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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW RESEARCH PAPER

PERSONAL BIAS AS A PRINCIPLE OF NATURAL JUSTICE

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

SUBMITTED BY -

SUBMITTED TO -

Aayush Ojha

Mrs. Priya Vijay,

Semester VI, Section B,

Assistant Professor,

Roll No. 306.

Administrative Law

NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF STUDY AND RESEARCH IN LAW, RANCHI 2016

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Topic

Page number

Introduction......3
Objective.4
Significane.4
Scope of the Study.4
Research Methodology 4
Literature Review 5

Body of the Project7-13


Conclusion & Suggestions14
Bibliography..15

INTRODUCTION

Bias, in general terms is an inclination to present or hold a partial perspective at the expense of
(possibly equally valid) alternatives. Anything biased generally is one-sided, and therefore lacks
a neutral point of view. Another meaning given is anything which tends or may be regarded as
tending to cause such a person to decide a case otherwise on evidence must be held to be biased.

Nemo in propria causa judex , esse debet, i.e.; no one should be made a judge in his own cause.
It is popularly known as the rule against bias. It is the minimal requirement of the natural justice
that the authority giving decision must be composed of impartial persons acting fairly, without
prejudice and bias. Bias means an operative prejudice, whether conscious or unconscious, as
result of some preconceived opinion or predisposition, in relation to a party or an issue.
Dictionary meaning of the term bias suggests anything which tends a person to decide a case
other than on the basis of evidences. Bias, in general terms is an inclination to present or hold a
partial perspective at the expense of (possibly equally valid) alternatives. Anything biased
generally is one-sided, and therefore lacks a neutral point of view. Another meaning given is
anything which tends or may be regarded as tending to cause such a person to decide a case
otherwise on evidence must be held to be biased
The rule against bias strikes against those factors which may improperly influence a judge
against arriving at a decision in a particular case. This rule is based on the premises that it is
against the human psychology to decide a case against his own interest. The basic objective of
this rule is to ensure public confidence in the impartiality of the administrative adjudicatory
process, for as per Lord Hewart CJ, in R v. Sussex1, justice should not only be done, but also
manifestly and undoubtedly seen to be done. A decision which is a result of bias is a nullity and
the trial is Coram non judice.

1 ([1924] 1 KB 256

Bias manifests itself variously and affects a decision in a variety of ways. It can broadly be
classified into six categories:

I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.

Personal Bias
Pecuniary Bias
Subject Matter Bias
Departmental Bias
Preconceived Notion Bias
Bias On Account Of Obstinacy.

OBJECTIVES

To analyse personal bias as a principle of natural justice, with special reference to the tests used
to establish it. The researcher aims to arrive upon an exhaustive definition of personal biasness as
given by various courts both in India and around the world by the aid of case laws and to weigh
personal bias with respect to administrative discretion and arrive upon a balance between the
two.
SIGNIFICANCE & BENEFIT OF THE STUDY
One of the two basic tenants of natural justice is that no person should be a judge in his own
matter, clearly showing that to uphold natural justice Personal bias or bias in any other form has
to be eliminated. The research aims at establishing a concrete definition of Personal Bias. Such a
study would surely impart better understanding of the subject both for the researcher and the
reader.
SCOPE AND LIMIATION OF THE STUDY
The research paper mainly focuses on the Personal Bias as a feature of Natural Justice in India.
Therefore, the literature and case laws are majorly derived from Indian laws & courts. But the
research paper briefly delves into the Global norms regulating personal bias.
The research is limited by the sources it uses, i.e. mainly doctrinal or secondary research. The
lack of primary data and statistics makes it rely upon previously works carried up in this field.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The paper is conceptual in nature; the method is therefore Doctrinal in nature. Research in this
area of law involves the analysis of case laws. The sources of research include both primary and
secondary. The statutes are the primary sources while the case laws are the secondary sources. it
mainly relies upon the secondary data available through books, legal databases, online portals
and publications etc. No field work has been carried out, thus no primary data is used while
drafting this paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW

It arises out of the personal or professional relationship of friendship or hostility between the
authority and the parties. Its the human nature that we try to give favorable decision to our
friends or relatives, whereas use the same as a weapon against the enemies.
Apex courts decision in Mineral Development Corporation Ltd. v. State of Bihar2, serves as a
good illustration on the point. Here, the petitioners were granted a mining lease for 99 years in
1947. But in 1955, government quashed the license. The petitioners brought an action against the
minister passing this order on the behalf of government, on the ground that, the petitioner in
1952 opposed the minister in General election. Therefore, on the account of political rivalry, the
minister passed such an order, and hence the order was suffered from personal bias. Supreme
Court found the allegation to be true and thus quashed the said order.
Similarly in Baidyanath Mohapatra v. State of Orissa3, the Supreme Court quashed the order of
the tribunal confirming premature retirement on the ground that the chairman of the tribunal was
also a member of the review committee which had recommended premature retirement.
In Cottle v. Cottle4 1939, the chairman of the bench was a friend of the wifes family who had
instituted matrimonial proceedings against her husband. The wife had told the husband that the
chairman would decide the case in her favour. The divisional court ordered rehearing. It later
turned out that the chairman was a friend of the wifes family.
In Maneklal v. Premchand5, a complaint was filed against Maneklal, an advocate, by Premchand
for professional misconduct. A committee was constituted by the Bar council to enquire into the
allegation. The chairman of the committee who was a senior lawyer had many years ago
appeared on behalf of Premchand in a case. Maneklal contended that there was a violation of
natural justice because there was past friendship between the chairman and Premchand. The
2 1960 AIR 468
3 1989 AIR 2218
4 129 W. Va. 344 (W. Va. 1946)
5 AIR 1995 S.C 425

Supreme Court agreed that there was no real likelihood of bias in this case, but still disqualified
the Chairman because Maneklal had developed a reasonable suspicion on him.
In the leading case of A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India6, one N was a candidate for selection to the
Indian Foreign service and was also a member of the Selection Board. N did not sit in the board
when his own name was considered. Name of N was recommended by the board and he was
selected by the Public service commission. The candidates who were not selected filed a writ
petition for quashing the selection of N on the ground that the principles of natural justice were
violated.
Quashing the selection, the court observed: It is against all canons of justice to make a man
judge in his own cause. It is true that he did not participate in the deliberations of the committee
when his name was considered. But then the very fact that he was a member of the selection
board must have had its own impact on the selection board. Further admittedly he participated in
the deliberations of the board when the claims of his rivals particularly that of one Mr Basu was
considered. He was also a party to the preparation of the list of selected candidates in order of
preference. At every stage of his participation in the deliberations of the selection board there
was a conflict between his interest and duty. Under those circumstances it is difficult to behave
that he could have been impartial. The real question is not whether he was biased or not. It is
difficult tom prove the state of mind of a person. Therefore what we have to see is whether there
is a reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to have been biased. This case is a
landmark in the development of administrative law and it has contributed in a large measure of
strengthening of the rule of law in this country.

6 AIR1970SC150

Principle of Personal Biasness


The traditional English law recognises two principles of natural justice:
A) Nemo debet esse judex in propria causa : No man shall be a judge in his own cause, or no
man can act as both at the one and the same time a party or a suitor and also a judge, or the
deciding authority must be impartial and without bias; and
B) Audi alteram partem: Hear the other side, or both the sides must be heard, or no man should
be condemned unheard, or that there must be fairness on the part of the deciding authority.
The first requirement of natural justice is that the judge should be impartial and neutral and must
be free from bias. He is supposed to be indifferent to parties to the controversy. He cannot act as
judge of a cause in which he himself has some interest either pecuniary or otherwise as it affords
the strongest proof against neutrality. He must be in a position to act judicially and to decide the
matter objectively. A judge must be of sterner stuff. His mental equipoise must always remain
firm and undefelected. He should not allow his personal prejudice to go against his decision
making. He must think dispassionately and submerge private feeling on every aspect of a case.
If the Judge is subject to bias in favour of or against either party to the dispute or is in a position
that a bias can be assumed, he is disqualified to act as a judge, and the proceedings will be
vitiated. This rule applies to the judicial and administrative authorities required to act judicially
or quasi judicially.
Bias may be generally defined as partiality or preference which is not founded on reason and is
actuated by self-interest whether pecuniary or personal. It means an operative prejudice,
whether conscious or unconscious, in relation to a party or an issue. Such an operative prejudice
may be a result of a preconceived opinion or a predisposition or a predetermination to decide the
case in a particular manner, so much so that it does not leave the mind open.
Rule against bias strikes against those factors which may improperly influence a judge in
arriving at a decision in any particular case. The requirement of this principle is that the judge

must be impartial and must decide the case objectively on the basis of evidence on record. It is a
fundamental principle often expressed in maxim nemo in propria causa judex, esse debet. In
absence of statutory authority, consensual agreement or the operation of necessity, no man can be
a judge in his own cause. Hence, a person having a direct interest in the subject matter of an
enquiry before a tribunal, if takes part in adjudication upon it, the tribunal is improperly
constituted and the court will grant an order of prohibition to prevent it from adjudicating or an
order of certiorari to quash a determination arrived at by it or order of injunction or of
declaration as may be appropriate? A Judge is disqualified from determining any case in which
he may be or may fairly be suspected to be biased. So important is this rule that Coke CJ
supposed that it should prevail even over an Act of Parliament; and he reported a where the
Court of Chancery that the equity judge in Chester was incompetent to judge a case in which he
himself was a party.
The Supreme Court in Crawford Bayley & Co. v. Union of India7 restated that the doctrine of
rule against bias comes into play if it is shown that the officer concerned has a personal
connection or personal interest or has personally acted in the matter concerned and or has already
taken a decision one way or the other which he may be interested in supporting. This rule of
disqualification is applied not only to avoid possibility of a partial decision but also to ensure
public confidence in the impartiality of the administrative adjudicatory process because not only
must no man be a judge in his own case but also justice should not only be done but should
manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. A decision which is a result of bias is a nullity
and the trial is Coram non-judice.Inference of bias, therefore, can be drawn only on the basis
of factual matrix and not merely on the basis of insinuations, conjectures and surmises. Bias
cannot be presumed, it must be proved from the facts of the case.

Test of Bias
The courts use the real likelihood test or the reasonable apprehension test to find out bias. A
pecuniary interest, however small it may be, disqualifies a person from acting as a judge. Other
interest, however small it may be, disqualifies a person from acting as a judge. Other interests

7 (1887) ILR 9 All 147

however do not stand on the same footing. Here the test is whether there is a real likelihood of
bias in the judge.
Real likelihood of bias means at least substantial possibility of bias. For a judgement to be biasfree the court will have to judge the matter as a reasonable man would judge of any matter in the
conduct of his own business. In words of Lord Hewart, the answer to the question whether there
was a real likelihood of bias depends not upon what actually was done but upon what might
appear to be done. Nothing is to be done which creates even a suspicion that there has been an
improper interference with the course of justice. In India, the real likelihood test is applied by the
Supreme Court in A.K. Kraipak case, the court observed:
The Real question is not whether he was biased. It is the difficult to prove that state of mind of
a person. Therefore, what we have to see is whether there is reasonable ground for believing that
he was likely to have been biased. a mere suspicion of bias is not sufficient. There must be a
real or reasonable likelihood of bias. In Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana8, the court
through Bhagwati C.J has very succinctly spelled out the test of reasonable likelihood. He
observed:
It is one of the fundamental principles of jurisprudence that no man can be a judge in his own
cause and that if there is a reasonable likelihood of bias it is in accordance with natural justice
and common sense that the justice likely to be so biased should be incapacitated from sitting.
The question is not whether the judge is actually biased or in fact decides partially, but whether
there is a real likelihood of bias. What is objectionable in such a case is not that the decision is
actually tainted with bias but that the circumstances are such as to create a reasonable
apprehension in the mind of others that there is a likelihood of bias affecting the decision. The
basic principle underlying this rule is that justice must not only be done but must also appear to
be done and this rule has received wide recognition in several decisions of this Court. It is also
important to note that this rule is not confined to cases where judicial power stricto sensu is
exercised. It is appropriately extended to all cases where an independent mind has to be applied
to arrive at a fair and just decision between the rival claims of parties.

8 1987 AIR 454

In Manek Lal v. Dr Premchand9 the court laid down the bias in following words: In such cases
the test is not whether in fact a bias has affected the judgement; the test is always is and must be
whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the tribunal
might have operated against him in the final decision of the authority.
So as to the real test of likelihood of bias, what is relevant is reasonableness of the apprehension
in that regard in the mind of the party.
There are two kinds of tests for establishing or demolishing the same:
a) Reasonable Suspicion of Bias: looks mainly to outward appearance.
b) Real Likelihood of Bias: Focuses on courts own evaluation of possibilities.
In both the situations, the court sees whether there is reasonable ground for believing that the
deciding officer was likely to be biased, as it is very difficult to prove a persons state of mind.
In the case of Jiwan K. Lohia v. Durga Dutt Lohia 10, the apex court observed that with regard to
the bias the teat to be applied is not whether in fact the bias has affected the judgment, but
whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable might have operated
against him in the final decision.
Therefore the real test for likelihood of bias is whether a reasonable person in possession of
relevant information, would have thought that bias was likely and whether the authority
concerned was likely to be disposed to decide a matter in a particular manner.
The reason is plain enough as per Lord Denning, Justice must be rooted in the confidence and the
confidence is destroyed when right minded people go away thinking that the judge is biased. A
number of circumstances may give rise to personal bias. Here judge may be relative, friend or
business associate of a party. He may have some personal grudge, enmity or grievance or
professional rivalry against such party. In view of these factors, there is likelihood that the judge
may be biased towards one party or prejudiced towards the other.

Exceptions to the rule against Bias


There are two exceptions two the rule against bias:
9 1957 SCR 575
10 AIR 1992 SC 188

1. Doctrine of necessity: Where bias is apparent but the same person who is likely to be
biased has to decide, because of the statutory requirement or the exclusiveness of a
competent authority to decide, the courts allow such person to decide. In Ashok Kumar
Yadav v. State of Haryana11, the court held that a member of the public service
commission could not entirely disassociate himself from the process of selection just
because a few candidates were related to him. He should disassociate himself from the
selection of the persons related to him but need not disassociate from the selection of
other candidates. Though his being on the selection committee could create a likelihood
of bias in favour of his relations yet, since the Public service commission is a
constitutional authority, such a member cant be entirely excluded from its work. In the
case of Institute of Chartered Accountants v. D.L. Ratna12, the court concluded that the
president and the vice president of the institute need not be required to sit on a
disciplinary committee as well as the governing council. The court therefore asked the
government to get the law amended so that they were not obliged to sit on both the
bodies. Here, the doctrine of necessity could have been invoked to save the infirmity
caused by bias. In order to successfully invoke the doctrine of necessity, it is essential to
show that despite the bias, the person objected to has to decide that matter because no one
else could decide it,
One such case was Mary Teresa Dias v. Acting Chief Justice13, a committee of twelve
judges of the High court of Kerala participated in a meeting to select candidates for
appointment as district judges. A female candidate, who was not selected, impugned the
validity of the selections in a writ petition before the Kerala High Court. The matter came
up before a bench consisting of 3 judges who were among those twelve who had been on
the committee for selection. The petitioner contended that the judges who had
participated in the selection ought not to sit on the bench to hear the writ petition against
the very selection. The Kerala High Court rejected this contention on various grounds.
11 1987 AIR 454
12 1987 AIR 71
13 AIR 1985 Ker 245

a) The selection made by the committee was an administrative function of the High Court,
and the judges had participated in it and taken a decision, which was institutional and not
personal.
b) The High Court could not be said to have prejudiced just because they had not selected a
particular candidate.
c) When the High court recommended the selection of candidates for judicial posts and it
was challenged, it was bound to consider the validity of such selection as being
necessary.
In T.N. Seshan v. Union of India14 the Chief Justice observed thus:
We must have a clear conception of the doctrine of absolute necessity. It is well settled that
the law permits certain things to be done as a matter of necessity which it would otherwise
not countenance on the touchstone of judicial proprietyIt is often invoked in cases of bias
where there is no other authority to judge or decide the issue.
2. Waiver: An allegation of Bias should be raised at a proper time. If a party knew of
disqualification arising out of bias in the adjudication and kept silent, his right to object is
lost by the principle of waiver. But sometimes, an individual may not be in a position to
object earlier because of fear or ignorance, in such cases the courts may not apply the
principle of waiver.

14 (1995) 4 SCC 611

CONCLUSION, SUGGESTIONS AND CRITICISMS


Every kind of preference is not sufficient to vitiate an administrative action. If the preference is
rational and unaccompanied by consideration of rational interest, pecuniary or otherwise, it
would not vitiate the decision. Similarly, there must be a real likelihood and not a mere suspicion
of bias, before the proceedings can be quashed on the ground of bias. This apprehension must be
judged from a healthy, reasonable and average point of view and not a mere apprehension and a
vague suspicion of whimsical capricious and unreasonable people. The proper approach for court
in such cases is not to look into ones own mind and ask am I biased? But instead look into the
mind of the party before it. The court must look at the impression which would be given to the
other party. Therefore the test is not what actually happened but the substantial possibility of that
which appeared to have happened .As the justice is rooted in the minds of the people and it is
destroyed and it is destroyed when the right minded people go away thinking that the judge is
biased.

References

M.P. Jain & S.N .Jain, Principles of Administrative Law, Lexis Nexis Butterworths
Wadhwa Nagpur.

I.P. Massey, Administrative Law, Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur.

Dr. Upadhyaya J.J.R, (2010), Administrative law, 7th Edition, Central Law Agency
Jain M.P. & Jain S.N., (2011), Principles of Administrative law, 6th edition 2011,

LexisNexis
Sathe S.P., (2012), Administrative Law, 7th edition, LexisNexis Butterworth Wadhwa

Nagpur), 2012.
Justice Thakkar C.K., (2012), Administrative Law, 2nd Edition, Eastern Book Company.
Takwani C.K., (2012), Lectures on Administrative Law, 2nd Edition, Eastern Book
Company.

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