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Margaret Iversen
When work on certain artistic problems has advanced so far that further work in the same
direction, proceeding from the same premises, appears unlikely to bear fruit, the result is
often a great recoil, or perhaps better, a reversal of direction. Such reversals. . . create the
possibility of erecting a new edifice out of the rubble of the old; they do this precisely by
abandoning what has already been achieved, that is, by turning back to apparently more
primitive modes of representation.1
These are the opening sentences of the third section of Panofskys Perspective
as Symbolic Form, where he discusses the great recoil of the Middle Ages.
I would like to adopt it to serve as a thumbnail sketch of Hubert
Damischs strategy in The Origin of Perspective. 2 Reading it one has the sense
of jumping over the whole history of alternative approaches to Art History
and the rise of post-structuralism to re-engage with the philosophical
concerns of the early Panofsky and the linguistic and psychoanalytic theory
of High Structuralism. Out of the rubble of these two intellectually robust
moments, Damisch hopes to fashion, not just a history or theory of
perspective, but a model for the future practice of Art History. This,
needless to say, is an extremely audacious enterprise, not least because,
one would have thought that the last of the great European Humanists
would consort rather uneasily with the great anti-humanist psychoanalyst,
Jacques Lacan.
Damischs book is about the invention of perspective as a paradigm or
model of thought that has far-reaching implications. Or, better, it is a
defence of that idea of perspective by appeal to an analysis of its founding
moment in Quattrocento Florence and its repercussions. Although a lot of
historical evidence is marshalled, it is not exactly a history of that moment,
for, as Damisch argues, one cannot trace the evolution of a paradigm as if it
were an object of historical enquiry like any other. Because it instantiates a
model of thought, it has to be approached theoretically, in much the same
way that Saussure approached the institution, the logical construct, that is
language. Perspective, for Damisch, not only organises the eld of visual
representation, it also organises the way we think about art and its history.
Damischs book, then, must be considered from the point of view of
its merit as a paradigm as a model for the practice of art history.
Because of its essentially philosophical claims, the details of his account
of Brunelleschis experiments or the Ideal City panels could be
factually wrong without undermining the philosophical validity of his
argument.
The same is true of the essay that Damisch takes as his model, Panofskys
Perspective as Symbolic Form, that other audacious art historical study of the
topic. Damisch declares that it remains more than a half a century after
its appearance, the inescapable horizon line and reference point for all
# The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press; all rights reserved.
doi:10.1093/oxartj/kci020
Margaret Iversen
enquiry concern this object of study (p. 2). For Panofsky, Renaissance
single-point perspective also has far-reaching implications: it anticipates
Descartess rationalised conception of space as innite extension and
Kants Copernican revolution in epistemology. The latter implies, as
Michael Podro has argued, that Panofsky regards perspective as the advent
of a reexive self-awareness about the relation of mind to things and about
the nature of art as being essentially about that relation, rather than, say,
the imitation of some supposedly preexisting reality: Perspective, like the
critical philosophy of Kant, holds both the viewer and the viewed within
its conception.3 Artistic reexivity about the nature of art, signals the
achievement of the sort of critical distance that enables a properly
historical study of art. So the moment of systematic perspective
construction is also the moment that art history as a discipline becomes
possible. There is a curious overlapping, then, of a particular moment in
the history of art and the very possibility of the serious study of arts
history. Object and viewpoint are locked together. As Joseph Koerner
nicely puts it, Panofskys essay nally works to place itself at perspectives
historical focal point.4
If Panofskys essay proposes a paradigm for the study of art, so also does
Damischs book. We can get some indication of what sort of paradigm it
proposes by noting what comes in for criticism. Damischs critique is
aimed at art historical receptions of perspective, which, ignoring the
lesson of Panofskys essay, treat it as if it were nothing more than a nifty
technical device for systematically creating an illusion of space, so that
foreshortenings and the diminution of size of objects in depth all obey a
common rule and conform to a single viewpoint.5 This non-meeting of
minds can be partly explained by the fact that these scholars and Damisch
are studying different objects. As James Elkins observed, there are those
who are interested in reconstructing perspective practice and those who
are interested in its philosophical implications. This split is nothing new:
Elkins cites a late fteenth-century source, Cristoforo Landino, who
considered perspective to be part philosophy and part geometry.6
Damischs pointed critique of recent treatments of perspective is part of a
broadside aimed at empiricist art historians generally, who, in a worrying
reversion to a pre-critical approach to cultural history, see their job as
detective work (p. 185). By pre-critical, Damisch means an approach
that has not fully absorbed Kants critique of the empiricist view that we
can have knowledge of a stable world that exists independent of the minds
constitution of it.
The other target of Damischs critique is that band of theoretically minded
lm and art theorists of the 1970s, mainly Marxists and feminists, who
attacked perspective construction as embodying a particular male,
bourgeois, individualistic ideology (pp. xiv xv). I personally would have
liked to see Damisch undertake a more serious critique of that body of
lm theory, because, like his book, it draws on Lacanian psychoanalysis
and uses the linguistic terminology of dispositif and enunciation.
Apparatus theory, as it is called, proposed an analogy between the set up
of the cinema (spectator, projector, screen) and that of perspective,
crediting both with powerful ideological and psychic effects. The key text
is Jean-Louis Baudrys Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematic
Apparatus published in 1970. Baudry founded his critique of the
cinematic apparatus on its inheritance of Quattrocento perspective
construction, which, he claimed, constitutes a viewing subject as
Panofsky
Margaret Iversen
devoted to arguing just how far perspective departs from actual perception,
for, paradoxically, our modern perceived reality has become so thoroughly
conditioned by perspectival forms of representation, including
photography, that we are likely to miss the point, which is that
modern perspective abstracts fundamentally from basic human psychophysiological perception, which is obviously not monocular or static or
strictly geometrical.
Panofskys account of Antiquitys conception of space and its axial system of
perspective aims to show that both are essentially unmodern. In Antiquity,
space exists only in so far as it is conceived as dimensions adhering to corporeal
objects inhabiting a void. This idea he borrowed from Riegls Late Roman Art
Industry. Yet, for Riegl, Antiquitys Kunstwollen, its aesthetic ideal, was to
suppress space as for as possible. For him, artistic representation is not
thought of as conforming to general perception or ideas of space, but of
modelling an ideal sort of object. According to Panofsky, insofar as Antique
painting does attempt to represent perspectival space, that is,
foreshortenings and diminution of size in depth, it sticks closely to actual
psycho-physiological effects or the subjective optical impression, such as
the central bulging and curvature of verticals, particularly at the edges of
the eld. When Christopher Wood notes that, for Panofsky, Antique
perspective is more faithful to the truth of perception than Renaissance
perspective because it attempts to reproduce the curvature of the retinal
image, he is right, but his emphasis is wrong because this so-called
truth, based on an immediate sensory impression, is unreexive, preKantian, in short, primitive.12 Compared with the rationalisation of
represented space accomplished by Renaissance perspective construction,
pre-modern perspective assumes a naively mimetic, pre-critical
perceptual relation to the world.
For Panofsky, then, central perspective construction is the embodiment of
the crucial recognition that visual representation is not properly mimetic but
constructive. It rationalises space, which now no longer clings to substantial
things. Instead, bodies and gaps between them were only differentiations or
modications of a continuum or a higher order.13 Instead of immediacy,
abstraction from sense experience. Instead of bodily sense impressions,
geometric systmaticity. Art is no longer regarded as a mimetic depiction
of objects seen; rather, it reexively includes the acknowledgment that it
is a highly formalised kind of performance aimed at a spectator. Although
Panofsky claims to favour modern perspective because it occupies a middle
ground between the claims of the subject and the object, this is not the
crucial point. The point is that art since the Renaissance embodies
the essential reexive, critical insight that representations (mental and
artistic) do not just copy objects, they produce objects structured in a
particular way. The difference between Antique and Modern perspective
is, then, somewhat like the distinction Schiller drew between Na ve and
Sentimental poetry: whereas the poet of Antiquity, being closer to nature,
creates instinctively, the modern poet always reects upon the impression
that objects make upon him.14
Because, for Panofsky, perspective is a model that relates vision to its
objects, constitutes them, in this highly reexive way, post-Renaissance art
has the freedom to choose between types of representation that either
stick closely to the objective character of things or to the subjective,
visual conception of them. The key term here is choose. Although this is
not spelled out, in the context of Panofskys other writing, it is clear that
Margaret Iversen
that his interest in late Roman art has something to do with the emergence of
Impressionism. In other words, the art historian inevitably participates in his
contemporary Kunstwollen. 21 In contrast, Panofskys sense of the historicity of
art historical thinking ends with the attainment of a quasi-transcendental
perspective. In his 1920 essay, The Concept of the Kunstwollen, he argued
that concepts proposed by Riegl, objective/subjective, haptic/optic, and so
on, provide the art historian with a point of view outside the phenomena,
a xed Archimedian point.22 Panofsky later questioned the value of these
concepts, but retained his quest for a method that allowed one a detached,
distanced point of view.
Damisch
Lacan
The symbolic order is one of Lacans three terms, which, along with the
imaginary and the real, organise the psychoanalytic eld. It came to
OXFORD ART JOURNAL 28.2 2005 199
abstract art we are accustomed to the idea of painting about painting, but we
are apparently less able to think about self-reexive gurative art. The tour de
force of Damischs analysis of the Urbino panels is enough to convince me of
the critical productivity of this idea.
Damisch also makes claims about the way these panels affect the subject
and for this he has recourse to Lacans conception of the symbolic order.
Since Lacan was, in fact, inuenced by Levi-Strauss in his formulation of
the symbolic order, this extension makes perfect sense. But can Damisch
shift between understanding perspective as a model of thought and
understanding it as equivalent to Lacans symbolic order without a terrible
grinding of gears? It is clear what motivated Damisch to introduce both
Levi-Strauss and Lacan effectively substituting them for Panofskys
Cassirer. Early on in the book, he claims that perspective is antiHumanist (p. 44). He cites Lacans observation that perspective reduces
man to an eye and the eye to a point, and links this with the later
institution of the Cartesian subject itself a sort of geometral point
(p. 45). Although perspective conceived as a symbolic form abstracts
radically from perceived reality and effectively denies the possibility of any
unmediated knowledge of the world, it offers ample compensations. Far
from the subject being decentred in relation to the structure, it offers
for the rst time, like Kants a priori categories of thought, a
legitimate position legitimate both epistemologically and ethically. Our
understanding of the world, whether scientic or pictorial, can be both
subjectively constituted and objectively valid. This explains why Panofsky
revived the formerly obscure term for single point perspective
construction, costruzione legittima. For Damisch, the subject of perspective
has no such condence: it constitutes a subject that is to become that of
modern science in the form of a point (p. 425). It marks a crisis of
subjectivity and knowledge that becomes apparent in Descartess Discourse
on Method where the subject is reduced to a point, the Cogito, and
separated by an abyss from extended substance.
Damisch sometimes understands the effects of the picture in purely
Lacanian terms: we are subjected, seduced, caught up in the picture
(p. 46), we are programmed, informed by the model (p. 51). And yet, he
also wants to preserve Panofskys reexive moment: he continues,
Perspective provides a means of staging this capture and of playing it out in
a reexive mode (p. 46). On the one hand, Damisch underwrites
Panofskys sense of perspective as a non-coercive model of thought: he
describes it as a regulative conguration intended not so much to inform
the representation as to orient and control its regime (p. 233). On the
other, it is a trap laid for the scopic drive (pp. 184 5). But are these
models compatible? Weve seen that the Panofskian epistemological model
of perspective carries with it implications or connotations of rationality,
critical distance, reexivity, and freedom. The psychoanalytic, Lacanian
model carries with it a quite different set of connotations: seduction,
alienation, lack, death, and desire. Damisch beautifully summed up these
latter implications in his/Cloud/book: Painting has power to make man
sensible of his own nothingness, his dependence, his void.26
Margaret Iversen
prominence in his work with the 1953 Rome Discourse where it was
understood as the most important determining order of the subject.27 In
its formulation, Lacan borrowed from Levi-Strauss and the linguist Roman
Jakobson their stress on the structural relations amongst signiers
constituting a system rather than on what is symbolised. For Lacan, our
subjection to this pre-established, inexorably determining, resolutely
impersonal system of signiers is none the less salutary because it
functions, like the intervention of the father in the Freudian Oedipal
scenario, as a third term breaking up the dyadic stasis and narcissistic
identication that characterises the imaginary register. The symbolic
order, one could say, abstracts fundamentally from the here and now. For
example, the physical, substantial father becomes a function a function
essentially of symbolic castration and prohibition. Since the imposition of
the symbolic order breaks up the dyad of mother and child, desire for the
lost unattainable object is set in motion and the ideal, narcissistic self of
the imaginary is shattered. Perspective is imagined by Damisch as the
visual equivalent of the discourse of the Other, yet there is very
little sense of the anguish and desire that runs through Lacans sense of the
subjects relation to the symbolic Other.
Damisch interprets the perspective paradigm as having precisely the
determining, decentering, extra-personal quality of Lacans symbolic
order. He makes this case by arguing that the vanishing point is equivalent
to the point of view they coincide on the plane of projection and,
consequently the vanishing point has the value of a look of the Other.
This, he thinks, is demonstrated by Brunelleschis rst experiment, as
described by Antonio Manetti, in which he drilled a peep hole through a
small wooden panel depicting the Florence Baptistery so that one could
peer through it from behind and see an astoundingly illusionistic depiction
reected in a mirror.28 Damisch proposes that the vanishing point, which
is frequently marked in painting of the period by a depicted aperture, will
from thenceforth have the signicance of a look back, or better, of a look
that constitutes me as viewer. The subject of perspective is consequently
decentred in relation to this prior point of sight or gaze implied by the
depiction (p. 115 ff). As Damisch notes, The perspective paradigm
effectively posits the other, in the face of the subject as always already
there (p. 446). Emile Benvenistes theorisation of the imbrication of the
subject in speech is Damischs model for this account. For Benveniste,
language puts forth empty forms which a speaker in the exercise of
discourse, appropriates to himself and which he relates to his person, at
the same time dening himself as I and a partner as you.29 Similarly,
perspectival representation, with its visual sentence structure (dispositif
denunciation ) addresses me with an implicit look (p. 227). For Damisch,
perspective as a paradigm operates like the imposition of language on the
individual and has, in the visual register, the same effect of
subjectication. This should put paid to the common view that the subject
of perspective is placed in a dominant position of mastery. On the
contrary, this subject holds only by a thread (p. 388). This thread,
which leads from the eye of the observer to the vanishing point, is capable
of snatching the spectator, like a sh on a line, into the picture. This
spectator nds him or herself looked at by the painting, lured, transxed,
summoned to take up his position. The windows and half open doors of
the Urbino panels are, according to Damisch, looking at you with all
their eyes (p. 266).
Margaret Iversen
the back of the room. At the rst centre, says Damsich, the subject is, so to
speak, produced by the system in which it has a designated place. In the
second centre, the narcissistic ego tries to nd its own reection
(p. 443). The light shining in from the right of the picture suggests
another, lateral viewpoint, called the distance point in perspective
construction, from which position the depth of the room would open up.
The mirror as marker of the imaginary register in Las Meninas opens up the
possibility that, for Damisch, the lm theorists were not mistaken, after
all. Imaginary perspective would be one in which the apparatus
disappeared and we were given an image having that belongs to me
aspect, as Lacan put it.37 Damisch makes an intriguing point about
the complex composition of Las Meninas that deserves further elaboration:
the painting, in splitting these viewpoints and functions, and making them
palpable, reects on its own operations (pp. 443 4). Here Damisch
gestures towards a way of going beyond Panofskys Kantian reexivity,
which applies universally to the subject of perspective, to a more limited
but credible way of thinking the subjects agency or room for manoeuver
in relation to art and the image more generally.
We saw that one of the implications for art history implicit in Panofskys
essay was the deduction of quasi-transcendental terms that create a legitimate
point of view for the eld of study. The subject of knowledge, the art
historian, is thus sprung out of any embeddedness in his or her own
cultural/intellectual milieu. As Stephen Melville put it in his essay, The
Temptation of New Perspectives, Panofskys valorization of perspective
forges an apparently non-problematic access to the rationalized space of the
past.38 This is one implication from which Damisch, I am sure, would
wish to distance himself. The Origin of Perspective is itself an eloquent
testimony to the way history is constantly recast. Damisch acknowledges,
for example, the productive effects of Freud and Lacan on subsequent
theorisations of perspective, including his own, and brushes aside charges
of anachronism brought by scholars of Renaissance art. He writes, If
there is any such thing as history, it must be conceded that it too takes the
same route: one that leads through this echo chamber, this eld of
interference in which Freuds text resonates with those of Alberti,
Manetti, and Leonardo (p. 123). Here critical distance is not conceived
of as empty or abstract space as it is in Panofsky. Rather, it is replete with
the intervening artistic and theoretical developments that inect the way
we understand the past. The history practised in The Origin of Perspective is
in this sense back to front. Brunelleschis perspective panel of the
Baptistery has a very weak provenance, only described by his biographer
some thirty years after his death, and curiously not even mentioned by
Alberti. Damischs treatment of it reminds me of the hypothesis of the big
bang in astrophysics. It must exist to explain subsequent historical
phenomena. Perhaps only at the end of the book, after reading what
Damisch proposes as the historical transformational group relating to the
panel Van Eycks Arnolni Marriage Portrait, the Urbino perspectives,
Velasquezs Las Meninas and Picassos variations on it can one take
seriously the claim that this missing panel represented the founding
operation of modern painting which consisted of Brunelleschi piercing a
hole in his panel and turning it around to view it in a mirror (p. 441).