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H o n o r a ry C h a i r m a n H e n r y A . K i s s i n g e r C h a i r m a n , A d v i s o ry C o u n c i l James Schlesinger
P ublisher Dimitri K. Simes A ssociate P ublisher Paul J. Saunders C ontributing E ditors Ian Bremmer
Ted Galen Carpenter • Alexis Debat • John Hulsman • Anatol Lieven • David B. Rivkin, Jr. • Ray Takeyh • Aluf Benn • Alexey Pushkov
Advisory Board Morton Abramowitz • Graham Allison • Brian Beedham • Conrad Black • Robert F. Ellsworth • Mar-
tin Feldstein • Fred C. Iklé • Daniel Pipes • Helmut Sonnenfeldt • Ruth Wedgwood • J. Robinson West • Dov Zakheim
The No-Win Zone
An After-Action Report from Lebanon
Daniel Byman & Steven Simon
i i
L
ebanon held the atten- of the conflict, militarily it was forced to
tion of the world for weeks stand by helplessly during the crisis.
after a successful Hizballah Nor do other parties come off look-
kidnapping operation on July 12, 2006, ing good. The United States emerged
led Israel to pummel the country in a sus- looking both cruel and ineffective in
tained air campaign and a limited ground Muslim eyes. European states engaged
offensive. Almost all observers agreed the in typical hand-waving during the war
clash had enormous implications—for- and in even more typical bickering over
mer House Speaker Newt Gingrich even who would do what in a post-clash peace-
claimed the conflict was “World War keeping operation, even though this at
III.” But unlike other wars, the winners best looks like a fig leaf. Iran and Syria,
and losers were not clear when the dust Hizballah’s patrons, did better, but even
settled. they may eventually find the results a
Pundits were quick to proclaim Hiz- mixed blessing.
ballah the winner, but Hizballah’s leader
B
Hassan Nasrallah openly admitted that efore we can assess the re-
the raid was a strategic mistake. Other sults of the war, it is important
analysts point to Israel’s degradation of to be clear on several points.
Hizballah’s long-range missile capabili- Reports that Iran prodded Hizballah to
ties, but Israelis take small comfort in attack to divert attention from the Ira-
this, knowing their own performance nian nuclear program seem to be false:
was flawed both militarily and political- The dispute over the Iranian program
ly. Lebanon itself suffered horribly, and has been going on for years with no end
though its fledgling democratic govern- in sight, and Hizballah had tried other
ment survived and became a major player operations in the past as well.
in the diplomacy that led to the ending Similarly, the claim that this con-
flict was a proxy war initiated by Iran to
Daniel Byman is the director of the Center for test whether a foe like the United States
Peace and Security Studies in the Edmund A. (using Israel as the stand-in) could be
Walsh School of Foreign Service at George- defeated by an opponent that would fight
town University and a non-resident senior hard and be willing to take casualties ig-
fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East nores the fact that far more important
Policy at the Brookings Institution. Steven in Tehran’s calculations are the success-
Simon is Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for es that various fighters in Iraq have had
Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on For- against the United States. Iran did not
eign Relations. need to launch a war in Lebanon for a
A
lthough there is a dis- gaining position vis-à-vis Hizballah is far
pute over whether Hizballah weaker. un resolutions that call for dis-
or Israel came out ahead, it arming Lebanese militias like Hizballah
is clear that Lebanon—both its people are thus even farther from fulfillment.
and its government—lost. The Lebanese In contrast, Damascus emerged as a
government suffered the ultimate indig- winner. Since the collapse of the Syrian-
nity for any regime: It was ignored. Once Israeli negotiations in 2000, Jerusalem
again it is clear to all factions in Leba- had simply ignored the al-Asad regime’s
non that their government cannot pro- political demands regarding the Golan
tect them from foreign threats or strong Heights and other disputes. Even more
domestic groups like Hizballah. In the worrisome for Damascus, the “Cedar
early 1970s, the impotence of the Leba- Revolution”, combined with French, U.S.
nese government in the face of Israe- and Arab pressure, forced Syria into a hu-
li-Palestinian clashes in Lebanon was a miliating military withdrawal from Leba-
I
ran is basking in the reflected 1As quoted in John Burns, “Syria Turns Over a Top
glory of its Lebanese proxy. Iran Insurgent”, The New York Times, February 28,
has long seen Hizballah as a tri- 2005, pp. 1.
umph for the Islamic revolution, having 2 “Majority of Lebanese believe Hizbullah won
helped create and sustain the organiza- war”, The Daily Star, August 26, 2006.
P
rime Minister Ehud Ol- casualties at Qana—again—that compli-
mert seized on the Hizballah cated the lives of politicians but had no
kidnapping as a way to demon- adverse effect on operations.) Hizballah’s
strate that he would be tough when Israel adroit use of anti-armor missiles not only
was threatened, but Israel’s poor showing against Merkava III tanks, but also to
left the government humiliated and reel- destroy improvised idf defensive posi-
ing politically. tions, was extremely effective and could
A steady drumbeat of missile launches not be countered in the short duration
T
he clash also led Europe plenish its depleted inventories. For over
to re-engage in the Middle two decades before the latest fighting,
East. The humanitarian ca- Hizballah proved able to resist Israel and
tastrophe that Hizballah and Israel vis- even prosper, and no one thinks unifil
ited on Lebanon animated the European will be more skilled or more aggressive
press; the resulting public outrage forced than the Israelis were. The organization
reluctant and unprepared European gov- also retains some long-range missiles it
ernments to declare that this was the hour can fire over the heads of unifil troops
of Europe. Europe responded better than into northern Israel. Israel has corre-
it did when Jacques Poos made a similar sponding capacity to strike at its enemy.
declaration in 1992 and the eu was hu- The likelihood for renewed fighting,
miliated by the Serbs—but this is faint therefore, is high. Despite uncommonly
praise. This time there was no American tough rules of engagement, the odds are
power in the wings to offer oomph to the that capitals will not give commanders on
European force, and it could only come the ground authority to open fire when
in after the belligerents had agreed to a they should. The odds are only slightly
ceasefire. smaller that a panicked unit will fire when
The Italians were the first to offer a it shouldn’t. Either way, its peacekeeping
sizable number of troops, but the French, utility will quickly fade and the deploy-
who lost 58 peacekeepers in Beirut in ment will be seen in Europe as a massive
1983 to Hizballah (a near-simultaneous liability. If Europe cannot yet be put into
Hizballah attack killed 241 U.S. Marines the category of “loser”, it can fairly be la-
who were part of the same mission), were beled as out there, swinging in the breeze.
more reticent. For Chirac and his mili-
D
tary advisors, the force size and rules of etermining the true
engagement stipulated by unscr 1701 winners of the fighting be-
would put too many soldiers in too much tween Israel and Hizballah
of an exposed and unstable situation. may take years, as the lessons are chewed,
Once again, peacekeepers would be at swallowed and digested by all the parties.
the mercy of local warring factions. The Yet while the jury is out, some interim
pressure to act decisively and effectually conclusions are appropriate for Israel, the
in a Middle East crisis, however, proved United States and other powers confront-
irresistible. Chirac reversed himself and ing strong terrorist movements.
the French increased their troop con- One obvious lesson concerns the dan-
centration by a factor of ten, including ger of power vacuums. A major triumph
a Leclerc tank company and a 155 mm of the Bush Administration was to oust
artillery unit. This in turn shook the Ger- Syria from Lebanon; a major failure was
mans out of isolation, resulting in Angela to put nothing in its place. When the
Merkel’s decision to send Germany to United States coerces oppressive occu-
patrol the Lebanese coast. piers like Syria or helps topple brutal
Whether or not the overall unifil-2 regimes, it must have a plan to build up a
troop level reaches the level envisaged by new government in its place. In Lebanon,
the Security Council, European govern- and in Iraq and the Palestinian territories,
ments will have assumed security respon- the destruction of a bad regime has led to
sibility for a situation over which they its replacement by radicals.