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MAE NIAGARA M.

BALANAY
Subject: Criminal Procedure
PEOPLE vs MONTEJO, 108 Phil. 613
FACTS:
Leroy S. Brown, Mayor of Basilan City, Detective Joaquin R.
Pollisco and several policemen were charged with murder. It was
alleged in the information that during May and June 1958, Mayor
Brown has organized groups of police patrol and civilian
commandoes, consisting of regular and special policemen, whom
he armed with pistols and high power guns and has established a
camp called sub-police headquarters in Tipo-Tipo, Lamitan. Said
sub-station was placed under his command, orders, direct
supervision and control. It was also alleged that criminal
complaints were entertained therein in which Detective Pollisco
acted as investigating officer and exercised authority to order the
apprehension of persons and their detention in the camp, for days
or weeks, without due process of law and without bringing them
to the proper court. On or about June 4 and 5, 1958, Yokan Awalin
Tebag was arrested by the order of Mayor Brown, without any
warrant or complaint filed in court and was then brought to and
detained in the said sub-station. However, while they were on
their way thereto, Awalin Tebag was maltreated by Pollisco
pursuant to instructions of Mayor Brown and once in the substation, he was subjected to further and more severe torture of
which Tebag died. To cover up his death, the peace officers
simulated an imaginary encounter between them and a band of
armed bandits of which Tebag allegedly formed part.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mayor Brown has committed an offense in
relation to his office.
HELD:
Mayor Brown has committed an offense in relation to his
office. Although public office is not an element of the crime of
murder in abstract, as committed by the main respondents
herein, according to the amended information, the offense
charged therein is intimately connected with their respective
offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance,
though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed,
they had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would
not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid office.
The co-defendants of Leroy Brown, obeyed his instruction because
he was superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City.

MAE NIAGARA M. BALANAY


Subject: Criminal Procedure
SANCHEZ vs JUDGE DEMETRIOU, 207 SCRA 627
FACTS:
The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the
Department of Justice to file appropriate charges against Antonio
L. Sanchez, Mayor of Calauan, Laguna, and several persons in
connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the
killing of Allan Gomez. Acting on this request, the Panel of State
Prosecutors conducted a preliminary investigation. Sanchez was
absent but was represented by his lawyer. On account of an
invitation from a PNP Commander, Sachez appeared for
investigation. However, when he was positively identified by the
persons who executed confessions implicating him as principal in
the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez, he was placed
on arrest status and was taken to the DOJ in Manila for an inquest
proceeding. The prosecutors then filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Calamba, Laguna, seven informations charging Antonio
Sanchez and 6 others with rape and killing of Sarmenta, and the
killing of Allan Gomez as aggravating circumstance but due to the
tense and partisan atmosphere in Laguna, the case was later on
transferred and raffled to Pasig, Metro Manila under the sala of
Judge Harriet Demetriou. Antonio Sanchez then filed a motion to
quash the informations on the grounds that only the ombudsman
has the competence to conduct investigation of all cases
involving public officers like him and that as a public officer, he
can be tried for the offense only the by the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not only the ombudsman has the competence
to conduct investigation of all cases involving public officers.
2. Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
1. It is not only the Ombudsman has the competence to
conduct investigation of all cases involving public officers. Though
the Ombudsman is indeed empowered to investigation and
prosecute, any illegal act or omission of any public official, this
authority is bit an exclusive authority but rather a shared or
concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. In fact,
other investigatory agencies of the government such as the DOJ,
in connection with the charge of sedition, and the Presidential

Commission on Good Governance, in ill gotten cases may conduct


the investigation.
2. The Reginal Trial has the jurisdiction over the case. Under
Section 4, Par. a of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. 1861, the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are only cases
involving (1) Violations of R.A. No. 3019 as amended or otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, R.A. 1379 and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the RPC, and (2) Other offenses or
felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to
their office. In the case at hand, the crime of rape with homicide
with which Sanchez stands charged obviously do not fall under
No. 1 which deals with graft and corruption cases neither it is
covered by No. 2 because it is not an offense committed in
relation to his office. Further, there is no direct relation between
the commission of the crime of rape with homicide and the
Petitioners office as municipal mayor because public office is not
an essential crime of the crime charged. The offense can stand
independently of the office. Hence, being an ordinary offense, the
case is triable by the regular courts and not the Sandiganbayan.
MAE NIAGARA M. BALANAY
Subject: Criminal Procedure
LACSON vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
301 SCRA 298 (1999)
FACTS:
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong
Baleleng gang were slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon
City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task
Group (ABRITG). The ABRITG was composed of police officers
which includes the then Chief Superintendent Panfilo Lacson who
headed the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission-Task Force
Habagat. Acting on a media expose that what actually transpired
was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the
Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, the
Ombudsman formed a panel of investigators headed by the
Deputy for Ombudsman for Military Affairs to investigate the
incident. The panel later absolved all the PNP officers and
personnel involved finding that it was a legitimate operations.
However, it was modified by the review board which found and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder against the
respondents, including Lacson.
Lacson was among those charged as principal in eleven
information for murder filed before the Sandiganbayans Second
Division. Said information was later amended charging Lacson
only as an accessory together with 3 others. Thereafter, Lacson
and others filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended
informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (par. a and c) of R.A. No. 7975
and that the law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to
cases where one or more of the principal accused are government

officials with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP Officials with the


rank of Chief Superintendent or higher, and the highest ranking
principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of
only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG
27. In a resolution, Sandiganbayan admitted the amended
information and was ordered the cases transferred to the Quezon
City RTC but the Official of the Special Prosecutor moved for a
reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with the
Sandiganbayan. Pending the motion, R.A. No. 8249 was enacted
by the Congress defining expanding the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan deleting the word principal from the phrase
principal accused in Section 2 (par. a and C) of R.A. 7975. The
Sandiganbayan then issued a resolution taking cognizance of the
cases herein filed against Lacson and other accused. Lacson arue
that the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has the
jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases since none of the
principal accused under the amended information has the rank of
Superintendent or higher.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction over
the case.
HELD:
The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the case. The
jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute.
The elements of that definition must appear in the complaint or
information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a
case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, and
not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial. The
multiple murder charge against Lacson and others falls under
Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the
offense charged must be committed by the offender in relation to
his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over
it.
In the case at bar, the amended informations for murder
against Lacson and others are wanting of specific factual
averments to show the intimate relation/connection between the
offense charged and the discharge of official function of the
offenders. While the above-quoted information states that the
above-named principal accused committed the crime of murder
"in relation to their public office, there is, however, no specific
allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said
principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their
official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended
information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and
investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their
custody. Hence, for failure to show in the amended informations
that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the
discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the

offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and,


therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan.

MAE NIAGARA M. BALANAY


Subject: Criminal Procedure
CORPUZ vs TANODBAYAN, G.R. No. L-62075
FACTS:
Private respondent Esteban Mangaser, an independent
candidate for vice mayor of Caba, La Union sent a letter to
President Ferdinand E. Marcos charging the petitioners with
violation of the 1978 Election Code, specifically for electioneering
and/or campaigning inside the voting centers during the election.
On instruction from the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) the
Regional Election Director of San Fernando, La Union, conducted a
formal investigation and then submitted its report recommending

to the COMELEC the dismissal of the complaint. Mangaser


eventually withdrew his charges filed with the COMELEC stating
his intention to refile it with the Tanodbayan. Thereafter, the
COMELEC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
Subsequently the assistant provincial fiscal started a
preliminary investigation of a complaint filed by Mangaser with
the Tanodbayan against the same parties and on the same
charges previously dismissed by the COMELEC. The COMELEC
Legal Assistance Office entered its appearance for the
respondents and moved for dismissal of the complaint. The
motion was denied. The TANODBAYAN asserting exclusive
authority to prosecute the case, stated in a letter to the COMELEC
Chairman that a lawyer of the COMELEC if not properly deputized
as a Tanodbayan prosecutor has no authority to conduct
preliminary investigations and prosecute offenses committed by
COMELEC officials in relation to their office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Tanodbayan has the exclusive jurisdiction
over the case.
HELD:
The Tanodbayan has no exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
Under the Constitution and the Election Code of 1978, it is the
COMELEC who has the exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute election offenses committed by any person, whether
private individual or public officer or employee, and in the latter
instance, irrespective of whether the offense is committed in
relation to his official duties or not. In other words, it is the nature
of the offense and not the personality of the offender that
matters. As long as the offense is an election offense jurisdiction
over the same rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view of its
all-embracing power over the conduct of elections.

MAE NIAGARA M. BALANAY


Subject: Criminal Procedure
BONDOC vs SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 71163-65

FACTS:
Two (2) employees of the Central Bank and nine (9) private
individuals, were charged with several felonies of estafa thru
falsification of public documents in three (3) separate
informations filed by the Tanodbayan with the Sandiganbayan.
The actions were docketed as Criminal Cases Numbered 5949 to
5951 and were assigned to the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan.
Before the prosecution rested its case, the Tanodbayan filed
with the Sandiganbayan another set of three (3) indictments, this
time against Carlito P. Bondoc and Rogelio Vicente, both private
individuals, charging them with the same crimes involved in
Cases No. 5949 to 5951 as principals by indispensable
cooperation. The actions against Bondoc and Vicente were
docketed as Criminal Cases Numbered 9349 to 9351 and were
assigned to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. Bondoc
moved to quash the informations on the basic theory that as a
private individual charged as co-principal with government
employees, he should be tried jointly with the latter pursuant to
Section 4 (paragraph 3) of PD 1606, as amended, hence, the
separate proceedings commenced against him were invalid, for
lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses and his
person. The Third Division denied Bondoc's motion to quash in a
ruling that a the joint trial of private individuals and public
employees charged as co-principals, dealt with in the cited
provision of law, is not a jurisdictional requirement and Bondoc's
theory would practically make the Court's "jurisdiction over a
private individual charged as co-principal, accomplice or
accessory with a public officer or employee dependent upon such
private individual" (as by evading service of legal processes until
"joint trial is no longer feasible).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the declaration of the Sandiganbayan that it
was no longer possible or legally feasible to try them jointly with
the government employees accused of the same offenses, had
the effect of causing the Sandiganbayan to lose jurisdiction over
Bondoc's cases
HELD:
The declaration of the Sandiganbayan that it was no longer
possible or legally feasible to try them jointly with the
government employees accused of the same offenses, had no
effect of causing the Sandiganbayan to lose jurisdiction over
Bondoc's cases. It is indisputable that the Sandiganbayan
acquired jurisdiction of the offenses charged in the informations
against Bondoc and his co-accused, based on the nature of the
crimes as described in the indictments and the penalty prescribed
therefor by law. It must at once be evident that the seeming

impossibility of a joint trial cannot and does not alter the essential
nature of the crimes in question, as felonies perpetrated by public
officers or employees in confabulation with private persons.
Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondoc's cases
to the Regional Trial Court, for the simple reason that the latter
would not have jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above
intimated, the inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial
of Bondoc's cases and those of the government employees
separately charged for the same crimes, has not altered the
nature of the offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification
punishable by penalties higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, committed by
government employees in conspiracy with private persons,
including Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive, original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be taken
cognizance of by the regular courts, apart from the fact that even
if the cases could be so transferred, a joint trial would nonetheless
not be possible.

MAE NIAGARA M. BALANAY


Subject: Criminal Procedure
AZARCON vs SANDIGANBAYAN
268 SCRA 747
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earthmoving business, hauling dirt and ore. His services were
contracted by PICOP. Occasionally, he engaged the services of
sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the
formers premises.
On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property
was issued by BIR commanding one of its Regional Directors to
distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal
property of Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and
a delinquent taxpayer. A Warrant of Garnishment was issued to
and subsequently signed by accused Azarcon ordering him to
transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in
his possession owned by Ancla. Azarcon then volunteered himself
to act as custodian of the truck owned by Ancla.
After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir of BIR
stating that while he had made representations to retain
possession of the property of Ancla, he thereby relinquishes
whatever responsibility he had over the said property since Ancla
surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from him. In his reply, the
BIR Reg. Dir. said that Azarcons failure to comply with the
provisions of the warrant did not relieve him from his
responsibility.
Along with Jaime Ancla, Azarcon was charged before the
Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds or
property and was then convicted. In his petition, Azarcon assailed
that the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over crimes
committed solely by private individuals and even assuming
arguendo that the appointment of a private individual as a

custodian or a depositary of distrained property is sufficient to


convert such individual into a public officer, he cannot still be
considered a public officer because there is no provision in the
National Internal Revenue Code which authorizes the Bureau of
Internal Revenue to constitute private individuals as depositaries
of distrained properties and that his appointment as a depositary
was not by virtue of a direct provision of law, or by election or by
appointment by a competent authority.
ISSUE:
Whether or the not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a
private individual designated by BIR as a custodian of distrained
property.
HELD:
The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a private
individual designated by BIR as a custodian of distrained property.
Sec. 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. It was specified therein that the only instances
when the Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a private
individual is when the complaint charges the private individual
either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public
officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within its
jurisdiction. The Information does not charge petitioner Azarcon of
being a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer
committing
an
offense
under
the
Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction. Thus, unless petitioner be proven a public officer, the
Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime
charged. Article 203 of the RPC determines who are public
officers. Granting that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for the
truck constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to take
part in an activity constituting public functions, he obviously may
not be deemed authorized by popular election. Neither was he
appointed by direct provision of law nor by competent authority.
While It is true that Sec. 206 of the NIRC, as pointed out by the
prosecution, authorizes the BIR to effect a constructive distraint
by requiring any person to preserve a distrained property, there is
no provision in the NIRC constituting such person a public officer
by reason of such requirement. The BIRs power authorizing a
private individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to
include the power to appoint him as a public officer.

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