Rethinking Scientific Specialization

Author(s): K. Brad Wray

Source: Social Studies of Science, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Feb., 2005), pp. 151-164
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.
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sss
RESEARCH NOTE
ABSTRACT
that we
creation

is to re-examine
My aim in this paper
specialization
to acknowledge
need
the role that conceptual
changes
accounts
of new specialties.
Whereas
earlier
sociological

instrumental

changes

as the

cause

of

the

creation

of

new

an

role in the creation

important
I argue
that conceptual
developments
Specifically,
creation
of both endocrinology
and virology.

conceptual

changes

specialties.
role in the

play

conceptual

Keywords

change,

Kuhn,

scientific

I argue
scientific

specialties,
of some
played

scientific

change,

I argue
can play
in the
focus on social and

in science.

an

that

important

specialization,

specialties

Scientific

Rethinking

Specialization

K. Brad Wray
the most

is the rapid and

change
striking forms of scientific
new
of
endless
scientific
of
seemingly
growth
specialties.
Philosophers
science seldom discuss
this dimension
of scientific change. Sociologists
on the other hand, once studied specialization with intense
and historians,
the sociological
interest. As Harriet Zuckerman
(1988) notes,
study of
scientific specialization was itself, for a time, a sociological
specialty (1988:

One

535).

of

Interest

in specialization,

though,

has since passed. This,

I believe

is

unfortunate.

in science.
aim in this paper is to re-examine
In
specialization
want
to
to reviewing
I
the important
of
earlier
studies,
insights
can
to
the
the
that
need
role
conceptual
changes
play in
emphasize
study
the creation of new specialties. Whereas
focus on social
earlier accounts
as the cause of the creation of new specialties,
I argue that
changes
My
addition

conceptual
changes have played an important role in the creation of some
scientific specialties.1 The account of the role of conceptual
developments
in the creation of new specialties that I develop and defend here is deeply

indebted to Thomas Kuhn's (2000 [1987], 2000 [1991], 2000 [1993])

later writings. Unfortunately,
this work
science studies research community.
Social
?

SSS

ISSN
www.

has been

151-164
2005)
of Science 35/l(February
Oaks
and SAGE Publications
(London, Thousand

largely neglected

Studies

0306-3127

DOI:

sagepublications.

CA, New

Delhi)

10.1177/0306312705045811
com

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by the

152

Social

Sociological

and Historical

Studies

of Scientific

Studies

of Science

35/1

Specialization

In this section I examine a variety of sociological

and historical
studies of
scientific
two
I
studies. I
specialization.
begin by examining
pioneering
that
of
both
treat
these
studies
the
of a new
argue
pioneering
development
as
a
in
the
social
of
science, and
specialty
essentially
change
organization
thus treat conceptual
changes as derivative. Further, both of these studies
one
cause of the creation of new specialties. I then briefly
that
there
is
imply
review the sociological
studies of specialization
that followed these pioneer
studies.
These
studies challenge the assumption
that
ing
second-generation
the same type of cause is responsible
for the creation of all scientific
But I argue that, like the pioneering
these studies
studies,
specialties.
continue to treat the conceptual,
epistemic, or cognitive changes associated
as secondary
to the social and instrumental
with
scientific
specialties
changes associated with the process.
Let us begin with the pioneering
accounts. According
to Joseph Ben
David

Collins
(1966
[1991]: 50), the creation of a new
of scientists carving out a new pro
specialty is a consequence
an existing
fessional niche in an effort to create a new social role. When
field shows little promise
for career advancement,
ambitious
and able
to create a new discipline,
scientists will seek means
young
field, or
a
case
Ben-David
and
account
Collins
their
with
support
specialty.
study of
as
the creation in the late 1800s of experimental
a
in
psychology
discipline
and Randall

scientific

became a distinct
they note, before experimental
psychology
was
matter
'the
of
divided
between
discipline,
subject
spec
psychology
ulative philosophy
and physiology'
In
the mid-1800s,
(1966 [1991]: 53).
a period of rapid expansion
physiology underwent
(1966 [1991]: 63). In a

Germany.

As

short period of time, between

1850 and 1864, many
of the
in physiology were filled by young men. As a result,
university positions
there was
little opportunity
for career advancement
for the upcoming
of physiologists
generation
(1966 [1991]: 63). Positions were blocked by
the recently appointed generation of men who still had full careers ahead of
them. This
led a number of promising young scientists trained in physiol
relatively

for themselves
the
ogy to create new career opportunities
by applying
to problems
of physiology
methods
in psychology.
Ben-David
and Collins suggest that the development
of psychology
is a
case
a
new
the
of
which
is
created.
in
process by
typical
specialty
Crowding
an existing field leads young scientists
a new specialty in an
to develop
effort to secure rewarding employment.
Importantly,
they insist that con
were
not responsible
in
the
of
human
mind
the
ceptual developments
study
a
as
for the creation of experimental
discipline
(1966 [1991]:
psychology
50). In fact, Ben-David
for the creation
necessary

and Collins
believe
of a new discipline

'the ideas
that, generally,
are usually available over a
relatively prolonged
period of time and in several places'
(1966
[1991]:
that
if ideas were sufficient for the creation of a new
suggest
50). They
to develop as a discipline
discipline, we should have expected psychology
first in either France or the UK
(1966 [1991]: 67-69).

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Wray:

Rethinking

Scientific

Specialization

153

account of specialization.
Let us now consider the second pioneering
Derek de Sol?a Price (1986 [1963]) suggests that the chief factor that leads
to the creation of a new specialty is the demand to make effective research
research is done by humans,
and our limited cognitive
possible. Scientific
on
the organization
constraints
of science.
capacities
place
significant
Because
there is a limit to how much people can read, each scientist can
only attend to a finite and rather small portion of the continuously
growing
literature. As more
and more people get involved in
body of scientific
more
more
and
science, and
journals publish more and more papers, each
new generation
of scientists confronts a larger body of scientific literature.
In fact, Price estimates
that by the early 1960s there were already more
than 10,000,000
scientific papers. And the number of publica
published
tions was doubling every 15 years. Price believes that the various sub-fields
in science are a consequence
of scientists carving out manageable
bodies of
literature. He hypothesizes
that the optimal size for a scientific research
is between
scientists. Such a commu
100 and 200 publishing
community
nity could keep abreast of the literature they produce
(1986 [1963]: 65).
accounts have in com
There are three features that these pioneering
mon. First, both accounts are premised on the assumption
that conceptual
in science are not what lead scientists to create new special
developments
ties. Hence,
both of these pioneering
studies privilege social changes in the
creation of a new specialty, and treat conceptual
changes as derivative.
are premised
on the assumption
in
that crowding
Second, both accounts
an existing field leads to the creation of a new specialty. Price assigns
a different function
and
than that hypothesized
by Ben-David
crowding
in search of new career
Collins.
Rather
than driving young
scientists
of scientists
Price believes that crowding leads communities
opportunities,
to narrow their area of research in an effort to prevent themselves from
growing body of research. Only by narrowing
thus creating a new specialty, are scientists able
literature. Third,
both
continuously
growing
the assumption
that there is one type of cause
that leads to the creation of new scientific specialties.
a period of extensive growth in the sociology of
1970s marked
The
1975: 146-48,
science in general (see Cole & Zuckerman,
165), and in

being overwhelmed
by the
their area of research, and
to effectively manage
the
on
accounts are premised

in particular
studies of scientific
(Zuckerman,
sociological
specialization
were
most
The
of
these
studies
Nicholas Mullins'
(1972)
1988).
important
'The Development
of a Scientific
Specialty', David Edge and Michael
(1976) 'The Con
(1976) Astronomy Transformed, Daryl Chubin's
Mulkay's
an
and
edited by
of Scientific
anthology
ceptualization
Specialties',
et al. (1976b), Perspectives on the Emergence of Scientific Disciplines.
Lemaine
Rather
than provide a synthesis of second-generation
studies, I want to
to
two
draw attention
ways these studies differed from the pioneering
studies.

studies examine the

First, a number of second-generation
sociological
and the development
of instrumentation
play
impact that new instruments
in the creation of new specialties. For example, Edge & Mulkay
(1976)

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154

Social

Studies

of Science

35/1

provide a detailed account of the ways in which new instruments

shaped
radio astronomy. Similarly, John Law (1976) argues that developments
in
a
instrumentation
role
in
the
creation
of
played
significant
X-ray crystallog
studies thus suggest a need to broaden the range of causes of
raphy. These
new scientific
in instru
specialties. But they assume that developments
are distinct from conceptual
mentation
1976:
(see Law,
developments
123).
a number of second-generation
studies acknowl
Second,
sociological
a new specialty is created
of the process by which
edge the complexity
et al., 1976a). In particular,
that the
(Lemaine
they begin to recognize
of a new specialty involves both social changes, the focus of
development
or cognitive
the pioneering
and conceptual
studies,
changes
(Edge &
et al., 1976a: 1;Mulkay & Edge,
1976: 364; Lemaine
1976: 153;
Mulkay,
to question
1976: 77). This
led some sociologists
the derivative
Worboys,
were assigned in the pioneering
role that epistemic developments
studies.
to privilege
studies of scientific
seemed
the
Sociological
specialization
to
social dimension
of the process to such an extent that it is impossible
how developments
in the content of science could lead to the
of a new specialty. As Chubin
(1976: 449) explains, sociological
studies of scientific specialization
of
take 'social structure as an antecedent
events
which
denies
the
that
intellectual
specialties',
'seemingly
possibility
and the relations they engender give rise to a social structure that we treat
as a specialty.' Becher &Trowler
(2001) suggest that Chubin himself was
unable to adequately
address this concern.
conceive

creation

the interests and attention

of sociologists
of science
Unfortunately,
shifted away from the study of scientific specialization
before this concern
was adequately addressed. As Zuckerman
(1988: 535) notes, 'with the shift
to the microsociology
in research attention
of scientific knowledge,
the
...
of
declined
I
believe
amongst
study
specialties
markedly
sociologists.'
that the study of specialization
ended prematurely.
Indeed, as Zuckerman
reasons
noted
in
the
late
'the
that
led sociologists
of
1980s,
(1988: 535)
science to study the development
of specialties in the first place still appear
an adequate under
to be valid.' In particular, we have yet to develop
can
in
the creation of new
of
the
role
that
standing
changes
conceptual
play
scientific

Scientific

specialties.

and

Specialization

Conceptual

Change

of the creation of new

section,
of the change. Thomas
that
focuses
specialties
Kuhn discusses
in
various
collected
essays
together in The
specialization
never
a paper de
wrote
Road Since Structure (2000). Unfortunately,
he
a
to
the topic. As
little
voted exclusively
result, there has been remarkably
uptake or response to what he said on the topic. My aim is to synthesize his
account of specialization.
I believe
that Kuhn
remarks into a coherent
how conceptual
changes can lead to
provides
insight into understanding
In this

the

creation

I want

of new

an account
to examine
on the epistemic dimension

specialties.

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Scientific

Rethinking

Wray:

155

Specialization

to Kuhn
specialty is
(2000
[1991]: 97), a new scientific
According
of a scientific revolution. To express
sometimes
created as a consequence
idiom of The Structure
the point in the familiar though often misunderstood
in a field
scientists
1996
when
Revolutions
(Kuhn,
of Scientific
[1962]),
are
to
encounter
resolve
the crisis
and
unable
anomalies
they
persistent
a new paradigm
with the resources provided by the prevailing paradigm,
to resolve the
is designed
inevitably be developed. The new paradigm
new
not be able
will
sometimes
the
anomalies.
But
outstanding
paradigm
to serve the purposes of all those working
in the field. As a consequence,
a new
part of the field as it was conceived before the revolution becomes
are not necessarily
discarded.
old paradigms
field or specialty. Thus,
in a more restricted domain.
Sometimes
they come to be employed
to
account
of
As Kuhn
his
scientific change in response
developed

will

in
his view of the nature of scientific revolutions
for
under
that
have
ways
implications
important
standing the process by which a new scientific specialty is created. Let us
of a scientific
the notion
how he reconceived
begin by examining
criticism, he modified
subtle but important

revolution.

in
involves a taxonomic
change. For example,
a lexicon
astronomers
in which
revolution
the Copernican
replaced
a satellite of the earth with a lexicon in which
'planet'
'planet' denotes
a satellite of the sun (2000 [1987]: 15). Kuhn believes
that 'the
denotes
transition to a new lexical structure, to a revised set of kinds, permits the
structure was unable to
the previous
resolution
of problems with which
A

scientific

revolution

deal' (2000 [1993]: 250). For example, the new lexicon introduced during
astronomers
to explain retrograde
enabled
the Copernican
revolution
account of scientific revolutions,
the
in Kuhn's
motion. Thus,
developed
notion of a
notion of a taxonomic
change replaces the earlier problematic
paradigm change.2
It is worth comparing
revolutionary
changes with the more common
In
normal
of
science.
normal
discoveries
science, advances do not
place
as Kuhn
to
taxonomies.
modifications
Rather,
(2000
existing
require
to
the
in
normal
science
discoveries
'simply [add]
14) explains,
[1987]:
...

way

at

constant

variables

understood

antecedently

for a given gas sample,

temperature',

the product
is

behave.'

of pressure

typical

example

Boyle's

discovery

and volume was

of

a normal

'that,

a constant
non-revolu

scientific

tionary
discovery.3
to Kuhn,
the taxonomic
sometimes
According
a
revolution
affect only a
of
scientific
consequence
lies
outside
of
'what
research
And,
community.
becomes
the domain of another scientific specialty, a
evolving form of the old kind terms remain in use'
a new specialty is created when a taxonomic
Hence,

that are a
changes
subset of a scientific
[the new taxonomy]
specialty in which an

[1993]: 250).
change affects only
is still employed
taxonomy
(2000

and the old

of a research community,
a
Not every revolutionary
in
restricted
domain.
change permits
effectively
taxonomic
this. For example, Copernicus'
change could not be
proposed
lexicon. In such cases, there
replacing the pre-Copernican
adopted without

part

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156

Social

is no need

Studies

of Science

35/1

to create a new

specialty, for the whole of the existing research

the
community
adopts
proposed
change.4
On this Kuhnian
involves both epistemic
and
account,
specialization
social changes. On the social dimension,
scientists who once had regular
contact with each other often have less in common
to bring them together.
no
same
conferences. They may even begin
longer attend the
They may
in
different
with
publishing
journals. They may also find communication
each other more difficult
(Kuhn, 1996 [1962]: 177). But, the process of
that Kuhn describes
is essentially epistemic
in nature. It is an
specialization
a
the inability of
of scientists to ade
epistemic
shortcoming,
community
the domain of their field with the existing taxonomy, which
quately model
to divide and thus create a new specialty. As Kuhn
leads the community
and the narrowing
of the range of expertise
explains,
'specialization
[are]
... the necessary
tools' (2000
price of increasingly
powerful
cognitive
to the conceptual
resources available in the existing
[1991]: 98). Confined
scientific taxonomies,
the resolution
of some outstanding
problems may
have been impossible. Certain phenomena may evade our detection unless
a revolutionary

an

to

is made

change

existing

Thus,

taxonomy.

sometimes

to relinquish part of their current domain of

scientists must be prepared
taxonomy better
study to those who are willing to employ a new modified
suited to the study of the recalcitrant phenomena.5
for

Support
Kuhn's

the Kuhnian

Account

of specialization
to explain how
provides us with a means
can
to
in
science
contribute
the
creation
of new
developments
not
Kuhn
does
from
the
Though
provide examples
history of

account

conceptual

specialties.
science to support his account,
I believe there are cases that do in fact
an
to
In
it.
effort
Kuhn's
defend
account, I want to examine two
support
case

studies.

a clear illustration
creation of endocrinology
provides
Kuhn
describes.
As
R.A.
process
(1977: 105) explains:
Gregory
The

[T]he discovery
hormone

secretin

simple

experiment
coordinated

normally
mediation

in 1902 by Bayliss
was

and Starling

of

the

... of the duodenal

...

a signal
event
in the history
of physiology.
A
...
were
revealed
that
the
of the body
functions
not
but
also by the
system,
only
by the nervous

of specific
chemical
formed
in, and transmitted
agents
from,
to others
a message
organ
by way of circulation,
conveying
intelligible
to those
cells
to capture
the
'chemical
and
only
equipped
messenger'
the encoded
instructions
for modification
of their activity.
decipher
By the
one

of what
discovery
era of physiology,

came

to be

the beginning

called

'hormones'

of endocrinology

there

was

as we

a new
opened
know
it today.

Before

their discovery,
Bayliss and Starling made
physiologists
generally
that the functions of the body were coordinated
by the nervous
worked with reflected this. Conse
system, and the taxonomy physiologists
in
their
quently,
making
discovery, Bayliss and Starling needed to invoke a
assumed

new

concept,

'hormone'

or

'chemical

messenger'.

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Wray:

Rethinking

Scientific

157

Specialization

altered the field of physi

significantly
Bayliss and Starling's discovery
as
was
Part
of
it
before
the discovery was
the
field
conceived
ology.
on the
to
to
the
effects
of
hormones
scientists
relinquished
prepared
study
new
a
in
'Hormone'
became
this
field
of
endocri
study,
body.
key concept
left
nology. But the traditional study of physiology was, to a large degree,
was
as
much
it
before
of
the
functions
of
intact
the
very
discovery. Many
nervous
as
the body are in fact coordinated
the
system,
by
physiologists
to study various functions of
and physiologists
could continue
assumed,
the body working with that assumption.
One significant change that the
discovery brought to physiology was a narrowing of the traditional domain
of the field. The revolutionary
reduced the range of
discovery of hormones
were
to
that
phenomena
physiologists
expected
explain in terms of the
nervous
the
various
functions
of the body that are
system. Investigating
tools
by 'chemical messengers'
cognitive
requires different
In fact, the study of these
that were available to physiologists.
that are coordi
functions
is sufficiently different from that of phenomena
as
nervous
to
warrant
the attention of specialists.
nated by the
system
to accommodate
the con
Rather than modify
the existing taxonomy
coordinated

than those

could have tried to explain the observed

'hormone',
physiologists
in terms of the then-operative
lexicon. Had they tried to do
phenomena
an
accurate understanding
would have eluded
this, though, it is likely that
that the functions of
them. The existing taxonomy, built on the assumption
the body are coordinated
by the nervous system, was not fit to explain the
cept

under

phenomena

consideration.

illustrates Kuhn's view. A revolutionary

discovery
required significant changes to the taxonomy of a field, with the result that
a new field was born and the domain of the original field was subsequently
for one set of purposes,
truncated. The cognitive tools that were designed
in the functioning
of the body, are
the study of the nervous
system
This

example

discovered
were

assumed

to be
to

nicely

inadequate

for the range of phenomena

to which

they

apply.

in the history of science that follow a similar

episodes
the creation of virology as a
of
for example,
including,
development,
path
separate field of study. In the late 19th century and first half of the 20th
century what we now call viruses were often studied as anomalous
phe
nomena
and biochemists
(Waterson &
by bacteriologists,
pathologists,
to understand
viruses as
scientists
Wilkinson,
1978). Some
attempted
There

are other

resources
of
with
the conceptual
and experimental
Working
were
in
of
viruses
with
the
bacteriology,
problem
growing
perplexed
they
to understand
viruses as non
artificial media. Other scientists attempted
resources
and experimental
organic entities. Working with the conceptual
a
non
were
toxic
how
concerned
with
of chemistry,
understanding
they
in
1977:
the
substance
could
79-84,
90). But,
replicate
(Hughes,
living

microbes.

1950s 'a fundamental

conceptual
change occurred with the recognition
structure despite observed differences
in
that all viruses share a common
1977:
and
host
(Hughes,
activity'
morphology,
specificity
pathological
100). It was then realized that viruses were a distinct kind of phenomenon,

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158

Social

and could not be adequately

conceptualized
a new taxonomy had to be
toxin. Thus,
as

'virus'

Studies

of Science

35/1

either as an organism or as a
to accommodate

constructed

a kind.

of viruses
used before
the discovery
bacteriologists
same
in
the
after
the
research
discovery. Subsequent
essentially
was
more
or
the
before
the
thus
less continuous with
practice
bacteriology
re
of viruses. Bacteriologists,
discovery
though, were able to relinquish
for explaining
certain phenomena
that they had previously
sponsibility
that had, until then, remained
phenomena
regarded as their responsibility,
The

taxonomy

remained

anomalous.
the other
came

similar

specialties

to be

recognized

in pathology
and biochemistry,
situation occurred
in which
the phenomena
that
scientists
investigated
as viruses.

two episodes
in the history of science illustrate the important
These
role that conceptual
changes can play in the creation of a new scientific
a new specialty
is created as a result of a revolu
specialty. Sometimes
leads a community
sometimes
of
Such a discovery
tionary discovery.
scientists to split the domain of their field and form two separate research
each pursuing their research with a taxonomy suited to their
communities,
needs and interests. The creation of a new specialty is thus one means by
of the world. Some
which scientists are able to develop an understanding
our
until
scientists
make
elude
understanding
changes to an
phenomena
existing taxonomy. Such changes allow scientists to approach the study of
tools. And when a taxonomic
recalcitrant phenomena with new conceptual
a
new
to
scientists
in the parent specialty realize
rise
change gives
specialty,
the limits of their model,
and thus relinquish
are
to explain.
phenomena
they
ill-equipped

Anticipating

responsibility

for explaining

Criticism

In light of the sociological

studies of specialization
discussed
earlier, I
two
criticisms
could
be
raised
criticisms.
Similar
anticipate
against either of
in the previous
but
I
will
the case studies discussed
section,
present the
criticisms as they apply to the case of virology. My aim in this section is to
account of special
and thus defend the Kuhnian
address the criticisms
earlier.
ization that I have developed
Let us consider
the criticisms.
First, one might
and techniques was
of new instruments
troduction
creation of virology. In support of this view one might

argue

that

the in
for the

responsible
cite the fact that the
in
made
of viruses depended
upon a series of developments
discovery
an
a
in
role
scientists'
that
process
enhancing
played
integral
filtering,
also cite the fact that the electron
of viruses. One might
understanding
role in the discovery
of viruses
also played an indispensable
microscope
1978: 105-06).
1977: 96, 98;Waterson
&Wilkinson,
(Hughes,
was
one
that
created, not as the result of
Second,
virology
might argue
as
a
result
but
of
rather
crowding in existing fields. In
changes,
conceptual
one
fact that even before
cite
the
of
this
1900,
view,
support
might
a
life form to
had
Martinus
concept of a non-cellular
Beijerinck
developed

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Wray:

Rethinking

Scientific

159

Specialization

account

for 'the agent of tobacco mosaic

disease'
(Hughes,
seem to have
the required conceptual
developments
long before the creation of virology as a specialty in the
it seems that the creation of virology as a specialty
quently,
on the migration
into
of physicists
depended,
ultimately,

Thus,

1977: 48-51).
available

been

1950s.

Conse

in the 1950s
the biological

sciences.

Like the young physiologists

who created experimental
psychol
were
new
career opportunities,
these
and created
ogy,
seeking
physicists
to biological
them by applying
the methods
of physics
phenomena
1977:
91).
(Hughes,
In the remainder of this section, I want to address these criticisms,
that technological
beginning with the first. It is undeniable
developments
an
role
in
the
of viruses, but I believe
it is a
discovery
played
important
to regard the technological
as
cause
mistake
of
the
ultimate
developments
are two considerations
the creation of virology as a specialty. There
that
lead me to believe this. First, rather than being an epistemic asset, at times
to the discovery of viruses.
the reliance on techniques was an impediment
Before
scientists
the
modern
'virus',
concept
developed
technique
determined
like filterability
and microscopic
characteristics,
invisibility,
were often used to identify substances
as viruses. But, as Sally Hughes
...
(1977: 87) notes, such 'technique-determined
physical characteristics
were

to differentiate
viruses from all other
criteria by which
inadequate
do not distinguish
types of infectious agents.' That is, these characteristics
viruses from other superficially
similar but unrelated
phenomena. What
scientists
lacked was 'information
about [the] intrinsic biological
proper
ties [of viruses]'
1977: 87). Consequently,
(Hughes,
to attribute
the creation
of virology
entirely

I believe it is amistake
to developments
in

instrumentation.

to what

is implied by this criticism, I believe that it is

with epistemic develop
technological
developments
ments. Earlier sociological
the role that develop
studies that emphasized
ments
in instrumentation
played in the creation of new specialties seem to
assume that these are distinct types of developments.
This assumption
is
most evident in Law's study of X-ray protein crystallography.
In fact, Law
Second, contrary
a mistake
to contrast

between
(1976: 123) proposes distinguishing
'"technique",
"theory", and
thus
that
the
"subject matter"
techniques
employed
specialties',
implying
of ac
in X-ray
could have been developed
independent
crystallography
to
what
Law
theoretical
Contrary
implies, I
companying
developments.
are often tied to conceptual
in instrumentation
believe that developments
in instrumentation
often either: (1)
That
is, developments
developments.
or
occur
with
simultaneous
upon
(2)
depend
developments;
conceptual
to
For
order
in
the
example,
develop
technology
conceptual developments.
to detect X-rays,
had to simultaneously
discover X-rays
(see
R?ntgen
a sharp distinction
1996 [1962]: 56-57). Thus, making
between
Kuhn,
as some
in instrumentation
and conceptual
developments,
developments
of the earlier sociological
Let us now consider
criticism. First, I believe

studies did, ismisleading.6

I have three replies to this
the second criticism.
that the criticism is based on aWhig
reading of

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160

Social

Studies

of Science

35/1

that viruses form a

history. It is only with hindsight, with the knowledge
that led
distinct kind of entity, that we identify all the various investigations
to virology.7 Scientists
to the discovery of viruses as contributions
involved
saw things quite differently. Before the 1950s, when
in these investigations
to a variety
scientists used the term 'virus', it was applied indiscriminately
as bac
have
of
been
of phenomena,
which
identified
many
subsequently
teria (Hughes,
1977: 92-95).
con
of the modern
Second,
though there were earlier anticipations
some
to
extent
with
the
cept, like Beijerinck's
proposal which
'agrees
to say
modern
definition
of the virus' (Hughes,
1977: 57), it is a mistake
in the 1950s. The
that he discovered
the same thing that was discovered
that Beijerinck had was, at the time, in conflict with
vague understanding
criticized by others, and not
widely
accepted background
assumptions,
1977: 57-58; Waterson
data (Hughes,
well supported by the then-available
1978: 27-30).8
&Wilkinson,
for the
Third, many of the scientists who were ultimately
responsible
creation of virology as a specialty were not looking for new career oppor
secure
with
tunities. Many
of them were well-established
researchers,
in research
involved
in a number
of specialties.
and actively
positions,
in virology lacked the incentives to create a new social
the pioneers
Hence,
the early founders of experimental
niche that had motivated
psychology.
a
came to
for
explanation
why
virology
Consequently,
comprehensive
be created as a new specialty in the 1950s requires reference to both: (1)
of viruses; and (2) the
in our understanding
conceptual
developments
accompanying

derstanding

Concluding

taxonomic

changes

required

to

articulate

an

adequate

un

of the phenomena.

Remarks

It is worth
the epistemic benefits of specialization.
analysis emphasizes
costs
creation
of a new
the
involved.
With
the
epistemic
briefly mentioning
narrows.
As a
the
of
individual
scientists
scientific
expertise
specialty
are
trust
to
and
scientists
consequence,
increasingly required
depend upon
in other specialties.9 This
the findings of those who work
increasing
science is one of the principal
that characterizes
contemporary
dependence
are created, barriers
costs of specialization
in science. As new specialties

My

to the development
and these can sometimes be an impediment
some
discoveries
have
upon
Indeed,
depended
important
For example,
the barriers created by specialization.
scientists transcending
181) notes that the discovery of the bacterial
(1999: 84-85,
PaulThagard
ulcers
of
specialties,
theory
required knowledge from two different medical
to make
of the knowledge
needed
Much
and
gastroenterology.
pathology
the discovery was available for some time before the discovery was made.
are created
science.

of

it was

two scientists from different

only when
specialties
the
that
discovery was made.10
collaboratively
an account
In summary,
I have developed
and defended
can
to
the creation
in
science
contribute
conceptual developments

But

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worked
of how
of a new

Wray:

Rethinking

Scientific

161

Specialization

scientific

In developing
I have
this account,
specialty.
left
unanswered
earlier
studies
question
by
sociological
or epistemic developments
how can conceptual
in science
of a new scientific specialty? I argued that
development
to split
eries will sometimes
lead a research community

a key
addressed
of specialization:
to the
contribute

scientific discov
into two commu
nities, each subsequently working with a taxonomy suited to its needs and
interests. Further,
I argued that this is what led to the creation of both
in the early 1900s and virology in the 1950s.
endocrinology
my aim has been to account for the role that conceptual
Although
can play in the creation of a new specialty, we should be
developments
of an important
mindful
insight of the second-generation
sociological
studies discussed
earlier. The creation of a new specialty
is a complex
process, often involving both cognitive and social changes. Even a social
factor like crowding in a field could play an important role in leading to the
sorts of conceptual
that would
lead to the creation of a new
developments
specialty. For example, as an existing field gets crowded there may be more
can lead to a significant
intense competition,
which
But, a
discovery.
examination
of
the
interaction
between
social
and
thorough
epistemic
factors in the process of specialization
is a topic that goes beyond the scope
of this paper.
Notes
I thank

audiences

Humanities

Circle

at the following,
at the University

to whom

I presented
earlier drafts: the Science
and
of Alberta;
the annual meeting
of the Canadian
Society
at the State
of Science;
the Philosophy
Department
Colloquium

for History

and Philosophy
of New York, Oswego;
the Pacific Division
of the American
meeting
and the 12th International
of Logic, Methodology,
and
Association;
Philosophical
Congress
of Science.
I also thank the following
individuals
for their constructive
feedback:
Philosophy

University

Lori Nash,

Randall
Kristina
Leslie
Collins,
Rolin, Paul Teller, David Hull, Lisa Gannett,
Robert
Robert Wilson,
and Alex Reuger.
In addition,
Cormack,
Smith, Patrick McGivern,
thank the two anonymous
referees for Social Studies of Science who provided
insightful
comments
that improved
the paper. Harold Kincaid
and David Vampola
also provided

as I worked
on the project. Finally,
I thank the Dean
of the
insight and encouragement
at SUNY-Oswego
of Arts and Sciences
and the Office
of International
Studies
for
College
to cover travel costs to two of the conferences
their financial
listed earlier.
support
here is not between
distinction
'externar
and 'internal' factors.
Indeed,
important
as Hull
et al. (1978) argue, it is often difficult
or not a factor is
to determine
whether
to count as external. For example,
scientists have frequently
been influenced
by

1. The

'extrascientific

and socioeconomic
and
including metaphysical
principles,
(1978: 717). From our perspective
today, what clearly looks like an
as internal by those influenced
factor was often regarded
by it.The distinction
is my concern here is between
social factors and epistemic
factors.

religious
external
that

beliefs',

beliefs

2. Kuhn

borrowed
the term 'paradigm' from
'the standard
in
examples
employed
took
(1977a: xix; 1996 [1962]: 23). But, as he explains,
language
teaching'
'paradigms
on a life of their own .... Having
solutions,
begun
problem
they
simply as exemplary
in which
their empire to include, first, the classical books
these accepted
expanded
the entire global set of commitments
shared
and, finally,
examples
initially appeared
the members
of a particular
scientific
(1977a: xix). Steven Weinberg
community'
use of the term
had raised concerns
about Kuhn's
(1998) notes that James Conant

even before
paradigm
role to play in Kuhn's

the publication
statement

final

of Structure.

Paradigms

on scientific

change.

still have
As widely

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an important
accepted

by

162

Social

of Science

35/1

in solving unresolved
of scientists
that guide a community
they are
problems,
view differs most from the
It is in this respect that Kuhn's
of consensus.
The positivists
assumed
that scientists were united by either an agreed upon

exemplars
the locus
positivists.

or a set of sentences

method,
3. Kuhn's

Studies

account

amended

that constitute

of scientific

the accepted
theory.
some
alleviates

revolutions

of his critics'

worries.

account
of scientific
earlier paradigm-related
criticizing Kuhn's
revolutions,
(1976: 392) argue that 'it is far from easy to state
Edge & Mulkay
entail the
what kinds of changes
should, from Kuhn's
perspective,
unambiguously
account
occurrence
of scientific
of a revolution.'
Given Kuhn's
revolutions,
developed

For

example,

all and only

4. Mulkay

that require taxonomic

changes will count as revolutionary.
changes
account
of scientific
512) describes Kuhn's
paradigm-related
as a closed model,
for it stresses
'the existence
of scientific
orthodoxies.'

those

(1975:

development

are ultimately
for they
that such accounts
513) believes
unacceptable
a branching
Instead he recommends
innovation
highly problematic'.
to which
areas are regularly
'new problem
model
of scientific
development,
according
account
of
formed'
social networks
created and associated
(1975: 520). The Kuhnian

Mulkay
'make

(1975:
scientific

as a branching
here ismore
model.
aptly described
specialization
presented
an account
of scientific fields
5. Abbott
of the dynamics
(2001) has recently developed
an important
the Kuhnian
role to conceptual
that attributes
changes. But unlike
to
and it is
account
social
sciences
account presented
here, Abbott's
only,
applies
a field, rather than the dynamics
that
within
concerned
with the dynamics
principally
of new

lead to the creation

6.

one

I thank

of the referees

fields.
a
Studies of Science for advice on developing
for suggesting
the second response.
in particular
alleged contributions
point with respect to Mendel's

for Social

response
7. Brannigan
to genetics.

to this first

8. As Waterson

of Beijerinck's
& Wilkinson
(1978: 27) note, a number
contemporaries
K.G.E.
the tobacco mosaic
disease,
including C.J. Koning,
researching
did not even understand
Friedrich
and Adolf Mayer,
'Beijerinck's
Hunger,

wh^were

and

criticism,
a similar
makes

(1981)

Heintzel,
including Emile Roux,
flight of thought'. Others,
were critical of Beijerinck's
Centanni,
conceptual
1978: 27-28).
9. On

Dmitri

and Eugenio
Ivanovski,
innovation
(Waterson & Wilkinson,

see Steven Shapin's

in science,
(1994) A Social History
of Truth.
the discovery
it is unlikely
that either scientist would have made
Swanson
that is created by specialization,
the predicament
Recognizing

the role of trust

10. Thagard

believes

that

alone.
working
& Smalheiser
(1997) have developed
literature
bodies
of scientific
between

software to identify connections

computer
from different fields that might
lead to scientific

discoveries.

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Mulkay

K. Brad Wray isAssistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the

State University of New York, Oswego. His research addresses the following
issues: the interaction between epistemic and social factors in science; the
for the
research in science; invisible hand explanations
role of collaborative
success of science; the relationship between age and scientific productivity;
and the viability of functional explanations
of social phenomena.
Address: Department
of Philosophy, State University of New York, Oswego,
128 Piez Hall, Oswego, NY 13126, USA; email: kwray@oswego.edu

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