Case Digests

1. Habeas Corpus

CASE TITLE :G.R. No. 169482

January 29, 2008

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF HABEAS CORPUS OF EUFEMIA

E. RODRIGUEZ, filed by EDGARDO E. VELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
LUISA R. VILLANUEVA and TERESITA R. PABELLO, respondents.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review1 of the resolutions February 2, 2005 and September 2,
2005 of the C.A.where the petition for habeas corpus was denied.
The nephew of Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow, allegedly suffering
from a poor state of mental health and deteriorating cognitive abilities filed for
habeas corpus after demanding the return of Eufemia from her adopted
daughters. The C.A. ruled that petitioner failed to present any convincing proof that
respondents (the legally adopted children of Eufemia) were unlawfully restraining
their mother of her liberty. He also failed to establish his legal right to the custody
of Eufemia as he was not her legal guardian. Thus, in a resolution dated February
2, 2005, the C.A. denied his petition.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was also denied. 7 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that, in determining whether or not a writ of habeas corpus should
issue, a court should limit itself to determining whether or not a person is
unlawfully being deprived of liberty and that there is no need to consider legal
custody or custodial rights. Thus, a writ of habeas corpus can cover persons who are
not under the legal custody of another. According to petitioner, as long as it is
alleged that a person is being illegally deprived of liberty, the writ of habeas
corpus may issue so that his physical body may be brought before the court that will
determine whether or not there is in fact an unlawful deprivation of liberty.
However, respondents state that they are the legally adopted daughters of Eufemia
and her deceased spouse, Maximo Rodriguez. Respondents point out that it was

petitioner and his family who were staying with Eufemia, not the other way around
as petitioner claimed. Eufemia paid for the rent of the house, the utilities and other
household needs.
Sometime in the 1980s, petitioner EDGARDO E. VELUZ was appointed as
administrator of the properties of Eufemia and her deceased spouse. By this
appointment, he took charge of collecting payments from tenants and transacted
business with third persons for and in behalf of Eufemia and the respondents who
were the only compulsory heirs of the late Maximo.Eufemia and the respondents
demanded an inventory and return of the properties entrusted to petitioner. His
failure to heed gave rise to a complaint of estafa. Consequently, and by reason of
their mothers deteriorating health, respondents decided to take custody of Eufemia
on January 11, 2005. She willingly went with them. Petitioner failed to prove either
his right to the custody of Eufemia or the illegality of respondents action.
ISSUE: Whether or not habeas corpus should be granted.
RULING: Petition Denied. ApplicationL: The writ of habeas corpus extends to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty or by which the rightful custody of a person is being withheld from the one
entitled thereto. It is issued when one is either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully
being prevented from exercising legal custody over another person. Thus, it
contemplates two instances: (1) deprivation of a persons liberty either through
illegal confinement or through detention and (2) withholding of the custody of any
person from someone entitled to such custody.
According to the S.C., if the respondents are not detaining or restraining the
applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be
dismissed
In this case, the C.A. made an inquiry into whether Eufemia was being restrained of
her liberty. It found that she was not.
Petition was DENIED.

II.
Tijing vs. CA, 354 SCRA 17; GR No. 125901, March 8, 2001
Posted by Pius Morados on April 29, 2012
(Special Proceedings Habeas Adoption: Custody of a minor)
Facts: Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their son
from respondent and presented witnesses to substantiate their petition. Respondent
claimed on the other hand that she is the natural mother of the child.
The trial court held in favor of the petitioners and granted the petition for habeas
corpus. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial
court. The appellate court expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas
corpus.
Issue: WON habeas corpus is the proper remedy to regain custody of a minor.
Held: Yes. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. The writ of
habeas corpus is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of
a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free
will.
III.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF

LAURENTE C. ILAGAN et.al. vs. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE
[G.R. No.70748. October 21, 1985]
FACTS:

A petition for Habeas Corpus was filed by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and Free Legal Assistance Group on behalf of Attorneys
LaurenteIlagan, Antonio Arellano, and Marcos Risonar.
The three lawyers were arrested and detained in Camp Catitipan solely on
the basis of a Mission Order signed by Gen. Echavarria, Regional Unified
Commander of the Ministry of National Defense. The petition was then filed on the

ground that the arrests were illegal and violative of the Constitution, because arrest
cannot be made on the basis of Mission Orders and there appears to be a military
campaign to harass lawyers who are involved in national security cases.
The respondents contended that the attorneys were arrested on the basis of a
Decree issued by the President. Respondents further allege that the detained
attorneys played active roles in organizing mass actions of the Communist Party of
the Philippines and the National Democratic Front.
The court resolved to order the temporary release of the detained attorneys
on the recognizance of the principal counsel of petitioners, namely retired Chief
Justice Concepcion and retired Associate Justice J.B.L Reyes. However, despite the
Order of the Court, the detained attorneys were not released. Respondents filed an
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration stating that the suspension of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus has the effect of ousting the Court of its jurisdiction to hear the case.
Furthermore, the respondents allege that information for Rebellion was filed
against the detained attorneys were not given the benefit of preliminary
investigation, and that they were denied the constitutional right to due process.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent filing of information is a bar to a petition for
Habeas Corpus?
RULING:
The case was dismissed for having become moot and academic. Petitioners
were detained by virtue of a Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City in relation to the criminal case for Rebellion filed against them before
said Court.
The detained attorneys question their detention because of improper arrest,
or that no preliminary investigation has been conducted, the remedy is not a
petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus but a Motion before the trial court to quash the
Warrant of Arrest, and /or the Information on grounds provided by the Rules or to
ask for an investigation / reinvestigation of the case. Habeas corpus would not lie
after the Warrant of commitment was issued by the Court on the basis of the

Information filed against the accused.

Preliminary investigation was also
unnecessary since the detained attorneys were lawfully arrested without a warrant.
Section 7, Rule 112, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure and Section 5, Rule
113 of the same Rules enumerates the instances when an arrest without warrant is
lawful.

IV.
Madrinan vs. Madrinan, 527 SCRA 487, GR No. 159374, July 12, 2007
(Special Proceedings Court of Appeals and Supreme Court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the family courts of Habeas Corpus involving custody of minors)
Facts: Petitioner and respondent were married, and after a bitter quarrel,
petitioner left the conjugal abode bringing with him their three sons (2 of which are
minors) to Albay and to Laguna subsequently.
Respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals for their their
2 minor sons on the ground that petitioners act disrupted their education and
deprived them of their mothers care.
Petitioner filed a memorandum alleging that respondent was unfit to take custody of
their children and questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that
under Section 5(b) of RA 8369, family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to
hear and decide the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent.
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its authority to take cognizance
and ruling, that under the Family Code, respondent was entitled to custody of the
minors.
Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition
for habeas corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family
courts under RA 8369.
Issue: WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases
involving custody of minors.

Held: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in a previous jurisprudence that The Court of
Appeals should has cognizance of this case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that
revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of
minors. RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their
jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors.
The concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court with family
courts in said cases was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004)
in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody
of Minors which provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. A verified petition for a writ of
habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The
writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court
belongs.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or
with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere
in the Philippines
V.
In Re: Azucena L. Garcia, 339 SCRA 292, GR 141443, August 30, 2000
(Special Proceedings Habeas Corpus: final judgment and bail)
Facts: Petitioner is convicted by final judgment of the crime of falsification of public
document. In the case at bar, petitioner is out on bail and is seeking for a relief via a
petition for habeas corpus questioning the validity of the judgment rendered.
Petitioner contends that were proceedings were attended by violations of the
constitutional rights of the accused; the judgment of conviction is void thereby
warranting relief by the extraordinary legal remedy of habeas corpus.
The OSG, on the other hand states that the writ of habeas corpus is a remedy
available to a person who is illegally imprisoned or restrained by his liberty.
Consequently, a person discharged or out on bail, like petitioner, is not entitled to
the writ.

Issue: WON a person convicted by final judgment and/or out on bail is entitled to
the writ of habeas corpus.
Held: No. The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. Its object is
to inquire into the legality of ones detention, and if found illegal, to order release of
the detainee.
It is a well-settled rule that the writ will not issue where the person in whose behalf
the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record,
and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render judgment,
or make the order.
VI.
Ilusorio vs. Bildner, GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000; 332 SCRA 169
(Special Proceedings Husband cannot be forced to live with his wife by Habeas
Corpus)
Facts: Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of
her husband Potenciano alleging that respondents refused petitioners demands to
see and visit her husband.
The CA allowed visitation rights to Erlinda for humanitarian consideration but
denied the petition for habeas corpus for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of
the subject of the petition.
Erlinda seeks to reverse the CA decision dismissing the application for habeas
corpus to have the custody of her husband and enforce consortium as the wife.
Potenciano seeks to annul that portion of the CA decision giving Erlinda visitation
rights.
Issue: May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with
her in their conjugal dwelling.
Held: No. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may
not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by

which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It
is available where a person continuous unlawfully denied of one or more of his
constitutional freedom. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restrainment, as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom.
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint
is illegal.
A person with full mental capacity coupled with the right choice may not be the
subject of visitation rights against free choice. The CA exceeded its authority when
it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even
prayed for such right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his
wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried
out by the sheriffs or by any other mesne process.
VII.
Feria vs CA, GR No. 122954, February 15, 2000; 525 SCRA 525_digested
(Special Proceedings Habeas Corpus)
Facts: After discovering that his entire criminal records, including the copy of the
judgment, was lost or destroyed, petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ
of Habeas Corpus with the SC against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the
Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and the City
Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement on the ground that
his continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of his
constitutional right to due process.
The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the mere loss of the records of the
case does not invalidate the judgment or commitment nor authorize the release of
the petitioner, and that the proper remedy would be reconstitution of the records of
the case which should be filed with the court which rendered the decision.

Petitioner argues that his detention is illegal because there exists no copy of
a valid judgment as required by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court,
and that the evidence considered by the trial court and Court of Appeals in
the habeas corpus proceedings did not establish the contents of such judgment.
In a comment, OSG maintains that public respondents have more than sufficiently
shown the existence of a legal ground for petitioners continued incarceration, viz.,
his conviction by final judgment, and under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court, the discharge of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment is
not authorized.
Issue: WON there is legal basis to detain petitioner after the destruction or loss of
his criminal records.
Held: Yes. The writ of habeas corpus, was devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom. It secures to a prisoner the right to have the
cause of his detention examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have
the issue ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful authority. Consequently,
the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a)
there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a
person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or (c) an excessive
penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. Petitioners
claim is anchored on the first ground considering, as he claims, that his continued
detention, notwithstanding the lack of a copy of a valid judgment of conviction, is
violative of his constitutional right to due process.Based on the records and the
hearing conducted by the trial court, there is sufficient evidence on record to
establish the fact of conviction of petitioner which serves as the legal basis for his
detention.
As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on
the petitioner who attacks such restraint. In other words, where the return is not
subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth process which on its face shows good
ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and
prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process. If the
detention of the prisoner is by reason of lawful public authority, the return is
considered prima facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner
has the burden of proof to show that the restraint is illegal.

When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so
charged, its judgment, order, or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas
corpus.

VIII.
Cruz vs. CA, G.R. No. 137560. January 19, 2000
(Special Proceedings Habeas Corpus: Requisites)
Facts: Maria Cruzs filed a petition for habeas corpus. Her son, David, was tried
and convicted by the trial court for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
(RA 6425). He was convicted on September 27, 1993 and sentenced to life
imprisonment. He was committed to the National Penitentiary on October 13, 1993.
On December 31, 1993, R.A. No. 769 took effect. This law amended provisions of
several penal laws, including the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The penalty for the illegal sale of marijuana under the old law was life
imprisonment to death. Under R.A. 7659, the penalty depended on the quantity of
the drug. The sale of 750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana became
punishable by reclusion perpetua, to death. The penalty for the sale of less than 750
grams of marijuana was reduced to a range from prision correccional to reclusion
perpetua, depending upon the quantity of the drug.
The amount of marijuana for which David Cruz was convicted is 2.70 grams. The
imposable penalty for this amount under the Simon ruling is prision correctional
which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Presently,
David Cruz has already served six (6) years and three (3) months of his sentence
which is way beyond the last day of prision correccional. The continued detention of
Cruz at, the National Penitentiary has been admitted by the Solicitor General as
already illegal.
Issue: WON a petition for a writ of habeas corpus be granted.
Held: Yes. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty. An application for the writ
of habeas corpus is made upon verified petition setting forth: (1) that the person in
whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; (2)
the officer or name of the person by whom he is imprisoned or restrained; (3) the

place where he is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; and (4) a copy of the
commitment or cause of detention of such person.

IX.
Harden vs. Director of Prisoners

Facts: Fred Harden is being confined in prison for contempt of court. This arose
when the plaintiff was restrained from transferring moneys, shares of stock, and
other properties and assets involving the administration of conjugal partnership
that he had with Mrs. Harden. Mr. Harden, however, transferred cash to various
banks in Hongkong and California, as well as to an unknown person. He was
ordered by the court to redeposit the money and the Balatoc Mining Co. shares
belonging to the conjugal partnership, which he had in Hongkong to the Chartered
Bank of India, Australia and China (Manila Branch). He was not able to fulfill these
orders, and so was put to jail.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner, Fred Harden, can warrant a writ of habeas
corpus
Held: No. The petition is denied with costs.
The grounds for relief by habeas corpus are only (1) deprivation of any fundamental
or constitutional rights (2) lack of jurisdiction of the court to impose the sentence or
(3) excessive penalty. It was held that the court has jurisdiction to impose the
sentence simply because the person charged is in the state and he is still within the
jurisdiction of its courts. Moreover, the penalty imposed on the petitioner is not
excessive because under Section 7, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, when the
contempt consists in the omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the
accused to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of a superior court until he
performs it. This justifies the penalty imposed on Fred Harden, thereby not making
it excessive. Moreover, the courts findings are supported by sufficient evidence and
it is a matter of fact which cannot be reviewed by habeas corpus. The writ of habeas
corpus cannot be used as a writ of error.