Why He Used the Bomb

An analysis into the influences on President Trumans decision to use

atomic weaponry on Japan

In 1945, World War II was drawing to a close. The Germans had surrendered in May, and
the allies just needed to win the war in the pacific. In June of 1945 the Joint Chiefs of Staff were
meeting to plan the invasion of the home islands of the Japanese for later that year.1 But at this
same time the worlds first atomic bomb was being finished in New Mexico and the question for
the President became when to use it.

In this essay, we will discuss a few of the influences pressed upon President Truman during the
summer of 1945. First is the interim committee in charge of the Manhattan Project (the project to
develop the atomic bomb) and what their opinion was. Second are the scientists who developed
the atomic bomb and how they felt the bomb should be used. After analyzing documents
pertaining to these two parties there are documents from President Truman that will be analyzed
to see who had a greater influence on the use of the atomic bombs against Japan. To understand
why these two groups had an influence on him however is to look at morality on the side of the
scientists. Also consider saving American lives, and public opinion of Japan for the side of the
interim committee.

The first document to be considered, are diary entries of Admiral William D. Leahy.
These diary entries cover from June 1, 1945 until August 10, 1945. Leahy was involved in
planning for the eventual invasion of Japan with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as
accompanying the President of the United States to the Potsdam Conference.2 In his meetings

1 William D. Leahy, Diary Entries Subject File Ayers Papers

2 Ibid. Pg. 1-5
2

with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy gives us details pertaining to the Joint Chiefs knowledge of
the Atomic Bomb. In his words he says none then knew the potentialities of the atomic bomb.3
Its interesting that those who were in charge of making war were unaware of a potential game
changer that was nearly complete. At this point for them to be making plans even though those in
charge of them were aware of the atomic bomb, we can derive that the plan had not been to rely
upon the atomic bomb to end the war. This is further strengthened in a petition from the atomic
scientists that will be further analyzed later on that describes the purpose of starting the atomic
program. It reads Until recently we have had to fear that the United States might be attacked by
atomic bombs during this war and that her only defense might lie in a counterattack by the same
means.4 From these two sources it is shown that the plan wasnt to use the bomb offensively but
to prepare to use it as a deterrent. The next step is to see what changed this plan to using
offensively.

On June 1, 1945 The Interim Committee recommended that the bomb should be used against
Japan, without specific warning, as soon as possible, and against such a target as would make
clear its devastating strength.5 After this was recommended, Admiral Leahy begins suggesting
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that there would be no need for a major invasion to win the war.6 We
can see that many on the military side were for a quick end. The best reason for this may be due
to the high casualties that would be lost on each island. Leahy wrote in his journal that for the
first of the Japanese home islands it was estimated that they would lose 63,000 soldiers out of
3 William D. Leahy, Diary Entries Subject File Ayers Papers
4 Atomic Scientists, A petition To The President of the United States
5 William D. Leahy, Diary Entries Subject File Ayers Papers
6 William D. Leahy, Diary Entries Subject File Ayers Papers
3

190,000 that would be required to land. 7 There was definite appeal in the power to force
surrender without the loss of any more American lives. But the scientists involved seemed to
think there was more to consider.

On July 16, 1945 the first live test of the atomic bomb took place in Alamogordo, New Mexico.
And its power was beyond the most optimistic expectations of those in charge of it.8 In a report
to the Secretary of War, he describes the awesome power of the bomb, and what it did to the
surrounding area. A few of his details include the sound being heard up to 180 miles away, with a
broken window 120 miles away. A crater 1200 feet in diameter with no vegetation, and the steel
tower that had held the bomb had evaporated.9 The next day the scientists in charge who had just
seen this scene of destruction in the desert wrote and sent a petition to President Truman
requesting the bomb not be used in this phase of the war.

Leo Szilard wrote the petition, and in asking for people to sign it he wrote the reason they
needed to is based on purely moral considerations. He describes how not every German is
responsible for the heinous acts that Germany had committed during the war. There were some
that could have spoken up to stop things, but they would have done so at risk to life and liberty.10
He calls it their responsibility to protest the use of the bomb since they do not have the major
risks, and because the people of the United States are unaware of this choice facing our country.11
7 Ibid. Pg. 1
8 L. R. Groves, Memorandum For The Secretary of War
9 Ibid. Pg. 2
10 Leo Szilard, Petition Request from Szilard to Edward Tellar
11 Ibid. Pg. 1
4

Szilard was on moral grounds to the use of the bomb at this phase of the war, and wanted other
scientists support in petitioning the President.

And he got support. The day after the test a petition was sent to the President while he
was at the Potsdam Conference.12 The scientists in their petition remind everyone that the initial
purpose of the atomic program was to protect against similar attacks from Germany. Since that is
no longer a threat, they know that it will be looked at as the way to end the war speedily. We
feel, however, that such attacks on Japan could not be justified13 they said as they argued that
once the bomb is dropped, the United States will be opening a door to an era of devastation.14
They foresaw that if any rival power obtained this same technology, any city in the United States
would be at risk of sudden annihilation.15 They did say it could be dropped, but only under
certain conditions after much warning being given to the Japanese, and giving them very clear
terms of surrender.16 They were morally trying to appeal to the President, and show him the
potential threat to the United States in the future.
In the book In the Shadow of the Shadow of the Bomb: Oppenheimer, Bethe, and the
Moral Responsibility of the Scientist author Silvan Schweber describes the struggle these
scientists had with the new world they were responsible for creating. A world where mutually
assured destruction (MAD) was the name of the defense strategies of the worlds nations. He
shows that they felt the self-conscious weight of what they had created. This works with their
12 William D. Leahy, Diary Entries Subject File Ayers Papers
13 A Petition to the President of the United States
14 Ibid. Pg. 1
15 Ibid. Pg. 1
16 Ibid, Pg. 1
5

petitions to show that they felt the moral implications and did not want this bomb dropped at that
time.

On one side, President Trumans military advisors were looking to use the bomb suddenly
to force a Japanese surrender. On the other, the scientists were asking the bomb not be used yet
on moral grounds. President Truman as commander in chief was the one responsible for making
the difficult decision to drop the bomb. To understand his motives, and how he was influenced, it
is important to see his communications to different groups.

First we will look at his statement following the dropping of the first atomic bomb. In
describing to the American people what has happened President Truman states We are now
prepared to obliterate more rapidly and completely every productive enterprisewe shall
completely destroy Japans power to make war. If they do not now accept our terms they may
expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth.17 President
Truman talks about wanton destruction with little restraint in regard to eliminating Japans ability
to make war. This tends to lean more towards the interim committee and military advisors side of
how to use the bomb. The unrestrained destruction is definitely opposed to the moral grounds of
the atomic scientists. However in a telegram to Richard Russell he shows what he is willing to
do, and why.

The telegram was dated the day the second bomb was dropped, in response to a telegram
President Truman had received a day after the first bomb was dropped. In the telegram President
17 President Harry S. Truman, Statement by the President of the United
States
6

Truman says that even though Japan is a terribly cruel nation, he doesnt feel we should act the
same.18 I certainly regret the necessity of wiping our whole populations because of the
pigheadedness of the leaders of a nation..I am not going to do it unless it is absolutely
necessary.19 President Truman shows that he will destroy Japan entirely if he deems it necessary.
This coincides with the unrestrained destruction of his statement following the first bomb. But
here he gives us a reason to go with the destruction. His object is to save American lives.20 He
claims to have a humane feeling for the women and children of Japan21, but one could argue if
this were true his statements and actions may more closely resemble that of the petition of the
atomic scientists.

Bringing it all together, we know that many of the atomic scientists did not want the
atomic bomb used at that phase in the war for moral reasons. We also know that the interim
committee and many military advisors to the President were in favor of using the bomb to end
the war quickly and save as many American lives as possible. President Truman did decide to use
the atomic bombs on Japan and promised to rain down destruction if they did not surrender. I
would submit that based on what President Truman said and did, he was more heavily influenced
by the military than by the scientists who knew the bomb. This being said, the dropping of the
atomic bombs on Japan during World War II was a result of the pressure and influence of the
military advisors to President Truman.
18 President Harry S. Truman, Harry S. Truman to Richard Russell, August 9,
1945
19 Ibid. Pg. 1
20 President Harry S. Truman, Harry S. Truman to Richard Russell, August 9,
1945.
21 Ibid. Pg. 1
7

BIBLIOGRAPHY
A Petition to the President of the United States July 17, 1945. Letter. FromTruman Library,
Miscellaneous Historical Documents Collection.
http://trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/pdfs/79.pdf#zoom
=100 (accessed March 5, 2016).
Groves, L. R., Memorandum For The Secretary of War, July 18, 1945.Memorandum.
From Truman Library, Research Material Lamont Papers.
http://trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents
/pdfs/2.pdf#zoom=100 (accessed March 5, 2016).
Leahy, William D., Diary Entries, June 1, 1945. Journal. From Truman Library, Subject File
Ayers Papers.
http://trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/pdfs/48.pdf#zoom
=100 (accessed March 5, 2016).
Schweber, Silvan S., In the Shadow of the Bomb: Oppenheimer, Bethe, and the Moral
Responsibility of the Scientist (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), Pg. 4
Szilard, Leo. Petition Request from Szilard to Edward Teller July 4, 1945. Manuscript. From
Atomic Archive.
http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/ManhattanProject/SzilardTeller1.shtml (accessed
March 5, 2016).

Truman, Harry S., Harry S. Truman to Richard B. Russell, August 9,1945. Letter. From
Truman Library, Official File Truman Papers.
http://trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/pdfs/9.pdf#zoom=
100 (accessed March 5, 2016).
Truman, Harry S., Statement By The President of the United States, August 6, 1945.
Manuscript. From Truman Library, Subject File, Ayers Papers.
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/index.ph
p?pagenumber=1. (accessed March 5, 2016)