Descartes' Mathematics

First published Mon Nov 28, 2011; substantive revision Fri Dec 11, 2015
To speak of Ren Descartes' contributions to the history of mathematics is to
speak of his La Gomtrie (1637), a short tract included with the
anonymously published Discourse on Method. In La Gomtrie, Descartes
details a groundbreaking program for geometrical problem-solvingwhat he
refers to as a geometrical calculus (calcul gomtrique)that rests on a
distinctive approach to the relationship between algebra and geometry.
Specifically, Descartes offers innovative algebraic techniques for analyzing
geometrical problems, a novel way of understanding the connection
between a curve's construction and its algebraic equation, and an algebraic
classification of curves that is based on the degree of the equations used to
represent these curves.

The problem-solving techniques and mathematical results that Descartes

presents in La Gomtrie were both novel and incredibly influential on the
practice of early modern mathematics. However, we can also locate in La
Gomtrie a philosophical significance: The blending of algebra and
geometry and the peculiar approach to the geometrical status of curves
which characterize Descartes' mathematical program stand as notable
contributions to the on-going philosophical debates that surrounded early
modern mathematical practice. By drawing on the context in which
Descartes' mathematical researches took place, and examining the main
questions and issues that shaped Descartes' early mathematical researches,
both the historical and philosophical significance of Books One and Two of La
Gomtrie will be highlighted in what follows.[1]

1. The Background to Descartes' Mathematical Researches

1.1 The Construction of Curves and the Solution to Geometrical Problems
1.2 Geometrical Analysis and Algebra
2. Descartes' Early Mathematical Researches (ca. 16161629)
2.1 Texts and sources
2.2 Problems and Proposals
3. La Gomtrie (1637)
3.1 Book One: Descartes' Geometrical Analysis
3.2 Book Two: The Classification of Curves and Geometrical Synthesis
3.3 The Tensions and Limitations of Descartes' Geometrical Calculus
Bibliography
Academic Tools
Other Internet Resources

Related Entries
1. The Background to Descartes' Mathematical Researches
When Descartes' mathematical researches commenced in the early
seventeenth century, mathematicians were wrestling with questions
concerning the appropriate methods for geometrical proof and, in particular,
the criteria for identifying curves that met the exact and rigorous standards
of geometry and that could thus be used in geometrical problem-solving.
These issues were given an added sense of urgency for practicing
mathematicians when, in 1588, Commandino's Latin translation of Pappus's
Collection (early fourth century CE) was published. In the Collection Pappus
appeals to the ancient practice of geometry as he offers normative claims
about how geometrical problems ought to be solved. Early modern readers
gave special attention to Pappus's proposals concerning (1) how a
mathematician should construct the curves used in geometrical proof, and
(2) how a geometer should apply the methods of analysis and synthesis in
geometrical problem-solving. The construction of curves will be treated in
1.1 and analysis and synthesis in section 1.2 below.

1.1 The Construction of Curves and the Solution to Geometrical Problems

Pappus's claims regarding the proper methods for constructing geometrical
curves are couched in terms of the ancient classification of geometrical
problems, which he famously describes in Book III of the Collection:

The ancients stated that there are three kinds of geometrical problems, and
that some are called plane, others solid, and others line-like; and those that
can be solved by straight lines and the circumference of a circle are rightly
called plane because the lines by means of which these problems are solved
have their origin in the plane. But such problems that must be solved by
assuming one or more conic sections in the construction, are called solid
because for their construction it is necessary to use the surfaces of solid
figures, namely cones. There remains a third kind that is called line-like. For
in their construction other lines than the ones just mentioned are assumed,
having an inconstant and changeable origin, such as spirals, and the curves
that the Greeks call tetragonizousas [square-making], and which we call
quandrantes, and conchoids, and cissoids, which have many amazing
properties (Pappus 1588, III, 7; translation from Bos 2001, 38).

We notice in the above remarks that Pappus bases his classification of

geometrical problems on the construction of the curves necessary for the
solution of a problem: If a problem is solved by a curve constructible by
straightedge and compass, it is planar; if a problem is solved by a curve
constructible by conic section, it is solid; and if a problem is solved by a
curve that requires a more complicated constructionthat has an
inconstant and changeable origin, it is line-like. Though a seemingly
straightforward directive of how to classify geometrical problems, there

remained an ambiguity in Pappus's text about whether the so-called solid

and line-like problemsproblems that required the construction of conics
and more complicated curves, such as the spiralwere in fact solvable by
genuinely geometrical methods. That is, there was an ambiguity, and thus,
an open question for early modern mathematicians, about whether
problems that could not be solved by straightedge and compass
construction met the rigorous standards of geometry. (For the special status
of constructions by straightedge and compass in Greek mathematics, see
Heath (1921) and Knorr (1986). For helpful overviews of the historical
development of Greek mathematics, see classics such as Merzbach and
Boyer (2011) and volume 1 of Kline (1972).)

A few examples will help clarify what is at stake here. The problem of
bisecting a given angle is counted among planar problems, because, as
detailed by Euclid in Elements I.9, to construct the line segment that divides
a given angle into two equal parts, we construct (by compass) three circles
of equal radius, and then (by straightedge) join the vertex of the angle with
the point at which the circles intersect (Euclid 1956, Volume I, 264265).
Notice here that, to generate the solution, curves are used to construct a
point that gives the solution to the problem: by constructing the circles, we
identify a point that allows us to bisect the curve. (When dealing with locus
problems, such as the Pappus problem, the curves that are constructed are
themselves the solution to the problem. See section 3 below.) The problem
of trisecting an angle, on the other hand, was considered a line-like problem,
because its solution required the construction of curves, such as the spiral,
which were not constructible by straightedge and compass. Perhaps most
famous among line-like problems is that of squaring the circle; for those who
deemed this problem solvable, the solution required the construction of a
curve such as the quadratrix, a curve that was proposed by the ancients in
order to solve this very problem (which is how the curve received its name).
Certainly, the generation of such curves could be described; Archimedes
famously describes the generation of the spiral in Definition 1 of his Spirals
and Pappus describes the generation of the quadratrix in Book IV of the
Collection. However, these descriptions were considered more
complicated precisely because they go beyond the intersection of curves
that are generated by straightedge and compass construction. For instance,
according to Archimedes, the spiral is generated by uniformly moving a line
segment around a given point while tracing the path of a point that itself
moves uniformly along the line segment. And, according to Pappus, the
quadratrix is generated by the uniform motions of two line segments, where
one segment moves around the center of a given circle and the other moves
through a quadrant of the circle. (Cf. Bos 2001, 4042 for the details of both
these constructions.) In a similar vein, the construction of conics was
considered more complicated: One of the accepted techniques for
constructing a conic required cutting a cone in a specified way, which again,
went beyond the consideration of intersecting curves that were
constructible by straightedge and compass.

In the Collection, Pappus does not offer a firm verdict on whether the conics
and more complicated curves meet the rigorous standards of geometrical
construction and hence, on whether they are admissible in the domain of
geometry. In the case of the conics, he relies on Apollonius's commentary
and reports the usefulness of these curves for the synthesis (or proofs) of
some problems (Pappus, 116). However, to claim a curve useful is quite
different from claiming it can be constructed by properly geometrical
methods (as we'll see more clearly below). Moreover, in the case of the
quadratrix, Pappus sets out the description of the curve in Book IV of the
Collection, and then immediately proceeds to identify the common
objections to the curve's description, e.g., that there is a petitio principii in
the very definition of the curve, without commenting on whether these
objections can be overcome. Thus, although it was known by the ancients
that conics and other complicated curves could be used to solve outstanding
problems, it was not clear to early modern mathematicians whether the
ancients considered these solutions genuinely geometrical. In other words, it
was not clear from Pappus's Collection whether these curves were
admissible in geometrical problem-solving and therefore, whether solid
problems (such as identifying the mean proportionals between given line
segments) or line-like problems (such as trisecting an angle and squaring
the circle) had genuine geometrical solutions.

Consequently, after the publication of Commandino's translation of the

Collection, early modern mathematicians gave added attention to the
questions of whether and why these curves should be used in geometrical
problem-solving. The spiral and quadratrix were prominent in such
discussions, because, as noted above, they could be used to address some
of the more famous outstanding geometrical problems, namely, angle
trisection and squaring the circle. [2] For instance, in his second and
expanded (1589) edition of Euclid's Elements (which was first published in
1574) as well as in his Geometria practica (1604), Christoph Clavius
discusses the status of the quadratrix. Accepting the objections to the
description of the quadratrix detailed by Pappus in the Collection, Clavius
supplies what he deems a truly geometrical construction of the curve that
would legitimize its use in geometrical problem-solving, and in solving the
problem of squaring the circle in particular. His construction is a pointwise
one: We begin with a quadrant of a circle (as in Pappus's description) but
rather than relying on the intersection of uniformly moving segments to
describe the curve, Clavius proceeds by first identifying the points of
intersection between segments that bisect the quadrant and segments that
bisect the arc of the quadrant. That is, we identify the several intersecting
points of segments which are constructible by straightedge and compass,
and then, to generate the quadratrix, we connect the (arbitrarily many)
intersecting points, which are evenly spaced along the sought after curve.
Therefore, to construct the quadratrix according to Clavius's method, we still
go beyond basic straightedge and compass constructions (connecting the
points in this case cannot be done by straightedge, as in the case of
bisection), but one need not consider the simultaneous motions of lines as
Pappus's construction requires. (See Bos 2001, 161162 for Clavius's

construction of the quadratrix and compare with Pappus's construction on

Bos 2001, 4042. For Descartes' assessment of Clavius's pointwise
construction see section 3.3 below.)

According to Clavius's commentary of 1589, this pointwise construction of

the quadratrix was an improvement over that offered by Pappus, because it
was more accurate: Since the pointwise construction allowed one to identify
arbitrarily many points along the curve, one could trace the quadratrix with
greater precision than if one had to consider the intersection of two moving
lines. To support his case, Clavius relates his pointwise construction of the
quadratrix with the pointwise construction of conics proposed by the great
geometer Apollonius and claims that unless someone wants to reject as
useless and ungeometrical the whole doctrine of conic sections proposed
by Apollonius, one is forced to accept our present description of the
[quadratrix] as entirely geometrical (cited in Bos 2001, 163). However, in
his later Geometria practica (1604), Clavius tempers his assessment of both
the quadratrix and the conics. He maintains that these more complicated
curves could be constructed by pointwise methods that offered greater
precision, but the curves thus generated were no longer presented as
absolutely geometrical. Instead, they were presented as more accurate,
easier, and geometrical in a certain way (Bos 2001, 1645).

In his Supplement of geometry (1593), Franois Vite also addresses the

outstanding problems of geometry which were solvable by curves that could
not constructed by straightedge and compass. He claims that at least some
such problems could be solved by properly geometrically means by adopting
as his postulate that the neusis problem could be solved. That is, he
assumed that given two lines, a point O, and a segment a, it was possible to
draw a straight line through O intersecting the two lines in points A and B
such that AB = a (Bos 2001, 167168). In the Supplement, Vite shows that
once we accept as a fundamental geometrical postulate that the neusis
problem is solvable, then we can, by legitimately geometrical means, solve
the problems of trisecting a given angle and of constructing the two mean
proportional between two given line segments. Specifically and importantly,
we generate these solutions without having to rely on the construction of
conics or higher-order curves, such as the spiral or quadratrix (Bos 2001,
168).

The neusis postulate was a powerful tool in Vite's problem-solving arsenal:

By assuming that the neusis problem could be solved, he expanded the
domain of acceptable geometrical constructions beyond straightedge and
compass. However, questions remained about the acceptability of this
assumption as a postulate, since Vite does not detail the construction of
the neusis problem but simply claims that the neusis postulate should not
be difficult for his readers to accept. In making this assumption, he was
taking a significant departure from ancient geometers, for whom the neusis
problem could only be solved by curves that were not constructible by

straightedge and compass. For instance, Pappus rendered the construction

of the neusis a solid problem and solved it by means of conics in Book IV of
the Collection, and Nicomedes rendered the construction of the neusis a
line-like problem and devised the cissoid for its solution. (See Bos 2001, 53
54 for Pappus's solution and 3033 for Nicomedes' solution. See also Pappus
1986, 112114 for the classification of the neusis as a sold problem.)

Nonetheless, according to Vite, if a problem could not be solved by neusis,

then questions of legitimacy remained. For instance, neither the spiral nor
the quadratrixcurves used to square the circle by Archimedes and Pappus,
respectivelycould be constructed in the same obvious and not difficult
way as the neusis. Vite appears to grant that the pointwise construction of
the quadratrix, such as that presented by Clavius, was in fact more precise
than other constructions of the curve, but, Vite claims, this greater
precision does not legitimize its status as genuinely geometrical. Indeed,
such precise descriptions relied on instruments and, thus, on the mechanical
arts and, as such, were not geometrical. Moreover, Vite claimed that, in
general, curves not constructed by the intersection of curves, such as the
Archimedean spiral, were not described in the way of true knowledge (Bos
2001, 177). Therefore, just as the quadratrix, these curves were not
legitimately geometrical, which left the problem of squaring the circle an
open problem for Vite.

1.2 Geometrical Analysis and Algebra

Vite's program of geometrical problem-solving had an added significance:
By adopting as his postulate that the neusis problem could be solved, Vite
was able to link geometrical construction with his algebraic analysis of
geometrical problems and show that cubic equations had a genuinely
geometrical solution (i.e., that the roots of cubic equations could be
constructed by consideration of intersecting geometrical curves). Vite's
program nicely illustrates the merging of algebra with geometrical problemsolving in early modern mathematics, and moreover, nicely illustrates an
influential way of interpreting Pappus's claims in the Collection regarding
how a mathematician should apply the methods of analysis and synthesis in
geometrical problem-solving.

As noted above, Pappus's remarks concerning the two-fold method of

analysis (resolutio) and synthesis (compositio) in the Collection received a
great deal of attention from early modern readers. And as with his remarks
concerning the construction of geometrical curves, there were ambiguities
in his discussion, which motivated varying interpretations of the method and
its application to geometrical problems. Here is a portion of what Pappus
claims of analysis and synthesis in Book VII of the Collection:

Now analysis is the path from what one is seeking, as if it were established,
by way of its consequences, to something that is established by synthesis.
That is to say, in analysis we assume what is sought as if it has been
achieved, and look for the thing from which it follows, and again what comes
before that, until by regressing in this way we come upon some one of the
things that are already known, or that occupy the rank of a first principle.
We call this kind of method analysis, as if to say anapalin lysis (reduction
backward). In synthesis, by reversal, we assume what was obtained last in
the analysis to have been achieved already, and, setting now in natural
order, as precedents, what before were following, and fitting them to each
other, we attain the end of the construction of what was sought. This is what
we call synthesis (Pappus, 8283).

Some of the directives Pappus offers here seem straightforward. The

mathematician begins by assuming what is sought after as if it has been
achieved until, through analysis, she reaches something that is already
known. Then, the mathematician reverses the steps, and through synthesis,
sets out in natural order the deduction leading from what is known to
what is sought after. However, there are ambiguities in Pappus's discussion.
Perhaps most importantly, it is not clear how reversing the steps of analysis
could offer a proof, or synthesis, of a stated problem, since the deductions
of analysis rely on conditionals (if x, then y) whereas a reversal would
require biconditionals (x iff y) to achieve synthesis (see Guicciardini 2009,
3138 for further interpretative problems surrounding Pappus's remarks; for
more on analysis and synthesis in the Renaissance see the classic Hintikka
and Remes 1974, the essays in Otte and Panza 1997, and Panza 2007).
Ambiguities notwithstanding, for Vite and other early modern
mathematicians there was one feature of the discussion that was incredibly
important: Pappus makes clear that the ancients had a method of analysis
at their disposal, and many early modern mathematicians attempted to
align this method from antiquity with the algebraic methods of geometrical
analysis that they were using.

Prior to the end of the sixteenth century, mathematicians had already used
algebra in the analysis of geometrical problems, but the program Vite
details marks a significant step forward. On the one hand, in his Isagoge
[Introduction to the analytic art] of 1591, which was presented as part of a
larger project to restore ancient analysis (entitled Book of the restored
mathematical analysis or the new algebra), Vite introduces a notation that
allowed him to treat magnitudes in a general way. The literal symbols he
uses (consonants and vowels depending on whether the variable in the
equation was unknown or indeterminate, respectively) represent
magnitudes generally and do not specify whether they are arithmetical
magnitudes (numbers) or geometrical magnitudes (such as line segments or
angles). He can thus represent arithmetic operations as applied to
magnitudes in general. For instance, A + B represents the addition of two
magnitudes and does not specify whether A and B are numbers (in which
case the addition represents a process of counting) or geometrical objects

(in which case the addition represents the combination of two line
segments) (see Vite 1591, 1127; for the significance of Vite's new
algebra for early modern mathematics see Bos 2001, Chp. 8; Mahoney
1973, Chp. 2; and Pycior 1997, Chp. 1).

On the other hand, the algebraic, symbolic analysis of geometrical problems

that Vite proposes was offered as the first step in a three-step process that
could render a geometrical solution. The three stages were: (1) zetetics,
which involved the algebraic analysis (or elaboration) of a problem; (2)
poristics, which clarified the relations between magnitudes by appeal to the
theory of proportions (see Giusti 1992 on the importance of proportion
theory for Vite's mathematics); and (3) exegetics, which offered the
genuine geometrical solution (or proof) of the problem. To better understand
the connection between the stages of zetetics and exegetics, which roughly
correspond to the ancient stages of analysis and synthesis, consider the
problem of identifying two mean proportionals. Geometrically, the problem
is as follows:

Given line segments a and b, find x and y such that a : x :: x : y :: y : b, or

put differently, such that

x
y

y
b

In the zetetic (analytic) stage of Vite's analysis, we follow Pappus's

directive to treat what is sought as if it has been achieved precisely by
naming the unknowns by variables. Then, by assuming the equivalence
between proportions (as Vite does), we can solve for the variables x and y
and establish that x and y have the following relationship to a and b:

x2 = ay and
y2 = xb.
Solving (1) for y, we have y = x2/a, and by substitution into (2), we get y2 =
(x2/a)2 = x4/a2 = xb, which yields:

x3 = a2b.
Solving (2) for x, we have x = y2/b, and by substitution into (1), we get x2 =
(y2/b)2 = y4/b2 = ay, which yields:

y3 = ab2.

Algebraically, then, the problem of finding two mean proportional can be

elaborated as follows:

Given (magnitudes) a and b, the problem is to find (magnitudes) x and y

such that x3 = a2b and y3 = ab2.

In this zetetic stage of analysis, the geometrical problem is transformed into

the algebraic problem of solving a standard-form cubic equation (i.e., a
cubic equation that does not include a quadratic term). However, for Vite,
the genuine solution to the problem must be supplied in the stage of
exegetics, which offers the geometrical construction and thus the synthesis,
or proof.[3] And it is here that the neusis postulate supplies the guarantee
that such a solution can be found: By assuming the neusis problem solved,
we can construct the curve that satisfies the two cubic equations above
(i.e., we can construct the roots of the equations) and thereby construct the
sought after mean proportionals. In other words, there was an assumed
equivalence in Vite's program between solving an algebraic problem that
required identifying the roots of specified cubic equations and solving a
geometrical problem that required the construction of a curve. We also see
this in his treatment of trisecting an angle: To solve the angle-trisection
problem is to solve two standard-form cubic equations, which Vite reveals
in his algebraic elaboration of the geometrical problem (cf. Bos 2001, 173
176). In fact, assuming the neusis postulate, we can solve any standardform cubic equation, and since it was already known at the time that all
fourth-degree equations are reducible to standard-form cubic equations,
what Vite supplied with his marriage of algebra and geometry in his 1594
Supplement was a program that solved all line-like problems that could be
elaborated in terms of cubic and quartic equations.

As powerful as Vite's program was, questions remained for practicing

mathematicians. Should we, as Vite urged, accept the neusis postulate as
not difficult and thus as a foundational construction principle for
geometry? And should we follow Vite in claiming that other curves that had
significant problem-solving power in geometrysuch as the spiral and
quadratrixwere not legitimately geometrical because they could not be
constructed by neusis? Moreover, there were questions about the
connection Vite forged between algebra and geometry. For Descartes in
particular, there were questions of whether there was a deeper, more
fundamental connection that could be forged between the solutions of
algebraic problems that were expressed in terms of equations and the
solutions of geometrical problems that required the construction curves.
However, these questions did not come into full relief for Descartes until the
early 1630s, after more than a decade of studying problems in both
geometry and algebra.

2. Descartes' Early Mathematical Researches (ca. 16161629)

2.1 Texts and sources

Based on the autobiographical narrative included in Part One of the
Discourse on Method (1637), where Descartes describes what he learned
when he was at one of the most famous schools in Europe (AT VI, 5; CSM I,
113), it is generally agreed that Descartes' initial study of mathematics
commenced when he was a student at La Fleche. He reports in the
Discourse that, when we he was younger, his mathematical studies included
some geometrical analysis and algebra (AT VI, 17; CSM I, 119), and he also
mentions that he delighted in mathematics, because of the certainty and
self-evidence of its reasonings (AT VI, 7; CSM I, 114). However, no specific
texts or mathematical problems are mentioned in the 1637 autobiographical
sketch. Thus, we rely on remarks made in correspondence for the more
specific details of Descartes' study of mathematics at La Fleche, and these
remarks strongly suggest that Clavius was a key figure in Descartes' earliest
(perhaps even initial) study of mathematics. For instance, in a letter of
March 1646 written by John Pell to Charles Cavendish, we have good reason
to believe that ca. 1616, while a student at La Fleche, Descartes read
Clavius's Algebra (1608). Reporting on his meeting with Descartes in
Amsterdam earlier that same year, Pell writes in particular that [Descartes]
says he had no other instructor for Algebra than ye reading of Clavy Algebra
above 30 years ago (cited in Sasaki 2003, 47; cf. AT IV, 729730 and Sasaki
2003, 4547 for other relevant portions of that letter). Moreover, in a 13
November 1629 letter written to Mersenne, Descartes refers to the second
(1589) edition of Clavius's annotated version of Euclid's Elements, in which,
as noted above, Clavius presents his pointwise construction of the
quadratrix and uses the curve to solve the problem of squaring the circle (AT
I, 7071; the portion of the letter that references Clavius is translated in
Sasaki (2003), 47). And following Sasaki (2003), it is reasonable to conclude
that Descartes was at least aware of Clavius' textbook Geometria practica
(1604), which was included as part of the mathematics curriculum of La
Fleche. (See Sasaki 2003, Chapter Two on Clavius' influence on and inclusion
in the mathematics curriculum of Jesuit schools in the early 1600s.)

Although our evidence of the mathematics that Descartes studied at La

Fleche is sketchy, we are quite certain that Descartes' entrance into the
debates of early modern mathematics began in earnest when he met Isaac
Beeckman in Breda, Holland in 1618. Among other things, Beeckman and
Descartes explored the fruitfulness of applying mathematics to natural
philosophy and discussed issues pertaining to physico-mathematics. It is in
this period that Descartes composed his Compendium musicae for
Beeckman, a text in which he addresses the application of mathematics to
music and also famously discusses the law of free fall. (Compare Koyr
1939, 99128 and Schuster 1977, 7293 on Descartes' treatment of free fall
in this early text. For discussion of Descartes' pursuit of causal knowledge in
his physico-mathematical researches in optics during this period, see
Schuster 2012.)

Beyond having a common interest in applied mathematics, Beeckman and

Descartes also discussed problems of pure mathematics, both in geometry
and in algebra, and Descartes' interest in such problems extended to 1628
1629, when he returned to Holland to meet Beeckman after his travels
through Germany, France, and Italy. Our understanding of what Descartes
accomplished in pure mathematics during this eleven year period relies on
the following sources:

Five letters written to Beeckman in 1619, which Beeckman transcribed in his

Journal. Beeckman's Journal was recovered in 1905 and published in 4
volumes by DeWaard some 35 years later, hereafter Beeckman (1604
1634). The excerpts of these letters that are relevant to Descartes'
mathematics are included in AT X. (For more details on how these letters
became available to us, see Sasaki 2003, 9596.)
The Cogitationes privatae (Private Reflections), which dates from ca. 1619
1620 and which Leibniz copied in 1676. This text is included in AT X. (For
more details on how this text became available to us, see Bos 2001, 237,
Note 17 and Sasaki 2003, 109.)
The Progymnasmata de solidorum elementis, a geometry text which dates
from around 1623 and which Leibniz partially copied in 1676. It has been
translated into English by Pasquale Joseph Federico (1982) and into French
by Pierre Costabel (1987).
A specimen of general algebra, which Descartes gave to Beeckman after he
returned to Holland in 1628. It was transcribed by Beeckman in his Journal
under the title Algebra Des Cartes specimen quoddam and can be found in
Volume III of Beeckman (16041634).
Some texts on algebra that were given to Beeckman in early 1629. These
were transcribed by Beeckman in his Journal in February 1629 and can be
found in Volume IV of Beeckman (16041634).
Several letters written to Mersenne in the 1630s in which Descartes refers to
some of the mathematical researches he completed during the 16181629
period.
A look at some of the problems and proposals found in these mathematical
works will help situate Descartes in his early modern mathematical context
and will also help to highlight the results from this period that have an
important connection to what is found in the opening books of the 1637 La
Gomtrie. To make these connections clear, the brief narrative below
emphasizes the proposals Descartes made during the 16181629 period
concerning (1) the criteria for geometrical curves and legitimately
geometrical constructions, and (2) the relationship between algebra and
geometry.

2.2 Problems and Proposals

The most famous letter written to Beeckman in 1619 dates from 26 March of
that year. In this letter Descartes announces his plan to expound an
entirely new science [scientia penitus nova], by which all problems that can
be posed, concerning any kind of quantity, continuous or discrete, can be
generally solved (AT X, 156). As he elaborates on how this new science will
proceed, Descartes clarifies that his solutions to the problems of discrete
and continuous quantitiesthat is, of arithmetic and geometry, respectively
will vary depending on the nature of the problem at hand. As he puts it,

[In this new science] each problem will be solved according to its own nature
as for example, in arithmetic some questions are resolved by rational
numbers, others only by surd [irrational] numbers, and others finally can be
imagined but not solved. So also I hope to show for continuous quantities
that some problems can be solved by straight lines and circles alone; others
only by other curved lines, which, however, result from a single motion and
can therefore be drawn with new types of compasses, which are no less
exact and geometrical, I think, than the common ones used to draw circles;
and finally others that can be solved by curved lines generated by diverse
motions not subordinated to one another, which curves are certainly only
imaginary such as the rather well-known quadratrix. I cannot imagine
anything that could not be solved by such lines at least, though I hope to
show which questions can be solved in this or that way and not any other,
so that almost nothing will remain to be found in geometry. It is, of course,
an infinite task, not for one man only. Incredibly ambitious; but I have seen
some light through the dark chaos of the science, by the help of which I
think all the thickest darkness can be dispelled (AT X, 156158; CSMK 23;
translation from Sasaki 2003, 102).

We notice in Descartes' remarks concerning geometry in particular that the

entirely new science he proposes will provide an exhaustive classification
for problem-solving, where each of his three classes is determined by the
curves needed for solution. This suggests an important overlap between
Descartes' three classes of geometrical problems and Pappus's three
classes, which, recall, were separated based on the types of curves required
for solution: Planar problems are solvable by straightedge and compass,
solid problems by conics, and line-like problems by more complicated curves
that have an inconstant and changeable origin. However, there is also a
significant difference between their classifications insofar as Descartes
strongly suggests that those problems that require imaginary curves for
their solution do not have a legitimately geometrical solution. Namely, just
as some problems of arithmetic can be imagined but not be solved, so too
in geometry, there is a class of problems that require curves that are
certainly only imaginary, i.e., curves generated by diverse motions, and
thus that are not geometrical in a proper sense. In this respect, Descartes is
moving from Pappus's descriptive classification to a normative one that
separates geometrical curves from non-geometrical curves, and thereby
distinguishes problems that have a legitimate geometrical solution from
those that do not. Just as importantly, we see in Descartes' letter his

attempt to expand the scope of legitimate geometrical constructions beyond

straightedge and compass by appealing to the motions needed to construct
a curve. Specifically, as we see in the passage above, Descartes relies on
the single motions of his new types of compasses, which [he says] are no
less exact and geometricalthan the common ones used to draw circles in
order to mark out a new class of problems that have legitimate geometrical
solutions.

In his 26 March 1619 letter to Beeckman, Descartes does not elaborate on

the new types of compasses to which he refers; he simply reports to
Beeckman in the early portions of the letter that he has, in a short time,
discovered four conspicuous and entirely new demonstrations with the help
of my compasses (AT X, 154). Fortunately, more details about these
compasses and Descartes' demonstrations are included in Cogitationes
privatae, or Private Reflections (ca. 16191620), a text in which Descartes
applies three different new compasses (often referred to by commentators
as proportional compasses) to the problems of (1) dividing a given angle
into any number of equal parts, (2) constructing the roots of three types of
cubic equations, and (3) describing a conic section. In the first two cases, as
Descartes treats the angular section and mean proportional problems, the
compasses on which he relies are used to generate a curve that will solve
the problem at hand.

Figure 1
Figure 1: As described in the text, four rulers (OA, OB, OC, OD),
which are hinged at point O with OA horizontal and OD at about 60 degrees,
the others between in order. Four rods of equal length a (HJ, FJ, GI, EI) are
attached to the rulers such that E, F, G, and H are a distance a from O on
rulers (OA, OB, OC, OD) respectively.Figure 2
Figure 2: Same as figure 1 except a curve, KLM, starting at K on ruler OA,
intersecting J on ruler OC and ending at M beyond ruler OD.
For instance, to solve the angular section problem, Descartes begins by
presenting an instrument that includes four rulers (OA, OB, OC, OD), which
are hinged at point O (figure 1). We then take four rods (HJ, FJ, GI, EI), which
are of equal length a, and attach them to the arms of the instrument such
that they are a distance a from O and are pair-wise hinged at points J and I.
Leaving OA stationary, we now move OD so as to vary the measure of angle
DOA, and following the path of point J, we generate the curve KLM (figure 2).
As Descartes has it, we can construct the curve KLM on any given angle by
appeal to the instrument described above, because the angle we are
trisecting plays no role in the construction of KLM. And once the curve KLM
is constructed, the given angle can be trisected by means of some basic
constructions with straight lines and circles. In this respect, the curve KLM
is, for Descartes, the means for solving the angle trisection problem, and
moreover, his treatment suggests that the construction can be generalized
further so that, by means of his new compass, an angle can also be

divided into 4, 5, or more equal parts. (I borrow my treatment of this

construction from Domski 2009, 121, which is itself indebted to the
presentation in Bos 2001, 237239.)

Figure 3: Mesolabe
Figure 3: demonstration of a mesolabe. The mesolabe consists of a set of
rulers. rulers YX and YZ are hinged at Y to form an adjustable angle XYZ.
Ruler BC is perpendicular to YX and fixed at point B, C is on YZ and movable.
Ruler CD is perpendicular to YZ and intersects YX at movable point D. DE is
perpendicular to YX and intersect YZ at movable point E.
EF is
perpendicular to YZ and intersects YX at movable point F.
FG is
perpendicular to YX and intersects YZ at movable point G.
GH is
perpendicular to YZ and intersects YX at movable point H. Points D, F, and H
trace out dotted lines. As the XYZ angle closes, all three points converge on
A.

A similar approach is taken by Descartes when he treats the problem of

constructing mean proportionals, where in this case, he appeals to his
famous mesolabe compass, an instrument that is used in Book Three of the
La Gomtrie to solve the same problem. As in 1637, this compass is used
to construct curves (the dotted lines in figure 3) that allow us to identify the
mean proportionals between any number of given line segments. And as
Vite before him, in the Private Reflections Descartes uses this construction
of mean proportionals to identify the roots of standard-form cubic equations
(see Bos 2001, 24045).

Notice that these constructions illustrate the sort of single motion

constructions to which Descartes refers in his 26 March 1619 letter to
Beeckman: His new compasses generate curves by the single motion of a
designated arm of the compass, and thus, the curves generated in this
manner meet the standard of geometrical intelligibilitythe standard by
which to distinguish geometrical from imaginary curvesthat is alluded to in
the brief outline of the entirely new science that Descartes envisions. That
such motions are completed by instruments does not threaten the
constructed curve's geometrical status. (As we saw above, Vite had leveled
this charge against the instrumental, pointwise constructions provided by
Clavius.) And moreover, we already notice in the mathematical research of
1619 Descartes' focus on the intelligibility of motions as a standard for
identifying legitimately geometrical curves. This theme will reemerge in
Book Two of La Gomtrie.

In addition, we find in Descartes' early work an interest in the relationship

between algebra and geometry that will be crucial to the program of
geometrical analysis presented in Book One of La Gomtrie, where at this
early stage of his research, Descartes, like his contemporaries, is exploring

the application of geometry to algebraic problems. For instance, as pointed

out above, Descartes uses the construction of mean proportionals to solve
algebraic equations in the Private Reflections, and in the same text he also
shows an interest in the geometrical representation of numbers and of
arithmetical operations. The same interest appears again in the later
Progymnasmata de solidorum elementis excertpa ex manuscript Cartesii
(Preliminary exercises on the elements of solids extracted from a manuscript
of Descartes, ca. 1623), a text in which Descartes offers a geometrical
representation of numbers and of four of the five basic arithmetical
operations (the four operations he treats are addition, subtraction,
multiplication, and division).

Though there is some dispute among commentators about Descartes' level

of expertise in algebra during this early 16191623 period (compare Bos
2001, 245 with Sasaki 2003, 126), texts from 16281629 show Descartes
making great advances in algebra in a relatively small amount of time. Two
textual sources are of particular interest: (1) The specimen of algebra given
to and transcribed by Beeckman in 1628 upon Descartes' return to Holland,
and (2) a text on the construction of roots for cubic and quartic equations
given to Beeckman in early 1629.[4] In the Specimen, Descartes presents a
rather basic problem-solving program (or schematism) for algebra that relies
on two-dimensional figures (lines and surfaces). The texts given to
Beeckman several months later, which Descartes composed while in
Holland, show a great advance over what's found in the Specimen, since in
these texts he appeals to conic sections (or solids) in his problem-solving
regime. For instance, Descartes constructs two mean proportionals by the
intersection of circle and parabola (a method he had discovered around
1625 according to Bos 2001, 255). More impressively, in a different text
from this same period, Descartes offers a method for constructing all solid
problems, i.e., for solving all third- and fourth-degree equations.

While some of the results from this period are connected with the problemsolving program presented in the 1637 La Gomtrie, Rabouin (2010) points
out that it is still not clear whether Descartes discovered his methods for
solution using the techniques that are applied in 1637 (Rabouin 2010, 456).
As such, Rabouin urges us to resist the somewhat standard reading of
Descartes' early mathematical works according to which there is a linear
and teleological progression from the 1619 pronouncement of an entirely
new science to the groundbreaking program of La Gomtrie (a reading
found, for instance, in Sasaki 2003, especially 156176). According to
Rabouin, it is not until the early 1630s, when Descartes engages with the
Pappus problemwhat Bos also considers the crucial catalyst of
Descartes' mature mathematical researches (Bos 2001, 283)that he
returns to his 1619 project to craft a new science of geometry that is
grounded on a new classification of curves and problems. Following Rabouin,
it is at this point of his mathematical career that Descartes more clearly
sees just how crucial the interplay of algebraic equations and geometry
could be for a general program of geometrical problem-solving.

3. La Gomtrie (1637)
In late 1631, the Dutch mathematician Golius urged Descartes to consider
the solution to the Pappus problem. Unlike the geometrical problems that
occupied Descartes' early researches, the Pappus problem is a locus
problem, i.e., a problem whose solution requires constructing a curvethe
Pappus curve according to Bos's terminologythat includes all the points
that satisfy the relationship stated in the problem. Generally speaking, the
Pappus Problem begins with a given number of lines, a given number of
angles, a given ratio, and a given segment, and the task is identify a curve
such that all the points on the curve satisfy a specified relation to the given
ratio. For instance, in the most basic two-line Pappus Problem (figure 4), we
are given two lines (L1, L2), two angles (1, 2), and a ratio . We designate
d1 to be the oblique distance between a point P and L1 such that P creates
1 with L1, and we designate d2 to be the oblique distance between a point
P in the plane and L2 such that P creates 2 with L2. The problem is to find
all points P such that d1 : d2 = . In this case, all the sought after points P
will lie along two straight lines, one line to the right of L1 and the other to
the left of L1. (See figure 5 for Bos's presentation of the general problem.)

Figure 4: A Two line Pappus problem

Figure 4: A Two-line Pappus problem. Lines L1 (from upper left to lower left)
and L2 (almost horizontal) intersect. Point P is in the first quadrant and a
line from L1 to Point P is distance d1 and a line from L2 to Point P is distance
d2. The interior angles are 1 and 2.

In the Collection, Pappus presents a solution to the three and four line
versions of the problem (i.e., the versions of the problem in which we begin
with three or four given lines and angles) as well as Apollonius's solution to
the six-line case, which relies on his theory of conics and the transformation
of areas to construct the locus of points (Pappus, 118123). However,
Pappus does not treat the general (n-line) case, and this is the advance of
the solution Descartes achieves in 1632, a solution published in La
Gomtrie, where he claims that, unlike the ancients, he has found a
method to successfully determine, describe, [and] explain the nature of the
line required when the question [of the Pappus Problem] involves a greater
number of lines (G, 22). And as Descartes reports to Mersenne in 1632, he
could not have found his general solution without the help of algebra:

I must admit that I took five or six weeks to find the solution [to the Pappus
Problem]; and if anyone else discovers it, I will not believe that he is
ignorant of algebra (To Mersenne 5 April 1632; AT I, 244; CSMK, 37).

Figure 5: The General Pappus Problem (from Bos 2001,Fig. 19.1, 273)

Figure 5: horizontal Line L1 intersecting non-parallel lines L2, L3, L4

(converging to a non-visible point above the figure). From point P (below L1
and between L3 and L4 in the figure) lines intersect L1 at point A and and 1
and distance d1=x; L4 at angle 4 and distance d4, L3 at angle 3 and
distance d3 and L2 at angle 2 and distance d2. Point O is the intersection
of L3 and L1 and the distance OA is x.

Given: a Line Li in the plane, n angles i, a ratio , a line segment a. For an

point P in plane, let d be the oblique distance between P and Li such that P
creates i with Li.

Problem: Find the locus of points P such that the following ratios are equal to
the given ratio :

For 3 lines: (d1)2 : d2d3

For 4 lines: d1d2 : d3d4
For 5 lines: d1d2d2

: ad4d5

For 6 lines: d1d2d3

: d4d5d6

In general,

For an even 2k number of lines: d1dk

: dk+1d2k

For an uneven 2k+1 number of lines: d1dk+1

: adk+2d2k+1

According to Bos, consideration of the general Pappus Problem provided

[Descartes], in 1632, with a new ordered vision of the realm of geometry
and it shaped his convictions about the structure and the proper methods of
geometry (Bos 2001, 283). The best evidence we have of the impact the
problem had on Descartes' approach to geometry is La Gomtrie itself: in
La Gomtrie, the Pappus problem is given pride of place as Descartes
details his geometrical calculus and demonstrates the power of his novel
program for solving geometrical problems. It is treated in Book One, as
Descartes explains his geometrical analysis, and then again in Book Two,
where Descartes offers the synthesis, i.e., the geometrical demonstration, of
his solution to the Pappus Problem in n-lines, a demonstration which relies
on the famous distinction between geometric and mechanical curves
that begins this part of the work.

3.1 Book One: Descartes' Geometrical Analysis

Book One of La Gomtrie is entitled Problems the construction of which
requires only straight lines and circles, and it is in this opening book that
Descartes details his geometrical analysis and describes how geometrical

problems are to be explicated algebraically. In this respect, what we find in

Book One is similar to the algebraic elaboration of geometrical problems
presented by Vite in his 1594 Supplement of geometry as he explains the
stage of exegetics. That said, Descartes' approach to analysis rests on
innovations in notation and formalism as well as in the merging of geometry
and arithmetic which move him beyond Vite's analysis, lending some
credence to Descartes' remark to Mersenne that, in La Gomtrie, his
program for geometry begins where Vite's left off (To Mersenne, December
1637, AT I, 479; CSMK 7779; See Macbeth 2004 for discussion of the
relationship between Vite's "analytical art" and Descartes' use of analysis
in geometry).

Book One commences with the geometrical interpretation of algebraic

operations, which, we saw above, Descartes had already explored in the
early period of his mathematical research. However, what we are presented
in 1637 is, as Guicciardini aptly describes, a gigantic innovation both over
Descartes' previous work and the work of his contemporaries (Guicciardini
2009, 38). On the one hand, Descartes offers a geometrical interpretation of
root extraction and thus treats five arithmetical operations (as opposed to
the four operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division that
were treated in his early work). On the other hand, and more significantly,
his treatment relies on an interpretation of arithmetical operations according
to which these operations are taken to be closed operations on line
segments. Traditionally, for instance, the product of two segments a * b was
interpreted as a rectangle, but for Descartes, the product is interpreted as a
segment. This allows Descartes to translate geometrical problems into
equations (that include products such as a * b) and treat each term of the
equation as similar in kind. Finally, Descartes uses a new exponential
notation as he sets forth equations of multiple terms in Book One, and this
notation, which replaces the traditional cossic notation of early modern
algebra, allows Descartes to tighten the connection between algebra and
geometry, and more specifically, between the algebraic representation of
curves through equations with the geometrical classification and
geometrical solution of stated problems (as we will see more clearly below
in section 3.2).

With his new geometrical interpretation of the five basic arithmetical

operations at his disposal, Descartes proceeds to describes how, in the
stage of geometrical analysis, one is to give an algebraic interpretation of a
geometrical problem:

If, then, we wish to solve any problem, we first suppose the solution already
effected, and give names to all the lines that seem needful for its
construction,to those that are unknown as well as to those that are known.
Then, making no distinction between unknown and unknown lines, we must
unravel the difficulty in any way that shows most naturally the relations
between these lines, until we find it possible to express a single quantity in

two ways. This will constitute an equation, since the terms of one of these
two expressions are together equal to the terms of the other (G, 69).

We notice that the key to Descartes' analysis is to make no distinction

between the known and unknown quantities in the problem: Both kinds of
quantities are granted a variable (generally, a, b, c for known quantities
and x, y, z for unknown quantities), and thus, we treat the unknowns as if
their values were already found. Or, as Descartes puts it, we suppose the
solution already effected. The task then is to reduce the problem to an
equation (in contemporary terms, to a polynomial equation in two
unknowns) that expresses the unknown quantity, or quantities, in terms of
the known quantities. For instance, take the following problem:[5]

Given a line segment AB containing point C (see figure 6), the problem is to
produce AB to D such that the product AD*DB is equal to the square of CD.
Let AC = a, CB = b, and BD = x, which yields AD = a + b + x and CD = b +
x. Thus, the problem to find BD such that AD*DB = (CD)2 is algebraically
equivalent to finding x such that: (a + b + x)*(x) = (b + x)2. Or, solving for
x, the problem is to find x such that, given a and b, x = b2 / (ab).

Figure 6:
A horizontal line with points A, C, B, and D marked on it in that order.
Distance a is from point A to C. Distance b from point C to B, distance x
from B to D.

In this example, we are dealing with a determinate problem, i.e., a problem

to which there are a finite number of solutions, and we can therefore reduce
the problem to a single equation that expresses the unknown quantity in
terms of the known quantities. However, as Descartes points out, there are
also indeterminate problems that involve an infinite number of solutions.
(Locus problems, such as the Pappus Problem, are of this sort, because the
solution includes the infinitely many points that lie along a curve.) When
dealing with an indeterminate problem, Descartes instructs us that we may
arbitrarily choose lines of known length for each unknown line to which
there corresponds no equation (G, 9), i.e., we are to set the unknown lines
as oblique coordinates that have a stated value. We then generate several
equations that express the unknown quantities in terms of one or more
known quantities, and solve the equations simultaneously. This is precisely
the approach that Descartes takes as he treats the Pappus Problem in Book
One.

Figure 7: The Four-Line Pappus Problem in Book One (G, 27)

Three solid, straight lines, FES which goes from the lower left to mid top,
EABG which goes from left to right, and TGH which goes from upper left to
mid right. Point C is below all three lines and from it dotted, straight lines,
CBRST (which intersects all three solid lines at points B, S, and T), CF, CH,
and CD which is a dotted line to point D to the left and down of C. There is
also a dotted, straight line DAR.

Descartes begins with consideration of the problem when we are given three
or four lines, which, borrowing from Guicciardini (2009), can be stated as
follows (see figure 7):

Having three or four lines given in position, it is required to find the locus of
points C from which drawing three or four lines to the three or four lines
given in position and making given angles with each one of the given lines
the following condition holds: the rectangle [or product] of two of the three
lines so drawn shall bear a given ratio to the square of the third (if there be
only three), or to the rectangle [or product] of the other two (if there be
four) (Guicciardini 2009, 54; based on G, 22).

In Book One, Descartes applies his geometrical analysis to the four-line case
of the Pappus problem. He begins by designating two given line segments
(of unknown length) AB and BC as oblique coordinates x and y, respectively,
such that all other lines needed to solve the problem will be expressed in
terms of x and y.[6] Then, by considering the angles given in the problem
and the properties of similar triangles, he generates an algebraic expression
of the sought after points C in terms of the two unknowns x and y and the
known quantity z (where z designates the ratio given in the problem) (G, 29
30).

Importantly, the analytic method that Descartes uses in the four-line case is
generalized to apply to the general, n-line version of the Pappus Problem.
That is, Descartes' claim is that no matter how many lines and angles are
given in the problem, it is possible, by means of his analytic method, to
express the sought after points C in terms of two unknown quantities (in
contemporary terms, to reduce the problem to a polynomial equation in two
unknowns) (G, 33). As a result, for any n-line version of the Pappus Problem,
we can generate values for C and construct the sought after Pappus curve in
a pointwise manner by assigning different values to x and y. As Descartes
puts it,

Furthermore, to determine the point C, but one condition is needed, namely,

that the product of a certain number of lines shall be equal to, or (what is
quite as simple), shall bear a given ratio to the product of certain other
lines. Since this condition can be expressed by a single equation in two
unknown quantities, we may give any value we please to either x or y and

find the value of the other from this equation. It is obvious that when not
more than five lines are given, the quantity x, which is not used to express
the first of the lines can never be of degree higher than the second.

Assigning a value to y, we have x2 = ax b2, and therefore x can be

found with ruler and compasses, by a method [for constructing roots]
already explained. If then we should take successively an infinite number of
different values for the line y, we should obtain an infinite number of values
for the line x, and therefore an infinity of different points, such as C, by
means of which the required curve can be drawn (G, 34).

The result of Descartes' analysis, as indicated by the remarks above, is that

the curve that includes the sought after points C can be pointwise
constructed by using ruler and compass to solve for the roots of a seconddegree equation in two unknowns. He then generalizes this result and
claims that the solution points for any problem that can be reduced to a
second-degree equation can be constructed by ruler and compass. If instead
a problem is reduced to an equation of third or fourth degree, the points are
constructed by conics, and if a problem is reduced to an equation of fifth or
sixth degree, the points are constructed by a curve that is just one degree
higher than the conic sections (G, 37). In other words, Descartes' claim is
that if a problem can be reduced to a single equation of degree not higher
than six, in which the unknown quantity or quantities are expressed in terms
of a known quantity, then the roots of the equation can be constructed by
straightedge and circle, or by conic, or by a more complicated curve that
does not have degree higher than four. Based on this result, Descartes
suggests a way to generalize further and solve the n-line Pappus Problem,
for no matter how many given lines and angles with which a Pappus Problem
begins, it will be possible to reduce the problem to an equation and then
pointwise construct the roots of the equation, i.e., the sought after points C
of the problem (G, 37).

What Descartes achieves here by means of his geometrical analysis is no

doubt significant. He has outlined a way of solving the Pappus Problem for
any number of given lines. However, questions about proving the Pappus
Problem solved still linger come the end of Book One. As in Vite's analysis,
Descartes has shown that a solution to the general problem exists but the
algebraic elaboration of the problem does not unto itself give a clue to how
we are to geometrically construct the curve that solves the problem. Notice
in particular that in Book One the roots (i.e., the points along the sought
after curves) are constructed by straight edge, compass, conics, and higher
order curves, such that the Pappus curves that include the roots are
constructed pointwise. But this leaves us the question: Are the Pappus
curves of Book One legitimately geometrical? That is, can the curves that
solve the n-line version of the Pappus Problem themselves be constructed
by legitimately geometrical methods? This is an issue broached in Book Two,

the main focus of which is how to enact a synthesis, or construction, of a

geometrical problem.

3.2 Book Two: The Classification of Curves and Geometrical Synthesis

Book Two of La Gomtrie is entitled On the Nature of Curved Lines and
commences with Descartes' famous distinction between geometric and
mechanical curves. Given its importance for understanding the program of
La Gomtrie as well as the attention this distinction has drawn from
commentators, it is worth examining the proposals made in the opening
pages of Book Two with some care.

Descartes begins with reference to the ancient classification of problems

and offers his interpretation of how ancient mathematicians distinguished
curves that could be used in the solution to geometrical problems from
those that could not:

The ancients were familiar with the fact that the problems of geometry may
be divided into three classes, namely, plane, solid, and linear problems. This
is equivalent to saying that some problems require only circles and straight
lines for their construction, while others require a conic section and still
others more complex curves. I am surprised, however, that they did not go
further, and distinguish between different degrees of those more complex
curves, nor do I see why they called the latter mechanical, rather than
geometrical. If we say that they are called mechanical because some sort of
instrument has to be used to describe them, then we must, to be consistent,
reject circles and straight lines, since these cannot be described on paper
without the use of compasses and a ruler, which may also be termed
instruments. It is not because the other instruments, being more
complicated than the ruler and compass, are therefore less accurate, for if
this were so they would have to be excluded from mechanics, in which
accuracy of construction is even more important than in geometry. In the
latter, exactness of reasoning alone is sought, and this can surely be as
thorough with reference to such lines as to simpler ones (G, 4044).

Descartes implies that the terms mechanical and non-geometrical were

synonymous in ancient mathematics, even though it is not at altogether
clear that this was the intended meaning of the term mechanical. Namely,
it is not clear, given the available textual evidence, that the classification of
curves into geometrical and mechanical was intended to serve as a
normative claim concerning the legitimacy of a curve's use in geometrical
problem-solving. It could just as easily be read as a descriptive moniker that
captures the different ways in which curves were constructed (see Molland
1976 on this issue; see section 2.2 above for Descartes' blending of the
descriptive and the normative in his 1619 proposal for a new science of
geometry).

Descartes' reading of the ancients aside, what's important for understanding

his own peculiar interpretation of geometrical curves is the distinction he
draws between the accuracy of construction of a curve, which he renders
an issue for mechanics, and the exactness of reasoning, which he deems
as the sole requirement for accepting a curve as legitimately geometrical. In
making this claim, Descartes is carving out a unique place for his notion of
geometrical curves: He abandons the accuracy of construction criterion
that Clavius adopted in his early works to render a curve acceptable in
geometrical problem-solving and also the claim forwarded by Vite that
instrumentally-constructed curves were not to be considered geometrical
(see section 1.1 above). As Descartes' presentation implies, both these sorts
of criteria confuse issues of mechanics with the exactness of reasoning
that is the sole concern of geometry. Thus, as Book Two continues,
Descartes reiterates that to determine the geometrical status of a curve we
must lay our focus on issues of exact and clear reasoning and, specifically,
on the question of whether a curve can be constructed by exact and clear
motions. After presenting the postulate that two or more lines can be
moved, one upon the other, determining by their intersection other curves,
Descartes explains,

It is true that the conic sections were never freely received into ancient
geometry, and I do not care to undertake to change names confirmed by
usage; nevertheless, it seems very clear to me that if we make the usual
assumption that geometry is precise and exact, while mechanics is not; and
if we think of geometry as the science which furnishes a general knowledge
of the measurement of all bodies, then we have no more right to exclude
the more complex curves than the simpler ones, provided they can be
conceived of as described by a continuous motion or by several successive
motions, each motion being completely determined by those which precede;
for in this way an exact knowledge of the magnitude of each is always
obtainable (G, 43).

We see in these remarks that the precision and exactness of geometry is

intimately tied with the geometer's consideration of motions that can be
precisely and exactly traced. Namely, the geometer is justified in using
simple curves as well as more complex curves, so long as the construction
of these curves proceeds by precise and exact motions. Descartes clarifies
how a complex curve can be conceived of as described by a continuous
motion or by several successive motions, each motion being completely
determined by those which precede by presenting the mesolabe compass
that he first developed in 1619:

Consider the lines AB, AD, AF, and so forth, which we may suppose to be
described by means of the instrument YZ [Figure 8]. This instrument
consists of several rulers hinged together in such a way that YZ being

placed along the line AN the angle XYZ can be increased or decreased in
size, and when its sides are together, the points B, C, D, E, F, G, H, all
coincide with A; but as the size of the angle is increased, the ruler BC,
fastened at right angles to XY at the point B, pushed toward Z the ruler CD
which slides along YZ always at right angles. In a like manner, CD pushes DE
which slides along YX always parallel to BC; DE pushes EF; EF pushes FG; FG
pushes GH, and so on. Thus we may imagine an infinity of rulers, each
pushing another, half of them making equal angles with YX and the rest with
YZ.

Now as the angle XYZ is increased, the point B describes the curve AB,
which is a circle; while the intersections of the other rulers, namely, the
points D, F, H describe the other curves, AD, AF, AH, of which the latter are
more complex than the first and this more complex than the circle.
Nevertheless I see no reason why the description of the first cannot be
conceived as clearly and distinctly as that of the circle, or at least as that of
the conic sections; or why that of the second, third, or any other that can be
thus described, cannot be as clearly conceived of as the first: and therefore I
see no reason why they should not be used in the same way in the solution
of geometric problems (G, 4447).[7]

Figure 8: Mesolabe
A mesolabe same as Figure 3.

A couple points are worth emphasizing. First, Descartes presents the more
complex curves generated by his compass as described by motions that can
be as conceived as clearly and distinctly as the motions required to
construct the more simple circle. And because of the clear and distinct
motions needed for their construction, these curves are legitimately
geometrical. That is, consistent with Descartes' general criterion for
constructing geometrical curves, these complex curves can be used in the
solution of geometric problems. Second, we see that although Descartes
takes care to distinguish the concerns of geometry from those of mechanics,
he does not steer away from the construction of curves by means of
instruments. Although instrumental constructions are mechanical
constructions, they can nonetheless give rise to geometrical curves
precisely because the motions of the instruments are clearly and distinctly
conceived. That the motions are generated by instruments does not render
the resultant curve non-geometrical. (For more on the use of instruments in
La Gomtrie, see Bos 1981.)

In a similar vein, curves that are non-geometrical by Descartes' standard are

curves that require more complicated, less clear and distinct motions for
their construction. He explains:

Probably the real explanation of the refusal of ancient geometers to accept

curves more complex than the conic sections lies in the fact that the first
curves to which their attention was attracted happened to be the spiral, the
quadratrix, and similar curves, which really do belong only to mechanics,
and are not among the curves that I think should be included here, since
they must be conceived of as described by two separate movements whose
relation does not admit of exact determination (G, 44).

Descartes explicitly names the spiral and quadratrix as those curves whose
construction must be conceived of as described by two separate
movements whose relation does not admit of exact determination. Later in
Book Two he clarifies why such descriptions fail to be clearly and distinctly
conceived:

geometry should not include lines that are like strings, in that they are
sometimes straight and sometimes curved, since the ratios between
straight and curved lines are not known, and I believe cannot be discovered
by human minds, and therefore no conclusion based upon such ratios can
be accepted as rigorous and exact (G, 91).

Given these remarks, the fundamental problem with the spiral, the
quadratrix, and lines that are like strings is that their construction requires
consideration of the ratio, or relation, between a circle and straight line.
Consider the spiral. As we saw above, its construction involves two uniform
motions: the uniform rectilinear motion of a point along a segment and the
uniform circular motion of the segment around a point. These two motions
must simultaneously be considered in order for the moving point's path to
describe the spiral, and this, for Descartes, is what is ultimately problematic.
The human mind can think about simultaneous rectilinear and circular
motions, but it cannot do so with the clarity and distinctness required to
meet the exact and rigorous standards of geometry. (This claim is not
without its problems, which will be discussed in section 3.3 below. For a
comparison between Descartes' criterion for the construction of geometrical
curves and the views put forward by Pascal, see Jesseph 2007.)

After presenting his construction criterion for geometrical curves, Descartes

develops his novel connection between geometrical construction and the
algebraic representation of these curves. Whereas in Book One Descartes
details how to use algebra to establish that a solution a geometrical problem
exists, here, in Book Two, Descartes proposes a stronger connection
between algebra and geometry and famously claims that any legitimately
geometrical curve can be represented by an equation:

I could give here several other ways of tracing and conceiving a series of
curved lines, each curve more complex than any preceding one, but I think

the best way to group together all such curves and then classify them in
order, is by recognizing the fact that all the points of those curves which we
may call geometric, that is, those which admit of precise and exact
measurement, must bear a definite relation to all points of a straight line,
and that this relation must be expressed means of a single equation (G, 48).

He then proceeds to classify these geometric curves according to the

degree of their corresponding equations, claiming:

If [a curve's] equation contains no term of higher degree than the rectangle

[product] of two unknown quantities, or the square of one, the curve
belongs to the first and simplest class, which contains only the circle, the
parabola, the hyperbola, and the ellipse; but when the equation contains
one or more terms of the third or fourth degree, in one or both of the two
unknown quantities (for it requires two unknown quantities to express the
relation between two points) the curve belongs to the second class; and if
the equation contains a term of the fifth or sixth degree in either or both of
the unknown quantities the curve belongs to the third class, and so on
indefinitely (G, 48).

The same point is made later in Book Two, where Descartes emphasizes that
no matter how we conceive a curve to be described, provided it be one of
those which I have called geometric, it will always be possible to find an
equation determining all of the curve's points (G, 56). He reiterates that
geometric curves can be classified according to their equations but also
points out that within a specific class, a curves' simplicity should be ranked
according to the motions required for construction. For instance, although
the circle belongs to the same class as the ellipse, hyperbola, and parabola,
these latter curves are equally complex whereas the circle is evidently a
simpler curve and will thus be more useful in the construction of problems
(G, 56).

As in Book One, Descartes uses the Pappus Problem to illustrate the power
of his geometrical calculus, where in Book Two, his aim is to show how his
algebraic classification of curves makes it easy to demonstrate the solution
which [he has] already given of the problem of Pappus (G, 59). The specific
goal here is to establish that the curves which solve the general Pappus
Problem are legitimately geometrical curves, i.e., to show that the Pappus
curves meet the exact and rigorous standards of geometrical construction
that he has just laid out. Descartes' discussion of the Pappus Problem in
Book Two begins as follows:

Having now made a general classification of curves, it is easy for me to

demonstrate the solution which I have already given of the problem of
Pappus. For, first, I have shown [in Book One] that when there are only three

or four lines the equation which serves to determine the required points is of
the second degree. It follows that the curve containing these points [i.e., the
Pappus curve] must belong to the first class, since such an equation
expresses the relation between all points of curves of Class I and all points
of a fixed straight line. When there are not more than eight given lines the
equation is at most a biquadratic, and therefore the resulting [Pappus] curve
belongs to Class II or Class I. When there are not more than twelve given
lines, the equation is of the sixth degree or lower, and therefore the required
curve belongs to Class III or a lower class, and so on for other cases (G, 59).

As indicated in the passage above, Descartes establishes in Book Two that

Pappus curves fall into the specified classes of geometric curves he has
designated, where the class into which a Pappus curve falls depends on the
number of lines given in the problem and thus, on the degree of the
equation to which the problem is reduced. For instance, when Descartes
treats the four-line Pappus Problem in Book Two, he shows that, by varying
the coefficients of the second degree equation to which the problem has
been reduced (through the analysis of Book One), we can construct either a
circle, parabola, hyperbola, or ellipse (G, 5980). That is, he shows that the
Pappus curve that solves the four-line problem is either a circle or one of the
conic sections, the very geometric curves that he has grouped into Class I.

3.3 The Tensions and Limitations of Descartes' Geometrical Calculus

In two stages, then, Descartes has demonstrated the solution to the general
Pappus Problem. In Book One he offers his algebraic analysis of the problem,
and in Book Two he claims to provide the synthesis (or demonstration) that
the curves that solve the general problem are legitimately geometrical
curves which meet his stated standard for geometrical exactness and
precision. And with these two stages completed, Descartes claims to
Mersenne six months after La Gomtrie is published that his treatment of
the general Pappus Problem is proof that his new method for geometricalproblem solving is an improvement over the methods of his predecessors:

I do not like to have to speak well of myself, but because there are few
people who are able to understand my Geometry, and since you will want
me to tell you what my own view of it is, I think it appropriate that I should
tell you that it is such that I could not wish to improve it. In the Optics and
the Meteorology I merely tried to show that my method is better than the
usual one; in my Geometry, however, I claim to have demonstrated this.
Right at the beginning I solve a problem which according to the testimony of
Pappus none of the ancients managed to solve; and it can be said that none
of the moderns has been able to solve it either, since none of them has
written about it, even though the cleverest of them have tried to solve the
other problems which Pappus mentions in the same place as having been
tackled by the ancients (To Mersenne, end of December 1637; AT 1, 478;
CSMK, 7778).

As great as Descartes' confidence in his solution to the Pappus Problem,

there are questions that surround his synthesis of the general problem in
Book Two.

As indicated above, Descartes attempts to establish via his synthesis that

the curves that solve the Pappus Problem are geometric by his own stated
standard, that is, that the Pappus curves are constructible by the precise
and exact motions needed to construct genuinely geometric curves.
However, it is not at all clear that Descartes has proven this point. Even
when addressing the basic four-line Pappus Problem in Book Two, Descartes
does not appeal to motions that are evidently clear and distinct as he
constructs the Pappus curves that solve the problem (in this case, the circle,
parabola, hyperbola, and ellipse). Rather, he relies on Apollonius's theory of
conics, which requires that a cone be cut at a designated point in the plane,
and as Bos remarks, this Apollonian technique for constructing conics is not
a method of construction that immediately presents itself to the mind as
clear and distinct (Bos 2001, 325). Specifically, since it was not evident to
mathematicians at the time whether constructions that required locating a
cone in the plane met the exact and rigorous standards of geometrical
reasoning, Descartes' treatment of the Pappus curves in this four-line case
does not convincingly demonstrate their geometric status. Later in Book
Two, when he treats the five-line Pappus Problem, matters get more
complicated.

Recall that in addition to his emphasis on the precise and exact motions
that can be used to describe legitimately geometrical curves, Descartes also
claims that these curves can be conceived of as described by a continuous
motion or by several successive motions. As such, we would reasonably
expect that the geometrical construction of these curves should not proceed
pointwise in the manner of Book One, where Descartes constructed the
Pappus curves by solving the equations to which the problem had been
reduced. However, when Descartes treats the five-line Pappus Problem in
Book Two, he in fact offers a pointwise construction of the Pappus curve. He
then remarks that the pointwise construction of this geometric Pappus
curve is importantly different from the pointwise construction of nongeometrical, mechanical curves:

It is worthy of note that there is a great difference between this method in

which the [Pappus] curve is traced by finding several points upon it, and
that used for the spiral and similar curves. In the latter, not any point of the
required curve may be found at pleasure, but only such points as can be
determined by a process simpler than that required for the composition of
the curveOn the other hand, there is no point on these [geometric]
curves which supplies a solution for the proposed problem that cannot be
determined by the method I have given (G, 8891).

The suggestion from Descartes is that when we pointwise construct a

geometric curve, we can identify any possible point on the curve, and
immediately after the above remarks, he proceeds to equate curves
constructed in this manner with curves that could possibly be constructed
by continuous motions: this method of tracing a curve by determining a
number of its points taken at random applies only to curves that can be
generated by a regular and continuous motion (G, 91).

This distinction between the pointwise construction of geometric and

mechanical curves serves two rather important purposes in the program
of La Gomtrie: (1) Descartes can establish that the Pappus curves he has
pointwise constructed are in fact geometrical and thereby complete his
synthesis (or demonstration) of the general Pappus Problem, and (2) he can
maintain a boundary between intelligible geometric curves and
unintelligible mechanical curves. Without a clear indication of why the
pointwise construction of a Pappus curve is geometric, Descartes would
have to allow mechanical curves such as the spiral and quadratrix into the
domain of geometrical curves, since these curves can also be pointwise
constructed. Recall for instance Clavius's pointwise construction of the
quadratrix. According to Clavius's description, we begin with a quadrant of a
circle and then identify the points of intersection between segments that
bisect the quadrant and segments that bisect the arc of the quadrant (see
figure 9). That is, we identify the several intersecting points of segments
which are constructible by straightedge and compass, and then, to generate
the quadratrix, we connect the intersecting points, which are evenly spaced
along the sought after curve. Why is such a pointwise construction not
geometric? Because, according to Descartes, if we proceed as Clavius
does, not any point of the required curve may be found at pleasure.
Specifically, given the restrictions of Euclidean construction, we are only
able to divide the given arc into 2n parts. As such, what Descartes suggests
is that it is not possible to divide the arc any way we please, and we cannot
therefore locate any arbitrary point along the curve by use of pointwise
construction. In the case of the geometric curves, however, we can find
any arbitrary point on the curve by appeal to the equations corresponding to
the problem; or borrowing Bos's terminology, Descartes is claiming that
geometric curves, and the Pappus curves in particular, can be generated
by generic pointwise constructions.

Figure 9
A vertical line AC and horizontal line AGB (going to the right). Three
hozontal parallel lines above AGB, (not labelled but consider them L1, L2, L3
from top to bottom). Three lines AE, AD, AF radiate from A between AC and
AGB. AE intersects L1 at point p1, AD with L2 at point p2, AF with L3 at
point p3 . Curve CG connects p1, p2, p3. Curve CB intersects L1 where AD
also intersects L1.

While consideration of Clavius's construction of the quadratrix offers some

reason to accept Descartes' distinction between the different sorts of
pointwise constructions, there remains the controversial claim that curves
described by generic pointwise constructions are curves that can be
constructed by continuous motion. This identification allows Descartes to
establish Pappus curves as geometric curves, but he offers no proof of the
identity, and thus, there is question of whether Descartes has in fact
demonstrated that the Pappus curves are geometric by his own standards.
(See Grosholz 1991 and Domski 2009 for alternative ways of addressing this
tension.)

There is a further question surrounding Descartes' criterion for geometric

curves. As we have seen above, Descartes' explicit concern in Book Two is to
offer a standard for geometrical curves that is bound with intelligible, clear
and distinct motions needed for their construction. However, Mancosu
(2007) has recently offered a compelling case that behind Descartes' explicit
remarks in La Gomtrie lies a more fundamental concern: To ensure that
those curves mathematicians had used to square the circle, such as the
spiral and quadratrix which are explicitly mentioned in Book Two, are
rendered non-geometrical. Mancosu supports his case with evidence from
Descartes' correspondence that shows, for Descartes, it is in fact possible in
some instances to clearly and distinctly conceive the relation between a
straight line and a circle, a relation he had considered inexact in La
Gomtrie. Namely, in a 1638 letter to Mersenne, Descartes writes,

You ask me if I think that a sphere which rotates on a plane describes a line
equal to its circumference, to which I simply reply yes, according to one of
the maxims I have written down, that is that whatever we conceive clearly
and distinctly is true. For I conceive quite well that the same line can be
sometimes straight and sometimes curved, like a string (To Mersenne, 27
May 1638; AT 2, 140141; translation from Mancosu 2007, 118).

In La Gomtrie, the relation between straight and curves lines was

considered inexact because, as Descartes put it, the ratios between
straight and curved lines are not known, and I believe cannot be discovered
by human minds (G, 91). That Descartes later admits clearly and distinctly
conceiving such a relation suggests, according to Mancosu, that the stated
criteria for geometrical curves presented in La Gomtrie reveals only part
of Descartes' mathematical agenda. A more complete portrait must,
Mancosu argues, take into account Descartes' commitment to the
impossibility of squaring the circle (see Descartes' letter to Mersenne, 13
November 1629, AT 1, 7071; translated in Mancosu 2007, 120; see also
Mancosu and Arana 2010 for further evidence in support of the position of
Mancosu 2007).

Whether Descartes had the hidden agenda that Mancosu suggests, the
explicit claims used to define the program of problem-solving presented in
La Gomtrie point to the limitations of Descartes' mathematics. As we have
seen above, Descartes' primary focus is on a standard for geometry's
exactness of reasoning that is bound to clear and distinct motions for
construction and to the finite equations to represent curves so constructed.
Consequently, there is no room in the program of La Gomtrie to use
infinitesimals in the construction of curves or to treat curves represented by
infinite equations. As such, Descartes eliminated from his geometrical
program the very elements of mathematical and geometrical reasoning that
made it possible for Newton and Leibniz to develop the calculus come the
late seventeenth century. Nonetheless, given how quickly Descartes honed
his mathematical skills and how quickly he developed his innovative
program for geometry, it would not be too risky to accept Descartes' selfassessment and maintain some confidence that the calculus would have
been in his reach had he considered the infinitesimal and the infinite:

having determined as I did [in La Gomtrie] all that could be achieved in

each type of problem and shown the way to do it, I claim that people should
not only believe that I have accomplished more than my predecessors but
should also be convinced that posterity will never discover anything in this
subject which I could not have discovered just as well if I had bothered to
look for it (To Mersenne, end of December 1637; AT 1, 478; CSMK, 7879).

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