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SUBJECT:

r - Mr. c"ur,.tdlirj'*
I Hr, Bates

THE usn or' /sprtrAl AGENTS

OF THE FBI IN A PARAHILITARY
IAW ENFORCEIIEI'IT OPERATION IN
THE INDIAN COUNTRY

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Gordon

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I - llr- Gallagher

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I - Hr' llosher

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1 - !tr. MooneY

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This position paper vras prepared for use of t.n/ l\

DFector of the FBI to brief the Attorney General and the li
Deputy Attorney General lOaC) on the role of the FBI
U
in- th6 eyent of a major confrontation in 'Indian country . - : .- .
(Federal jurisdiction) where (1) the President decides
.-.r:against ttre use of troops; and (2) the FBt is ordered
uy tne President and/or the Attorney General to deploy
rsr special Agents in a paraFrilitary la# enforcement
situation, in l-ieu of the use of troopsThere is attached for ready reference a doct-rnent
captioned. "Background Paper onf$e Anerican Ind'ian and the(AIll)
-"
Tai<eover of grouided lhee by thts?r,errc_qrr-Ilql*Llt9foTgn!-.
Indian'
a;'teiican
This study outlines early history-of the
jurisdict-ion of the FBI to investigate within the Indian''-'
e,
iountry, background on AIM and Lheir record {Sr violence,
t.l
histor! antl bickground concerning the Pine Ricige indian
Dakota'
in
South
Tribe
Sioux
Oglala
Reservltion of the
L
a prelude to the occupation of Wounded Knee, the occupati'cn
of Wounded. Knee by AII'1 and the use of FBI' U. S. llarshals
and Bureau of fndian Affairs (era) Police ai Wounded
Knee, South Dakota, during the period iebruary 27 - Flay 8, 1973 '
in a paramilitary law enforcemenL situation.

PURPOSE:

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't The FBI was inst.rucbed O the Department

in the latter part of L9Y2 to conduct
ffi)
extremist and criminal investigations pertaining to AIH'
Ouritrg the afternoon of February 27, 1973, aPproximately
200 rnembers and supporters of AIM, carrying weapons, left
Calico Hall, Pine ifiage, South Dakota, in a car caravan and
were under surveillanle by a few FBI Special Agents' -Under
Charles Means'
the leadership of Dennis James Banks and, Russell
oR the
the caravan mived into Wounded Kneer South Dakotar
pine Rid.ge fndian Reservation where they took eleven hostages
and. burgiarized the Wounded Knee trading post in violation of
Federal s*'atutes involving crime on an Indian reservation' A
e;;i;i;n-wis made by SAC ioseph H, Trimbach, Minneapolis
i
Division, to set up roadblockl to cofrtain theU.militantsrS' llarshals,'I i'
which roadblocks vrere manned. by FBI Agents,
and BIA Police. This is hovr the FBI first became involved
in the Wounded Knee armed standoff against the U. S' Government.
FBI

INvOLVEI'IEf

ROLE OF TtiE

IIHITE HOUSE, JUSTTCE

DEPARTT4ENT AND OTHnR AGENCTES-:

iegular and continuous

consuLtation with responsible officials representing the
White Houser rrdlre 1y lti:. John D' Ehrlichman, Assistant to the
president for Dom.-rtic Affairs, Flr- Leon'ard Garment, Special
Consultant to the President, and his assistant, Bradley Patterson,
On
and officiaLs in the U. S, Department of the Interior'
eval-ualed
was
Knee
Wounded
at
February ZB, 19?3r the situation
in a su?i"s of meetings between former AG Richard G. Kleindienst,
former DAG Joseph T. Sneed. former Associate DAG Charles D'
w{e.-resp'rl$iJa{e*foL
Ablard, and oth-ers . t!@=
the Interior
Departinent-of
tTfiO;.
of
the decision rnaking
adninister
these..agencies
as
were-in61ved
o
jurisdictiOn.
Indian .reservations under Federal
PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE FBI: The various other Federal
eeA Knee takeover \'tere the U' S'
Mirshals Service (USMS), BIA Police, DoJ Attorneys, public
U. S.
infornation officers and Community Relations Servicers. the
Army'
u.
bhe
and
Defense,
(usns),
of
Departr"rent
Attorneys
The DOJ sent Ra1ph erickson, Special Assistant to the AG' to
Wounded Knee u= itt. senior U. S. Government representative on
4 other DoJ
the scene. Ile was subsequently followec by who
assumed this
and/or DepartmenL of the Interior officials 28 May
8, 1973'
role during the'71-day siege from February

-2

RE:

THE USEf-t' SPECIAL AGENT3

\_.

Throughout the operation there was a definite lack of

continuity as each senior represenLative replaced _another.
Colonel V-lney Warner (now General), Chief of Staff' 82nd'
Airborne nivilion, was dispatched, to Wounded. Knee at the
Outset, Lo assess the situation and to reconnend whether or
The AG issued instructions
not troops should be utilized.
and negotiations with the
confrontation
no
t,here wai to be
DOJ were to be entered
the
of
militants by representatives
into to res6lve the matter and have the hostages released'.
There was a divided authority among the many
agencies present at Wounded Knee, in|luding church and
social groups. The senior Government representative'
Departmental Attorneys, and members of the USArs Staff
issued conflicting instructions. Each representative
present on the scene took instructions lor the most part
from superiors of his own agency- For exanpler orr -'*:.
March.4, 19?3, after consulting with Colonel llarnerr
Ralph Erickson issued orders that the use of deadly force
by tfre law enforceme.nt of f icers on the scene could- only
be used in self-d.eftrise to avoid death or serious bodily

harm. fn the applicalion of force the officers, including

This vras
FBI Agents, vrerl- to aim to wound, rather than kill"
in direct conflict with the policy of the Bureau that an
Agent is not to shoot any person except vrhen- necessary in
believes that he
-setf-defenser that is, when he reasollably
grievous
bodily harm.
or another is in danger of death or
Special
wound'
Special Agents are not trained to shoot to
Agents are trained to shoot in self-defense'to neutralize the
deadly force. The SACs on the scene and officials at FBIHQ
strenuously objected to orders such as this which had
previously-been approved by the AG without consuLtation with
any FBI official.
on a number of occasions the Acting Director and
officials of the PBI requested the 3ldministration and the l-i-Department to consider [f,e use of troops at Wounded' Knee- fit:-:
Waihington, D, C., DOJ off icial-s in conjunction with other
agencies explored the possibifity of using
Governmental
troops. Colonel- Warner on the scene recorunended to the Chief
bf Slaff of the Army against the use of troops. Tha Government
concluded that such- use woulcl be undesirable bccausc (1)(2)it
Lhe
woulcl substantially increase the risk of loss of life'
full prestige of the U. S. Govcrnncnt t+otrld bc commjtt'cd to
".

3-

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f".
Hemorandum to\,r. Gebhardt
RE: TTTE USE OF SPECIAI AGENTS
what was primarily a dispute between rival tribal factions
(:t the use oi ermy troops against these rndians nright,
3'nd
be misinterpreted by tire preis ai,a some citizens.
.- _i:.._
The FBI encountered extreme problens, both in the
field and, at FBIHQ, in adapting to a paramilitary role.
The FBf was not equipped logistically to operate
in a parami.litary situaLion in open Lerrain whictr
ultimately ended, in a 71-day siege- The FBf and USMS had,
to be eguipped vrith military equipment, including Armored, , I
Personnel carriers (APCs), M-15s, automdtic infantry weaporsl,
chemical weapons, steel helmetsr gas masks, body armor,
illuminating flares, military clothing and rations. Authority
had to be obtained from both the AG (and/or his representative)
- and. from. the Generar counsel, Department bf oefensl, prior to
requesting the rnilitary logistics adviserr Colonel Jack Pot.ter,
- to obtain the vreapons and material through the Directorate
of Military support (oous; , This clearance was often'not
forthcoming when cLearance had to be obtained during the
night hours. This phase of the operation required ihe rar
to'maintain a constant 24 hour vigilance so as to equip
our Special Agents and the other 1aw enforcerilent officers r+ith
the weapons and material needed for a defensive operation.
I

OPTNIONS OF THE SACS W}IOWERE ON THE

SCENE: SACs Richard

G"

; Wilburn K. Oearuler,
Atlanta; and Joseph H. Trimbach, Hinneapolis4
furnished their
observations regarding ttre l.lounded Knee Speci'al. fn essence,
they advised connplete confusion existed as there were a number
of-oO.T representatives on the scene, each issuing conflicting
There was no coordination betwecn the agencies other
.9foers.
tI33 that pro
advance
pf
DoJ officials and birector tlayne
corburn, uslls, would fly back to washington, D, c", presumlbly
for conferences and, would return with new policy of which
FBrHQ was not aware. The military did not rearize in ,"nany
ere to assLst and nct direct the fgf,
sAc Held at the .time advised FBri{e to have any success at
lpolit j.cal
o wl- t.hdr
F'BI
undcr FBI dlr-EEtion and
leadership. -sAe- rroxlE stated at l'Jound
ild-there was a
constant vacillation of instructions and policy vhich was
" and make it an

-4-

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Gebhardt
Memorandum bo
RE: TliE USE OF SPECIAL AGENTS

the ill-advised
devastating.' sAc DeBruler beLieved
lnslructions gir"., prolonged lhe incident at'wounded Knee
andinsomemeasureresultedinunnecessaryrisk-t'o11I
AII sACs
enf orcement peiro.,.,et hnd, others at the scene.
involved in
recommended should we J-n the future -becomewhere
Special
another situation dimilar to Woundecl Knee
are-deployed that t!'e-entire operation
Agent p"ttor,rr"i
-air."iiot'of
FBI of ficials and' vrhen law be under tne
are involved'
enforcement puiion""f from other agencies
it should, l.'"iuarly understood, the fef ls in the

'

FBrHe =:ni::::?:I.?::':*'1
:
:til"r"-ffi'li;,.
with the mijor task of coordinating al}
ffiua

phases of the wounded Knee paramilitary law enforcement

othei interested agenciet'r....
operation with the Departmeit and
the rnterior, and the
including usl.ts, the DeparLment of the
other agencies, including
BIA. Many oi-i.n. of ficiats from
not trained law enforcenentthe staff in-trte DAG's Office, were
It was necessary to constantLy gxplain matters
p"i"o"".r.
As the
and give advice from a law lnforcernent standpoint'
Agents
150
and
SACs
fgf iu, utifizing approximately 3 perimeter along withPerother
day at Wounded Xiee- in a def en-sive
hostile fire, it was
Eederal officers which were receiviirg
done in a decision
necessary to insure that nothing was
might result in
rnaking rote "t tt,* Ifhite iib;;; 5r oo.r which
taking heavy cas-ualties'''
Federal law enforcement of f icersphase
oi Wounded Knee that the
It was r"potl.a in the initial of---an M-60
machine gun and
militants were in Possession
could
rifles),
AK-4?s (Communist automatic assault necessarywhich
convince
it W.t
-to
resutr in h";;t-."i"ulti;;.
were necessary- for lhu prot'ection
APCs
that
makers
the decision

oftheSpecialAgentsandU's.Marshals.t.IhentheAPCs
to a more
came under hostiie fire they could -not be moved
It is the
secure position without uulitority from the AG'
supervisors that
consensus of opinion "*""g lft" hladquarters
a traincd latv enforcement
no Government official wh6 is not
the
officer be pernrittea to airect a law enforcement' operation
magnitude of Houndcd Knee
nG and DAG to
RECOt4llEllDATTOli: The Director meet with-the that
they furry
wounded Knee incicrent so
iffithe
occurs in the future or an
u"J.rrtand if such an incidcnt
atrd thc FllI is involved'
inciclent simil-ar to I'Iounded Kncechargc
from the outset and
the FBI will insist upon taking

-5-

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Hemorandum to Hr. Gebhardt

RE: THE USE OF SPECIAL AGENTS

xill not countenance any l-nterference on an operational basis

with respect to our actions. They should understand the
FBI due to its long years of experience and training is able
to make law enforcement decisions without over-reacting
to protect the general public, its Special Agent personnel,
and the violators of the lavr. The AG and DaG should be
advised. it'is our broad policy in such instances as'this to
'get in and get out as qulckly as possible" with complete
regard for the safety of all concerned. . The PBI furthermore
would seize control quickly and take a definite, aggressive
stand where necessary. It shouLd be clearly stated that the
FBI does not desire to become involved in any politicaL
situations and definitely not participata in any discussion

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ADDENDUM:

J. B. ADAIvIS:ams

J:/g/75_

We shouti notA up an) action in contacting the Deputy Attorney

' General and Attorney General as we are presently engaged in attempting to
clarily tl,e respective roles of the Marshals, FBI, BIA dxd tribal police in
:'confrontations such.aS'the recent Yairton incident. Apirropriate reconrmendations in this latter area are forthcoming.

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