, the logbook, which it unequivocally pronounced as a crucial and
vital piece of evidence. In the words of the Court in the 2nd ALPAP case, [t]he logbook with the
heading Return-To-Work Compliance/Returnees bears their individual signature signifying their
conformity that they were among those workers who returned to work only on June 26, 1998 or after the
deadline imposed by DOLE. x x x In fine, only those returning pilots, irrespective of whether they
comprise the entire membership of ALPAP, are bound by the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution.
FACTS:
From 1989, La Salle Greenhills, Inc. (LSGI) contracted the services of medical professionals, specifically
pediatricians, dentists and a physician, to comprise its Health Service Team (HST). Petitioners, along with other
members of the HST signed uniform one-page Contracts of Retainer for the period of a specific academic
cal~ndar beginning in June of a certain year (1989 and the succeeding 15 years) and terminating in March of the
following year when the school year ends. After fifteen consecutive years of renewal each academic year, where
the last Contract of Retainer was for the school year of 2003-2004, LSGI Head Administrator, on that last day of
the school year, informed the Medical Service Team, including herein petitioners, that their contracts will no longer
be renewed for the following school year by reason of LSGI's decision to hire two (2) full-time doctors and
dentists. When petitioners', along with their medical colleagues', requests for payment of their separation pay
were denied, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for separation pay, damages and attorney's
fees before the NLRC. They alleged that they were regular employees who could only be dismissed for just and
authorized causes
LSGI denied that complainants were regular employees, asserting: that complainants were independent
contractors who were retained by LSGI by reason of their medical skills and expertise to provide ancillary medical
and dental services; that LSGI had no power to impose disciplinary measures upon complainants including
dismissal from employment; and that LSGI had no power of control over how complainants actually performed
their professional services.
The LA dismissied petitioners complaint, but the NLRC reversed. On appeal, the CA ruled against petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ruling that
petitioners were not regular employees who may only be dismissed for just and authorized causes.
RULING:
NO. In the case at bar, the CA disregarded the repeated renewals of the Contracts of Retainer of petitioners
spanning a decade and a half. While vague in its sparseness, the Contract of Retainer very clearly spelled out
that LSGI had the power of control over petitioners. It is enough that the employer has the right to wield that
power. In all, given the following: ( 1) repeated renewal of petitioners' contract for fifteen years, interrupted only by
the close of the school year; (2) the necessity of the work performed by petitioners as school physicians ~and
dentists; and (3) the existence of LSGI's power of control over the means and method pursued by petitioners in
the performance of their job, we rule that petitioners attained regular employment, entitled to security of tenure
who could only be dismissed for just and authorized causes. Consequently, petitioners were illegally dismissed
and are entitled to the twin remedies of payment of separation pay and full back wages. We order separation pay
in lieu of reinstatement given the time that has lapsed, twelve years, in the litigation of this case.
Petition granted.
FACTS:
WMS is a local manning agency, with Reginaldo A. Oben (Oben) as its President and Manager. 4 On September
30, 2008, WMS, for and in behalf of its foreign principal, WSL, hired respondent as fitter aboard the vessel Crown
Garnet for a period of nine months with a monthly salary of US$698.00.Respondents employment was covered
by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the Associated Marine, Officers' and Seamen's Union of the
Philippines (AMOSUP) and WSL - Hong Kong, represented by WMS.
Respondent averred that in January 2009, he started experiencing neck and lower back pain. In April 2009, he
purportedly noticed numbness and weakness of his left hand. Respondent stated that towards the end of his
contract, the Chief Engineer tried to convince him to extend his contract but he declined. The Chief Engineer then
told him that he would report to their Superintendent respondent's ailment. 8
Respondent further stated that he signed off from the vessel on July 13, 2009. Upon arrival in the Philippines on
July 15, 2009, he was referred to the company-designated physicianand was diagnosed of cervical radiculopathy,
thoracic and lumbar spondylosis, as well as carpal tunnel syndrome of the left, and trigger finger, third digit of his
right hand. He underwent carpal tunnel surgery on his left hand, and physical therapy (PT) sessions for his
cervical and lumbar condition.10
On September 9, 2009, Dr. Estrada reported that respondent's carpal tunnel surgery was healing well.
Respondent followed up with his physiatrist, for his shoulder pain. 11 As of November 12, 2009, respondent had
completed 24 PT sessions for his shoulder, upper back and cervical pain. However, the company-designated
doctor declared that respondent was complaining of pain in these areas with poor response to therapy and
medications. And because of complaint for low back pain, he advised respondent to defer PT sessions and seek
the opinion of an orthopedic specialist.12
However, on November 23, 2009, the Legal Affairs Department of AMOSUP informed WMS of respondent's claim
for disability benefits13 and the clarificatory conference scheduled on November 27, 2009.
On November 24, 2009, respondent requested from the company-designated doctor the final assessment of his
health condition but to no avail.
On January 9, 2010, the company-designated doctor opined that respondent's chance of being declared fit to
work was "quite good" provided he completes his remaining physical therapy sessions for about 4-6 weeks for his
left hand pain and back pain. He also reported that respondent failed to return for his consultation since
November 12, 2009.
After final evaluation, On March 12, 2010, the company-designated doctor gave respondent a final disability rating
of Grade 10, and made the following pronouncements: Disability Grade 10 will be applicable to his present
physical status under the POEA guidelines, x x x.19
On August 2, 2011, respondent consulted Dr. Renato P. Runas (Dr. Runas), an independent orthopedic surgeon.
Dr. Runas diagnosed him of being afflicted with cervical and lumbar spondylosis with nerve root
compression.20 On August 15, 2011, Dr. Runas opined that respondent "is not fit for further sea duty permanently
in whatever capacity with a status equivalent to Grade 8" Impediment - moderate rigidity or 2/3 loss of trunk
motion or lifting power.
Respondent posited that he was entitled to permanent and total disability benefits because: he was declared fit to
work prior to his last contract with petitioners; he sustained his illness in the course of and by reason of his work;
despite surgery and PT, his condition did not improve; the company-designated physician did not assess the
degree of his disability; his chosen physician declared him permanently unfit for sea duty; and, since repatriation,
he had never been employed and his earning capacity had since then been impaired. 22
Petitioners stressed that when respondent filed a complaint before the AMOSUP on November 23, 2009, he was
still undergoing treatment; and during which the company-designated physician had not yet given him a final
disability assessment.24 They insisted that the company-designated doctor failed to give an assessment within
120 days because respondent failed to appear for his consultations with the company-designated doctors. 25 They
explained that although no assessment was issued within the 120-day period, respondent was given a final
assessment on March 12, 2010, or within the 240-day maximum period for treatment.
The PVA rendered its Decision for respondent ordering the respondents Wallem Maritime Services[J Inc. and/or
Wallem Shipmanagement Ltd., to jointly and severally pay complainant Edwinito V. Quillao, the amount of Eighty
Nine Thousands [sic] One Hundred US Dollars (US$89,100.00) as disability benefits, plus ten percent thereof as
attorney's fees, or a total of Ninety Eight Thousands [sic] One Hundred Ten US Dollars (US$98,110.00) or its peso
equivalent converted at the time of payment.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the CA but the CA affirmed the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrators.
FACTS:
On November 14, 2005, CPMPC hired Carbonilla, Jr. as a Credit and Collection Manager and, as such,
was tasked with the handling of the credit collection activities of the cooperative, which included
recommending approvals, formulating and implementing credit and collection policies and conducting
trainings. Sometime in 2007, CPMPC underwent a reorganization whereby Carbonilla, Jr. was also
assigned to perform the duties of Human Resources Department (HRD) Manager, i.e., assisting in the
personnel hiring, firing, and handling of labor disputes. In 2008, he was appointed as Legal Officer and
subsequently, held the position of Legal and Collection Manager.
However, beginning February 2008, CPMPC, through its HRD Manager, Ma. Theresa R. Marquez
(HRD Manager Marquez), sent various memoranda to Carbonilla, Jr. seeking explanation on the
various infractions he allegedly committed.
Unconvinced by Carbonilla, Jr.'s explanations, CPMPC scheduled several clarificatory hearings, but the
former failed to attend despite due notice. Later, CPMPC conducted a formal investigation where it
ultimately found Carbonilla, Jr. to have committed acts prejudicial to CPMPC's interests. As such,
CPMPC, CEO Quevedo, sent Carbonilla, Jr. a Notice of Dismissal dated August 5, 2008 informing the
latter of his termination on the grounds of:
(a) loss of trust and confidence;
(b) gross disrespect;
(c) serious misconduct;
(d) gross negligence;
(e) commission of a crime of falsification/inducing Aguipo to violate the law or the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code; and
(f) committing acts highly prejudicial to the interest of the cooperative.
Consequently, Carbonilla, Jr. filed the instant case for illegal dismissal, non-payment salaries, 13th
month pay, as well as damages and backawages, against CPMPC, before the NLRC. In support o f his
claims, Carbonilla, Jr. denied the administrative charges against him, asserting that the Management
and Board of Directors of CPMPC merely orchestrated means to unjustly dismiss him from
employment.
CPMPC maintained that the totality of Carbonilla, Jr.'s infractions was sufficient to warrant his dismissal,
and that it had complied with the procedural due process in terminating him.
The La dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The LA found that Carbonilla, Jr. committed a litany of
infractions, the totality of which constituted just cause for the termination of his employment. Likewise, it
was determined that CPMPC afforded Carbonilla, Jr. procedural due process prior to his termination, as
evinced by the former's issuance of a series of memoranda, as well as its conduct of investigation with
notices to the latter.
The NLRC affirmed the LA ruling. It found CPMPC to have substantially proven the existence of just
causes in dismissing Carbonilla, Jr., i.e., abuse of authority; disrespect to his colleagues and superiors;
being remiss in his duties; and commission of acts of misrepresentations.
The CA reversed and set aside the NLRC ruling. CPMPC failed to discharge the burden of proving that
Carbonilla, Jr.'s dismissal was for just causes.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly ascribed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in
ruling that Carbonilla, Jr.'s dismissal was valid.
RULING:
In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings
and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the CA committed reversible error in
granting Carbonilla, Jr.'s certiorari petition since the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in ruling
that he was validly dismissed from employment as CPMPC was able to prove, through substantial
evidence, the existence of just causes warranting the same.
Basic is the rule that an employer may validly terminate the services of an employee for any of the just
causes enumerated under Article 296 (formerly Article 282) of the Labor Code.
As may be gathered from the tenor of CPMPC's Notice of Dismissal, it is apparent that Carbonilla, Jr.'s
employment was terminated on the grounds of, among others, serious misconduct and loss of trust and
confidence.
On the first ground, case law characterizes misconduct as a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character and implies wrongful
intent and not mere error in judgment. For misconduct to be considered as a just cause for termination,
the following requisites must concur: (a) the misconduct must be serious; (b) it must relate to the
performance of the employee's duties showing that the employee has become unfit to continue working
for the employer; and (c) it must have been performed with wrongful intent.
All of the foregoing requisites have been duly established in this case. Records reveal that Carbonilla,
Jr.'s serious misconduct consisted of him frequently exhibiting disrespectful and belligerent behavior,
not only to his colleagues, but also to his superiors. He even used his stature as a law graduate to insist
that he is "above" them, often using misguided legalese to weasel his way out of the charges against
him, as well as to strong-arm his colleagues and superiors into succumbing to his arrogance.
Indisputably, Carbonilla, Jr.'s demeanor towards his colleagues and superiors is serious in nature as it
is not only reflective of defiance but also breeds of antagonism in the work environment. Surely, within
the bounds of law, management has the rightful prerogative to take away dissidents and undesirables
from the workplace. It should not be forced to deal with difficult personnel, especially one who occupies
a position of trust and confidence, as will be later discussed, else it be compelled to act against the best
interest of its business.
For another, Carbonilla, Jr.'s dismissal was also justified on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.
According to jurisprudence, loss of trust and confidence will validate an employee's dismissal when it
is shown that: (a) the employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence; and (b) he performs
an act that would justify such loss of trust and confidence.93 There are two (2) classes of positions of
trust: first, managerial employees whose primary duty consists of the management of the establishment
in which they are employed or of a department or a subdivision thereof, and to other officers or
members of the managerial staff; and second, fiduciary rank-and-file employees, such as cashiers,
auditors, property custodians, or those who, in the normal exercise of their functions, regularly handle
significant amounts of money or property. These employees, though rank-and-file, are routinely charged
with the care and custody of the employer's money or property, and are thus classified as occupying
positions of trust and confidence.
We will not rule upon the other issues raised by petitioner as this Court is not the proper venue to address the
same in view of the pending petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner before the CA.
Pre-existence of an illness does not irrevocably bar compensability because disability laws still grant the same
provided seafarer's working conditions bear causal connection with his illness.
The petitioner was employed by respondent as Chief Cook which constantly exposes him to heat while preparing
the food for the entire crew all throughout the day while he was under employ. The steady and prolonged
exposure to heat naturally causes exhaustion which could unduly burden his heart and interfere with the normal
functioning of his cardio-vascular system. His illness was aggravated by his work thus it is compensable.