Spain Delegate Address at the NATO Summit Simulation April 2016

Euro-Atlantic Council of Macedonia

In 1982 Spain entered NATO as the first country to join since 1955. Spains domestic political
climate was not favorable for NATO membership during Francisco Francos dictatorship, as Franco
preferred the deployment of the military as an agent of internal stability as opposed to employing it as a
contributor to the stability of West European countries.
Tras el gobierno de Franco, y segn pasaba por una transicin hacia la democracia, Espaa ha demostrado
toda buena voluntad de participar en los empeos de defensa colectiva y en la alianza militar
intergubernamental, y deposit un un instrumento de ratificacin para ser formalmente el decimosexto miembro
de la Organizacin del Tratado del Atlntico Norte el 30 de mayo de 1982, con el presidente Leopoldo Calvo
Sotelo subsecuentemente atendiendo a la cumbre de Bonn como un lder del gobierno de la OTAN.

Post-Francos rule and as it transitioned to democracy, Spain has demonstrated every goodwill to
take full participation in the collective defense efforts and initiatives of the intergovernmental military
alliance, and deposited an instrument of ratification to formally become the 16th member of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization on May 30, 1982, with Prime Minister Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo attending the
subsequent Bonn Summit as a full NATO government leader.
Our Spanish Navy, which is to say, the Armada Espaola, being one of the oldest active naval
forces and worlds most powerful maritime force of the 16th and early 17th century, as well as the
defender of a vast trade network across the Atlantic ocean for several centuries during the Spanish
Empire, is one of our humble contributions to current-day NATO maritime operations. In light of a
growing Russian threat to surface ships in the European theater, Spains Rota maintenance team has been
credited with the successful installation of SeaRAM Sea Rolling Airframe Missiles - aboard the four
U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyers, DDGs, forward deployed to Rota, Spain. The four DDGs support
the European phased adaptive approach to defending Europe against ballistic missile threats from the
Middle East. However they have had the side effect of prompting Russia to increase its offensive
capability in the region for it has perceived the DDGs presence as directed against Russia [ most likely
viewed from the perspective of the establishment of land-based Aegis ashore missile defense sites in
Romania and Poland].
As pertaining last months complaints by eleven members of the European Parliament regarding
Russian navys frequent stopovers in the Spanish north African enclave of Ceuta, and the allegations that
these naval operations are key to maintaining the Russian armys positions in Ukraine, we necessitate
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to point out that European law has remained ambiguous on whether or not such naval operations
constitute a violation of EU sanctions against Moscow over its annexation of Crimea. These visits, which
occur 10 times a year on the average, are authorized on a case-by-case basis by the Spanish Foreign
Ministry, and as a policy implemented with complete transparency it has not drawn protests from NATO
allies, albeit has helped Spains efforts to maintain best possible relations with Russia.
Although NATO is facing various novel types of threats such as guerrilla terrorist combat
exemplified in the recent Paris and Brussels bombings, our combined defense and security is put in
jeopardy by a not so obvious factor, namely secessionist movements. Our biggest threat is internal.
Referendums, such as the Scottish one on their portended departure from the United Kingdom, strike at
the very foundations of the NATO alliance, for the sole and major hazard of it triggering a wave of
secessions across NATO, ranging from Canada to Italy. Spain might have been caught up in a similar
trend of Catalonian independence aspirations, nevertheless we necessitate pointing out that a potential
Catalonian independence might facilitate a chain reaction of several other independence movements
across NATO members, imperiling NATO countries territorial and political integrity and consequently
destabilizing the worlds greatest military alliance. We are talking not only Spains Catalonia and UKs
Scotland, but also Canadas Quebec, Belgiums Flanders, and Italys Venice, Sicily and Lombardy.
Thus we expect NATOs support in the area of internal security in the component of support for
NATO member countries that are facing internal conflicts along ethnic, religious, and language lines.
NATO is oriented to serving the function of a defensive umbrella towards external threats. We also deem
it necessary and equally as important for the Alliance to have developed programs for supporting
governments internal policies that pertain to the internal cohesion of states. It is in NATOs own best
interest to be ready to react to or counteract any such foreseen internal conflicts which may weaken its
Mediterranean wing, in light of the forewarnings of ISIS jihadists spread into Libya, and the Daesh
control of Sirte, as casting an uncomfortable shadow upon Mediterranean cruise ships security. There are
estimates of the potential for terror factions trying to build a navy to be used on waging a war against the
West, starting with terror attacks on Mediterranean cruise ships. The Mediterranean is not only facing the
issues of immigration, but rather also and perhaps even more importantly the issues of jeopardized
maritime trade and maritime access.
Hemos sido advertidos de la propagacin de yijadistas de ISIS en Libia, y del control del Daesh sobre Sirte,
que emiten una sombra de incomodidad sobre la seguridad de los cruceros del Mediterrneo. Hay estimaciones
sobre posibles facciones terroristas que tratan de construir una marina de guerra para ser usada en su guerra
contra el occidente, comenzando con ataques a cruceros del Mediterrneo. El Mediterrneo no slo se enfrenta a
los problemas de la inmigracin, sino tambin, y quizs sea lo ms importante, al peligro del comercio y acceso
martimo.
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