Katarungang Pambarangay Law Cases

Katarungang Pambarangay Law
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MAURO BLARDONY, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE L. COSCOLLUELA, JR., as
Presiding Judge of Branch CXLVI, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT NATIONAL CAPITAL
REGION, MAKATI, METRO MANILA and MA. ROSARIO ARANETA BLARDONY,
respondents.1990 February 281st DivisionG.R. No. 70261D E C I S I O N
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
The petitioner seeks a review of the orders dated August 9, 1983, and
February 20, 1985, of respondent Judge Jose Coscolluela, Jr., of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch CXLVI, amending the order of his predecessor,
Judge Segundo Soza, (which dismissed private respondent's petition for
dissolution of the conjugal partnership and partition of conjugal properties) by
requiring petitioner to submit an accounting of his salaries, allowances,
bonuses and commissions.
The petitioner and the private respondent are spouses. They were married on
April 30, 1975. During their marriage, they begot one child named Patricia
Araneta Blardony, who was born on November 10, 1975. Due to irreconcilable
differences, petitioner and private respondent separated in March, 1981.
On different dates, the spouses executed the following agreements:
(a) Memorandum of Agreement dated July 1981 for the support of their
child, Patricia;
(b) Receipt dated January 11, 1982, evidencing the Compromise of
Settlement of Advances claimed by private respondent from petitioner;
[c] The Deed of Conveyance of a property situated in Alabang, Muntinlupa;
and
(d) The Confirmation of the waiver by private respondent in favor of
petitioner over a property situated in Calatagan, Batangas. (p. 25, Rollo.)
On May 3, 1982, the wife filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership and Partition of Conjugal Partnership
Properties in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXVI, in Makati,
where it was docketed as Sp. No. 9711.
The husband, in his answer, admitted that he had abandoned the conjugal
home since March 1981; that before the filing of the petition, he and his wife,
assisted by their respective counsel, tried to file a joint petition for the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership but their attempt failed due to their
inability to agree upon the equitable partition of their conjugal partnership
properties and he prayed the court to order "a fair and equitable dissolution of
their conjugal partnership in accordance with law." (p. 74, Rollo.).
On October 8, 1982, the husband filed a motion to dismiss the petition on
jurisdictional grounds, claiming that it should have been filed first in the Lupon
Tagapamayapa as provided in P.D. 1508, because both are residents of the
same Municipality of Makati.
Mrs. Blardony opposed the motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, Judge Segundo
Soza dismissed her petition on October 8, 1982 for her failure, as plaintiff, to
comply with Section 6 of P.D. 1508.
Mrs. Blardony filed a motion for reconsideration. In the meantime, the courts
were reorganized and the case was transferred to Branch CXLVI (146) of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, presided over by Judge Jose Coscolluela, Jr.
On August 9, 1983, Judge Coscolluela set aside Judge Soza's order of
dismissal and required the defendant to submit an accounting of his salaries,
allowances, bonuses, and commissions. The latter's motion for reconsideration
of that order was denied by the court on February 20, 1985. Hence, this
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction on the grounds that respondent Judge exceeded
his jurisdiction:
1. in assuming jurisdiction over the case without prior referral to the Lupon
Tagapamayapa as required by P.D. 1508; and
2. in declaring that the issues of support pendente lite and delivery of
personal property belonging to the conjugal partnership of the parties are
essentially involved in the petition, hence, the parties could go directly to
court without passing through the Lupon Tagapamayapa, as provided in
Section 6 of P.D. 1508.
The petition has no merit. Our jurisprudence is replete with decisions of this
Court to the effect that while the referral of a case to the Lupon Tagapayapa is
a condition precedent for filing a complaint in court, it is not a jurisdictional
requirement, "its non-compliance cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court
has already acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the
defendant." (Fernandez vs. Militante, May 31, 1988; Gonzales vs. Court of
Appeals, 151 SCRA 287; Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 127 SCRA
470). Petitioner waived the pre-litigation conciliation procedure prescribed in
P.D. No. 1508 when he did not file a motion to dismiss the complaint on that
score, but filed his answer thereto wherein he prayed the court to make an
equitable partition of the conjugal properties.
"While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising
jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking exception thereto, they instead
invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking affirmative
relief from it . . . Upon this premise, petitioners cannot be allowed belatedly to
adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to

which they had submitted themselves voluntarily." (Royales vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 127 SCRA 470.)
Furthermore, under Section 6 of P.D. 1508, the complaint may be filed directly
in a competent court without passing the Lupon Tagapayapa in the following
cases:
"SECTION 6.
Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint.
No
complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the
authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof, shall be filed or
instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there
has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon
Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached
as certified by the Lupon Secretary or
the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless
the settlement has been repudiated.
However, the parties may go directly to court in the following cases:
"xxx
xxx
xxx
"(3) Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction,

attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente lite; and
"xxx
xxx
xxx
Respondent Judge correctly observed that:

". . . the issues of support pendente lite and delivery of personal properties
belonging to the conjugal partnership, although not `coupled' in the strict
sense of the word with the instant petition, are essentially involved in this
petition because of the minority of the daughter, Patricia Araneta Blardony
who, as of this date, is not yet 8 years old, and because the resolution or
decision of this court on the pending petition would be incomplete without a
clear cut disposition on the partition of the personal and real properties of the
conjugal partnership and consequent delivery thereof to the proper parties."
(p. 20, Rollo.)
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the orders complained of, the
petition for certiorari is denied for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
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(MAURO BLARDONY, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE L. COSCOLLUELA, JR., as

Presiding Judge of Branch CXLVI, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT NATIONAL CAPITAL
REGION, MAKATI, METRO MANILA and MA. ROSARIO ARANETA BLARDONY,
respondents., G.R. No. 70261, 1990 February 28, 1st Division)

[1987V296] ERNESTO ANDRES, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.1987 June 231st DivisionG.R. No.
L-48957D E C I S I O N
GANCAYCO, J.:
In an information that was filed in the then Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Isabela, the petitioner, Ernesto Andres, was charged
with the crime of homicide with frustrated homicide. Trial on the merits
thereon ensued after the petitioner pleaded not guilty upon being arraigned.
The petitioner invoked the justifying circumstance of self-defense under Article
11 of the Revised Penal Code as his main defense after it was indubitably
proved that he stabbed the deceased and the other offended party.
On June 25, 1975, the trial court rendered a decision finding the petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of homicide and frustrated
homicide. The trial court held that the petitioner failed to establish selfdefense by clear and convincing evidence for no unlawful aggression on the
part of the group of the deceased was attendant. Thus, in the dispositive
portion of the said decision the petitioner was convicted and sentenced:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds ERNESTO ANDRES guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE, as charged, for the unjustified
killing of FEDERICO BAYYA, the commission of which was attended by the
mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation without any aggravating
circumstance to offset it, for which crime the said accused is hereby sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
prision mayor, as minimum, and TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Federico Bayya
in the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The Court also hereby finds the same accused ERNESTO ANDRES guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE, as charged,
for the frustrated killing of RODOLFO CUMARAT, the commission of which was
attended by the lone mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation,
without any aggravating circumstance to offset it. Accordingly, the said
accused is also sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2)
YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of prision correccional, as minimum, and SIX
(6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify
the said RODOLFO CUMARAT in the sum of ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
FIFTY (P1,850.00) PESOS, as actual damages and in the sum of THREE
THOUSAND (P3,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, as moral damages,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The knife (bread slicer) used in the commission of said crimes is ordered
confiscated in favor of the Government.
The accused shall also pay the costs." 1
Not satisfied therewith, the petitioner elevated this case to the herein
respondent Court of Appeals. The respondent Court affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court. However, in the ratio decidendi of its decision, the
respondent Court brushed aside a discussion, in relation to the case at bar, of
the most important requisite of the justifying circumstance of self-defense,
i.e., unlawful aggression, and merely proceeded in adjudicating the case based
on the absence of the second requisite of self-defense, that of the "reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it." 2 It held that:
"We are now called upon to rule on the appellant's plea of self-defense.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the circumstances here as described
by the witnesses for the defense are true, We cannot see our way clear to
crediting appellant with the justification for taking the life of Federico Bayya
and for inflicting upon Rodolfo Cumarat with a stab wound which nearly
caused Cumarat's life for it is clear from the evidence that the four men were
unarmed (the claim that one of them was carrying a club is hardly to be
believed) and the accused himself stated that the attackers were only using
their fists on him. His claim that there were 'many people' may be true in the
sense that there were many passersby. But as far as persons attacking him
were concerned there were only four, for which reason We find it hardly
justifiable for him to use his breadknife against his attackers, a weapon which
proved so lethal that only one thrust on the victim was fatal enough." 3
In assuming for the sake of argument that the defense's version of the facts is
true and then ruling on the case only on the basis of the second requisite of
self-defense, the respondent Court paved the way for this petition for review
on certiorari. The petitioner then saw the ripe opportunity to call for an
interpretation and a correct application of the second requisite of self-defense.
The facts of the case as found by the respondent Court are herein reproduced,
to wit:
"Facts Not Contested:
It was the town fiesta of Santiago, Isabela and the streets were full of
pedestrians. At 1:00 in the early morning of July 26, 1972, the accused in the
company of three ladies, Eufemia Calso, his fiancee, who later became his
wife, her sister Sally and one other were walking along the provincial road on
their way home from a late movie. On the same road and going along the
same direction were four men, the deceased Federico Bayya, his cousin
Fernando Bayya, Rodolfo Cumarat and one other, who too, were on their way
home after having drunk one bottle of beer each in a nearby restaurant when
Federico Bayya happened to bump Eufemia (defense says he kissed Eufemia)
which displeased the accused causing the latter to box Federico. Federico tried
to retaliate but due to the intervention of the lady companion of the accused.
Federico was appeased and both groups proceeded on their way.
"Disputed Facts:
"According to the prosecution witnesses, after the bumping (kissing) incident
Federico and his companions walked ahead of the group of the accused, but
upon reaching the intersection of the road where they were about to turn to
go to their respective houses, the accused suddenly caught up with them, and
without any word of warning stabbed first Rodolfo Cumarat or the left side of
his abdomen, followed by another stab at Federico. Federico's stab wound
proved fatal, while Rodolfo's, although likewise fatal, was attended to on time
and fortunately treated effectively, thus averting his death.
"The defense on the other hand, thru witnesses Efufemia and Sally Calso offer
a different version. They claim that after the 'first incident' they proceeded to
walk ahead, with the four men trailing behind them; and when they were
about to reach the intersection, one of the four men who was later identified
by the witnesses as Rodolfo Cumarat tried to catch up with Andres, and
placing his hand over Andres' shoulder, boxed Andres twice. Andres tried to
run away but all the four men chased him and started to pummel him with fist
blows. Andres testifies that one of his attackers was carrying a club with which
he sought to strike the accused. (t.s.n. pp. 3-11, April 2, 1975).
Q. Why were you not able to reach the house of Eufemia Calso on that
particular night?
A. When we were about to reach the Kwikway, or the corner a certain man
put his arms on my shoulder.
Q. After that man placed his arms on your shoulder what happened next if
any?
A. That man when he placed his arm on my shoulder boxed me on my throat
and then the arms which was placed on my shoulder boxed me at the back of
my head.
Q. Do you know that man who placed his arms around your shoulder and
boxed you?
A. Before I did not know the name of that man and I came to know him only
during the investigation.
Q. And what is the name?
A. Rodolfo Cumarat, sir.
Q. After Rodolfo Cumarat boxed you in your throat and nape, what happened
next if any?
May we make the observation that the trend of the question would lead the
witness.
COURT:
Sustained.
Atty. Delizo.
Q. When Rodolfo Cumarat boxed you what did you do, if any?
A. After Rodolfo Cumarat boxed me I ran from here to that place and then his
companions got near me with clubs and they started boxing me.
Q. How many persons have you seen with a club on that particular night?
A. Only one sir.
Q. And how many persons were boxing you?
A. I did not know, sir, because when they were boxing me I covered my face
(witness demonstrating the way he placed both his hands in his face and
crouch with his hands trying to protect his head and face). And when I put up
my face I saw plenty of persons.
Q. Where did you see those persons?
A. The place where they overtook me, sir.
Q. When you were boxed by those persons whom you do not know the
number what did you do, if any?
Fiscal Lopez:
Misleading.
Atty. Delizo:
I withdraw my question.
Q. You said you saw a man with a club what did that man do, if any?
A. The man with a club clubbed me.
Q. What part of your body was hit?
A. Right shoulder, sir.
Q. How many times were you hit by the club?
A. I don't remember how many times, sir.
Q. How about Rodolfo Cumarat what did he do, if any?
A. Rodolfo Cumarat also boxed me and when I crouched and covered my face,
Rodolfo kept on boxing me and when I raised my face I saw already many
people.
Q. Do you know how many times were you boxed by those persons who
boxed you?
A. I don't know how many times sir.
Q. What did you do if any, when you were boxed and clubbed by those
persons?
A. When I lifted my face I looked around and saw many people and they told
me that they are going to kill me and I remember my knife bread slicer in my
waist." 4
According to the respondent Court, the petitioner was not justified in using his
knife as against the bare fists of the unarmed group of his alleged assailants.
In addition, the respondent Court made the observation that "the accused was
a little too fast and imprudent in the use of his breadknife, for there really was
no imminent danger to his life and limb when he wielded it against the
deceased and Rodolfo Cumarat." 5 Consequently, it held that the second
requisite of self-defense was absent in this case.
The petitioner claimed otherwise, hence, this petition.
It must be noted that the petitioner originally pleaded self-defense. In this
kind of a defense, the burden of proof rests upon the accused. His duty is to
establish self-defense by evidence clear and convincing, relying on the
strength of his own evidence not on the weakness of the prosecution." 6
The first requisite of self-defense is indispensable. There can be no selfdefense until it is proved that there has been unlawful aggression on the part
of the person injured or killed by the accused. 7
If there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent or to repel. The
second requisite of self-defense will have no basis. In the case of People vs.
Yuman, 8 this rule was explained as follows:
". . . it is evident that our conclusion will have to be that her act of mortally
wounding her lover Marciano Martin had not been preceded by aggression on
the part of the latter. There is no occasion to speak here of the 'reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it,' nor is it necessary to
inquire whether or not there was 'sufficient provocation' on the part of the one
invoking legitimate self-defense because both circumstances presuppose
unlawful aggression which, we repeat, was not present in the instant case."
Therefore, the inescapable conclusion is that the issue raised by the petitioner
as to the second requisite of self-defense is rather premature for he must first
establish the existence of unlawful aggression being perpetrated against his
person.
Now, was there unlawful aggression on the part of the petitioner's alleged
assailants?
We hold that there was none.

During the trial of the case, the prosecution and the defense presented two
conflicting versions of the facts. Each one contended that the opposing party
was the aggressor. Thus, the trial court's findings of fact and assignment of
values as to the evidence adduced become relevant and decisive.
After a thorough perusal of the evidence on record, We find the trial court's
findings and conclusions to be well in accord. We thus agree with the
following:
"From the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, Fernando Bayya and
Rodolfo Cumarat, and that of the witnesses for the defense it is clear that the
incident that happened in the early morning of July 26, 1972 which resulted in
the fatal stabbing of Federico Bayya and the almost fatal stabbing of Rodolfo
Cumarat by the accused consisted of two stages. The first stage was the
"accidental bumping" or "kissing" of Eufemia Calso, the then sweetheart of the
accused, by Federico Bayya in front of the store of the Singer Sewing Machine
along the provincial road of Santiago. The accused boxed Federico Bayya on
the face but before the latter could retaliate, Sally Calso intervened by
pacifying Federico Bayya and holding his collar. Eufemia Calso also held the
accused and pulled him away; while the companions of Federico Bayya
apologized for their companion's conduct and also pulled away the latter. Thus,
the trouble was peacefully settled and the two groups separated and continued
walking along the road in the same direction. The second stage happened at
the intersection near the Kwik-Kway Engineering where the stabbing took
place.
"As to who started the unlawful aggression in the second stage, the two sets
of witnesses do not agree. The prosecution witnesses claim that when their
group was at the intersection near the Kwik-Kway Engineering building, the
accused suddenly attacked them with his knife and stabbed Rodolfo Cumarat
and then Federico Bayya. The defense witnesses, however, testified that it was
the group of the four men that first attacked the accused. They claim that
Rodolfo Cumarat walked to the side of the accused, placed his arm on the
shoulder of the accused and then boxed him on the back of his head and on
his throat. The accused then ran but he was chased by the four men. When
they were able to overtake the accused, they rained fist blows on all parts of
his body and one of them clubbed him on the shoulders. The accused
crouched and tried to parry the blows with hi hand. Eufemia Calso told the
accused to run but the latter could not run because he was wounded. The
accused heard his attackers say that they were going to kill him, he
remembered that he had hi knife (bread slicer) tucked in his waist. He pulled
it, closed his eyes and swung it indiscriminately against his attackers. Then he
heard the whistle of a policeman and his assailants ran away. The policeman
ran after his attackers and he also ran after the policeman to tell the latter his
attackers. He did not, however, continue to run after the policeman and
instead went to the house of his sweetheart, Eufemia Calso. He did not know if
he was able to stab any of his attackers.
"The Court is not impressed by the testimony of the accused on this point and
that of his sweetheart Eufemia Calso because they are full of contradictions
and improbabilities.
"(1) The testimony of the accused that he ran away after he was boxed by
Rodolfo Cumarat is contradictory to his sworn statement, marked Exhibit "3",
in which he stated that after Cumarat boxed him, he immediately stabbed the
latter.
"(2) The testimony at the trial of Eufemia Calso that the accused ran away
after he was boxed by Cumarat is also contradictory to her sworn statement
given by her to the police (Exhibit "1") and also to her testimony at the
preliminary investigation (Exhibit "2") in which she stated that the accused did
not run away.
"(3) The testimony of the accused at the trial that after he was overtaken
by the four men, they boxed him and clubbed him and that he crouched to
evade the blows is contradicted by his sworn statement, marked Exhibit "3", in
which he stated that after Cumarat boxed him, he immediately stabbed the
latter and when he saw that the companions of Cumarat were surrounding him
he immediately attacked them by stabbing them indiscriminately, without
stating that these companion boxed him and clubbed him.
"(4) The testimony at the trial Eufemia Calso that it was Cumarat who first
boxed the accused and then the former's companion also boxed and clubbed
the latter is contradicted by her sworn statements, Exhibit "1" and Exhibit "2",
in which she did not mention the boxing and clubbing of the accused by the
other companions of Cumarat.
"(5) The testimony of the accused at the trial that the four men were armed
is contradicted by his aforementioned sworn statement, Exhibit "3", in which
he did not mention any club at all. That the men had a club is also highly
improbable and unbelievable because not one of them was armed with a club
when they first met the group of the accused in front of the store of the Singer
Sewing Machine and since the two groups walked together up to the
intersection, it can safely be presumed that the four men were also unarmed
when they reached the intersection since no evidence was presented to show
that somebody else handed a club to one of the four men. Moreover, Eufemia
Calso in her two sworn statements, Exhibit "I" and Exhibit "2", stated that she
did not notice any arm or weapon held by any of the four men. These
statements also contradict Eufemia Calso's testimony at the trial that one of
the four men was armed with a club.
"(6) The testimony of the accused at the trial he suffered contusions on his
face and other parts of his body is not only contradictory to his sworn
statement, Exhibit "3", but also belied by the following facts: (a) he did not
submit himself for medical treatment; (b) he was able to report for work as
usual at 4:00 o'clock that same morning of July 26, 1972, only a few hours
after the occurrence of the fatal incident; (c) he went to the municipal building
at about 6:00 o'clock that same morning where he was investigated by the
police, and nothing was mentioned about his physical condition or appearance
during the investigation, which shows that the contusions that he claimed at
the trial to have suffered is not true; otherwise, the police investigator would
not have failed to notice said contusions, if any, and to ask him about it; (d)
Eufemia Calso, in her aforementioned sworn statements did not also mention
the wounds suffered by the accused.
"(7) If is true as claimed by the accused that the four men ganged up on
him, boxed him and clubbed him, it would seem unbelievable that the many
people who were all around them on the road did not intervene to stop it by
holding the alleged combatants and calling a policeman. An attack by several
men did not seem to be probable on the crowded road, but a sudden and swift
attack by a single person seemed possible.
"(8) The claim of innocence at the trial by the accused is negatived by the
fact that he ran away after having stabbed his victims and went to throw his
knife away to another street and also by the fact that he did not surrender to
the police right away." 9
Even the respondent Court of Appeals added a piece of its opinion in
withholding credence from the defense's version of the facts by stating that:
"Besides We are not quite convinced that the defense witnesses' story on the
witness stand is a true recital of the incident as it really happened. . . ." 10
In view of the foregoing, it is crystal clear that the defense's version of the
facts was discredited by both Courts a quo, proving without doubt that there
was no unlawful aggression on the part of the petitioner's victims. On the
contrary, it was petitioner who was the unlawful aggressor. His pretension as
to the presence of the second requisite of self-defense is obviously without
basis.
The indemnity to the heirs of Federico Bayya is increased to P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, with the above modification as to the indemnity the petition for
review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Sarmiento,
JJ., concur.
----------------Footnotes
1. Pp. 273-274, Original Record.

2. Article 11, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code.
3. Pp. 21-22, Rollo, pp. 6-7, Decision.
4. Pp. 17-21, Rollo, CA Decision, pp. 2-6.
5. Ibid., p. 23, Rollo.
6. People vs. Talaboc, Jr., L-25004, October 31, 1969.
7. People vs. Apolinario, No. 38562, October 18, 1933.
8. 61 Phil. 786 (1935).
9. Pp. 263-267, Original Record, Decision of the CFI.
10. P. 22, Rollo, Decision of the Court of Appeals.
([1987V296] ERNESTO ANDRES, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents., G.R. No. L-48957, 1987 June 23,
1st Division)

[1999V748] ANGEL L. BOLEYLEY, petitioner, vs. HON. CLARENCE J.
VILLANUEVA, Presiding Judge, Branch 7, Regional Trial Court, Baguio City, and
ALBERT S. SURLA, respondents.1999 Sep 141st DivisionG.R. No. 128734D E C
ISION
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari assailing the
orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Baguio City1 [Presided over by
Judge Clarence J. Villanueva.] that granted private respondent's motion to
dismiss the complaint below on the ground that petitioner did not refer the
action to the barangay lupon for conciliation or settlement before filing the
case in court, as prescribed in the Revised Katarungan Pambarangay Law.
The facts are as follows:
On August 7, 1996, petitioner Angel L. Boleyley filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Baguio City, a complaint against private respondent for collection of a
sum of money, as follows:
"1.) The sum of P530,000.00 for actual damages;
"2.) The sum of P50,000.00 for moral damages;
"3.) The sum of P30,000.00 for exemplary damages;
"4.) The sum of P30,000.00 as attorney's fees plus P1,000.00 per court
hearing;
"5.) The costs of suit."2 [Petition, Annex "C", Rollo, pp. 23-28.]
On September 13, 1996, private respondent Albert S. Surla filed with the trial
court a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that petitioner did not
comply with the Revised Katarungan Pambarangay Law requiring as a
condition for the filing of a complaint in court referral of the matter to the
barangay lupon chairman or the pangkat, for conciliation or settlement.3
[Petition, Annex "D", Rollo, pp. 29-32.]
On September 17, 1997, petitioner filed an opposition to motion to dismiss on
the ground that private respondent was not a resident of Baguio City so that
the dispute involving the parties was not within the authority of the lupon to
bring together for conciliation or settlement.4 [Petition, Annex "E", Rollo, pp.
33-35.]
On November 29, 1996, the trial court issued an order dismissing the case for
being premature, for not having been referred to the barangay lupon.5
[Petition, Annex "A", Rollo, pp. 20-21.]
On December 5, 1996, petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for
reconsideration on the ground that private respondent could not invoke the
Katarungan Pambarangay Law because he was not a resident of Baguio City.6
[Petition, Annex"F", Rollo, pp. 36-38.]
On February 17, 1997, the trial court resolved to deny the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit, notice of which denial was received by
petitioner on March 4, 1997.7 [Petition, Annex "B", Rollo, p. 22.]
Hence, this petition.8 [Filed on April 8, 1997, by registered mail.]
On July 9, 1997, the Court resolved to require the respondents to comment on
the petition within ten (10) days from notice.9 [Rollo, p. 45.]
On August 26, 1997, private respondent filed his comment.10 [Rollo, pp. 4956.]
On November 10, 1997, petitioner filed a reply,11 [Rollo, pp. 58-60] in
compliance with the resolution of September 29, 1997.12 [Rollo, p. 57.]
At issue is whether or not petitioner was bound to refer the dispute to the
barangay lupon or pangkat for conciliation or settlement before he could file
an action for collection with the regional trial court.13 [Petition, Rollo, pp. 1019 at p. 13.]
We give due course to the petition.
It is a basic rule of procedure that "jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or
some of the claims asserted therein. The jurisdiction of the court can not be
made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to
dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely
depend upon the defendant."14 [Serdoncillo vs. Benolirao, G. R. No. 118328,
October 8, 1998; San Miguel Corporation vs. NLRC, 255 SCRA 133 [1996];
Citibank, N. A. vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 108961, November 27, 1998.]
In the complaint filed by petitioner with the Regional Trial Court, Baguio City,
he stated that:
"COMPLAINT
"COMES NOW the plaintiff by his undersigned counsel and to this Honorable
Court respectfully alleges:
"1.) That plaintiff is of legal age, married, Filipino and a resident of No. 100
Imelda Village, Baguio City while defendant is also of legal age, Filipino and
with postal office address at C-4 Ina Mansion, Kisad Road, Baguio City where
he may be served with summons and other legal processes;" 15 [Annex "C",
Petition, Rollo, pp. 23-25.]
From the above allegations, it is obvious that the parties do not reside in the
same city or municipality, and hence, the dispute is excepted from the
requirement of referral to the barangay lupon or pangkat for conciliation or
settlement prior to filing with the court.16 [Bejer vs. Court of Appeals, 169
SCRA 566 [1989]; Candido vs. Macapagal, 221 SCRA 328 [1993].]
It is true that plaintiff's complaint should have alleged defendant's place of
actual residence, not his postal office address. The allegation of defendant's
actual residence would have been ideal to determine venue, which is plaintiff's
choice of either his place of residence or that of the defendant or any of the
principal defendants.17 [Rule 4, Section 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.] "In
procedural law, however, specifically for purposes of venue it has been held
that the residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or
his actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency, thus:
"x x x We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term 'resides' connotes ex vi
termini 'actual residence' as distinguished from 'legal residence or domicile'.
The term 'resides', like the term 'residing' or 'residence' is elastic and should
be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. x x x In other words, 'resides' should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. x x x No particular length of time
of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than

temporary"
talics supplied),"18 [Bejer vs. Court of Appeals, supra, citing
Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Sarmiento, 75 SCRA 124 [1977].]
Nevertheless, the complaint clearly implies that the parties do not reside in
the same city or municipality.
The venue of the action is not affected by the filing of defendant's
(respondent's) motion to dismiss stating that he also resided in Baguio City.
That is not decisive to determine the proper venue.
Consequently, we rule that there is no need of prior referral of the dispute to
the barangay lupon or pangkat in the absence of showing in the complaint
itself that the parties reside in the same city or municipality.19 [Section 408
[f], R. A. 7160; Agbayani vs. Belen, 145 SCRA 635 [1986].]
In thus dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of cause of action or prematurity, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, entitling petitioner to the relief prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for certiorari and ANNULS
the orders of the Regional Trial Court, Baguio City, Branch 07, dated November
20, 1997, and April 28, 1998, in Civil Case No. 3483-R.
The Court orders the trial court to forthwith deny private respondent's motion
to dismiss, and proceed to the disposition of the case with all deliberate
dispatch.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
([1999V748] ANGEL L. BOLEYLEY, petitioner, vs. HON. CLARENCE J.
VILLANUEVA, Presiding Judge, Branch 7, Regional Trial Court, Baguio City, and
ALBERT S. SURLA, respondents., G.R. No. 128734, 1999 Sep 14, 1st Division)
/---!e-library!
6.0
Philippines
Copyright
2000
by
Sony
Valdez---\
[2000R320] AMPARO S. FARRALES and ATTY. RAUL S. SISON, complainants,
vs. JUDGE RUBY B. CAMARISTA, respondent.2000 Mar 23rd DivisionA.M. No.
MTJ-99-1184R E S O L U T I O N
MELO, J.:
Through a verified complaint dated December 15, 1997, complainants, client

and counsel, charged respondent with gross incompetence, gross inefficiency,
and ignorance of the law, with regard to two civil cases, as follows: (a) Civil
Case No. 144411-CV entitled "Amparo Farrales, represented by her Attorneyin-Fact, Atty. Eldorado T. Lim vs. Mrs. Meny Martin" (also referred to in the
record as Menny Martin) for Ejectment/Unlawful Detainer; and Civil Case No.
144414-CV entitled "Amparo Farrales, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact,
Atty. Eldorado T. Lim vs. Mrs. Mely Rizon" for Ejectment/Unlawful Detainer.
The factual antecedents of the subject complaint are as follows:
On June 10, 1994 and June 13, 1994, both aforestated cases were filed by
complainants and were raffled to Branch I, Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila,
presided over by respondent.
In the first case, therein defendant, on June 22, 1994, filed her responsive
pleading. On January 25, 1995, respondent, motu proprio issued an order
referring the case for conciliation to the barangay chairman of Barangay 676,
Zone 73, Ermita, Manila. From January 25, 1995 to January 25, 1996, the
case was not calendared for hearing, until herein complainant-counsel, Atty.
Raul S. Sison, who took over the case from Atty. Eldorado T. Lim, filed his
formal entry of appearance. On February 2, 1996, the plaintiff (complainant
herein) filed a motion to set aside the order of January 25, 1995, and to set
the case for preliminary conference, which was denied by respondent.
Subsequently, the parties submitted themselves to conciliation but no
settlement was reached. There being no clarificatory hearing set, the case was
deemed submitted for decision as of October, 1996. On February 27, 1997,
plaintiff filed a motion for early decision. However, despite repeated followups, the case remained undecided.
In the second case, the defendant therein, on June 21, 1994, filed a motion
for referral to the proper barangay for arbitration and/or conciliation. Later,
respondent issued two orders dated November 7, 1994 and January 27, 1995,
respectively, directing the parties to conciliate before the Chairman of
Barangay 676, Zone 73, Ermita, Manila. Meanwhile, complainant Sison entered
his appearance as counsel for plaintiff therein. On February 12, 1996,
complainants filed a motion to set aside the order of November 7, 1994, as
well as to render judgment. Respondent denied the same and referred the
case to said barangay for conciliation proceedings under penalty of the case
being dismissed. Subsequently, a certificate to file action was issued by the
barangay chairman following defendants failure to appear during the
scheduled conciliation meeting. On July 12, 1996, after the lapse of two years
and one month from the service of summons, defendant filed her answer.
However, notwithstanding the lapse of time in filing the answer and plaintiffs
opposition thereto, respondent, in an order dated September 3, 1996, directed
the parties to file their respective position papers. After the lapse of thirty
days from submission of position papers and there being no decision rendered
by respondent, plaintiff filed a motion for early decision on February 27, 1997.
When still no decision was rendered, complainant Sison (plaintiffs counsel)

wrote respondent on July 18, 1997 requesting that a decision be rendered in
the case. Still, the case remained unresolved.
Herein complainants contend that the delay in the disposition of the abovestated cases was a result of respondents lack of basic knowledge of the 1991
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and/or her ignorance of the law. They
likewise question respondents act of referring the case to the barangay level
for conciliation when the parties actually reside in barangays of different
cities/municipalities.
Thereafter, complainant Sison submitted his manifestation dated January 26,
1998 informing the Court that despite the filing of the instant administrative
complaint, no decision had yet been rendered by respondent in the two civil
cases.
In respondents answer, she alleged that the subject civil cases were two of
those left by then Acting Presiding Judge Alden Cervantes and were originally
pending before Branch 28, Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila before they were
reassigned by raffle to respondents sala. She also contends that although
barangay conciliation is not necessary in Civil Case No. 144414-CV, she
referred the case, motu proprio, to the lupon of the barangay where the realty
subject thereof is located in accordance with the last paragraph of Section 2,
Presidential Decree No. 1508, and the last paragraph of Section 408 of the
Local Government Code of 1991. For failure of the parties to settle the case
before the lupon, the same was deemed submitted for decision.
The subject complaint also cited our decision in Administrative Matter No. MTJ97-1123 (initiated by Atty. Joselito Enriquez against herein respondent on the
basis of which the latter was found to be unconscientious and not prompt in
the performance of her duties and was fined P3,000.00 with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more
severely). Respondent avers that such conclusion was arrived at since the
Court overlooked some facts in her favor in imposing upon her a fine with
warning.
On March 17, 1999, the Court issued a resolution requiring the parties to
manifest if they were submitting the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings. Atty. Sison filed his manifestation to the effect that complainants
were withdrawing their complaint. Respondent, on the other hand, submitted a
supplemental answer or explanation. On the basis of the second, the Office of
the Court Administrator recommends that a fine in the amount of P20,000.00
be imposed against respondent with a stern warning that the same or similar
acts in the future be dealt with more severely.
The crux of the matter is respondents violation of the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure and her erroneous application of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law (Presidential Decree No. 1508).
The Rule on Summary Procedure clearly and undoubtedly provides for the
period within which judgment should be rendered. Section 10 thereof
provides:
SEC. 10. Rendition of judgment.-Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the
last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the
same, the court shall render judgment.
However, should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it
may, during the said period, issue an order specifying the matters to be
clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on the
said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall be
rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last clarificatory
affidavits, or the expiration of the period for filing the same.
The court shall not resort to the clarificatory procedure to gain time for the
rendition of the judgment.
Section 8 thereof, which provides the contents of the record of the preliminary
conference, includes a statement as to -c) Whether, on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulations and admissions
made by the parties, judgment may be rendered without the need of further
proceedings, in which event the judgment shall be rendered within thirty (30)
days from issuance of the order;
It is thus very clear that the period for rendition of judgment in cases falling
under summary procedure is thirty days. This is in keeping with the spirit of
the rule which aims to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination
of the cases falling thereunder.
The jurisprudential direction consistently taken by the Court adheres to the
rule that failure to decide a case within the required period is not excusable
and constitutes gross inefficiency Abarquez vs. Rebosura, 285 SCRA 109
[1998]; In re Judge Jose F. Madara, 104 SCRA 245 [1981]; Longboan vs.
Judge Polig, 186 SCRA 557 [1990]; Sabado vs. Cajigal, 219 SCRA 800
[1993]). Delay in disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of the
people in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute
(Abarquez vs. Rebosura, supra).
Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct admonishes all judges to
dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the period
fixed by law. Rule 3.01 compels them to be faithful to the law and prompts
them to maintain professional competence.
Failure to observe time provisions for the rendition of judgments constitutes a
ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge (AlfonsoCortes vs. Maglalang, 227 SCRA 482 [1993]; Mappala vs. Nuez, 240 SCRA
600 [1995]), absent sufficient justification for his non-compliance therewith
(Abarquez vs. Rebosura, supra). Of

the Rule on Summary Procedure
expeditious resolution of cases
respondents attempt to excuse
necessarily fail.
special
which
falling
herself
import is the requirement under

was intended precisely for the
thereunder. For this reason,
from such requirement must
The last affidavits and position paper in Civil Case No. 144411-CV were filed
on October 25, 1996, whereas the last pleading (defendants position paper) in
Civil Case No. 144414-CV was filed on October 23, 1996. Notwithstanding the
provisions of Section 10 of the Rule, complainant Sison received the decision
in both cases only on February 12, 1998, almost two years from submission of
the last affidavits and position papers therein.
Respondent submits that she cannot be held administratively liable for gross
inefficiency because both cases were not originally assigned to her but to
Branch 28, Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, and were only assigned to her on
October 24, 1994. She also claims that her court was transferred in an
untimely and abrupt manner to a makeshift office too small for proper court
operations which left both the court records and court personnel in disarray to
such degree that disallowed the latter to have an effective filing system.
Further, it is argued that at the time of the pendency of the subject cases,
Republic Act No. 7691 which provides for the expanded jurisdiction of the
inferior court, was at its peak. Consequently, the sudden deluge of cases
unloaded by the regional trial court together with those filed by litigants
combined with the deplorable conditions of her court caused the delay.
All the above-stated posturings are lame excuses for a delayed decision,
especially when it falls under the Rule on Summary Procedure. To accept them
as valid will defeat the very purpose of the rule since any judge would be
given the imprimatur of violating the time provisions merely for such frivolous
reasons.
In addition, respondent also erroneously applied the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law. She anchors her act on Section 2 thereof (or Sec. 408,
Republic Act No. 7160) which reads in full:
SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto.-The
lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties
actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all
disputes except:
(a).....Where the party
instrumentality thereof;
is
the
government,
or
any
subdivision
or
(b).....Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates
to the performance of his official functions;
(c).....Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine
exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
(d).....Offenses where there is no private offended party;

(e).....Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or
municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to
amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon; Chief
(f).....Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different
cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other
and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable
settlement by an appropriate lupon;
(g).....Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in
the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the
lupon under this Code are filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio
refer the case to the lupon concerned for amicable settlement.
The last paragraph of the aforecited provision apparently gives the Court
discretion to refer the case to the lupon for amicable settlement although it
may not fall within the authority of the lupon (such as the civil cases subject of
this administrative proceeding). However, referring the subject civil cases to
the lupon is saliently an unsound exercise of discretion considering that the
matter falls under the Rule on Summary Procedure. As aptly explained in
Gachon vs. Devera, Jr. (274 SCRA 540 [1997]), the Rule on Summary
Procedure was promulgated for the purpose of achieving "an expeditious and
inexpensive determination of cases." The fact that unlawful detainer cases fall
under summary procedure, speedy resolution thereof is thus deemed a matter
of public policy. Thus, the Rule frowns upon delays.
Manifestly, respondents act of referring the subject cases to the lupon
subverts the very nature of the Rule and defeats its objective of expediting the
adjudication thereof. Besides, as correctly explained by the Court
Administrator, the preliminary conference under Sections 7 and 8 serves the
purpose of a possible amicable settlement, viz:
SEC. 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties.-Not later than thirty
(30) days after the last answer is filed, a preliminary conference shall be held.
The rules on pre-trial in ordinary cases shall be applicable to the preliminary
conference unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall be a
cause for the dismissal of his complaint. The defendant who appears in the
absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in
accordance with Section 6 hereof. All cross-claims shall be dismissed.
If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall be entitled to
judgment in accordance with Section 6 hereof. This Rule shall not apply where
one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action who had
pleaded a common defense shall appear at the preliminary conference.
Section 8 of said Rule reads in full:
SEC. 8. Record of preliminary conference.Within five (5) days after the
termination of the preliminary conference, the court shall issue an order
stating the matters taken up therein, including but not limited to:
a).....Whether the parties have arrived at an amicable settlement, and if so,
the terms thereof;
b).....The stipulations or admissions entered into by the parties;
c).....Whether, on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulations and
admissions made by the parties, judgment may be rendered without the need
of further proceedings, in which event the judgment shall be rendered within
thirty (30) days from issuance of the order;
d).....A clear specification of material facts which remain controverted; and
e).....Such other matters intended to expedite the disposition of the case.
The last issue that we have to pass upon is the effect of the affidavit of
desistance on respondents administrative liability. In Rogue vs. Grimaldo (260
SCRA 1 [1996]), the complainants, who filed a complaint against a court
stenographer for illegal exaction of money, later executed an affidavit of
desistance which prompted therein respondent to move for the dismissal of
the complaint. We pronounced that the affidavit of desistance by the
complainant cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to investigate and
ascertain the truth of the matter alleged in the complaints against respondent.
We cited Caa vs. Santos (234 SCRA 17 [1994]) where we held that "[t]he
Court has an interest in the conduct of the officials and employees of the
judiciary and in improving the delivery of justice to the people and its efforts
in that direction cannot be frustrated by any private arrangement of the
parties."
All the more in the instant case, which involves a judge, must we apply the
above-stated rule for a judge should always be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence and should administer justice
impartially and without delay (Bolalin vs. Occiano, 266 SCRA 203 [1997]).
Judges, who are called upon to administer the law and apply it to the facts,
should be studious of the principles of law and diligent in endeavoring to
ascertain the facts. They should exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance
with the statutes and procedural rules (Del Callar vs. Salvador, 268 SCRA 320
[1997]). They must always strive to live up to their responsibility of assisting
parties litigants in obtaining a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
their cases and proceedings (Perez vs. Andaya, 286 SCRA 40 [1998]).
Considering that this is not respondents first administrative case of the same
nature, we take cognizance of the Court Administrators reasons for
recommending a fine of P20,000.00. Nevertheless, we deem the amount of
P10,000.00 as a reasonable fine under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge Ruby B. Camarista, presiding judge of
Branch I, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, is hereby declared GUILTY of
gross incompetence, gross inefficiency, and ignorance of the law, and is
hereby ordered to pay a FINE of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). She is also
WARNED that the commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
([2000R320] AMPARO S. FARRALES and ATTY. RAUL S. SISON, complainants,
vs. JUDGE RUBY B. CAMARISTA, respondent., A.M. No. MTJ-99-1184, 2000
Mar 2, 3rd Division)
Lack of Jurisdiction
[1962V66E] KER & COMPANY, LTD., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF TAX
APPEALS and THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.1962 Jan
31En BancG.R. No. L-12396D E C I S I O N
PAREDES, J.:
An appeal from a resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals sustaining a Motion to
Dismiss of the Collector of Internal Revenue, on the ground that said Court is
without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.
On the basis of its income tax returns filed for the years 1947, 1948, 1949 and
1950, the petitioner was assessed by the Collector in the respective sums of
P42,342.30, P18,651.87, P139.67 and P12,813.00 (Exhibits 1-9). Upon failure
of petitioner to pay the said assessments, the Collector sent a demand letter
dated February 16, 1953, (Exh. 10). In a letter dated May 24, 1953 (Exh. 12),
counsel for petitioner sought the reconsideration of the demand letter. A
revision of the previous assessments was made by the Collector in his letter of
January 5, 1954 (Exh. 13), reducing the tax liabilities of petitioner for 1947
from P42,342.30 to P27,026.28 and for 1950 from P12,813.00 to P8,542.00;
the assessments for 1948 to 1949 in the sum of P18,651.87 and P139.67
remain the same.
The letter of January 5, 1954 (Exh. 13), has remained unaltered and
unrevised up to this date, in spite of the repeated requests for reconsideration
by petitioner, as evidenced by its letter dated February 12, 1954 (Exh. 14) and
May 22, 1954 (Exh. 17). In fact, the Collector reiterated the demand
contained in said letter of January 5, 1954, as shown by his letters dated July
28, 1954 and December 9, 1954 (Exhs. 18 and 19, respectively). The
petitioner denied having received the said letter (Exh. 18), although it was
mailed to petitioner in the ordinary course of business. The record shows that
it had received all the letters of the Collector except, allegedly, said Exh. 18.
Although petitioner did not know when it received the communication dated
December 9, 1954 (Exh. 19), it is a fact that said petitioner replied to this
letter (Exh. 19), in its letter dated August 1, 1955, which was wholly denied in
the Collector's letter dated January 23, 1956 reiterating the assessment of
January 5, 1954. On February 9, 1956, the Collector issued a warrant of
distraint and levy against the petitioner.
The petitioner filed a petition for review with preliminary injunction on March
1, 1956. After issues were joined, the Tax Court heard the incident of
preliminary injunction. Before the incident was resolved, however, the Tax
Court motu proprio issued an order setting the case again for hearing for the
purpose of determining whether or not, the court had jurisdiction to entertain
the petition filed by petitioner on March 1, 1956.
On October 3, 1956, the Collector filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction, and over the opposition of the petitioner, on January 5,
1957, the Tax Court dismissed the petition. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied on May 9, 1957.
In the instant appeal, petitioner-appellant submits the following issues:
1.
Whether the ruling of the Collector which is appealable was his
letter of January 5, 1954 (Exh. 13), or his letter of January 5, 1954 (Exh. 20).
2.
Whether or not the 30-day period provided by section 11 of R.A.
1125 should commence to run only on February 1, 1956, the date on which
the petitioner received the respondent's letter of January 23, 1956 (Exh. 20).
3.
Whether or not the 30-day period is a jurisdictional requirement.
4.
Whether respondent Collector was barred from filing a motion to
dismiss based on said section 11, after he had filed his answer to the petition
below, which did not contain such a defense; and
5.
Whether the Tax Court erred in not holding that the Collector's
order to collect by warrant of distraint and levy had been timely appealed by
the petitioner.
While the right to appeal a decision of the Collector to the Tax Court is merely
a statutory remedy, nevertheless the requirement that it must be brought
within thirty days after receipt of the Collector's decision, or ruling is
jurisdiction. "If a statutory remedy provides as a condition precedent that the
action to enforce it must be commenced within a prescribed time, such
requirement is jurisdictional and failure to comply therewith may be raised in a
motion to dismiss" (Callahan vs. Chespeake & Ohio, 407 Supp. 323,
mentioned on p. 175, Moran's Rules of Court, Vol. 1, 1952 Ed.). The right to
appeal from a decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is
a statutory right, but it can be invoked only in accordance with the manner in
which the legislature has provided for the purpose (The Secretary of
Agriculture, etc. vs. Judge CFI, G. R. No. L-7752, May 27, 1955). The right to
appeal from the decision of the Collector being a statutory right, the same can
be invoked only in accordance with the requisites provided by law (Wee Poco
v. Posadas, 64 Phil. 648). And this should be so because in cases involving a
tax, there is an imperious need for its prompt collection. Appealed cases
decided by the Tax Court shall have preference over all civil proceeding except
habeas corpus, workmen's compensation and election cases (sec. 18, par. 4,
Rep. Act 1125), and the appeal therefrom is directly taken to the Supreme
Court (Ibid, par. 3). It is the interest of the Government to know promptly
those assessments which are acquiesced in and those disputed by the tax
payers. Such knowledge is essential in formulating the Government's estimate
of expected revenues and expenditures.
Petitioner-appellant questions the right of the lower court to raise the question
of jurisdiction motu proprio. It should be recalled, however, that the Tax Court
is a court of special jurisdiction. As such, it can only take cognizance of such
matters as are clearly within its jurisdiction. To obviate the possibility that its
decision may be rendered void, it can, by its own initiative, raise the question
of jurisdiction, although not raised by the parties.
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125 partly provides:
"SEC. 11.
Who may appeal; effect of appeal. Any person, association or
corporation adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the Collector of
Internal revenue, the Collector of Customs or any provincial or city Board of
Assessment Appeals may file an appeal in the Court of Tax Appeals within
thirty days after the receipt of such decision or ruling. . . . ."
It is argued that the decision or ruling of the Collector which should be
appealed to the Tax Court is the former's letter dated January 5, 1954 (Exh.
13), and that the 30-period provided in section 11, commenced to run only on
February 1, 1956, the date on which the petitioner-appellant received the
Collector's letter dated January 23, 1956. This contention is without merit. The
Collector's letter dated January 23, 1956, partly reads as follows:
"With reference to your letter dated August 1, 1955, concerning the deficiency
income tax liabilities of Ker & Co., Ltd., Manila, for 1947, 1948, 1949 and
1950, I regret to have to inform you that, notwithstanding your allegations
therein, this Office still finds no justification to alter, reverse or modify the
assessments issued against your client for said years.
As elucidated in our letter to you of January 5, 1954, the alleged home-leave
liabilities which your client claimed as deduction were disallowed as such
because the same were not actually incurred but were mere reserve accounts
for contingent purpose. No evidence were presented by you showing that the
said expenses were actually incurred in the years of their deductions or in the
subsequent years. . . .".
It is thus noted that the allegation in the above quoted letter is simply a
reiteration of the previous demand as contained in the Collector's letter of
January 5, 1954 (Exh. 13). Again the Collector sent to the petitioner-appellant
the demand letter dated July 28, 1954 (Exh. 18), which merely reiterated the
demand dated January 5, 1954. Although petitioner denied having received
said letter, yet it is significant to mention that when it was presented to the
lower court as Exhibit 18 for the Collector, the petitioner had not objected to
it. This is the first time they attack its receipt. It is finally to be observed that
the ruling of the Collector contained in his letter of January 5, 1954, remained
unaltered and unmodified. As the Court a quo has correctly commented
"Under the facts stated above, we find that the decision of respondent which is
appealable to this Court under Sections 7 and 11 of Republic Act No. 1125 is
the one contained in his letter of January 5, 1954, the same having remained
unaltered and unmodified up to the date the appeal was filed (See Angel
Saraos v. CIR, CTA Case No. 229, March 5, 1956; Merced Drug Store v. CIR,
CTA Case No. 180, May 21, 1956. . . . .
Moreover, since a letter of demand or assessment was sent by the Collector of
Internal Revenue to a taxpayer contains a determination of the tax liability of
the latter, such letter or assessment must be considered as the 'decision'
appealable to this Court. The Supreme Court appears to recognize the same
view when it held that the `assessment made by the Collector of Internal
Revenue is the substantive and dispositive part of his decision' (Ventanilla v.
BTA, G.R. No. L-7384, prom. Dec. 19, 1955). Under circumstances comparable
with our law, the United States Supreme Court in the case of Gull v. U.S.
(1935, 295 U.S. 247; 79 L. ed., 1941) sustained the same theory that the
assessment is the action of an administrative agency equivalent to a decision
and is therefore given the force of a judgment".
This being the case, it logically follows that the decision which was appealed
was that of January 5, 1954 and that the 30-day period should have started
from the receipt of the said letter on January 25, 1954 (Exh. 14). No appeal
having been taken from this decision, the same became final, conclusive and
executory (Roxas v. Sayoc, G. R. No. L- 8502, Nov. 29, 1956).
Petitioner contends that the Collector waived the defense based on said
section 11, when he failed to file a motion to dismiss within the reglementary
period and did not set it up as a defense in the answer filed by him. Suffice it
to state, however, that a motion to dismiss may be allowed after the answer is
filed or even after the hearing had been commenced (Bugayong v. Ginez, G.
R. No. L-10033, Dec. 28, 1956; 53 O.G. No. 4, p. 1050). Moreover, the
present case involves jurisdiction over subject-matter, which can not be
waived, and which can be raised at any stage of the proceeding, even if no
such defense is made in the answer (Juanillo v. De la Rama, II Off. Gaz. 304
[1943]; I Francisco Trial Technique and Practice Court pp. 128-129).
Petition-appellant also claims that inasmuch as the disputed assessment was
made prior to the creation and actual organization of the Tax Court (The Court
of Tax Appeals was established upon the enactment of R.A. No. 1125, although
the act took effect only on July 21, 1954 with the appointment of two judges
and the Court Personnel and with the adoption by it in the interim of the Rules
and Regulations of the defunct Board of Tax Appeals [See Sta. Clara Lumber
Co. v. Coll. of Int. Rev. CTA Case No. 91, Res. dated Sept. 20, 1955]), there
was, legally speaking, no 30-day period to compute or determine in relation to
the appeals from the decisions of the Collector. However, in admitting that the
disputed assessment was issued prior to the organization of the Tax Court, the
petitioner- appellant, if it really wanted to protect itself, should have paid the
taxes due and then filed a suit for their refund under section 306 of the Tax
Code with the proper Court if First Instance. The petitioner- appellant failed to
take this step. With the actual organization of the Tax Court on July 21, 1954,
the petitioner-appellant could have filed a petitioner for review with the said
court within 30 days after July 21, 1954 (Sta. Clara Lumber Co. vs. Court of
Int. Rev., supra; Ipekdian Merchandising Co. Inc. vs. C.I. Revenue, CTA Case
No. 107). In these two CTA cases, the petitioner-taxpayer appealed the
decisions of the Collector to the defunct Board of Tax Appeals which found for
the respondent-appellee. Later, they appealed to this Court which dismissed
their cases without prejudice. When they brought these cases to the Tax
Court, the latter dismissed them for having been filed outside the 30-day
period after July 21, 1954. In the case at bar, after receipt of the Collector's
demand letter dated January 5, 1954, petitioner not only did not pay the taxes
due and sue for their refund but also failed to file its petition for review within
30 days after July 21, 1954. A taxpayer should display more alertness in the
protection of his rights (Koppel [Phil.], Inc. vs. Coll. Int. Rev., G.R. No. L10550, Sept. 19, 1961).
Petitioner-appellant argues that the Tax Court acted erroneously in not holding
that insofar as the Collector's order to collect (by warrant of distraint and levy)
is concerned, it has the power to hear and determine the legality thereof,
because the appeal from said order had been timely made to said court by
petitioner-appellant. This argument is unmeritorious once it is considered, as
we do, that what has been appealed in this case is the decision of the Tax
Court dated January 5, 1957, in which decision, the incident regarding the
legality or illegality of the Collector's issuance of the warrant of distraint and
levy had not at all been brought out or ventilated.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the resolution appealed from being in accordance with law,
hereby is affirmed en toto, with costs against the petitioner-appellant.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and De
Leon, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., concurs in the result.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
([1962V66E] KER & COMPANY, LTD., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF TAX
APPEALS and THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents., G.R. No.
L-12396, 1962 Jan 31, En Banc)

[1998V597E] TERESITA G. FABIAN petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO,
in his capacity as ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN respondents.1998
Sep 16En BancG.R. No. 129742D E C I S I O N
REGALADO, J:
Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
from the "Joint Order" issued by public respondents on June 18, 1997 in OMBAdm. Case No. 0-95-0411 which granted the motion for reconsideration of and
absolved private respondents from administrative charges for inter alia grave
misconduct committed by him as then Assistant Regional Director, Region IVA, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).
I
It appears from the statement and counter-statement of facts of the parties
that petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of
PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged
in the construction business. Private respondents Nestor V. Agustin was the
incumbent District Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed
the offenses for which he was administratively charged in the Office in the
office of the Ombudsman.
Promat participated in the bidding for government construction project
including those under the FMED, and private respondent, reportedly taking
advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous
relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which private
respondents gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in
problems concerning the same in his office.
Later, misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the
parties and when petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private
respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of
employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed
the aforementioned administrative case against him in a letter-complaint
dated July 24, 1995.
The said complaint sought the dismissal of private respondent for violation of
Section 19, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36
of Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer
for his preventive suspension. For purposes of this case, the charges referred
to may be subsumed under the category of oppression, misconduct, and
disgraceful or immoral conduct.
On January 31, 1996, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a
resolution finding private respondents guilty of grave misconduct and ordering
his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. His
resolution bore the approval of Director Napoleon Baldrias and Assistant
Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera of their office.
Herein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated February 26, 1996,
approved the aforesaid resolution with modifications, by finding private
respondent guilty of misconduct and meting out the penalty of suspension
without pay for one year. After private respondent moved for reconsideration,
respondent Ombudsman discovered that the formers new counsel had been
his "classmate and close associate" hence he inhibited himself. The case was
transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero who, in the
now challenged Joint Order of June 18, 1997, set aside the February 26, 1997
Order of respondent Ombudsman and exonerated private respondents from

the administrative charges.
II
In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)1 [Effective November 17, 1989.] pertinently
provides that In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of
the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
However, she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order
No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the office of the Ombudsman),2 [Effective May
1, 1990.] when a respondent is absolved of the charges in an administrative
proceeding decision of the ombudsman is final and unappealable. She
accordingly submits that the office of the ombudsman has no authority under
the law to restrict, in the manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of
appeal allowed by Republic Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review of
this Court. Because of the aforecited provision in those Rules of Procedure, she
claims that she found it "necessary to take an alternative recourse under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, because of the doubt it creates on the availability of
appeals under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Respondents filed their respective comments and rejoined that the Office of
the Ombudsman is empowered by the Constitution and the law to promulgate
its own rules of procedure. Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
provides, among others, that the Office of the Ombudsman can "(p)romulgate
its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such
functions or duties as may be provided by law."
Republic Act No. 6770 duly implements the Constitutional mandate with these
relevant provisions:
Sec. 14. Restrictions. - x x x No court shall hear any appeal or application for
remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman except the
Supreme Court on pure question on law.
xxx
Sec. 18. Rules of Procedure. - (1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall
promulgate its own rules of procedure for the effective exercise or
performance of its powers, functions, and duties.
xxx
Sec. 23. Formal Investigation. - (1) Administrative investigations by the Office

of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and
consistent with the due process. x x x
xxx
Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. - All provisionary orders at the
Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of
the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written
notice shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
xxx
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by
substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing
the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one
month salary shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of
the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman
as the interest of justice may require.
Respondents consequently contend that, on the foregoing constitutional and
statutory authority, petitioner cannot assail the validity of the rules of
procedure formulated by the Office of the Ombudsman governing the conduct
of proceeding before it, including those with respect to the availabity or nonavalability of appeal in administrative cases. Such as Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No.07.
Respondents also question the propriety of petitioners proposition that,
although she definitely prefaced her petition by categorizing the same as "an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court," she makes the
aforequoted ambivalent statement which in effect asks that, should the
remedy under Rule 45 be unavailable, her petition be treated in the alternative
as an original action for certiorari under Rule 65. The parties thereafter
engage in a discussion of the differences between a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 and a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
Ultimately, they also attempt to review and rationalize the decision of this
Court applying Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 vis--vis Section 7, Rule
III of Administrative Order No. 07. As correctly pointed out by public
respondents, Ocampo IV vs. Ombudsman, et al.3 [G.R. Nos. 103446-47,
August 30, 1993, 225 SCRA 725.] and Young vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et
al.4 [G.R. No. 110736, December 27, 1993. 228 SCRA 718.4 were original
actions for certiorari under Rule 65. Yabut vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et
al.5 [G.R. No. 111304, June 17, 1994, 223 SCRA 310.] was commenced by a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Then came Cruz, Jr. vs. People,
et al.,6 [G.R. No. 107 837, June 27, 1994, 233 SCRA 439.] Olivas vs. Office of
the Ombudsman, et al., 7 [G.R. No. 102420, December 20, 1995, 239 SCRA
283.] Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.,8 [G.R. No. 118533, October 4, 1995,
248 SCRA 700.] and Jao, et al. vs. Vasquez,9 [G.R. No. 111223, October 6,
1995, 249 SCRA 35, jointly deciding G.R. No. 104604.] which were for
certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus under Rule 65. Alba vs. Nitorreda, et
al.10 [G.R. No. 120223, March 13, 1996, 254 SCRA 753.] was initiated by a
pleading unlikely denominated as an "Appeal/Petition for Certiorari and/or
Prohibition," with a prayer for ancillary remedies, and ultimately followed by
Constantino vs. Hon. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, et al.11 [G.R. No. 127457,
April 13, 1998.] which was a special civil action for certiorari.
Considering, however the view that this Court now takes of the case at bar
and the issues therein which will shortly be explained, it refrains from
preemptively resolving the controverted points raised by the parties on the
nature and propriety of application of the writ of certiorari when used as a
mode of appeal or as the basis of a special original action, and whether or not
they may be resorted to concurrently or alternatively, obvious though the
answers thereto appear to be. Besides, some seemingly obiter statements in
Yabuts and Alba could bear reexamination and clarification. Hence, we will
merely observe and lay down the rule at this juncture that Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative diciplinary action. It
cannot be taken into account where an original action for certiorari under Rule
65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a
criminal action.
III
After respondents separate comments had been filed, the Court was intrigued
by the fact, which does appear to have been seriously considered before, that
the administrative liability of a public official could fall under the jurisdiction of
both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus,
the offenses imputed to herein private respondent were based on both Section
19 of Republic Act. No. 6770 and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807.
Yet, pursuant to the amendment of section 9, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 by
Republic Act No. 7902, all adjudications by Civil Service Commission in
administrative disciplinary cases were made appealable to the Court of
Appeals effective March 18, 1995, while those of the Office of the Ombudsman
are appealable to this Court.
It could thus be posible that in the same administrative case involving two
respondents, the proceedings against one could eventually have been elevated
to the Court of Appeals, while the other may have found its way to the
Ombudsman from which it is sought to be brought to this Court. Yet
systematic and efficient case management would dictate the consolidation of

thos cases in the Court of Appeals, both for expediency and to avoid possible
conflicting decisions.
Then there is the consideration that Section 30, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution provides that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate
indiction of the Supreme Court as providedin this Constitution without its
advice and consent," and that Republic Act No. 6770, with its challenged
Section 27, took effect on November 17, 1989, obviously in spite of that
constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the case, neither of whom
did so in this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.
Since the constitution is intended fort the observance of the judiciary and
other departments of the government and the judges are sworn to support its
provisions, the courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands
or countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear that a statute trangresses
the authority vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to declare
that the constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case before them for
judgement.12 [See 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, 155-156, pp531537.]
Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which
are not raised in the pleadings,13 [Op. Cit., 174, p. 184.] the rule has been
recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a court from
inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgement that it
lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a courts jurisdiction in a
proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the
proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it
necessarily follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the
statute.14 Mendoza vs. Small Claims Court of Los Angeles J.D., 321 P. 2d 9.14
Constitutional question, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the
trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of
the appelate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on
the courts own motion.15 [State ex re. Burg vs. City of Albuquerque, et al.
249 P.242.] The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of
jurisdiction at any point in the case where the fact is developed.16 [State vs.
Huber, 40 S.E. 2d 11.] The court has a clearly recognized right to determine
its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.17 [In re Thomas, 117 N.E. 2d 740.]
The foregoing authorities notwithstanding, the Court believed that the parties
hereto should be further heard on this constitutional question.
Correspongdingly, the following resolution was issued on May 14, 1998, the
material parts stating as follows:
The Court observes that the present petition, from the very allegations
thereof, is "an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from
the Joint Order (Re: Motion for Reconsideration) issued in OMB-Adm. Case
No. 0-95-0411, entitled Teresita G. Fabian vs. Engr. Nestor V. Agustin, Asst.
Regional Director, Region IV-A, EDSA, Quezon City, which absolved the latter
from the administrative charges for grave misconduct, among other."
It is further averred therein that the present appeal to this Court is allowed
under Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1987 (R.A. No. 6770) and,
pursuant thereto, the Office of the Ombudsman issued its Rules of Procedure,
Section 7 whereof is assailed by petitioner in this proceeding. It will be
recalled that R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989, with Section
27 thereof pertinently providing that all administrative diciplinary cases,
orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to this Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Court notes, however, that neither the petition nor the two comments
thereon took into account or discussed the validity of the aforestated Section
27 of R.A. No. 8770 in light of the provisions of Section 30, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its
advise and consent."
The Court also invites the attention of the parties to its relevant ruling in First
Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals , et al. (G.R. No. 110571,
October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 519) and the provisions of its former Circular No.
1-95,as now substantially reproduced in Rule 43 of the 1997 revision of the
Rules of Civil Procedure.
In view of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court is invoked and
involved and in this case, and the foregoing legal consideration appear to
impugn the constitutionality and validity of the grant of said appellate
jurisdiction to it, the Court deems it necessary that the parties be heard
thereon and the issue be first resolved before conducting further proceedings
in this appellate review.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Submit their
position and arguments on the matter subject of this resolution by filing their
corresponding pleadings within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
IV
The records do not show that the Office of the Solicitor General has complied
with such requirement, hence the Court dispenses with any submission it
should have presented. On the other hand, petitioner espouses the thoery that
the provision in Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 which authorizes an
appeal by certiorari to this Court of the aforementioned adjudications of the
Ombudsman is not violative of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution. She
claims that what is proscribed is the passage of law "increasing" the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court "as provided in this Constitution," and such appellate
jurisdiction includes "all cases in which only an error or question of law is
involved." Since Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII of the Constitution authorizes this
Court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari the
aforesaid final judgement or orders "as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide," said Section 27 does not increase this Court may provide," said
section 27 does not increase this Courts appellate jurisdiction since, by
providing that the mode of appeal shall be by petition for certiorari under Rule
45, then what may be raised therein are only questions of law of which this
Court already has of which this Court already has jurisdiction.
We are not impressed by this discourse. It overlooks the fact that by
jurisprudential developments over the years, this Court has allowed appeals by
certiorari under Rule 45 in a substantial number of cases and instances even if
questions of fact are directly involved and have to be resolved by the appellate
court.18 [See Reyes, et al./ vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 110207, July
11, 1996, 258 SCRA 651, and the cases and instances therein enumerated.]
Also, the very provision cited by petitioner specifies that the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court contemplated therein is to be exercised over "final
judgements and orders of lower courts," that is, the courts composing the
integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or
agencies, hence whenever the legislature intends that the decisions or
resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be reveiwable by the Supreme
Court or the Court of Appeals, a specific provision to that effect is included in
the law creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special
statutory court. No such provision on appellate procedure is required for the
regular courts of the integrtated judicial system because they are what are
referred to and already provided for in Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
Apropos to the foregoing, and as correctly observed by private respondent,
the revised Rules of Civil Procedure19 [Effective July 1, 1997.] preclude
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. In the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
Section 1 Rule 45, on "Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court," explicitly
states:
SECTION 1 . Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A person desiring to
appeal by certiorari from a judgement or final order or Resolution of the Court
of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other court
whenevr authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition
for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only question of law which
must be distinctly set forth. (Italics ours).
This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court which made
mention only of the Court of Appeals, and had to be adopted in statutes
creating and providing for appeals from certain administrative or quasi-judicial
agencies, whenever the purpose was to restrict the scope of the appeal to
questions of law. That intended limitation on appellate review, as we have just
discussed, was not fully subserved by recourse to the former Rule 45 but,
then, at that time there was no uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies.
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for
review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts
enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from udgments and final orders of
quasi-judicial agencies20 [At present, the sole exception which still subsists is
a judgment or final order issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines (Sec.
2, Rule 43), presently under reexamination.] are now required to be brought
to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the
requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and
adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial
agencies.21 [Rule 43 was substantially taken from and reproduces the
appellate procedure provided in Circular No. 1-91 of the Supreme Court dated
February 27, 1991 and its subsequent Revised Administrative Circ No. 1-95
which took effect on June 1, 1995.]
It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply only to
"ordinary" quasi-judicial agencies, but not to the Office of the Ombudsman
which is a "high constitutional body." We see no reason for this distinction for,
if hierarchical rank should be a criterion, that proposition thereby disregards
the fact that Rule 43 even includes the Office of the President and the Civil
Service Commission, although the latter is even an independent constitutional
commission, unlike the Office of the Ombudsman which is a constitutionallymandated but statutorily created body.
Regarding the misgiving that the review of the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman by the Court of Appeals would cover questions of law, of fact or
of both, we do not perceive that as an objectionable feature. After all, factual
controversies are usually involved in administrative disciplinary actions, just
like those coming from the Civil Service, Commission, and the Court of
Appeals as a trier of fact is better prepared than this Court to resolve the
same. On the other hand, we cannot have this situation covered by Rule 45
since it now applies only to appeals from the regular courts. Neither can we
place it under Rule 65 since the review therein is limited to jurisdictional
questions.* [Petitioner suggests as alternative procedures, the application of
either Rule 65 or Rule 43 (Rollo, 433)]
The submission that because this Court has taken cognizance of cases
involving Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, that fact may be viewed as
"acquiescence" or "acceptance" by it of the appellate jurisdiction contemplated
in said Section 27, is unfortunately too tenuous. The jurisdiction of a court is
not of acquiescence as a matter of fact but an issue of conferment as a matter
of law. Besides, we have already discussed the cases referred to, including the
inaccuracies of some statements therein, and we have pointed out the
instances when Rule 45 is involved, hence covered by Section 27 of Republic
Act No. 6770 now under discussion, and when that provision would not apply
if it is a judicial review under Rule 65.
Private respondent invokes the rule that courts generally avoid having to
decide a constitutional question, especially when the case can be decided on
other grounds. As a general proposition that is correct. Here, however, there is
an actual case susceptible of judicial determination. Also, the constitutional

question, at the instance of this Court, was raised by the proper parties,
although there was even no need for that because the Court can rule on the
matter sua sponte when its appellate jurisdiction is involved. The
constitutional question was timely raised, although it could even be raised any
time likewise by reason of the jurisdictional issue confronting the Court.
Finally,the resolution of the constitutional issue here is obviously necessary for
the resolution of the present case. 22 [Board of Optometry, etc., et al. vs.
Colet, G.R. No. 122241, July 30, 1996, 260 -SCRA 88, and cases therein cited;
Philippine Constitution Association, et al. vs. Enriquez, etc., et a1., G.R. No.
113105, August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 506, and companion cases.]
It is, however, suggested that this case could also be decided on other
grounds, short of passing upon; the constitutional question. We appreciate the
ratiocination of private respondent but regret that we must reject the same.
That private respondent could be absolved of the charge because the decision
exonerating him is final and unappealable assumes that Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 07 is valid, but that is precisely one of the issues
here. The prevailing rule that the Court should not interfere with the discretion
of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint is not applicable
in this administrative case, as earlier explained. That two decisions rendered
by this Court supposedly imply the validity of the aforementioned Section 7 of
Rule III is precisely under review here because of some statements therein
somewhat at odds with settled rules and the decisions of this Court on the
same issues, hence to invoke the same would be to beg the question.
V
Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects,
therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an
appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the
Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been
cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition
which, as correctly explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of
Appeals, el al. 23 [G.R. No. 110571, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 519.] was
intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its
appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation
enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court 24
[See Records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, VoI . II, pp. 130-132.]
We perforce have to likewise reject the supposed inconsistency of the ruling in
First Lepanto Ceramics and some statements in Yabut and Alba, not only
because of the difference in the factual settings, but also because those
isolated cryptic statements in Yabut and Alba should best be clarified in the
adjudication on the merits of this case. By way of anticipation, that will have
to be undertaken by the proper court of competent jurisdiction.
Furthermore in addition to our preceding discussion on whether Section 27 of

Republic Act No. 6770 expanded the jurisdiction of this Court without its
advice and consent, private respondents position paper correctly yields the
legislative background of Republic Act No. 6770. On September 26, 1989, the
Conference Committee Report on S.B. No. 453 and H.B. No. 13646, setting
forth the new version of what would later be Republic Act No. 6770, was
approved on second reading by the House of Representatives.25 [Citing the
Journal and Record of the House of Representatives, Third Regular Session,
1989-90, Vol. II, p. 512.] The Senate was informed of the approval of the final
version of the Act on October 2, 1989 26 [Citing the Journal of the Senate,
Third Regular Session, 1989-90, Vol. 1, pp. 618-619.] and the same was
thereafter enacted into law by President Aquino on November 17, 1989.
Submitted with said position paper is an excerpt showing that the Senate, in
the deliberations on the procedure for appeal from the Office of the
Ombudsman to this Court, was aware of the provisions of Section 30, Article
III of the Constitution. It also reveals that Senator Edgardo Angara, as a coauthor and the principal sponsor of S.B. No. 543 admitted that the said
provision will expand this Courts jurisdiction, and that the Committec on
Justice and Human Rights had not consulted this Court on the matter, thus:
INTERPELLATION OF SENATOR SHAHANI
xxx
Thereafter, with reference to Section 22(4) which provides that the decisions
of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court, in
reply to Senator Shahanis query whether the Supreme Court would agree to
such provision in the light of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution which
requires its advice and concurrence in laws increasing its appellate jurisdiction,
Senator Angara informed that the Committee has not yet consulted the
Supreme Court regarding the matter. He agreed that the provision will expand
the Supreme Courts jurisdiction by allowing appeals through petitions for
review, adding that they should be appeals on certiorari.27 [27 Journal of the
Senate, Second Regular Session, 1988-89, Vol. 1, p. 77, August 3, 1988.]
There is no showing that even up to its enactment, Republic Act No. 6770 was
ever referred to this Court for its advice and consent .28 [28 Ibid., id., id., pp.
111-112, August 9, 1988.]
VI
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory
philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court
of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.
There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said Section 27 refers to
appellate jurisdiction which, being substantive in nature, cannot be
disregarded by this Court under its rule-making power, especially if it results in

a diminution, increase or modification of substantive rights. Obviously,
however, where the law is procedural in essence and purpose, the foregoing
consideration would not pose a proscriptive issue against the exercise of the
rule-making power of this Court. This brings to fore the question of whether
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive or procedural.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or
statutes which are procedural, hence within the scope of this Courts rulemaking power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may
be procedural in one context and substantive in another.29 [8 Ninth Decennial
Digest 155.] It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive is
frequently a question of great difficulty.30 [People ex rel. Mijares, et al. vs.
Kniss, et al. , 357 P. 2d 352.] It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if
a rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own
procedural and jurisdictional system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the
practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any
substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that
is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them.31 [32 Am. Jur. 2d, Federal Practice and
Procedure, 505, p. 936.] If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not
procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means o
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.32
[People vs. Smith, 205 P. 2d 444.]
In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the
exercise of its rule-making power, of pending cases involving a review of
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions
to the Court of Appeals which shall now be vested with exclusive appellate
jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure only.33 [21 CJS, Courts, 502, p.
769.] This is so because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party
which is affected by the law. That right has been preserved. Only the
procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided has been changed.
The rationale for this is that litigant has a vested right in a particular remedy,
which may be changed by substitution without impairing vested rights, hence
he can have none in rules of procedure which relate to the remedy.34 [34 Elm
Park Iowa, Inc. vs. Denniston, et al., 280 NW 2d 262.]
Furthermore, it cannot be said that transfer of appellate jurisdiction to the
Court of Appeals in this case is an act of creating a new right of appeal
because such power of the Supreme Court to transfer appeals to subordinate
appellate courts is purely a procedural and not a substantive power. Neither
can we consider such transfer as impairing a vested right because the parties
have still a remedy and still a competent tribunal to administer that remedy.35
[35 Id., id.]
Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a transfer of
cases from one court to another, are procedural and remedial merely and that,
as such, they are applicable to actions pending at the time the statute went
into effect36 [21 CJS, Courts, 502, pp. 769-770, 5 NR 2d 1242.] or, in the
case at bar, when its invalidity was declared. Accordingly, even from the
standpoint of jurisdiction ex hypothesi the validity of the transfer of appeals in
said cases to the Court of Appeals can be sustained.
WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989),
together with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or
issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for
appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman
to the Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further force
and effect.
The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals
for final disposition, with said petition to be considered by the Court of Appeals
pro hac vice as a petition for review under Rule 43, without prejudice to its
requiring the parties to submit such amended or supplemental pleadings and
additional documents or records as it may deem necessary and proper.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing, and Purisima JJ., concur.
([1998V597E] TERESITA G. FABIAN petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A.
DESIERTO, in his capacity as ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his
capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN
respondents., G.R. No. 129742, 1998 Sep 16, En Banc)

RODOLFO SUAREZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and CESARIO
MANIGBAS, respondents.1990 June 062nd DivisionG.R. No. 80199D E C I S I
ON
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
condemning petitioner Rodolfo Suarez to pay moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorney's fees in favor of private respondent Cesario Manigbas.
Respondent Manigbas used to be a security guard of the D'Robe Security

Agency of which petitioner, Capt. Rodolfo Suarez, was the general manager.
He was assigned to the Security Bank and Trust Agency branch at Sucat,
Paraaque, Metro Manila. During his tour of duty with the said bank, he
alleged that his employer pulled him out of his assignment and later dismissed
him. This dismissal was contested by him before the National Labor Relations
Commission.
Respondent found another employment with the RP Guardian Security Agency.
While he was with his second employer, petitioner Suarez signed and sent a
letter to the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency
Operators, (PADPAO), an association of security agencies, which reported
misdemeanors committed by several of its guards, including the respondent.
The remarks pertaining to respondent Manigbas states, to wit: "Padding
payroll; used to leave his post every weekend without a reliever nor
permission from the Agency; misrepresentation on the submission of Daily
Time Record."
(p. 19, Memorandum of Petitioner) Consequently, plaintiff was dismissed by
the RP Guardian Security Agency and was unemployed for six (6) months until
re-hired by the said agency but on temporary basis. Plaintiff claimed that the
letter of defendant Suarez to the PADPAO exposed him to public ridicule,
inconvenience, humiliation and contempt which resulted in his being
blacklisted by security agencies giving him difficulty in finding employment
and causing him mental torture and anguish.
Petitioner Suarez denied that respondent was similarly relieved or dismissed
from employment. He claimed that after his relief of his assignment with the
Security Bank and Trust Company branch at Sucat, Paraaque, Metro Manila,
the respondent refused to accept re-assignment. Respondent's relief was done
in accordance with the company rule not to allow guards to stay for a long
time at one post for security reasons. The letter complained of was a
privileged communication consistent with the call of the PADPAO to make
available to it information on misdemeanors of security guards. It was written
in good faith and without any intention to cause damage to the respondent.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the respondent awarding moral
damages in the amount of P10,000; exemplary damages in the amount of
P3,000; actual damages in the amount of P1,000; attorney's fees in the
amount of P2,000 and costs. On appeal to respondent court, the said decision
was affirmed with the modification eliminating the award of actual damages.
Hence, this petition.
Basically, petitioner raises the following issues:
1. Whether or not the regional trial court had no jurisdiction over the case
at bar considering that the total money claims of respondent is only ten
thousand pesos (P10,000); and
2. Whether or not the letter sent to PADPAO is covered by the rule on
privileged communication.
In the resolution of August 22, 1988, the petition was given due course and
the parties were required to submit their respective memoranda within thirty
(30) days from notice thereof. Petitioner filed his memorandum of November
7, 1988 while respondent filed his on October 27, 1988.
Anent the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the court a quo in entertaining this
case, petitioner's contentions are devoid of merit. While though it is clear from
the complaint filed that the total amount claimed by respondent Manigbas is
ten thousand pesos (P10,000) and that under BP 129, the Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases in which the
demand, exclusive of interest and cost, or the value of the property in
controversy, amounts to more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000),
petitioner is estopped from invoking this rule since he never questioned this
flaw until this case was appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals from the
adverse decision of the trial court. It is settled that any decision rendered
without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even
on appeal before this Court. The only exception is where the party raising the
issue is barred by estoppel. (Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, reiterated in
Solid Homes, Inc. v. Payawal and Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84811, August
29, 1989).
While petitioner could have prevented the trial court from exercising
jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking exception thereto, they instead
invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking affirmative
relief from it. What is more, they participated in the trial of the case by crossexamining respondent. Upon the premises, petitioner, cannot now be allowed
belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the
court to which they had submitted themselves voluntarily. (Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, supra)
With regard to the issue on whether or not the letter sent to the PADPAO and
signed by petitioner, considering the derogatory remarks on the private
respondent, is covered by the protective mantle of privileged communication,
the answer is in the negative. Petitioner, in support of his contention that such
letter is privileged communication, cites the case of U.S. v. Bustos, 37 Phil.
731, wherein the court laid down the following:
"A communication made in good faith upon any subject matter in which the
party making the communication has an interest or concerning which he has a
duty is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty,
although it contains incriminatory or derogatory matter which, without the
privilege, would be libelous and actionable." (p. 21, Memorandum for the
Petitioner)
And also the case of Santiago v. Calvo, 48 Phil. 919, where the Court held:
"Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for
belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of
privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. The privilege is not
defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate
terms. A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic
examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity." (p. 22, Memorandum for
the Petitioner)
Petitioner contends that the alleged libelous letter to the PADPAO is a
privileged communication, hence, not actionable. We believe that the letter
sent is not really a privileged communication.
In the case of Lu Chu Sing vs. Lu Tiong Gui, 76 Phil. 669, the Court said that
"the fact that a communication is privileged does not mean that it is not
actionable, the privileged character simply does away with the presumption of
malice which the plaintiff has to prove in such a case." And the evidence
necessary to prove malice on the part of the writer of a privileged
communication is not strictly documentary for it may be either extrinsic,
internal, and circumstantial, like any other fact necessary to make out
plaintiff's case (U.S. vs. Caete, 38 Phil. 253).
As aptly put by the respondent Court:
"In the present case, malice is strongly shown in appellant's writing the letter
which put the person of the appellee in bad light before his peers and the
security agencies who may have come across said letter in the course of his
employment. The said letter accused the appellee of "padding payroll
Used
to leave his post every weekend and without a reliever nor permission from
the agency. Misrepresentation on the submission of Daily Time Record." These
charges, however, were not duly substantiated by any proof contrary to the
PADPAO guidelines that the report on security guards been based on "actual
facts and not on imaginary or personal considerations." (Exh. 2). Besides, the
letter was written almost three months after appellee's employment with the
D'Robe Security Agency of which the appellant was the general manager had
already been terminated. In fact, appellee's termination caused him to file a
labor case against the D'Robe Security Agency with the then Ministry of Labor
and Employment docketed as NLRC NRC No. 5-3833-82 and resulted in the
payment of his back wages. With this in mind, appellant was guided and
motivated by revenge in writing and sending the derogatory letter to the
PADPAO which, in the guise of an official communication was designed to
damage appellee's name as well as compromise his future employment with
any security agency associated with the PADPAO. In other words, this would
result in the blacklisting of appellee by prospective employers. In fact,
appellee's employment with the RP Guardian Security Agency hangs on a
balance. As a consequence, he was dismissed; although he was re-hired after

six months this was on a temporary basis pending the outcome of the present
case. These significant facts evidently betray the conduct of appellant who
shall be denied the benefits of qualified privilege and justify the imposition of
personal liability to the appellee.
"A private communication, maliciously made by one person to another,
although in the performance of a legal, moral or social duty, is not privileged
(Imperial vs. Ziga, L-19726, April 13, 1967, 19 SCRA 726). According to
Justice Street in his work, Foundation of Legal Liability, quoted in U.S. vs.
Caete, et al., (38 Phil. 253), malice is a "term used to indicate the fact that
the defamer is prompted by personal ill-will or spite, and speaks not merely in
response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed
(People vs. De los Reyes, (CA) 47 O.G. 3569)." (pp. 32-33, Rollo)
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
The questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Penned by Justice Jorge R. Coquia and concurred in by Justices Josue N.
Bellosillo and Venancio D. Aldecoa, Jr.
(RODOLFO SUAREZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and CESARIO
MANIGBAS, respondents., G.R. No. 80199, 1990 June 06, 2nd Division)

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adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to

"(3) Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction,

Respondent Judge correctly observed that:

(MAURO BLARDONY, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE L. COSCOLLUELA, JR., as

/---!e-library! 6.0 Philippines Copyright 2000 by Sony Valdez---\

We hold that there was none.

1. Pp. 273-274, Original Record.

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of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than

Through a verified complaint dated December 15, 1997, complainants, client

When still no decision was rendered, complainant Sison (plaintiffs counsel)

(Abarquez vs. Rebosura, supra). Of

import is the requirement under

(d).....Offenses where there is no private offended party;

/---!e-library! 6.0 Philippines Copyright 2000 by Sony Valdez---\

Order of respondent Ombudsman and exonerated private respondents from

Sec. 23. Formal Investigation. - (1) Administrative investigations by the Office

systematic and efficient case management would dictate the consolidation of

an actual case susceptible of judicial determination. Also, the constitutional

Furthermore in addition to our preceding discussion on whether Section 27 of

disregarded by this Court under its rule-making power, especially if it results in

/---!e-library! 6.0 Philippines Copyright 2000 by Sony Valdez---\

Respondent Manigbas used to be a security guard of the D'Robe Security

balance. As a consequence, he was dismissed; although he was re-hired after

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