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No. 15-15211
No. 15-15213
No. 15-15215
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PUENTE ARIZONA, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
JOSEPH M. ARPAIO, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellants.
On Appeal From the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Case No. 2:14-CV-01356
The Honorable David G. Campbell
United States District Court Judge
PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING AND
REHEARING EN BANC
Erwin Chemerinsky
Anne Lai
University of California, Irvine
School of Law
401 E. Peltason Dr.
Irvine, CA 92697
Telephone: (949) 824-9894
Facsimile: (949) 824-2747
echemerinsky@law.uci.edu
alai@law.uci.edu
Cindy Pnuco
Joshua Piovia-Scott
Dan Stormer
Hadsell Stormer & Renick LLP
127 N. Fair Oaks Ave., Ste. 204
Pasadena, CA 91103
Telephone: (866) 457-2590
cpanuco@hadsellstormer.com
jps@hadsellstormer.com
dstormer@hadsellstormer.com
Daniel J. Pochoda
ACLU Foundation of Arizona
3707 N. 7th St., Ste. 235
Phoenix, AZ 85014
Telephone: (602) 650-1854
dpochoda@acluaz.org
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page(s)
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................... ii
INTRODUCTION AND RULE 35(B)(1) STATEMENT............................ 1
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................... 3
I.
II.
III.
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 16
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England
546 U.S. 320 (2006) .................................................................... 14, 15
Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown
554 U.S. 60 (2008) .............................................................................. 8
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
558 U.S. 310 (2010) ...................................................................... 7, 15
City of Los Angeles, California v. Patel,
135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015) ..... 7
English v. General Electric Co.
496 U.S. 72 (1999) .............................................................................. 8
Exxon Corp. v. Hunt
475 U.S. 355 (1986) .................................................................... 15, 16
Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Association
505 U.S. 88 (1992) .................................................................. 8, 10, 12
Garner v. Memphis Police Department
710 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1985) ........................................................... 14
Haywood v. Drown
556 U.S. 729 (2009) .......................................................................... 14
Hughes v. Oklahoma
441 U.S. 322 (1979) .......................................................................... 10
John Doe No. 1 v. Reed
561 U.S. 186 (2010) .......................................................................... 15
ii
Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio
770 F.3d at 789 (9th Cir. 2014) ............................................... passim
Lozano v. City of Hazleton
724 F.3d 297 (3rd Cir. 2013) ......................................................... 2, 4
N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Insurance Co.
514 U.S. 645 (1995) ............................................................................ 8
Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc.
135 S.Ct. 1591 (2015) ....................................................................... 11
Perez v. Campbell
402 U.S. 637 (1971) .......................................................................... 10
S. Pac. Transport Co. v. Public Utility Commission of State of Or.
9 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1993)............................................................ 8, 13
Sprint Telephony PCS, L.P. v. County of San Diego
543 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2008) ......................................................... 3, 4
Tennessee v. Garner
471 U.S. 1 (1985) ........................................................................ 14, 15
United States v. Arizona
641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) ..................................................... 1, 4, 5
United States v. Salerno
481 U.S. 739 (1987) .................................................................. passim
United States v. South Carolina
720 F.3d 518 (4th Cir. 2013) ........................................................... 12
Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party
552 U.S. 442 (2008) ............................................................................ 3
iii
STATUTES
A.R.S. 13-2002 .......................................................................................... 5
A.R.S. 13-2008 .......................................................................................... 1
A.R.S. 13-2009 .......................................................................................... 1
Act 69, 2011 S.C. Acts (S.B. 20) 6 .......................................................... 13
MISCELLANEOUS
Michael Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes,
46 Stan. L. Rev. 235 (1994)......................................................................... 6
Richard Fallon, Fact and Fiction about Facial Challenges,
99 Cal. L. Rev. 915 (2011) ......................................................... 7, 12, 14, 15
Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the
Valid Rule Requirement, 48 Am. U. L. Rev. 359 (1998) ............................ 5
Scott A. Keller & Misha Tseytlin, Applying Constitutional Decision
Rules Versus Invalidating Statutes in Toto, 98 Va. L. R. 301 (2012) ... 4, 6
Gillian Metzger, Facial and As-Applied Challenges
Under the Roberts Court, 36 Fordham Urb. L. J. 773 (2008) ................. 16
Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and
Immigration Outside the Law, 59 Duke L.J. 1723 (2010)......................... 7
iv
INTRODUCTION
AND RULE 35(B)(1) STATEMENT
The panel decision in this case upholds a pair of measures
conceived of as part of Arizonas state-level immigration strategy of
attrition through enforcement.1 The measures, passed in 2007 and
2008, turned unauthorized immigrant workers into felons by
capitalizing on the practical reality that, because of federal law, they
could not obtain employment in the state without relying on false
identity information.2 The panel opinion, in reaching its result:
establishes new hurdles for litigants bringing facial constitutional
challenges that conflict with controlling Ninth Circuit precedent,
see, e.g., Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2014)
(en banc);
creates an intra- and inter-circuit split on a question of
exceptional importancei.e., how United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739 (1987) is applied in preemption cases, see United States v.
Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 346 (9th Cir. 2011), aff'd in part, rev'd in
Sitting by designation.
2
and ultimately untenable reading of Salerno that conflicts with the law
of this Circuit. The issue is not whether Salerno applies to facial
preemption challengesthe parties all agree it does.4 The issue is about
how the Salerno standard works in a preemption case. Recently, this
4
See Sprint Telephony PCS, L.P. v. County of San Diego, 543 F.3d 571,
579 n. 33 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). As courts and commentators have
observed, there is some debate as to whether, outside of the First
Amendment context, the Salerno test should continue to be controlling
or whether statutes should instead be judged against a plainly
legitimate sweep standard. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008) (citation omitted). For
purposes of this petition, Plaintiffs-Appellees assume that the Salerno
no set of circumstances formulation applies.
3
Court explained that, under Salerno, where a statute itself violates the
constitutional decision rule at issue, the entire statute fails . . . and
thus would be invalid in all of its applications. Lopez-Valenzuela, 770
F.3d at 789 (quoting Scott A. Keller & Misha Tseytlin, Applying
Constitutional Decision Rules Versus Invalidating Statutes in Toto, 98
Va. L. R. 301, 331 (2012)). This principle applies as well to preemption
cases. See infra Part II (describing decision rule in this case).
Rather than trying to determine if the constitutional decision rule
invalidated the worker identity provisions, defying the clear instruction
of Lopez-Valenzuela, the panel went straight to identifying applications
that (in its view) did not implicate federal interests. See Op. 17, 20. This
gets the analysis backwards, and creates a serious intra-circuit conflict.
As the Court admonished in Arizona:
Arizonas framing of the Salerno issue assumes that S.B.
1070 is not preempted on its face, and then points out
allegedly permissible applications of it. This formulation
misses the point: there can be no constitutional
application of a statute that, on its face, conflicts with
Congressional intent and therefore is preempted by the
Supremacy Clause.
641 F.3d at 345-46 (discussing Sprint). The Third Circuit has similarly
rejected the notion that a hypothetical factual scenario in which
implementation . . . would not directly interfere with federal law would
be able to save a statute from preemption. Lozano, 724 F.3d at 313
n.22;5 see also Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial
Lozano noted, as this Court also has, that the Supreme Court has not
discussed Salerno in key preemption cases since it was decided. Id.;
Arizona, 641 F.3d at 345 n.3. This would be consistent with notion that
Salerno does not pose a problem where a statute is preempted from the
start.
6 See infra at 11 (identifying the only two cases brought by DefendantsAppellants in which an individual appeared to have a non-immigration
purpose). It is unknown whether this individual made the false
representation as part of the employment verification process or not.
7 Indeed, she could be (and in fact was) prosecuted under Arizonas
generally applicable forgery statute, A.R.S. 13-2002. 1-ER-665-67.
Alternatively, Arizona could have enacted a statute addressing identity
theft in employment in a narrow class of cases not involving
immigration.
5
II.
here. First, the titles and official descriptions of H.B. 2779 and H.B.
2745 make explicit that the proposals were intended to address
employment of undocumented immigrants. 1-ER-26; 1-SER-107 (Senate
Amended Fact Sheet for H.B. 2779); 1-SER-118 (House Summary for
H.B. 2745).9 Moreover, contrary to the panels speculation that the bills
were also aimed at curbing . . . identity theft in general, Op. at 8, the
unrefuted record evidence demonstrates that the purpose of the worker
identity provisions was to punish undocumented workers and express
Arizonas disapproval of federal policy in the area. For example,
legislators advocating for the bill:
urged that the provisions be strong enough to ensure
unauthorized workers stay in jail and never be allowed to be
citizens of the United States again, 1-SER-190 (statement of Sen.
Tom OHalleran);
noted that unauthorized workers should be punished harshly
under the provisions because doing otherwise would be viewed as
a weakening of our . . . opposition to illegal immigration, 1-SER187 (statement of Sen. Robert Burns);
explained that state action was necessary because the Feds have
not done their job to quell the national epidemic of unlawful
immigration that threatens the destruction of our country, 1SER-149-51 (statement of Rep. Pearce).
H.B. 2745 even included a corollary provision for employers who
knowingly accepted false identity information from a person for the
purpose of determining whether the person has the legal right or
authorization . . . to work under 8 [U.S.C. ] 1324a. 1-SER-84.
10
10
the target at which the state law aims). Where state lawmakers are,
as here, transparent about their purpose to frustrate Congressional
intent, the law does not permit the Court to look the other way. Id. at
1600 (rejecting dissents contention, similar to the panels view here,
that the Court should focus on what the State seeks to regulate . . . not
why the State seeks to regulate it).
Of course, in this case, the practical effect of the worker identity
provisions has been fully consistent with their purpose. In other words,
if what matters is whether the legislature succeeded in disrupting the
federal scheme, the answer is a resounding yes. See 1-ER-27
(concluding that laws would [] have the most impact on unauthorized
[immigrants]); see also US Br. at 20 (enforcement against persons who
commit fraud to demonstrate authorization to work interferes with
federal control). Defendants-Appellants had been enforcing the worker
identity provisions for years before the District Court entered its
injunction, and they could point to only two cases in the record where
individuals were prosecuted for using a false identity for a nonimmigration purpose. Appellants Opening Brief (AOB) at 9 n.2; see 4ER 593-96, 664; 5-ER-900-01, 905. See also 1-ER-27 (citing Sheriffs
Office News Release reporting that 100% of [] suspects arrested in 55
worksite raids were illegal aliens); 1-SER 222 (County Attorneys
Office report referring to worker identity provisions as Illegal
Immigration Legislation).11
The question on a facial challenge is what the practical effects of a
law were at the time of passage. Here, it was entirely predictable that
the laws would have primarily been enforced against undocumented
11
11
13
12
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13
15
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Respectfully Submitted,
By /s/ Anne Lai
Anne Lai
Erwin Chemerinsky
University of California, Irvine
School of Law
401 E. Peltason Dr., Ste. 3500
Irvine, CA 92616-5479
Jessica Myers Vosburgh
National Day Laborer
Organizing Network
2104 Chapel Hill Rd.
Birmingham, AL 35216
Jessica Karp Bansal
Emilou MacLean
National Day Laborer Organizing
Network
675 S. Park View St., Ste. B
Los Angeles, CA 90057
Cindy Pnuco
Joshua Piovia-Scott
Dan Stormer
Hadsell Stormer & Renick LLP
127 N. Fair Oaks Ave., Ste. 204
Pasadena, CA 91103
Daniel J. Pochoda
ACLU Foundation of Arizona
3707 N. 7th St., Ste. 235
Phoenix, AZ 85014
17
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Form 11.
Proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more and contains _4,200_____ words (petitions
and answers must not exceed 4,200 words).
or
____
Monospaced, has 10.5 or fewer characters per inch and contains _______
words or ________ lines of text (petitions and answers must not exceed
4,200 words or 390 lines of text).
or
____
In compliance with Fed. R. App. 32(c) and does not exceed 15 pages.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing
PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING AND REHEARING EN
BANC with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system on
May 16, 2016. I certify that all participants in the case are registered
CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the appellate
CM/ECF system.
Case:
Case:15-15211,
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FOR PUBLICATION
No. 15-15211
D.C. No.
2:14-cv-01356DGC
Case:
Case:15-15211,
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ID:9978923,
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No. 15-15213
D.C. No.
2:14-cv-01356DGC
Case:
Case:15-15211,
15-15211,05/16/2016,
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ID:9978923,
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No. 15-15215
D.C. No.
2:14-cv-01356DGC
OPINION
Case:
Case:15-15211,
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SUMMARY**
Civil Rights
The panel vacated the district courts preliminary
injunction, reversed the district courts finding regarding the
merits of plaintiffs facial preemption claim, dismissed an
appeal by Maricopa County, and remanded, in an action
challenging provisions of Arizonas identity theft laws, which
prohibit using a false identity to obtain employment.
The panel first rejected plaintiffs assertion that Arizonas
employment-related identity theft laws were facially
preempted by the federal Immigration Reform and Control
Act. The panel determined that although some applications
of the identity theft laws may come into conflict with the
Immigration Reform and Control Acts comprehensive
scheme or with the federal governments exclusive discretion
over immigration-related prosecutions, when the laws are
applied to U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents those
Case:
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COUNSEL
Dominic Draye (argued), John R. Lopez, IV, Office of the
Attorney General, Phoenix, Arizona, for Defendant-Appellant
State of Arizona.
Douglas L. Irish, Thomas P. Liddy, J. Kenneth Mangum, Ann
Thompson Uglietta, Maricopa County Attorneys Office;
Phoenix, Arizona, for Defendant-Appellant William
Montgomery.
Michele Marie Iafrate, Iafrate & Associates, Phoenix,
Arizona, for Defendant-Appellant Joseph M. Arpaio.
Jessica Vosburgh (argued) National Day Laborer Organizing
Network, Hoover, Alabama; Cindy Pnuco (argued), Joshua
Piovia-Scott, and Dan Stormer, Hadsell Stormer & Renick
Case:
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Case:
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OPINION
TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:
An immigrant advocacy organization, Puente Arizona,
along with individual unauthorized aliens1 and taxpayers of
Maricopa County (collectively Puente), challenge
provisions of Arizonas identity theft laws which prohibit
using a false identity to obtain employment. The district
court found the laws facially preempted by federal
immigration policy and granted a preliminary injunction
preventing the Arizona government defendants (collectively
Arizona) from enforcing the challenged provisions.
Arizona appeals that preliminary injunction, and defendant
Maricopa County individually appeals its liability under
42 U.S.C. 1983 based on Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Because we find that the
challenged laws are not preempted in all applications, we
reverse the district courts holding that the laws are likely
facially preempted and we vacate the district courts
preliminary injunction. We also dismiss Maricopa Countys
Monell appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We remand for
consideration of the as-applied challenge to the statutes.
I
This case began when Arizona amended its identity theft
laws to reach the growing problem of employment-related
identity theft within the state. Arizona passed H.B. 2779 in
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Case:
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10
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4
Because the Ninth Circuit utilizes a sliding scale approach to the
Winter test, a preliminary injunction is also appropriate when a plaintiff
raises serious questions as to the merits and the balance of hardships
tips sharply in [plaintiffs] favor. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell,
632 F. 3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted).
12
13
14
We thank the United States for filing a helpful amicus brief in this
matter, but we decline to implement their suggestion to engage in an asapplied analysis. The United States agrees with us that the identity theft
laws are constitutional on their face but has asked us to narrow the
preliminary injunction to prohibit two applications of the laws:
(1) enforcement actions that rely on the Form I-9, and (2) prosecutions of
fraud committed to demonstrate work authorization under federal
immigration law. On this facial challenge we decline to enjoin certain
applications of the laws. The question of which applications of the laws
are preempted is properly left for the district court, which has yet to rule
or create a suitable record on Puentes as-applied challenge.
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