Ercan TANRIVER

2015800417

Transformation of Turkey's Foreign Policy Towards

Syria: Enemy Esad, Brother Esad, Enemy Esed
Abstract
Before the JDP government, relations between Turkey and Syria were very problematic. The
JDP government has given high priority to the Middle East in foreign policy. The Turkish
government aimed to maintain and expand relations with Syria. During this period, JDP
government implemented Strategic Depth and Zero Problem With Our Neighbours policies.
These policies strengthened Turkeys influence over region. This created pragmatic
rapprochement process between these two countries. Turkey and Syria have had negative
peace and leaders relations have been affecting relations between Syria and Turkey. Before
the Arab Spring, leaders relations affected states relations positively. However, after the
Arab Spring, this affected negatively. This article examines why Turkey changed its foreign
policy towards Syria after the Arab Spring. There are three areas of Turkish engagement in
Syrian civil war: Turkeys active support for rebels, position on the recent developments
regarding Kurdish issue, and refugees policy.

Key Words: JDP, Turkey, Syria, Erdogan, Esad, Strategic Depth, Zero Problem With Our
Neighbours, Soft Power, Refugee Crisis

Introduction
Before 1998 relations between Turkey and Syria were very problematic. After
Adana Protocol, normalization process between Turkey and Syria began. During Erdoan
administration, Turkey and Syria had relatively good relations. This process has reached the
highest point with Strategic Depth and Zero Problem With Our Neighbours until Arab Spring.
After Arab Spring, some events caused the deterioration of relations. Turkey could not
convince Esad regime to reform about some areas that was promised before elections. Esad
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started to react Turkeys desires and relations between Erdoan and Esad completely changed
in this period. Turkey gave up her Strategic Depth and Zero Problem With Our Neighbours
policies and she followed more aggressive policies.

Rapprochement Process and Brother ESAD

Before 1998 relations between Turkey and Syria were very problematic. These
problems were Syrias claims over Hatay, disputes over water and Syrias support to PKK, the
terrorist organization. Historically, Turkey used hard power strategy against Syria because of
Syrian support to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in the early 1980s (Duran, Hasan,
2013, 509). In 1987, Turkey used the headwaters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers as a
bargaining chip against Syria. War could have broken out when Turkey threatened military
action against Syria because Syria sheltered Abdullah calan who is leader of the PKK
(Duran, Hasan, 2013, 509). When Abdullah calan was expelled by Syria and Syria stopped
her supports to PKK, Relations between Turkey and Syria improved. Normalization process
of Turkish-Syrian ties began with Adana protocol in 1998. Adana protocol created cooperation
between Turkey and Syria against PKK terrorist organization and relations continued to
improve in other fields such as political, economic, security and cultural. In 2000 Turkish
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer participated in Syrian President Hafez Esads funeral and this
contributed to improve relations between Syria and Turkey (Duran, Hasan, 2013, 510).
In 2002, JDP came to power. During the JDP administration, it implemented two
policies. These are Strategic Depth and Zero Problem With Our Neighbors. The concept of the
Strategic Depth assumes the use of historical and geographical attributes in order to lead a
global and proactive policy within regional dimension. Strategic Depth aims to make Turkey
an important political subject and an active regional player which will guarantee stability of
region and will act as a mediator in disputes between regional countries (Smer, Fahrettin,
2013, 12). According to this policy, Turkey can become major regional and global actor
because of geostrategic position as a central country (Kinga Smolen, 2013, 146). The main
goal is security of region, not particular countries. JDP decided to adopt the instruments of
soft power which includes finance, trade, culture, ethnic, religious kinship, diplomatic
activities and used soft power for active policy within regional dimension (Altunk, Meliha
Benli, 2013, 3). JDP tried to play mediator role in conflicts and disputes. For example, Turkey
tried to bring different Iraqi factions together, contribute to a solution of problems between
Hamas and the PLO. In 2010, Turkey cooperated with Brazil to find a solution between the
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West and Iran for Iranian Nuclear Program. Turkey also mediated between Israel and Syria for
the return of the Golan Heights to Syria (Kinga Smolen, 2013, 147).
JDP government gave importance to relations with the Syrian regime. In 2009 and
in 2010, there were meetings of the Turkish-Syrian High Level Strategic Cooperation Council
and these meetings promoted cooperation with numerous bilateral agreements on
environmental protection, social services and energy, political, security, commerce, culture,
health, agriculture, environment, transportation, education and water. Syria and Turkey lifted
visa requirements after these meetings. (Smer, Fahrettin, 2013, 13). Relations reached such a
level that a joint cabinet meeting. In 2010, 750,000 Syrians visited Turkey, while 1.35 million
Turks visited Syria. In 2009, Turkey and Syria engaged in a joint military exercise. Good
relations with Syria contributed economic developments of Turkey. Minister of Foreign
Affairs Davutolu said that The most effective remedy for the strained relations is the
formation of common economic areas. Trade volume between Syria and Turkey reached
nearly $2.5 billion. (Ozden, enay, 2013, 8). Turkey became largest trading partner of Syria.
The JDP government announced that it would seek economic integration with Syria. The
concept of "amgen" was developed concerning the formulation of a joint visa policy among
Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq like a Schengen system in Europe (Ozden, enay, 2013, 9). In
this period, Erdogan said to Esad my brother in many times. Good relations between
Erdoan and Esad created relatively good relations between states.

After Arab Spring: Enemy ESED

Before the Arab Spring, Turkey stood in with the authoritarian regimes in Tunisia,
Libya, Egypt, and Syria. When the protests started in Tunisia, the Turkish government had a
special Cabinet meeting, according to Davutolu and they made a strategic decision. They
assessed that this Tunisian revolt is not a nation revolt, it is not a revolt of one country. It is a
widespread regional revolt because now it is time for change. After the meeting, Turkey
decided to support the Arab people. Davutolu said that it was their right to demand and this
was the flow of history. These events created difficult challenges for Turkish foreign policy in
the Middle East. Turkey had pursued active foreign policy towards the region which was
invested politically and economically in the Middle East. This meant that Turkey invested in
the status quo. Turkeys political, security and economic relations with the regional countries
created challenges for Turkeys response to the uprisings. In this context, Turkey decided to
support people who live in these countries rather than regimes in these countries.
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When the protests spreaded to Syria, Turkey tried to convince the Esad regime to
carry out reforms which were promised before elections in Syria by Esad in the political
system and were hopeful that their views would be taken into account. Erdoan personally
called on Esad to stop the violence towards civilians and described the actions of the military
forces as inhuman. However, when Esad insisted on maintaining his regime, Turkey took a
harsher line against Esad. Erdoan declared that Turkey cannot continue to support Syria
under these conditions. With Arab Spring, Zero Problem With Our Neighbors failed. JDP
opted for the zero problems with neighbours rule, which excludes any intervention into
internal affairs of other countries and good relations with them. However, after Arab Spring,
Erdogan said that Syrias problems is not foreign policy for us, they are domestic policy for
Turkey. According to Zero Problem With Our Neighbors policy, Turkey should support
status quo in region but Turkey did not do that. Another important policy for Turkey was
Strategic Depth. It also failed after Arab Spring and Turkeys soft power limits were seen with
Syria case (Altunk, Meliha Benli, 2013, 6). After Arab Spring, Turkey lost its mediator role
and to be more aggressive against Esad. Friend Esad even, Brother Esad turned into
Enemy Esed. According to Birgl Demirta, It is interesting in terms of discourse analysis
that JDP leaders changed the name of the Syrian leader from "Esad" to "Esed" during the
crisis and as the political leadership started to use the new term, all the pro-government
Turkish media used it as well. This is important evidence of Turkish politicians' impact on
media sources. It is noteworthy that after this discourse change, the Turkish Language
Institution ruled in June 2011 that the new version, Esed, is the correct one. Tension increased
with some incidents between Turkey and Syria such as assassination of several Syrians,
shooting down of a Turkish fighter plane F4-Phantom etc. After that Turkey abandoned soft
power policy and soft power turned into hard power (Altunk, Meliha Benli, 2013, 7).
Turkey broke off all contact with the Syrian government by withdrawing its ambassador and
other diplomatic staff. Turkey supported the proposal of the League of Arab States and
Western countries to impose economic sanctions on Syria. Turkey itself decided to impose a
30 per cent tax on Syrian goods. There are three areas of Turkish engagement in Syrian civil
war: Turkeys active support for rebels, position on the recent developments regarding
Kurdish issue, and refugees policy

Syrian Rebels or Terrorists?

Turkey started to talk with the Syrian rebels and Turkey also tried to negotiate
compromise between Esad and the opposition. When Turkeys attempts failed, Turkey
changed its support to the opposition. Then Turkey supported Free Syrian Army which has
been founded by Syrian rebels who have been against Esad regime and wanted to reforms in
the political system. The second meeting of the group of friends of Syria took place in
Istanbul (Aras, Damla, 2012, 42). In June 2012 the minister of foreign affairs Davutolu
participated in a meeting of representatives of the Syrian opposition which was organized by
the League of Arab States in Cairo. In 2012, Davutolu said that: "Peace and stability can be
restored in Syria, not with the Baath regime but with a new political system which takes its
legitimacy from the people." Throughout 2011 both Erdoan and Davutolu declared several
times that Esads days were numbered and predicted the fall of the regime in a few months.
Turkey thought that Syrian crisis will end like other crisis in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt etc. but
this did not happen in short time. On the other hand, there is no guarantee that if the Esad
regime were to be overthrown by this opposition movement, a democratic system would be
established and peace and stability would prevail in Syria.

Kurdish Issue
Another is Kurdish issue. After invasion of Iraq by US in 2003, Turkey, Iran, and
Syria shared new security perceptions and have same interests. Turkey, Syria and Iran gave
importance to stability and a territorial integrity of Iraq and they rejected the formation of an
independent Kurdish state (Tol, Gonul, 2012, ). The deterioration of Turkish-Syrian relations
has reawakened the mutual interest of Esad regime and the PKK against Turkey. The impact
of the Syrian crisis on the Kurdish issue in Turkey became evident in the early days of the
conflict when the Esad regime re-started its support of the PKK in response to Turkeys
backing the Syrian opposition. Initially Turkey tried to counter this development so it
cooperated with Barzani who is President of the Kurdish Regional Government and used his
influence among the Kurds in Syria. Eventually the JDP government started a peace process
with the PKK in Turkey with the objective of solving the Kurdish problem but it did not work.
There are some problems with the Syrian National Council. It could not bring together all
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opposition groups, one of the most important groups are the Kurds. The PYD used its
influence on Syrian Kurds to prevent their participation in the uprising and the PYD harshly
criticized Syrian National Council.
On the other hand, after 2013, Syrian opposition became increasingly complex, with jihadist
groups. Turkey and other Gulf states continued to support these Sunni Islamist radicals. In
2014, ISIS emerged. ISIS takeover considerable portions of Iraqi and Syrian territory. Threat
perceptions of Turkey and US are different in this issue. US is fighting against ISIS with local
powers like Syrian oppositions and Kurds in North Iraq and North Syria. United States is
arming PYD (the Syrian sister organization of the PKK). However, PYD is a terrorist
organization for Turkey and someday these weapons may turn against Turkey or Kurds may
take advantage of power vacuum in region to found independent Kurdish state.

Refugees
The refugee issue is another issue. At the beginning of the crisis Turkey announced
that it would welcome anyone who was escaping the brutality of the Assad regime. This
created big problem between two states. Esad has been seeing Turkey as a threat because
according to Esad Turkey has sheltered for terrorists and she has trained them (Ozden, enay,
2013, 1). The Turkish finance minister stated that the government spent 533 million Turkish
lira to cover the needs of Syrians through 2012. In early 2013, there are 156,000 Syrian
refugees in Turkey (Sirkeci, Ibrahim, 2013). By September 2013 Turkeys Ministry of Foreign
Affairs announced that the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey has exceeded 500 thousand.
By the end of 2014 the government expects the total number of Syrian refugees in Turkey to
approach 1.5 million. Now there are officially 1.8 million Syrian refugees and unofficially 3
million Syrian refugees(Sirkeci, Ibrahim, 2013). According to Eurpean Commision
Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection report in 2016, there are more than 3.1 million
refugees in Turkey and with this number, Turkey is the country which has the largest refugee
population in the world. Not only do these refugees live in refugee camps but also cities in
Turkey. Now there are many refugee camps in Turkey for Syrian people. There are no data
about economic burden of Syrian refugees to Turkey officially. In addition to its economic
costs, the refugee issue has already disturbed the social and political balances in these areas
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and at times has led to tensions between different communities (Ozden, enay,2013, 2). On
the other hand, nobody knows when Syrian refugees return to their homes or whether they
will return to their homes or not.

Conclusion
In conclusion, before JDP government, there were problematic relations between
Turkey and Syria. These two states saw each other as a threat but after JDP government,
everything changed. Strategic Depth and Zero Problem With Our Neighbours policies
improved relations economically and politically. Another important issue is leaders relations.
Good relations between Erdoan and Esad created more cooperation at region. The beginning
of Arab Spring, Turkish government decided that Turkey supports people instead of regimes.
When protests spread to Syria, Erdoan encountered reaction of Esad and this caused the
failure of Strategic Depth and Zero Problem With Our Neighbours. Esads violence against
reformist groups may have been the short term reason behind the deterioration of relations;
however, Turkeys becoming entangled in the Syrian civil war due to its approach to Syrian
rebels, Kurdish issue and Syrian refugees has further complicated the picture. Ultimately,
Turkey is trying to avoid becoming even more entangled in the Syrian problem and is
counting on the international community to find a solution. But no such solution is imminent.
Turkey thought that Syrian crisis will end like other crisis in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt etc. and
Turkey can improve relation with new regime easily but this did not happen. Turkey faced the
same dilemma for months to come, while a growing number of refugees across its borders.
Turkish government continues to support these positions by arguing that they are the ethical
positions so they will stick to them. However, although ethics are part of international
relations, no government operates only on ethical principles. These policies did not stop
bloodshed, in contrast these policies increased bloodshed. The vast majority of refugees have
fled to neighbouring countries such as Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, and the number of
Syrians there far outweighs those who have made the difficult journey to Europe. Instability
in Middle East caused many problems for Turkey and these problems have affected these
states economically and sociologically.

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