Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
August 2, 1990
GANCAYCO, J.:
The validity of a warrantless search on the person of
petitioner is put into issue in this case.
On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning
Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both members of
the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Dav ao
Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force,
were conducting a surveillance along M agallanes Street,
Davao Ci ty. While they were within the premises of the Rizal
Memorial Colleges they s potted peti tioner carrying a "buri"
bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously.
They approached the petitioner and identified thems elves as
members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his
attempt to get away was thwarted by the two
notwithstanding his resistance.
They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where
they found one (1) caliber .38 Smi th & Wesson revolver with
Serial No. 770196 1 two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a
.38 caliber gun 2 a smoke (tear gas) grenade, 3 and two (2)
live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. 4 They brought the
peti tioner to the police station for further inves tigation. In
the course of the s ame, the peti tioner was asked to show the
necessary license or authori ty to possess firearms and
ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so.
He was then taken to the D avao Metrodiscom office and the
prohibi ted articles recovered from him were indorsed to
M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the
Regional Trial Court of D avao Ci ty wherein after a plea of not
guilty and trial on the meri ts a decision was rendered on
October 8, 1987 finding peti tioner guilty of the offense
charged as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoi ng, this Court , fi nds
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged.
It appearing that the accuse d was below eighteen (18) years
old at the time of the commission of the offense (Art. 68, par.
2), he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
the following
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-appellant Loreto Salangga, alias "Dodong," and
Laureto Lopez, alias "Retoy," were haled to court as
conspirators in the rape and killing of a fifteen-y ear old
barrio lass named Imelda Talaboc, allegedly committed
in Magsaysay, Davao del Norte on or about July 18, 1987.
1
Assisted by counsel de oficio, both accus ed pleaded not
guilty during thei r arrai gnment. After trial, judgment
was rendered by said trial court on February 21, 1991
finding appellant Salangga guilty of attempted rape with
homicide, imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua but with full credit for his preventive
imprisonment, and ordering him to pay P30,000.00 as
indemnity to the heirs of the victim. Accused Laureto
Lopez was acquitted for failure of the prosecution to
prove his guilty beyond reasonable doubt. 2
It appears that in the late afternoon of July 18, 1987, in
Sitio Ogsing, Barangay Tacul, Magsaysay, Davao del Sur,
Imelda Talaboc was sent by her mother to fetch water
from the spring, or "bugac," the only source of water in
the vicinity. Imelda left with two one-gallon containers.
At around 5:30 to 6:30 of the same afternoon, when the
dusk of twilight was enveloping the area, one Ricky
Monterde, a friend and brother in fai th of the Talaboc
family, who resided only two hundred meters away
from the latter's residence, likewise went to fetch water.
On his way, he saw appellant Salangga walking about
three meters ahead of Imelda. He noticed that appellant
kept glanci ng back towards Imelda who was carrying
water containers. Trailing the girl was accused Lopez
who was walking behi nd her at a distance of about
twenty fathoms. 3
On the same occasion, Lenie Alingay, a twelve-year old
elementary student residing at Sitio O gsing, was on her
way home from her grandfather's house. She recounted
that she met Imelda at the downhill crossing leading
towards the barrio. Lenie explained that she was about
four meters away from Imelda, while the latter was
following appellant and walking about two meters
behind him. As Imelda came abreast wi th Lenie, the
former asked the latter if she was going to school on
Monday. Then, as Leni e proceeded on her way home,
she saw that Lopez who was sitting on a rice paddy
suddenly stood up and followed Imelda. At about the
The following morni ng, the sus pects were brought to the
office of Station Commander Manuel Macabutas in the
municipal hall where both were inv estigated by P/Sgt.
Mario Gataber of the Mags aysay Police Station.
Appellant scrawl ed his quivery signature on an unsworn
statement, 5 handwritten by some other person,
wherein he admi tted the crime charged, except that he
xxx
Yes.
Q And despi te that fact, you did not find ways and
means to contact the CLAO or Atty. Acquiatan in order to
assist Salangga in the interview?
xxx
Yes.
No.
No." 16
No.
xxx
#Footnotes
1 Criminal Cas e No. XXI-92 (88) Regional Trial Court,
Branch 21, Bansalan, Davao del Sur; O riginal Record, 1;
Judge Rodolfo A. Escovilla, presiding.
2
Rollo, 58-59.
3 TSN, June 1, 1990, 4-5; March 21, 1990, 5-8, 11, 3839.
4
Exhibit A.
26 People vs. Yutuc, G.R. No. 82590, July 26, 1990, 188
SCRA 1.
27 People vs. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48 (1924); People vs.
Parayno, et al., L-24804, July 5, 1968, 24 SCRA 3; People
vs. Taruc, G.R. No. 74655, January 20, 1988, 157 SCRA
178; People vs. Yabut, G.R. No. 82263, June 26, 1992,
210 SCRA 394.
search
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68955
September 4, 1986
xxx
authori ties. Because of the threat to his life and family, Ces ar
Masamlok joined the group. Accused then tol d him, he should
attend a seminar scheduled on April 19, 1982. Along with this
invitation, accused pulled gut from his waistline a .38 caliber
revolver which M asamlok really saw, being only about two (2)
meters away from accused, which make him easily Identified
said firearm, as that marked as Exhibit "A" for the pros ecution.
(TSN, pages 72, 73, and 74, Hearing-January 4, 1983).
On April 19, 1982, as previously invited, Masamlok,
accompanied by his father, Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and
Ayok Ides went to the hous e of accused and attended the
seminar, Those present in the seminar were: accused Ruben
Burgos, Antonio Burgos, Oscar Gomez, Landrino Burgos, alias
Pedipol and one alias Jamper.
The first speaker was accused Ruben Burgos, who said
very distinctly that he is an NPA together with his
companions, to assure the unity of the civilian. That he
encouraged the group to ov erthrow the government,
emphasizing that thos e who attended the seminar were
already members of the NPA, and if they rev eal to the
authorities, they will be killed.
Accused, while talking, showed to the audience
pamphlets and documents, then finally shouted, the NPA will
be victorious. Masamlok likewise Identified the pamphlets as
those marked as Exh. exhibits "B", "C", and "D" for the
prosecution. (TSN, pages 75, 76 and 77, Hearing-January 4,
1983)
Other speakers in said meeting were Pedipol, Jamper
and Oscar Gomez, who likewise expounded their own
opinions about the NPA. It was also announced in said
seminar that a certain Tonio Burgos, will be responsible for
the collection of the contribution from the members. (TSN,
pages 78-79, Hearing- January 4, 1983)
On May 12, 1982, however, Cesar M asamlok
surrendered to Captain Bargio of the Provincial Headquarters
of the Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Panfilo Lovitos was presented
t prove that on M ay 19, 1982, he administered the
subscription of th extra-judicial confession of accused Ruben
Burgos, marked as Exhibi t "E " for the prosecution, consisting
of five (5) pages.
Appearing voluntarily in said office, for the subscription
of his confession, Fiscal Lovitos, realizing that accused was not
repres ented by counsel, reques ted the services of Atty. Anyog,
whose office is adjacent to the Fiscal's Office, to assist accused
in the subscription of his extra-judicial statement.
Atty. Anyog assisted accused in the reading of his
confession from English to Visay an l anguage, resulting to the
deletion of question No. 19 of the document, by an inserted
certification of Atty. Anyog and signature of accused,
indicating his having understood, the allegations of his extrajudicial statement.
now
raises
the
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT (SIC)
THE ARREST OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT WITHOUT VALID
WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE
SEARCH IN THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR
FIREARM WITHOUT VALID WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.
III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED APPELLANT GUILT Y BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR
VIOLATION OF P.D. No. 9 IN RELATION TO GENERAL ORDERS
NOS. 6 AND 7
Was the arres t of Ruben Burgos lawful? Were the search
of his house and the subsequent confiscation of a firearm and
documents allegedly found therein conducted in a lawful and
valid manner? Does the evidence sustaining the crime charged
meet the test of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
The records of the case disclose that when the police
authori ties went to the house of Ruben Burgos for the purpose
of arresting him upon information given by Ces ar Masamlok
that the accused allegedly recruited him to join the New
People's Army (NPA), they did not have any warrant of arrest
or search warrant with them (TSN, p. 25, October 14, 1982;
and TSN, p. 61, November 15, 1982).
A CALAMBA:
Q When you went to the area to arrest Ruben Burgos,
you were not armed with an arrest warrant?
A
None Sir.
A Yes Sir.
Q
Yes Sir.
him?
No Sir.
xxx xxx
xxx
Yes Sir.
Yes Sir.
xxx
xxx
Footnotes
* The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure have made
clearer the exceptions when an arrest may be made without
warrant. Rule 113, Section 5 provides:
Arrest without warrant when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his pres ence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense,
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicati ng that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arres ted is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or pl ace where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while bei ng transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the
person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest Police station or i jail and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 11 2, Section 7. 6a
17a).
SYLLABI/SYNOPSIS
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 125299. January 22, 1999]
PEO PLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plai ntiff-appellee, vs.
FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO, and VIOLETA GADDAO y
CATAMA @ "NENETH," accused-appellants.
D EC IS IO N
PUNO, J.:
"I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FIND ING APPELLANT
GUILT Y DESPITE THE INCREDIBILITY OF THE POLICE
VERSION OF THE MANNER THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST AS
CONDUCTED.
II
THE PNP OFFICERS' VERSIONS AS TO WHERE THE BUY BUST MONEY CAM E FROM ARE INCONSISTENT WITH ONE
ANOTHER AND ALSO REEKS WITH INCREDIBILITY.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FIND ING APPELLANT
GUILT Y AND SENTENCING HER TO DEATH DESPITE THE
MANIFESTLY IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES IN THE
VERSIONS OF THE POLICE AS TO HOW AND BY WHOM THE
ALLEGED BUY-BUST MONEY WAS RECOVERED FROM HER,
WHICH IN CONSEQ UENCE RESULTS IN THE EVID ENCE, OF
RETRIEVAL FROM HER OF THE SAM E, NEBULOUS, AT BEST,
NIL, AT WORST.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
VALIDITY OF THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH LEADING TO THE
SEIZURE OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY FOUND INSIDE
THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT."[15]
The assigned errors involve two pri ncipal issues: (1) the
validity of the buy-bust operation in the apprehension of
accused-appellant Dori a; and (2) the validity of the
warrantless arrest of accus ed-appellant Gaddao, the search of
her person and house, and the admissibility of the pieces of
evidence obtained therefrom.
Accused-appellants were caught by the police in a buybust operation. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment
employed by peace officers as an effective way of
apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of an
offense.[16] Entrapment has received judicial sanction when
undertaken with due regard to cons titutional and l egal
safeguards.[17]
Entrapment was unknown in common law. It is a
judicially created twentieth-century American doctri ne that
evolved from the increasing use of informers and undercover
agents in the detection of crimes, particularly liquor and
narcotics offenses.[18] Entrapment sprouted from the
doctri ne of estoppel and the public interest in the formulation
and application of decent standards in the enforcement of
criminal law.[19] It also took off from a spontaneous moral
revulsion against using the powers of government to beguile
innocent but ductile persons into laps es that they might
otherwise resist.[20]
In the American jurisdiction, the term "entrapment" has
a generally negative meaning because it is understood as the
inducement of one to commit a crime not contemplated by
him, for the mere purpos e of instituting a criminal prosecution
against him.[21] The classic defini tion of entrapment is that
articulated by Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States,[22]
the firs t Supreme Court decision to acknowledge the concept:
"Entrapment is the conception and pl anni ng of an offense by
an officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who
would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery,
pers uasion or fraud of the officer."[23] It consists of two (2)
elements: (a) acts of persuasion, trickery, or fraud carried out
by law enforcement officers or the agents to induce a
A This CLM, the date and the time and the Exhibit "A," I
was the one who made these markings, sir.
PROSECUTOR May we place on record that the one that
was enclosed...
ATTY. ARIAS Your Honor, there are also entri es included
in that enclosure where it appears D-394-95, also Exhibit "A,"
etc. etc., that was not pointed to by the witness. I want to make
it of record that there are other entries included in the
enclosure.
COURT Noted. The court saw it.
Q Whereat?
A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto St., sir.
We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused appellant Doria is not unl awful. Warrantless arrests are
allowed in three ins tances as provided by Section 5 of Rule
113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arres t a
person:
Q Whereat?
Q As far as you can see, she was just inside her house?
A I saw her outside, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q During all the time that this confrontation, arrest or
whatever by SPO3 M anlangit was taking place, you were just
in the side lines?
A I was just watching, sir.
Q So you were just an on-looker to what Manlangit was
doing, becaus e precisely accordi ng to you your role in this
buy-bust operation was as a back-up?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who got the alleged marijuana from inside the house
of Mrs. Neneth?
A PO3 Manlangit, sir.
Q Manlangit got the marijuana?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the money from Aling Neneth?
COURT
Go down there. Show to the court.
INTERPRETER
Witness went down the witness stand and approached a
carton box.
A Like this, sir.
PROSECUTOR
Can we describe it?
ATTY. VALDEZ
Yes.
PROSECUTOR
One flap is inside and the other flap is standing and with
the contents visible.
you did not know whether Badua already retrieved the buybust money from her?
COURT
A Yes, sir.
Noted.
A Yes, sir.
Q Under the table according to you?
Q And got hold of this carton?
A Yes, sir, dining table.
A Yes, sir.
Q Somewhere here?
Q Did you mention anything to Aling Neneth?
A It's far, sir.
A I asked her, what's this...
PROSECUTOR
Q No, no. no. did you mention anything to Aling Neneth
before getting the carton?
A Here, sir.
sir.
Q That is all that you saw?
Q Who got hold of this?
A Yes, sir.
A I was the one, sir.
PROSECUTOR
Q You were the one who got this?
For the record, your Honor...
A Yes, sir.
Q You were only able to verify according to you...
Q At that particular point in time, you di d not know if
the alleged buy-bust money was already retrieved by Badua?
A Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR
Panero, wait. Becaus e I am objecting to the words a
piece of plastic. By reading it...
What is that? What can you say, Fiscal? I'm asking you?
PROSECUTOR
With due respect, what I am saying is, let's pl ace the size
of the plastic. A piece of plastic may be big or a small one, for
record purposes.
COURT
Leave that to the court.
PROSECUTOR
Leave that to the court.
Q The only reason according to you, you were abl e to...
Look at this, no even Superman... I withdraw that. Not even a
man wi th very kin [sic] eyes can tell the contents here. And
according to the Court, it could be "tikoy," is it not [sic]?
A Yes, sir.
Q Siopao?
A Yes, sir.
Q Canned goods?
A Yes, sir.
Q It could be ice cream because it says Snow Pop, Ice
Pop?
A I presumed it was also marijuana because it may ...
Q I am not asking you what your presumptions are. I'm
asking you what it could possibly be.
A It's the same plastic, sir.
ATTY. VALDEZ
I'm not even asking you that question so why are you
voluntarily saying the information. Let the prosecutor do that
for you.
COURT
[13] Decision of the tri al court, pp. 13-14, Rollo, pp. 3031.
[14] Brief for Accused-Appellant Florencio Doria, pp. 8,
14, Rollo, pp. 52, 58.
[15] Brief for Accused-Appellant Violeta Gaddao, p. 39,
Rollo, p. 126.
[16] People v. Basilgo, 235 SCRA 191 [1994] ; People v.
Yap, 229 SCRA 787 [1994]; People v. Macasa, 229 SCRA 422
[1994].
[17] People v. Herrera, 247 SCRA 433 [1995]; People v.
Tadepa, 244 SCRA 339 [1995]; People v. Basilgo, supra.
[18] 21 Am Jur 2d, "Criminal Law," Sec. 203 [1981 ed.];
see also State v. Campbell, 110 NH 238, 265 A2d 11, 13
[1970]-- sal e of narcotics; Annotation in 62 ALR 3d 110, Sec.
2[a].
[19] 21 Am Jur 2d, "Criminal Law," Sec. 204 [1981 ed.];
see also United States ex rel. Hall v. Illinois (CA7 Ill) 329 F2d
354, 358-359 cert den 379 US 891, 13 L Ed 2d 94, 85 S Ct 164
[1964]-- unlawful sale and possession of narcotic drugs.
[20] Id; see also State v. Campbell, supra, at 13; United
States v. Becker (CA2 NY) 62 F2d 1007, 1009 [1933]-- s endi ng
obscene matter in interstate commerce.
[21] 21 Am Jur 2d, "Criminal Law," Sec. 202 [1981 ed.].
[26] Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442, 451 -452
[1932].
[63] Id.
[64] Page 88, section 57.
[65] Id., at 52-53; also cited in People v. Hilario and
Aguila, 93 Phil. 386, 389-390 [1953].
[66] 40 O.G. No. 23, p. 4476 [1941].
[67] Id., at 4478.
[68] 43 O.G. No. 4, p. 1286 [1947].
[85] Id.
[103]103 Emphasis supplied.103
[86] People v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759, 764 -765 [1994];
People v. Salcedo, 195 SCRA 345, 352 [1991]; People v.
William, 209 SCRA 808, 814 [1992]; People v. Ale, 145 SCRA
50, 58-59 [1986].
[87] 591 P. 2d 947 [Cal. 1979].
[88] Id. at 955. The Supreme Court of Californi a quoted
Richard C. Donnelly, "Judicial Control of Informants, Spies,
Stool Pi geons and Agent Provocateurs," Yale Law Journal, vol.
60: 1091, 1111 [1951], also herei n cited; See also Paton,
[116] Id.
[117] Id.
[118] PO3 M anlangi t affi rmed this fact in his crossexamination by counsel for appellant Gaddao -- TSN of
February 20, 1996, pp. 42-43.
[119] SPO1 Badua's testimony does not clearly es tablish
where he found the marked bills-- whether from appellant
Gaddao's person or after a search of her house.
[139] Id.
[140] Id, at 410-411; also cited in People v. Flores, 165
SCRA 71, 85 [1988].
dispatching
in
transit
or
SO ORDERED.
Narvas a, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco, and Martinez, JJ, concur.
Melo, and Puno, JJ., join Panganiban J., separate opinion.
Vitug, J., concur but res erve his vote on the discussion on the
warrantless search of appellant as his incidental to a lawful
arrest.
[1] Original Record, 1; Rollo, 3.
[2] Ibid., 19, 21.
[3] Ibid., 76; per Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol.
[4] TSN, October 10, 1994, 1-14; October 19, 1994, 2-9.
[5] Ibid., February 15, 1995, 4-26; March 2, 1995, 1-4.
[6] The other modes include violations of Sections 3
(Importation of Prohibited Drugs), 5 (Mai ntenance of a Den,
Dive or Resort for Prohibited Drugs Users), 6 (Employees and
Visitors of Prohibited Drug D en), 7 (Manufacture of Prohibited
Drugs), 8 (Possession or Us e of Prohibited Drugs), 9
(Cultivitation of Plants which are Sources of Prohibited
Drugs), 11 (Unl awful Prescription of Prohibited Drugs), and
12 (Unnecessary Prescription of Prohibited Drugs), all under
Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Article III of the Act
provides for similar violations in cases involving regulated
drugs, namely, Sections 14, 14- A, 15, 15-A, 16, 17, 18, and 19.
[7] Jurado, etcc. vs. Suy Yan, L-30714, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA
663.
[8] People vs. Trancca, G.R. No. 110357, August 17, 1994, 235
SCRA 435.
[9] People vs. Gireng G.R. No. 97949, February 21, 1995, 241
SCRA 11.
[10] People vs. Nicolas, et al., G.R. No. 110116, February 1,
1995, 241 SCRA 67.
[11] Section 1, Rules of Court.
[12] People vs. Barros, G.R. No. 90640, Marcch 29, 1994, 231
SCRA 557.
[13] Chia, et al. vs. Acting Collector of Cus toms, et al. L-43810,
September 26, 1989, 177 SCRA 755; Papa, etc., et al. vs. Mago,
et al., L-27360, February 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 857.
[14] Aniag, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No.
104961, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 424; Valmonte, et al. vs.
De Villa, et al., G.R. No. 83988, May 24, 1990, 185 SCRA 665.
[15] People vs. Leangsiri, G.R. No. 112659, January 24, 1996,
252 SCRA 213; Peopl e vs. Figueroa, G.R. No. 97143, October 2,
1995, 248 SCRA 679.
[16] People vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. 113474, December 13,
1994, 239 SCRA 174; People vs. Tabar, et al. G.R. No. 101124,
May 17, 1993, 222 SCRA 144.
[17] Peopl e vs. Malstedt, G.R. No. 91107, June 19, 1991, 198
SCRA 401.
[18] Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d. 889
(1968), adopted in Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. no.
89139, August 2, 1990, 188 SCRA 288.
[19] Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court.
[20] People vs. Malmstedt, supra, Fn 17; Lo Ho Wing, et al.,
G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991, 193 SCRA 122; People vs.
Maspil, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 85177, August 20, 1990, 188 SCRA
751; People vs. Tangliben, G.R. No. 63630, April 6, 1990, 184
SCRA 220; People vs. Claudio, L -72564, April 15, 1988, 160
SCRA 646.
[21] See also People vs. Labarias, G.R. No. 87165, January 25,
1993, 217 SCRA 483; People vs. Tonog, Jr., etc., at al., G.R. No.
94533, February 4, 1992, 205 SCRA 772.
[22] See Salonga vs. Pao, etcc., et al., G.R. No. 59524, February
18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438; Bautista, et al. vs. Sarmiento, etc., at
el., L-45137, September 23, 1985, 138 SCRA 592. The term
denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is
sufficient to sustain a proposition or establish the facts, as to
counterbalance the presumption of innocence and warrant the
conviction of the accused.
[23] Owens vs. Gratezel, 148 Md. 689, 132 A. 265.
[24] Brand vs. Hincchman, 68 Micch. 590, 36 N.W. 664, 13 Am.
St. Rep. 362.
[25] Section1, Rule 112.
[26] Section 4, first and fourth paragraphs., id.
[27] People vs. Fernandez, supra, Fn 16; People vs. Ramos, G.R.
Nos. 101804-07, May 25, 1993, 222 SCRA 557; People vs.
Tabar, et al., supra, Fn. 16; People vs. Exal a, et al., G.R. No.
76005, April 23, 1993, 221 SCRA 494.
[28] People vs. Barros, supra, Fn 12.
[29] People vs. Lacerna, G.R. No. 109250, September 5, 1997,
and cases therein cited.
[30] Approved on April 27, 1992 and published in the Official
Gazette on June 22, 1992, Vol. 88, No. 25, 3880.
[31] People vs. Gatward, et al., G.R. Nos. 118772-73, February
7, 1997.
[32] See Section 24 of the Act, which likewise imposes the
maximum penalties provided for i n Sections 3, 4(1), 5(1), 6, 7,
8, 9, 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, and Sections 14, 14-A, 15(1),
15-A(1), 16, and 19 of Article III, where those found guilty of
any of said offenses are government officials, employees or
officers including members of police agencies and the armed
forces.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
MELO, J.:
Two passengers who were apprehended after they
supposedly staged a hold-up inside a passenger jeepney on
September 29, 1990 were haled to court, not for the felonious
asportation, but for possession of the two unlicens ed firearms
In regard to the second ascription aired by the accusedappellant, emphasis is laid on the fact that the court a quo
should hav e relied more on the explanation offered by the
defense rather than giving credence to the testimony of the
People's witnesses. For one thing, accus ed- appellant
asseverates that they could not have been positively identified
by Percival Tan and Rene Araneta considering that it was then
still dark when the accus ed boarded the jeep, up to the time
they were apprehended. But counsel for accused -appellant
concedes that the jeep was lighted subject to the caveat that it
was not well lighted (p. 12, Brief for Accused-Appellant) which
does not entirely foreclose positive identification of the
culprits who admittedly shared a ride with their victims and
were thus s eated within the closed quarters of the jeepney.
Moreover, it was es tablished by the prosecution that Rene
Araneta's jacket was one of the items which was as ported, that
it was worn by one of the felons, and that the jacket was
recognized by Rene Araneta from a distance of 1 -1/2 meters
(p. 7, Brief for Accused-Appellant). To lessen the impact of the
affirmative statements uttered against accused- appellant, it is
argued that the immedi ate propensity of a criminal is to move
out from the scene of the locus criminis and not merely to
walk casually within the vicinity. We said in People vs.
Ocampo (G.R. No. 80262, September 1, 1993) that indeed,
there can be no legal dispute to the l egal proposition that
flight from the scene of the felony is one of the indicia of a
guilty conscience, but it is equally true, we proceeded to say,
that culpri ts, in exceptional cases, have become bolder by
returning to the scene of the crime to feign innocence. At any
rate, it has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the
factual findings of the trial court and the conclusions drawn
therefrom are accorded utmos t respect since the magistrate at
the court of origin had the first hand impression of the
demeanor and deportment of witnesses (People vs. Lim, 206
SCRA 176 [1992]; People vs. Castillo, 208 SCRA 62).
With respect to the so-called warrantless arrest of accused-appellant, we are of the view that the search falls within the
purview of Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which s erves as an
exception to the requisite warrant prior to arrest:
When an offense has in fact been committed, and the has
personal knowl edge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it;
inasmuch as the police team was formed and dispatched to
look for the persons responsible for the crime on account of
the information related by Percival Tan and Rene Araneta that
they had just been robbed (People vs. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756
[1993]; People vs. Tonog, Jr., 205 SCRA 772 [1992]). And since
accused-appellant's arrest was lawful, it follows that the
search made incidental thereto was valid (People vs. Tanilon,
221 SCRA 671 [1993]). Moreover, the unlicensed firearms
were found when the police team apprehended the accused
for the robbery and not for illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition (Peopl e vs. Cruz, 165 SCRA 135 [1988]). The
principle imparted by Justice Padilla in Cruz was based on the
ruling of this Court in M agoncia vs. Palacio (90 Phil. 771
[1948]) that:
. . . When, in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of
a criminal offense, the offending police officers should happen
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121917. March 12, 1997]
ROBIN CARIO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD PADILLA, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
D EC IS IO N
FRANCISCO, J.:
On October 26, 1992, high-powered fi rearms with live
ammunitions were found in the possession of petitioner Robin
Padilla @ Robinhood Padilla, i.e.:
"(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919
with six (6) live ammunitions;
"(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN -RP 131120 with four
(4) long and one (1) short magazine with ammunitions;
"(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight
(8) ammunitions; and
"(4) Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38
caliber revolver."[1]
Petitioner was corres pondingly charged on D ecember 3, 1992,
before the Regional Tri al Court (RTC) of Angeles Ci ty with
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under P.D.
1866[2] thru the following Information:[3]
"That on or about the 26th day of October, 1992, in the City of
Angeles, Philippines, and withi n the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abov e-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have i n his
possession and under his custody and control one (1) M-16
Baby Armalite rifle, SN -RP 131120 with four (4) long and one
(1) short magazines with ammunitions, one (1) .357 caliber
revolver Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live
ammunitions and one (1) .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A35723Y
with clip and eight (8) ammuni tions, without having the
necessary authority and permit to carry and possess the same.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW."[4]
The lower court then ordered the arrest of petitioner,[5] but
granted his application for bail.[6] During the arraignment on
January 20, 1993, a plea of not guilty was entered for
peti tioner after he refused,[7] upon advice of counsel,[8] to
make any plea.[9] Petitioner waived i n wri ting his right to be
present in any and all stages of the case.[10]
After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered
judgment dated April 25, 1994 convicting petitioner of the
crime charged and s entenced him to an "indeterminate
penalty from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as minimum, to 21 y ears of reclusion perpetua, as
maximum".[11] Petitioner filed his notice of appeal on April
28, 1994.[12] Pending the appeal in the res pondent Court of
Appeals,[13] the Solicitor-General, convinced that the
conviction shows strong evidence of guilt, filed on December
2, 1994 a motion to cancel petitioner's bail bond. The
resolution of this motion was incorporated in the now assailed
respondent
court's
decision
sustaining
petitioner's
conviction,[14] the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the foregoing circumstances considered, the
appeal ed decision is hereby AFFIRM ED, and furthermore, the
P200,000.00 bailbond posted by accus ed-appellant for his
provisional liberty, FGU Insurance Corporation Bond No. JCR
(2) 6523, is hereby cancelled. The Regional Trial Court, Branch
61, Angeles City, is directed to issue the Order of Arres t of
accused-appellant and thereafter his transmittal to the
National Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine National Police
where the said accused-appellant shall remain under
confinement pending resolution of his appeal, should he
appeal to the Supreme Court. This shall be immediately
executory. The Regional Trial Court is further directed to
submit a report of compliance herewith.
SO ORDERED."[15]
Petitioner received a copy of this decision on July 26,
1995.[16] On Augus t 9, 1995 he filed a "motion for
reconsideration (and to recall the warrant of arres t)"[17] but
the same was denied by respondent court in i ts September 20,
1995 Resolution,[18] copy of which was received by
peti tioner on September 27, 1995. The next day, September
28, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari
with application for bail[19] followed by two "s uppl emental
peti tions" filed by different counsels,[20] a "second
supplemental petition"[21] and an urgent motion for the
separate resolution of his application for bail. Again, the
Solicitor-General[22] sought the denial of the application for
bail, to which the Court agreed in a Resolution promulgated on
July 31, 1996.[23] The Court also granted the SolicitorGeneral's motion to file a consolidated comment on the
are
sanctioned
in
the
following
[7] Rule 116, Section 1(c) "If the accused refuses to plead, or
makes a conditional plea of guilty, a plea of not guilty shall be
entered for him."
[8] Petitioner was assisted by his then lead couns el Dean
Antonio Coronel (appearance withdrawn April, 1993 to serve
his suspension by the Supreme Court, RTC Records, Vol. I, p.
260) and Atty. Philip Jurado. The prosecution was represented
by Angeles City Prosecutor Antonio G.P. Fausto and his
Assistant, Rufino Antonio.
[9] Order dated January 20, 1993, RTC Records, Vol. I, pp. 59
and 75.
[10] RTC Records, Vol. I, p. 57.
[11] RTC Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 48.
[12] RTC Records, vol. II, p. 828.
[13] The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. No. CR-16040. Atty
Jurado wi thdrew his appearance as peti tioner's counsel on
October, 1994 when the appeal was pending for the CA. His
signature, however still appeared on some pleadings for
peti tioner (CA Rollo, p. 429). Rene A.V. Saguisag and
Associates entered their appearance as new counsel (CA Rollo,
p. 58). Appellant's brief, however, was also signed by his
brother Robert A. Padilla and Gina C. Garcia (CA Rollo, p. 146).
[14] The 23-page CA (Speci al Tenth Division) decision
promul gated on July 21, 1995 was penned by Jus tice Antonio
P. Solano with Justices Ricardo P. Galvez and Conchita CarpioMorales, concurring. (Rollo, pp. 50-72).
[15] CA Decision, p. 23; Rollo, p. 50.
[16] Registry Return Receipt, attached to p. 343 of the CA
Rollo.
[17] Registry Receipt stamped August 9, 1995. See CA Rollo,
pp. 403-430.
[18] CA Rollo, pp. 463-464.
[19] The petition was signed by the Raval Suplico and Lokin
Law Office.
[20] One suppl emental petition was filed on October 9, 1995
signed by Padilla, Jurado and Saguisag. The other
supplemental peti tion was filed on October 11, 1995 and
signed by the Raval Suplico and Lokin Office.
[44] Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 104988, June
18, 1996. The fifth being customs search.
[45] Search incident to l awful arrest. - A person l awfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anythi ng
which may be us ed as proof of the commission of the offens e,
without a search warrant.
[46] People v. Salazar, G.R. No. 98060, January 27, 1997;
People v. Figueroa, 248 SCRA 679 (1995); People v. Gerente,
219 SCRA 756; People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401; People v.
Sucro, 195 SCRA 388; People v. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220;
People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122; People v. Paco, 170 SCRA
681; Manipon v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267.
[47] Mapp v. Warden, 531 F2d 1167; United States v. Griffin,
530 F2d 739; United States v. Hilstrom, 533 F2d 209, 429 U. S.
982, 97 S Ct 498; US v. Pacelli, 470 F2d 67, 415 U.S. 983, 93 S
Ct 1501; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 91 S Ct
2022; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 443, 465, 91 S Ct 2022, 203738;
[65] People vs. Solayao, G.R. No. 119220, September 20, 1996;
People vs. Lualhati, 234 SCRA 325 (1994); People vs. Damaso,
212 SCRA 547 (1992).
[66] Exh. "C" - 357 Smith and Wesson with bullets; Exh. "D" M-16 armalite with magazine; Exh."K" - M -16 magazine; Exh.
"L" - Pei tro Berreta; Exh. "N" - 2 long magazines ; Exh. "O" - 1
short magazine.
[67] Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 18-19; Rollo, pp. 6768.
Mission Order
Number 29-9-92-B
SO ROBIN PADILLA
-P O ST I. PROCEED TO: Camp Crame, NCR, Recom 1-12-Baguio City
II. PURPO SE: To intensify Int'l coverage and to negotiate the
imdte. surrender of Father Frank Navarro (rebel priest),
believed attending conference in Baguio City. (CPP/NPA).
III.DURATION: FROM: 29 Sept to 31 Oct 1992.
IV.
AUTHORIZE
UNIFORM/ATTIRE:
TO
WEAR
THE
FOLLOWING
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are
as dangerous as the checkpoints it would sustain and fraught
with serious threats to individual liberty. The bland
declaration that individual rights mus t yield to the demands of
national security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was
intended precisely to limit the authority of the State even if
asserted on the ground of national security. What is wors e is
that the searches and seizures are peremptorily pronounced
to be reasonable even without proof of probable cause and
much less the requi red warrant. The improbable excuse is that
they are aimed at 'establishing an effective territorial defens e,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere
FIRST DIVISION
PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Trece Martires, Cavite, * in Criminal Case No. NC-267,
enti tled "People of the Philippines v. Santiago Evaristo and
Noli Carillo," finding the accused guilty of illegal possession of
firearms in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and
accordingly sentencing them to the penalty of life
imprisonment.
The information indicting the accused-appellants (hereinafter
referred to as the appellants) reads:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accus es
SANTIAGO EVARISTO AND NOLI CARILLO of the crime of
VIOLATION of P.D. 1866, committed as follows:
That on or about the 23rd. day of August 1988, in the
Municipality of Mendez, Province of Cavite, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorabl e Court, the abovenamed accus ed being private persons not authorized by law
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
manufacture, repair and kept (sic) in their possession, custody
and control one (1) caliber 38 revolver (pal tik) with two live
ammunition and one (1) empty shell of said caliber, two (2) 12
gauge home made s hot guns, one (1) caliber 22 revolver
(sumpak) and two (2) vise grips and one (1) plier use (sic) in
the manufacture and repair of said firearms without any
permit or license from competent (sic) authority.
CONTRATRY (sic) TO LAW.
Cavite City, August 30, 1988. 1
Appellants having entered a plead of not guilty, tri al
thereupon commenced, with the prosecution and the defense
pres enting their respective wi tnesses and evidence to support
thei r divergent versions of the events leading to the arrest of
the appellants.
A careful review of the records and the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses, Sgt. Eladio Romeroso and CIC Edgardo
Vallarta of the Philippine Constabulary, indicates that on the
day in question, a contingent composed of Romeroso and
Vallarta, together with a Sgt. Daniel Maligay a, also of the
Philippine Constabulary, and two (2) members of the
Integrated National Police, were on routine patrol duty in
Barangay III, Mendez, Cavite. At or about 5:50 in the
afternoon, successive bursts of gunfire were heard in the
3.
The lower court grav ely erred in giving credence to
the arresting officer's testimonies which are patently
contradictory and half truths (sic) testimonies. 3
(2)
Any evidence obtained i n violation of this or the
preceding section shall be i nadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
Sec. 2.
The ri ght of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonabl e searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no s earch warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined under
oath or affi rmation of the complai nant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the plac e to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3.
(1)
. .. .
(b)
When an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicati ng that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c)
When the person to be arres ted is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or pl ace where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while bei ng transferred from one
confinement to another.
For purpos es of the present cas e, the second circumstance by
which a warrantless arres t may be undertaken is applicabl e.
For, as disclosed by the records, the peace officers, while on
patrol, heard bursts of gunfire and this proceeded to
investigate the matter. This incident may well be within the
"offens e" envisioned by par. 5 (b) of Rule 113, Rules of Court.
As the Court held in People of the Philippines v. Sucro, 7 "an
offense is committed in the presence or wi thin the view of an
officer, withi n the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest
without a warrant, when the officer sees the offens e, although
at a distance, or HEARS THE DISTURBANCES CREATED
THEREBY AND PROCEED S AT ONCE TO THE SCENE
THEREOF." 8
The next inquiry is addressed to the existence of personal
knowledge on the part of the peace officer of facts pointing to
the person to be arrested as the perpetrator of the offens e.
Agai n, reference to the records resolves said query. Giving
chase to Rosillo, the peace officers came upon the two (2)
appellants who were then asked concerning Rosillo's
whereabouts. At that point, Sgt. Vallarta discerned the bulge
on the waist of Carillo. This visual observation along wi th the
earlier report of gunfire, as well as the peace officer's
professional instincts, are more than sufficient to pass the test
of the Rules. Consequently, under the facts, the fi rearm taken
from Carillo can be said to have been seized incidental to a
lawful and valid arrest.
The next area to be addressed is the allegation of the
appellants that the statute's coverage does not extend to
firearms that are not functional or serviceable. The Court does
not agree.
and Rosillo, there were also other people in the vicinity, such
as Evaristo's mother, brother and other farmers.
The Court sees no such conflict. A recourse to the trial court
proceedings easily shows that the two (2) prosecution
witnesses, Sgt. Romerosa and CIC Vallarta, tes tified in a
strai ghtforward and candid manner, categorically identifying
the appellants as the two (2) individuals they had
apprehended and clearly narrating the circumstances of such
apprehension. The defens e has given no possible reason or
motivation for thes e peace officers to make false accusations
against the appellants. Absent the pres entation of such
defense evidence, the testimony of the peace officers should
deserve full credence.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court of Trece
Marti res, Cavite in Criminal Cas e No. NC-267 findi ng the
accused Santiago Ev aristo and Noel Carillo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for Illegal Possession of Firearms as defined
in Presidential Decree No. 1866, is hereby AFFIRMED.
The Court orders the forfeiture of the firearms and other
incidental paraphernalia found in the possession of the
appellants, in favor of the Philippine National Police (PNP) to
be disposed of in accordance with law.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Grio-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinion
8 Ibid., citing U.S. vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil. 472 and U.S. vs.
Samonte, 16 Phil. 516.
9 Emphasis (underscoring and capitals) supplied.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 86218. September 18, 1992.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff -Appellee, v. ELSIE
BAGISTA y BANGCO, Accused-Appellant.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the ponencia holds that there was a v alid
seizure of the firearms and paraphernalia found i n Evaristo's
house because, first, he agreed to its search and, second, the
said prohibited articles were in plain view and open to eye
and hand. But I must express my reservations on the
conclusion that the bulge in Carillo's waist provided the
probable caus e that justified the warrantless search of his
person and the seizure from him of the paltik.
This case is similar to People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401,
where I also dissented. As I did there, I will here also observe
that the search does not come under any of the three
situations enumerated under Rul e 113, Section 5, of the Rul es
of Court, where a warrantless arrest and search may be made.
Paragraph (a) and (c) are clearly not inapplicable. And neither
is Par. (b) because although i t may be conceded that a crime
had jus t been committed, the arresting officers had no
personal knowledge that Ev aristo had committed it. In fact,
they were pursuing Rosillo, whom they actually saw firing a
gun in the air, and not Carillo, whose assistance they even
sought. The circumstance that the search resulted in the
discovery of the unlicensed firearm did not and could not
retroactively validate the warrantless search for it was clearly
void ab initio. The seized pistol is the fruit of the poisonous
tree and should not have been used in evidence against
Rosillo.
Footnotes
* Presided over by Hon. Enrique M. Almario.
1 Rollo, p. 4.
2 Rollo, pp. 21-22.
3 Rollo, Appellant's Brief, p. 55.
4 390 U.S. 324.
5 403 U.S. 443.
6 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 2, 1989 Edition,
p. 427.
7 G.R. No. 93239, 18 March 1991, 195 SCRA 388.
SYLLABUS
1.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE; RULE.
The general rule regardi ng searches and seizures can be
stated i n this manner: no person shall be subjected to a search
of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his residence
except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a
lawful arrest. The basis for the rule can be found in Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Art. III, Section 3 (2)
further ordai ns that any evidence obtained in violation of the
aforementioned right shall, among others, "be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding."cralaw virtua1aw library
2.
ID.; ID.; ID. ; ID.; SEARCH OF A MOVING VEHICLE, AN
EXCEPTION. The constitutional proscription against
warrantless searches and seizures admi ts of certain
exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a
warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving
vehicle, and the seizure of evidence in plain view. With regard
to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the
ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible
for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE. This in no way,
howev er, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to
conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of
probable caus e. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an
extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to
be valid only as long as the officers conducti ng the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that
they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a
crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICATION IN CASE AT
BAR. The NARCOM officers in the case at bar had probable
cause to stop and search all vehicles coming from the north at
Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidenti al information
they received from their regular informant that a woman
having the same appearance as that of accused -appellant
would be bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise
have probable cause to search accused-appellants belongings
since she fits the description given by the NARCOM informant.
Since there was a valid warrantless search by the NARCOM
agents, any evidence obtained during the course of s aid search
is admissible against Accused-Appellant.
5.
REM EDIAL LAW; EVID ENCE; CREDIBILITY OF
WITNESS; FINDINGS OF TRIAL JUDGE; RULE AND
EXCEPTION; CASE AT BAR. The prosecution had shown,
primarily through the positive testimony of Sgt. Parajas, that
the bag contai ning the dried marijuana leav es was taken from
accused-appellants possession. She denies this fact and
contends that the bag in question was actually taken from the
luggage carrier above the passenger seats and not from her.
Indisputably, We have two opposing versions of what actually
happened at the checkpoint in Km. 16, Acop, Tublay, Benguet,
resulting in the accused-appellants apprehension, that of the
prosecution and that of the defense. In situations like this, the
matter of assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is
best performed by the trial courts because, unlike appellate
courts, they can wei gh such tes timony in the light of the
demeanor, conduct and attitude of the wi tnesses at the trial.
The exception is when the trial court has overlooked certain
facts of subs tance and v alue that, if considered, might affect
the result, which We do not find in the instant case.
6.
ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY MINOR
DISCREPANCIES; CASE AT BAR. As to the alleged
discrepancies in the prosecutions case, such as the color of
the stripes of the bag which contained the marijuana and
whether the i tems seized from accus ed-appellant were
marijuana leaves or marijuana fruit tops, these are minor in
character and do not detract from the prosecutions cas e since
it was shown by the Receipt of Property Seized, which was
signed by accus ed-appellant, that these were the very items
taken from her at the time of her arrest.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE; RULE;
SEARCH OF MOVING VEHICLE AS AN EXCEPTION; REQUIRES
PROBABLE CAUSE; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. In the
case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the bag of the
accused on the basis alone of an information they received
that a woman, 23 years of age with naturally curly hair, and
52" or 53" in height would be transporti ng marijuana. The
extensive search was indiscriminately made on all the
baggages of all passengers of the bus where the accused was
riding, whether male or female, and whether or not their
physical appearance answered the description of the suspect
as described in the alleged information. If there really was
such an information, as claimed by the NARCOM agents, it is a
perplexi ng thought why they had to search the baggages of
ALL passengers, not only the bags of those who appeared to
answer the description of the woman s uspected of carrying
marijuana. Moreover, the accused was not at all acti ng
suspiciously when the NARCOM agents searched her bag,
where they allegedly found the marijuana. From the
circumstances of the cas e at bar, it would seem that the
NARCOM agents were only fishing for evidence when they
searched the baggages of all the passengers, including that of
the accused. They had no probable cause to reasonably believe
that the accus ed was the woman carrying marijuana alluded
to in the information they allegedly received. Thus, the
warrantless s earch made on the personal effects of herein
accused on the basis of mere information, without more, is to
D EC IS IO N
NOCON, J.:
for her sacks of cabbages, but was told by the latter that he
would attend to her later.
When the bus reached Tubl ay, Benguet, it was stopped by the
NARCOM agents who boarded the same and began ins pecti ng
the baggages of the passengers. Accused-appellant claimed
that the bag containing the marijuana was taken from the
luggage carrier abov e the passenger seats. When nobody
admitted owning the bag, the NARCOM agent approached her,
took the shoulder bag on her lap, and asked her to come with
them for investi gation as she fits the description of the wouldbe transporter of the marijuana given by the NARCOM
informer. She denied having any thing to do with the
marijuana found on the bus.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law
library
To corroborate her story, Accused-appellant presented the
conductor of the Dangwa Tranco bus, Nestor Yangkin. He
testified that when the NARCOM agents boarded the bus at
Tublay, Benguet, one of them got a bag from the luggage
carri er, opened i t, and smelled the contents. The agent then
asked the passengers who among them owned the bag; when
nobody answered, he walked to the back of the bus, all the
time looking at the faces of the passengers. When the agent
approached accus ed-appellant, who was seated at the rear of
the bus, the former talked to her, then escorted her out of the
bus. 7
During Yangkins cross-exami nation, it came out that the 10
sacks of vegetables that were loaded at Abatan were brought
by a man who told him that the fare for the sacks will be paid
upon arrival at the Dangwa Station in Baguio City but that the
owner of the sacks would be ridi ng in the bus. And yet,
Yangkin did not seek out the alleged owner of the sacks. The
witness also testified that none of the passengers approached
him and offered to pay for the fare of the sacks, 8 contrary to
accused-appellants testimony.
In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court found the
testimony of Sgt. Parajas credi ble. Said the court a
quo:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
". . . The tes timony of Sgt. Oscar Parajas was di rect and
strai ghtforward as he gave all the requisite details of the
entrapment operation they conducted bas ed on an
information provided by a coordinating individual. His
testimony rev eals that the bag containi ng the marijuana leav es
was found on the lap of the accused. There is nothing in the
record to suggest that Sgt. Parajas was mov ed by any motive
than simply the carrying out of his official mission or duty.
Where there is no evidence and nothi ng to indicate that the
principal witness for the pros ecution was actuated by
improper motives, the presumption is that he was not so
actuated and his tes timony is entitled to full faith and credit
(People v. Francia, L-69253, September 30, 1987, 154 SCRA
495)." 9
The trial court brushed aside the defenses obs ervation that
there were discrepancies between the tes timony of Sgt.
Parajas and the evidence presented, such as the color of the
bag allegedly taken from accused-appellant and the kind of
marijuana taken from the bag, as immaterial. Similarly
Separate Opinions
1.
Testimony of Sgt. Oscar Parajas, T. S.N., August 3,
1988, pp. 3-6.
2.
3.
4.
Exhibit "D" .
5.
6.
Exhibit "E" .
7.
8.
9.
10.
Exhibit "G" .
11.
Exhibit "G-1" .
12.
Exhibit "B" .
13.
Exhibit "B-1" .
14.
See the dissent of then Jus tice (now Chief Jus tice)
Andres R. Narvasa in People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401, 413.
15.
16.
Dissent of the Chief Justice Narvasa, s upra note 14,
198 SCRA 401, 414.
17.
18.
Valmonte v. de Villa, 185 SCRA 665, at 670, citing
Dyke v. Taylor, 361 U.S. 216, .0 L Ed 538, 88 S Ct 1472.
19.
Dimaisip v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 193 SCRA 373,
382. (1991).
20.
Id.
21.
22.
23.
24.
Exhibit "G" .
2.
His presence within the vicinity of the crime scene
right after the incident in the company of accused Salvamante
was tes tified to by Mike Tabayan, the only prosecution
witness who noticed the defective hands of the accus ed. As
they had to ask for directions from the witness in the Tagalog
dialect shows that they were strangers to the place
3.
Accused M aqueda knows or is familiar with accused
Rene Salvamante as they from the same town. By his own
testimony, accused Maqueda has es tablished that he
Salvamante are close friends to the point that they went out
together during the Christmas vacation in 1991 and he even
accompanied Salvamante i n selling the black radio cassette
recorder.
4.
His Motion to Grant Bail (Exhibit "HH") contains this
statement that he is willing and volunteering to be State
witness in the above-entitl ed case, it the accused in appeari ng
that he is the leas t guilty along This in effect, supports his
extrajudicial confession trade to the police at Although he
claims that he did not his signature would lean his as he was
just told that rel ease from detention, this is a flimsy excuse
which cannot Had he not understood what the motion meant,
he could have easily asked his sister and brother-in-law what
it meant seeing that their signatures up already affixed on the
motion.
5.
This time, his admission to Prosecutor Zarate that
he was at the Barker house that fateful morning and his even
more damaging admission to Ray Dean Salvosa as to what he
actually did can be considered as another circumstance to
already bloster the increasing circums tances agai nst the
accused.
6.
The accused's defense is alibi. As stated in a long
Line of cases, alibi is at best a weak defens e and easy of
fabrication (People vs. Martinado, G.R. No. 92020, October 19,
1992, 214 SCRA 712). For alibi to be given credence, it must
not only appear that the accused interposing the same was at
some other pl ace but also that i t was physically impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of i ts
commission (People vs. Pugal, G.R. No. 90637, October 29,
1992, 215 SCRA 247). This defense easily crumbles down as
Tayaban pl aced accused Maqueda at vicinity of the crime
scene.
The combi nation of all these ci rcumstances plus extrajudicial
confession produce the needed proof beyond reasonable
doubt that indeed accused Maqueda is guilty of the crime. 11
The extrajudicial confession referred to is the Sinumpaang
Salaysay (Exhibit: "LL") of Maqueda taken by SP02 Molleno
immediately after Maqueda was arrested.
Maqueda seasonably appealed to us his conviction. In his 14page brief, he pleads that we acquit him becaus e the trial court
committed this lone error:
. . . IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED. 12
Only three pages of the brief, typed double space, are devoted
to his arguments which are anchored on his alibi that at the
time the crime Was committed he was not in Benguet but in
Sukat, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, ad the failure of the star
witnesses for the Prosecution to identify him. He alleges that
Mrs. Barker, when investi gated at the hospital, Pointed to
Richard Malig as the companion of Rene Salvamante, and that
when initially investigated, the two housemai ds gave a
description of Salvamante's companion that fitted Richard
Malig.
We find no merit in this appeal. As hereinafter shown, the
defense of alibi is unconvincing.
The accused's arguments which s tress the incredibility of the
testimonies of Mrs. Barker and the househelps identifying
Maqueda are misdirected and misplaced becaus e the tri al
court had ruled that Mrs. Teresita M endoza Barker and the
two housemaids, Norie Dacara and Julieta Villanuev a, were
not able to positively identify Magueda, The trial court based
his conviction on his extrajudicial confession and the proof of
corpus delicti, as well as on circums tantial evidence. He
should have focused his attention and arguments on these.
From its ratiocinations, the trial court made a distinction
between an extrajudicial confession the Sinumpaang
Salaysay and an extrajudicial admission the, verbal
admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa. A
perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay fails to convince us that it
is an extrajudicial confession. It is only an extrajudicial
admission. There is a distinction between. the former and the
latter as clearly shown i n Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court which read as follows:
Sec. 26. Admission of a party. The act, declaration or
omission of party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him.
xxx
xxx
xxx
(1)
He and a companion were seen a kilometer away
from the Barker hous e an hour after the crime in question was
committed there;
(2)
Rene Salvamante, who is still at large, was positively
identified by Mrs. Barker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva
as one of two persons who committed the crime;
(3)
(4)
He and Rene Salvamante were together in
Guinyangan, Quezon, and both left the place sometime in
September 1991;
(5)
He was arrested i n Gui nyangan, Quezon, on 4 March
1992; and
(6)
He freely and voluntarily offered to be a state
witness stating that "he is the least guilty."
Section 4, Rul e 133 of the Rules of Court provides that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a)
(b)
The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
(c)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
20
Id. at 445.
21
23
SO ORDERED,
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
22
See 1 JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, The Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines 344 (Ist ed. 1987).
37 SCRA 450 [1971].
24
121 SCRA 538, 554 [1983]. see also People vs.
Penillos, 205 SCRA 546 [1992]; People vs. De Jesus, 213 SCRA
345 [1992] ; People vs. Tujon, 215 SCRA 559 [1992]; People vs.
Besey, 219 SCRA 404 [1993].
25
Footnotes
26
27
2 Id., 37.
28
3 Id., 49.
29
30
16 An Jur 2d 206, quoting D unbauld in The Bill of
Rights, 140 [19573]
5 Id., 86.
31
6 OR, 94.
32
33
People vs. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368 [1991] People vs.
Dela Cruz, 229 SCRA 754 [1994].
8 RTC Decision, 3-12, 14-15; OR, 924-933, 935-936; Rollo, 5960, 61-62.
9 OR, 933-934; Rollo, 59-60.
10
11
12
Rollo, 87
13
14
2 Wharton's criminal Evidence B 337 (12th ed.,
1955). See also 2 Underhill's Criminal Evidence 385 (5th ed.,
1956); Yigmore on Evidence S 821 (3rd ed., 1940); People vs.
Agus tin, G.R. No. 110290, 25 January 1995; and People vs.
Lorenzo, G.R. No. 110107, 26 January 1995.
15
16
17
18
19
34
People vs. Penillos, 205 SCRA 546 [1992]; People vs.
Dela Cruz, 207 SCRA 632 [1992]; People vs. Casinillo, 213
SCRA 777 [1992]; People vs. Florida, 214 SCRA 227 [1992].