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Joson V.

Torres (2005)
Petition: Validity of the suspension from office of
petitioner. Review a resolution of the Executive Secretary
Petitioner: Eduardo Nonato Joson (Governor of Nueva
Ecija)
Respondent: Ruben Torres ( Executive Secretary)
Doctrine:
POWER TO DISCIPLINE LOCAL OFFICIALS
Preventive suspension allows proper investigation.

agreement to maintain peace and order which the


parties involved did not comply with.
6. Moreover, Petitioner failed to file his Answer to the
complaint thus he was considered to have waived his
right and with this, Executive Secretary Torres issued
an Order, by authority of the President, placing
petitioner under preventive suspension for 60 days.
7. The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals by the
petitioner via certiorari. This was dismissed. Hence, this
present petition.
ISSUE:

FACTS:
1. Eduardo Joson, Governor of Nueva Ecija, was charged
with grave misconduct and abuse of discretion.
2. In order to have a loan (P150 Million) approved,
respondents claim that Torres threatened them while in
the session hall for a Sangguniang Panlalawigan
meeting. The loan was later on disapproved for reasons
that were unfavorable to the financial position of the
province since they still had an unpaid obligation.
3. Torres et al, then prayed for Ramos (President) for the
removal or suspension of Joson
4. Ramos then ordered the Secretary of Interior and Local
Government Barbers to take preemptive and
investigative actions, but to not break the peace since
he thinks that the use of force will not be justified.
5. Joson was informed by Sec. Barbers who later on went
to Nueva Ecija to make the parties enter into an

1. Whether or not, the suspension was valid and


constitutional.
2. Whether or not the DILG has investigating authority
over the case.

PROVISION:
Article 10 Section 4
The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect
to component cities and municipalities, and cities and
municipalities with respect to component barangays shall
ensure that the acts of their component units are within the
scope of their prescribed powers and functions.

The President shall have control of all the executive


departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed.
HELD:
Yes. The suspension was valid and
constitutional. Preventive suspension may be imposed by
the Disciplining Authority at any time (a) after the issues
are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c)
given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability
that the respondent, who continues to hold office, could
influence
the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of
the records and other evidence.
Executive Secretary Torres, on behalf of the President,
imposed preventive suspension on petitioner Joson
1.

A.O. NO. 23 Section 2 Disciplining


Authority: All administrative complaints,
duly verified, against elective local
officials mentioned in the preceding
Section shall be acted upon by the
President. The President, who may act
through the Executive Secretary, shall
hereinafter be referred to as the
Disciplining Authority.
i. President by himself or through
the Executive Secretary;
Investigating Authority: Secretary
of Interior and Local Government

or a constituted Investigating
Committee.

ii. Granted the power of the President


over administrative disciplinary
cases against elective officials. This
is the power of general supervision
over local governments.
The power of supervision means
overseeing or the authority of an officer
to see that the subordinate officers
perform their duties.
Supervision is not incompatible with
discipline. And the power to discipline
and ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed must be construed to authorize
the President to order an investigation of
the conduct of local officials when in his
opinion the good of the public service so
requires.
The power to discipline and ensuring that
laws of the land are properly executed are
vested upon the President as the Chief
Executive. With the power to discipline
comes the power to supervise since
supervision is not at all incompatible with
discipline. Consequently, it is well within
the Presidents power to order an
investigation regarding the conduct of

local officials as long as it is for the good


of the public.
Moreover, the power of the DILG to
investigate administrative complaints is
based on the doctrine of qualified political
agency where the heads of departments
are considered as alter egos of the
President himself. This doctrine is rooted
from the control power of the President
provided in Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution.
Under the alter-ego principle, the
members of the Cabinet may act for and
in behalf of the President in certain
matters because the president cannot be
expected to exercise his control (and
supervisory) powers personally all the
time.
2. Yes. DILG has authority over the case.
There are 2 authorities in jurisdiction
over administrative disciplinary actions
against elective local officials,
i. Disciplining Authority President
and the
ii. Investigating Authority The
Secretary of Interior and Local
Govt.
The Sec of DILG is not an exclusive
Investigating Authority.

The power of the President over admin is


from the power of general supervision
over local govt. The power to discipline
evidently includes investigation.
The power to investigate to the DILG or a
special investigating committee may be
delegated as may be constituted
Disciplining Authority which is not undue
delegation.
The President remains the Disciplining
Authority and the power of DILG to
investigate administration complaints is
based on the doctrine where decision of
executive officials are valid in so far as the
decision of the President.
DILG asked Joson to file his answer
though what happened was not to be
considered fatal. Ramos then found
complaint sufficient in form and
substance to warrant further
investigation.

Province of Negros Occidental v. COA


(2010)

2.

Represented by Governor Rafael Coscolluela, PNO enetered


into a Group Health Care Agreement amounting to P3.76 M
with Philam Care who was chosen through public budding.

3.

The next year, Provincial Auditor of Negros Occidental


suspended the premium payment on the ground that it did
not have the approval of the Office of the President (OP), as
required by A.O. No. 103. The Provincial Auditor also claimed
that the payment of health care benefits violated R.A. 6785
(Salary Standardization Law).

4.

PNO complied with the directive and sent a letter to the OP.
President Estrada directed COA to lift the suspension and
allow payment limited to P100, 000 only.

5.

COA ignored the directive and issued a Notice of


Disallowance.

6.

PNO appealed to COA but the latter affirmed the Provincial


Auditors Notice of Disallowance.

7.

The following were held liable:

Petition: Certiorari
Petitioner: Province of Negros Occidental
Respondent: The Commissioners, COA, Regional Cluster Directors
and The Provincial Auditor of Negros Occidental
DOCTRINE:
The Presidents power of general supervision over the LGUs means the
power of a superior officer to see to it that subordinates perform their
functions according to law.
- Limited to seeing to it that rules are followed and laws are faithfully
executed
- President may only point out that rules have not been followed but
the President cannot lay down rules, neither does he have the
discretion to modify or replace rules.
This is different from the Presidents power to control which covers all
executive departments, bureaus and offices.

a.

FACTS:
1.

Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental passed


Resolution No. 720-A allocating P4 M of its retained earnings
for the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits
of 1,949 officials and employees of the province.

b.
c.
8.

1,949 officials and employees of the province


(including the accountant)
Former Governor Rafael Coscolluela
Sangguniang Panlalawigan

Philam Care was not held liable because it was unjust to


require Philam Care to refund the amount received for services
it had duly rendered since insurance law prohibits refund of

premiums after risks had already attached to the policy


contract.
9.

PNO claims that the payment of premium health benefits was a


clear exercise of express powers of LGUs to allocate their
resources in accordance with their own priorities.

ISSUE:
WoN COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
disallowance of P3.76 M for premium paid for the hospitalization
and health care insurance benefits granted by PNO to its 1,949
officials and employees

PROVISION:
A.O. No. 103 (Authorizing the Grant of CY-1993 Productivity
Incentive Benefits to Government Personnel and Prohibiting
Payments of Similar Benefits in Future Years Unless Duly
Authorized by the President
RULING + RATIO:
YES, COA committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing
premium payment.
Section 2 of A.O. No. 103, which prohibits grant of productivity
incentive benefits to employees, applies ONLY to government
offices/agencies and GOCCs and NOT to LGUs.
LGUs are subject only to the power of supervision of the President and
not to the power of control.
DISPOSITION: The petition is GRANTED.

Alternative Center v. Zamora


Petition: Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus With Application for TRO
Petitioner: Alternative Center for Organizational Reforms and Development
Inc.
Respondent: Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora
DOCTRINE:
To hold that the executive branch may disregard constitutional provisions
which define its duties, provided it has the backing of statute, is virtually
to make the Constitution amendable by statute. Moreover, if it were the
intent of the framers to allow the enactment of statutes making the
release of the IRA conditional instead of automatic, then Article X Section
6 of the Constitution would have been worded to say shall be
[automatically] released to them as provided by law.
FACTS:
1.
2.

GAA for the year 2000 provided Internal Revenue Allocations worth
P111, 778,000,000 for Local Government Units
An UNPROGRAMMED FUND heading under the same GAA provided that
P10B shall be allocated outside the P111B state above if it, shall be used to
fund the IRA, which amount shall be released only when the original
revenue targets submitted by the President to Congress can be realized

ISSUES:
1.

WoN certain provisions of the GAA are unconstitutional

PROVISION:
Article X Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution

Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law,


in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.

GAA Headings
XXXVII Allocations to Local Government Units
LIV Unprogrammed Fund
Special Provision under the GAA

1- Release of the Fund. The amounts herein appropriated shall be released


only when the revenue collections exceed the original revenue targets
submitted by the President of the Philippines to Congress pursuant to Section
22, Article VII of the Constitution or when the corresponding funding or
receipts for the purpose have been realized except in the special cases covered
by specific procedures in Special Provision Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 13 and 14
herein: PROVIDED, That in cases of foreign-assisted projects, the existence of a
perfected loan agreement shall be sufficient compliance for the issuance of a
Special Allotment Release Order covering the loan proceeds: PROVIDED,
FURTHER, That no amount of the Unprogrammed Fund shall be funded out of
the savings generated from programmed items in this Act.
4- Additional Operational Requirements and Projects of Agencies. The
appropriations for Purpose 6 Additional Operational Requirements and
Projects of Agencies herein indicated shall be released only when the original
revenue targets submitted by the President of the Philippines to Congress
pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution can be realized based on a
quarterly assessment of the Development Budget Coordinating Committee, the
Committee on Finance of the Senate and the Committee on Appropriations of
the House of Representatives and shall be used to fund the following:
RULING + RATIO: Yes
Petitioners: GAA violated this constitutional mandate when it made the
release of IRA contingent on whether revenue collections could meet the
revenue targets originally submitted by the President, rather than making the
release automatic
Respondents: Constitutional provision is addressed not to the
legislature but to the executive, hence, the same does not prevent the
legislature from imposing conditions upon the release of the IRA.
* Respondents cite the exchange between Commissioner (now Chief Justice)
Davide and Commissioner Nolledo in the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission
Commissioner Davide referred to the national government as the entity that
collects and remits internal revenue. Similarly, Commissioner Nolledo alluded
to the Budget Officer, who is clearly under the executive branch.
Respondents thus infer that the subject constitutional provision merely
prevents the executive branch of the government from unilaterally
withholding the IRA, but not the legislature from authorizing the
executive branch to withhold the same. In the words of respondents, This
essentially means that the President or any member of the Executive
Department cannot unilaterally, i.e.,without the backing of statute, withhold the
release of the IRA (WRONG)

SC: SEE DOCTRINE


Supporting arguments of SC
1.

If indeed the framers intended to allow the enactment of statutes making


the release of IRA conditional instead of automatic, then Article X, Section
6 of the Constitution would have been worded differently.

EXAMPLES:
Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the
national taxes which shall be [automatically] released to them as provided by
law, or,
Local government units shall have a just share in the national taxes which shall
be [automatically] released to them as provided by law, or
Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the
national taxes which shall be automatically released to them subject to
exceptions Congress may provide
2.

Under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the just share of local
governments is qualified by the words as determined by law, and
not the release thereof, the plain implication is that Congress is not
authorized by the Constitution to hinder or impede the automatic release
of the IRA.

DISPOSITION: petition is GRANTED. XXXVII and LIV Special Provisions 1 and


4 of the Year 2000 GAA are hereby declared unconstitutional insofar as they
set apart a portion of the IRA, in the amount of P10 Billion, as part of the
UNPROGRAMMED FUND

Borja, Jr. v. Comelec

Petition: Certiorari
Petitioner: Benjamin U. Borja
Respondent: Commission on Elections and Jose T. Capco, Jr.
Ponencia: Mendoza, J.
DOCTRINE: (Term Limit of Elective Local Officials)
-

It is the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in


the same elective position.
He must have served three consecutive times in an elective
local office, he must have also been elected to the same
position for the same number of times before the
disqualification may apply.

FACTS:
1.

Private Resondent, Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as viice-mayor of


Pateros. He became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of
the incumbent, Cesar Borja.

2.

He was then elected mayor of Pateros twice after the term in which
he became mayor due to the death of the incumbent.

3.

Respondent, then filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of


Pateros for the third time. Petitioner, Cesar Borja, Jr., sought his
disqualification for having served three consecutive terms already.

4.

Second Division of Comelec ruled in favor of the petitioner, but was


subsequently reversed by the Comelec en banc in favor of the
respondent, holding the respondent eligible to run for mayor.

5.

Respondent was proclaimed elected by the Municipal Board of


Canvassers.

ISSUES:
2.

WoN Respondent is allowed to serve again as mayor.

PROVISION:

Sections 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution


o The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.

RULING + RATIO:
1. YES, the Respondent may serve as mayor again.
a. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken
to the right to be elected as well as the right to
serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it
is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive times, he must also have been elected
to the same position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply.
b. It underscores the constitutional intent to cover only
the terms of office to which one may have been
elected for purposes of the three-term limit on local
elective officials, disregarding for this purpose
service by automatic succession.
Disposition: Petition is Dismissed.

ADORMEO v. COMELEC (2002)

Petition: Petition for certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary


injunction and/ or temporary restraining order
Petitioner: Raymundo M. Adormeo
Respondents: Ramon Y. Talaga Jr.
Ponencia: Quisumbing, J.
DOCTRINE:
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to
be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. It is not
enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective
local office; he must also have been elected to the same position for the same
number of times before the disqualification can apply (cited in Borja Jr. vs
COMELEC).
The two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: a)
that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive
terms (cited Lonzanida vs. COMELEC).

recall election - served only the unexpired term of Tagarao. This is in


violation of Art. 10 Sec. 8 of the 1987 Constitution.
5.

On March 9, 2001, Talaga Jr. responded that he was not elected City Mayor
for 3 consecutive terms but only for 2 consecutive terms. He pointed to his
defeat in the 1998 election by Tagarao. Because of his defeat the
consecutiveness of his years as mayor was interrupted, and thus his
mayorship was not for three consecutive terms of 3 years each.
Respondent added that his service from May 12, 2001 until June 30,
2001 for 13 months and 18 days was not a full term.

6.

On April 20, 2001, the COMELEC disqualified Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. for the
position of city mayor on the ground that he had already served three (3)
consecutive terms, and his CoC was ordered withdrawn and/or cancelled.

7.

On April 27, 2001, private respondent filed an MR = recall recall election


was not a regular election, but a separate special election specifically to
remove incompetent local officials.

8.

On May 3, 2001, petitioner filed his opposition to private respondents MR


stating therein that serving the unexpired term of office (of Tagarao) is
considered as one (1) term. Petitioner further contended that Article 8 of
the Constitution speaks of term and does not mention tenure.

9.

On May 9, 2001, the COMELEC en banc ruled in favor of private respondent


Ramon Y. Talaga Jr. It reversed the First Divisions ruling and held that 1)
respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms because he did
not win in the May 11, 1998 elections; 2) that he was installed only as
mayor by reason of his victory in the recall elections; 3) that his victory in
the recall elections was not considered a term of office and is not included
in the 3-term disqualification rule, and 4) that he did not fully serve the
three (3) consecutive terms, and his loss in the May 11, 1998 elections is
considered an interruption in the continuity of his service as Mayor of
Lucena City.

FACTS:
1.

Raymundo Adormeo and Ramon Talaga Jr. were the only candidates who
filed their certificates of candidacy for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14,
2001 elections. Talaga Jr. was then the incumbent mayor.

2.

Talaga, Jr. was elected mayor in May 1992 (served full term) then got reelected in 1995-1998. However, in the 1998 election, he lost to Bernard G.
Tagarao.

3.

In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again won and served the
unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001.

4.

On March 2, 2001, Adormeo filed with the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor, Lucena City a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., on
the ground that Talaga Jr. was elected and had served as city mayor for
three (3) consecutive terms as follows: (1) May 1992 election served full
term; (2) May 1995-1998 election - served full term; (3) May 12, 2000

10. On May 19, 2001, after canvassing, Talaga Jr. was proclaimed as the duly
elected Mayor of Lucena City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Talaga Jr. had already served 3 consecutive terms in
office and is therefore disqualified to run for mayor of Lucena City in the May
14, 2001 elections
PROVISION:
Article 10 Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected. (Also stated in LGC Sec 43)
RATIO/HELD: No, Talaga Jr. has not served 3 consecutive terms; still qualified
to run for mayor
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to
be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. It is not
enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective
local office; he must also have been elected to the same position for the same
number of times before the disqualification can apply (cited in Borja Jr. vs
COMELEC).
The two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: a)
that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive
terms (cited Lonzanida vs. COMELEC).
COMELECs ruling that private respondent was not elected for three (3)
consecutive terms should be upheld. The continuity of his mayorship was
disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections, not by voluntary renunciation.
Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was
elected. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term
in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance
from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.

DISPOSITION: Instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The resolution of


public respondent Commission on Elections dated May 9, 2001, in
Comelec SPA No. 01-055 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

Socrates v COMELEC
Socrates vs. Commission on Elections (2002)
Petition: certiorari
Petitioner: VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES, Mayor of Puerto
Princesa City
Respondent: THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE PREPARATORY
RECALL ASSEMBLY (PRA) of Puerto Princesa City, PRA Interim
Chairman Punong Bgy. MARK DAVID HAGEDORN, PRA Interim
Secretary Punong Bgy. BENJAMIN JARILLA, PRA Chairman and
Presiding Officer Punong Bgy. EARL S. BUENVIAJE and PRA Secretary
Punong Bgy. CARLOS ABALLA, JR.
Ponencia: CARPIO, J.
DOCTRINE: Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate
reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms.
The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent
reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not
immediately after the end of the third consecutive term.
FACTS:
- 528 members of the barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa
convened for a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) to initiate the recall
of Victorino Dennis M. Socrates as Puerto Princesas mayor. Mark
David M. Hagedorn was designated as interim chair.
- PRA Resolution No. 01-02 declared its loss of confidence in Socrates
and called for his recall. The PRA requested the COMELEC to schedule
the recall election for mayor within 30 days from receipt of the Recall
Resolution. The COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution and
scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
- Edward M. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the
recall election.

- Adovo, Gilo, Ollave, Sr. (petition-in-intervention) and Manaay


(petition-in-intervention) filed a petition to disqualify Hagedorn from
running in the recall election and to cancel his certificate of candidacy
on the ground that Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a fourth
consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of
the city for three (3) consecutive full terms immediately prior to the
instant recall election for the same post.
- The COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall
election.
ISSUES: 1. W/N Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall
elections.
PROVISIONS:
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution: Section 8. The term of office
of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code:
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official was elected.
RULING + RATIO:
1. No. Hagedorn is not disqualified to run for the recall elections.

Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection


for a fourth term following three consecutive terms.
The
Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for
a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the
end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the
term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but
not an immediate reelection after the third term. Neither does the
Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to
run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office.
What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.
Hagedorn's candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is
not an immediate reelection after his third consecutive term which
ended on June 30, 2001.
The immediate reelection that the
Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular
elections in 2001. Hagedorn did not seek reelection in the 2001
elections.
Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992, 1995
and 1998 elections and served in full his three consecutive terms as
mayor of Puerto Princesa. Under the Constitution and the Local
Government Code, Hagedorn could no longer run for mayor in the 2001
elections. Thus, Hagedorn did not run for mayor in the 2001 elections.
Socrates ran and won as mayor of Puerto Princesa in the 2001
elections.
Hagedorns three consecutive terms ended on June 30, 2001.
Hagedorns new recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004
is not a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms
as mayor. An involuntary interruption occurred from June 30, 2001 to
September 24, 2002 which broke the continuity or consecutive
character of Hagedorns service as mayor.
In summary, we hold that Hagedorn is qualified to run in the September
24, 2002 recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa because:

1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his


three consecutive terms as mayor which ended on June 30, 2001;
2. Hagedorns continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily
interrupted from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 during which
time he was a private citizen;
3. Hagedorns recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004
cannot be made to retroact to June 30, 2001 to make a fourth
consecutive term because factually the recall term is not a fourth
consecutive term; and
4. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible
effect to the right of the electorate to choose their leaders.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 154512,
154683 and 155083-84 are DISMISSED. The temporary
restraining order issued by this Court on September 24, 2002
enjoining the proclamation of the winning candidate for mayor of
Puerto Princesa in the recall election of September 24, 2002 is
lifted. No costs.

Latasa v. COMELEC
Petition: Certiorari
Petitioner: ARSENIO A. LATASA
Respondent: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROMEO SUNGA
Ponencia: Azcuna, J.
DOCTRINE: Rest period
FACTS:
6.

Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality


of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and
1998. During petitioners third term, the Municipality of Digos was
declared a component city, to be known as the City of Digos. At this
point, petitioner reached his three-term limit. However, under
Section 53, Article IX of the Charter, petitioner was mandated to
serve in a holdover capacity as mayor of the new City of
Digos. Hence, he took his oath as the city mayor.

7.

On March 1, 2001, private respondent Romeo M. Sunga, also a


candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the
COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course, Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy and/ or For Disqualification against petitioner Latasa.
Sunga claims that petitioner falsely represented his eligibility to
run for mayor since he had already reached the three-term limit.

8.

On March 5, 2001, petitioner Latasa filed his Answer,[2] arguing


that he did not make any false representation in his certificate of
candidacy since he fully disclosed therein that he had served as
mayor of the Municipality of Digos for three consecutive terms.
Moreover, he argued that this fact does not bar him from filing a
certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 2001 elections since this
will be the first time that he will be running for the post of city
mayor.

9.

COMELECs first division ruled to cancel Latasas COC for being a


violation of the three three-term rule proscribed by the 1987
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.

10. Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration dated May 4,


2001, which remained unacted upon until the day of the elections,
May 14, 2001.
11. On May 16, 2001, private respondent Sunga filed an Ex Parte
Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order Enjoining the
City Board of Canvassers From Canvassing or Tabulating
Respondents Votes, and From Proclaiming Him as the Duly Elected
Mayor if He Wins the Elections.[6] Despite this, however,
petitioner Latasa was still proclaimed winner on May 17, 2001,
having garnered the most number of votes. Consequently, private
respondent Sunga filed, on May 27, 2001, a Supplemental Motion,
which essentially sought the annulment of petitioners
proclamation and the suspension of its effects.
12. On July 1, 2001, petitioner was sworn into and assumed his office
as the newly elected mayor of Digos City. It was only on August 27,
2002 that the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
13. Hence, this petition
ISSUE
3. Whether or not petitioner Latasa is eligible to run as candidate
for the position of mayor of the newly-created City of Digos
immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as
mayor of the Municipality of Digos.

PROVISION:

Article X, Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials,


except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

RULING + RATIO:
2.

NO. Petitioner held office for three consecutive terms


without a rest period
a. The territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the
same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the
inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those
in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of
voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their
municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These
are also the same inhabitants over whom he held
power and authority as their chief executive for nine
years.
b. Jurisprudence
i. Borja Jr. v. COMELEC: Vice Mayor becomes
Mayor upon death of the Mayor. His term as
mayor upon the death of his predecessor
cannot be construed as having served a full
term as contemplated under the subject
constitutional provision.
ii. Lonzanida v. COMELEC: A Mayor wins a third
consecutive term for office, but soon after
involuntarily relinquishes his office because a
failure of elections was declared. 2 years later,
he ran again for Mayor and was deemed
eligible. Upon protest of his opponent, said
Mayor was deemed eligible to run because his

c.

relinquishment of office constituted a break in


his continuous service as Mayor, and his
three-term limit was thereby reset.
iii. Adormeo v. COMELEC: On his third
consecutive run for office, Mayor Adormeo
lost. Months later, a recall election was
initiated, and by that virtue, Adorneo was
elected back into office. The Court held
therein that private respondent cannot be
construed as having been elected and served
for three consecutive terms. His loss in the
May 1998 elections was considered by the
Court as an interruption in the continuity of
his service as mayor.
iv. Socrates v. COMELEC: Hagedorn reached his
three-term limit and did not run in the
proceeding election. Recall proceedings were
initiated and Hagedorn filed his COC. Socrates
protested by stating that Hagedorn was
running on his fourth consecutive term. Court
stated that the principle behind the threeterm limit rule is to prevent consecutiveness
of the service of terms, and that there was in
his case a break in such consecutiveness after
the end of his third term and before the recall
election.
It is evident that in the abovementioned cases, there
exists a rest period or a break in the service of the
local elective official. In Lonzanida, petitioner therein
was a private citizen a few months before the next
mayoral elections. Similarly, in Adormeo and Socrates,
the private respondents therein lived as private
citizens for two years and fifteen months
respectively. Indeed, the law contemplates a rest
period during which the local elective official steps
down from office and ceases to exercise power or

authority over the inhabitants of the territorial


jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.
DISPOSITION: Petition is DISMISSED

Ong vs. Alegre (2006)

Petition: Petition for certiorari impugning Comelec en banc resolution


granting respondents motion for reconsideration and disqualifying the
petitioner to run.
Petitioner: Francis G. Ong
Respondent: Joseph Stanley Alegre and Commission on Elections
Ponencia: Garcia, J.
DOCTRINE: (Three-term limit rule)
For the three-term limit for elective local government officials
to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post, and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
FACTS:
1. Private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre and petitioner Francis
Ong were candidates for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in
the 2004 elections. Ong was then the incumbent mayor.
2. On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed with the COMELEC a Petition to
Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of
Ong. That Ong had already ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May
2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office as mayor and
discharged the duties thereof for 3 consecutive full terms
corresponding to those elections.
3. Way back 1998 elections, Alegre and Ong was vying for the
office of mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte, Ong being
subsequently proclaimed by COMELEC the winner. Alegre
subsequently filed an election protest, RTC declared Alegre as the
duly elected mayor in that 1998 mayoralty contest, however the
decision came out only on July 4, 2001, when Ong had fully served
the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to
serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of San
Vicente.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Ongs assumption of office as Mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be
considered as one full term service in the context of the consecutive
three-term limit rule.

PROVISIONS:
Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 43 (b) of the Local Government Code:
Sec. 43. Term of Office.
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three
consecutive years in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which
the elective official concerned was elected.
RULING + RATIO:
1. Yes.
It is true that the RTC ruled that it was Alegre who won in
the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected mayor
of San Vicente. However, it was without practical and legal use and
value, having been promulgated only after the term of the
contested office has expired.
Petitioners contention that he was only a presumptive
winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under
protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His
proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente

as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his
assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions
thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as
service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
It is absurd if Alegre would under the three-term rule - be
considered as having served term 1998-2001, when another
actually served such term.
Disposition:
Petition was DISMISSED and the assailed en banc Resolution
of the COMELEC was AFFIRMED.
.

DIZON v COMELEC

Petition: Certiorari and Prohibition, assailing the COMELEC en


banc decision, which upheld the same commissions decision in its
second division

15. Now, respondent Morales is running for 2007-2010. So petitioner


would have Morales disqualified under the provisions in Art. X, Sec.
8 of the Constitution.

Petitioner: Roberto Dizon

16. Respondent argues that his election for the 1998-2001 post was
not valid as there was a case assailing the validity of his assumption
of office and that the SC declared Anthony Dee as the duly elected
mayor (although the SC found that on this term he was able to
enjoy it fully as de facto mayor, eventually confirmed by the
resolution of the case) and then he was elected mayor again from
2001-2004

Respondent: Commission on Elections and Mariano P. Morales, Jr.


Ponencia: Carpio, J.

a.
DOCTRINE: (Term Limit of Elective Local Officials)
-

Three consecutive terms means three FULL consecutive


terms
Any interruption, no matter how brief, negates the term
that he has served as a valid count in this rule in the
Constitution

b.

c.

But the point of contention here is that he was disqualified


for the 2004 election, thus he needed to relinquish the
disputed position in the last term, the 2004-2007 term, on
May 17, 2007. The Vice-Mayor took the oath of office as
acting mayor for the remainder of his term
THUS, he would argue that he had only served for three
consecutive terms, from 1995-2004, then he argues that
his 2004-2007 term was void because there was an
involuntary break (his disqualification)
i. The Supreme Court ordered on May 2007 that the
case questioning his occupation of 2004-2007 was
void. He stepped down on May 16 2007.
Hence he could run again from 2007-2010

FACTS:
14. Petitioner, as citizen and taxpayer, avers that respondent has been
mayor for FOUR terms:
a. 1995-1998
b. 1998-2001
c. 2001-2004
d. 2004-2007

17. Second Division of Comelec ruled in favor of the mayor, affirmed by


the COMELEC en banc.
18. Petitioner argues that respondent obviously abdicated the position
only because the elections for the next year were coming up, thus
he needed to abdicate to qualify for the elections again.

ISSUES:
4.

WoN Respondent is allowed to serve again as mayor.

b.

other actions as mayor which Morales


exercised from 2004-2007
Also, petitioners argue that respondent used dilatory
tactics in order to stretch the pending case against him
regarding his occupation from 2004-2007. Thus,
Morales should be found in bad faith for delaying
justice to serve his purposes. The Court justshrugs.

PROVISION:

Sections 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution


o The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.

RULING + RATIO:
3. YES, the Respondent may serve as mayor again.
a. The law contemplates a rest period or an interruption
of any kind that would constitute as breaking the
three consecutive term limit. The constitution must
be construed in its plain meaning.
i. No matter how short the term of the acting
mayor from 2004-2007 was (two months and
14 days!) it counts as a stop. Thus, the 20042007 occupation of Morales as mayor is void.
ii. INTERESTINGLY: No pronouncements as to
the decisions, administrative orders, and

Disposition: Petition is Dismissed. ALAT.

FACTS:
1. Bolos was elected as Punong Barangay of Barangay

2.
3.
4.

5.

6.

Bolos v. COMELEC [March 17, 2009]


Petition: Petition for certiorari
Petitioner: Nicasio Bolos, Jr.
Respondent: The Commission on Elections and Rey Angeles
Cinconiegue
Ponencia: Peralta, J.
DOCTRINE:
One is deemed to have voluntarily renounced his office during
his third term when he runs for and wins in a different position.

Biking, Dauis, Bohol for 3 consecutive terms (Won in


elections 1994, 1997 and 2002)
In the 2004 elections, he ran for Municipal Councilor of
Dauis and won. He served until June 30, 2007.
In October 2007, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
Punong Barangay in Barangay Biking.
Cinconiegue, the incumbent Punong Barangay and a
candidate for the same office, filed a petition for
disqualification before the COMELEC on the ground that
Bolos already served the 3-term limit under Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A No.
7160
The First Division of COMELEC, in a Resolution, ruled that
Bolos' relinquishment of the office of Punong Barangay as
a consequence of his assumption as member of
Sangguniang Bayan (as Municipal Councilor) is
considered voluntary renunciation of the former office.
COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUES:
1. WoN there was voluntary renunciation of the Office of

Punong Barangay when Bolos assumed office as


Municipal Councilor
2. WoN COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed Resolution

PROVISIONS:
1. Section 8, Article X
The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years, and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected.
2. Section 43 (b) and (c) of the Local Government Code
No local elective official shall serve for more than
three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the
full term for which the elective official concerned
was elected.
The term of barangay officials and members of
the sangguniang kabataan shall be for five (5)
years, which shall begin after the regular election
of barangay officials on the second Monday of
May 1997: Provided, That the sangguniang
kabataan members who were elected in the May
1996 elections shall serve until the next regular
election of barangay officials.
RULING + RATIO:
1. YES. The Court agrees with COMELEC that there was
voluntary renunciation.

a. It is undisputed that Bolos was elected as Punong


Barangay for 3 consecutive terms satisfying the
first condition for disqualification.
b. When he filed his COC for Municipal Councilor, he
was not deemed resigned. However, all acts in
pursuit of winning as Municipal Councilor point
out an intent to give up his position as Punong
Barangay. Abandonment, like resignation, is
voluntary.
c. He was currently serving his 3rd term as Punong
Barangay when he ran for a different position.
Upon winning, he voluntarily relinquishes his
office as Punong Barangay which the Court deems
as voluntary renunciation.
d. Petitioner's claim that he left his position as
Punong Barangay by "operation of law" is
incorrect.
i. Black's definition of "operation of law" is
it "expresses the manner in which rights,
and sometimes liabilities, devolve upon a
person by the mere application to the
particular transaction of the established
rules of law, without the act or
cooperation of the party himself."
2. No. COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
Resolution.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The
COMELEC Resolutions dated March 4, 2008 and August 7, 2008
are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO
ORDERED.

Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective


interruption of a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the
three-term limitation.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, is a temporary incapacity to
render service during an unbroken term; in the context of term
limitation, interruption of service occurs after there has been a break
in the term.
Facts:
1.
2.

3.
4.

Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections


Petition: Certiorari
Petitioners: SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND
FERDINAND N. TALABONG
Respondents: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F.
ASILO
Doctrine:

5.

The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor


of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001,
2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively.
During his third term, the Sandiganbayan preventively
suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case.
The Court subsequently lifted the suspension order hence he
resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his
term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for
the same position.
The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and
Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due
course to Asilos certificate of candidacy
a. He had already been elected and had served for three
terms
b. His candidacy for a fourth term violated the threeterm limit rule under Section 8, Art. X of the
Constitution and Section 43 (b) of RA 7160.
COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and
the COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider such ruling hence
the present petition.

Issue:
WON Asilos preventive suspension constituted an interruption that
allowed him to run for a 4th term.

Provision:
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution
The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.

Ruling + Ratio:
No, preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective officials
term.
-

First branch of the provision: fixes the term of a local elective


office and limits an elective officials stay in office to no more
than three consecutive terms.
o This formulation no more than three consecutive
terms is a clear command suggesting the existence of
an inflexible rule.
o The meaning is clear reference is to the term, not to
the service that a public official may render.1awphi1 In
other words, the limitation refers to the term.
Second branch of the provision: voluntary renunciation of
office "shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected."
o The descriptive word "voluntary" linked together with
"renunciation" signifies an act of surrender based on
the surenderees own freely exercised will; in other
words, a loss of title to office by conscious choice.
o Such loss of title is not considered an interruption
because it is presumed to be purposely sought to avoid

the application of the term limitation. (Intent of the


provision is to close gaps that an elective official may
seize to defeat the three-term rule)
From relevant jurisprudence:
o The "interruption" of a term exempting an elective
official from the three-term limit rule is one that
involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to
office. The elective official must have involuntarily left
his office for a length of time, however short, for an
effective interruption to occur.
o Failure to render service retains title to the office but
cannot exercise his functions for reasons established
by law.
o Interruption exception to the three-term limit rule
and not failure to render service
Preventive suspension - interim remedial measure to address
the situation of an official who have been charged
administratively or criminally, where the evidence
preliminarily indicates the likelihood of or potential for
eventual guilt or liability.
o Suspended official is barred from performing the
functions of his office and does not receive salary in
the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to
his office
o No position is vacated when a public official is
preventively suspended.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, is a temporary incapacity
to render service during an unbroken term; in the context of
term limitation, interruption of service occurs after there has
been a break in the term.
A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption
because the suspended official continues to stay in office
although he is barred from exercising the functions and
prerogatives of the office within the suspension period.

Indicator in the officials continuity in office: (1)


absence of a permanent replacement and; (2) the lack
of authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.
Disposition: WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the
petition and accordingly NULLIFY the assailed COMELEC rulings. The
private respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo is declared DISQUALIFIED to run,
and perforce to serve, as Councilor of Lucena City for a prohibited
fourth term. Costs against private respondent Asilo.
o

DOCTRINE: (Unconstitutionality of holdover provision)


Congress has no authority of extending the three-year term limit by
inserting a holdover provision in RA 9054.\
Congress in passing RA 10153 and removing the holdover option has
made it clear that it wants to suppress the holdover rule expressed in
RA 9054.
FACTS:
1.) The first ARMM elections were scheduled by RA6734, the Organic
Act of ARMM.

RA 9054 reset the elections of ARMM officials to the 2 nd


Monday of September 2001.
RA 9140 reset the elections under RA9054 to Nov. 26, 2001.
RA 9333 reset the elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005,
and on the same date every three years thereafter.

2.) Pursuant to RA9333, the next ARMM elections should have been
held on August 8, 2011.

Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate (2012)


[Motion for Reconsideration]
Petition: Motion for Reconsideration
Petitioner: Datu Michael Abas Kida, et al.
Respondent: Senate of the Philippines
Ponencia: Justice Brion

Comelec had begun preparations for these elections and


accepted CoCs.

3.) However, in 2011, RA10153 was enacted resetting the ARMM


elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local
elections.
4.) Petitioners assail the constitutionality of said RA while defending he
constitutionality of RA 9054.

The original petition in the SC was dismissed. Thus, this motion


for reconsideration.

5.) Petitioners contend, among others, that the holdover provision in


RA 9054 is constitutional:

That before their successors [in office] are elected in


either an election to be held at the soonest possible time
or in May 2013, the said incumbent ARMM Regional
officials may validly continue functioning as such in a
holdover capacity.

PROVISION:
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms.
Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054 [Holdover provision]
Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials. (1) Terms of
Office. The terms of office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice
Governor and members of the Regional Assembly shall be for a period
of three (3) years, which shall begin at noon on the 30 th day of
September next following the day of the election and shall end at noon
of the same date three (3) years thereafter. The incumbent elective
officials of the autonomous region shall continue in effect until their
successors are elected and qualified.

ISSUE: Whether or no the holdover provision in RA 9054 is


constitutional.
RULING + RATIO:
NO. The holdover provision in RA 9054 is unconstitutional for
violation of Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution.

Elective ARMM officials are also local officials and are


therefore bound by the three-year term limit by the
constitution.
Congress has no authority of extending the three-year
term limit by inserting a holdover provision in RA 9054.
The three-year term limit should stay as the three-year term
limit as stated in the Constitution.
Congress in passing RA 10153 and removing the holdover
option has made it clear that it wants to suppress the
holdover rule expressed in RA 9054.

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
we DENY with FINALITY the motions for reconsideration for lack
of merit and UPHOLD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

existing boundaries will be substantially altered as a result of the


creation of a new province.
Thus, a plebiscite for creating a new province should include the
participation of the residents of the mother province for the plebiscite
to conform to the constitutional requirement.
FACTS:
1.) BP 885 An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to
be known as the Province of Negros del Norte was enacted.
2.) Petitioners filed a case for prohibition for the purpose of stopping
respondent Comelec from conducting the plebiscite scheduled on
January 3, 1986.
a. They contend that BP885 is unconstitutional for not being
in accord with the Constitution and the Local Government
Code
3.) The plebiscite sought to be restrained was held as scheduled.
a. However, the plebiscite was confined only to the
inhabitants of the territory of Negros del Norte, to the
exclusion of the voters from the rest of the province of
Negros Occidental.

Tan vs Comelec (1986)


Petition: petition for prohibition
Petitioner: Patricio Tan, et al.
Respondent: Commission on Elections
Ponencia: Alampay, J.
DOCTRINE:
In the conduct of plebiscite for the creation of a new province, the unit
or units referred to in the Constitution include the areas whose

4.) Respondents argue that the remaining cities and municipalities of


Negros Occidental not included in the new province of Negros del
Norte do not fall within the term unit or units affected as referred
to in the Constitution.
a. They also insist that the petition has been rendered moot
and academic by the approval of the creation of Negros del
Norte and its subsequent proclamation.
ISSUE:
W/N the creation of the province of Negros del Norte violated
the Constitution

It will also affect all the people living the areas of the
mother province and the proposed province
particularly in terms of economy.
Because both the mother province and the proposed
province will be affected, they are, thus, the unit or units
referred to in the Constitution which must be included in
the plebiscite.
o

PROVISION:
Section 3. Art.XI 1973 Constitution
No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code,
and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in
the unit or units affected.
Section 197. Local Government Code
SEC.197. Requisites for Creation A province may be created if it has a
territory of at least three thousand five hundred square kilometers, a
population of at least five hundred thousand person, an average
estimated annual income, as certified by the Ministry of Finance, of not
less than ten million pesos for the last three consecutive years, and its
creation shall not reduce the population and income of the mother
province or provinces at the time of said creation to less than the
minimum requirements under this section. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two or more islands.
RULING + RATIO:
1. YES. The creation of the province of Negros del Norte
violated the Constitution.
Invalid plebiscite
-

In this case, the existing province of Negros Occidental would


necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its
existing boundaries in order to create Negros del Norte.
To form the province of Negros del Norte, at least 3 cities and 8
municipalities will be subtracted from the parent province.
o This will result in the removal of approx. 2,768 sq.km.
from the land area of an existing province whose
boundaries will be substantially altered.

Negros del Norte did not satisfy the area requirement under the
Local Government Code
-

The Local Government Code requires that in order to create a


province, it must have at least 3500 sq.km. of territory
But the land area of Negros del Norte would only be about
2,584 sq.km. based on the area of the cities and municipalities
constituting the new province
o territory refers only to land mass and excludes
waters
Thus, it failed to comply with the requisites for the creation of a
province.

DISPOSITION: BP885 is declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of


Negros del Norte as a province is null and void.

FACTS:
1. Before Senate Bill No. 2157, now R.A. No. 9009, was introduced
by Senator Aquilino Pimentel, there were 57 bills filed for
conversion of 57 municipalities into component cities.
During the 11th Congress (June 1998-June 2001), 33 of these
bills were enacted into law, while 24 remained as pending
bills. Among these 24 were the 16 municipalities that were
converted into component cities through the Cityhood
Laws.
2. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the LGC which increased
the income requirement solely from locally generated
sources from P20M to P100M to be qualified to become a
component city.
3. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to
determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality
approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
4. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the 16 laws, each
converting the municipality covered thereby into a component
city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the COMELEC
from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws.
-

LEAGUE OF CITIES v COMELEC


Petition: Prohibition
Petitioner: League of Cities of the Phils. (LCP)
Respondent: Comelec
Ponencia: Bersamin, J.
DOCTRINE:
The exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws are the
express articulation of that intent to exempt respondent municipalities
from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.

In the Decision (2008), the Court En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted


the petitions and struck down the Cityhood Laws as
unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and
the equal protection clause.
In the Resolution, by a 7-5 vote denied the 1st motion for
reconsideration. Then with a vote of 6-6, denied the second
motion for reconsideration for being a prohibited pleading.
Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides
that: No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or
final resolution by the same party shall be entertained. Thus, a
decision becomes final and executory after 15 days from receipt
of the denial of the first motion for reconsideration.
However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a second
motion for reconsideration is granted by the Court, the Court
therefore allows the filing of the second motion for

5.

reconsideration. In such a case, the second motion for


reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading.
Then, in another Decision (2009) by a vote of 6-4, declared the
Cityhood Laws as constitutional.

The tenor of the ponencias 2008 Decision and 2010 Resolution


is that the exemption clauses in the 16 Cityhood Laws are
unconstitutional because they are not written in the Local
Government Code of 1991 (LGC), particularly Section 450
thereof, as amended by RA 9009

ISSUE: WoN respondent municipalities are exempt from the


coverage of RA 9009 (which would lead to WoN the exemption
clauses in the 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional)
PROVISION:
Article X, Section 10 provides
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

RULING + RATIO:
YES. Congress intended that those with pending cityhood bills
during the 11th Congress would not be covered by the new and
higher income requirement of P100 million imposed by R.A. No.
9009. When the LGC was amended by R.A. No. 9009, the
amendment carried with it both the letter and the intent of the
law, and such were incorporated in the LGC by which the
compliance of the Cityhood Laws was gauged.

The exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws


are the express articulation of that intent to exempt
respondent municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.

These municipalities have proven themselves viable and


capable to become component cities of their respective
provinces. It is also acknowledged that they were centers of
trade and commerce, points of convergence of transportation,
rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural
resources, and flourishing tourism spots.
Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also
true that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No.
9009 through the exemption clauses found therein.
Purpose of the enactment of R.A. No 9009 was merely to
stop the mad rush of municipalities wanting to be
converted into cities and the apprehension that before
long the country will be a country of cities and without
municipalities. The imposition of a very high income
requirement of P100 million, increased from P20 million, was
simply to make it extremely difficult for municipalities to
become component cities.
Petitioners in these cases complain about the purported
reduction of their just share in the national taxes (IRA).
To be sure, petitioners are entitled to a just share, not a
specific amount. But the feared reduction proved to be false
when, after the implementation of the Cityhood Laws, their
respective shares increased, not decreased. What these
petitioner cities were stating as a reduction of their respective
IRA shares was based on a computation of what they would
receive if respondent municipalities were not to become
component cities at all. Of course, that would mean a bigger
amount to which they have staked their claim. After
considering these, it all boils down to money and how
much more they would receive if respondent
municipalities remain as municipalities and not share in
the 23% fixed IRA from the national government for cities.
Petitioners complain of the projects that they would not be
able to pursue and the expenditures that they would not be
able to meet, but totally ignored the respondent municipalities
obligations arising from the contracts they have already

entered into, the employees that they have already hired, and
the projects that they have already initiated and completed as
component cities. Petitioners have completely overlooked the
need of respondent municipalities to become effective vehicles
intending to accelerate economic growth in the countryside. It
is like the elder siblings wanting to kill the newly-borns so
that their inheritance would not be diminished.
Congress merely took the 16 municipalities covered thereby
from the disadvantaged position brought about by the abrupt
increase in the income requirement of R.A. No. 9009,
acknowledging the privilege that they have already given to
those newly-converted component cities, which prior to the
enactment of R.A. No. 9009, were undeniably in the same
footing or class as the respondent municipalities.
By allowing respondent municipalities to convert into
component cities, Congress desired only to uphold the very
purpose of the LGC, i.e., to make the local government units
enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them
to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the attainment of
national goals, which is the very mandate of the Constitution.
DISPOSITION:
The Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
August 24, 2010, dated and filed on September 14, 2010 by
respondents Municipality of Baybay, et al. is GRANTED.
The Resolution dated August 24, 2010 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Cityhood LawsRepublic Acts Nos. 9389, 9390,
9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409,
9434,
9435,
9436,
and
9491are
declared
CONSTITUTIONAL.

The State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable


local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization whereby local government units shall be given
more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The
process of decentralization shall proceed from the national
government to the local government units. reason for the
creation of LGC
FACTS:
19. Oct 2006 PGMA approved RA 9355 (An Act Creating the
Province of Dinagat Islands)
20. Dec 2006 COMELEC conducted the mandatory plebiscite for
the ratification of the creation of the province under the
Local Government Code (LGC) and was approved by the
majority.
21. With the approval from both the mother province of Surigao
del Norte and Dinagat, president appointed interim set of
officials who took oath on Jan 2007.
Navarro v. Ermita (2011)

22. May 2007 synchronized elections of Dinagats new set of


provincial officials.

Petition: Urgent motion to recall entry of judgment


Petitioner: Rodolfo Navarro, Victor Bernal and Rene Medina
Respondent: Exec. Sec. Eduardo Ermita
Ponencia: Nachura

23. Nov 2006 petitioners filed to SC a petition for certiorari and


prohibition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9355. SC
dismissed petition.

DOCTRINE:

24. Moreover, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 sq. m and


population of 106, 951, which both fail to comply with the set

requirements of Sec. 10 of Article 10 of the Constitution and


Section 461 of the LGC.
25. SC granted the petition and declared RA 9355
unconstitutional for being unable to reach the set
requirements.SC also declared null and void the provision on
Article 9 (2) of the IRR of LGC for being ultra vires to Sec. 461
of the LGC.
ISSUE:
5. WoN RA 9355 is unconstitutional on the ground that it
allows the creation of a province which does not meet the
land and population requirements set by Sec 461 of the
LGC.
PROVISIONS:
Section 3 Article X of the 1987 Constitution
The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization with
effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum,
allocate among the different local government units their
powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries,
powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other
matters relating to the organization and operation of the local
units.
Section 2 of the LGC paragraph (a)

It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial


and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the attainment of national
goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization whereby
local government units shall be given more powers,
authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of
decentralization shall proceed from the national government to
the local government units.
Section 461 of the LGC.
Requisites for Creation.
Annual Income: (P20,000,000.00) AND EITHER of the
following requisites:
(i)
a contiguous territory of at least two thousand
(2,000) square kilometers
(ii) a population of not less than 250,000 inhabitants
Territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2)
or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or
cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province.

Article 9 (2) of the IRR of LGC. The land area requirement


shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of
one (1) or more islands.

RULING + RATIO:
NO, RA 9355 is not unconstitutional
When the local government unit to be created consists of one (1)
or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as
expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if
the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a
component city, respectively.

countryside development.
The LGC is dynamic and
cognizant of the needs of the Philippines as an archipelagic
country. This accounts for the exemption from the land area
requirement of local government units composed of one or more
islands.

Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government


units genuine and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and
minimum land area requirements for prospective local
government units should be liberally construed in order to
achieve the desired results.
This would mean that Congress has opted to assign a distinctive
preference to create a province with contiguous land area over
one composed of islands and negate the greater imperative of
development of self-reliant communities, rural progress,
and the delivery of basic services to the constituency.
As Section 533 provides, the Oversight Committee shall
formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations
necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of any
and all provisions of this Code, thereby ensuring compliance with
the principles of local autonomy as defined under the
Constitution. It was also mandated by the Constitution that a
local government code shall be enacted by Congress.
Section 2 of the LGC states the very reason for the enactment
of the LGC that is to attain decentralization and

MMDA vs Garin (2005)

Petitioner-appellee: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority


Oppositor-appellant: Dante Garin

3.

Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.
DOCTRINE:
MMDA may confiscate and suspend or revoke a drivers license
when a traffic law or regulation has been violated as part of its
mandate to manage transportation and traffic as well as the
administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement
operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education
programs.

4.

5.

FACTS:
NOTE: The facts in numbers 1-4 just set the story. They arent really
relevant because the case was rendered moot and academic. The real
issue at hand is the constitutionality of Sec 5(f) of RA 7924.
1.
2.

Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his


drivers license was confiscated for parking illegally.
Garin requested the MMDA for his license to be returned. But
because he received no response, he filed for a preliminary
injunction assailing among others that Sec 5 (f) of RA 7924 (the
statute creating the MMDA) which authorizes MMDA to
confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the
enforcement of traffic laws and regulations, grants MMDA the
unbridled discretion of confiscating licenses of erring motorists
because there were no implementing rules and regulations .
a.
MMDA claimed that there were implementing rules as
reflected in Memorandum Circular No TT-96-001 of
MMDA which laid down the rules in confiscating
licenses. But this was ruled to be void because this
Memorandum Circular was passed without a quorum.

Therefore, in the absence of implementing rules and


regulations from MMDA to guide traffic enforcers, RTC ruled in
Garins favor, directing MMDA to return his license and for the
authority to desist from confiscating drivers license without
first giving the driver the opportunity to be heard.
MMDA filed a petition saying that there was a quorum so
Memorandum Circular No TT-96-001 is valid. But such a
petition was dismissed because it was rendered moot and
academic due to the fact that MMDA Chairman Bayani
Fernando already issued Memorandum Circular No 04 which
outlined the procedures for the use of the Metropolitan Traffic
Ticket (MTT) scheme.
Nevertheless, the SC decided to rule on the constitutionality of
Section 5(f) of RA 7924 so that MMDA may be guided in the
proper implementation of its future programs.

ISSUES:
WON Sec 5(f) of RA 7924 is constitutional?
PROVISION:
Sec. 5(f) of RA 7924. Functions and power of MMDA
MMDA shall install and administer a single ticketing system, fix,
impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of
traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or nonmoving in nature,
and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the
enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of
Rep. Act No. 4136 and P.D. No. 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding,
and that (f)or this purpose, the Authority shall enforce all traffic laws
and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center,
and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local
government units, duly licensed security guards, or members of nongovernmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain

authority, subject to such conditions and requirements as the Authority


may impose.
RULING + RATIO:
Yes , Sec (5) of RA 7924 is constitutional.
A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may
withhold in the exercise of its police powerthe power to enact laws in
order to promote the general welfare. Hence, such a grant may be
suspended or revoked in the interest of public safety.
Police power is lodged primarily in the Legislature. This is delegated by
Congress to LGUs in the Local Government Code. Metropolitan Manila is
a body composed of several LGUs. In 1995, RA 7924 was passed which
declared Metro manila a special development and administrative
region. This statute consequently placed the administration of metrowide basic services under a development authority: which is referred
to as the MMDA.
However, the MMDA is not vested with police power. All its
functions are administrative in nature. Its powers are limited to the
ff acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of
a system and administration.
MDDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed
with legislative power, unlike its predecessor, the Metro Manila
Commission Hence, it has NO POWER TO ENACT ordinances for the
welfare of the community. Instead, MMDA CAN ONLY ENFORCE
existing laws and regulations because MMDA is an agency created
for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the
various national government agencies, people's organizations,

non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the


efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast
metropolitan area.
What is being contested in this case is the clause of Sec 5(f) of RA 7924
which states that MMDA shall install and administer a single ticketing
system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of
violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or
nonmoving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers
licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations.
The clause quoted above cannot be considered as an undue delegation
of legislative power because what it merely provides is that: where
there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the
legislature or agencies vested or delegated with leg powers, MMDA
is not prohibited, and is in fact, duty-bound, to confiscate and suspend
or revoke drivers license in the exercise of its mandate of transport
and traffic management, as well as the administration and
implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic
engineering services and traffic education programs.Hence, Sec 5(f) is
constitutional.
To reiterate, MMDA is limited by an enabling lawmeaning its
efforts must be authorized by a valid law, ordinance, or regulation from
a legitimate source. MMDA cannot enact ordinances and regulations
for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. MMDA
can only enforce such because it does not have police power. Its
powers are purely administrative in nature.
DISPOSITION: Petition dismissed.

G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011


Petition: for prohibition under Rule 65, of Proclamation
1946 and AO 273 and 273-A
Petitioner: Zaldy Ampatuan, et. al.
Respondent: Hon. Ronaldo Puno, DILG (PNP + AFP)
Ponencia: Abad
Doctrine: President as Commander-in-Chief, call-out
powers (Article VII, Sec. 18) vs. emergency powers granted
by Congress (Article VI, Sec. 23 (2))
Facts

Weve been here before (and again), so a quick


recap:
o

Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and


Regie Sahali-Generale v. Hon. Ronaldo Puno

Following the Maguindanao Massacre, PGMA


issued the assailed Proc. 1946 and Admin. Orders
which declared a state of emergency in
Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat + Cotobato City,
and transferred (AO 273), amended to
delegated (AO 273-A), supervision of ARMM
from the Office of the Prez to the DILG.
Petitioners ARMM officials doth protest: no
factual basis for state of emergency declaration;
and that the troop deployments and supervision
transfer/delegation to DILG are unconstitutional,
violating local autonomy (see Expanded ARMM
Act and 1987 Consti.)
Respondents say:

purpose of Proc. 1946 not to deprove


autonomy, but to restore order. The basis
is her calling-out power (Art. VII Sec. 18),
and the determination of the need to
invoke this power rests solely her
wisdom, supported and justified by
intelligence reports.
the AOs only merely delegated (see 273A) ARMM supervisory powers from the
Prez to the DILG Sec., and only to facilitate
the massacre investigation. No provision
for exercise of emergency powers were
involved.

Issues

W/N Proc. 1946 and AOs 233(-a) violate local


autonomy as per Art. X, Sec. 16, 1987 Const., and
Art. V, Sec. 1, Expanded ARMM Act (Art. X issue)

W/N PGMA invalidly exercised emergency powers in calling


out the PNP and AFP to lock the place down
W/N PGMA has factual bases for #1 and #2

Provision(s): (Art. X-limited)

1987 Constitution, Article X, Sec. 16: The President


shall exercise general supervision over autonomous
regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.

Art. V, Sec. 1, RA 9054 (Expanded ARMM Organic


Act): General Supervision of the President Over the

Regional Governor Consistent with the Constitution and


basic policy on local autonomy, the President of the

Republic shall exercise general supervision over the


Regional Governor to ensure that his or her acts are
within the scope of his or her powers and functions.
The power of supervision of the President over
the provincial governors and the mayors of the highly
urbanized cities shall be exercised through the Regional
Governor; over the mayors of the component cities and
municipalities, through the provincial governor, and over
the punong barangay, through the city or municipal
mayor.
xxx
The President may suspend the Regional Governor for a
period not exceeding six (6) months for willful violation of the
Constitution, this Organic Act or any existing law that applies to
the autonomous region.

Ruling + Ratio (re: Art. X)

W/N Proc. And AO violate Art. X and RA 9054? NO.


Daenerys dragons, NO.
o No takeover by the DILG of ARMM operations
occurred.
Proof: When Governor Ampatuan was
arrested, the Vice-Gov succeeded him.
Then the Speaker of the Regional
Assembly took over the Vice. What
DILG takeover?
Proof: did the Proc. And AO contain
any emergency power provision? No.
Daenerys dimpled dragons, NO.

o Why AO delegate supervision to DILG? OSG:


Crime investigation. Also, DILG Secretary is
Presidential alter ego anyway.
And while were at it: DILG gained no
power to remove/suspend ARMM
officers in this delegation.
Disposition

We all know how this ends by now.

Petitioner: Datu Michael Abas Kida, et al.


Respondent: Senate of the Philippines
Ponencia: Justice Brion
DOCTRINE: (Authority of the Government over the Autonomous
Region)
The autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to defeat
national policies and concerns. Since the synchronization of elections is
not just a regional concern but a national one, the ARMM is subject to it;
the regional autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be used to exempt
the region from having to act in accordance with a national policy
mandated by no less than the Constitution.
FACTS:
1.) The first ARMM elections were scheduled by RA6734, the Organic
Act of ARMM.

RA 9054 reset the elections of ARMM officials to the 2 nd


Monday of September 2001.
RA 9140 reset the elections under RA9054 to Nov. 26, 2001.
RA 9333 reset the elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005,
and on the same date every three years thereafter.

2.) Pursuant to RA9333, the next ARMM elections should have been
held on August 8, 2011.

Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate (2011)


Petition: Motion for Reconsideration

Comelec had begun preparations for these elections and


accepted CoCs.

3.) However, in 2011, RA10153 was enacted resetting the ARMM


elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local
elections.

ISSUE: Whether or not synchronization of the elections impedes or


defeats the autonomy that the Constitution granted to the ARMM.
RULING + RATIO:
No. Synchronization does not impede on the autonomy granted by
the Constitution to the ARMM.

There is no conflict between the two Constitutional mandates


synchronization and autonomy.
o The constitution should be interpreted as a whole in
order to harmonize and reconcile the provisions as to
give to all of them full force and effect.
While autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, the
framers of the Constitution never equated autonomy with
independence.
o The ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to
operate within the larger framework of the State and
is still subject to the national policies set by the
national government, save only for those specific
areas reserved by the Constitution for regional
autonomous determination.
Interestingly, the framers of the Constitution initially proposed
to remove Section 17 of Article X, believing it to be unnecessary
in light of the enumeration of powers granted to autonomous
regions in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Upon
further reflection, the framers decided to reinstate the
provision in order to make it clear, once and for all, that
these are the limits of the powers of the autonomous
government. Those not enumerated are actually to be
exercised by the national government.
In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot
be invoked to defeat national policies and concerns.
o Since the synchronization of elections is not just a
regional concern but a national one, the ARMM is
subject to it; the regional autonomy granted to the
ARMM cannot be used to exempt the region from

having to act in accordance with a national policy


mandated by no less than the Constitution.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the
consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for
lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We
likewise LIFT the temporary restraining order we issued in our
Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs.

Petitioner: DATU FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS, DATU BLO UMPAR ADIONG, DATU

MACALIMPOWAC DELANGALEN, CELSO PALMA, ALI MONTANA BABAO,


JULMUNIR JANNARAL, RASHID SABER, and DATU JAMAL ASHLEY ABBAS
Respondent: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and HONORABLE GUILLERMO C.
CARAGUE, DEPARTMENT SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT

Ponencia: Cortez, J.
DOCTRINE: Section 18 of Article X
xxx
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only the provinces,
cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region.
xxx
FACTS:
This case involves the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9)
cities in Mindanao and Palawan, scheduled for November 19, 1989, in
implementation of Republic Act No. 6734 or "An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."
Petitioners pray that the Court:
1) enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting the
plebiscite and the Sec. of Budget and Management from releasing funds
for such purpose; (2) declare R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof,
unconstitutional.

ABBAS v COMELEC(1989)

Petitioners argue that R.A. 6734


1) is violative of the Constitution, arguments are thus enumerated:
a. Citing Section 1 of R.A. No. 6734, Abbas contends that the
Organic Act unconditionally creates an autonomous region in
Mindanao, contrary to the Constitution. Section 1 declares that "[t]here
is hereby created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be
composed of provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite
called for the purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution." [No merit. The very section he cites clearly makes
mention of Section 18 of Article X. There is also a provision in the

Transitory Provisions of the Organic Act which incorporates the


Constitutional Provisions.]
b. Petitioner Mama-O (in another petition) insists that R.A. No.
6734 is unconstitutional because only the provinces of Basilan, Sulu,
Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte and Maguindanao and the
cities of Marawi and Cotabato, and not all the others also included in
the Organic Act, share historical and cultural heritage and other
relevant characteristics. [No merit. The determination of which places
to be included is left to the wisdom of the Congress.]
c. The Organic Act violates the constitutional guarantee on free
exercise of religion. [No merit. Case is not yet justiciable.]
d. Section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 allegedly grants the President the
power to merge regions, a power which is not conferred by the
Constitution upon the President. [No merit. What is referred to in R.A.
No. 6734 is the merger of administrative regions, not of political
divisions, which the President is allowed to do.]
2) Certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli
Agreement
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not R.A. No 6734 (the Organic Act) is unconstitutional.
2) Whether or not the Organic Act is in conflict with the Tripoli
Agreement.
PROVISION:
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each
autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the
regional consultative commission composed of representatives
appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral
bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government
for the region consisting of the executive and representative of the
constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for
special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction
consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when

approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a


plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only the provinces,
cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite
shall be included in the autonomous region.
RULING + RATIO:
1) On Constitutionality, all contentions are without merit
(More or less, for Issue 1 same explanations lang found within the facts na
naka bracket, yung [No Merit.] Expounded version lang to )
a. The very same section he cites clearly mentions Section 18 of
Article X. This clearly indicates that the creation of the autonomous
region shall take place only in accord with the constitutional
requirements. Moreover, there is a specific provision in the Transitory
Provisions of the Organic Act which explicitly incorporates
substantially the same requirements embodied in the Constitution.
b. The Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress
shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region.
Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress
of the areas that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm
of the legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would
have to go into the wisdom of the law. This the Court cannot do without
doing violence to the separation of governmental powers.
c. The objection centers on a provision in the Organic Act which
mandates that should there be any conflict between the Muslim Code
and the Tribal Code on the one had, and the national law on the other
hand, the Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should apply
national law. Petitioners maintain that the Islamic law (Shari'ah) is
derived from the Koran, which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may
not be subjected to any "man-made" national law.
Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by enumerating possible
instances of conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code and
national law, wherein an application of national law might be offensive
to a Muslim's religious convictions.

As enshrined in the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to


settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable. In the present case, no actual controversy
between real litigants exists.
d. It must be pointed out that what is referred to in R.A. No.
6734 is the merger of administrative regions, which are mere
groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes and
which the President is allowed to do. Administrative regions are not
territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays as enumerated in Section 10 of the
Constitution which provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected.
While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly
provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally
been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of
general supervision over local governments.

We find it neither necessary nor determinative of the case to rule on the


nature of the Tripoli Agreement and its binding effect on the Philippine
Government. In the first place, it is now the Constitution itself that
provides for the creation of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao.
The standard for any inquiry into the validity of R.A. No. 6734 would
therefore be what is so provided in the Constitution. Any conflict
between the two will not have the effect of enjoining the
implementation of the Organic Act.
Assuming arguendo that the Tripoli Agreement is a binding treaty or
international agreement, it would then constitute part of the law of the
land. But as internal law it would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, an
enactment of the Congress of the Philippines, rather it would be in the
same class as the latter. Thus, if at all, R.A. No. 6734 would be
amendatory of the Tripoli Agreement, being a subsequent law.
DISPOSITION: Petitions are dismissed for lack of merit.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: What does majority mean in Section


18 and in R.A. No 6734?
Does it refer to a majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all
the constituent units, or a majority in each of the constituent units, or
both?

Commission Members of the Islamic Conference and the Secretary General of


the Organization of Islamic Conference.

2) On the Tripoli Agreement1


1

The Tripoli Agreement took effect on December 23, 1976. It is an Agreement


Between the government of the Republic of the Philippines of the Philippines
and the MNLF with the participation of the Quadripartie Ministerial

It provides for "[t]he establishment of Autonomy in the southern Philippines


within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of
the Philippines" and enumerated the thirteen (13) provinces comprising the
"areas of autonomy."

What is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes


approving the organic Act in individual constituent units and not a
double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as
well as in the individual constituent units. The creation of the
autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in
the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent
units and the
proviso underscores this.

Petition: Certiorari, Prohibition


Petitioner: : Cordillera Regional Assembly Member Alexander P.
Ordillo, (Banaue), Ifugao Provincial Board Member Corazon Montinig,
(Mayoyao), Former Vice-Mayor Martin Udan (Banaue), Municipal
Councilors Martin Gano, (Lagawe), and Teodoro Hewe, (Hingyon),
Barangay Councilman Pedro W. Dulag (Lamut); Et al.
Respondent: COMELEC; The Honorable Franklin M. Drilon, Secretary
Of Justice; Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Executive Secretary; The Cabinet
Officer for Regional Development; Hon. Guillermo Carague, Secretary of
Budget and Management; and Hon. Rosalina S. Cajucom, Oic, National
Treasurer
Ponencia: Gutierrez, Jr.

DOCTRINE:
An autonomous region, as laid out in Article X of the Consitution, cannot
be constituted by only one province/city/municipality

FACTS:
1.

ORDILLOS vs COMELEC (1990)

2.

Pursuant to RA 6766 (An Act Providing for an Organic Act for


the Cordillera Autonomous Region), a plebiscite was held
among the provinces of Ifugao, Benguet, Mountain Province,
Abra, Kalinga-Apayao, and the city of Baguio.
The creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) was
approved in only the province of Ifugao.

3.

4.

5.
6.

COMELEC passed a resolution stating that the Organic Act had


been approved and ratified by majority of the votes cast only in
Ifugao. The Secretary of Justice on the same day issued a
memorandum stating that the province of Ifugao, being the
only province which voted favorably then, alone, legally and
validly constitutes the CAR, pursuant to the proviso in Sec 13
(A) of RA 6766.
As a result, Congress passed RA 6861, setting the elections in
the CAR of Ifugao. Prior to the issuance of the COMELEC
Resolution, the Executive Secretary issued a memorandum
granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera
Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly.
Petitioner filed a petition to declare the non-ratification of the
Organic Act of the CAR with the COMELEC, which was merely
noted.
President later issued AO 160 declaring that the Cordillera
Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly, as well as
all other offices created under EO 220 abolished in light of the
ratification of the act.

ISSUES:
1.

WoN the province of Ifugao, being the only one favorably


voting for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region
can, alone, legally and validly constitute such Region

PROVISION:

Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution of the Philippines


o

The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous


region with the assistance and participation of the regional
consultative commission composed of representatives
appointed by the President from a list of nominees from
multi-sectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic
structure of government for the region consisting of the

executive department and legislative assembly, both of


which shall be elective and representative of the constituent
political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for
special courts with personal, family, and property law
jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region.

Article X, Section 19 of the Constitution of the Philippines


o

The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall,


within eighteen months from the time of organization of
both Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.

RULING + RATIO:
1. NO. The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute
the CAR
a. The keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and
geographical areas in Section 15 of Art X of the
Consitution connote that the region is to be made of
more than one constituent unit. Furthermore, Article
III, Sections 1 and 2 of Aa 6766 provide that the CAR is
to be administered by the Cordillera government
consisting of the Regional Government and local
government units. From these sections, it can be
gleaned that Congress never intended that a single
province may constitute the autonomous region.
b. Article V, Sections 1 and 4 of the statute vests the
legislative power in the Cordillera Assembly. If the
position of the respondents is taken, there will be the
awkward situation of legislative power being
concurrently held by the Cordillera Assembly of the

c.

d.
e.

CAR and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ifugao. A


similar argument could also be made with regard to
Article XII Section 10 of the law creating a Regional
Planning and Development Board vis--vis the
Provincial Planning and Development Board.
Allotment of P10,000,000 to the regional government
to initiate operations under Article XXI, Section 13
cannot be construed as funding only one province. The
province of Ifugao consists only 11% of the total
population of the areas contemplated in Article I,
Section 2 of the law.
In sum, the entirety of RA 6766 creating the CAR is
infused with provisions which rule against the sole
province of Ifugao constituting the Region.
Decision in Abbas vs. COMELEC is not applicable to the
case at bar. It established the rule to follow on which
provinces and cities shall comprise the ARMM which
would become the same rule to follow with regard to
the CAR. However, there is nothing in the Abbas
decision which deals with the issue on whether an
autonomous region could exist despite the fact that
only one province or one city is to constitute it

DISPOSITION: Petition GRANTED


-

Resolution 2259 of the COMELEC, insofar as it upholds the


creation of an autonomous region, the February 14, 1990
memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the February 5, 1990
memorandum of the Executive Secretary, AO 160, and RA 6861
are declared null and void
EO 220 is declared to be still in force and effect until properly
repealed or amended

BADUA V CA

Petition: Petition for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of


the Maeng Tribal Court
Petitioner: MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA
Respondent: COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ LIRIO AND
FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR

Ponencia: J, PUNO.

DOCTRINE
Since the CAR did not come into legal existence, the Maeng
Tribal Court was not constituted into an indigenous or special
court under R.A. No. 6766.Hence, the Maeng Tribal Court is
an ordinary tribal court existing under the customs and
traditions of an indigenous cultural community.
Such tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial
system which consists of the Supreme Court and the lower
courts which have been established bylaw. They do not possess
judicial power. Like the pangkats or conciliation panels created
by P.D. No.1508 in the barangays, they are advisory and
conciliatory bodies whose principal
objective is to
bring
together the parties to a dispute and persuade them to make
peace, settle, and compromise.

FACTS:

1. Quema mortgaged his 2 parcels of land to Dra.Valera. He was


able to redeem the land 22 years later, long after the
mortgagee had already died. He allegedly paid the redemption
price to the mortgagees heir
2. On the other hand, Rosa Badua, alleged that the land was sold
to her by Dra. Valera when she was still alive. However, she
could not produce the deed of sale for it is allegedly in the
possession of Vice-Gov. Benesa
3. As Quema was prevented by Rosa from cultivating the land, he
filed a case before the Barangay Council,but it failed to settle
the dispute. Judge Cacho advised Quema to file his complaint in
the provincial level courts. Instead, Quema filed it in the tribal
court of the Maeng Tribe, which decided in favor of Quema
4. The Baduas did not immediately vacate the land. They
subsequently received a "warning order" from azone
commander of the Cordillera People's Liberation Army. The
order stated that, "Non-compliance of thesaid decision of the
Court and any attempt to bringthis case to another Court will
force the CPLA to settle the matter, in which case, you will have
no oneto blame since the case has been settled."
5. Fearful for his life, Leonor Badua went into hiding. Later, his
wife, Rosa, was arrested by the CPLA and detained for 2 days
6. Spouses Baduas filed this petition "for Special and
Extraordinary Reliefs"
7. Respondents alleged that: the Maeng Tribe is acultural
minority group of Tingguians. The tribe is a part of the
Cordillera Bodong Association or Administration on whose
military arm is the CPLA. The tribal court or council of elders is
composed of prominent and respected residents in the locality.
It decides and settles all kinds of disputes more speedily than
regular courts, without intervention of lawyers. The
proceedings and decisions of tribal courts are respected and
obeyed by parties, the municipal and barangay officials and the
people in the locality, ostracism being the penalty for
disobedience of non-compliance with, the decisions of the
council of elders in the areas where the tribal courts operate.

They contend that the SC has no jurisdiction over the tribal


courts because they are not part of the judicial system.
ISSUES:

WON a tribal court of the Cordillera Bodong Administration


can render a valid and executory decision in a land dispute

PROVISION:

Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each
autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the
regional consultative commission composed of representatives
appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of
government for the region consisting of the executive department
and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and
representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall
likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and property
law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities,
and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region.
Section 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall,
within eighteen months from the time of organization of both Houses,
pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras.


DISPOSITION:

An amicable settlement, compromise and arbitration award rendered


by a pangkat, if not seasonably repudiated, has the force and effect of
final judgement of court (Sec 11 of PD 1508) but it can be enforced only
through the local city or municipal court to which the Secretary of
Lupon transmits the compromise settlement or arbitration award upon
expiration
of
period
to
annul
or
repudiate
it
(Sec. 14, P.D. 1508). Similarly, the decisions of a tribal court based on
compromise / arbitration, as provided in P.D. 1508, may been forced or
set aside, in and through the regular courts today.

Reasoning:

Thus, the Cordillera Bodong Administration created under Sec


13 of E.O.220, the indigenous and special courts for the
indigenous cultural communities of the Cordillera region (Sec.
1,
Art.
VII,
RA
6766),
and
the
CPLA, as a regional police force or a regional command of the
AFP (Secs. 2 and 4, Article XVIII of R.A. 6766), do not legally
exist.
Since the CAR did not come into legal existence, the Maeng
Tribal Court was not constituted into an indigenous or special
court under R.A. No. 6766.Hence, the Maeng Tribal Court is
an ordinary tribal court existing under the customs and
traditions of an indigenous cultural community.
Such tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial
system which consists of the Supreme Court and the lower
courts which have been established bylaw. They do not possess
judicial power. Like the pangkats or conciliation panels created
by P.D. No.1508 in the barangays, they are advisory and
conciliatory bodies whose principal
objective is to
bring
together the parties to a dispute and persuade them to make
peace, settle, and compromise.

DISPOSITION: Petition GRANTED

In "Cordillera Regional Assembly Member Alexander P. Ordillo,


et al. vs. COMELEC, the SC en banc, found that in the
plebiscite pursuant to RA 6766, the creation of the Cordillera
Autonomous Region was rejected by all the provinces and city
of the Cordillera region, except Ifugao province, hence, the CAR
did not come to be. Thus Resolution No. 2259 of the COMELEC,
insofar as it upholds the creation of an autonomous region, the
Feb.
14,
1990
memorandumof the Secretary of Justice, the Feb. 5, 1990memo
randum of the Executive Secretary, Admin. Order No. 160, and
RA 6861 were declared null and void while E.O. 220 is declared
to be still in force and effect until properly repealed or
amended."

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