Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
3, 2011
Copyright 2011 by the Society for Applied Anthropology
0018-7259/11/030224-09$1.40/1
Introduction
Kenneth Ruddle is affiliated with the Research Center for Resources and
Rural Development, Hanoi, Vietnam. Research was supported financially
by IC-Net, as part of a JICA project. Local assistance was provided by
Dr. Nguyen Long, then of the Research Institute of Marine Products,
Haiphong, and provincial fisheries officers. Professor Anthony Davis,
Department of Sociology-Anthropology, Mount Saint Vincent University,
Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, made valuable comments on an early
draft of the manuscript as did three anonymous reviewers of the submitted version. The author is most grateful to them all.
224
Although several cases have described particularly onerous conditions within convoluted credit systems in South
Asian small-scale fisheries (Aghazadeh 1994; Khan, Ali, and
Tanveer 2005; Rahman et al. 2002), such situations are not the
norm throughout Asia. Evidence to the contrary from Southeast Asia was demonstrated in the 1940s by Raymond Firths
(1966) classic and exquisitely detailed study of the economy
of a Malay fishing community. Further contrary evidence was
provided by scholars examining client-patron relationships
(see below), as well as by another group (Merlijn 1989; Platteau and Abraham 1987; Stirrat 1974; Yap 1978) focusing on
the role of middlemen in fishing communities. These scholars
have challenged the established view by emphasizing the
range of social and economic functions they perform.
However, such work has been largely overlooked by
development practitioners, who were predominantly economists. Yamey (1964), for example, attributed the neglect of
anthropological studies to the economists concern with such
large-scale factors as entire sectors of a national economy
(compared with the general small-scale anthropological focus); to time pressures that forced them to refer to distilled
reports rather than examine primary studies and original
field data; and to their focus on such issues as foreign trade
or public finance, to which anthropologists seemingly had
nothing to contribute.
The latest body of evidence began to emerge in the early
1990s, when Adams (1992), Adams and Fitchett (1992),
Bouman (1990), and Bouman and Hospes (1994) showed
the widespread importance of informal financial systems
in poorer nations and, contrary to stereotypical thinking,
that well-functioning preexisting credit schemes are neither
uncommon nor necessarily exploitative. Subsequently, rural
credit arrangements have been revealed as both heterogeneous
and segmented, with the coexistence of formal and informal
credit markets being widely reported for Asia (Bardhan and
Udry 1999; Barslund and Tarp 2003; Duong and Izumida
2002; Yadav, Otsuka, and David 1992), Latin America
(Guirkinger 2008; Trivelli 2003), and Africa (Mosley 1999).
In addition to a lack of collateral, as is common among
fishers and which, therefore, drives them to the informal
financial sector, informal credit systems have some important advantages over the formal sector. These include ready
availability, quick and easy delivery, flexible conditions,
unintimidating application procedures, and the perception
of being less risky than loans contracted in the formal sector. Further, although interest rates on informal loans vary
depending on the source, there is often little or none on those
from friends or relatives. However, loans from informal credit
institutions can have higher interest rates than those in the
formal sector. Nevertheless, as in Bangladesh, for example,
people still prefer to use the informal sector, believing that
formal institutions are too corrupt, too bureaucratic, and too
focused on profits (Holmgren 2005).
Lacking collateral that includes land deeds/titles, other
immovable property, and third party guarantees, as required
by banks, almost everywhere in poor countries small-scale
226
Scott hypotheses can be discerned in the empirical data presented here, in fisheries communities where a van chai retains
a strong influence, as will be seen below, the moral imperative
that it introduces is likely to be predominant.
Patron-client relationships have long played a major
role in marine resource use in Southeast Asia (Firth 1966;
Mangahas 2004; Merlijn 1989; Pelras 2000) where they are
especially common in Chinese-managed business. Far from
being conservative actors in the fishing industry, Mez and
Ferse (2010) observe that by reacting to market indicators,
particularly entrepreneurial patrons function as business
innovators by announcing their willingness to buy a new
commodity and equipping their clients to switch fishing targets and harvest it. In general, loans and related matters are
handled informally, except for the clients moral obligation to
sell all his catches to the middleman to whom he is indebted.
In Sarawak, for example, middlemen supply trawlers with
cool boxes, fish baskets, prawn tanks, and ice paid for by a
deduction from the catch price (Merlijn 1989). Merlijn notes
that this provides both credit and insurance since the price
is lowered when the catch is of low value. Small loans are
extended informally and on a verbal basis and seem to be
only vaguely kept in mind, which, Merlijn (1989:691) says:
Reflects the basic stake at the root of the debt relationship.
The middlemen are basically interested in the persistence
of this relationship and use the loans in order to maintain
access to the fishermens catches. To the extent that they
are satisfied with their fishermen, they are eager to prevent
them from repaying their loans. The fact that neither party
appears to wish to settle these running debts should be seen
in this light. The message being conveyed is that trust is
established between them, and as long as trust exists, there
is no reason to worry about financial transactions. As a
consequence, repayments are never fixed, neither in time
nor in installments. The rhythm of repayment depends on
the daily landings of the fishermen.
Bank Loans
Overall interest rates on bank loans obtained by boat
owners averaged 2.24 percent per month in all five provinces.
Rates ranged from a below average of 1.85 percent per month
in Nhatrang and Danang to about average in Quang Binh
(2.19% per month) and Binh Thuan (2.26% per month), to
a high of 2.96 percent per month in Ba Ria-Vung Tau. Loan
periods also varied, with a range of from four months to four
years and an average of 1.7 years. Average loan periods were
shortest in Quang Binh (1.3 years) and longest in Ba Ria-Vung
Tau (3.0 years). This again reflected the relative poverty of
Quang Binh fishers compared with the relative affluence of
those in Ba Ria-Vung Tau, and, therefore, the risk-taking
perceptions of bank loan officers. Loan periods were close
to the overall average in Danang (1.65 years), Nhatrang (1.6
years), and Binh Thuan (1.8 years).
Market intermediaries relied little on banks. Indeed, only
one had obtained credit exclusively from a bank (borrowing
$1,800 for 12 months at an interest rate of 2.6% per month).
Another combined a bank loan of $18,100 (for a three month
period at a rate of 2.2% per month) with money borrowed
from family members. However, only 17 percent of the total
credit borrowed was obtained from the bank. No examples
were found of market intermediaries obtaining credit either
from friends or financial institutions other than banks.
interest rate of 5 percent per year. In the other case, a purseseiner from Danang, a $27,000 loan carried an annual interest
rate of 10 percent.
Moneylenders (Investors)
Only 6 percent of boat owners raised capital entirely
from moneylenders. Such people were mainly fish market intermediaries who combine moneylending and other business
enterprises with their main marine resource business. In the
Northern and Central regions, moneylenders provide capital
for the purchase or construction of fishing boats, whereas in
the Southern Region they covered mostly the cost of fishing
supplies (ice, drinking water, food, fuel, and lubricants).
Moneylenders were not a popular source of funds among
boat owners because interest rates were relatively high and
lending periods limited, the maximum period in the sample
being two years. However, less collateral was required than
for bank loans. Interest rates were usually 3.0 percent per
month. In addition, since most moneylenders were also fish
market intermediaries, as a condition of the loan, boat owners were required to sell their catch to the moneylender who
extended credit to them. Although in some cases this was done
at the prevailing market price, mostly the catch was sold at
a discount of 10-15 percent.
The business arrangements between moneylenders and
boat owners varied considerably. In some cases, no interest
was charged on the loan, but catch sales arrangements could
be onerous. Some required the sale of the entire catch to
the moneylender, whereas, in other cases, only part of the
catch was sold at a discounted price to that person. In some
instances, no repayments were claimed from the boat owner
when catches were bad, but under those conditions, the repayment would accumulate.
There were usually several or more moneylenders in
all but the poorest fishing communities. They competed for
clients, and richer moneylenders had business relationships
with several or more boat owners. Since money lenders might
have to compete among themselves within a community to
invest in a fishing boat owner, they were obliged to be generous with their clients. In addition to making gifts on the
special occasions of festivals and family ceremonies, they had
to assist them during time of need. On the other hand, boat
owners have such a relationship with only one moneylender,
and they could change moneylenders if a relationship soured.
In some instances, it was reported that fishing families had
maintained a business relationship with the moneylenders
family for several generations, with sons and daughters on
both side of the arrangement inheriting mutual obligations.
Further Research
Several aspects of informal finance were not covered in
the field study on which this article is based. These include
diversity and change within the sector, the perspectives of
rural users in terms of the patron-client relationship, the social roles of middlemen, and the distribution of power within
small groups involved in informal financial arrangements.
The research reported on here is intended as a first baseline study of the credit situation in a sample of Vietnamese
fishing communities. It urgently needs revising both via a
restudy of the same localities and an expanded geographical
coverage. Restudy is required because the economy of Vietnam has grown and diversified enormously since the mid1990s, and, concomitantly, the structure and productivity of
the already varied national fishery has changed significantly.
For example, in the fishery sector there has been considerable internal and southwards migration, largely in search of
economic opportunities. The composition of such migrants
needs to be ascertained, since boat owners and entrepreneurs
might need to seek sources of informal credit in their areas
of in-migration, whereas fisheries laborers and boat crew
members would not. The former may or may not have preexisting social relations in their new working locality and so
may or may not have access to local lines of informal credit.
Alternatively, they might have retained access to informal
credit in their areas of origin. Or perhaps new boat ownership patterns have emerged, like local person and in-migrant
joint ownership that might be based on kin or some other
kind of social relationship. Or it may be a straightforward
business arrangement. Regardless of the details, it is almost
certain that both the formal and informal credit systems in
Vietnamese fisheries have also changed in important but as
yet undocumented ways since the mid-1990s.
Transcending stereotypical misconceptions that have
stunted research on rural financial systems requires a broad
and integrated approach to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the roles and performance of all households,
individuals, and institutions involved within their varied
economic, social, and stakeholder contexts. As a first step,
that requires an understanding of household economies since
the status of a households finances determines whether or
not it can invest in an enterprise from its own resources alone
or whether it must seek credit to do so. Similarly, categories
of individual or small groups both seeking and providing
credit must be ascertained, as must be the local informal and
the formal regional and national institutions that provide it.
Rural credit in any locality is a complex system for which
all components, linkages, relationships, and context must be
established. For example, Duong and Izumida (2002) showed
that farm households made concurrent formal and informal loans,
with the former accounting for 80 percent of the total, of which
about 91 percent was used for production and asset accumulation.
Informal loans were also to top-up insufficient formal loans, so
they were also mainly used for the same purposes. However,
30 percent of informal sector loans were used for evening out
229
consumption and paying large medical expenditures, demonstrating the importance to poorer households of informal networks
and relatives (Barslund and Tarp 2003). However, whereas farm
households have acceptable collateral to satisfy formal sector
requirements, those engaged in fishing, as demonstrated in this
article, depend largely on the informal sector.
Barslund and Tarp (2003) noted the large regional economic differences in Vietnam. In the research reported here,
it was found that fishers in Ba Ria-Vung Tau were relatively
well-off economically and so could fund their operations
either from their own fishing efforts or obtain loans without
taking on partners. Similarly, the income of fisheries households sampled generally exceeded the national average for
all households (because the latter was depressed by the great
preponderance of farm households). However, the field study
found a significant north to south increase in both income and
savings rates of fishery households. The reasons for this need
to be understood, given the importance of tailoring formal
credit supply to potential local needs and demand.
In the case of Vietnam, and likely elsewhere, there is
a need to understand the relationship between the informal
credit system and preexisting (also termed traditional)
management institutions in fishing villages. One example in
the Vietnamese case is the van chai, the main functions of
which include mutual assistance among the membership and
regulating the disposal of the catch and profit sharing (Ruddle
1998; Ruddle and Tuong 2009). Although locally varied,
everywhere the veneration of deities and ancestors, plus the
sacred obligations of mutual assistance, provide the van chai
with its moral authority (Ruddle and Tuong 2009:10).
The implications of climatic change and associated
adaptation should be examined for rural financial systems.
Because suppliers of formal credit would likely not be flexible
enough to meet new and potentially unconventional demand,
the role of informal sources could, therefore, expand proportionately. For fisheries, climate change will have an as yet
unknown impact on day-to-day and longer-term operations
that will likely include alterations in location, timing, and
the technology (ies) used, all of which will reflect changes
in fish species composition and behavior, as well as changes
in all upstream and downstream activities tied to any fishing
system, and related economic and social activities. Therefore,
credit will be required so that fishers can obtain the new gear
and other equipment required to deal with changes in species
composition and fish behavior, among other things. Managing
such a complex set of uncertain changes would probably be
beyond the capacity of central and local governments, thus,
the need for informal credit directly attuned to local situations
would likely become paramount.
Finally, more field research should be conducted on the
financial systems used by small-scale fishers worldwide. This
requires attention to both overturn persistent misconceptions
about the need for and role of informal credit in small-scale
fisheries in non-Western contexts worldwide and also to
provide comprehensive and unbiased information to set the
context for introducing new credit systems, regardless of type.
230
Conclusion
Field study in five provinces of Vietnam demonstrated
that a well-functioning, heterogeneous, and segmented credit
system existed, which included both formal and informal
components intermingled in complementary ways by borrowers. Although this is the first such report for fisheries
communities in Vietnam, it verifies and contributes to the
evidence of the regionally diverse literature that has accumulated over the last two decades.
The fisheries households sampled obtained credit and
other financial services from various sources. Banks are the
predominant formal institution, and family members were
the main informal sector supplier. Most fishing boat owners combine credit obtained from a bank with that from one
or more informal sources, mainly family. Informal sources
remain preeminent in marine capture fishing communities.
Obtaining loans from a combination of family members and
investors (generally friends from within the same fishing
community) was the third most popular way of raising capital.
Credit was used by boat owners mainly to build new boats or
purchase engines, gear, and other essential equipment. Money
lenders were not a popular source of funds among boat owners because interest rates were relatively high and lending
periods limited. However, less collateral was required than
for bank loans. The business arrangements between money
lenders and boat owners varied considerably. In some cases,
no interest was charged on the loan, but catch sales arrangements could be onerous.
This field research further demonstrated that for Vietnam
the negative stereotypical image of the informal credit role
of moneylenders is not always justified, particularly when
seen within a patron-client framework. For example, since
money lenders might have to compete among themselves
within a community to invest in a fishing boat owner, they
were obliged to be generous with their clients. In addition to
making gifts on the special occasions of festivals and family
ceremonies, they had to assist them during times of need, as
when it became necessary to repair or replace damaged boats
or gear, or to pay for a funeral and help the family with other
expenses resulting from the death of an active fisherman. This
is a classic example of the long-familiar patron-client relationship. In contrast, boat owners had a relationship with only
one money lender, although they could change to another if a
relationship soured. Some fishing families had maintained a
business relationship with a moneylenders family for several
generations, with sons and daughters on both sides inheriting
mutual obligations (cf. Merlijn 1989 for similar arrangements
in Sarawak). As in Malaysia (Merlijn 1989), it is common to
blame the poor performance of capital-intensive development
and/or institutional services in small-scale fisheries on the
behavior of middlemen. However, such a kneejerk response
often demonstrates nothing more than an ignorance of the
flexible and multiplex economic and social services that
they perform in fishing communities. Rather, poor use rates
of such introductions as marketing systems and cooperatives
HUMAN ORGANIZATION
Land, Carl H.
1977 The Dyadic Basis of Clientelism. In Friends, Followers, and
Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism. Steffen W. Schmidt,
James C. Scott, Carl H. Lande, and Laura Gusty, eds. Pp. xiiixxxvii. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Aghazadeh, Esmail.
1994 Fisheries Socio-Economic Analysis and Policy. Technical
Report, BGD/89/012. Mymensingh: The Fisheries Research
Institute Bangladesh.
231
Ruddle, Kenneth
1998 Traditional Community-Based Coastal Marine Fisheries
Management in Vietnam. Ocean and Coastal Management
40(1):1-22.
2009 Vietnam Fisheries Management: Remembering the Source.
Samudra Report No. 54. Chennai, India: International Collective
in Support of Fishworkers.
Ruddle Kenneth, and Phi Lai Tuong
2009 The Van Chai of Vietnam: Managing Nearshore Fisheries
and Fishing Communities. Hong Kong, China: International
Resources Management Institute.
Scott, James S.
1976 The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and
Subsistence in Southeast Asia. New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press.
Stirrat, Roderick L.
1974 Fish to Market: Traders in Rural Sri Lanka. South Asian
Review 7(1): 189-207.
Swartz, J. Marc, ed.
1968 Local Level Politics: Social and Cultural Perspectives.
Chicago, Ill.: Aldine.
Trivelli, Carolina
2003 Non-formal Credit for Rural Agricultural Areas: New
Evidence for an Old Problem. Latin American Studies Series
2:11-27.
Yadav, S., K. Otsuka, and C. C. David
1992 Segmentation in Rural Financial Markets: The Case of Nepal.
World Development 20(3):423-436.
Yamey, Basil S.
1964 The Study of Peasant Economic Systems: Some Concluding
Comments and Questions. In Capital, Saving, and Credit in
Peasant Societies. Raymond Firth and Basil S. Yamey, eds. Pp.
376-386. London, United Kingdom: George Allen and Unwin.
Yap, Chan Ling.
1978 The Middlemen in Fish Marketing: An Appraisal. Journal of
Agricultural Economics and Development 8(2):180-193.
232
HUMAN ORGANIZATION