Socialism and Democracy in Argentina in the Age of the Second International

Author(s): Jeremy Adelman

Source: The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 72, No. 2 (May, 1992), pp. 211-238
Published by: Duke University Press
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Socialismand Democracyin Argentina

in the Age ofthe Second International
JEREMY ADELMAN

H E

"failure"ofArgentine
socialismpriorto WorldWar

II has stirredthe interestof historiansand social scientists. Whereas the European working classes became
strong supporters of democratic socialism, the Argentine working class,
even in free elections, spurned and continues to spurn a Socialist option.
What's more, the working class of Argentina, and of Latin America as
a whole (with the arguable exception of Chile), traditionallyhas thrown
its support behind populist parties. The failure of socialism and the success of populism are connected: the weakness of socialism in Argentina,
and in Latin America in general, opened the way for populist politicians
to galvanize the unintegrated masses into a forcefulpolitical movement.
In Argentina, this correlation is especially pronounced: the failure of
democratic socialism before 1930 leftvacant a political space that Colonel
Juan Domingo Peron successfullyexploited in the wake of the 1943 coup
d'etat.'
The authoris gratefulto Paula Alonso,Emilio Kouri,Hilda Sabato,and RichardWalterfor
theircommentson an earlierdraftofthisarticle.
i. The list of writersin thistradition
is long. To name some classics:Gino Germani,
Estructurasocial de la Argentina:analisisestadistico(BuenosAires:EditorialRaigal, 1955);
Samuel L. Baily,Labor, Nationalism,and Politicsin Argentina(New Brunswick:Rutgers
Univ. Press, 1967); RichardJ. Walter,The SocialistPartyofArgentina,i8go-i930 (Austin:
Instituteof Latin AmericanStudies, Univ. of Texas, I977). While each of these offersa
different
focuson the politicsoflabor,all threecoincidein describingthe failureof mainstreamdemocraticSocialiststo earn the enduringsupportof Argentina'smasses, leaving
themopen to capturebyothermovements.For morerecentworkswiththe same angle, see
CharlesBergquist,Labor in LatinAmerica:ComparativeEssays on Chile,Argentina,Venezuela, and Colombia(Stanford:StanfordUniv.Press, 1986),chap. 3, esp. 137-39; Ronaldo
Munck,Argentina:FromAnarchismto Peronism(London:Zed Books, 1987);JulioGodio,
El movimiento
obreroargentino,4 vols. (BuenosAires:EditorialLegasa, 1987-go); Isidoro
Cheresky,"Sindicatosy fuerzaspoliticasen la Argentinapre-peronista,"
in Historia del

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212

| HAHR I MAY

I JEREMY

ADELMAN

But the correlationdoes not necessarilyimplycausality.Democratic

socialism'sfailureto generatesignificant
enduringsupportis not an explanationforpopulism.Moreover,the concernto explainthe success of
populismby pointingto the failureof socialismpresumesthatsocialism
would have made inroadsamong the workingclasses if theyhad promoted a prototypeof what laterwould emergeas a populistdiscourse.
The assumptionimpliesthatthe masses,whoevertheywere,were ready
formobilizationand providedthe naturalpoliticalspace fora progressive
movement.The mostpopularaccountof the failureof Argentinesocialism,forinstance,blamesitsleadershipforemulatingEuropean Socialists
and failingto appreciatethereal interests
ofArgentine
workers.2
This articlehopes to contributeto a reassessmentof the Argentine
Socialistexperience.It looksat one aspectofthe Socialistmovement:the
thinkingand strategybehindelectoralparticipation
priorto the coup of
1930, and especiallysurrounding
the complexand intenseyears of the
transition
to democracy,from1g9o to theelectionofHipolitoYrigoyenin
1916.3Democraticpoliticswas important
to ArgentineSocialistsbecause
theychampioneda parliamentary
road to socialismover others,such as
movimiento
obreroen AmericaLatina, ed. Pablo Gonzalez Casanova,vol. 4 (Mexico City:
Siglo Veintiuno,1984), 147-99.
A classicrenditioncan be
historiography.
2. This is especiallytrueoftheleft-nationalist
en Argentina:el sextodomifoundin JorgeAbelardoRamos,Revoluci6nycontra-revoluci6n
nio, 1922-1943, 5thed. (BuenosAires:Plus Ultra,1973), and one morerecentlylaundered
Movimientoobreroargentino.For recentattemptsto reassessthe
in Godio's multivolume
Adelman,"The PoliticalEconworkingclass,see Jeremy
politicalbehavioroftheArgentine
omyofLabour in Argentina,1870-1930,"and OfeliaPianetto,"The Labour Movementand
the HistoricalConjuncture:C6rdoba, 1917-1921," in Essays in ArgentineLabour History,
Adelman(London: Macmillan,1992); RicardoFalc6n, "Izquierdas,
1870-1939, ed. Jeremy
regimenpolitico,cuesti6netnicay cuesti6nsocial en Argentina(1890-1912)," 12 Anuario.
Segunda Epoca, Escuela de Historia,UniversidadNacionalde Rosario(Rosario,1986-87),
367-88. Torcuato S. Di Tella has tried to reconcilethe nationalistrevisionistliterature
of
and more recentstudiesofthe workingclass by emphasizingthe internalheterogeneity
leadersto emulatethe naturalaffinity
the labor movementand the failureofworking-class
for caudillismoamong Argentineworkers,especiallyof the interior.See his "WorkingLatinAmnerican
ResearchReview16:2 (1981),
Class Organizationand Politicsin Argentina,"
33-56.
3. This articlebuilds on RichardWalter'sseminalworkon pre-1930spartypolitics.
in BuenosAires,1918-1930," JournalofInterSee his "MunicipalPoliticsand Government
AmericanStudiesand WorldAffairs16:2 (May 1974), and "Electionsin the CityofBuenos
Social Class and PoliticalPreferences,"
Aires duringthe First YrigoyenAdministration:
"Politipiece is E. SpencerWellhofer,
HAHR 58:4 (Nov. 1978),595-624. A less informative
cal PartyDevelopmentin Argentina:The Emergenceof SocialistPartyParliamentarism,"
Studiesand WorldAffairs17:2 (May 1975), 153-74. Fine work
Journalof Inter-American
on the earlyhistoryof the partysystemcan be foundin Anne L. Potter,"The Failure of
JournalofLatinAmeriPerspective,"
Democracyin Argentina,1916-1930: An Institutional
can Studies 13:1 (May 1981), 83-109; Karen L. Remmer,PartyCompetitionin Argentina
and Chile: PoliticalRecruitment
and PublicPolicy,i8go-i930 (Lincoln:Univ. of Nebraska
theypay scant
Press, 1984),93-104. While Potterand Remmerexaminepartycompetition,
attentionto the Socialistparty.

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SOCIALISM

AND DEMOCRACY

IN ARGENTINA

213

revolutionary
or syndicalroutes.Theirchoice hingedon a numberofassumptionsabout democracy.These assumptions-discussedin the first
section-and the strategythatflowedfromthe theory-discussedin the
second section-set the contextforthe Socialistparty'sinvolvementin
Argentina's
briefexperiencewithdemocracybeforeWorldWar II.
This essayarguesthatArgentine
Socialistsboundthemselvesin a theoreticaltrap.They called fortwotransitions:
a transition
to "real" democracyand a transition
to socialism.By demanding"real" democracy,they
depreciatedthe systemalreadyin operation.At the same time,theyarvotersonlywhenthe march
gued thatworkerswouldbe fullyenlightened
towardsocialismhad begun. The transition
to socialismwas a preconditionfor"real" democracy,but onlyin a "real"democracywould workers
be enlightenedor "conscious"enoughto vote forSocialists.How could
Socialistspursuea parliamentary
road to socialismifthe end resultwas a
precondition
forrationalvotingbehavior?Argentine
Socialistswere never
able to resolvethis teleologicalproblem,and it plagued theirelectoral
whichturneditsbackon the"unconscious"voter.
strategy,
The Questionof Democracy
affectedby the reigningpolitical
ArgentineSocialistswere profoundly
In Marx'stime,the prospectsfora
theoriesof the Second International.
democraticrouteto socialismwere bleak,and Marxhimselfbelievedthat
socialismwould come about onlywitha violentand cataclysmicrevolution.By the 188os, however,afterMarx'sdeath,mattersbegan to change.
In the wake of Bismark'spoliticalopening,GermanSocialistpoliticians
were able to organizeeffectively.
In no time,the GermanSocial Democraticpartybecame the largestpoliticalpartyin Europe. Accordingly,
the ErfurtProgramofthe Second International
(1891)anchoredSocialist
politicsto democracy:onlythroughelectedrepresentative
politicswould
socialismbe achieved.4
At the same time,Socialistgroups(oftenled by European and especially German exiles) began to formin Latin Americancities, mainly
Buenos Aires.These disparategroupswere soon takenoverby a generationofArgentine-born
Socialists.A nucleusofSocialistcenterswitha new
nativeleadershipformedthecoreoftheArgentine
Socialistpartyin 1896.5
Theirdoctrine,however,was importedfromEurope.
4. For a summary,see Carl E. Schorske,GermanSocial Democracy,1905-1917: The
DevelopmentoftheGreat Schism(Cambridge:HarvardUniv.Press,1955), 4-6; JamesJoll,
The Second International, 1889-1914 (London:Weidenfeld
and Nicolson,1955), 7-36; Adam
Przeworskiand JohnSprague,PaperStones:A HistoryofElectoralSocialism(Chicago:Univ.
ofChicago Press, 1986),esp. 29-60.
5. The PartidoSocialistaObreroInternacional
formedin April1895;held itsfirstexecu-

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| HAHR I MAY I JEREMY ADELMAN

214

Socialists,European and Argentine,soon abandonedMarx'spreference forrevolutionary

politics,but theystillsubscribedto Marx'stheoreticalsubordination
ofpoliticsto socialand economicdevelopment.The
laws ofmotiongoverningsocialformations
were drivenby the needs and
level ofsophistication
ofthe economic"base." Politicscould meddlewith
the needs of technology,
but oftenat the cost ofmisuseor misallocation
of the means of production.In time,progresswas markedby less interferenceby politicsin the economicrealm.Capitalism'sgreatsuperiority
was itsabilityto shed noneconomicobstaclesto self-sustained
technological development.Historywas supposedto see politicsincreasingly
mirror
economics.6

TheoreticiansoftheSecondInternational
stretchedtherelativenature
ofpoliticsto a logicalconclusion:a Socialistpoliticalpartycould notpush
a societybeyondwhat the economicbase would allow. The founderof
the ArgentinePartidoSocialista(PS), JuanB. Justo,tookthiscredo seriously. Fromhis readingof Marxand nineteenth-century
positivistssuch
as HerbertSpencerand AugusteComte,he understood
the forceof the phenomenonof productionwithinthe framework
of
history,
the subordination
ofpoliticalandjuridicalinstitutions
to technologyand the economy,and the incessantsocial evolutionwhich
is historyitself,and the weaknessof all writtenlaws which impede
technical-economic
forces.7
For Justo,Marxand Engels "werethe firstto understandthoroughly
the historicalrole ofthe mode ofproduction,to whichare subordinated
all otherphases ofsociallife."8The primacyofeconomicsoverpoliticsin
the courseofhistorywas a powerfultheoreticaltool against
determining
forcesaspiringto takepoliticsbeyondtheparliamentary
realm.
A physicianby training,Justojoined the youthwing of the Union
tive meetingin October,whenit changeditsnameto PartidoSocialistaObreroArgentino;
and held its firstcongressin June1896. Walter,SocialistParty,17-37; Michael F. Mullaney,"The ArgentineSocialistParty,1890-1930: EarlyDevelopmentand InternalSchisms"
(Ph.D. diss., Universityof Essex, 1982), 13-48. For a selectionof writingsby the most
importantMarxistto come fromEurope, see Leonardo Paso, ed., La clase obrera y el
nacimientodel marxismoen la Argentina,selecci6nde articulosde GermanAve Lallemant
(Buenos Aires: Editorial Anteo, 1974).

6. Noberto Bobbio, Which Socialism?:Marxism,Socialismand Democracy, trans.

RogerGriffin,
ed. RichardBellamy(Minneapolis:Univ.ofMinnesotaPress, 1987), 37-39.
7. Juan B. Justo,Economia, valor, interes(Buenos Aires: EditorialLa Vanguardia,
1928), 4; Teoria y practicade la historia(BuenosAires:Lotitoy Barberis,1969), 6-1o. The

formerwas written in 1913, the latter in 1909.

8. Justo,Teoriay practica,6o-6i; and "El CongresoSocialistaInternacional

de Copenhagen"(1910), in Internacionalismo
y patria: obras completas,vol. 5 (BuenosAires:Libreria "La Vanguardia,"1925), 14. Hereafterall referencesto Justo'scompleteworksare cited
as OC.

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SOCIALISM

AND DEMOCRACY

IN ARGENTINA

215

Civica, then an oppositionmovementamongthe politicalforcesof the

late i88os. In 1890, when a groupfromthe Union Civica joined other
forcesin an abortiverebellionagainstPresidentJu'arezCelman,Justolent
his medicalservicesto the cause. The faileduprisinglefta lastingmark:
Justodefectedfromthe Union Civica, charginghis formercohortswith
withtryingto pushpoliticsbeyondtheboundsofwhatconadventurism,
ditionswould allow. His Socialistinclinations
grewalongwithhis disgust
at thevoluntarism
ofthenewbornUnionCivicaRadical(UCR), whichled
a revoltin 1893and forwhichJustoheld a lifetimeabhorrence.9
In 1895,touringEurope and theUnitedStatesafterfinishing
his translation of the firstvolume of Das Kapital, Justowitnessedanotherversion of politicaladventurism:
WilliamJenningsBryan'spopulism.Justo
saw the "freesilver"campaignin the UnitedStatesas the last gasp of a
and a voracious
dyingmiddleclass caughtbetweena swellingproletariat
bourgeoisie.It was retrograde,mystical,and out of step witheconomic
The experiencecontributed
and technicaldevelopments.'0
to Justo'ssuspicion of and hostilitytowardanythingresemblingpopulism,and when
he foundedthe PartidoSocialistain June1896 he made the basic principles clear: all politicalprojectswereto be keptwithinthe realmofwhat
could be modestlyrealized. No politicalproposalcould violatewhatthe
economycould sustain.When dissentdid emergewithinthe party,Justo
preferredwholesaledefectionsto preserveideologicalpurityratherthan
Justo'sfirmhand overthe partyuntil
acceptance of internaldifferences.
his deathin January1928 ensuredthatdemocraticsocialismin Argentina
conformedto thiselementary
reductionofpoliticsto economics."
9. The mostdetailedJustobiographiesare bothbyDardo Cuneo:JuanB. Justo(Buenos
Aires:EditorialAmericalee,1945), andJuan B. Justoy las luchas sociales en la Argentina
(BuenosAires:ALPE, 1956), but theyread morelikehagiography.
Biographicalinformation
is also scatteredthroughout
JoseArico,"La hip6tesisde Justo:una propuestalatinoamericana de recreaci6ndel socialismo"(unpublishedms., Centrode EstudiosContemporaneos,
UniversidadAut6nomade Puebla, 1981). For Justo'schargeagainsttheUCR see Cuneo, 73;
and Justo,"El momentoactual del socialismo:II" (I920), RevistaSocialista6 (June1935),
403-4.
10. Justo,En los Estados Unidos.Apuntesescritosen 1895 para un peri6dicoobrero
(BuenosAires:EditorialLa Vanguardia,1928),65-78.
11. Justo'sinfluenceoverthe partywouldbe hardto uinderestimate.
As a professor
on
the medical facultyof the University
of Buenos Aires,he was seen as the modernizerof
he was seen as the authorityon
Argentinemedicine;as Marx'sfirstArgentinetranslator,
Socialisttheory.His voraciousreadingofEnglish,French,and GermanSocialisttractsensured his unchallengedintellectualleadership.Long afterhis death,Justo'swritingswere
printedin La Vanguardia,thepartynewspaper,and well intothe 1940She was stillcitedto
back up partypolicies.Perhapstheonlysystematic
challelnge
to Justo'ssocialismcame from
the little-known
Manuel Ugarte,who was ejected fromthe partyin 1913. Justo'sview of
internaldissentis the runningthemein Mullaney's"Argentine
SocialistParty."On Ugarte,
see BenitoMarianetti,Manuel Ugarte:un precursoren la lucha emancipadorade Ameirica
Latina (BuenosAires:EdicionesSilalba, 1976),29-92.

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216

I HAHR I MAY I JEREMY ADELMAN

But how did the Socialistsjustifyparticipating

in a systembetter
knownforitswidespreadfraudand corruption,
bothbeforeand afterthe
electoralreformof 1912? International
Socialists,Justoincluded,also had
inheriteda kind of positivist-naturalism
thatwas increasinglyin vogue
afterMarx'sdeath,whenEngels' influenceon Socialistthoughtprevailed.
This thinkingheld thatthe breakdownof capitalismwas a precondition
forsocialism,and thatsuch a breakdownwas inevitableaccordingto the
12 The beliefin thisinevitability,
laws ofmotionofhistory.
reoverarching
inforcedby an elaboratearrayof technicalexplanationsforcapitalism's
economiccontradictions,
enthusedSocialistswiththe further
beliefthat
participationin electoralpoliticsmightcoax the transition.Socialism"the enlightenedexpressionof historicalinevitability,"
to borrowPrzeworski'sdescription-couldplaythedemocraticgamewithoutlosingand
could acceleratethetransition
to a classlessor"real"democracy.ForJusto,
the naturallaws ofprogresswere as sharplydefinedas the solarsystem:
The worldofhistoryis a massofmenand thingsmovedand shapedby
forcesas regularas thosewhichmovethe solarsystemand mold the
earth. Historicalphenomenaare also logicaland necessary,the fatal
consequencesofcombinations
determinedby circumstance.13
The naturaland immutablelaws ofhistorymade socialismthe logical
and fataldestinyofsociety.Butwhatdeterminedthatsocialismwould be
the naturaloutcome?Justoand his mostdevoutfollowerswere doctors,
and as such were versedin Darwin'sevolutionary
biology.For manyof
than Marx'sdiathem, Spencer's Social Darwinismwas moreformative
lectics.14 Socialismwould win by naturalselection:in economicterms,
the collectivepracticesof socialismwere superiorto the individualized
practicesofcompetitive
capitalism.Andsincethefittest
survive,socialism
would simplyelbowcapitalismintothepast. Understanding
thebiological
basis of social development,in Justo'sview,dispelledidealistnotionsof
the past and futureand, at the same time,offereda simpleexplanation
forthe adventof socialism:socialismadaptsbetterthancapitalismto the
15
exigenciesoftechnology.
Challengeto
12. PeterGay,The DilemmaofDemocraticSocialism:Eduard Bernstein's
Marx (New York:Collier Books, 1962), 87-88, 298-99; and Adam Przeworski,Capitalism
and Social Democracy (Cambridge:CambridgeUniv.Press, 1985), 49-50.
13. Justo,Teoria y practica, 9-0o.
14. See, forinstance,Nicolas Repetto'sconfessionthatSpencer was moreinfluential
and thatMarxwas unintelligible,
in Mi paso por la politica,de Roca a Yrigoyen(Buenos
socialista
Aires:S. Reuda, 1956),35. See also EnriqueDickmann,Recuerdosde un inilitante
(Buenos Aires: Editorial La Vanguardia, 1949), 418.

15. Justo'sconfidencein naturalselectionled him to argue thatthe laws of evolution

toolsthanwere dialectics.Justo,Teoriay practica,19-27; and "El
were betterexplanatory

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SOCIALISM

AND DEMOCRACY

IN ARGENTINA

217

Hence politicswas subordinateto economics,and economics was

bound by the laws ofnaturalselection,whichwould make the transition
to socialisminevitable.But ifpoliticswas onlyrelativeand socialisminevitable,whydid Socialistsengagein democraticpoliticsat all? Socialist
partiesworldwidethrewthemselvesinto the melee of late nineteenthcenturydemocraticpoliticsbelievingthattheycould guide the progress
oftransition.
As theenlightened
bearersofthetruth,theycould "legislate
thesocietyintosocialism"(toborrowanotherofPrzeworski's
phrases)and
mitigatetheviolenceand costofthetransition.'6
Capitalism,by enlarging
theranksoftheproletariat,
wouldcreatemoreSocialistvoters,and liberal
would graduallygiveway to Socialistones. "When thisingovernments
fluencebecomespreponderant,"
wroteJustoin 1902, "the Statewillhave
lostitspolice function,
and the government
willbe electedto develop,to
the maximumofits ability,and forthe good ofsociety,its administrative
17
function."

The intellectualarsenal to justifySocialistparticipationin electoral

politicsrestedon one criticallink:it assumedthatworkerswould automaticallyand necessarilytranslatetheirobjectiveinterests
as workersinto
subjectivepracticesas Socialistvoters.Workerswere expected to vote
Socialistbecause theywere workers.Justas economicsdeterminedpolitics, the voter'slocationin the productionprocessdeterminedelectoral
preference.For Justo,"experienceis the sourceofall knowledgeand the
inexorablecritiqueof illusion,"and since workwas the mostimportant
and constantexperience,it was onlynaturalthatthe experienceofbeing
theworkeras to his lamentablecondition.'8
proletarianinstructed
Experience, in Justo'sview, "obviously"determinedconsciousness,and "once
is feltand understood,nothingcan impede the workerfrom
exploitation
his rightto strugglefora betterlife."'9
defendinghimselfand maintaining
In case the automaticconnectionbetweenexperienceand consciousness,betweenobjectivelocationin theproduction
processand thesubjectiveinterestin an alternative
societywas interrupted,
Socialistsassumed
an educationalrole. Facing a societywitha strongCatholicchurchand
caudillistatraditions,
Justobecame an avid exponentofliteracycampaigns
and public and seculareducationto erode archaicCatholicand personrealismoingenuo"(1903),in La realizaci6ndel socialismo,OC vol. 6 (BuenosAires:Editorial

La Vaiiguardia, 1947), 255-63.

i6. Palabra Socialista,Feb. 15, 1914;AdamPrzeworski,
"Social Democracyas a Historical Phenomenon," New Left Review 122 (1980), 31; Przeworski, Capitalism and Social
Democracy, 47-50; Przeworski and Sprague, Paper Stones, 29-31.
17. Justo, "El socialismo" (1902), in Realizaci6n del socialismo, 201.
i8. Justo,Teoriay practica,516.
19. Justo,"La acci6nobrera"(1896), in Realizaci6ndel socialismo,33.

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218

I HAHR I MAY I JEREMY ADELMAN

alist vestiges. In his writingshe claimed to followin the footstepsof

Argentina'smid-nineteenth-century
liberalarchitectofpubliceducation,
Domingo Sarmiento.And like Sarmiento,Justowas unkindto backward
criollo elementsfromthe interior,whose hostilityto European mores
blockedArgentines'
pathto self-awareness.20
The Argentinecase was twisted,however,by an additionalproblem:
the systemto whichthe Socialistscommitted
themselveswas nota freely
operatingdemocracyuntil 1912, at least formale voters. Unlike most
oftheirEuropean and NorthAmericancolleagues,Argentinedemocratic
Socialistsdecidedtoparticipate
in electionsriddledwithfraudand corruptionand in whichonlya smallproportion
ofeligiblevotersparticipated.
Whereas the UCR refusedto legitimatesuch a regimeand sustaineda
ferventand intransigent
positionin favorof electoralreform,the Socialists,thoughunhappy,playedbytherules.Why?Accordingto Justo,"new
politicalrelationscorrespondto newmodesofproduction,"
and thespread
ofcapitalismeventually
wouldcreateliberalpoliticalpractices.2'
The bourgeois revolutionof the nineteenthcenturyallowed capitalistrelationsto
productionand marketforcesto breakdownall vestigesoftheold regime.
Capitalismflourishedin the wake of a seriesof reforms:independence
fromSpain brokethe yokeof mercantilism;
the abolitionof slaveryand
the mitaforcedemployersto relyincreasingly
on purelyeconomicmeasuresto recruitlabor;and the railwaysallowednew coloniststo establish
specializedproductionunits-farmsand chacras-for theworldmarket.
Indeed, accordingto Mario Bravo,one ofJusto'sfollowers,"the railway
has democratizedour countrymorethanthe representative
and federal
systemenshrinedin theconstitution."22
But thisrevolutionwas incomplete.A truecapitalistbourgeoisiedid
notsurface.Instead,as thevalue ofland rosewiththeconstruction
ofthe
railways,the introduction
ofnew breedsoflivestock,and a liberalaccess
to creditthatfomentedspeculation,theArgentine
dominantclass intensifiedits investment
patterns:it investeditsfortunes
notin intensiverural
20.
See Justo,Educaci6n puiblica, OC vol. 3 (Buenos Aires: La Vanguardia,1930),
which is entirelydevoted to the themeof education.See also "Maestrosy no maestros"
(n.d.), in RevistaSocialista7 (Apr.1937),241; "El trabajoy el estudio,"in RevistaSocialista

8 (May 1937), 323; Luis Caminos Ceballos to Alfredo Torcelli, Oct. 27, 1913, Archivo Gen-

cited as
eral de la Naci6n,Buenos Aires,ArchivoAlfredoTorcelli,Sala 8-7-8-16(hereafter
AGN, AAT).
21. Justo,Realizaci6n del socialismo, 200.
en el programadel partidosocialista,"RevistaArgen22. Mario Bravo,"El unitarismo
tina del Ciencias Politicas5 (1912),287. Socialistshad theirown readingofArgentinehissaw the thinkers
ofthe Generationof 1837as followersofBernardo
tory,whichmistakenly
againstthe backwardfederalismof the
Rivadaviaand beacons ofan enlightenedcentralism
interior.

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SOCIALISM

AND DEMOCRACY

IN ARGENTINA

219

productionbut in extensiveestancias.The estancieroclass aimed its produce to the worldmarketbut used resourcesinefficiently.
Moreover,by
monopolizingthe land, the estancierosblockedthe creationofa dynamic
class of pettybourgeoisruralproducersalong the lines of NorthAmerican farmers.If powerfullandownerswere the creationof international
capitalism,the estancieroclass nippedArgentinecapitalismin the bud.23
This stultified
bourgeoisrevolutiontherebyheld back liberaldemocratic
progress.Justoand his followersexcoriatedthe "South Americanplutocrats"and the "luxurycivilization"theycreated,forit preventedpolitics
fromtakingitsnaturalcourse.
Due to the barbarismand corruptionof the oligarchy,the electoral
strugglepresentssome exceptionaldifficulties
amongthe organized
workers,only the select few,who by intelligenceor character,can
understandpoliticsseriously.24
The irreversible
pressureoftheforcesofproduction,however,would
sweep awayall precapitalist
obstacles.The autonomousflourishing
ofthe
forcesof productionwould therebycreate the simultaneousconditions
forboth a liberalrevolution-byentrenching
liberaldemocracy-and a
Socialisttransformation-by
openingthe eyes of workersto theirclass
wouldsimultaneously
position.Liberalreforms
lead to socialism:
Thus whenthereis freedomto struggle-freetradersand protectionists,landownersand tenants-whentheworkingpeople cease to look
with indifference
at the taskof fencingin theirland or introducing
sheep-shearing
devices,theywilldemandall sortsofimprovements
in
productionto correspondwithan improvement
in theirlifestyle,
and in
thismannercollaborateto createan alternative
pathofdevelopment.25
In thisfashion,Justoand his followers
claimedto be the trueheirsof
Argentina'sgreatnineteenth-century
liberals,MarianoMoreno,Bernarfailedbourgeoisrevo23. The mostforceful
rendition
ofthisexplanationofArgentina's
lutioncan be foundin Justo'sbooksEl socialismoargentino(BuenosAires:La Vanguardia,
1910), 10-24, and La teoria cientifica de la historia y la politica argentina (BuenosAires:La
Vanguardia,1898), 18-49. This thesishas become the dominantexplanationofwhyArgentina failed to go the route of Australiaand Canada. For some recentexplorationsof the
An
historiography,
see JuanCarlos Koroland Hilda Sabato, "IncompleteIndustrialization:
ArgentineObsession,"Latin American Research Review 25:1 (1990), 7-30; Waldo Ansaldi,
"Reflexioneshist6ricassobrela debilidadde la democraciaargentina(1880-1930)," 12 Anuario. SegundaEpoca, Escuela de Historia,UniversidadNacionalde Rosario,391-421; Jeremy
Adelman,FrontierDevelopment:Land, Labour and Capital on the WheatlandsofArgenPress,forthcoming),
esp. chaps.
tinaand Canada, 1890-1914 (New York:OxfordUniversity
i and 8.
24. Justo,Realizaci6n del socialismo, 247; also in Teoria y practica, 225.
25. Justo,Teoria cient4fica,
46; also in Realizaci6ndel socialismo,200.

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220

| HAHR I MAY I JEREMY ADELMAN

dinoRivadavia,DomingoSarmiento,
and especiallyJuanBautistaAlberdi
liberalswho, iftheyhad been allowedto realize theirprojects,would
have forgeda societyakin to those of the BritishDominions.26In the
meantime,itwas up to theArgentine
Socialiststoperseverein thecause of
liberalism
political
againstla politicacriolla-which galvanizedrelations
betweenestancierosand unenlightened
subalternclasses.Butbecause the
realm of politicswas only relativeand "real" democracyimplieda cercould notbe pushedtoo quickly.For
tainilevel ofconsciousness,reforms
thesereasons,Socialistsdislikedtheadventurism
ofthe UCR (and eventuofanarchistsand Communists,
who espoused armed
ally the voluntarism
struggle).27

If ArgentineSocialistssaw the nineteenth-century

liberalsas heralds
ofprogress,theyalso sharedtheirdistrustofthe masses.Justowas wary
ofthe prematureintroduction
ofuniversalsuffrage:
by forcingunenlightened citizensto vote, criollobarbarianscould retainthe reinsof power
and enjoytheillusionofbeingliberals.In Spainand LatinAmerica,Justo
cautioned,oligarchicalgovernments
"have given the rightto vote to a
people who forthe mostpart neverasked forit and do not know how
On thispointJustowas unbending:the working
to exercisethatright."28
class had to be "conscious"first,and thenit could earn and exerciseits
rights.For thisreasonJustoneveragreedto a coalitionwiththe UCR in
supportof electoralreform,and he denouncedgeneralstrikesaimed at
ofthedayto implement
forcingthe government
changes.29
Herein lay one of the centralpoliticalproblemsfacingthe Argentine
Socialists.Consciousnesswas a prerequisiteforproperelectoralpolitics.
But withouta fullbourgeoisrevolutionor pervasivecapitalism,proletarian consciousnesswas truncated.Thus the Socialistssimultaneously
had
to push forgradualdemocratization
in accordancewitheconomicdevelopmentand to infuseworkerswitha sozialistischer
Geistthroughschools,
26. La Vanguardia, Feb. 3, 1914; Justo,Teoria cientffica,37-40; Dickmann,Recuerdos, 8o-8i; Repetto,Mi paso por la politica,113-14;MarioBravo,"Organizaci6n,programa
RevistaArgentinade Ciencias Politicas
y desarrollodel PartidoSocialistaen la Argentina,"
10:56 (May 1915), 1i9. It is interesting to note that when Jean Jaures visited Buenos Aires

in 1911, he gave a seriesofspeeches,the mostmemorableofwhichvindicatedthe political

thoughtof JuanBautistaAlberdi.See JeanJaures,Conferenciaspronunciadasen Buenos
withtheFrenchSocialAires(BuenosAires:La Vanguardia,1922). ForJusto'sfullagreement
liberals,see Tulio
ist, see his prologuein the same booklet.On the nineteenth-century
Halperin-Donghi,Una nacionpara el desiertoargentino(BuenosAires:CentroEditorde
Revista de
AmericaLatina, 1982), 19-55; and Leon Pomer,"El estadonacionalargentino,"
Historiade America no. 105 (Jan.-June1988),53-88.
de Copenhagen,"38.
27. Justo,"El congresosocialistainternacional
28. Justo,Teoria y practica, 449-50.
29. On thisissue the legacyofEduard Bernsteinand Rosa Luxembourg,who favored
the use ofstrikesforthevote,had no influenceon Justo.See, forinstance,Justo,"La admisi6nde gruposgremialesen el PartidoSocialista"(ig9o), in Realizaci6ndel socialismo,277.

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SOCIALISM

AND DEMOCRACY

IN ARGENTINA

221

libraries,cooperatives,and unions,so thattheywould recognizetheir

class interests.The goal ofthistwo-track
was thatwhenuniversal
strategy
suffrage
was trulyin place, theworkerswouldbe readyto exercisetheir
rightsconsciously,by supportingsocialism.30
In thisfashionJustoand his
followers
whitewashedanyapparentconflicts
in playingby theruleswhile
chargingthatthe rulesperpetuatedtheold regime.
The PartidoSocialistaat the Polls
Even beforethe PS was founded,Socialistsranforpublicoffice.In 1896,
nine Socialistcentersformeda local federation
to fieldcandidatesin the
Federal Capital for the March electionsfornationaldeputies. Out of
12,973 votes cast, the groupreceived 138. For Enrique Dickmann,the
Russian-bornfollowerofJusto,the resultswere not surprising:
fromthe
startthe campaignhad been symbolic,designedto inject"reason"into
the occasion.31In Juneof thatyearthe partywas founded,thoughwith
principlesreflecting
theprimacyplaced on economicsoverpolitics.To be
sure,as earlyas the 1895elections,candidatesdid championthe cause of
electoralreform.The party'sexecutivecommittee,drafting
the electoral
in October 1895,dividedit intoeconomicand politicalparts.At
platform
the top ofthe politicallistwas a call foruniversalsuffrage.
Yet when the
firstsix pointsin the party'sprogramwere adopted in June1896, they
dealtwithworkconditions,
followedbythestruggleformonetary
stability
and the eventualabolitionof paper money.At least in a formalsense,
electoralreformwas at thebottomofthelist.32
The party'srangewas limitedto the FederalCapitaldistrict,and only
later did it spread to otherurbancenters.The 1898 partycongressincludedno representatives
frombeyondthecapital.The nationalexecutive
committee'sreporturged militantsto turntheireyes to new districtsthoughthe same reportassuredmembersthatsocialism'sslow penetrationofotherregionswas due to the economicand politicalbackwardness
outsidethe country'smaincity.33
Part of the problemlay in the party'sstructure.It was not a decentralizedcommitteestructurealong the lines of the UCR and the main
Americanpoliticalparties,but a tightcentralization
in the hands of the
30. Justo,"El socialismo,"in Realizaci6ndel socialismo,200.
31. Dickmann, Recuerdos, 101-4.

32. Mullaney,"ArgentineSocialistParty,"47-48; JacintoOddone, Historiadel socialismoargentino,1896-1g91, vol. i (BuenosAires:CentroEditorde AmericaLatina, 1983),

46, 66. The call forsuffrage
includedwomen,and the PS shouldgo on recordas the most
in Argentina.
Ultimately,
however,economicissues
consistent
championofwomen'ssuffrage
prevailed.
33. La Vanguardia, Feb. 19 and Apr.23, 1898.

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| HAHR I MAY I JEREMY ADELMAN

222
TABLE

i:

SocialistPartyVotein the FederalCapital,1896-ig9o

Year

Vote

1896
1898

134
105
135
165

1goo
1902
1904
1906

1908
1g9o

1,257
3,495
5,178
7,oo6

Source: La Vanguardia, selected years.

executivecommittee.Delegates dispatchedfromthe capital set up regional brancheswhose credentialshad to be approvedby the executive
committee.This leftlittleroomforspontaneousorganization
frombelow
or regionalprogramsthatmightdiffer
accordingto local issues.
In 1898 the partyfieldedcandidatesagain,winninga mere 105 votes
amid conditionsoffraudand corruption.34
It repeatedtheabysmalperformance in the nextfewelections(Table i), thoughthe poor showingdid
not drivethe partyeitherto abstainor to call on tradeunionsupportto
reinforceitscampaign.
It was not until 1904 thatthe partytastedsuccess. AlfredoPalacios
became the firstSocialistdeputy,elected with 804 votes to represent
the neighborhoodof La Boca.35Underthe reformist
wingofJoaquinV.
a briefand verymodestelecGonzailez,PresidentRoca's interior
minister,
toralreformwas initiated.Butthe 1905UCR revoltand theretrenchment
of the new president,Quintana,reversedthe reformsin 1906. Palacios
losthis seat in the nextelection.
While the Socialistsparticipatedsymbolically
in electoralpoliticsand
the UCR stagedoccasionaluprisings,thecountry's
workerswere engaged
in an increasingly
bitterconfrontation
in thestreetsofitslargecities.After
the wave of strikesand unionorganizationintensified,
1902,
peakingin
theyears1909 and 1g_0.36 In spiteoftheviolenceon theshopfloorand on
34. Some of the campaignersrememberedthe atmospherewell. See Dickmann,Recuerdos, 117; Repetto,Mi paso por la politica,84-85.
35. La Vanguardia,Mar. 19, 1904; Dickmann,Recuerdos,119-21.
36. DepartamentoNacionalde Trabajo,Estadisticade las Huelgas(BuenosAires,1940),
20. For a generalsurveyof strikeaction,see Adelman,"PoliticalEconomyof Labour in
Argentina";and RonaldoMunck,"CyclesofClass Struggleand the Makingofthe Working
Class in Argentina,189o-192o,"JournalofLatinAmericanStudies19:i (May 1987), 19-39.
The best summaryof statepoliciesin responseto workeragitationis JuanSuriano,Trabajadores, anarquismoy estado represor:de la Ley de Residenciaa la Ley de Defensa Social
(1902-1910)
(BuenosAires:CentroEditorde Am6ricaLatina, 1988).

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SOCIALISM

AND DEMOCRACY

IN ARGENTINA

223

the streets,the PS stayedalooffromconflicts.The party'srelationswith

tradeunionswere stormy.By rigidlydistinguishing
betweenpoliticaland
economicpraxis,the partysegregatedelectoralfromtradeunionorganization.Thus, Socialistswere averseto massiveorganization
ofworkerson
the shop floor,leavingsuch mobilizationto professional
tradeunionists.
Only among the railwayworkers(the rankand fileof La Fraternidad)
and the typographical
workersdid the Socialisttrade union leadership
emerge.
Accordingto the party'sstatutes,trade unionistshad to affiliate
throughlocal partyoffices.Only in LgLo, at the party'sninthcongress,
was the firstarticleof the statutesamendedto allow the representation
ofagrupacionesde oficio(tradeunionaffiliates)
to bridgeunionand party
militancy.
By then,however,unionculturehad takena different,
syndicalisttack.Onlythe typographical
workersestablishedaffiliates
to theparty,
thoughwoodworkers,metalworkers,
and smithsset up short-lived
agrupaciones. In early 1912, at the party'stenthcongress,the typographical
workerssponsoreda resolutioncallingfora commissionon unionpropaganda and a special committeeto enlistthe supportof union affiliates.
Althoughthe clauses were approved,the executivecommitteeinsisted
thatnew unionaffiliates
shouldnotbe allowedto swaytheciviland political operationoftheparty.38
This splitbetweenthepoliticalandtheeconomicsometimesled Socialists to adopt hostilestancesagainststrikesthatcalled foranythingmore
thanmerelyeconomicconcessions.Strikeactionwas theindependentterrain of unions,and aside fromcallingforsolidarity
withpicketers,the
partydid next to nothingto supportthem.The rankand filewho did
bridgethe gulfbetweentheunionsand thepartychafedunderthe strain.
Roque Masi, a meatpackerfromSan Nicolas,struggledforyearsto enroll
his companeros in the party.Afterenlistingtwo, he wrotebitterlyto a
friend:
I thinkI have been successful,and I am proud,and hope to get many
more. It is a real shamethatwe countonlyon the "conscious"votes,
37. RuthThompson,"The Limitations
ofIdeologyin theEarlyArgentine
Labour Movement:Anarchismin TradeUnions,18go-1920," JournalofLatinAmericanStudiesi6:i (May
1984), 81-89, and "TradeUnionStructures:
Some NeglectedIssues,"in Essays in Argentine
Labour History,ed. Adelman.
38. On the agrupacionesde oficio,see PartidoSocialista,"Orden del dia del IX Congreso Nacionaldel PartidoSocialista,"May 23-24, 1910, pp. 15-16. On the typographical
workers'resolution,see AdolfoDickmann,Los congresossocialistas:40 anos de democracia
(BuenosAires:La Vanguardia,1936), 19-20. The same splitbefellthe leadersofthe incipient agrarianmovementafterthe Gritode Alcortauprisingin 1912. Early efforts
to make
the Federaci6nAgrariaArgentinaaddressruraltenantdisgruntlement
withthe partyfloundered. See JeremyAdelman,"Una cosecha por levantar:el PartidoSocialistay el campo
antesde la PrimeraGuerraMundial,"Anuariodel IEHS 4 (1989).

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224

| HAHR I MAY I JEREMY ADELMAN

and thatour ranksare filledwithSocialistswho thinktheyare Socialistsonlybecause theyread La Vanguardia.9

Protestingagainststaterepressionalso raisedthe trickyissue of citizenship.Repressionwas directedespeciallyat non-Argentines,
who composed the bulk of the urbanworkforce.The state'sopen repressionof
foreign-born
anarchist"insurgents"
dissuadedthose workersfromopen
expressionsofdissent.Nordid thestateurgeforeign-born
workersto take
up citizenship;indeed,itpractically
discouragedthem.Moreover,conservativeregimesdid theirutmosttofosterimmigration
oftemporary
workers
fromItaly and Spain to workon the pampean harvest,only to return
home at the end of the season. The famedgolondrina(swallow)seasonal
migration
did nothingto rootimmigrant
workersin Argentine
society.Immigrantschose notto botherapplyingforcitizenshipto a countrythat,at
least officially,
did notwantthem.40
The positionof the PS duringthisperiod may help to explainwhy
workersdid not supporteven minimalpoliticalreforms.While the state
unleashedthe police againststrikers
and stuffed
ballotboxes in the country'selection,the partyand its leaderscalled on non-Argentines
to take
up citizenshipand togethercreatea newArgentina.4'
Thiswas reasonable
enough,forwithoutbecomingcitizenstheycould notvote. But withlow
in generaland persistent
ratesofnaturalization
ethnicsolidarities
thatisolated immigrant
workersfromthe formalpoliticalrealm,the Socialists'
citizenshipdrivesfloundered.
Justohad unkindwordsforthosewho refusedto changetheirnationality."Foreignershave not made use of theirrights,whichcost so little
to acquire,"he wrote,"forlack ofvalue placed on the battleagainstthe
vices ofla politicacriolla,or outofignoranceand lackofpubliceducation,
or due to greed, or due to negativeand sterilepatrioticpreoccupations
withtheirhomeland.... 42 Socialistsexpoundedon thechargeofgreed:
workerscame to Argentinaonlyto make moneyand not to participate
in civil life-an ironicaccusation,giventhe Socialists'own primacyon
economicmatters.43
39. Roque Masi to AlfredoTorcelli,July24, 1914, AGN, AAT.
40. Suriano,Trabajadores,3; Adelman,"PoliticalEconomyof Labour in Argentina";
were bereftof political
Falc6n, "lzquierdas,"367-88. This does not mean thatimmigrants
was robust.See Hilda SabatoanidEma Cibotti,
channels.Atlocal and informal
levels,activity
"Hacer politica en Buenos Aires: los italianosen la escena puiblicaportefia,i86o-i88o,"
Boletindel Institutode HistoriaArgentinay Americana2 (1990).
Internacionalismo
y patria,7, 93, 199.
41. See La Vanguardia,Mar. 22, 1906; Justo,
42. Justo,"Nuevas practicasy no nuevasleyes,"El Diario del Pueblo (Buenos Aires),
Oct. 22, 1899. Throughout1899 Justocarriedon a visceralcampaignin thispaper against
who refusedto takeup citizenship.
immigrants
43. See VirgilioAuresin La Vanguardia,Feb. 10, 1912.

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SOCIALISM

AND DEMOCRACY

IN ARGENTINA

225

The Socialists'frustration
sometimesled themto attackethnicinsularity.Justo'sopen disdain fornationalismled him to condemnethnic
he dreamedofa "razanacional."By rejectingethnicdifferences,
diversity;
however,theSocialistsalienatedthoseworkerswhowantedto retaintheir
heritage.The anarchists,by contrast,were noticeablymore sensitiveto
ethnicparticularity-inpart because it reinforcedtheirgenerallyantipoliticalviews.44
The labor unrestpeaked in 0gog-1owitha seriesof generalstrikes,
followedby anotherroundofantilaborlegislation.DuringPresidentJose
Figueroa Alcorta'sterm(L9o6-191o), fivestatesof siege were declared,
leading to the Law of Social Defenseof 1g1o, whichimposeddraconian
penaltiesagainstsubversion.But if 1g1o was the culminationof nearlya
decade of capital-laborviolence,it was also the beginningof a new era.
The old regimewas exhausted,and manymembersofthe establishment
recognizedthe necessityofstavingoffcivilwar.When Roque SaienzPefia
was elected in late 1910, he promisedwidespreadchanges.A projectfor
free,compulsory,
and secretballotingwas sentto Congressin 1911 and
passed in early1912.
While the PS hithertohad emphasizedcitizenshipand economicmatters,it had said littleabout democracy.Its mainorgan,La Vanguardia,
had scarcelymentionedthe congressionaldebate on democraticreform.
SaienzPefia,withhis interiorminister,
IndalecioGomez, had draftedthe
broad outlinesof democraticaperturein Europe even beforereturning
to ArgentinafromRome in mid-1g9o. Since the PS alreadyabided by
the old rules, appearingunconcernedabout immediatedemocratization
and avoidingthe role ofintransigent
opposition,the SaienzPe-nagovernmentfeltno pressureto strikea deal. Instead,thenewlyelectedpresident
turnedto the UCR and HipolitoYrigoyenforan agreementon the contentofthebill.45It was betweentheestablishment
and itsmostvociferous
thatthenew rulesofthe gamewere
opponents(aside fromtheanarchists)
drawnup.
When the new law tookeffect,so did a new constellationof forces.
44. See, forinstance,Justo,"Por qu6 no me gustaescribirpara una hoja que se dice
israelita,"Vida Nuestra(Nov. 1923). See also Enrique Dickmann'sown deniialofhis Judaismand Russianbackgroundin Recuerdos,43, 88. The ethnicquestionand Socialistpolitics
have been exploredby Falc6n in "lzquierdas,"367-8o, and Pianetto,"Labour Movement
and HistoricalConjuncture."
45. For a detaileddiscussionofthelegislation,see Dario Cant6n,Eleccionesy partidos
politicosen la Argentina:historia,interpretation
y balance: 1910-1 966 (BuenosAires:Siglo
VeintiunoArgentinaEditores,1973),21-22; MiguelAngelCarcano,Sienz Peiia, la revolude BuenosAires,1986), 146-64;
ci6n por los comicios(BuenosAires:EditorialUniversitaria
RobertoGarcia Pinto,"IndalecioG6mez y la politicade su tiempo,"Boletindel Institutode
San Felipe y Santiagode EstudiosHist6ricosde Salta 6:26 (1952), 124.

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226

| HAHR

I MAY I JEREMY

ADELMAN

Those who
to inclusionary.
Overnight,politicsshiftedfromexclusionary
them,bore the
until1912 had playedby the rules,therebylegitimating
whilethosewho refusedto playand
politicalcostofthenewarrangement,
heirs
had criticizedfromthe outsidecould now claim to be the rightful
despiteitshopes offorming
a vibrant
ofreform.The olderestablishment,
conservativeparty,benefitedleast; the Radicalsbenefitedmost.The net
gains forthe Socialistswere mixed,but theyno longerenjoyedalmost
working-class
voters.Suddenly
unchallengeddominionoverthecountry's
the PartidoSocialistawas forcedto competewiththe UCR forthe same
votingconstituencies.
and havingignoredthe
Having takenno positionin the negotiations
congressionaldebates,the Socialistswere forcedto accept whatthe new
law offered.They were pleased withsome of the clauses, includingthe
same reforms
thathad helped Palacioswin in 1904 (the secretballotand
single-memberconstituencies).But in a long editorial,La Vanguardia
attackedthelegislation,especiallytheclause makingvotingobligatory.
The obligatory
theprincipal
vote,above all, whichmaynotconstitute
characteristic
ofthe new law, is a leap intothe unknown,whichmay
and unconleave us worseoffWill it cause, amongthe downtrodden
scious, more venality?Or will thosenow submergedin indifference
become sane forcesin civillife?46
While itacceptedsomepoints,theeditorialdenouncedthelegislation
as anothertwist"byouraristocratic
president"
who"has madean electoral
reformforthe bourgeoisie,and not forthe people." Yet the PS agreed
On the surface,
to abide by the rules,just as it had before,symbolically.
the Socialistssneeredat the possibleeffectsof the new law and at their
principalrivals.Deeper down,theyrecognizedthatthiswas the party's
to make sweepinggains in the wake of the consciousnessopportunity
raisingeventsof 9gogand g91o. Aboundingwithoptimism,theythrew
themselvesintothe electoralmelee.
The law tookeffect
congressional
midterm
electionswere
immediately:
posted forApril7, 1912. Fromtheoutset,the PS decided to concentrate
itsefforts
in thecitiesofBuenosAiresand Rosario,wherethevastmajority
ofpartyaffiliates
lived. Outsidethe cities,it wouldtaketimeto generate
support.The problemwithelections,La Vanguardianoted,was the long
tradition
ofignoranceand indifference
amongthemasses:theydid notap46. La Vanguardia,Feb. 9, 1912. See also the executivecommitteereporton electoral
reform,PartidoSocialista,"Ordendel Dia del X CongresoNacionaldel PartidoSocialista,"
Jan.13-14, 1912, pp. 9-10. Whilethe recordclearlyshowsthatthe PS did nottakethe new
law seriously,thisdid notpreventJusto,Dickmann,or Repetto,in theirsubsequentwriting
and memoirs,fromdescribingthe Saenz Pefialaw as a milestone.

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SOCIALISM

AND DEMOCRACY

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227

preciatethemeaningofthevote,and itwas up to thepartyto demonstrate

thattheirvote mattered.ThroughoutFebruaryand March,partyactivists blasted the UCR and other"oligarchic"partiesfortheiremptiness,
averringthatonly seriousparties(like the PS) had a "real," "practical,"
and "concrete"essence thatdid notfallintothe melange"ofabstraction
and imprecision."47
Socialistsattackedthe "unconscious"votersand the
partiesthatattractedthem.On theeve oftheelection,Justodeclaredthat
workerswho failedto vote Socialistbetrayedtheirinterests.
Withgood reasonit is said thatcollectivemiserycan be explainedby
theincapacityofthepeople to sustaina collectivestruggleforlife....
We representthe electoralorganizationof the workingpeople, and
aspire, throughpoliticalpower,to raise theirstandardof livingand
preparethemfortheircompleteemancipation.48
A self-righteous
tonelaced a messagethatdrummedhome the meaninglessnessofelectionsunderthetutelageofpoliticacriollawhileinsisting
thatcitizensparticipate.The dual messagecalled on electorsto legitimate
a regimethatcould notmeettheirdemands.Hope, as faras thevoterwas
concerned,residednotin thesubjectivewillofthecitizenry
butin theobforceofeconomic
jective forceofeconomicdevelopment.The long-term
change would eventuallymold politics,but in the meantime,Socialists
had to prepare the citizenryby a modicumof legislationand symbolic
in elections.
participation
The electionresults,however,pleased the Socialists:votersfromthe
capital sent JuanB. Justoand AlfredoPalacios to Congress.The vote
was close. The UCR and the PS joustedforleadershipwithinthe capital
(Table 2). Beyondthe capital,the PS returnswerethreadbare(Table 3).
The resultspromptedsome rethinking
by PS leaders. Where it mattered(thatis, among"conscious"voters),the PS clearlydid notmonopotheresults
lize votes;itcompetedcloselywiththeRadicals.Nevertheless,
canand thecompleteeclipseoftheconservative
did exceed expectations,
didatesin thecapitalled someto concludethattheold oligarchy
had been
and challengeto Socialdethroned.The UCR's triumph
acrossthecountry
ists in the capitalwas due, notedLa Vanguardia,to its "use of different
methodsfromthe old shenanigansof the oligarchs. . . whichforus imand in government."
plies thatwe mustwatchthemcloselyin Parliament
The PS recognizedthatitwas no longersufficient
"to marchin itsnormal
pace withthe pleasure of knowingthatgood citizenswill recognizeits
value." But such a germof reappraisalwas buriedin the convictionthat
47. La Vanguardia,Mar. 5, 1912.
48. Ibid., Mar. 9, 12, and 24, 1912; also El Ariete(Quilmes),Feb.
sis added.

20,

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1912.

Emnpha-

| HAHR I MAY I JEREMY ADELMAN

228

2: Votesforthe Socialistand RadicalPartiesin NationalElections

in the Federal Capital,1912-1930

TABLE

Uni6nCivica Radical
Year

Number

1912

35,896

1914
1916

37,517
61,604

1918

74,200

24.25
32.00

48.o8

43.16

60,364
68,195

1924

71,074

38.53

212,365
83,251

76.29
27.99

117,022

Number

Percentage

1920
1922

1926
1928
1930

PartidoSocialista
Percentage

32,451
43,267
52,895

21.29

55,000
54,813
77,373

33.98

36.92
41.29

49,366

37.29

37.59
59.80

28.72
30.21

41.95
32.50

63,589
34,780
83,076

12.49

27.93

Note: 1916 and 1922 were presidentialelections.The restwere congressional.The UCR

resultsfor1926 and 1928 includebreakawayfactions.The 1918 resultsdo not include the
whilethe
35,281 votes(20.54 percent)castforAlfredoPalacios'PartidoSocialistaArgentino,
1930 resultsdo not includethe 109,323 votes(36.74 percent)cast forthe PartidoSocialista
Independiente.
Source: Dario Cant6n,Materialespara el estudiode la sociologiapoliticaen la Argentina
(Buenos Aires:InstitutoTorcuatodi Tella, 1968),81-103.

TABLE T:
Year
1912

1914
1916
1918
1920
1922
1924
1926
1928

Votesforthe PartidoSocialistaby Province,1912-1930

Federal Capital

SantaFe

32,451
43,267

4,354
6,719

52,895

7,127
7,691
13,751

3,679

12,379
10,562

3,004
2,298

17,820
19,849

5,651

49,366
55,000
54,813

1930

BuenosAires

77,373
63,589
34,780

83,076

26,408

C6rdoba

140

All others

2,222

261

1,467

1,978

693
1,575

3,704
5,422
ii,688

577

7,877

i,815

120

1,809
778
1,136
1,260

2,386

9,682

10,042

9,886

10,604

Source: See Table 2.

historywas on the side of the Socialists;thatthe naturallaws of motion

unveiledthe superiormessageofsocialismand theintrinsic
interestofthe
workersinjoiningtheforcesofprogress.49
Strategically,
the PS shiftedits
focusawayfromthe olderconservative
forcesand addresseditscampaign
to radicalism.But in substanceitsmessagehad notchanged.
49. La Vanguardia,May 1i, Aug.31, Oct. 8, and Nov. 23,

1912,

respectively.

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The 1913and 1914congressional

electionsappeared to vindicatethat
strategy.In 1913, Nicolas Repettoand Mario Bravo went to the lower
house and Enrique del Valle Iberlucea went to the Senate-all three
representing
the capital. Likewisein 1914 the capitalfavoredthe Socialists, sendingseven new PS deputies,includingDickmann,to Congress
comparedto the UCR's three,in spiteof the net drop in Socialistvotes
from46,377 in 1913 to 43,267 in 1914. Nevertheless,it seemed thatthe
PS was on itswayto becomingthemajority
forcein thecapital.
While the partycelebratedthe beginningof"the passiverevolution"
based on "a real democracy,"its reactionalso reflectedthe concernto
maintainitspurityand appeal onlyto the consciousvoter.In the wake of
the 1913results,La Vanguardianoted:
Our partynowrunstheriskofbeinginvadedbya delugeofmenwhose
meritsdo not lie, in anyway,eitherin the depthof theirideas or in
the firmness
oftheirconvictions.The partymustdefenditselfagainst
sucha danger.
50
Socialismwas supposed to be "a culminatingrole in the process of
whilesocialdemocracywas to be "cementedon a
Argentinecivilization,"
broad and deep processofillumination;
theremustbe no assimilationof
"5' One Socialist,
citizenswithouthavingilluminatedthespark of truth.
lookingat the preferencesofvotersoutsidethe capital,complainedthat
"the people are notready"and thatonlyin BuenosAires,and to a lesser
extentRosario,were workers"awareofthe significance
ofcitizenship."52
Thus it was decided not to extendthe appeal beyondthe major urban
centersbut to "deepen" the processof consciousnessraisingamong the
advanced proletariat.53
Thoughsymbolic,electionswere "gloriousoccasions to illuminatethe mindsof the people and warmtheirhearts";the
PS shouldnotbe too concernedwithvotechasing.54
The nationalelection resultsin the rest of the countrywere poor
(Table 3). In the countyofLobos in BuenosAiresprovince,whereSocialists had had an activeofficeforyears,the March 1914 electionsyielded
and a mere48 forthe
928 votesforthe UCR, 675 forthe Conservatives,
PS.55One ofthe foundersoftheparty,Esteban Gimenez,notedthatbe50. Ibid., Apr. 6, 1913; also Apr. 13, 1913.
51. AlejandroCalzado, "La acci6nsocialistay la concienciaciudadana,"RevistaArgentina de Ciencias Politicas8 (1914), 26o-6i. Emphasisadded.
52. Ibid.
53. La Vanguardia, July1 and Oct. 23, 1913; Espirtaco (Pigue), Sept. 1, 1915; Vida
Nueva (Cordoba),Jan. i6, 1915; El Ariete (Quilmes),Apr.30, 1914.
54. La Vanguardia, Feb. 1, 1914.
newspaperin Lobos waxedoptimistic
thatthesewere at least
55. The party'sbimonthly
48 "conscious"voters.Vida Nueva (Lobos), Apr. 1, 1914. That peak of supportremained

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| HAHR I MAY I JEREMY ADELMAN

230

yondthe capitalin theprovinceofBuenosAirestheoligarchy(embodied

in strongman
MarcelinoUgarte)stillheldthereinsofpower.For Gimenez
where socialismwas "denied fireand water,
thiswas "enemycountry,"
bereftof support,and surroundedby politicaltribesincapableofassimilatinganythingnew or sane, wherewe Socialistswill have to sufferthe
In Cordoba,some solace was foundin the Federal
fateofall invaders."56
ofwhatCordobawill be like
Capitalresults:"BuenosAiresis a reflection
in a fewyears." 57
For all intentsand purposesthepartydismissedtherestofthecountry
Votersoutsidethe capitalrespondedin
as backwardand unenlightened.
kind:exceptforCordoba,whichsentthreeSocialistdeputiesto Congress
from1924 to 1928 (due to theabstinenceofone wingofthe Radicals),the
PS neverearneda seat in Congressto representthe interior.In a speech
to Congress,Justoassuredthe deputiesthatthiswas a sourceofthe PS's
strength:
It would alarmus to findthe popularityof our candidatesas high in
Jujuyor Catamarcaas it is in the capital:we wouldhave to conclude
that our essence was lost. We are the partyof consciousuniversal
suffrage.58

In the wake of the 1913 and 1914 resultsin the capital,the PS also
reassessed its principalopponent,the UCR. While in 1912 the PS had
a dynamic
treatedthe UCR as a potentially
forcerepresenting
progressive
factionof the elite allied withthe middleclass, the Radicals' success in
the interior,along withtheirvague campaignpromises,now prompted
the Socialiststo dismissthemas just a new visage of the old oligarchy.
One militantobservedthatthe UCR "is a simplefactionofcriollopolitiThis view fed
cians,who ignoreor are ignorantofgenuineradicalism."59
the illusionthatthe UCR was doomedto be squeezed betweentheforces
ofreaction,representedbytheconservative
parties,and genuineforcesof
unsurpassedforyears.In 1916, witha veryhighturnout,thepartyearnedonly46 votes. In
Yet even in
the provinceofBuenosAires,Quilmesand Avellanedawerethe PS strongholds.
Quilmes,by now an emergingindustrialzone, the votewas poor. See El Ariete(Quilmes),
Apr. 10, 1914;La Vanguardia,Apr.22, 1915.
56. Esteban Gim6nez, "La lucha en la provinciade Buenos Aires,"La Vanguardia,
Nov. 20, 1913. See also Vida Nueva (Lobos), Aug. 15 and Dec. 15, 1913.
57. Adelante(Cordoba),Sept. 1 and Oct. 1, 1913.Whenhe recountedhis own involvementin Socialistpolitics,Repettoclaimedthatthe PS victories'beinglimitedto the capital
reflectedthe existenceof"real democracy"whenelsewhereitwas a sham. See Repetto,Mi
paso por la politica,149.
58. Justo,La obra parlamentaria,mayo1912-abril1913(BuenosAires:La Vanguardia,
1913), 145.
59. Guido AnatolioCartey,"La necesidadde un partidoradical,"HumanidadNueva
5:58 (Sept. 1913).

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SOCIALISM

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progress,embodiedin the PS: "theRadicalpartywillbe groundbetween

two stones-the conservatives
who knowwhattheywant,and socialism,
which is the synthesisof the aspirationsand revolutionary
forceof the
workingclass."60The onlyhope forthe UCR was to become the genuine
representative
of the forcesof reaction.Regardless,if the PS once had
seen the Radicals as a modernizing
force,it now dismissedthe UCR as
eitherdoomedorjust anotherversionofpol'ticacriolla.
In the contextof the party'sofficialneglectof the unconvertedoutside the FederalCapital,partylocalsbeganto itchformorefreedom.The
mostseriousconflicteruptedfollowing
the 1914electionsin La Plata and
led to the splintering
of the partyin the provinceof Buenos Aires. The
La Plata local had startedmakingwavesas earlyas 1904, when members
called fora moredecentralizedpartystructure
to give locals moreflexibility.In 1913,AlfredoPalacioswas threatenedwithsuspensionfromthe
partyfordueling,alongwithotherminorinfractions
ofpartystatutes;his
behavior,althoughpopularin the eyes of many,smackedof the loathsome politicacriolla. In February1914,in responseto the groundswell
of support,the La Plata sectionsenta notedefendingPalaciosto the PS
provincialexecutive.(Palacioswas finally
expelledin 1915.)
La Plata activistswere upset by the strictline partyleaders tookin
generaland theirneglectoftheprovincialelectorate-the ruralsectorin
particular.Provincialand nationalexecutivesupbraidedthe local forinsubordinationand, afteran investigation,
suspendedthe entireLa Plata
sectionin April 1914. The local's leader,the recentlyelected provincial
deputyAlfredoTorcelli,was popularamongrank-and-file
activists;the
suspensionsparkedwholesaledefections
fromtheparty.The refugees,led
in 1915. One activist
by Palacios,formedthe PartidoSocialistaArgentino
fromthe countyofTresArroyosdecriedthe "insulting
conductofthe authoritarians
of the party[who]will bringgraverconsequencesthanthey
"61
realize.

Electionsbeganto favornon-Socialist
parties.In 1915, the UCR swept
the provincialcontests,takingthe governorships
of Santa Fe and Entre
Rios and registering
impressivegainsin otherprovinces.The onlyconservativeholdoutwas the provinceof BuenosAires,wherethe Socialists
actuallylost votescomparedto the previousnationalcongressionalelections.The Socialistreactionto thisupswingin Radicalsupportwas bitter.
Only a year earlier,the partyhad predictedthe Radicals' eclipse. Now,
"the secretto the successofRadicalismis thattheaveragevoteroffersno
6o. La Vanguardia,Oct. 28, 1914; also Nov. 25 and Dec. 2, 1914.
6i. Letters,JuanPita to AlfredoTorcelli,July13, 1915;RobertoBordemayto Torcelli,

Aug. 28, 1914, AGN, AAT.

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| HAHR I MAY

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resistance,even in themostbackwardprovinces.Theircustomsand their

The oligarchy,
educationare thoseofthegroupfromtheold regime."62
accordingto the PS, let the UCR do itspoliticaldirtywork,thereby"saving
the era ofcaudillismo."When the UCR sweptCordobain November,La
Vanguardiaconcluded,"we can saythatwe are barelyon theroadtoward
a real freevote."To justifythe lackof"real"democracy,the partyorgan
maintainedthat "the few votes whichour ticketobtainedare the best
proofofour suspicion."63
Since the Socialistvotewas a gaugeofclass consciousness,partyleadershipturnedits back on an electoratesupposedly
notyetreadyforthe light.
In the presidentialelectionof 1916, some conservative
forcesaligned
themselvesbehind the Partido Democrata Progresistawhile others
(mainlythe provincialconservativesof Buenos Aires, behind Ugarte)
made an independentbid. The UCR and the PS avoided alliances. The
Socialistspresenteda longlistofcampaignissues,rangingfromthe derogationof repressivelabor legislationto a new land tax to cuts in arms
expenditures.It was a coherentproposalnextto the vague liberalismof
the Radicals and the vague conservatism
of the Right.But it was aimed
mainlyat votersin thecapital,"thesuperiorcenterofthesocialand political organismofthe Republic."The presidential
ticketofJuanB. Justoand
Nicolas Repettoattracteda crowdofnearlyone hundredthousandon the
eve ofthe election.64
The resultswere close. Yrigoyendid not win a majorityof votes in
the electoralcollege,and negotiations
withtheRightallowedhimto take
office.The Socialistsdid poorly.Beyondthe capital,theirsupportwas
almostinsignificant,
where"ourpartyhas yetto penetratethedenseweed
ofpopularignorance!"(Table 3). In the provinceof BuenosAires,where
the partyhad hoped to makesome advances,especiallyin the industrial
In thecountry
belt surrounding
thecapital,thePS voterosemarginally.65
as a whole, the percentageof votes forthe PS actuallyfellfrom9.3 to
8.9, while the Radicals harvested45.6 percentof the votes cast. If the
atmospheresmelledof defeat,the partyfoundsolace in its stronghold,
62. La Vanguardia, Apr.27, 1915.
63. Ibid., Nov. 25, 1915; Espartaco (Pigue), Dec. 1, 1915; Vida Nueva (C6rdoba),
July 17, 1915.
64. For a recollectionof the 1916 electionsee Dickmann,Recuerdos,278. It is inter-

estingto note thatNicolas Repettodoes not even mentionthe eventin his own memoir,
whichmightindicateeithera desireto forgetthe experienceor a view thatelectionswere
unimportant
in his own politicalcareer.
65. ThoughTable 3, takenfromCant6n'sestimates,suggestsan increasein votes,the
local Socialistpresspublishedresultsthatshoweda fallin votesin theprovince,from8,6oo
votesin 1914 to 7,600 in 1916. See El Ariete (Quilmes),Apr.20, 1916; Vida Nueva (Lobos),
Apr. 15, 1916.

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SOCIALISM

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Buenos Aires: "the metropolisof Latin America. . . will neverbe the

victimof reaction;it will alwaysbe, above all, the citylightforthe new
continent,
emancipatedby democracy,impelledbylibertyand guidedby
socialismto fulfill
itsgreatand manifest
Butas theresultscame
destiny."66
in, it became clear thatthepartyhad forfeited
itsleadershipto the UCR,
whichearnedalmosthalfthevotescast. In thecongressional
vote,thetop
Socialistcandidate,Justo,ended in ninthplace behinda listof Radicals
(Table 2).
Forced to relinquishits claim to majoritystatusin the capital, the
PS reassessedits optimism.In a long editorialon the significance
of the
election,La Vanguardianotedthatthe struggleforsocialismwould take
muchlongerthan expected. For the firsttime,it openlyacknowledged
thatformaldemocracywouldnotlead to an automaticSocialistvictory,in
spiteofthe party'sadvocacyofboththe modernization
(in liberalterms)
and transformation
(in Socialistterms)of the country.Before any advancescould be made on theparliamentary
roadto socialism,othersteps
were necessary:the incorporation
ofnon-Argentines
intothe bodypolitic
and the raisingofworkers'consciousness.Workers'refusalto throwtheir
weightbehind the Socialistcause spoiled the necessaryrelationship
betweenexperienceand consciousness.
Ifthetheorylayin shamblesaroundthem,Socialistsstilldirectedtheir
critiqueat Argentinesociety.Theirdefeattheyattributed
to Argentina's
"inorganic"democracy,forwhilethevotewas formally
free,the elections
were not. The resilienceofpoliticacriollameantthatvotersdid not, in
substance,vote freely,because theywere notconscious.The partyconcluded thatonlyits 8 percentofthe votewas "good"; the rest,in effect,
was notan exercisein democracy.67
The WaningIdeal
In thewakeofthe 1916 results,theSocialistssankintodepression.Iftheir
itdid nothelp thattheworldwas tearexpectationsremainedunfulfilled,
war. The consentofferedby European
ing itselfapart in a nationalistic
Socialistpartiesto the war effort
in theirrespectivecountriesdestroyed
theillusionofsocialism'sinternationalist
credentials.Meanwhile,theRussian Revolutionposed an alternative
routeto socialism.At firstJustosupbut as it drovea wedge between members
portedthe Bolshevikeffort,
66. La Vanguardia,Apr.9, 1916.
67. Ibid., Apr. 15, 1916; El Ariete (Quilmes), Apr. io, 1916; Vida Nueva (Lobos),
Apr. 15, 1916. For Dickmann,Yrigoyen's
election"wasa symbolicexpressionofan inorganic
democracy,chaotic,anarchic,thoughdemocratic."Dickmann,Recuerdos,279.

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| HAHR I MAY

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of the partydisillusionedwithJusto'sstrictdeterminism
and parliamentarism,Justoand his closestfollowers
grewincreasingly
criticalofLenin's
project.The new externalinfluencesfromEurope, whichhad originally
providedinspiration,
now emaciatedtheirideals.68
It was internalforces,however,thatdid the mostdamage. Fernando
Ghio, an Italian-bornworkerfromMataderos,expresseda widelyheld
sentiment.Faced withan uncomfortable
partyline thatblamedthe electorateforthe poor showingin 1916, Ghio bemoanedthe
leaders of the Socialistpartywho tryto justifyto those inside and
outside [the party]the defeatsuffered
at the handsof democracyon
forthoseof us who sufferedthe
2 April . . . [I]t is some consolation
insultsand diatribesof our compaiierosto have . . . put our finger
on the woundand exposedto theconsciousand Socialistpeople those
who are reallyresponsibleforthedefeatoftoday.
To Ghio,therewas littledoubtwhowas toblame:"Justo,Repetto,and the
others,thereis thefruitofourmachinations:
the secondofApril,L9L6!"69
The Socialistpartyneverbrokeout ofthe capital.There, it occasionally increasedits votes but neverconsolidatedits gains.70Firm support
oscillatedaround30 percent(Table 2). Outside the capital,the PS remained in the wilderness(Table 3). In 1917, Ghio and otherdissidents
fromthe capital'surbanbelt met in Mataderosto establishthe Partido
SocialistaRevolucionario.
The following
year,theInternational
Socialists,
led by the typographers'
unionleaderJoseFernandoPenelon,splitfrom
the PS to formthe Communistparty.That same year,amid the greatest
laborunrestin the nation'shistory,
the Socialistsfoughta bittermidterm
electionin the capital. In spiteof workeragitationand calls forrevolution, the Socialistvote dropped markedly-notjust in the countrybut
in the capital. What was worse, as RichardWalter'scalculationsshow,
Socialistswere losingvotes fromtheirtraditional
blue-collarbulwark.7'
Only District4, La Boca, wentforthe PS. Yrigoyen's
inroadsintoSocialist terrainwere checked,thoughmoreeffectively
by the deepeningclass
struggleand the repressionofthe Semana Tragica ofearly19L9. In local
68. For the Socialistattitudetowardcommunism,
see Justo,"El momentoactual del
socialismo,I," Revista Socialista 5 (May 1935), 326. For the splitwithinthe party,see
Emilio J. Corbiere, Origenesdel comunismoargentino(Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de
AmericaLatina, 1984), 13-43; and Mullaney,"Argentine
SocialistParty,"176-81.
69. Letter,FernandoGhio to AlfredoTorcelli,Apr.i8, 1916, AGN, AAT.
70. For a surveyofelectionsbetween1916 and 1920 in the FederalCapital,see Walter,
"Electionsin the CityofBuenosAires,"610-22.
71. Ibid., 614-18. At the municipallevel the PS vote increased,but as Walterpoints
out, Yrigoyenlearnedto takelocal electionsseriouslythereafter,
and the Socialistsslid back
to secondplace. See Walter,"MunicipalPoliticsand Government
in BuenosAires,"178.

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The young
electionsthatyear,the PS recoveredsomeofitsconstituency.
solace in theoutcome:
congressmanFedericoPinedofoundbittersweet
Because we representthattendencymostconsistentwithcosmopolitan civilization,and above all withthe European civilizationin this
country,we are the factorbest selectedto impedethe predominance
ofthoseindigenouselementswhichtodayreturntoweighin Argentine
politics,unburiedby the unconsciouspracticeofuniversalsuffrage.72
The Radicals' abilityto swingeven the mostdiehardworking-class
districtsshowedonce morewhenYrigoyenregainedcontrolof his party
constituency,
drawing
in 1926 and began to reassemblea working-class
supportaway fromthe Socialists.If the PS could claim to be the official oppositionat all, it was onlybecause conservative
forcescould never
forma lastingalliance.73The Socialistsnevermanagedto win morethan
15 percentofthe nationalvote,and thatpeak (14.6 percentin 1924) was
exceptionalin lightof the UCR's rightward
driftunder Marcelo T. De
whetheruniversalmale suffrage
Alvear.It made littledifference
actually
afterthe electoral
functioned;Socialistsupportdid not rise significantly
reformof 1912.

The stumblingof the Socialistpartyreflectedthe crumblingof Second Internationalism

aroundthe world,as its European cousins splintered under the weightof staterepressionor internecinedisputes.Yet
thatmade itsappeal to
ArgentineSocialistsclungto an electoralstrategy
"conscious"voters.As it became clear thatthesevotersconstitutedonly
a fractionofthe electorateand as Yrigoyen's
gripon the UCR tightened,
some SocialistsfearedthatArgentine
toward
democracywas deteriorating
demagoguery.The brightyounglightsof the party,AntonioDe Tomaso
and Federico Pinedo, began clandestinetalkswiththe uprootedAlvear
leadershipas wellas conservatives
outsidetheUCR to sabotageYrigoyen's
electoralbid. Afterhis victoryin 1928, a new alliance of forcesbegan
thegovernment.
secretlyconspiringto overthrow
and his rolein thepartyslowly
Meanwhile,Justo'shealthdeteriorated
diminishedto occasionalspeechesin theSenate.Withouta strongleader,
The largestdissentthe schismatictendencieswithinthe PS intensified.
ing group,led by De Tomasoand Pinedo,stageda dramaticsplitin July
wing withthem,
1927. Takingthe majorityof the party'sparliamentary
72. Cited in Dario Cant6n,JoseLuis Moreno,and AlbertoCiria,Argentina:la democracia constitucional
y su crisis(BuenosAires:EditorialPaidos, 1972), 99.
73. On the conservatives'weakness,see Ansaldi,"Reflexioneshist6ricas,"400-401;
Ezequiel Gallo and RobertoC6rtesConde, Argentina:la repusblica
conservadora(Buenos
Aires: EditorialPaidos, 1972), 229-33; Cant6net al., Argentina:la democraciaconstitucional,87.

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| HAHR I MAY

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theyformedthe IndependentSocialistparty(PSI) in 1928. The PSI's programwas identicalto thatofthe PS, but thisnew generationof Socialist
leaderswere causticcriticsofYrigoyen's
"sham"democraticsystem.They
openlydamned a democracyin whichvoterswere unconsciousof their
true interests.De Tomaso, Pinedo, and otherSocialistscollaboratedin
thecoup thattoppledYrigoyenin September1930, and theylaterbecame
important
membersoftheillegitimate
governments
ofthe 1930S.74
stuckto theirdemocraticbeliefsand did
Many,ifnotmost,Sociali-sts
notparticipatein the coup. The mainstream
partydid notabet the coup
or collaboratein the 1930S governments.
It rejectedthevoluntarism
ofthe
praetorianregime,and its leaderswere sufficiently
devoutdemocratsto
recognizethe difference
betweenGeneralJoseUriburu,theleaderofthe
1930 coup, and the traditional
leadersofthe ancien regimebefore1916.
But theydid notdefendYrigoyen'srightto rule on the basis ofuniversal
suffrage.
Instead,theyapplaudedtheend ofa regimethathad "criminally
betrayedthehopes ofthepeople."75
It mightbe arguedthatgrowingauthoritarianism
reinforced
theSocialists' democraticcredentials.Indeed, the beliefthatYrigoyen'spopulism
was the malefactorof democraticfailure,combinedwiththe succession
of illegitimategovernments
duringthe 1930s, made the Socialistpartya
whenthetransition
championofdemocraticrestoration.
Ironically,
finally
came in 1945, the Socialistsfoundthemselvescut offfromthe rank-andfileworking-class
vote.The issueofdemocracydividedthewaters:Peron's
populismand militarybackgroundreekedoffascism,even ifit attracted
workers'support.76
Conclusion
From the 189os to WorldWar I, the heydayof Second Internationalism,
ArgentineSocialistsconceivedof social classes as the bearers of objecinterests.Working-class
voterswereexpectedto voteas
tivelyconstituted
workersand the bourgeoisieas bourgeois.This meantthatonce workers
vote Socialbecame consciousoftheirclassposition,theywouldnaturally
74. For a catalogueof the PSI involvement
in the 1930 coup, see PartidoSocialista
Independiente,La revoluci6ndel 6 de setiembrey los socialistasindependientes
(Buenos
Aires:n.p., 1961).
75. For the PS positionand role in the 1930 coup, see PartidoSocialista,El Partido
Socialistay el movimiento
militardel 6 de setiembre:documentos
civiles(BuenosAires,n.p.,
1931). See also JulioGodio, El movimiento
obreroargentino,(1g9o-1930), vol. 2 (Buenos
Aires:EditorialLegasa, 1987),394-408.
76. For a recent chronicleof the eventsof 1945, see JuanCarlos Torre, La vieja
guardia sindical y Per6n: sobre los ortgenesdel peronismo(Buenos Aires: EditorialSudamericana,1990).

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ist. Politicalchoices followedautomatically

fromeconomicstatus:class
was independentofpolitics.
formation
This neattheoryposed realproblemsin practice.Socialistswere irked
by the Radicals,who blurredclass linesin vagueappeals to liberalpolitical rights.Preferring
hardhitting
policiesfullofconstructive
suggestions
foreconomicreform,the Socialistswere baffledby the Radicals'success.
It was up to politicalparties,in the Socialists'view, to unveilthe class
interestto citizensin thoseclassesbornofeconomictransformation.
The
Radicals,on theotherhand,cloudedclassinterests.
In disclosingobjectiveclass interest,the Socialistsencounteredtwo
problems.The firstwas the trap of reductionism.By treatingclass formationas a processoccurringbeyondpoliticsin the realmofeconomics,
Socialistsdiscountedthe possibility
thatworking-class
votersmightvote
accordingto criterianot reducibleexclusivelyto theirproletarianstatus.
So by accusingthe Radicals of engagingin politicacriolla while at the
sametimerelegatingformaldemocratization
to secondpriority,
theSocialistsweakenedanyclaimto beingthedefendersofpoliticalrights.
The secondproblemwas logical.Since thecause ofpoliticalrightswas
secondaryto economictransformation,
the call to vote Socialistwas in
itselfmeaningless.Votingwas meaningful
onlywhenthe rightwas exercised by consciousagents.Since the stultified
bourgeoisrevolutionpreventedconsciousnessfrompercolatingamongthe masses,theirvote was
bound to be "irrational."
voters'preferencewas a self-fulfilling
Argentine
prophecyas long as underdevelopment,
which impeded full capitalist
social relationsfromprevailing,obscured"real"consciousness.This logical cul-de-sacpromptedmanySocialiststo questionthe meritof formal
democracyin Argentina.Thus itwas notinconsistent
fora smallgroupof
Socialiststo colludewithconservatives
in the 120os, help lead thecoup of
1930,

andform
partofthegovernments
ofthedecadainfame
ofthe1930s.

in coping with democracybedeviled

ArgentineSocialists'difficulty
theirparty'sfortunes.Democracyonly matteredif citizensknew what
to do with theirpoliticalrights.If any of the necessarylinksbetween
work,consciousness,and propervotingbehaviorwas severed,the efficacy ofdemocracyhad to be questioned.ArgentineSocialistsadheredto
this "necessitarian"logic.77In so doing theycould not understandwhy
the working-class
electorateoftenfavoredbourgeoisparties.Their only
explanationwas "falseconsciousness,"
based on the survivalof an older,
precapitalist,or criollotraditionthatpreventedcitizensfromseeing the
77. For an explorationof aspects of "necessitarianlogic," see Roberto Mangabeira
Unger,False-Necessity:
Anti-Necessitarian
Social Theoryin the Serviceof Radical Democracy(Cambridge:CambridgeUniv.Press, 1987).

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238

| HAHR I MAY I JEREMY ADELMAN

light.The forceoftradition,
manySocialistsbelieved,ultimately
defeated
the purposeof elections.The PartidoSocialistaclungto the rules in the
convictionthateventuallyitsmessagewouldbe heard.But ratherthanreassess theirattitudetowardthe voters,the Socialistsinvokedthe circular
logicoffalseconsciousness.Disappointingperformances
at the polls thus
became a self-fulfilling
prophecy.

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