Oliveros v.

Lopez
168 SCRA 431
DOCTRINE: Under Article 494 and 1083 of the Civil Code, co-ownership of
an estate should not exceed twenty years, while the agreement to keep a
thing undivided should not exceed ten years. When parties stipulated a
definite period to keep a thing undivided which exceeds the maximum
allowed by law, said stipulation shall be void only as to the period beyond
such maximum. Thus, co-ownership of an estate cannot exceed twenty
years so property should be divided after twenty years. Each co-owner
may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common
insofar as his share is concerned.
Article 494 specifically mandates that each co-owner may demand at any
time the partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is
concerned.
FACTS:
Upon his death, Lopez left the lot he owned to his widow and six children;
the heirs did not initiate any move to legally partition the property. After
many years, the widow and the eldest son, Candido, executed a deed of
absolute sale of the undivided eastern portion of their interests in favor of
spouses Oliveras & Minor; another deed of absolute sale of the undivided
eastern part in favor of spouses Oliveras & Gaspar. The two Oliveras
spouses had since possessed the properties.
After many years, the counsel of the two Oliveras spouses wrote to the
remaining heirs of Lopez reminding them of the Oliveras spouses demand
to partition the property so they could acquire their titles without court
action. The heirs didnt answer so the Oliveras spouses filed a complaint
for partition and damages.
According to the Oliveras spouses, possession of the disputed properties
was delivered to them with the knowledge and consent of the heirs;
however, according to the heirs, no sale transpired as the vendors, the
widow and Candido, could not sold specific portions of the property

making Oliveras spouses possession and occupation of specific portions

of the properties illegal. Trial court ruled that the deeds of absolute sale
are valid and ordered the segregation of the lot.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the two deeds of absolute sale were null and void
since the lot had not yet been partitioned. -- NO
2. Whether or not the action for partition has prescribed. -- NO
HELD:
1. Under Article 494 and 1083 of the Civil Code, co-ownership of an
estate should not exceed twenty years, while the agreement to keep a
thing undivided should not exceed ten years. When parties stipulated a
definite period to keep a thing undivided which exceeds the maximum
allowed by law, said stipulation shall be void only as to the period
beyond such maximum. Thus, co-ownership of an estate cannot
exceed twenty years so property should be divided after twenty years.
Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing
owned in common insofar as his share is concerned.
In this case, the heirs maintained the co-ownership beyond 20 years so
when the widow and Candido sold definite portions of the lot, they
validly exercised dominion over them because, by operation of law, the
co-ownership had ceased. The filing of the complaint for partition by
the Oliveras spouses who are legally considered as subrogated to the
rights over the partitions of lot in their possession merely served as
formality on the widow and Candidos act of terminating co-ownership.
2. Prescription may have barred the filing of complaint under Article
1144 (a) of the Civil Code; however, Article 494 specifically mandates
that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing
owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. In this case,
although the complaint was filed after thirteen years from the
execution of the deeds of sale, the Oliveras spouses action for
partition was timely and properly filed.

Prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the coownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner. Petitioners registration
of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a valid
repudiation of co-ownership, especially since there was fraud involved.
FACTS:
DELIMA V. CA- Repudiation of Co-ownership
Cancellation of old title and issuance of new one constituted an open and
clear repudiation of the trust or co-ownership which would start the
running of prescription.

Lupo Mariateguie died without a will on June 15, 1953. During his lifetime,
Lupo contracted 3 marriages. He had 8 children all in all: 4 with his first
wife, Eusebia; 1 daughter with his second wife, Flaviana; and 3 with his
third wife, Felipe.

FACTS:
This case is another story of sibling war over a Friar Land Estate inherited
from their parent who had acquired said land from the Government. When
the parents died, Respondent Galileo allegedly paid the remaining balance
of the purchase price, and the estate tax. Later on, he executed an
affidavit declaring himself as sole owner and acquired TCT over it. 10
years after the TCT was issued, the other heirs instituted this action for
reconveyance claiming their part as co-owners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the other heirs are still entitled to the land or are they
barred by prescription.

Lupo left four properties which he acquired while he was still unmarried.
On December 2, 1967, Lupos descendants by his 1st and 2nd marriages
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated one of
the lots unto themselves. An OCT was issued in the names of these heirs.
Subsequently, this lot was subdivided into two, for which separate TCTs
were issued to the respective parties.
Lupos children with the third wife, who were claiming continuous
enjoyment and possession of the land, protested. They went to court
saying that when the court adjudicated one of the four lots to their coheirs, they were deprived of their respective shares in the lot. They prayed
for the partition of the entire estate (all 4 lots) and the annulment of the
deed of extrajudicial partition.

RULING:
The other heirs are barred by prescription. How did this happen? Galileo
was able to prove the 4 requirements: (1) clear and convincing evidence
of repudiation (2) made known to the other owners (3) adverse possession
and open repudiation (4) for over 10 years.

The defendants (other heirs) filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of

lack of cause of action and prescription. The trial court dismissed the case
while the CA declared that all the heirs were entitled to equal shares in
the estate. CA directed the heirs who had acquired TCTs to execute deeds
of reconveyance in favor of the heirs with the third wife.

What is important in this case is that the Court ruled that registration of
the land would be sufficient compliance with the notice requirement
above.

ISSUE:

MARIATEGUI V. CA - Prescription of an Action for Partition

Whether or not prescription barred private respondents right to demand

partition of the estate
[The court established that the heirs had successional rights as their
father had, during his lifetime, repeatedly acknowledged them as his

children; that they enjoyed that status since birth legitimate children &
heirs indeed]
RULING:
No. Prescription does not run against private respondents wrt the filing of
the action for partition so long as the heirs/co-owners for whose benefit
the prescription is invoked have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the
co-ownership.
The registration was not a valid act of repudiation because it was not
clearly made known to the other heirs. For prescription to run, the act of
repudiation is subject to certain conditions:
1. a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership
2. such act is clearly made known to the other co-owners
3. the evidence is clear and conclusive
4. OCEN possession of the property
Assuming that it was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership,
prescription had not yet set in when the respondents filed the action for
partition. The reason is because there was fraud involved in obtaining
registration. Earlier the respondent heirs were assured by the petitionerheirs no to worry about their share in their inheritance; their existence as
co-owners was recognized and in fact, they constructed a house on the
registered lot without objection from the petitioner-heirs. In as much as
petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their coheirs, prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time
respondents discovered the fraud. In this case, respondents immediately
commenced an action two months after they learned of the fraud.
Salvador v. CA
G.R. No. 109910, April 5, 1995
FACTS:
AlipioYabo was the owner of Lot No. 6080 and Lot No. 6180 situated
in Barrio Bulua, Cagayan de Oro City, whose title devolved upon his nine

children, including Maria, upon his death sometime before or during the
second world war.
In 1976, Pastor Makibalo, who is the husband of Maria, filed a
complaint against the spouses Alberto and ElpiaYabo for "Quieting of Title,
Annulment of Documents, and Damages." In the complaint, he alleged
that he owned a total of eight shares of the subject lots, having purchased
the shares of seven of Alipio's children and inherited the share of his wife,
Maria, and that except for the portion corresponding to Gaudencia's share
which he did not buy, he occupied, cultivated, and possessed
continuously, openly, peacefully, and exclusively the two parcels of land.
He then prayed that he be declared the absolute owner of 8/9 of the lots
in question.
On 8 October 1976, the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of
the late AlipioYabo lodged a complaint for partition and quieting of title
with damages against Pastor Makibalo, Enecia Cristal, and the spouses
Eulogio and Remedies Salvador. They alleged that Lot No. 6080 and Lot
No. 6180 are the common property of the heirs of AlipioYabo, namely, the
plaintiffs, defendant Enecia Cristal, Maria Yabo and Jose Yabo, whose share
had been sold to Alberto Yabo; that after Alipio's death, the spouses Pastor
and Maria Makibalo, Enecia Cristal and Jose Yabo became the de facto
administrators of the said properties; and that much to their surprise, they
discovered that the Salvador spouses, who were strangers to the family,
have been harvesting coconuts from the lots, which act as a cloud on the
plaintiffs' title over the lots.
The plaintiffs then prayed that (a) they, as well as defendant Pastor
Makibalo, in representation of his wife, and Enecia Cristal, in
representation of Gaudencia, be declared as the owners of the lots; (b) the
Salvador spouses be declared as having no rights thereto except as
possible assignees of their co-defendants, Pastor Makibalo and Enecia
Cristal; (c) the lots be partitioned according to law among the
aforementioned co-owners; and (d) the defendants be made to pay for the
value of the fruits they harvested from the lots and for moral and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees, expenses of the litigation, and costs
of the suit.
To cut the story short, the trial court decided in favor of the
plaintiffs; thus, the defendants appealed trial courts decision to the Court
of Appeals. The CA held, among others, that prescription and laches have
not run against the private respondents with respect to the 1/9 share of
Maria Yabo in the estate of her father and to her conjugal share in the
portions acquired from her brothers and sisters.

ISSUE:WON prescription and lachescan be applied against the co-heirs of

Pastor Makibalo?
RULING:
NO.
Article 494 of the Civil Code, which provides that each co-owner
may demand at any time the partition of the common property, implies
that an action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be
barred by laches. The imprescriptibility of the action cannot,
however, be invoked when one of the co-owners has possessed
the property as exclusive owner and for a period sufficient to
acquire it by prescription.
What needs to be addressed first is whether or not Pastor Makibalo
has acquired by prescription the shares of his other co-heirs or co-owners.
Prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership requires a continuous,
open, peaceful, public, and adverse possession for a period of time fixed
by law.
This Court has held that the possession of a co-owner is like that of
a trustee and shall not be regarded as adverse to the other co-owners but
in fact as beneficial to all of them. Acts which may be considered adverse
to strangers may not be considered adverse insofar as co-owners are
concerned. A mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents,
fruits or profits from the property, the erection of buildings and fences and
the planting of trees thereon, and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve
as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and
convincing evidence that he exercised acts of possession which
unequivocably constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the
other co-owners.
Thus, in order that a co-owner's possession may be deemed
adverse to the cestuique trust or the other co-owners, the
following elements must concur: (1) that he has performed
unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the
cestuique trust or the other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts
of repudiation have been made known to the cestuique trust or
the other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon must be
clear and convincing.
The records do not show that Pastor Makibalo adjudicated to
himself the whole estate of his wife by means of an affidavit filed with the

Office of the Register of Deeds as allowed under Section 1 Rule 74 of the

Rules of Court, or that he caused the issuance of a certificate of title in his
name or the cancellation of the tax declaration in Alipio's name and the
issuance of a new one in his own name. The only act which may be
deemed as a repudiation by Pastor of the co-ownership over the lots is his
filing on 28 April 1976 of an action to quiet title (Civil Case No. 5000). The
period of prescription started to run only from this repudiation. However,
this was tolled when his co-heirs, the private respondents herein,
instituted on 8 October 1976 an action for partition (Civil Case No. 5174)
of the lots.Hence, the adverse possession by Pastor being for only about
six months would not vest in him exclusive ownership of his wife's estate,
and absent acquisitive prescription of ownership, laches and prescription
of the action for partition will not lie in favor of Pastor.
Mercado vs. Spouses Espinocilla
Facts:
Doroteo Espinocilla owned a parcel of land, Lot No. 552, (570 sq. m.) at
Sorsogon. After he died, his five children, Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel,
Macario, and Dionisia divided it equally among themselves. Later, Dionisia
died (no descendants) and Macario took possession of Dionisias share. In
an affidavit of transfer of real property dated November 1948, Macario
claimed that Dionisia had donated her share to him in May 1945.
August 1977, Macario and his daughters Betty and Saida sold 225 sq. m.
to his son Roger, husband of respondent Belen and father of respondent
Ferdinand. March 1985, Roger Espinocilla sold 114 sq. m. to Caridad
Atienza. (So in Lot No. 552: Belen Espinocilla= 109 sq. m., Caridad Atienza
= 120 sq. m., Caroline Yu = 209 sq. m., and petitioner, Salvacions son =
132 sq. m).
Petitioner sued the respondents to recover two portions: an area of 28.58
sq. m. which he bought from Aspren and another 28.5 sq. m. which
allegedly belonged to him but was. He claims it must be returned to him.
He avers that he is entitled to own and possess 171 sq. m. having
inherited 142.5 sq. m. from his mother Salvacion (Doroteo= 114sq m +
Dionisia 28.5 sq m) and bought 28.5 sq. m. from his aunt Aspren. He
occupies only 132 sq. m., he claims that respondents encroach on his
share by 39 sq. m.

Respondents claim that they rightfully possess the land they occupy by
virtue of acquisitive prescription and that there is no basis for petitioners
claim of encroachment.
RTC:
1. Petitioner entitled to 171 sq. m. The RTC computed that Salvacion,
Aspren, Isabel and Macario each inherited 114 sq. m. from Doroteo and
28.5 sq. m. from Dionisia.
2. Macario was not entitled to 228 sq. m. Thus, respondents must return
39 sq. m. to petitioner who occupies only 132 sq. m.13
3. Macarios affidavit is void (no public document of donation)
4. Accordingly, Macario cannot acquire said shares by prescription.
5. Partially declared the nullity of the Deed of Absolute Sale by Macario,
Betty and Saida to Roger as it affects the portion or the share belonging to
Salvacion
CA reversed the RTC decision and dismissed petitioners complaint on the
ground that extraordinary acquisitive prescription has already set in in
favor of respondents since petitioners complaint was filed only on July 13,
2000.
Issue:
The core issue to be resolved is whether petitioners action to recover the
subject portion is barred by prescription.
Petitioner concludes that if a person obtains legal title to property by fraud
or concealment, courts of equity will impress upon the title a so-called
constructive trust in favor of the defrauded party.
Held:
We affirm the CA ruling dismissing petitioners complaint on the ground of
prescription.
Prescription, as a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over
immovable property, is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and
under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be
in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted, and adverse.

Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. In

extraordinary prescription, ownership and other real rights over
immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse
possession for 30 years without need of title or of good faith.
Respondents uninterrupted adverse possession for 55 years of 109 sq. m.
of Lot No. 552 was established. Macario occupied Dionisias share in 1945
although his claim that Dionisia donated it to him in 1945 was only made
in a 1948 affidavit. We also agree with the CA that Macarios possession of
Dionisias share was public and adverse since his other co-owners, his
three other sisters, also occupied portions of Lot No. 552. Indeed, the
1977 sale made by Macario and his two daughters in favor of his son
Roger confirms the adverse nature of Macarios possession because said
sale of 225 sq. m. was an act of ownership. Roger also exercised an act of
ownership when he sold 114 sq. m. to Caridad Atienza. It was only in the
year 2000, upon receipt of the summons to answer petitioners complaint,
that respondents peaceful possession of the remaining portion was
interrupted. By then, however, extraordinary acquisitive prescription has
already set in in favor of respondents. That the RTC found Macarios 1948
affidavit void is of no moment. Extraordinary prescription is unconcerned
with Macarios title or good faith.
Petitioner himself admits the adverse nature of respondents possession
with his assertion that Macarios fraudulent acquisition of Dionisias share
created a constructive trust. Prescription may supervene even if the
trustee does not repudiate the relationship. Moreover, the CA correctly
dismissed petitioners complaint as an action for reconveyance based on
an implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years from the time the
right of action accrues( extinctive prescription), where rights and actions
are lost by the lapse of time. Petitioners action for recovery of possession
having been filed 55 years after Macario occupied Dionisias share, it is
also barred by extinctive prescription. The CA while condemning Macarios
fraudulent act of depriving his three sisters of their shares in Dionisias
share, equally emphasized the fact that Macarios sisters wasted their
opportunity to question his acts.