II.

EFFECTSANDAPPLICATIONOFLAWS
Article 1. This Act shall be known as the "Civil
Code of the Philippines."
A. When Law Takes Effects
NewCivilCode
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.
This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication.
RevisedAdministrativeCode
Sec. 18. When Laws Take Effect. - Laws shall take
effect after fifteen (15) days following the
completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation,
unless it is otherwise provided.
Sec. 19. Prospectivity. - Laws shall have
prospective effect unless the contrary is expressly
provided
Sec. 20. Interpretation of Laws and Administrative
Issuances. - In the interpretation of a law or
administrative issuance promulgated in all the
official languages, the English text shall control,

unless otherwise specifically provided. In case of

ambiguity, omission or mistake, the other texts
may be consulted.
Sec. 21. No Implied Revival of Repealed Law.When a law which expressly repeals a prior law
itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not be
thereby revived unless expressly so provided.
Sec. 22. Revival of Law Impliedly Repealed. When a law which impliedly repeals a prior law is
itself repealed, the prior law shall thereby be
revived, unless the repealing law provides
otherwise.Sec. 23. Ignorance of the Law. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith.
Sec. 24. Contents. - There shall be published in
the Official Gazette all legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature; all executive and
administrative issuances of general application;
decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals, or other courts of
similar rank, as may be deemed by said courts of
sufficient importance to be so published; such
documents or classes of documents as may be
required so to be published by law; and such
documents or classes of documents as the
President shall determine from time to time to
have general application or which he may
authorize so to be published

The publication of any law, resolution or other

official documents in the Official Gazette shall be
prima facie evidence of its authority.

ExecutiveOrder200
Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication either
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is
otherwise provided.
Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise
known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines," and
all other laws inconsistent with this Executive
Order are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.

date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed

within three (3) months from that date shall not
thereafter be the basis of any sanction against
any party or persons

TANADA VS TUVERA
FACTS: The petitioner filed a a writ of mandamus,
invoking the right of the people to be informed on
matters of public concern, to compel the
respondent public officials to cause the
publication of various presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letters of implementations, and
administrative order. Respondent further contend
that the publication in Official Gazette is not a sine
qua non requirement for the effectivity of the law
because law themselves provides their own
effectivity dates.

Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect

immediately after its publication in the Official
Gazette.

ISSUE: W/N the publication in Official Gazette is

required before any law or statute takes effect

AdministrativeCodeof1987(E.O. No. 292), Book VII,

Chapter 2, Sec. 3 - Sec. 3. Filing. - (1) Every
agency shall file with the University of the
Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of
every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the

HELD: Yes. The publication of all presidential

issuances of public nature or of general
applicability is mandated by law. Presidential
issuances which apply only to particular persons
or class of persons such as administrative or
executive orders need not be published on the

assumption that they have been circularized to all

concern. On the other hand, presidential
issuances of general applicability which have not
been published shall have no force & effect.

B.IGNORANCEOFTHELAW
Art. 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith.
Everyone is conclusively presumed to know the
law. Far from reality but obligatory. Once the law
has been promulgated and has taken effect, it is
the duty of everyone to know it.
Reasons behind the article:1. If laws will be
binding until they are actually known, then social
life will be impossible, because most laws cannot

be enforced due to their being unknown to many

2. It is absurd to absolve those who do not know
the law and increase the obligations of those who
know it3. It is almost impossible to prove the
contrary, when a person claims ignorance of the
law4. In our conscience, we carry norms of right
and wrong, and a sense of duty, so that our
reason indicates many times what we have to do;
and in more complicated juridical relations, there
are lawyers who should be consulted.
The laws referred to in this article are those of the
Philippines. There in no conclusive presumption of
knowledge of foreign laws. Thus, ignorance of a
foreign law will not be a mistake of law but
mistake of fact. Ignorance may either be of law or
of fact. Ignorance of fact may excuse a party from
the legal consequences of his conduct; but not
ignorance of law. A lawyer cannot be disbarred
from an honest mistake or error of law.
KASILAG VS RODRIGUEZ
FACTS: Kasilag and Emiliana Ambrosio entered a
contract of mortgage of improvements of land
acquired as homestead to secure the payment of
the indebtedness og P1,000 plus interest. The
parties stipulated that Ambrosio was to pay the
debt with interest within 4 12 years., and in such
case, mortgage would not have any effect. They
agreed that Ambrosio would execute a deed of

sale if it would not be paid within 4 12 years and

that she would pay the tax on the land. After a
year, it turned out that she wasnt able to pay the
tax. Hence, they entered a verbal agreement
whereby she conveyed to the latter the
possession of the land on the condition that they
would not collect the interest of the loan, would
attend to the payment of the land tax, would
benefit by the fruits of the land, & would introduce
improvement thereof.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner should be deemed the
possessor of the land in good faith because he
was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the
manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated
HELD: The possession of the land is illegal and
void because such contract is expressly prohibited
by Sec 116 of Act No 1874 as amended. Petitioner
acted in bad faith in taking possession of the land
because he knew that the contract he made with
Ambrosio was an absolute sale and that the latter
could not sell the land because it is prohibited by
Sec 116 of Act 2874. Gross and inexcusable
ignorance of the law may not be the basis of good
faith.
ELEGADO VS COURT OF TAX APPEALS
FACTS: Warren Taylor Graham, a American
national, died in the US. He left certain shares of

stock in the Philippines. Thus, his son filed an

estate tax return. He appointed Elegado as hi
attorney-in-fact for the allowance of the will in the
Philippines. CIR assessed the estate in the amount
of P96,509.35 which was protested by the law firm
of Bump, Yang, and Walker on behalf of the
estates but was denied by the commissioner.
nd
Elegado filed a 2
estate tax return in the
amount of P72,948.87 which was protested by
Agrava Law Office on behalf of the estate. While
protest was pending, Elegado filed a motion for
allowance of the basic tax P96,509.35 and said
that his liability had not yet been paid although
the assessment had long become final and
executor. Petitioner was denied contending that
st
the 1 assessment is not binding on him because
it was based on a return filed for by lawyers.
st
ISSUE: W/N the 1 assessment is invalid because
the foreign lawyers were not familiar with our tax
laws and procedure
HELD: No. Foreigners are not excused from
compliance with our laws and procedure because
of ignorance. Elegado was a Filipino lawyer
representing a foreign company.

C. Retroactivity of Laws
NewCivilCode
Art. 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided. General Rule: All
statutes are applied prospectively
Exceptions: 1) When the law itself expressly
provides; 2) In case of remedial statutes; 3) In
case of curative statutes; 4) In case of laws
interpreting others; 5) In case of laws creating
new rights
Penal statutes shall have retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the accused who is not a
habitual criminalRemedial statutes those which
refer to the method of enforcing rights or
obtaining redress of their invasion. A remedial
statute may be made applicable to cases pending
at the time of its enactment
Curative statutes those which undertake to cure
errors and irregularities, thereby validating judicial
or administrative proceedings, acts of public
officers, or private deeds and contracts which
otherwise would not produce their intended
consequences by reason of some statutory
disability or failure to comply with some technical

requirement. They operate on conditions already

existing and are necessarily retroactive in
operation.
Interpreting statutes laws which merely interpret
the meaning of other laws are considered as
incorporated in the latter, but they shall not affect
judicial decisions which have become final in the
meantime.Laws creating new rights the principle
that a new law shall not have retroactive effect
only governs rights arising from acts done under
the rule of the former law; but if a right be
declared for the first time by a new law it shall
take effect from the time of such declaration even
though it has arisen from acts subject to the
former laws, provided that it does not prejudice
another acquired right of the same origin.
Art. 2252. Changes made and new provisions and
rules laid down by this Code which may prejudice
or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the old legislation shall have no retroactive
effect.For the determination of the applicable law
in cases which are not specified elsewhere in this
Code, the following articles shall be observed:
Art. 2253. The Civil Code of 1889 and other
previous laws shall govern rights originating,
under said laws, from acts done or events which
took place under their regime, even though this
Code may regulate them in a different manner, or

may not recognize them. But if a right should be

declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be
effective at once, even though the act or event
which gives rise thereto may have been done or
may have occurred under prior legislation,
provided said new right does not prejudice or
impair any vested or acquired right, of the same
origin.
Art. 2254. No vested or acquired right can arise
from acts or omissions which are against the law
or which infringe upon the rights of others.
Art. 2255. The former laws shall regulate acts and
contracts with a condition or period, which were
executed or entered into before the effectivity of
this Code, even though the condition or period
may still be pending at the time this body of laws
goes into effect.
Art. 2256. Acts and contracts under the regime of
the old laws, if they are valid in accordance
therewith, shall continue to be fully operative as
provided in the same, with the limitations
established in these rules. But the revocation or
modification of these acts and contracts after the
beginning of the effectivity of this Code, shall be
subject to the provisions of this new body of laws.
Art. 2257. Provisions of this Code which attach a

civil sanction or penalty or a deprivation of rights

to acts or omissions which were not penalized by
the former laws, are not applicable to those who,
when said laws were in force, may have executed
the act or incurred in the omission forbidden or
condemned by this Code. If the fault is also
punished by the previous legislation, the less
severe sanction shall be applied.
If a continuous or repeated act or omission was
commenced before the beginning of the
effectivity of this Code, and the same subsists or
is maintained or repeated after this body of laws
has become operative, the sanction or penalty
prescribed in this Code shall be applied, even
though the previous laws may not have provided
any sanction or penalty therefor.
Art. 2258. Actions and rights which came into
being but were not exercised before the effectivity
of this Code, shall remain in full force in
conformity with the old legislation; but their
exercise, duration and the procedure to enforce
them shall be regulated by this Code and by the
Rules of Court. If the exercise of the right or of the
action was commenced under the old laws, but is
pending on the date this Code takes effect, and
the procedure was different from that established
in this new body of laws, the parties concerned
may choose which method or course to pursue.
(Rule 4)

Art. 2259. The capacity of a married woman to

execute acts and contracts is governed by this
Code, even if her marriage was celebrated under
the former laws.
Art. 2260. The voluntary recognition of a natural
child shall take place according to this Code, even
if the child was born before the effectivity of this
body of laws.
Art. 2261. The exemption prescribed in Article 302
shall also be applicable to any support, pension or
gratuity already existing or granted before this
Code becomes effective.
Art. 2262. Guardians of the property of minors,
appointed by the courts before this Code goes into
effect, shall continue to act as such,
notwithstanding the provisions of Article 320.
Art. 2263. Rights to the inheritance of a person
who died, with or without a will, before the
effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the
Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by
the Rules of Court. The inheritance of those who,
with or without a will, die after the beginning of
the effectivity of this Code, shall be adjudicated
and distributed in accordance with this new body
of laws and by the Rules of Court; but the
testamentary provisions shall be carried out
insofar as they may be permitted by this Code.

Therefore, legitimes, betterments, legacies and

bequests shall be respected; however, their
amount shall be reduced if in no other manner can
every compulsory heir be given his full share
according to this Code.
Art. 2264. The status and rights of natural children
by legal fiction referred to in article 89 and
illegitimate children mentioned in Article 287,
shall also be acquired by children born before the
effectivity of this Code.
Art. 2265. The right of retention of real or personal
property arising after this Code becomes effective,
includes those things which came into the
creditor's possession before said date.
Art. 2266. The following shall have not only
prospective but also retroactive effect: 1. Article
315, whereby a descendant cannot be compelled,
in a criminal case, to testify against his parents
and ascendants;
2. Articles 101 and 88, providing against collusion
in cases of legal separation and annulment of
marriage;3. Articles 283, 284, and 289,
concerning the proof of illegitimate filiation;4.
Article 838, authorizing the probate of a will on
petition of the testator himself; 5. Articles 1359 to
1369, relative to the reformation of instruments;

6. Articles 476 to 481, regulating actions to quiet

title;7. Articles 2029 to 2031, which are designed
to promote compromise. (n)
Art. 2267. The following provisions shall apply not
only to future cases but also to those pending on
the date this Code becomes effective:1. Article 29,
Relative to criminal prosecutions wherein the
accused is acquitted on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt;
2. Article 33, concerning cases of defamation,
fraud, and physical injuries.

they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is

not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in
Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the
time of the publication of such laws a final
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is
serving the same.
FamilyCode
Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws.

Art. 2268. Suits between members of the same

family which are pending at the time this Code
goes into effect shall be suspended, under such
terms as the court may determine, in order that
compromise may be earnestly sought, or, in case
of legal separation proceedings, for the purpose of
effecting, if possible, a reconciliation.
Art. 2269. The principles upon which the
preceding transitional provisions are based shall,
by analogy, be applied to cases not specifically
regulated by them.
RevisedPenalCode
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal
Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as

D. Mandatory or Prohibitory Laws

NewCivilCode
Art. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of

mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void,

except when the law itself authorizes their validity.
Mandatory statutes provisions which relate to
substance, affect substantial rights and are the
very essence of the thing required to be done.
Violation of a mandatory or prohibitory statute
renders the act illegal and void.Directory statutes
provisions which are mere matters of form, or
which are not material, do not affect any
substantial right, and do not relate to the essence
of the thing to be done, so that compliance is a
matter of convenience rather than substance.
Art 17 (3). Prohibitive laws concerning persons,
their acts or property, and those which have, for
their object, public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
or judgments promulgated, or by determinations
or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
NERWIN VS PNOC
FACTS: In 1999, National Electrification
Administration (NEA) published an invitation to
pre-qualify and to bid for a contract known as IPB
No. 80 for the supply and delivery of about 60,000
pieces of wood poles and 20,000 of cross- arms.
Nerwin was one of the bidders The contract was
awarded to him being the lowest bidder. However,
NEAs board of directors passed a resolution

reducing by 50% the material requirements for

IPB 80 to which Nerwin protested. A losing bidder,
Tri State and Pacific Synergy filed a complaint
alleging the documents Nerwin submitted during
the pre-qualification bid were falsified. Finding a
way to nullify the bid, NEA sought the opinion of
Govt Corporate Counsel who upheld the eligibility
of Nerwin. NEA allegedly held negotiations with
other bidders for IPB 80 contract. As a result,
Nerwin filed a complaint with prayer of injunction
which was grabted by RTC Manila. PNOC Energy
Devt Corp issued an invitation to pre- qualify and
bid for O-ILAW project. Nerwin filed a civil action in
RTC alleging that it was an attempt to subject
portions of IPB 80 to another bidding. He prayed
for TRO to enjoin respondents to the proposed
bidding. Respondents averred that this is in
violation of a rule that government infrastructure
are not subject to TROs. RTC granted TRO
nevertheless. CA ruled in favor of respondents.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N CA erred in dismissing the case
pursuant to RA 8975 which prohibits issuance of
TRO except SC to govt projects
HELD: Decision of CA affirmed. Sec 3 of RA 8975
clearly prohibits issuance of TRO, preliminary
injunctions, and preliminary mandatory
injunctions against govt.

E. Waiver of Rights
Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals,
or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person
with a right recognized by law.
Elements of a right: 1. Subject
a. active entitled to demand the enforcement of
a right
b. passive duty-bound to suffer its enforcement
2. Object thing or service
3. Efficient cause the fact that gives rise to the
legal relationa. voluntary from the will of man
(i.e. contracts)b. involuntary independent of
such will (i.e. fortuitous events)
Kinds of Rights:1. Political Rights participation of
persons in the government of the state 2. Civil
Rights rights not included under political rights
a. Rights of Personality rights arising from the
fact of being human (e.g. right to life, security,
honor, liberty, work, etc)b. Family rights rights of
a person as member of a familyc. Patrimonial
rights rights that have property as their object
i. real rights enforceable against the whole world

ii. personal rights enforceable to a determinate

personFirst two right cannot be waived, while
patrimonial rights can be
Renunciation or waiver of rights the
relinquishment of a known right with both
knowledge of its existence and an intention to
relinquish it. Waiver may either be expressed or
implied.
Requirements of a waiver:1. He must actually
have the right which he renounces2. He must
have the capacity to make the renunciation3. The
renunciation must be made in a clear and
equivocal manner (informed consent)(4. intent to
waive)(5. it must be expressed or implied)
Scope of waiver the doctrine of waiver is
generally applicable to all rights and privileges to
which a person is legally entitled, whether
secured by contract, conferred by statute, or
guaranteed by the constitution, provided such
rights and privileges rest in the individual and are
intended for his sole benefit.
Article 2035. No compromise upon the following
questions shall be valid: 1. The civil status of
persons;2. The validity of a marriage or a legal
separation;3. Any ground for legal separation;
4. Future support;5. The jurisdiction of courts; 6.

Future legitime.

F. Repeal of Laws
NewCivilCode
Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent
ones, and their violation or non- observance shall
not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to
the contrary. When the courts declared a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall
be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
Kinds of Repeal of Laws:1. Express or Declared
Repeal contained in a special provision of a
subsequent law2. Implied or Tacit Repeal takes
place when the provisions of the subsequent law
are incompatible or inconsistent with those of an
earlier law. If there is a conflict between an old
and a new law, so that the observance of one
excludes that of the other, the conflict must be
resolved in favor of the later law. Implied repeals
are not to be favored because they rest only on

the presumption that because the old and the new

laws are incompatible with each other, there is an
intention to repeal the old. There must be a plain,
unavoidable, and irreconcilable repugnancy
between the two. If both can by reasonable
construction stand together, both will be
sustained.
2 Requisites of Implied Repeals:1. The laws cover
the same subject matter 2. The latter is repugnant
to the earlier
1987Constitution
Art. XVIII, Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions, and other executive issuances not
inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain
operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
FamilyCode
Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, XI, and XV of
Book 1 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known
as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended,
and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40,
41, and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603,
otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, as amended, and all laws, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations, rules and
regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith

are hereby repealed.

Art. 255. If any provision of this Code is held
invalid, all the other provisions not affected
thereby shall remain valid.
THORNTON VS THORNTON
FACTS: Petitioner was an American, respondent
was a Filipino. They were married and had one
daughter. After 3 years, the woman grew restless
and bored as a plain housewife and wanted to
return to her old job as GRO in a nightclub. One
day, the woman left the family home together
with their daughter and told her servants that she
was going to Basilan. The husband filed a petition
for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court
in Makati City but was dismissed because the
child was in Basilan. When he went to Basilan, he
didnt find them and the barangay office issued a
certification that respondent was no longer
residing there. Petitioner filed another petition for
habeas corpus in CA which could issue a writ of
habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.
The petition was denied by CA on the ground that
it did not have jurisdiction over the case since RA
8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family
courts exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for
habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An
Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of CA) and B.P 129
(The judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.)

ISSUE: W/N CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of

habeas corpus in cases involving custody of
minors in light of the provision in RA 8369 giving
family courts exclusive jurisdiction over such
petitions.
HELD: Petition granted. CA should take cognizance
of the case because nothing in RA 8369 revoked
its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus
involving custody of minors. The reasoning of CA
cant be affirmed because it will result to
iniquitous, leaving petitioners without legal course
in obtaining custody. The minor could be
transferred from one place to another and habeas
corpus case will be left without legal remedy since
family courts take cognizance only cases within
their jurisdiction. Literal interpretation would
render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice,
and contradiction. The literal interpretation of
exclusive will result in grave injustice and
negate the policy to protect the rights and
promote welfare of children.
G. Judicial Decisions
NewCivilCode
Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of
the legal system of the Philippines.

Jurisprudence cant be considered as an

independent source of law. It cannot create law
because of the doctrine of separation of powers.
But the courts interpretation of a statute
constitutes part of the law as of the date it was
originally passed, since the courts construction
merely establishes contemporaneous legislative
intent that the interpreted law carried into effect.
Role of Jurisprudence:1. To fill the deficiencies of
legislation and provide a rule for the facts of a
given case for which there is neither positive
provision of law nor established custom2. To adapt
and adjust rigid and inflexible provisions of law,
rendered inadequate by time and circumstances,
to the changing conditions of life and society, so
that the law may accomplish its social mission
Doctrine of Stare Decisis It enjoins adherence to
judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country
to follow the rule established in a decision of the
SC thereof. That decision becomes a judicial
precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by
all courts in the land. It is based on the principle
that once a question of law has been examined
and decided, it should be deemed settled and
closed for further argument. However, the
doctrine is flexible. So that when, in light of
changing conditions, a rule has ceased to be of
benefit and use to society, the courts may rightly

depart from it.

LORNA PESCA VS ZOSIMO PESCA
FACTS: The petitioner and respondent were
married and had four children. Lorna filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity on the
part of her husband. She alleged that he is
emotionally immature and irresponsible. He was
cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker.
Whenever she tells him to stop or at least
minimize his drinking, her husband would hurt
her. There was even a time when she was chased
by a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in
the presence of their children. The children also
suffered physical violence. Petitioner and their
children left the home. Two months later, they
returned upon the promise of respondent to
change. But he didnt. She was battered again.
Her husband was imprisoned for 11 days for slight
physical injuries. RTC declared their marriage null
and void. CA reversed RTCs ruling. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: W/N the guidelines for psychological
incapacity in the case of Republic vs CA & Molina
should be taken in consideration in deciding in
this case.
HELD: Yes. In the Molina case, guidelines were laid

down by the SC before a case would fall under the

category of psychological incapacity to declare a
marriage null and void. This decision has force
and effect of a law. These guidelines are
mandatory in nature. Petition denied.
H. Duty to Render Judgment
NewCivilCode
Art. 9. No judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the laws.
This article does not apply to criminal
prosecutions, because when there is no law
punishing an act, the case must be dismissed; and
thus, it only applies to civil cases.
How will the judge decide in cases of obscurity or
deficiency of law? 1. Statutory Construction2.
Stare Decisis3. Custom and Traditions
It is the duty of the judge to apply the law without
fear or favor, to follow its mandate, and not to
tamper with it. Court cant adopt a policy different
from the law.Customs juridical rule which results
from a constant and continued uniform practice
by the members of a social community, with

respect to a particular state of facts, and observed

with a conviction that it is juridically obligatory.
Requisites:1. plurality of acts or various
resolutions of a juridical question raised
repeatedly in life2. uniformity or identity of the
acts or various solutions to the juridical question3.
general practice by the great mass of the social
group4. continued performance of these acts for a
long period of time;5. general conviction that the
practice corresponds to a juridical necessity or
that it is obligatory; and6. the practice must not
be contrary to law, morals or public order.
Suppletory to Law where there is no statute
exactly applicable to the point in controversy, the
custom of the place shall be applied, and in the
absence thereof, the general principles of law.
General Principles of Law Universal juridical
standards dictated by correct reason; or those
principles of justice beyond the variability and
uncertainty of facts, those high standards which
serve as a foundation to positive law, those rules
accepted by jurisconsults which constitute real
axioms for all those who intervene in juridical life,
and which form a law superior to that which is
enacted.
Art. 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the

lawmaking body intended right and justice to

prevail.
The rule state din this article is to be applied only
in case of doubt, and when all other rules of
interpretation fail.Equity is an attribute of justice,
and there can be no justice if the application of
the law is not made with equity.
RevisedPenalCode
Art. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts
which should be repressed but which are not
covered by the law, and in cases of excessive
penalties. virtual law library Whenever a court
has knowledge of any act which it may deem
proper to repress and which is not punishable by
law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall
report to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, the reasons which induce
the court to believe that said act should be made
the subject of legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the
Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, such statement as may be deemed
proper, without suspending the execution of the
sentence, when a strict enforcement of the
provisions of this Code would result in the
imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking
into consideration the degree of malice and the

injury caused by the offense.

PEOPLE VS RITTER
FACTS: On or about October 10, 1986, Ritter
brought Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in a
hotel room in Olongapo. Ritter masturbated Jessie
and fingered Rosario. Afterwards, he inserted a
foreign object to the vagina of Rosario. The next
morning, Ritter gave Jessie 200, and Rosario 300.
Rosario told Jessie that Ritter inserted an object
inside her vagina. Sometime the following day,
Rosario said that the object has already been
removed from her vagina. On May 14, 1987,
Alcantara saw Rosario with bloody skirt, foul
smelling. Rosario was brought and confined to
Olongapo City general Hospital. An OB-Gyne tried
to remove the object inside her vagina using
forceps but failed because it was deeply
embedded and covered by tissues. She was
having peritonitis. She told the attending
physician that a Negro inserted the object to her
vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was made liable for
rape with homicide.
ISSUE: W/N Ritter was liable for rape and homicide
HELD: No. The prosecution failed to prove that
Rosario was only 12 years old when the incident
with Ritter happened. And that Rosario prostituted
herself even at the tender age. As evidence, she

received 300 from Ritter the following morning. A

doctor/specialist also testified that the inserted
object in the vagina of Rosario Baluyot by Ritter
was different from that which caused her death.
As evidence, Rosario herself said to Jessie the
following day that the object has been removed
already. She also told the doctor that a Negro
inserted it to her vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was
a Caucasian. Ritter was also acquitted for the
criminal case of rape with homicide. However, it
does not exempt him for the moral and exemplary
damages he must award to the victims heirs. It
does not necessarily follow that the appellant is
also free from civil liability which is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action. Ritter was
deported.
I. Presumption and Applicability of Custom
NewCivilCode
Art. 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public
order or public policy shall not be countenanced.
Art. 12. A custom must be proved as a fact,
according to the rules of evidence.
1987Constitution,Art.XII
Section 5. The State, subject to the provisions of
this Constitution and national development

policies and programs, shall protect the rights of

indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral
lands to ensure their economic, social, and
cultural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of
customary laws governing property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and extent
of ancestral domain.
RulesofCourtRule129
Section 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A
court may take judicial notice of matters which
are of public knowledge, or are capable to
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be
known to judges because of their judicial
functions.
Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary.
During the trial, the court, on its own initiative,
or on request of a party, may announce its
intention to take judicial notice of any matter and
allow the parties to be heard thereon.
MARTINEZ VS VAN BUSKIRK
FACTS: On Spetember 11, 1908, Martinez was
riding a carromata in Ermita along the left side of
the street when a delivery wagon belonging to the
defendant to which a pair of horses was attached

came along the street in the opposite direction at

great speed. The horses ran into the carromata
and wounded Martinez servely. The defendant
presented evidence that the cochero was a good
servant and a reliable and safe cochero. And that
he was delivering stuff so he tied the driving lines
of the horses to the front end of the delivery
wagon and went inside the wagon to unload the
stuff to be delivered. But while unloading, another
vehicle drove by whose driver cracked a whip and
made some noises which frightened the horses
and which made it ran away. The cochero was
thrown from the inside of the wagon and was
unable to stop the horses. The horses collided
with the carromata.
ISSUE: W/N the employer is liable for the
negligence of his cochero
HELD: No. Defendant not liable. Cochero was not
negligent. What happened was an accident. It has
been a custom or a matter of common knowledge
and universal practice of merchants to leave
horses in the manner which the cochero left it
during the accident. This is the custom in all
cities. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by
such practice has acquiesced for years.
Art. 13. When the laws speak of years, months,
days or nights, it shall be understood that years
are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months,

of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and

nights from sunset to sunrise.
The rule stated above is applicable only where a
given period of time must be counted from a
certain date in order to determine the date on
which an act must performed. But there is no
necessity for such computation when the date is
fixes; that is, when the act is to take place at a
specified future date.
RulesofCourt(ROC)Rule22
(1) In computing any period of time prescribed or
allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court,
or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or
event from which the designated period of time
begins to run is to be excluded and the date of
performance included. If the last day of the
period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a
Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the
court sits, the time shall not run until the next
working day
(2) Should an act be done which effectively
interrupts the running of the period, the allowable
period after such interruption shall start to run on
the day after notice of the cessation of the cause
thereof.The day of the act that caused the
interruption shall be excluded in the computation
of the period

RevisedAdministrativeCode
Section 31. "Year" shall be understood to be
twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days,
unless it refers to a specific calendar month in
which case it shall be computed according to the
number of days the specific month contains;
"day," to a day of twenty-four hours; and "night,"
from sunset to sunrise
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP INC. FACTS: Gilbert
Yap, Vice Chair of Primetown applied on March 11,
1999 for a refund or credit of income tax which
Primetown paid in 1997. He claimed that they are
entitled for a refund because they suffered losses
that year due to the increase of cost of labor and
materials, etc. However, despite the losses, they
still paid their
quarterly income tax and remitted creditable
withholding tax from real estate sales to BIR.
Hence, they were claiming for a refund. On May
13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Santos
required Primetown to submit additional
documents to which Primetown complied with.
However, its claim was not acted upon which
prompted it to file a petition for review in CTA on
April 14, 2000. CTA dismissed the petition as it
was filed beyonf the 2-year prescriptive period for
filing a judicial claim for tax refund according to

Sec 229 of NIRC. According to CTA, the two-year

period is equivalent to 730 days pursuant to Art
13 of NCC. Since Primetown filed its final
adjustment return on April 14, 1998 and that year
2000 was a leap year, the petition was filed 731
days after Primetown filed its final adjusted return.
Hence, beyond the reglementary period.
Primetown appealed to CA. CA reversed the
decision of CTA. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N petition was filed within the two-year
period
HELD: Pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative
Code of 1987, a year shall be understood to be 12
calendar months. The SC defined a calendar
month as a month designated in the calendar
without regard to the number of days it may
contain. The court held that Administrative Code
of 1987 impliedly repealed Art 13 of NCC as the
provisions are irreconcilable. Primetown is entitled
for the refund since it is filed within the 2-year
reglementary period.
K. Applicability of Penal Laws
NewCivilCode
Article 14. Penal laws and those of public security
and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or
sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the

principles of public international law and to treaty

stipulations
Article 17 (3). Prohibitive laws concerning persons,
their acts or property, and those which have, for
their object, public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
or judgments promulgated, or by determinations
or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Offenses by military personnel jurisdiction of
civil tribunals of Philippines is not affected by the
military or special character of the persons.
General Rule: Aliens are bound by Philippine penal
law. Exception under international law:1) Offenses
are committed in the foreign territory;2) Against
foreign officers;
3) Offenses committed in a foreign vessel.
RevisedPenalCode
Art. 2. Application of its provisions. Except as
provided in the treaties and laws of preferential
application, the provisions of this Code shall be
enforced not only within the Philippine
Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior
waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its
jurisdiction, against those who:

1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine

ship or airship2. Should forge or counterfeit any
coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or
obligations and securities issued by the
Government of the Philippine Islands; chan robles
virtual law library3. Should be liable for acts
connected with the introduction into these islands
of the obligations and securities mentioned in the
presiding number;4. While being public officers or
employees, should commit an offense in the
exercise of their functions; or5. Should commit
any of the crimes against national security and
the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book
Two of this Code.
L. Binding Effect
NewCivilCode
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties,
or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.
Theories on Personal Law1. Domiciliary Theory
the necessary connection between a state and an
individual is found in the fact that the individual is
domiciled in the state in question2. Nationality
Theory nationality and citizenship is the basis for
determining the personal laws of an individual

FamilyCode
Art 26(2). Where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
TENCHAVEZ VS ESCANO
FACTS: Pastor Tenchavez, 32, married Vicenta
Escano, 27, on February 24, 1948 in Cebu without
the knowledge of Escanos parents. They were
planning to elope but this did not materialize
because Vicenta went back to her college. When
she confessed her marriage to her parents, her
parents were angered. But because of the fear the
marriage could cause, they wanted them to have
a church wedding, which Escano refused upon
receiving anonymous letter saying that Tenchavez
had another woman. Escano later on moved to
Misamis Occidental to escape from the scandal
that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a
lawyer filed for her a petition drafted by Sen.
Pelaez to annul her marriage. She did not sign the
petition and case was dismissed. She then applied
for a passport, indicating there that she was
single, her purpose was to study, and she intends
to return after 2 years. In US, she filed a divorce
against Tenchanez on the ground of extreme

cruelty, entirely mental in character. The divorce

was granted. Later on, Escano married an
American. On August 8, 1958, she acquired
American citizenship. In May 1956, Tenchavez
initiated proceeding at bar against Escano, legal
separation for bigamy; against Escano parents
whom he charged for dissuading Escano to live
with him as his wife; and against the Catholic
Church for having decreed an annulment of
marriage. He asked for 1 million for damages.
Vicenta claimed that she had a valid divorce and
validly married to her current husband. She also
claimed that she was under the undue influence
of Pacita Noel whom she charged in conspiracy
with Tenchavez.
ISSUE: W/N the divorce was valid
HELD: No. When the divorce was granted, Escano
was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to
Philippine law.
NewCivilCode
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property
is subject to the law of the country where it is
stipulated.However, intestate and testamentary
successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law

of the person whose succession is under

consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found.
INTESTATE OF AMOS BELLIS
FACTS: Amos Bellis was a citizen of Texas. He had
st
5 legitimate children on his 1 wife whom he
nd
divorced. On his 2
wife, he had 3 legitimate
children and 3 illegitimate children. Before his
death, he made two wills, one disposing off his
Texas properties and the other, disposing his
Philippine properties. In both wills, his illegitimate
children were not given anything. The illegitimate
children opposed the will on the ground that they
have been deprived of their legitimes to which
they should be entitled, ig Philippine laws will be
applied.
ISSUE: W/N the national law of the deceased
should determine the successional rights of the
illegitimate children
HELD: The illegitimate children are not entitled to
their legitimes under Texas Law, being the
national law of the deceased. See Art 16
NewCivilCode

Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts,

wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they
are executed.When the acts referred to are
executed before the diplomatic or consular
officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a
foreign country, the solemnities established by
Philippine laws shall be observed in their
execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have, for their object,
public order, public policy and good customs shall
not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
Art. 18. In matters which are governed by the
Code of Commerce and special laws, their
deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of
this Code.
E. TAMANO VS JUDGE ORTIZ
FACTS: Sen. Tamano and Zorayda Tamano married
in civil rites. Before Sen. Tamano died, he married
Estrellita in civil rites too. A year after Sen.
Tamanos death, Zorayda and her son filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage of
her husband and Estrellita on the ground that it
was bigamous. Zorayda further claimed that her

husband claimed to be divorces and Estrellita as

single, hence, their marriage was fraudulent.
Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that QC
RTC has no jurisdiction because only a party to a
marriage could file an action for annulment
against the other spouse. Estrellita also contended
that since Tamano and Zorayda were both
Muslims and married in Muslim rites, the
jurisdiction to hear and try the case is vested in
Sharia courts pursuant to Art 155 of Code of
Muslim. RTC denied the petition and ruled it has
jurisdiction since Estrellita and Tamano were
married in accordance with the Civil Code. Motion
for reconsideration was also denied. Petitioner
referred to SC which ruled that it should be
referred to CA first. The CA ruled that the case
would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia
courts only when filed in places where there are
sharia courts. But in places where there are no
sharia courts, the instant petition could be at RTC.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N Sharia courts and not the RTC has
jurisdiction over the subject case and the nature
of action.HELD: SC held that RTC has jurisdiction
over all actions involving the contract of marriage
and marital relations. In this case, both petitioner
and the deceased were married through a civil
wedding. And whether or not they were likewise
married in a Muslim wedding, sharia courts are
still not vested with original jurisdiction over

marriages married under civil and Muslim law.

Digest 6:VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO vs. THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC
INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY,
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION
AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and
SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS
G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES
ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND
SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY,
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL
REFORMS, respondents.
x----------------------x
G.R. No. 179275 December 23, 2008
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D.
AGCAOILI, petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE
PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR,
respondents.
x----------------------x
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention
x----------------------x
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C.

AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M.

LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S.
MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. TRILLANES, respondentsintervenors
Facts: During the hype of Arroyo administration, a new
controversy arises. During the 2007 election the
conversation of President Arroyo and the herein
petitioner Virgilio Garciliano, COMELEC regional director,
regarding the desire of the president to have a favourable
outcome in terms of his senatoriables. Such
conversation was recorded and was played during the
house of representative investigation. Because of such
turn of events, a petition was filed before the court
praying that such playing of the illegally seized
communication was in violation of RA 4200 or the antiwire tapping law. Also such petition for injunction prays
that the Senate committee be prevented from further
conducting such investigation for the basic reason that
there was no proper publication of the senate rules,
empowering them to make such investigation of the
unlawfully seized documents.
Issue: Whether or not there was proper publication of the
rules as to empower the senate to further proceed with
their investigation?
Held: No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following:
The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the
conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly

published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the

constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides that "the Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of
publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process.Publication is indeed
imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law
or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.What constitutes publication is set forth
in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "laws
shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of
their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."
Respondents justify their non-observance of the
constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the
rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite
that, they are published in booklet form available to
anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the
Senates internet web page.
The Court does not agree. The absence of any
amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senates
defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law
instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in

accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and

does not make any distinction whether or not these rules
have undergone amendments or revision. The
constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails
over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the
Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of
R.A. No. 8792,otherwise known as the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid
publication through the internet is all the more incorrect.
R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an
electronic document as the functional equivalent of a
written document only for evidentiary purposes.In other
words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in
evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data
messages and/or electronic documents.It does not make
the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and
regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate
Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the
Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative
inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct
of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be
deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the
rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure."
Indeed the inquiry to be conducted by the senate in aid of
legislation cannot proceed for the reason that the rules

that they will observe was not properly published as

provided by the Fundamental Law of the land. Such
inquiry if allowed without observance of the required
publication will put a persons life, liberty and property at
stake without due process of law. Also, the further
assertion of the senate that they already published such
rules through their web page, in observance of the RA
8792 or the Electronic Commerce Act was only viewed by
the court as matter of evidence and still does not
conforme with what the constitution propounded.
In this regard the high court granted the petition for
injunction preventing the senate to conduct such inquiry
in aid of legislation.

Crim Pro Case Digest: Simon V. Chua G.R. No. 157547

February 23, 2011
G.R. No. 157547 February 23, 2011
Lessons Applicable: Procedural laws may be given
retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage. There are no vested rights in
the rules of procedure.
Laws Applicable:

FACTS:

December 1996: Eduard Simon issued a check to

Elvin Chan a Landbank Check dated December 26,
1996 worth P336,000.00

December 26, 1996: It was dishonored due to

account closed.

After a formal demand, Simon filed for preliminary

attachmen - MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of
preliminary attachment

Simon filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of

litis pendentia because there is already a charge of
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 - granted by the
MeTC

Chan appealed to the CA - reversed and set aside

the decision of the MeTC
ISSUE: W/N the case should be dismissed due to litis
pendentia because the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure pertaining to independent civil actions which
became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to
this case renders Chan's civil action to recover as an
independent civil action
HELD: YES. Reversa CA and reinstate MeTC

Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to

actions pending and undetermined at the time of their

passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of

procedure. xxx
Surely, it could not have been the intendment of
the framers of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the
offended private party defrauded and empty-handed
by excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving
her only the remedy, which in many cases results in a
Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit. To
do so may leave the offended party unable to recover
even the face value of the check due her, thereby
unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of
the payee. The protection which the law seeks to
provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.
However, there is no independent civil action to
recover the value of a bouncing check issued in
contravention of BP 22. Applying Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court, effective December 1, 200 that the
criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil
action. No reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed
DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez
(different facts): issuance of a bouncing check may
result in two separate and distinct crimes of estafa
and violation of BP 22, the procedures for the

recovery of the civil liabilities arising from these two

distinct crimes are different and non-interchangeable
In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party
may opt to reserve his right to file a separate civil
action, or may institute an independent action based
on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code
In prosecutions of violations of BP 22,
however, the Court has adopted a policy to prohibit
the reservation or institution of a separate civil action
to claim the civil liability arising from the issuance of
the bouncing check
RANSISCO V. COURT OF APPEALS
319 SCRA 354

FACTS:
A. Fransisco Realty and Development and
Herby Commercial and Construction
Corporation entered into a Land
Development and Construction Contract.
Fransisco was the president of AFRDC while
Ong was the president of HCCC. It was
agreed upon that HCCC would undertake the
construction of housing units and the

development of a large parcel of land. The

payment would be on a turnkey basis. To
facilitate the payment, AFDRC executed a Deed
of Assignment to enable the HCCC to collect
payments from the GSIS. Further, they opened an
account with a bank from which checks would
be issued by Fransisco and the GSIS
president.
HCCC later on filed a complaint for the unpaid
balance in pursuance to its agreement with
AFRDC. However, an amicable settlement
ensued, which was embodied in a Memorandum
of Agreement. It was embodied in said agreement
that GSIS recognizes its indebtedness to HCCC
and that HCCC would also pay its obligations to
AFRDC.
A year later, it was found out that Diaz and
Fransisco had drawn checks payable to Ong.
Ong denied accepting said checks and it was
further found out that Diaz entrusted the
checks to Fransisco who later forged the
signature of Ong, showing that he indorsed the
checks to her and then she
deposited the checks to her personal savings
account. This incident prompted Ong to file a
complaint against Fransisco.

HELD:
Ongs signature was found to be forged by
Fransisco.
Fransiscos contention that he was authorized
to sign Ongs name in her favor giving her
authority to collect all the receivables of HCCC
from GSIS. This contention is bereft of any
merit. The Negotiable Instruments Law
provides that when a person is under obligation
to indorse in a representative capacity, he may
indorse in such terms as to negative personal
liability. An agent, when so signing, should
indicate that he is merely signing as an agent in
behalf of the principal and must disclose the
name of his principal. Otherwise, he will be
held liable personally. And assuming she was
indeed authorized, she didn't comply with the
requirements of the law. Instead of signing
Ongs name, she should have signed in her own
name as agent of HCCC. Thus, her contentions
cannot support or validate her acts of forgery.

DM Consunji v. CA, G.R. No. 137873, April 20,

2001
FACTS: A construction worker died when he fell 14 floors
when the platform which he was on board fell from the
Renaissance Tower in Pasig City. He works for DM
Consunji Inc. It was noted that this happened because
the pin inserted to the platform loosened and there was
no safety lock. His widow filed with RTC of Pasig a
complaint for damages against DM Consunji Inc. The
employer averred that the widow already availed benefits
from the State Insurance Fund and that she cannot
recover civil damages from the company anymore.
ISSUE: W/N the widow is already barred from availing
death benefits under the Civil Code because she already
availed damages under the Labor Code
HELD: Although SC ruled that recovery of damages
under the Workers Compensation Act is a bar to recover
under a civil action, the CA ruled that in this case, the
widow had a right to file an ordinary action for civil
actions because she was not aware and ignorant of her
rights and courses of action. She was not aware of her
rights and remedies. Thus, her election to claim from the
Insurance Fund does not waive her claim from the
petitioner company. The argument that ignorance of the
law excuses no one is not applicable in this case

because it is only applicable to mandatory and prohibitory

laws.
AUJERO VS. PHILCOMSAT

retirement benefits at a rate equivalent to one

and a half of his monthly salary for every year of
service. At that time, the petitioner was
Philcomsats Senior Vice-President with a monthly

OCTOBER 23, 2012 ~ VBDIAZ

salary of P274,805.00.

HYPTE R. AUJERO, PETITIONER, VS.

On September 12, 2001, the petitioner executed a

PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE

Deed of Release and Quitclaim in Philcomsats

CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

favor, following his receipt from the latter of a

G.R. No. 193484, January 18, 2012

Facts:

check in the amount of P9,439,327.91.

Almost three (3) years thereafter, the petitioner
filed a complaint for unpaid retirement benefits,

It was in 1967 that the petitioner started working

claiming that the actual amount of his retirement

for respondent Philippine Communications

pay is P14,015,055.00 and the P9,439,327.91 he

Satellite Corporation (Philcomsat) as an

received from Philcomsat as supposed settlement

accountant in the latters Finance Department. On

for all his claims is unconscionable, which is more

August 15, 2001 or after 34 years of service, the

than enough reason to declare his quitclaim as

petitioner applied for early retirement. His

null and void. According to the petitioner, he had

application for retirement was approved, effective

no choice but to accept a lesser amount as he was

September 15, 2001, entitling him to receive

in dire need thereof and was all set to return to his

hometown and he signed the quitclaim despite

employers seeking to evade their legal

the considerable deficiency as no single centavo

responsibilities, a legitimate waiver representing a

would be released to him if he did not execute a

voluntary settlement of a laborers claims should

release and waiver in Philcomsats favor.

be respected by the courts as the law between

the parties. Considering the petitioners claim of

The petitioner claims that his right to receive the

full amount of his retirement benefits, which is
equivalent to one and a half of his monthly salary

fraud and bad faith against Philcomsat to be

unsubstantiated, this Court finds the quitclaim in
dispute to be legitimate waiver.

for every year of service, is provided under the

Retirement Plan that Philcomsat created on

While the petitioner bewailed as having been

January 1, 1977 for the benefit of its employees.

coerced or pressured into signing the release and

waiver, his failure to present evidence renders his

Issue: Whether the quitclaim executed by the

petitioner in Philcomsats favor is valid, thereby
foreclosing his right to institute any claim against
Philcomsat.
Held:
While the law looks with disfavor upon releases
and quitclaims by employees who are inveigled or
pressured into signing them by unscrupulous

allegation self-serving and inutile to invalidate the

same. That no portion of his retirement pay will be
released to him or his urgent need for funds does
not constitute the pressure or coercion
contemplated by law.
DE CASTRO VS. JBC
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND

President or Acting President from making

BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA

appointments within two months immediately

MACAPAGAL ARROYO

before the next presidential elections and up to

G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

the end of his term, except temporary

appointments to executive positions when

FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief

Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs

continued vacancies therein will prejudice public

service or endanger public safety.

just days after the coming presidential elections

on May 10, 2010.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18,

2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of

These cases trace their genesis to the controversy

filling up the position of Chief Justice.

that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory

retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010,

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC

or seven days after the presidential election.

automatically considered for the position of

Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article

Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate

VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety

Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice

days from the occurrence thereof from a list of

Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C.

at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial

Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales;

and Bar Council for every vacancy. Also

Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and

considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive

Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura.

Department) of the Constitution prohibits the

However, the last two declined their nomination

through letters dated January 18, 2010 and

pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the

January 25, 2010, respectively.

positions, the establishment of the JBC, the

The OSG contends that the incumbent President

specified period within which the President shall

may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the

appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the

Constitution does not apply to appointments in
the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in
the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days
from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1),
Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the
framers intended the prohibition to apply to
Supreme Court appointments, they could have
easily expressly stated so in the Constitution,
which explains why the prohibition found in Article
VII (Executive Department) was not written in
Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the
framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample
restrictions or limitations on the Presidents power
to appoint members of the Supreme Court to
ensure its independence from political
vicissitudes and its insulation from political

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court

is whether the JBC properly initiated the process,
there being an insistence from some of the
oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do
so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after
May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether
the JBC may resume its process until the short list
is prepared, in view of the provision of Section
4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the
President to appoint one from the short list to fill
the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief
Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days
from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can
appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon
his retirement.

HELD:

fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or

in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven

Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not

apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the

Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety

days from the occurrence thereof.

Supreme Court or to other appointments to the

Judiciary.

Had the framers intended to extend the

prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in

conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

the appointment of Members of the Supreme

Court, they could have explicitly done so. They
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of
the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in
Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done
only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial

appointments within two months before the next

Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme

presidential elections and up to the end of the

Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and

Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are

refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

obviously of the same character, in that they

affect the power of the President to appoint. The

Had the framers intended to extend the

prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to
the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court, they could have explicitly done so. They
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of
the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in
Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done
only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the
Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to

appointments within the Executive Department
renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies
only to the Executive Department. This conclusion
is consistent with the rule that every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, i.e. that every part must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment. It is absurd to assume that the
framers deliberately situated Section 15 between
Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended
Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in
respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the
framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and
surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII,
most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

Case Digest: Abas Kida v. Senate

G.R. No. 196271, : October 18, 2011
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal
capacity,
and
in
representation
of
MAGUINDANAO
FEDERATION
OF
AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION,
INC., et al., Petitioners, v. SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President
JUAN
PONCE
ENRILE,
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES, et al., Respondents.
FACTS:
On August 1, 1989 or two years after
the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress
acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled
"An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."The
initially
assenting
provinces
were Lanao del Sur,Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawitawi.RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular
elections for the regional officials of the ARMM on
a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90
days after its ratification.
Thereafter, R.A. No. 9054 was passed to further
enhance the structure of ARMM under R.A. 6734.
Along with it is the reset of the regular elections
for the ARMM regional officials to the second
Monday of September 2001.
RA No. 9333was subsequently passed by Congress
to reset the ARMM regional elections to the

2ndMonday of August 2005, and on the same date

every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and
RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a
plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional
elections should have been held onAugust 8,
2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these
elections and had accepted certificates of
candidacies for the various regional offices to be
elected.But onJune 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was
enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May
2013, to coincide with the regular national and
local elections of the country.With the enactment
into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped
its preparations for the ARMM elections.
Several
cases
for certiorari,
prohibition
and madamus originating from different parties
arose as a consequence of the passage of R.A. No.
9333 and R.A. No. 10153 questioning the validity
of said laws.
OnSeptember 13, 2011, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the
implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the
incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue
to perform their functions should these cases not
be decided by the end of their term onSeptember
30, 2011.
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No.
9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws
amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with

the
supermajority
vote
and
plebiscite
requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3,
Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become
effective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further
maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to
comply with the three-reading requirement of
Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution.Also
cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the
right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as
the failure to adhere to the "elective and
representative" character of the executive and
legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the
petitioners challenged the grant to the President
of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the
functions of the elective ARMM officials until the
officials elected under the May 2013 regular
elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily,
they also argue that the power of appointment
also gave the President the power of control over
the ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16,
Article X of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
A. Whether or not the 1987 Constitution
mandates the synchronization of
elections
B. Whether or not the passage of RA No.
10153 violates the provisions of the
1987 Constitution
HELD:

Court dismissed the petition and affirmed

the constitutionality of R.A. 10153 in toto. The
Court agreed with respondent Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) on its position that the
Constitution mandates synchronization, citing
Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution. While the
Constitution does not expressly state that
Congress has to synchronize national and local
elections, the clear intent towards this objective
can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions
(Article XVIII) of the Constitution,which show the
extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by
deliberately making adjustments to the terms of
the incumbent officials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections.
The objective behind setting a common
termination date for all elective officials, done
among others through the shortening the terms of
the twelve winning senators with the least number
of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future
elections whether national or local to once every
three years.This intention finds full support in the
discussions during the Constitutional Commission
deliberations.
Furthermore,
to
achieve
synchronization,
Congressnecessarilyhas
to

reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs regular

elections (which should have been held in August
2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed
schedule of the national and local elections (fixed
by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).
InOsme v. Commission on Elections, the court thus
explained:
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the
1987 Constitution that the terms of office of
Senators,
Members
of
the
House
of
Representatives, the local officials, the President
and the Vice-President have been synchronized to
end on the same hour, date and year noon of June
30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the
above-mentioned
Sections
that
the
term
ofsynchronizationis used synonymously as the
phraseholding simultaneouslysince this is the
precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on
the
sameday
or
occasion.This
common
termination date will synchronize future elections
to once every three years (Bernas, the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol.
II, p. 605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the
House of Representatives and the local officials

(under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be

synchronized with the election for President and
Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise
evident from the x x xrecords of the proceedings
in the Constitutional Commission. [Emphasis
supplied.]
Although called regional elections, the ARMM
elections should be included among the elections
to be synchronized as it is a "local" election based
on
the
wording
and
structure
of
the
Constitution. Regional elections in the ARMM for
the positions of governor, vice-governor and
regional assembly representatives fall within the
classification of "local" elections, since they
pertain to the elected officials who will serve
within the limited region of ARMM. From the
perspective of the Constitution, autonomous
regions are considered one of the forms of local
governments, as evident from Article Xof the
Constitution
entitled
"Local
Government."Autonomous regions are established
and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this
Article the article wholly devoted to Local
Government.
Second issue: Congress, in passing RA No.
10153, acted strictly within its constitutional

mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted

within due constitutional bounds and with marked
reasonableness in light of the necessary
adjustments that synchronization demands.
Congress, therefore, cannot be accused of any
evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to
perform its duty nor is there reason to accord
merit to the petitioners claims of grave abuse of
discretion.
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy
and the synchronization of national and local
elections
are
recognized
and
established
constitutional mandates, with one being as
compelling as the other.If their compelling force
differs at all, the difference is in their coverage;
synchronization operates on and affects the whole
country, while regional autonomy as the term
suggests directly carries a narrower regional
effect although its national effect cannot be
discounted.
In all these, the need for interim measures is
dictated
by
necessity;
out-of-the-way
arrangements and approaches were adopted or
used in order to adjust to the goal or objective in
sight in a manner that does not do violence to the
Constitution
and
to
reasonably
accepted
norms.Under these limitations, the choice of
measures was a question of wisdom left to
congressional discretion.

However, the holdover contained in R.A. No.

10153, for those who were elected in executive
and legislative positions in the ARMM during the
2008-2011 term as an option that Congress could
have chosen because a holdover violates Section
8, Article X of the Constitution. In the case of the
terms of local officials, their term has been fixed
clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for
any implementing legislation with respect to the
fixed term itself and no vagueness that would
allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the
term of three years for local officials should stay
at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and
cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.
RA No. 10153, does not in any way amend what
the organic law of the ARMM(RA No. 9054) sets
outs in terms of structure of governance.What RA
No. 10153 in fact only does is to"appoint officersin-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor,
Regional Vice Governor and Members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform
the functions pertaining to the said offices until
the officials duly elected in the May 2013
elections shall have qualified and assumed
office."This power is far different from appointing
elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term
ending on the assumption to office of the officials

elected in the May 2013 elections. It must be

therefore emphasized that the law must be
interpreted as an interim measure to synchronize
elections and must not be interpreted otherwise.

RAYTHEON V. ROUZIE (2008)

[ G.R. No. 162894, February 26, 2008 ]
FACTS:
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc., a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of
the State of Connecticut, United States of America, and
respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen,
entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent
as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in
several government projects in the Philippines for an
agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. On 11
March 1992, respondent secured a service contract with
the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the
dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption
and
mudflows.
On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the
Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission, a suit against BMSI and Rust International,
Inc., Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for
alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination
and breach of employment contract.

On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of

La Union, instituted an action for damages before the
Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union. The Complaint
named as defendants herein petitioner Raytheon
International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST, the two
corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case.
Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which
disclosed that per the written agreement between
respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated as
Special Sales Representative Agreement, the rights and
obligations of the parties shall be governed by thelaws of
the State of Connecticut. Petitioner sought the dismissal
of the complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause of
action and forum non conveniens and prayed for
damages by way of compulsory counterclaim.
Petitioner asserts that the written contract between
respondent and BMSI included a valid choice of law
clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by
the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the
presence of foreign elements in the dispute namely, the
parties and witnesses involved are American
corporations and citizens and the evidence to be
presented is located outside the Philippines that
renders our local courts inconvenient forums.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED
ON THE GROUND OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS?
RULING:
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-oflaws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court
and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject

matter, the parties and theres, it may or can proceed to

try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the
convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This
is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country
where
the
case
is
filed.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial
court acquired jurisdiction over herein respondent (as
party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the
other hand, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as
party defendant) was acquired by its voluntary
appearance in court.
That the subject contract included a stipulation that
the same shall be governed by the lawsof the State of
Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts,
or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded
from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of
law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers
whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this
state; choice of law asks the further question whether the
application of a substantive law which will determine the
merits of the case is fair to both parties.The choice of law
stipulation will become relevant only when the
substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is,
after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial
court.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a
court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions
on its jurisdiction where it is not the most convenient or
available forum and the parties are not precluded from

seeking remedies elsewhere. Petitioners averments of

the foreign elements in the instant case are not sufficient
to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No.
No.
1192-BG
and
the
parties
involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based
on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a
factual determination; hence, it is more properly
considered as a matter of defense. While it is within the
discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming
jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital
facts are established, to determine whether special
circumstances require the courts desistance.

Fuentes v. Conrado Roca, G.R. 178902, April 2010

Post under case digests, Civil Law at Friday, December
16, 2011 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
HAD8J5EKCNKC
FACTS: On, Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a 358square meter lot in Zambales from his mother. Six years
later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the
petitioners Fuentes spouses through the help of Atty.
Plagata

who

would

prepare

the

documents

and requirements to complete the sale. In the agreement

between Tarciano and Fuentes spouses there will be a

Php 60,000 down payment and Php 140,000 will be paid

upon the removal of Tarciano of certain structures on the

On the other hand, the CA reversed the ruling of the CA

land and after the consent of the estranged wife of

stating that the action has not prescribed since the

Tarciano, Rosario, would be attained. Atty. Plagata thus

applicable law is the 1950 Civil Code which provided that

went about to complete such tasks and claimed that he

the sale of Conjugal Property without the consent of the

went to Manila to get the signature of Rosario but

other spouse is voidable and the action must be brought

notarized the document at Zamboanga . The deed of sale

within 10 years. Given that the transaction was in 1989

was executed January 11, 1989. As time passed,

and the action was brought in 1997 hence it was well

Tarciano and Rosario died while the Fuentes spouses

within

the

prescriptive

period.

and possession and control over the lot. Eight years later
in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed a case

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Rosarios signature on the

to annul the sale and reconvey the property on the

document of consent to her husband Tarcianos sale of

ground that the sale was void since the consent of

their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged;

Rosario was not attained and that Rosarios signature

was a mere forgery. The Fuentes spouses claim that the

2. Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of

action has prescribed since an action to annul a sale on

nullity of that sale to the spouses already prescribed;

the ground of fraud is 4 years from discovery.

and

The RTC ruled in favor of the Fuentes spouses ruling that

3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent

there was no forgery, that the testimony of Atty. Plagata

was not had, could bring the action to annul that sale.

who witnessed the signing of Rosario must be given

weight, and that the action has already prescribed.

RULING: 1. The SC ruled that there was forgery due to

the difference in the signatures of Rosario in the

the fraud, that prescriptive period applied to the Fuentes

document

document

spouses since it was them who should have assailed

executed at the same time period. The SC noted that the

such contract due to the fraud but they failed to do so. On

CA was correct in ruling that the heavy handwriting in the

the other hand, the action to assail a sale based on no

document which stated consent was completely different

consent given by the other spouse does not prescribe

from the sample signature. There was no evidence

since

giving

consent

and

another

it

is

void

contract.

provided to explain why there was such difference in the

handwriting.

3. It is argued by the Spouses Fuentes that it is only the

spouse, Rosario, who can file such a case to assail the

2. Although Tarciano and Rosario was married during the

validity of the sale but given that Rosario was already

1950 civil code, the sale was done in 1989, after the

dead no one could bring the action anymore. The SC

effectivity of the Family Code. The Family Code applies

ruled that such position is wrong since as stated above,

to Conjugal Partnerships already established at the

that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the

enactment

sale

land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario

ofconjugal property done by Tarciano without the consent

despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the

of Rosario is completely void under Art 124 of the family

ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the

code. With that, it is a given fact that assailing a void

Rocas. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under

contract never prescribes. On the argument that the

Article 429 of the Civil Code, to excludeany person from

action has already prescribed based on the discovery of

its enjoyment and disposal.

of

the

Family

Code.

The