Using the

Mistakes of
al Qaedas
Franchises to
Undermine Its
Strategies
By
BRIAN FISHMAN

Since the invasion of Iraq, al Qaeda has used franchises to expand its global reach. Al Qaeda offered
these franchises very little, except its name, reputation,
and ideology. Because of al Qaedas minimal investment, destroying the franchise groups will accomplish
very little against the mother organization. Instead, the
United States should use al Qaedas franchises as a
vehicle to attack al Qaedas name, reputation, and ideas.
Al Qaedas franchises are more prone to strategic mistakes than their namesake; those errors should be used
as the cornerstone of a narrative to highlight al Qaedas
ideological failings. Al Qaeda in Iraq has been particularly mistake-prone. Three mistakes in particular offer
opportunities to undermine al Qaedas ideology: attacks
against Muslim civilians, the declaration of the Islamic
State of Iraq, and infighting with other Iraqi insurgent
groups.
Keywords: al Qaeda; ideology; Iraq; communications;
United States; strategy

ince the invasion of Iraq, al Qaeda has used

franchises to expand its global reach.
Rather than attempt to destroy these organizations piecemeal, the United States should
exploit the strategic and operational mistakes of
al Qaedas franchises to directly undermine the
ideological and political arguments al Qaeda
uses to justify its violence. Al Qaeda has long
used the United Statess strengths against it;
now is the time to return the favor.
Al Qaeda has always depended on cooperation with relatively independent cells to provide
operational breadth, but a growing relationship
with established terrorist organizations has dramatically increased al Qaedas reach. This is

Brian Fishman is a senior associate in the Combating

Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point and an instructor
in the Department of Social Sciences. His research focus
is the impact of the war in Iraq on terrorism globally.
Before joining the CTC, Fishman worked as the Foreign
Affairs/Defense Legislative Assistant for Congresswoman
Lynn Woolsey. The views expressed herein are his own
and do not reflect West Point, the Department of
Defense, or the United States government.
DOI: 10.1177/0002716208316650

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ANNALS, AAPSS, 618, July 2008

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how Abu Musab al-Zarqawis group, Tawhid wal Jihad (Monotheism and
Struggle), became al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), how the Groupe Salafiste pour la
Predication et la Combate became al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),
and how a small crowd of former Egyptian Islamic Group members began calling itself al Qaeda in the Land of Kinanah (AQLK).
Al Qaedas affiliate strategy enabled it to build franchises without expending
many of its own resources, which means destroying the franchise organization
will not appreciably weaken al Qaeda. The only thing al Qaeda offered franchises
was its name, reputation, and ideas. Thus far, the U.S. strategy in Iraq and elsewhere has focused on destroying franchise organizations. This strategy is important in the context of the war in Iraq but does not inhibit al Qaedas global
capabilities. Instead, the United States should use al Qaedas franchises as a vehicle to attack al Qaedas name, reputation, and ideas.
Al Qaedas franchises bind themselves to al Qaeda with ideological kinship, a
shared brand name, andusuallypublic deference to al Qaeda Centrals leaders. Fortunately for the United States, such bonds are often weaker than they
appear. Al Qaedas franchises often diverge from their mother organization both
ideologically and operationally.
For example, some franchises do not completely adopt al Qaedas ideas about
global war (Fishman 2006). Instead, they combine al Qaedas ideas with more
parochial, regional concerns (Baghdadi 2005).
Franchises differ operationally as well. Al Qaedas franchises often function on
tighter operational timelines than their namesake, which is buffered from its enemies by tribal politics and the rugged mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al
Qaeda in Iraq literally engages U.S. troops on a daily basisa far cry from the
years of planning that went into the 9/11 attacks. Buffeted by security concerns
and the ongoing demands of an insurgency, al Qaedas most prominent affiliates
are less able to train and plan carefully for the long term, which makes them far
more prone to strategic and operational errors than their nominal leaders along
the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
Those mistakes have marginalized AQI on site in Iraq, but the United States has
thus far failed to systematically use those errors to discredit al Qaedas ideology, a tactic that would hurt all elements of al Qaeda, not just AQI. In a war ostensibly fought
as part of the fight against al Qaeda writ large, this is a shocking failure to capitalize
on a strategic opportunity. The oversight is particularly unfortunate because AQI has
made numerous mistakes that speak directly to the hypocrisy and brutality inherent
in al Qaedas worldview. I outline some of these mistakes in the pages that follow.
The next president of the United States will be responsible for crafting a strategy to subdue al Qaeda. A major component of that strategy should be to compellingly link military operations and mass communications in a strategic
narrative to discredit al Qaeda. To be effective, that narrative must be grounded
in hard facts, not rhetoric (accurate, empty, or otherwise). Al Qaedas affiliates,
especially AQI, have been prone to operational mistakes that highlight al Qaedas
overall ideological extremism. Al Qaeda has been careful to avoid such operational
blundershard factsbut they should be held to account for the indiscretions
of their less careful affiliates, especially in Iraq. The U.S. strategy to discredit
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al Qaeda should be based on using the hard facts provided by al Qaedas affiliates
to illustrate the inherent radicalism in al Qaedas ideology.

Iraq
As the insurgency in Iraq gained momentum early in 2004, al Qaedas leaders
understood that they needed a major presence in the Iraqi insurgency if they
were to take credit for events there. Just as the Arab fighters in Afghanistan took
credit for what the native Afghanis did to the Soviet Union in the 1980s, al
Qaedas leaders hope to take credit for an American withdrawal from Iraq.
Ultimately, al Qaeda gained a foothold in Iraq when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
swore bayatallegianceto Osama bin Laden in October 2004. His terrorist organization in Iraq, previously known as Monotheism and Struggle, adopted the title
of al Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers. In the West, the name was simplified to al
Qaeda in Iraq. Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri likely had reservations
about allowing Zarqawi to use al Qaedas brand. Bin Laden and Zarqawi did not get
along when they met in Afghanistan; moreover, Zarqawis brutal attitude and
intransigent religious stances (even by al Qaedas standards) conflicted with al
Qaedas more pragmatic leadership (Husayn 2005). Such brutality could be operationally useful in Iraq for a man with Zarqawis moral and strategic parameters, but
they were ill suited to al Qaedas long-term strategy of uniting the Muslim world.
Zarqawis divisive legacy continued after his death. AQI continued to alienate
other Sunni groups in Iraq with its religious bullying and bloody attacks. These
operational mistakes have undermined AQIs position in Iraqit is weaker today
than at any time since 2003but the United States is not leveraging the mistakes
effectively to attack al Qaedas ideology and thus disrupt its global operations.
Three issues in particular offer opportunities to undermine al Qaedas ideology: attacks against Muslim civilians, the declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq
(ISI), and infighting with other Iraqi insurgent groups.

Attacks on civilians
AQIs attacks on Muslim civilians have been operationally successful but
strategically disastrous for the organization. This is no surprise; al Qaedas most
senior leaders have long been concerned that such attacks are useful for undermining confidence in the local government but alienate far more potential supporters than they attract (McCants and Brachman 2006). For al Qaedas
leadership, however, AQIs public reveling in the violence is even more disturbing than the attacks themselves (Zawahiri 2005).
AQI stopped publicizing its brutality after its most strategically misguided
attack: the suicide bombing of three hotels in Amman, Jordan, in November
2005. That attack prompted al Qaedas leadership to send Zarqawi multiple
angry letters urging him to forgo such operations (Libi 2005; Rahman 2005). The
Jordanian government responded quickly and intelligently to AQIs Amman

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attack, quickly highlighting a failed female suicide bomber and humanizing the
victims by describing a wedding that had been torn to pieces by the bombing
(Fattah 2005). Jordan knew the message to use against al Qaeda long before the
bombs exploded: attack al Qaedas hypocrisy for killing fellow Muslims, its willing brutality, and its ill-defined political goals. When the bombs did go off,
Jordans only challenge was picking out the details to illustrate al Qaedas failing.

Three issues . . . offer opportunities to

undermine al Qaedas ideology: attacks against
Muslim civilians, the declaration of the Islamic
State of Iraq (ISI), and infighting with other
Iraqi insurgent groups.

Jordans quick response paid dividends. Support for Zarqawi plummeted following the bombings; approval of suicide bombings in general decreased from 57
percent in 2005 to 29 percent a year later (Gerges 2005; Pew Global Attitudes
Report 2007). Most important, Jordanian disdain for Zarqawis tactics translated
into disapproval of Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda generally: support for bin
Laden in Jordan fell from 56 percent in 2003 to 20 percent in 2007 (Pew Global
Attitudes Report 2007).

The Islamic State of Iraq

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi recognized the failure of the Amman attacks. Two
months later, he subjugated AQI to a new political organization, the Mujahidin
Shura Council (MSC) (Iraqi 2006). The purpose of the MSC was to put an Iraqi
face on al Qaedas campaign in Iraq and, perhaps, to insulate al Qaeda writ large
from Zarqawis mistakes in Iraq. The strategy did not last; Zarqawi was killed in
June 2006. His death gave al Qaeda the opportunity to redefine its organization
in Iraq. The group did so definitively in October 2006 when it declared the
Islamic State of Iraq (Information Minister 2006).
The ISI is a different kind of organization than the MSC, which never pretended to be more than a media front group. The ISI claims real political and
religious authority. It established an emir and a cabinet of officials to administer
the state, claimed that Muslims around the world had an obligation to emigrate
to within its borders, and demanded the allegiance of all Sunnis in western Iraq.
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The ISIs problem is that it has two core constituencies with widely divergent
demands: Iraqi Sunnis living under the ISIs jurisdiction want security and basic
services, and al Qaeda ideologues outside of Iraq want the ISI to demonstrate
Islamic governance as they conceive of it. Nothing illustrates this fundamental
contradiction better than the ISIs emir, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi. A complete
unknown to al Qaeda ideologues, the selection of al-Baghdadi as emir stoked a
debate among al Qaeda supporters about whether establishing the ISI was strategically smart or religiously acceptable.
Naming al-Baghdadi (whose name indicated he was from Baghdad) emir seems
to have been an attempt to convince Iraqis that one of their own was leading al
Qaedas effort in Iraq, but it infuriated jihadi ideologues concerned that the emir
of the first true Islamic emirate in the Middle East must be a well-known figure
with an established track record of religious and political leadership (Ali 2007).
Al-Baghdadis emirship embodied overall discontent with an organization claiming
to provide true Islamic governance in the heart of the Middle East but that was
incapable of making good on either its grandiose religious or political promises.
Al Qaeda has always worked to avoid overpromising in an effort to contrast itself
with the hypocrisy of Arab governments that promise social gains to their citizens
but never deliver. It became clearer that creating the ISI was rash when the U.S. militarys spokesman in Iraq revealed that al-Baghdadi was actually a fictional character
invented by AQI to serve as its figurehead emir (Bergner 2007). The real leader is an
Egyptian, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, who goes by the name Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir in
Iraq.

Infighting with Iraqi Sunnis

Al Qaedas leadership and the ISIs strategists did not just accept criticism of the
ISI. Figures ranging from the online jihadi pundit Sheikh Atiyatallah to senior al
Qaeda leaders Abu Yahya al-Libi and Ayman al-Zawahiri stepped up to defend the
ISI (Atiyatallah 2006; Libi 2007; Zawahiri 2007). Most interestingly, the ISIs own
media organization published a defense of the ISI titled Informing the People
about the Birth of the Islamic State of Iraq. Informing the People explained the
ISIs concept of governance and was meant to convince Iraqis and jihadi ideologues alike to support the new state (Tamimi 2007; Fishman 2007). Its authors
likely hoped the book would convince skeptics of the ISIs righteousness the same
way the Federalist Papers did for the nascent United States.
Predictably, those hopes were dashed. Informing the People makes very clear
that the ISI believes establishing sharia (Islamic law) is more important than providing security and services. It clearly subsumes the practical concerns of Iraqis
to the demands of religious orthodoxy as al Qaeda sees it. That tension came to a
head with a disagreement over control of territory. Jihadi ideologues outside of
Iraq insisted that a true Islamic state must control territory and unify Muslims
within its territory under its jurisdiction. Whereas everyday Iraqis probably
would have liked to see AQI/ISI cooperate with other Sunni groups to achieve
this end, the ISI went about their mission the only way they knew how: violence
against other Sunni insurgent groups in Iraq.
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The cycle of violence and recriminations is too complex to recount here, but
even parts of the ISIs most loyal ally, Ansar al-Sunnah, protested the ISIs assassinating its members (Ansar al-Sunnah Islamic Law and Judiciary Office 2007; for
more details, see Kohlmann 2007). The critical strategic point is that the ISIs
infighting with other Sunni insurgent groups in Iraq pointedly and dramatically
undermines al Qaedas claim that they are the global vanguard of Islam fighting on
behalf of all Muslims. Since al Qaedas appeal is largely built on the idea that it is
the only force willing to stand up to the West, that critique strikes at the heart of al
Qaedas ideology. The ISI can vilify Iraqi Muslims working with the United States,
but it is not so easy to dismiss groups that are also fighting the U.S. occupation.
Since the surge, American forces in Iraq have capitalized on the split between
nationalist Sunni groups and al Qaedas ISI, but the United States has not used
this critical failing to broadly illustrate the fundamental problems inherent in al
Qaedas worldview.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The United Statess foreign policy structure is not designed to counter the ideology of a subnational group like al Qaeda. Nonetheless, the next U.S. president
should learn several lessons from the past so that the United States is better positioned to take advantage of strategic opportunities in the future.

Build a strategic message, wait patiently, capitalize on opportunities

Simply berating al Qaeda with the same tired accusations is unhelpful and often
counterproductive. Not only will the most important target audienceArabs and
Muslims globally, not the American publicstop listening, but constant American
sermonizing probably alienates them from U.S. goals even further.
The United States needs a strategic message built around al Qaedas hypocrisy
and its failures. Al Qaedas primary enemy is other Muslims, not the United
States. Many in the West claim that al Qaeda does not offer a positive vision of
governance, but that is no longer true. Al Qaeda has offered a vision of governance in Iraqthe ISIand it has been roundly rejected by the Sunni Muslims
in a position to accept it. That truth is more damaging to al Qaeda than empty
American rhetoric, yet American political leaders continue to parrot empty slogans that have little impact where they matter mostin the Middle East.
General Petraeuss understated tone and lack of triumphalism in Iraq is a step in
the right direction.
The most effective messages tie discrete events to larger ideas. When al Qaeda
or its affiliates make mistakesand they willthe appropriate response is to link
those mistakes to al Qaedas hypocrisy, its failures, and its brutality against
Muslims. This is what Jordan did after Zarqawis Amman bombings. The United
States should learn from this example.

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Magnify debates among enemies

The Sunni revolt against al Qaeda in Iraq is extremely important and has
received widespread attention in the Middle East. The United States should stoke
tensions between nationalist Sunnis and the ISI and argue that such disputes are
inevitable with a group as radical as al Qaeda. The United States must not make
this argument explicitly but encourage proxies to make it instead. Critically, the
United States should work to ensure that such debates gain as much visibility globally as possible. The optimal U.S. communications strategy is to say very little, but
to shine a bright light on the arguments al Qaeda wishes it was not having.
Al Qaeda thrives when it does not have to defend its claims to religious, cultural, and political authority. The best challengers to al Qaeda are religious figures and militant groups with track records of opposing al Qaeda and the United
States. Such figures are very difficult for al Qaeda to discredit as American
stooges. The United States should not try to shape their message, but should
work to amplify it even when the message does not agree completely with U.S.
policy. The United States thrives on political pluralism; even abroad, this pluralism is deadly to al Qaeda.

Choose the right enemies

The outcome of the war in Iraq will be suboptimal for the United States.
Pretending otherwise is not useful. The next U.S. president will likely implement
either a full or partial pullout from Iraq. Even under relatively favorable terms,
the United Statess enemies will claim victory and take credit for this decision; al
Qaeda must not be allowed to make that claim convincingly.
The majority of the fighters in IraqShiite militias and Sunni insurgents
have nothing to do with al Qaeda. The United States should work to ensure that
they counter al Qaedas inevitable claim that it is responsible for a U.S. withdrawal. This is easier said than done. The Arab-Afghans were able to claim credit
for defeating the Soviets because many native Afghans did not particularly care
what those outside of Afghanistan thought about the war; they only cared that the
Soviets were gone. The Afghans did not compete for fame on an international
level. The risk of a similar reaction cannot be completely mitigated in Iraq.
Nationalist and tribal forces have local interests, and thus they have less investment in bragging globally about victory than does al Qaeda.
Nonetheless, the United States can influence which groups in Iraq have the
credibility to claim victory in Iraq. By publicly identifying which groups America
considers dangerous, the United States can influence which insurgents have the
most credibility to claim victory. When withdrawal is imminent, the United States
should focus attention on tribal and nationalist groups, not al Qaeda. A reasonable outcome is still possibleif not likelyin Iraq. Even if the U.S. withdrawal
occurs under circumstances acceptable to many American citizens, al Qaeda and
others will still claim victory and will likely be believed abroad.

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Furthermore, any major change of U.S. policy in Iraq should be joined with
an effort to suppress al Qaedas media operations. AQIs greatest power is in the
propaganda war. It is not worth playing a constant game of cat and mouse with al
Qaedas media operations online and elsewhere, but they should be silenced in
moments of critical strategic transition.

Conceive of operations comprehensively

Al Qaeda has always understood that its military activitiessuch as bombings
and assassinationsare only the beginning of larger operations to shape the way
people think about the world. Their planning integrates the military elements
directly with strategic communications into a single, sprawling operation. The
United States should learn from this model. Communications are a part of every
U.S. operationmilitary, reconstruction, humanitarianwhether commanders
recognize it or not. Planners must learn to think through communications contingencies just as they do logistical and military ones.

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