Organizational learning capability and battlefield performance: The British and German Armies in

World War II
Author: MAX VISSER - Email: m.visser@fm.ru.nl
University: RADBOUD UNIVERSITY NIJMEGEN
Track: 50. Knowledge and Learning General Track

Abstract - In the past two decades the concept of organizational learning capability has been
developed to bridge the gap between the concepts of learning organization and organizational
learning. However, current conceptualizations of organizational learning capability still
predominantly lean towards the learning organization side, emphasizing the necessity of
double-loop learning in profit firms in highly volatile markets. This leaves room for a
conceptualization of organizational learning capability that leans more towards the
organizational learning side, emphasizing the necessity of solid single-loop learning in
nonprofit and government organizations facing complex societal and political problems and
situations. Army organizations appear as particularly interesting cases in this respect. In this
paper such a conceptualization is proposed as a model with four dimensions: (1) degree of
empowerment; (2) degree of error openness; (3) degree of knowledge conversion; (4) degree
of adequate human resource management and development. Next, this model is applied to the
British and German army organizations during World War II, on the basis of a secondary
analysis of historical and military sources and data. It is argued that this learning capability is
differentially present in both armies, and that this difference can be reasonably related to
differences in battlefield performance between these armies.
Keywords organizational learning capability; battlefield performance; British army; German
army; empowerment; error openness; knowledge conversion; human resource management.

The importance of learning in and by organizations has since long been recognized by
organization scientists. In particular in the last three decades the interest in organizational
learning and learning organizations has been growing, as evidenced by increasing numbers of
journal articles, reviews and books (Argote, 2011; Bapuji and Crossan, 2004). This does not

imply, however, that there has been an equivalent growth in common conceptual understanding
and theoretical convergence among learning scholars. According to many observers, this still is a
field characterized by conceptual diffusion and confusion, despite some recent attempts towards
conceptual order (Huysman, 2000; Tosey et al., 2012, Visser, 2007).
One of the most important and enduring differences can be found between the concepts of
learning organization and organizational learning. Most of the literature on the first concept has
adopted a prescriptive, practice-oriented approach, directed at developing learning
organizations. Mostly designed for profit firms looking for organizational survival in highly
volatile markets, this literature is both optimistic and normative about the necessity of double
loop, generative and other forms of deep learning for such survival (e.g., Pedler et al., 1997;
Senge, 1990). Most of the literature on the second concept has adopted a descriptive, scientific
approach, directed at analyzing organizational learning. This literature is less optimistic and
normative about the necessity and possibility of deep learning in organizations (Easterby-Smith
et al., 1998; rtenblad, 2002; Tsang, 1997).
To bridge the gap between these concepts, an increasing number of studies have attempted to
identify factors that influence the development of an organizations learning capability (Prieto
and Revilla, 2006; Van Grinsven and Visser, 2011). However, this literature still predominantly
leans towards the learning organization side, emphasizing the necessity of deep learning and
mainly diagnosing profit firms in industry and services sectors. Although some authors here
diagnose the learning capability of nonprofit and governmental organizations, they uniformly
apply the same instrument to all organizations, often finding that nonprofit and government
organizations are less capable of learning than the profit ones (e.g., Goh and Richards, 1997;
Moilanen, 2001).

But diagnosing organizational learning capability may be equally useful for organizations not
facing existential dangers in highly volatile markets, and thus not experiencing a pressing need
for deep forms of learning. Governmental and larger non-profit organizations, for example, often
face complex societal and political problems and situations, which, when not adequately solved
and dealt with, make them the object of media and political scrutiny. At the same time their
continuing existence is mostly not at stake. Consequently, these organizations need to become
particularly good at single loop, adaptive and other less deep forms of learning, and a diagnosis
of their learning capability would profit more from organizational learning than learning
organization theory (Browne and Wildavsky, 1984; McHargue, 2003; Wilson, 1989).
Army organizations appear as particularly interesting cases in this respect. On the one hand
armies arguably face the most dynamic and competitive situation any organization may
encounter, i.e. actual war. On the other hand their existence, at least in an institutional sense, is
generally not at stake, although naturally victory and defeat may have a large impact on army
functioning. Furthermore, the common image of armies as hierarchical and bureaucratic
machines appears at odds with the degree of adaptability that organizations should possess
when dealing with such dynamic and competitive situations, according to current organization
theory (Bijlsma et al., 2010; Mutch, 2006; Stokes, 2007). In other words, army organizations
appear to pose a learning paradox here.
In this paper a four dimensional model of organization learning capability is proposed that leans
more towards the organizational learning side, and that is specifically directed at nonprofit and
government organizations. Next, this model is applied to the British and German Army
organizations in World War II, , on the basis of a secondary analysis of historical and military
sources. It is argued that this learning capability is differentially present in both armies, and that

this difference can be reasonably related to differences in battlefield performance between these
armies.

Dimensions of Organizational Learning Capability

For the purpose of this paper I regard organizational learning as the detection and correction of
error, whereby an error is defined as a problematic situation, involving a discrepancy between
what organization members aspire to achieve and what they actually achieve (Argyris and Schn,
1978: 2; 1996; March and Olson, 1975). An organizations capability to detect and correct errors
is here supposed to have four dimensions, based on a synthesis of the dimensions distinguished in
the literature (Table 1) and in the sources mentioned below:

Table 1 about here

The first dimension, degree of empowerment, refers to the degree to which decision-making
responsibilities are (de)centralized in organizations. Drawing on theory and research on
empowerment and (de)centralized decision-making in organizations (e.g., Argyris, 1998; Mills
and Ungson, 2003; Randolph, 2000), it is supposed that the more decision-making
responsibilities are decentralized to lower echelon employees, the higher the probability is that
they will make errors.
The second dimension, degree of error openness, refers to the degree to which organizational
learning climates are open or closed towards errors. Drawing on theory and research on (Model I
and II) learning climates (e.g., Argyris and Schn, 1978, 1996; Schneider et al., 2002), and on
deutero-learning and double binds in organizations (e.g., Rowe and Boyce, 2009; Visser, 2007,

2010b), it is supposed that the more open towards and tolerant of errors organizational learning
climates are, the higher the probability that errors may be surfaced and corrected.
The third dimension, degree of knowledge conversion, refers to the degree to which lessons
learned from past errors in organizations are being translated, stored and disseminated. Drawing
on theory and research on organizational knowledge conversion (e.g., Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka et
al., 2006), and on the use of after action reviews in organizations (e.g., Baird et al., 1997, 1999;
Darling et al., 2005; Ron et al., 2006), it is supposed that the more organizations translate, store
and spread lessons learned from previous error detection and correction in and through formal
and informal channels and repositories, the higher the probability that these organizations as a
whole may learn from these experiences.
The fourth dimension, degree of adequate human resource management and development,
refers to the degree to which organizations adequately deal with their personnel. Drawing on
theory and research on human resource management and development in organizations (e.g.,
Arthur and Aiman-Smith, 2001; Jaw and Liu, 2003; Lopez et al., 2006; Tannenbaum, 1997), it is
supposed that the better selected, educated, trained and motivated organization members are, the
more decision-making responsibilities they can handle, the more responsibilities can be delegated
to them, which brings us back full circle to the first dimension.
These four dimensions are supposed to form a configuration or Gestalt, to the extent that they
dynamically interact in the determination of organizational learning capability (Meyer et al.,
1993; Miller, 1996; Siggelkow, 2002). When the dimensions are positively configured, they may
constitute a productive learning cycle, and, when negatively configured, they may constitute a
defensive learning cycle. Changes in one dimension always lead to corresponding changes in the
other dimensions, so that improvement or deterioration in one dimension will soon or later affect
the other three dimensions.

In the following sections this model of organizational learning capability will be applied to the
British and German army organizations in World War II, on the basis of a secondary analysis of
historical and military sources and data. The sources were repeatedly searched from February
2005 to March 2010 through search engines PiCarta, Web of Science, Google Scholar, and
Google, using the search terms army organization, British Army, German Army, army
performance alone and in various combinations. References in the sources found were further
checked for relevance and suitability for this paper.

The British Army

Regarding degree of empowerment, the British Army in World War II came from a tradition as an
Imperial Army, accustomed to fighting brief, small-scale colonial wars in disparate areas around
the vast British Empire. At the heart of this tradition stood the British Armys regiments, which
were responsible for maintaining one of their two or three battalions overseas. While the
regimental system in general fostered an excellent esprit de corps, strong unit cohesion and
identification, and provided room for local experimentation, during World War II this system
hampered the adoption of army wide doctrine and tactics and the formation, development and
training of coherent fighting units at the brigade and division levels. Further, continuity and
cohesion at these levels suffered from regimentally-induced wholesale replacements of battalions
inside divisions, from the rotation of battalions between the Home Office and field commands,
and from frequent leadership changes at senior levels. The latter problem, combined with the lack
of army wide doctrine, led to radically different operational styles, meaning that divisions and
higher had to learn a new way of waging war with each new commander (French, 2001; Hart,
2001; Heginbotham, 2000).

To avoid the massive manpower attrition of World War I (the shadow of Passchendaele),
already in the 1930s the British Army had come to rely on combined arms operations to generate
overwhelming firepower (French, 1996a: 170). However, only in 1942 did Field Marshall
Bernard Montgomery apply it successfully in the North African desert. Building on recognized
British strengths in artillery, logistics and administration, his operational methods were
characterized by careful and methodical planning, achievement of a distinct material superiority,
and the concentrated and coordinated use of artillery fire power and tactical air power. The
purpose was to curtail German operational maneuverability and flexibility, and to engage the
Germans in attritional, massive set-piece battles, which Montgomery knew in the long run would
exhaust the scarce German human and material resources (Hart, 2001, 2007).
The decentralized nature of the British Army and the lack of army wide doctrine led to different
styles of command and empowerment across echelons. On the one hand, junior officers were
required to obey orders to the letter, and rather than taking independent action and seize
battlefield opportunities they were encouraged to wait for orders (Befehlstaktik). Under
Montgomerys command, also more senior officers were gripped in this way (Hart, 2007: 76).
On the other hand, senior commanders were allowed much leeway in interpreting doctrine and
applying general principles of war, stemming from a general distaste of abstract rules and ideas
and an inclination towards improvisation and pragmatism among these senior commanders
(French, 2001; Hart, 2001; Heginbotham, 2000).
Regarding degree of error openness, when in the course of 1940-1942 the British Army
suffered a long line of defeats at the Germans hands, this led to efforts towards face-saving,
protection of reputation, and putting the blame on others, rather than openly and honestly
evaluating strengths and weaknesses. Class differences between senior officers and the rank and
file hampered communication from the bottom up and advice seeking from the top down, as well

as cooperation between older, socially exclusive units and newer units. These class differences
were exacerbated by the hierarchical culture, making criticism on commanders only possible in
euphemistic and diluted terms, and valuing loyalty over honesty. Furthermore, senior officers and
the War Office made a habit of censoring lessons-learned material, fearing that an open
discussion of errors by both commanders and troops might adversely affect troop morale and
public opinion. Only when the British Army gradually gained successes in N-Africa and Italy,
did the pace of learning increase, because the British made it a habit to learn from success only,
not from failure (Hart, 2001; 2007).
Further, error openness was not encouraged by the inclination of the two most influential British
senior commanders Brooke and Montgomery to ruthlessly weed out any officer who they
believed was not competent to do his job (French, 1996b: 1197). Not only did this lead to a
quick rotation of divisional commanders, it also made them reluctant to act boldly and to gamble,
because gamble could imply failure, and failure could imply the end of a successful career
(French, 1996b; Hart, 2001).
Regarding degree of knowledge conversion, in general the British Army lacked appropriate
mechanisms to draw and disseminate combat lessons-learned. Only halfway World War II did the
Army establish the Directorate of Tactical Investigation to adopt a more professional and
scientific approach to the analysis of lessons-learned. Among senior commanders, Montgomery
in particular recognized the importance of lessons-learned from immediate post-battle analysis,
and saw to it that these lessons were disseminated though education of his senior officers (and
through them further down the chain of command), and to his troops through memoranda,
pamphlets, and other written materials. He then based his doctrine and training on these lessons
learned, emphasizing retraining in the field. But his traits of arrogance, egoism and
condescension also hampered this whole lessons-learned process: troops had to learn the gospel

according to Monty (Hart, 2001: 125; 2007). However, since his approach was only gradually
backed up and propagated by the War Office, until 1944 it remained particular to the armies
under his command. Also, most other senior commanders did not consider field training and
retraining under combat conditions very important, leaving it to the Home Office or the regiments
(Hart, 2001, 2007; Heginbotham, 2000).
Regarding degree of adequate human resource management and development, throughout
World War II the British Army experienced problems with the quality and quantity of officers
and men. With regard to officers, class considerations were influential in determining officer
suitability, and only in 1942 did the War Office establish selection boards for a more rigorous
and objective assessment. Further, only after 1942 did Officer Cadet Training Units receive their
training from battle-experienced instructors, which until then were reassigned to front-line units,
due to manpower shortage. In spite of allegations of Blimpism, most senior officers had
received a broad staff college education in tactics, military law and organization, geography and
foreign affairs, history, economy, and more. However, the staff colleges tried to produce both
good staff officers and commanders. According to many observers, turning out good
commanders should have been a priority, and these commanders should have been separately
trained from staff officers. But this was not done, partly because of the fear of training arrogant
staff officers in the German mould, partly because higher training continued to be carried out
through Army exercises (although these were held only twice between 1925-1935). Not
surprisingly, by 1944 two main weaknesses were identified among British corps and divisional
commanders: they had not been trained in peacetime for their wartime roles, and the course at
the staff college was insufficiently related to staff and command duties in battle (French, 1996b:
1190-1191). These deficiencies, however, were partly overcome by the attempts of Field

Marshals Brooke and Montgomery to promote only competent and professional officers, at least
within the armies under their command (Hart, 2001; French, 1996b).
With regard to men, the quality of the most important branch, the regular infantry, was diluted
by the assignment of the best men to the industry, the technical branches, and other services.
Within the army, many good men were diverted to various Special Forces that grew beyond all
reasonable bounds to the equivalent of six divisions, where the British Army only employed 18
first-line infantry divisions. British morale, influenced by World War I traumas, remained
vulnerable, and throughout World War II commanders were cautious and conscious of the
continuing needs for maintenance of morale and casualty conservation. Casualty conservation
was driven by acute manpower shortages in the UK by 1943, and by political and imperial
considerations, in which the British were aware that after World War II they needed a strong and
large standing army to play an continuing role in world politics against the US and Russia
(French, 1996a; Hart, 2001).
For example, much of Montgomerys seemingly erratic operational conduct of the Normandy
and Market-Garden campaigns can only be comprehended in relation to these two overriding
concerns. Morale was boosted by Montys methodical and cautious approach, in which victory
was practically ensured through large advantages in material and numbers. Casualty conservation
was important in halting seemingly promising exploitation of operational successes in Normandy
and thereafter, and also explains in part the unimpressive combat performance of AngloCanadian forces in Northwest Europe, why numerical superior forces failed to achieve
decisive penetrations (Hart, 2007: 66).
Military justice in general was lenient, with no soldier being executed for desertion during the
whole war. In practice the Army combined psychological treatment for exhaustion victims, and
suspended sentences for deserters in order to make the best use of the limited manpower

available. On the whole, the military justice system reflected the essentially civilian attitudes
among the rank and file in the Army (French, 1998, 2000; Hart, 2007).

The German Army

Regarding degree of empowerment, the doctrine of war of the German Army traditionally was
directed at overwhelming the enemy through superior fighting power, rather than through
numerical and material superiority. The geographical position of Prussia (later Germany) as a
relatively small state, with few natural resources and surrounded by powerful (potential) enemies,
led to an operational conception of war, which since the early 19th century had been
systematically translated into army wide doctrine, tactics and training. An emphasis was laid on
maneuver, surprise and improvisation to ensure a quick and decisive destruction of the enemys
command and control capability. In line with this, the army encouraged individual initiative,
independent thinking and responsibility at all levels of command. As a consequence, German
officers did not give detailed orders from the top down (Befehlstaktik), but instead provided
broad missions to their lower commanders (Auftragstaktik). They assigned them the tasks to be
accomplished and left them as much room as possible in determining how they should
accomplish these tasks. However, in the course of World War II Hitler, as supreme commander
of the armed forces, tended to resort to Befehlstaktik again (Frieser, 2005; Uhle-Wettler, 1993;
Von Lossow, 1977).
The General Staff of the German Army played an important role in developing and maintaining
army doctrine. In the spirit of Napoleon, this Staff and its equivalents at army, corps and division
levels functioned as small, well-trained, integrated support units of commanders, emphasizing
execution over detailed planning that, in the words of Von Moltke, would not survive the first

contact with the enemy (Boothe, 2005: 76). Staff units were very reluctant to place
administrative burdens on the troops in the field, relying on global ten days reports instead of
detailed daily reports. Staffs at all echelons remained well-informed and closely connected to one
another, though, because officers rotated continuously between the General Staff and senior field
command positions (Dupuy, 1984; Hughes, 1986; Van Creveld, 1983).
Regarding degree of error openness, an important role of the General Staff was the rigorous and
objective analysis of victory and defeat on the basis of critical and detailed after action reports
(Erfahrungsberichte) from lower units. For example, directly after the seemingly successful
Polish campaign in October 1939, the Army commander-in-chief, Colonel-General Von
Brauchitsch, ordered his corps and division commanders to come up with as critical, honest and
realistic Erfahrungsberichte as possible. In the same spirit, these senior commanders in their
turn should collect after action reports from their subordinate officers down to regimental level.
Within one month these reports were written, collected and passed on to OKH. In general lower
commanders were not afraid to issue reports in this spirit, indicating a high level of trust and
honesty between echelons (Hart, 2001; Murray, 1981; Visser, 2008).
Regarding degree of knowledge conversion, the General Staff used the results of analysis for the
continuous improvement of doctrine and tactics and their translation in training programs, which
it developed in close collaboration with the Army. For example, the lessons learned from the
Polish campaign were translated into a vast, six-month (re)training program, not only for the
units that had been involved in that campaign, but also, and even more importantly, for the
numerous new units and existing reserve units that Hitler intended to commit against the West in
the Spring of 1940. In that program, the lessons of Poland were directly tied to the training of
existing and new troops, emphasizing the importance of combat leadership of officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and the importance of discipline and order as a basis for victory.

The General Staffs training section developed a detailed set of objectives and standards for
training in the various schools of the German Army, where officers and NCOs with recent
combat experience were brought in as instructors (Hart, 2001; Murray, 1981; Visser 2008).
Regarding degree of adequate human resource management and development, throughout
World War II the German Army increasingly experienced problems with the quantity of officers
and men, but in general attempted to maintain quality standards. With regard to officers, in the
German Army the selection of officers, their admission to officer training and their commission
rested with the regimental commanders of the men involved. Only in 1942 a central screening
bureau was instituted for officer testing, but the other decisions remained at the regimental level.
Officers were primarily selected on the basis of character and will power, more than intelligence,
class or education. Psychological tests, examinations and personal evaluations played a main role
in the selection process. In formal training tactics and operations were emphasized, while
strategy, logistics and organization were relatively neglected. As the war proceeded, active front
service increasingly came to be regarded as the best training of aspiring officers, including those
NCOs who showed leadership and initiative in front of the enemy. Promotion to higher ranks
primarily occurred on the basis of personal evaluations of character, competence and the ability
to generate trust under front line conditions, increasingly more than seniority, class or General
Staff training (Dupuy, 1984; Van Creveld, 1983; Visser, 2010a).
Although in the course of the war a shortage of officers developed, the German Army in general
did not compromise on their quality, preferring competent junior or no officers over incompetent
ones. Thus, in 1944 hundreds of battalions were commanded by majors, captains or even 1st
lieutenants. In their behavior, officers were expected to show responsibility, independent action
and quick decision-making, while remaining within the framework of the mission of their senior
officers. They should lead from up front, issuing their own mission orders on the basis of first-

hand knowledge of the situation. Unlike the British Army, officers were expected to live with
their men and allowed to fraternalize with them when off duty. At the same time they were
expected to enforce strict discipline, thus combining attitudes of sternness and benevolence. In
general both officers and senior NCOs, at least up to battalion level, were highly regarded by
their men (Frieser, 2005; Kershaw, 1990; Shils and Janowitz, 1948; Visser, 2010a).
With regard to men, they were selected, trained and organized in ways that bolstered unit
cohesion and morale. The selection of recruits occurred in local centers by a selection officer and
a physician, while their admission to specific army branches rested with their future regimental
commanders. Selection was based on personal judgments and tests, assessing character more than
intelligence. This system ensured that the best men were assigned to front-line fighting units,
rather than to special branches and staff units (Hart, 2001; Van Creveld, 1983; Wilson, 1989).
In the German Army replacements were mainly used to set up new divisions, not to bring
existing divisions up to strength. This practice turned divisions into cohesive, tightly knit units
with considerable fighting power, until cohesion gains were offset by the depletion of men and
officers due to war attrition. Further, this practice made rotation of divisions in and out the line
possible to the very end of World War II. Rotation involved a few weeks of refreshment,
rearmament, recovery and rest, which were quite important for morale. Replacements reached
their divisions in 1,000 men strong, armed and self-sustained marching battalions
(Marschbattallione), led by officers of the receiving division. Recovered men and officers also
traveled back to their last field unit in the same Marschbattallione, which in this way were
instrumental in integrating old and new men and officers. Recovered soldiers, though small in
numbers, were particularly welcomed by their units, since these veterans were important for
group cohesion and front atmosphere (Kershaw, 1990; Shils and Janowitz, 1948; Van Creveld,
1983).

Since especially at the Eastern front war attrition often broke up cohesive units in a matter of
days, other sources of morale were important as well. Although the influence of Nazi propaganda
is often mentioned in this respect, it is estimated that Nazi enthusiasts made up only 10-15
percent of all enlisted men. However, they were more numerous among NCOs and young
officers, and much more numerous among Waffen SS and paratroopers. Further, personal faith in
Hitler as a leader was widespread among the troops. As the war progressed, other forces driving
German morale became the increasing realization that the German Homeland was now in danger,
the still faint but uneasy realization that the war excesses and crimes committed by German
forces at the Eastern front would now backfire on Germany at the hands of the revenging
Russians, and the Allied call for unconditional surrender. It led to the sardonic exhortation Enjoy
the war while you can, because the peace will be terrible (Kershaw, 1990: 57; Shils and
Janowitz, 1948; Van Creveld, 1983).
Military justice in general was harsh and often draconian, with 11,753 men executed for
desertion and undermining morale, which probably led to relatively low desertion rates. The
harsh system was given a human face by the veterans and by relative lenience on private
transgressions, like drunkenness and women in the barracks (Kershaw, 1990; Shils and Janowitz,
1948; Van Creveld, 1983; Wilson, 1989).

British and German Battlefield Performance

In order to assess relative battlefield performance, it is important to find engagements in World

War II that permit a more or less fair comparison between German and British Army units
without too many confounding influences of Allied air and naval superiority, Allied and Axis
political developments, and relative differences in combat experience.

For several reasons, the Italian campaign between September 1943 and June 1944 appears
suited for that purpose. First, it affords a comparison of German and British Army performance at
a time and place in which Allied naval and air superiority did not yet decisively impact ground
operations. Although the initial landing at and securing of the Salerno beach head was decisively
aided by Allied naval and air bombing, in later engagements the rugged mountainous terrain and
adverse weather conditions made Allied naval and air support much more difficult (Graham and
Bidwell, 1986). Second, it affords such a comparison at a time that the German Army, although
badly battered at Stalingrad (December 1942), did not yet experience the profound impact of the
Normandy invasion and the attempted assassination of Hitler (June - July, 1944)(Wilmot, 1952).
Third, it affords an assessment of the development of battlefield performance of the British Army
over nine months of intense fighting, after its initial string of defeats during 1940-1942 and its
successful comeback in the North African desert (Dupuy, 1985; Graham and Bidwell, 1986; Hart,
2001).
The Italian campaign has been intensively researched by Dupuy, a retired US Army colonel and
military historian. Dupuy and his team developed the Quantified Judgment Model, which
involved the identification and quantification of 73 battlefield performance variables, pertaining
to weapons, terrain, weather, season, air superiority, posture, mobility, vulnerability, tactical air
effects and intangible factors such as leadership and morale (Dupuy, 1985, 1986). While not
without its critics (e.g., Brown, 1986, 1987; Geldenhuys and Botha, 1994), the QJM in general
has remained robust under criticism (Dupuy, 1986, 1987; Nutter, 2004).
Dupuy tested the QJM on the basis of 60 division-size engagements in the US Fifth Army zone
in Italy between September 1943 - June 1944. He selected this particular zone because both
ground and air operations took place in a confined operational area between the Tyrrhenian Sea
and the Apennines, which permitted a better comparison of forces than would be possible in less

strictly confined areas (Dupuy, 1985). Since the Fifth Army zone involved the commitment of
US as well as British and Commonwealth divisions, out of Dupuys original 60 engagements I
have selected those 28 that only involved British divisions. Table 2 contains the various
campaigns, engagements, German and British units, and other necessary data (based on Dupuy,
1985: 234-235). In this Table it can be seen that seven British and seven German divisions were
involved in these engagements, in which the British divisions enjoyed an average numerical
superiority of about 40 percent over their German counterparts.

Table 2 about here

Dupuy developed two measures to analyze engagements in the Italian campaign. The first
measure, Combat Effectiveness Value (CEV), is concerned with the ratio of relative combat
outcomes and combat power. In a formula it is defined as: CEV = (Rg/Ra)(Pg/Pa), whereby CEVg
= 1/CEVa and vice versa (Dupuy, 1986).
In this formula the first part, R, represents Result, defined by three sub measures: mission
accomplishment (the extent to which opposing sides succeed in achieving their goals); spatial
effectiveness (the number of miles gained or withdrawn in an engagement), and casualty
effectiveness (the number of daily inflicted casualties, controlled for the size of the opposing
sides). Calculating R values for the German and Allied sides in the engagements results in Rg/Ra
ratios, reflecting the actual outcome of an engagement (Dupuy, 1985, 1986).
The second part of the CEV formula, P, represents Combat Power, which in its turn is defined
as: P = S x V. Here S represents Force Strength, a quantification of the lethality of all infantry,
artillery, armor, and air support weapons used into an Operational Lethality Index, modified for
the effects of environmental variables (like weather, terrain and season) on the effectiveness of

each weapon. Further, V represents Variables affecting the employment of the force under the
circumstances existing as the time of the engagement. This includes tangible factors like posture,
terrain, weather, mobility and vulnerability, and intangible factors like leadership, training,
experience, morale and logistics. Calculating P values for the German and Allied sides in the
engagements results in Pg/Pa ratios, reflecting the theoretical outcome of an engagement (Dupuy,
1985, 1986).
Applying this CEV formula to the 28 engagements between British and German forces (Table
2), the average CEVg of 1.55 (or corresponding CEVb of 0.65) seems to indicate that on the
whole the Germans were about 50 percent more combat effective than the British forces facing
them. However, as Table 3 indicates, the British forces showed some signs of development and
adaptation during the nine months under consideration. In the Salerno and Volturna campaigns
(September - December 1943) the average CEVg of 1.59 (or corresponding CEVb of 0.63)
appears to show the distinct combat advantages of the Germans (Graham and Bidwell, 1986). In
the Anzio and Rome campaigns (January - June 1944), the average CEVg decreases somewhat to
1.49 (with a corresponding CEVb of 0.67), indicating a slight improvement in combat
effectiveness of the British troops. This development coincides with a decrease in average
numerical superiority of British over German forces from 85 to 2 percent, providing further
indication of British troops learning to fight more effectively in the face of stiff resistance.

Table 3 about here

The second measure, Score Effectiveness Value (SEV), is not concerned with results and
weapons, but simply counts the number of men and the daily number of casualties (killed,
wounded, missing) on both sides of an engagement. From this a score is calculated, indicating the

average number of casualties inflicted on the enemy by blocks of 100 men on each side. The
Score Effectiveness is calculated by dividing the score by a constant, the value of which depends
on a number of interacting factors, of which posture (attack, delaying resistance, hasty defense,
prepared defense, fortified defense) is the most important (Dupuy, 1985).
As an example, a typical average engagement in World War II has the following division of
forces (Dupuy, 1986: 206-207):
Army
N
Posture
# Casualties/day
% cas/day
German
10,000
Defense
250
2,5
Allied
20,000
Attack
400
2,0
AL Score ffect (SEa): GE cas/AL N 250/20,000 x 100 = 1.25
GE Score Effect (SEg): AL cas/GE N 400/10,000 x 100 = 4.0 / 2.0 = 2.0

During most of World War II the Allied forces were the attacking party and the Germans
delaying or defending. Because of the advantages of a defensive posture, the German score is
divided by a constant of 2.0, yielding a German Score Effect (SEg) of 2.0. The Score
Effectiveness Value of German versus Allied troops (SEVg) then is 2.0 : 1.25, or 1.6 : 1 (the
corresponding SEVa is the reverse, namely 1.25 : 2.0, or 0.63 : 1).
Applying this SEV formula to the 28 engagements between British and German forces in Italy
(Table 2), the average SEVg of 1.87 : 1 (or corresponding SEVb of 0.54 : 1) seems to indicate that
on a man for man basis the German troops inflicted casualties at an average 87 percent higher
rate than they incurred from the opposing British troops. However, as Table 3 indicates, on this
measure the British forces showed signs of development and adaptation as well during the nine
months under consideration. While in the Salerno and Volturna campaigns the average SEVg is
2.47 (with a corresponding SEVb of 0.41), in the Anzio and Rome campaigns the average SEVg
has dropped to 1.35 (with a corresponding SEVb of 0.74), providing another indication of clear
improvement in battlefield effectiveness of the British troops.

Discussion and Conclusions

In this paper it has been argued that the German Army enjoyed a more effective battlefield
performance than the British Army, and that this advantage can be reasonably related to their
comparatively higher organizational learning capability vis--vis the British. Regarding the four
dimensions, the German Army appears to present a relatively more productive learning cycle, in
which officers and men were substantially empowered, in which errors were valued and honestly
appraised, in which lessons learned from errors were quickly and thoroughly disseminated, and in
which officers and men were thoroughly selected, trained and organized so that they could be
empowered more, and so on. The British Army appears to present a relatively more defensive
learning cycle, in which officers and men were little empowered, in which errors were
unwelcome and covered up, in which lessons learned from errors were partly disseminated, and
in which officers and men were reasonably well selected, trained and organized so that in
principle they could have been empowered more, and so on.
While organizational learning capability may have been influential, several other factors have
played a role as well in determining battlefield performance. For example, a factor favoring the
Germans was geographical proximity, with the British troops fighting on remote battlefields and
the German forces increasingly fighting close to home, in defense of their fatherland (Kershaw,
1990). Another factor favoring the Germans was the political factor, with the Allied forces
consisting of multiple nations with concomitant political complications and the German forces
being led by one man, at least in principle (Beaumont, 1986). This was particularly true for the
Italian campaign, which was subject to rather intense inter-Allied strive and disagreement, while
Hitler lend his senior commander in Italy, Air Marshal Kesselring, a relatively free hand (Graham

and Bidwell, 1986; Wilmot, 1952). However, from the Normandy invasion onward inter-Allied
cooperation greatly improved, while Hitlers increasing resort to Befehlstaktik and micromanagement became de facto liabilities for the German Army (Murray, 1992; Wilmot, 1952).
In the end, however, all these factors could not compensate for the basic strategic fact that
Germany lacked sufficient industrial, logistical and human resources to wage a prolonged twofront war against the combined Allied forces and that its fate was de facto sealed after the
onslaught at Stalingrad (Frieser, 2005; Murray, 1992).

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Table 1 Dimensions of organizational learning capability

Source
Chiva et al.
(2007)
Jerez-Gmez
et al. (2005)
Marsick and
Watkins
(2003)
Moilanen
(2001)
Goh
and
Richards
(1997)
DiBella et al.
(1996)
Ulrich et al.
(1993)

Dimensions of organizational learning capability

(1) Experimentation; (2) risk taking; (3) interaction with the external environment; (4) dialogue; (5)
participative decision making.
(1) Managerial commitment to learning; (2) systems perspective; (3) openness and
experimentation; (4) knowledge transfer and integration.
(1) Create continuous learning opportunities; (2) promote inquiry and dialogue; (3) encourage
collaboration and team learning; (4) create systems to capture and share learning; (5) empower
people toward a collective vision; (6) connect the organization to its environment; (7) provide
strategic leadership for learning.
(1) Driving forces; (2) finding purpose; (3) questioning; (4) empowering; (5) evaluating.
(1) Clarity of purpose and mission; (2) leadership commitment and empowerment; (3)
experimentation and rewards; (4) transfer of knowledge; (5) teamwork and group problem solving.
(1) Scanning imperative; (2) performance gap; (3) concern for measurement; (4) experimental
mindset; (5) climate of openness; (6) continuous education; (7) operational variety; (8) multiple
advocates; (9) involved leadership; (10) systems perspective.
(1) Build a commitment to learning capability; (2) work to generate ideas with impact; (3) work to
generalize ideas with impact.

Table 2 Selected engagements British-German troops, Italy 1943-1944

Nr. Engagement
Brit. div.
Salerno Campaign, September 9-18, 1943
D1
Port of Salerno, Sep. 9-11
46 I
D2
Amphitheater, Sep. 9-11
56 I
D4
Vietri I, Sep. 12-14
46 I
D5
Battipaglia I, Sep. 12-15
56 I
D7
Vietri II, Sep. 17-18
46 I
D8
Battipaglia II, Sep. 17-18
56 I
Volturno Campaign, October 12-December 8, 1943
D10 Grazzanise, Oct. 12-14
7A
D11 Capua, Oct. 13
56 I
D15 Castel Volturno, Oct. 13-15
46 I
D17 Canal I, Oct. 15-20
46 I
D18 Monte Grande, Oct. 16-17
50 I
D19 Canal II, Oct. 17-18
7I
D20 Francolise, Oct. 20-22
7I
D22 Monte Camino I, Nov. 5-7
56 I
D25 Monte Camino II, Nov. 8-12
56 I
D27 Calabritto, Dec. 1-2
46 I
D28 Monte Camino III, Dec. 2-6
56 I
Anzio Campaign, January 22-February 29, 1944
D30 Aprilia I, Jan. 25-26
1I
D31 The Factory, Jan. 27
1I
D32 Campoleone, Jan. 29-31
1I
D33 Campoleone counterattack, Feb. 3-5 1 I
D34 Carroceto, Feb. 7-8
1I
D36 Aprilia II, Feb. 9
1I
D39 Moletta river, Feb. 16-19
56 I
Rome Campaign, May 11-June 4, 1944
D49 Moletta offensive, May 23-24
5I
D50 Anzio-Albano road, May 23-24
1I
D57 Ardea, May 28-30
5I
D60 Tarto-Tiber, June 3-4
1/5I
28
Average
7 divs
Ratio

Italics = attacking
I = Infantry
A = Armored
b= Britsh
g = German

Nb

Germ. div.

Ng

CEVb

SEb

SEg

12,917
12,917
12,917
11,230
18,912
14,730

16 Pz
16 Pz
HG Pz
16 Pz
HG Pz
16 Pz

4,250
4,250
15,000
14,730
13,300
6,995

0.79
0.46
1.04
0.19
0.78
0.73

1.02
0.99
1.78
1.61
1.59
0.88

3.85
2.75
2.30
2.86
1.74
2.02

14,557
16,857
17,765
17,500
16,400
14,600
14,000
19,513
5,200
17,765
20,744

15 PzGr
HG Pz
15 PzGr
15 PzGr
HG Pz
15 PzGr
15 PzGr
15 PzGr
15 PzGr
15 PzGr
15 PzGr

8,068
8,000
8,158
8,138
7,239
8,138
8,088
6,750
7,942
7,588
3,288

0.46
0.13
0.41
0.90
0.71
0.91
0.85
0.52
0.26
0.79
0.79

0.68
1.08
0.51
0.93
0.76
0.75
0.96
0.81
0.42
0.84
1.25

2.05
3.94
2.94
1.73
2.20
1.60
1.06
2.06
2.24
2.95
3.27

19,350
17,976
17,766
9,734
4,515
17,730
9,761

3 PzGr
3 PzGr
3 PzGr
Kg Greizer
3 PzGr
Kg Greizer
65 I / 4 Pa

6,750
15,317
15,098
26,029
26,490
27,518
21,478

0.49
0.59
0.77
0.85
0.98
0.21
0.67

0.81
0.73
0.88
3.14
1.56
1.35
1.88

4.60
1.10
1.71
3.11
1.47
2.08
4.56

17,345
17,313
15,557
38,011
15,842

4 Pa
65 I
4 Pa
4 Pa
7 divs

12,569
11,343
7,659
10,855
11,465

0.59
0.89
0.74
0.60
0.65
(1.55)

2.43
2.48
1.81
2.36
1.30

1.92
1.58
1.60
2.44
2.42

1 :
0.54:

1.87
1

1.38 :

Pz = Panzer
Gr = Grenadier
Kg = Kampfgruppe
Pa = Paratroopers

Table 3 Development British-German battlefield performance over campaigns, 1943-1944

Campaigns
Salerno & Volturna
(Sept.- Dec. 1943,
17 engagements)
Anzio & Rome
(Jan. June 1944,
11 engagements)
Average
Ratio

Nb / Ng
1.85 : 1

CEVb(g)
0.63
(1.59)

1.02 : 1

0.67
(1.49)

1.38 : 1

0.65
(1.55)

SEb
0.99
1
:
0.41 :
1.77
1
:
0.74 :
1.30

SEg
2.44
2.47
1
2.38
1.35
1
2.42

1
:
0.54 :

1.87
1