Mindanao Bus Co. v.

City Assessor
Facts:
Petitioner is a public utility solely engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes
by motor trucks. He is the owner of the land where it maintains and operates a
garage for its TPU motor trucks; a repair shop; blacksmith and carpentry shops, and
with these machineries which are placed therein, its TPU trucks are made; body
constructed; and same are repaired in a condition to be serviceable in the TPU land
transportation business it operates. The City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City
assessed at P4,400 petitioner's above-mentioned equipment. Petitioner appealed
the assessment to the respondent Board of Tax Appeals on the ground that the
same are not realty.
Issue:
Won the machineries and equipments are considered immobilized which subject to
a realty tax?
Held:
No. The machineries and equipments are not considered immovable.
The court held that the equipments are merely incidental and not essential and
principal to the business of the petitioner. The transportation business could be
carried on without the repair or service shop if its rolling equipment is repaired or
serviced in another shop belonging to another.
EVANGELISTA vs. ALTO SURETY & INSURANCE CO.
Facts:
Petitioner, Santos Evangelista, instituted Civil Case in the Court of First Instance of
Manila for a sum of money, he obtained a writ of attachment, which levied upon a
house, built by Rivera on a land situated in Manila and leased to him, by filing copy
of said writ and the corresponding notice of attachment with the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Manila. In due course, judgment was rendered in favor of
Evangelista, who bought the house at public auction held in compliance with the
writ of execution issued in said case. When Evangelista sought to take possession of
the house, Rivera refused to surrender it, upon the ground that he had leased the
property from the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. and that the latter is now the
true owner of said property It appears that a definite deed of sale of the same house
had been issued to respondent, as the highest bidder at an auction sale held
incompliance with a writ of execution issued in Civil Case of the same court for the
sum of money, had been rendered in favor respondent herein, as plaintiff therein.
Evangelista instituted the present action against respondent and Ricardo Rivera, for
the purpose of establishing his title over said house, securing possession thereof,

apart from recovering damages. After due trial, the CFI Manila rendered judgment
for Evangelista, sentencing Rivera and Alto Surety to deliver the house in question
to Evangelista and to pay him, jointly and severally until said delivery, plus costs.
On appeal taken by respondent, this decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals,
which absolved said respondent from the complaint, upon the ground that, although
the writ of attachment in favor of Evangelista had been filed with the Register of
Deeds of Manila prior to the sale in favor of respondent, Evangelista did not acquire
thereby a preferential lien, the attachment having been levied as if the house in
question were immovable property, although in the opinion of the Court of Appeals,
it is "ostensibly a personal property. Issue:
WON the house is personal property?
Held:
No, the said house is not a personal property, much less a debt, credit or other
personal property not capable of manual delivery, but immovable property.
Asexplicitly held, in Laddera vs. Hodges (48 Off. Gaz., 5374), "A true building
(notmerely superimposed on the soil) is immovable or real property, whether it is
erected by the owner of the land or by usufructuary or lessee. This is the doctrine of
our Supreme Court in Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Company, 37 Phil., 644. It is
true that the parties to a deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house
as personal property for purposes of said contract (Luna vs. Encarnacion, * 48 Off.
Gaz.,2664; Standard Oil Co. of New York vs. Jaramillo, 44 Phil., 630; De Jesus vs.
Juan Dee Co., Inc., 72 Phil., 464). However, this view is good only insofar as the
contracting parties are concerned. It is based, partly, upon the principle of estoppel.
Neither this principle, nor said view, is applicable to strangers to said contract. Much
less is it inpoint where there has been no contract whatsoever, with respect to the
status of thehouse involved as in the case at bar.
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed, and another one
shall be entered affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Manila, with the costs
of this instance against respondent, the Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. It is so
ordered.

Facts.
After agreeing to make an investment in Orosas theatre business and his assurance
that he would be personally liable for any account that the said construction might
incur, Lopez delivered the lumber which was used for the construction of the Plaza
Theatre. But of the total cost of the materials amounting to P62,255.85, Lopez was
paid only P20848.50.

Lopez was pressing Orosa for payment of the remaining unpaid obligation, the latter
and Belarmino Rustia, the president of the corporation, promised to obtain a bank
loan by mortgaging the properties of the Plaza Theatre. Unknown to him, however,
as early as November, 1946, the corporation already got a loan from the Philippine
National Bank with the Luzon Surety Company as surety, and the corporation in turn
executed a mortgage on the land and building in favor of said company as countersecurity.
Persistent demand from Lopez for the payment of the amount due him caused
Vicente Orosa, Jr. to execute an alleged "deed of assignment" of his 420 shares of
stock of the Plaza Theater, Inc.,