INFORMATION TO USERS

This rnanuscript has been reproduced fram the microfilm master. UMI films
the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus. sorne thesis and
dissertation copies are in typewriter face. while others may be from any type of
computer printer.

The qualKy of thls reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the

copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations
and photographs. print bleedthrough. substandard margins. and improper
alignment can adversely affed reprodudion.

ln the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages. these will be noted. Also. if unauthorized
copyright material had ta be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g.. maps. drawings, charts) are reproduced by

sectioning the original. beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing
from left to right in &quai sections with small overlaps.

Photographs induded in the original manuscript have been reproduced

xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white
photographie prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing
in this copy for an additional charge. Contad UMI diredly ta order.

ProQuest Information and Leaming

300 North Zeeb Road. Ann Arbor. MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600
 SUHRAWAR.DÏ(d.1191)AND HIS INTERPRETATION OF AVICENNA'S (d.l037)
PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

Roxanne D. Marcotte
Institute of Is1am.ic Studies
McGill Univesity

Marcb 2000
A tbesis submjtted to the FacuJty of Graduate Studies and Resea'Ch in pa"tial fulfilment
of the requirements of the degree of Ph.D. in Islamic Studies

•.
~
© Roxanne D. Marcotte
1+1 National Ubrary
of Canada
Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada
Acquisitions and Acquisitions et
Bibliographie Services services bibliographiques
385 weIIingIon Street 395. rue W"'lf1gton
OIawaON K1A0N4 oaawa ON K1A 0N4
canada C8nBda

The author bas granted a non-
exclusive licence allowing the
National Library of Canada to
reproduce, lou, distnbute or sell
copies oftitis thesis in microform,
paper or electronic formats.
L'auteur a accordé une licence non
exclusive permettant à la
Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de
reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou
vendre des copies de cette thèse sous
la forme de microfiche/film., de
reproduction sur papier ou sur format
électronique.

The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du

copyright in tbis thesis. Neither the
thesis nor substantial extracts from it
may be printed or otherwise
reproduced without the author's
permission.
droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse.
Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels
de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés
ou autrement reproduits sans son
autorisation.

0-612-64616-5

Canadl
 RESUME

Auteure: Roxanne D. Marcotte

Titre: Suhrawardï (m. l191) et son interprétation de l'anthropologie
philosophique d'Avicenne (d. 1037)
Dèpartment: Institute of Islamic Studies
Diplôme: Doctorat en Philosophie (D.Ph.)

L'interprétation par Suhrawardi de l'anthropologie philosophique d'Avicenne depend, en

fait, du systeme péripatéticien, et cela, en dépit de son motif de la lumière et de la predonunance de
l'imagination qu'il introduit. Sa définition de l'âme ne s'eloigne pas de façon signifieat1ve de celle
d'Avicenne: sa définition en tant qu'entélichie et de substance, son incorporéalité, sa pre-existence,
ou le l'Ôle des poeumoro. Par contre, il critique le matérialisme d'un certain nombre de positions
adoptées par Avicenne. Ce qui est en jeu, c'est l'unité ontologique de l'âme que Suhrawardï perçoit
a>m.me étant menacée p.. la localisation dans le corps des facultés responsables de la représentation
- les imagination active et passive, de même que r estimation - Et de leurs objets. AprèS avoir
aitiqué les théories "extramissive" et uintromissive" de la vision, Suhrawardï iJltroduit sa propre
théorie qui a pour but d'expliquer la vision mystique, U réduit les facultés internes responsables de la
représentation d'Avicenne à une seule faculté, préférant mettre l'acceat sur le rôle que joue l'âme
dans la perception. U analyse ta connaissance de soi en discutant de l'appréhension primaire de
l'existence individuelle, de l'identité personnelle, du caractère nonmédié de ce type de oonnaissace,
et de la question de l' individufrion. Au niveau conceptuel,l'intellection demeure logiquement première

par rapport à l'imagin-.ion, alors que les discussions portant sur l'intelligence agente, ses fonctions,
et la conjonction de l'âme rationnelle - la lumière-Isfahbad - avec l'intelligence agente - le principe
lumineux - sont avicenniens. Les concepts épistémologiques tels que l'intuition et la contemplation
mystique, aucisux dans le débat sur ta primauté de la connaissance mystique sur la connaissance
philosophique. Les propos de Suhraw81"dï et d'Avicenne entourant la natUre de la connaissance
prophétique conrrastent avec la nature de la connaissance mystique en introduisant les fonctions
négative et positive de la faculté d'imagination, c'est-ai-dire le rôle de cette dernière dans le processus
de particularisation des vérités universelles et sa fonction mimétique. Les discussions eschatologiques
introduisent l'idée de la survie de l'imagination nécessaire pour que les âmes puissent faire l'expérience
de la rétribution (divine) et atteindre leur perfection dans l'au-delà - mentionnée par Avicenne
seulement par quelques allusions mais déVeloppée par Suhrawardï; alors que la possibilité d'une

• métempsychose n'est pas totalement écartée, Suhrawsrdï introduit deux sphères distinctes - Ether
Zamharir - qui deviendront le substrat "pneumatique" for la faculté imaginative.
el
 A BSTR..-'\Cf

Author: Roxanne D. Marcotte

Title: Suhrawardî (d. 1191) and His Interpretation of A viceJ1Jlll' s (d. 1037)
Philosophical Anthropo1ogy
Department: Institute of Islamic Studies
Degree: Dactor of Philosophy (ph.D.)

Suhrawardî's inlerpretation. of A~'iœnna's philosophica1 anthropology greatly depends on

the Peripatetic system. in. spite of ils nove1 light motif and the faculty of imagination' s predo mi Dance.
His definitio11 of tbe soul does 110t depart significand)" from Avicetma' s: its definition as an entelechy
and a substance, its incorporeality, its pre-existence, or the role of the vital. spirits - pneumN"a.
However, he criticizes the materia1ism implied in a 11umber of Avicennan theses. At issue i5 the
ontological unity of the soul that Suhrawardi perceives tel be jeopardized by the 10calizatioll in the
body of the represenrative facuJties - the active and passive imtginatiOftS and the esti.aultion - and

.~
their objects. Alter criticizing the .. extramissive" and the" ÏJltromissive" theories of vision. Suhrawsrdi
iauoduces bis own illuminetive tbeory iD. an effort ta simultaneously account for mystical vision. He
"..-.....
also reduces Avicenna's faculties responsible for representatian to a single facu1ty, focusÜ1g on the
sours role in perception. Subraw..di aaalyses self-knowledge, discusSÏlIg the primary aw..eness of
one's own e!cistence, setf-ideJUity, the unmediated ch8l'1leter of chis type of knowledge, ad the issue
of individuation. At the ccnceptua11eve1, inte11ectioJlis Iogica11y prior to imagiution, while discussioJ1S
about the active intelligence, its functioJlS, and the conjwletion of the rational soul - the Isfahbad-light
- with the active ÙlteUigence - the Jigbt principle - still remsinAvicennan. Epistemologica1 concepts
such as intuition and mystica1 contemplation become central in. the debate over the primacy of
mystical kJ10wledge over philosophieal tnowledge. Suhraw8r'dï's an.d Avicenna's discussions about
the nature of prophetic tnowledge are then contnlSted with the nature of mystical knowledge by
iJIlroduciog the llegative and positive fua.ctiOftS of the facu1ty of imagiution, nameIy, il! role in the
pawticu18rizlltion of univers" truths and its mimetic functioJl. The SUMval of the imsginative faculty
is a11uded by Avicenna, but explicitly developed by Suhraw&rdî. 115 survival is required for the
experieacing of divine retribution and the perfecting of seuls in the afœrlife; white metempsychosis
lurts in the background. And rmaUy, Suhrawlrdi introduces two distinct spheres - Ether and Zambarir
- that become the "pnewnaric" substrata for the poslbumous aeti.vities of the imaginative facu1ty.
 Inmemariam
TomyMother
Yvette GéIinas

ACICNOWLEDGMENTS

My first and most lasting debt is towards my thesis advisor professer Hermann LandoJt who
has relemLessly suggested particu1arreadings of tbe Persian ortbe Arabie. indieated possible alternative
iJlterpretations. even disagreed with m8llY of my readings or conjectures. l would Jike ta thank the
professors who guided my inteUectual joumeys. especialJy those lit the Institute of !stamic Swdies
(McGill University): Professors W. Hallaq. D. Little. M. Estalami. E. Ormsby. S. Alvi. l must
indude J.-R. Milot as wellas tbe Arabie language teaehers of the Université de MoDlril, die Institut
Bourghiba des Langues Vivantes de l'Université Tunis - I. and the Language Cenœr- st tbe Jordani8ll
University. as weJl as tbe Persian Juguage teaehers of the Logbat N8IIle-ye Deb.khoda Institute,
lC.P,S. (Tebnm) md tbe UJJiversity of TeJuoan, and the professors that bave welcamed us in tbeir
,"-- classes _ the University of Jordan IUld the University of Tebnu1,
The completion of tbis tbesis would have been. impossible witbout tbe financial support
provided by • nomber of in.st1tutions - in the forms of fellawships for researcb or rœvel grants:

• 1999 (FaU) - Depa'tmeDta1 Travel Grant • Institute of Islamic Studies. McOLJI

URiR!lS'iey (Ilip to Paris, France)
• 1999 (Wuuer) • Canadian Commiuee of the Middle EastStudies Associalion
(CANMES) Graduae Student Travel Grant (trip 10 Washi ngton.
DC and Dayton, OH. USA)
- 1998 (FaU) • Alma Miller Student Trave1 Grant (trip ta Binghamton, New
York. USA), McûZlI U~i;Y
- 1996 to 1999 - Depanmen1al FeUowship. Institute of Islamie Studies, McOOI
Um'R!ni!Y
- 1991 (Summer) • Alma Mater Studeat Travel Grant (trip 10 StJoJm. Newfoundland.
Canada), Mt:Oi/I Um-RrS7ty
- 1996 (Sommer) - Bourse Québec-TWlisie - Anlbic Laaguage Swdies, Tunisia,
Lttsliœr BollJ7Ui/Jll des Lto,pes ~ ~ URiRndé de Tl/ms
-1993 to 1995 - Fonds fCAR for Ph. D. resœrcb - (JuebecOoRmmeDr
- 1993 8Dd 1994 - Honcx.y AnburTagge Fel1owsbip. McGill Major FeUowsbip,
McGiII UJJiPlni{Y
-1992-1993 • Deparlmema1 Fenowship. Inslitute of Islamic Studies, McGiU
Um'R!n~

•
 iv
A number of Ùldividuals and iJ1stitutions must be memioned for their sincere support and
assistance in the PUlSuit of my academic goals: Professor Ma"C Pelch•• Dean of the faculté de
Théologie et de Sciences ReJgieuses. st the Université Laval (Quebec City) and the professors of tbe
facuJty for the opportuDity ta teacb our fint class, an intensive introduetory course on Islam (sommer
of 1999) as Invited Professor; Professer Suzanne foisy, Director of the Department of PhiJosophy, st
the Université du Québec 8. Trois-Rivières (UQTR) and the professors of the departmeot who have
made it possible for us ta re.:b a course in Oriental PbiJosophy (W1Jlter' of 2000) - Islamic Philosophy
- as Lecturet and for tbe opportunity to become a referce fCX' the Elearomc Joum81 ofIlle Camldriul
.5Oatv" of Aestheilc / ReYUe éJecDTulifjue de la Soaeœ cansdie.rUJe d'esdJdifJue in March 1999:
ProfesSOl" Marie-Andrée Roy, Director of the Département des Sciences Religieuses of the Université
du Québec à Montréal (uQAM) who made it possible for us ta jaïn the Executive CommiŒee of The
Canadian Society for the Study of Religion (CSSR) 1 La Société canadienne pour l'étUde de la
religion (SCER) for the year 1999-2000 as Member-at-Large 1 COdSeillère and for which it was a
pleasure 10 judge the Undergradu8Ie SUldent Essay Contest that ye.: tbe lare Professor Ahmad
TafazzoJi and Professor JaleJI Amuzeg•• of tbe University of Tebran, facu1ty of Arts. who have
made my stay in Tebran most ple&S8IIt by havidg me work on a frencb tnmslation of a section of die
DeJZbn during the WiJJEer of 1995: the Direetor' of the Language Center of tbe Department of
Modem Languages. st the University of Jordan, who ha ltindly invited me ta be a OUest Lecturer in
the F all of 1993 md the Winter' of 1994, my first cJas room experience.
1 bave had the opportunity ta present the fmlS of my research st a number of schol8rly
conferences both in Canada and abroad:

• 13 • "Subrawardi (m. 1191) et les facultés internes selon le commentaire de Shahrazürl (m.
CL 1288) sur le .{5bIl1Ir III-FsiJnIfJ ,01 Qualriéme conférence européeJUle d'étUdes iraniennes
(Socïetas lraIloJogica Europaea), Monde Iraaiœ CNRS. Pans. Sept. 6-10,1999.

• 12 • -The New Status of Imaginai Forms: Suhrawardi's Departure from Avicennan

Psychology," Medievalist Association of America (MAA), Washington. D.C., April 8-11,
1999.

• Il • ,.Self-Consciousness, Se1f-IdeJdity. md SeJf-Knowledge in Subrawardi," Medieval

Pbilosophy and the Classical Tradition in Islam, Judllism. and Chrisâanity. University of
Dayton, Ohio, April 11-13. 1999.

• 10· "Religious Epistemology w FsIJn!irIf Epistemology: The Knowledge of Prophets and

Theosophers in the Works of Suhrawa'di. n I1th Annual conference SSIPS 1 SAGP 1998,
Binghamton Uniyersity. BiDghamton. New York. Oct. 23-5, 1998.

••
• 9· "Escbatology and the Imaginative Faculty: Avicenna and Suhrawa'di" 17th Annual
conference SSIPS 1 SAGP 1998, Binghamton University. Binghamton. New York. Oct.
23-5,1998.
 v
• 8 • "Métaphysique néopl~nicienne oriemale ct ambropoJogie philosophique," XXVlle
Congrès de l'Association des sociétés de philosophie de langue fnmçaise (A.5.P.L.f.),
Université Laval. Québec. Québec, August 18-22. 1998.

• 7· "Suhrawardi's Presential KnowJedge and the Soul's KnowJedge of ItseJf," 42nd Annual
Congress Canadian Pbi1osophical Association (C.P A. 1 A.C.P. 1998) st the 1998 Congress
of the Social Sciences and Humanities (H.S.S.f.C. 1 F.C.S.H.S.), University of Ottawa,
Ottawa. Ontario, May 27-30, 1998.

• 6 • "The Pbi1osophical Antbropology of tbe BuslIÜ1ll/-QuJlib and the YllZtIâD Sltinjiél1r:

Two Warts Aaributed to Subrawardi. SJtIlykJ/ IlI-IsIJnirJ." Second Biennial Conference on
lranian SlUdies (S.B.C.I.S.), BQesda. Mayland. May 22-4,1998.

• 5 • "La notion de pLletUl1ll : une solution au problème posé par les "formes suspendues" de
Suhrawardi (m.1191)," Congres annuel de la Sociélé de philosophie du Québec (SPQ). 6~
congrèS de l'Association canadienne fraaçaise pour l'avancement de la science 1998 (ACfAS),
Université Laval, Québec. May 11-5. 1998.

• 4 • "Avicenna and Suhrawardi on Imagination (mld6k8lfYYÜllIJ)," 16tb Annual Conference

SSIPS 1 SAGP 1997, Bioghamton University, Bingbamton, New York, Oct. 24-6, 1997.

• 3 • "The flCUlties of the Soul in Suhrawni's Mystical lnterpr'etIlion of Avicenna's

Psychology," 41st Annual Congress CPA 1997 st the 1997 Congress of Leamed Socielies,
Memorial University. St.-John's, Newfoundland. June 1-4,1997.

• 2 • ,. Un critique de la tbéOrie visuelle dans la psycbologie d 'Avicenne (m. 1037): Suhrawardi

(m. 1191)," CoagrèS annuel de 1. SocitU de pbi1osopbie du Québec(SPQ), 65ecoagrés de
l'ACFAS 1997. Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières (UQ1R), Trois-Rivières. Québec,
May 13-6. 1997.

• 1 • "InteBett and Intuition in the Philosopbical WorJes of al-Subraw..cli." 15tb Annual

Confereaœ SSIPS 1 SAGP 1996, BiJJgbamton University, Binghamton, New York. Oct.
25-7,1996.

1 would a1so like ta mention a number of slUdies that bave or will appe.. and !rom wbich
some SCUiOIlS of the tbesis are derived:

• 4 • "Métaphysique JléopJatonicienne oriemale et andlropologie philosophique," AdCS du

.KXWe Co~ de .rAssocriDo.rJ des Soatrés" de PAüosopAie de LiuJ,tue FnlDÇSise: La
8lt!lllpJJysitJue, JUstoitrJ, cnl'iJoe. œjeur (Université Laval, Québec, 18-22 août, 1998), 2
vols. (Sainte-foy, Québec: Presses de l'Université Laval) (Fortbcoming)

• 3 • "Resson ( ~.I) and Direct lnmition (8lusiJlllJlldII) in the Work of SbiIJiI) al-Din
Suhrawa-dï (d. 1191)," Fe.srst:JJnh Dedit:Wetl rD HrJfessor HtnIlllml L8Jldo/r, cd. Todd
Lawson (f ortbcoming)

• 2 • "Suhrawawdi's Psychology in. tbe PApa of tbe Arabic "'-~ [71Je FlRs/Jes of
LWN]: Some Remarks," in 77Je {Jur"lUJd PJJilosopAiall ReOearims, S. Handaroh, R.
AJ. McGregor, E. R. Alexandrin. R. MascGUe, S. Mulyâ. A. Alibay and D. Steigerwald. A.
Matin (Yogya Karta, Indonesia: Indonesian Academie Society XXI. 1998),51-64.

• • 1 • "Philosopbical Reamn Versus Mystical Intuilion. - SlIihab al-Din Subrawni (d. 1191),"
AmlyueJdeestudiosiJnllJes (Madrid, Spain) 7 (1996): 109-126.
 vi

1 would also like to tbank tbe staff of the Library of the IJlstitute of Istamic Studies - Salwa
Ferabian. Steve Miller. Wayne St.Thomas. and Mr. Gaœk - for their re1ent1ess help and the editorial
heJp Asad Shaker and Lisa Alexandrin.
Most importantly. 1 must tbank my aWlt Denise and Shabed. a very very dear friend. who
have bath provided mewitb tbeirunceasing moral supportduring tbese numerousyears. The complerion
of this dissertation would not bave been possible without it.

.. _."

•
 vii

SUHRAWAROï (d. 1191) AND HIS INTJRPRErATION OF AVICENNA'S (d. J037)

PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

Absll'aCtS i
Ac:k.IDwlecigmelllS . üi
TableofCoatents vii
T~oa x
AblJrevil&Î.odS xi

INrROOUcrION - Pbilosopbical. Aatbmpology 1

Problem of the Philosophical Anthropology 1
Chapters of the Thesis 3

CHAP"J"ER. ONE - Is1am.ic Pbilosopbica1 Antbropology 8

Historical Background 8
Neoplatonism and Pseudepigraphical Works Il
The Is181tlÏc Milieu 13
A vicenna' s Philosophica1 Anthropoloy 23
Post-Aviœnnan. Developments till Suhrawa-di 30

CHAYI"ER TWO - Subraw.cli 35

Biographical. Sources , 35
E..ly ure and Education 36
His Stay' in Aleppo 38
The Sociopolitical Conten " 40
Mou.nting Opposition 46
The Final Moments 51
Enumeration of bis Worles 53
Problem of
C1lrooology 55
Problem of the Nature of bis Writings 58
His Intelleetual Allegiance 60
Suhrawardï' 5 Philosophical Anthropology 65
Works on Issues on Philosophical Anthropology 67

CHAJI'I'ER TIIIlEE - NIIt1JI'e of tIle Soul 69

The Sou! as Entelechy and Substantiality 69
Incorporeality of the Soul 77
Pre-existeooe of the Soul 81
Existentiation of the Soul 91
Physical Constituents and Cosmological ConjuJlction 92
Soul-Body Relation 91
The Vital Spirit....................................... . 103
The Religious Tradition 103
Nature of Vital Spirits 105
Types of Spirits 109
Functions of the Vital Spirits 112
Light and the Rational. Soul 114

••
Human PS)"chic Spirit and Forms 116
Existence Mter Death 119
 viu

CIJAIFI1?Il FOUR. - Division of tIIe Saut _ 121

Vegetative. Animal, and HumanSoul 121
Fivefold Division and Localisation of Faculties 122
Rejeaion of Different FacuJties in a Bodily Organ 123
Two Distinct FacuJties and Funetions 124
Proolem of RecoUection 126
Rejeaion of Fivefold Division of the Soul 129
A Tenebrous FacuJty and Ruling lights '" 132

CHAP"l"œ FIVE - PE!l"CeJ'CiOD '" -.. . . 138

Visual (SeJ1Sible) Perception 138
The Extramissive Theory of the Light Rays 138
The Intromissive Theory of the Fonns of Objects 141
Nature of His Refutations _ 144
Theory of Vision Adopted by Suhrawardi _ _ 146
Conditions of Vision 148
RuJing' Light - Isfahbad-I...igbt 151

CHAP"l"œ SIX - Tlae Faca1ty of lauIgiJ:lllltioa _ 156

Nature of the Faculty of Imaginstion 157
The Avicenne Structure , 158
Unity of Funetions of the Animal Soul 160
Materia1.ity Or Immateria1ity 162
Suhrswardï' s Modified and Simplified Version -. 166
Contents of Imagination and of the Rational Soul 167

CIJAIFI1?Il SEVEN' - Epistemology 177

Se1f-Knowledge _ 177
Self-Con.sci.ousness 179
SeJf-Identity 182
UnmediatedNature ofSelf-Knowledge 183
Individuation and Personal. Individuality 190
Intellection 196
Practical and Theoretical Intellects 197
The Process ofInte1Jection 201
The F acu1t)7 of Imagination _ 210
The Active IntelJigence _ 213
Conjune:tion with the Di'Vine Realm , 219
Divine Spirit. Log-os, and Light - -.225
Philosophy vs Mystical Experience 230
OntologyofLight : " 233
&sence of Presential KnowJedge 236

•
 CHAI"fB. EKilrI" - Propbecalogy 243
Prophetie Knowledge vs Theosophical Knowledge 245
One or Many Episœmological Processes 249
Metaphysieal Considerations 253
Anthropological ConsideratiollS 256
The Notion of Intellective Conjunction 258
The Facultyr of Imagination 260
Divine Signs and Interpretation. 266

CHAYrER. NINE - EsclllIlology 273

Bodily Resun-eetion 273
Metempsyehosis 278
Avieenna and the Survival of the Individual Self 284
Avieenaa and the Survival of the Imaginative Faculty 286
Suhrawardr 5 Eschatology and the Active Imagination 295
A Separate World of Imagination. 305

CO~USION 313

BIBLI<XiRAPHY 326

•
 x

TRANSUTER...ÀTION

The foUowing transliteration. of Arabie and Persian. will be used. It should be noted that the
fijJm lJ1'Dii.1"4b (:;) is transliterated br "ah," unless it oceurs within and I!liifall or Rtl} (attributive)

construction, lJ1 which case it is transJiterated br "al." The Ôlun~iI.J ( • ) oecurring in. the iflitiaJ
position is omitted, il only appears in. the forms of "a," "i," or "u," according to its vocalization.

• ..J =r ..:J =k
T =i ..J =z ~ =g (Persian)
1 =a ..J =zh (Persian) J =1

..
""'!'"

.;,
=b
=p
=t
(Persian)
~

..i'
...,.
=s
=sh
=~
r
v
•
=m
=n
=h
~ =th ...,. =c;I J =w
".
,,-.... .: =j "'- =~ • =h(t)P
.......... a =ch (persian) Ji =? ~ = y (ï)
e =1, e. ~ = ft ( oIifmOj.sümh)
é =kh t =gh (,$ =ay (diphtongs)
~ =d ~ =f J =8W (diphtongs)
~ =dh ~ =q

The translations of Arabie and Pa"Sian texts are mine, unJess specified othenvise. 1 have
opted to stay close to the original Persian and Arabie texts, thus providing translations that are
more literai than Jiterary. The definite article is usuaUy omitted in the transcription of Arabie,
unIess the words are part of an r{liil'llh construction in the original texts.

The foUowiog words are neither italicized nor transliterated throughout this wode:

madrasah (5) Imam(s) Islam Sufi (s)

Ulama (5) Shaykb (5) hadith (5)

•
 xi

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

1. JoWDa1s

A. ArablCS
An. al-Andalus
A.C.P.Q. American Catholic Philosophica.l Quarterly
A.H. Analecta H usserliana
A.H.D .L.Nf.A Archives d' histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age
A.I. Annales islamologlques
A.O. Acta Orientalia
A.S. Asiatische Srodien / Etudes asiatiques
A.E.A Anaquel de estudios àrabes
A.S.P. Arabie Sciences and Philosophy
B.EO. Bulletin d'études orientales
B.C.A.!. Bulletin aitique des Annales islamiques
B.!.E. Bulletin de l'Institut d' Egypte
B.I.FA.O. Bulletin. de l'Institut français d'archéologie orientale
B.P.M Bulletin de pbiJosophie médievale
B.S.F.P. Bulletin de la société française de philosophie
B.S.O.A.S. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
C.I. Cahier de l'imaginaire
D. Dialogue
D.L Der Islam
F.A al-Fila- al- t Arabi
G.A. Graeco-Arabica
H.I. Hamdard IsJamicus
H.T.R. Harvard Theological Review
I.B.L.A Revue de l' Institut des Belles Lettres Arabes
I.e. (slamic Culture
I.I. fndo-(ranica
I.N. Iran. Nameh
1.Q. Islamic Quarterly
I.S. Islamic Studies
J. al-Jimicah
J.A Journal asiatique
J.AO.S. Journal of Americsn Oriental Society
J.H.A.S. Journal for the History of Anmic Science
J.HAs.S. Journal of the History of Asian Studies
J.H.P. Journal of the HistDry of Philosophy
J.N.E.S. Journal of Near Eastern Studies
J.P. Journal of Philosophy
J.R.A.S.

•
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
L. Luqman.
 xii

• M.
Mu.
M.LO.EO.
M.M.
M.S.
M.St.
The Monist
Le Museon
Mélanges de r Institut dominiœin d' erudes orientales
Maghreb- Machrek
Muslim Wodd
Medieval Studies
en' Caïre

M.U.S.J. Mélanges de ru niversite Saint Joseph

M.W. Muslim World
Or. Orientalia
Os. Oriens
Ot. Orient
P. Phronesis
P.F. Philosophical Forum
R.C. Revue du Caire
R.EF.M. Revista Espagnola de filosofia. Medieval
R.E.!. Revue des études islamiques
R.HR. Revue d' histoire des religions
R.H.S. Revue d' histoire des sciences
R.M.M.M. Revue du monde musulman et de la Méditet'T8Jlée
R.P.L Revue philosophique de Louvain
R.T. Revue thomiste
S.C.R. Studies in Comparative Religion
S.I. Studia Islamica
S.Ir. Studia lranica
S.M. Scripta MeditemUlea
S.T.F.M. Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale
T. al-Taw~d

V. Viater. Medieval and Renaissance Studies

Z.D.M.G. Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenlandschen GeseUschafts

n. EncycJopedi. _d Dietio..nes
E.I. Encyclopedia of Islam. 1st ed.
E.I. 2 Encyclopedia of Islam. 2nd ed.
E.R. Encyclopedia of Religion
E.Iranica Encyclopedia Iranica
E.R.li Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics

•
 xiii

ID. AviceDDa's Works 1

Açlhawïyah AçI~awïyah fi al-Ma'ad

AVlcenna's (Avic.) A vlcenna's Psychology; an English Translation of "K.îtiib al-
Najat." Book II. Chapœr VI (Rahman)
Diinish. Phys. Danish-nimah-yi cAlaI. TabiCiyat
Directives (Du'.) Le livre des directives et remaques (Goichon)
Ishirit al-Ishiiriit wa al-Tanbihiit
Mub~athat al- M ubi.1.tathiil
Najat al-Najiit min al-Gbsraq fi BaJJr al-Oalü1ac
Shifii', Nafs AVlcenna's "De Anima"; Being the Psychological Part of
"Kitiib al-Sbifi J : ' (ArabicTe~"t) (Rahman)
Shad~ Shar~ Kîrab Uthùlüjïya al-Mansüb ili Arisçü

Ta'liqil al-TaCliqiit 'ali l:fawiishï Kiliib al-Nafs ili Ari5Çü

IV.Subrawwdï·s Worb
Abriij Risilat al-Abriij
Alwiïh al-Alwil.t al-cImidïyah
'Aq! c Aql-i
Surkh
Archange (Arch.) L'Archange empourpré. quinze traités et récits mystiques
(Corbin.)
Awaz A wiz-i Par-i Jibriill
Ghurbah Qi~~a al-Ghurbah al-Gbarbiyah
Hayikil Hayiikil al-Nür li al-Suhrawardi al-Ishriqi
J#kmat l:fikmat al- Ishriq

'Ishq Risiïlah fi I:Iaqiqat aL-'Ishq

J
rtiqiid Risiilab fi l'tiqid al-IJukama
Kalimat Kalimat a1-T~awwuf
Lam~it Kitab aJ-Lam~it fi a1-I:Iaqi~iq (ed. MaCIu!)
LamaI:tit (Meta.) Kitib aJ-Lam~itfi al-!:IaqiJiq (ed. Najaf-Ghuli) [Metaphysics]
Lughat Lughat-i Mürin
Man~q Man~q al-Ta1w~it
Mashiri' Kitiib aJ-Mashiri' wa al-Muç~it
Mystical (Myst.) The Mystica1 and Visionary Treatises (Thackston)
Muqiwamit Kitiib al-Muqiwamit
Opera. [ Oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques, [
Opera. II Oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques. [[

• 1 In the footnotes, translaions of Avicenna' 5 and Suhrawardfs works ace included in pan:ntbeses.
 XlV

Opera. III Oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques. III

PaIt'ü Partü-Niimah
Rüzï Rûzï biïJamiiCat-i Süfiyan
Sih RlSiilah Sih Risilah az Shaykb-l Ishriq. al-AJwaJ;t al-'Imiidïyah,
Kalimat al-T~awwuf, al-Lam~iit.
Sagesse (Sag. ) Le Livre de la sagesse orientale (Corbin)
Ta1w~it Kitah aJ-Ta1w~it al-Lawf.1ïyah wa aJ-cArshïyah
Tayr Risiilah al- Tayr
Tufüliyah Risiilah fi E:Iilat al-TufUliyah
Wiridiit aJ-Wiridiït wa al-Taqdïsiit

.-
...
~_ .

•
 xv

v. F-nglislJ.AnbicSDdPeniao TitJes of Subnnrardï'sWorb

On the Beliefs of Wise Men = Risi1ah fi rtiqid al-l:Iukama'
The Cham of Gabriel' s Wing .~wiiZ-i Par-i Jibra 'il

A Day with a Group of Sufis RüZÏ ba JamiiCat-i $üfiyan

Flashes of Light = al-LamliQst fi al-Htqii'iq
Garden of the Hearts = Bustiin al-QuJüb
Intimations = al-TalwïJ:tiit
Invocations and Prayers = aJ-Wiridat wa al-Taqdïsiit
Knowledge of the Divine = Yazdin Shiniikht
Language of the Ants = Lughat-i Müriin
The LovEl"S' Friend Münis al-cUshshaq (also known as the Treatise on the Reality of
Love)
Mystie81 Stations Maqimat aJ-$üfiyah (aIso known as Remaries on Sufism)
Oppositions = al-Muqiiwamiit
Orienta1-lliwninative Wisdom = IJikmat aJ-Ishriiq
,,-. Paths and ConversatiOJlS =
c
al-Mashiiri wa a1-M~at
The Red Intellect = CAql-i Surkh

Rem..ks On Sufism = Kalimit al-T~awwuf (also known as the Mystical Stations )

Rays of Light = Partü-niimah
Some Arabie Poems = Min Ashciribi aJ-cArabi
The Sound of the Simurgh = ~aî1t-i Simurgh
Subte1ties [Witticism] = Laçii'if (also known as Tasteful Rema-ks and Splendid Points
Kalimit al-Dhawqïyah wa al-Nukat al-Shawqïyah)
Tasteful Remarks and Splendid Points = Kalimiit al-Dhawqïyah wa al-Nukat aJ-Shawqiyah
= (8150 known as Subtelties = Ltf;ii'if)

Tablets Dedieated to cImiid al-Dia = al-A1wii.tl al-clmsdiyah (penian and Arabic)

A Tale of the Occidental Exile = Qi~~at al-Gburbah aI-Gharbïyab
Temples of Light = Hayiikil aJ-Nür (Persian and Arabic)
Treatise of the Bird = RisaIah al-Tayr (also known as Translation of the Treatise of the
Bird = Tarjamah Risiilab al-Tayr)
Treatise On the High Towers or the Signs of the Zodiac = RisËil81 al-Abriïj
Treatise On the State of Childbood = Risilah fi l:Iih~ al- Tufüliyah

Treatise On the Rea1ity of Love = RisiiJah fi J:laqïqat al-tIshq (aIso known as the The
Lovers' Friend = Müms al-CUshshiq)
 TNTRODlICTlON

• INTRODUCfION •

PIULOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHIC.J\L ANTHROPOLOGY

Sïnce the dawn of rime, questions regB1'ding the buman nature have dways been important
for humankind. They, in fact, became integrsl parts of human speculations; perl1aps, they were even
st the origin of the philosophieal quest into the meaning of life and everything which it encompasses

- the natural world, the greater cosmie arder, and the wodd of the Gods - on aecount of their
inscrutéility. Here is what Mulli $adri (d. 1641), one of Suhrawardi' 5 spiritual heirs, bas to say
sbout the knowledge of the 50131, "know that the inner knowledge of the soul is one of those
extJ'emely difficu1t [fields of] knowledge... J
AvieeJlJlll's and Suhrawardrs philosophieal investigations into the nature of the soul do Bot
constitute whc has come to be commonly known as psyehology. Nowadays, a science of the soul is
no longer envisioaed in tenus of antiquated existenlial or pbi1osophical conceptions reg..ding ils
nature, fune:tions cr ongin. But the fset remains that, although psyehology bas become a discipline

with is OWJl scientific methods, on the other haad, philosophi.œ1 queries have persised and have
provided ample material 011 which to specul8te - e.g., philosopby of mind. Psyehology seets to
probe mta the J1ItUre of the ÏJlner fu.netioning of die hum8l1 psyehe.
.A\.s a modem discipline, it does not fiad its origins in Medieval conceptions; rather, it took
shape with the works of suda individuaLs Il! Ribot (d. 1819) who coaceived of the field of psychology
witboutrelying on ancient notions of the sou!, and Lachelier(d. 1885)who conceivedit as encompassing
the reaJm of sensible consciousness. In. die beginning of the 18th century, psyehology with its
modem. meaning, emerges as tbe result of a distinction established between a n.otion of psychology
defUled as a rational investigation ÏJltO the nature al the soul and the empirica1 investigation of the
phen.omeaa of conscious St8tes - in the works of Christian Wolff (d. 1754), a disciple of Leibniz 8I1d

1 He CQIlCUIUes by SUItiq"in which the plulosophers were aceediJItJly Jle,lecd'ul, despue the JeIIIIh
of their iavestiaaticDS, the power of their thoughts and the freq:uency of their endeavoun in the field. This
tnawled,e caD oDly be aaquired from illumination drawn (.19#~) tram the lamp-nidte of Prophecy (mr:mbu
1II-l1ubü"."..,) and through foUowing the ligbtlr of Revelation (itI1w1r ;I/-I1u/JuJVJr;l/J ) and Prophethood

• (1II-nSillMJ) and the lanterns of die Book ( m~i/lIII-bI1lD) and the TraditIon (.-SfUIIYIIJ) th. has come clown
CO us in the Pail of our Imams, maaœrs of pdance (.hJif.Iph) and infallibili.ty, from tbeir anc:estIOr the Seai of
the Prophets ...," cf. Mulli: Sadra, 1I1-.{5bDJtr JlI.~,P:I'h (I~ahaD: 5hahriya- Boots, 1342/1962),234; quoted
ÏJI Morris, 7M WisdtNDofi'M~,131; â. Corbin, "Laplace de MolJa Sadr&," 81-113.
 INTRODUcrrON - 2

tescher of Kant. This distinction rested on esrlier attempts to describe S)'"5tematically mental processes
- Locke (d. (104), Berkeley(d. 1153), Hume (d. 1716), or Condillac (d. 1780). Modem preoccupâÏOJ1S
with the wodcing of the mind f1Jld, bowever, their precursors ÎJl the w01"ks of Descartes (d. 1650)
who WIS perhaps the first who offered an interesling Sbld}- on the minds of animals, but, more
importal1t1y, who estabJished a parallelism betWeen .. psychic" faets and .. ph}--siologica1" facts, although

bis preoccupations were esseJltiaUy metaphysiœt! A few years ea-lier, Bacon (d. 1623) iJl bis De
diçAdNe prescnted ps}"chology as a science of the soul, of its substaJlce, of its faculties. of ils
objetts, and 50 on, ~eoccupations that are at the heart of Avicenna's and Suhrawardïs philosophica1
antbropolog}". Scill earlier, Bakel (d. L590) conœived of psyehology in terms of the perfection of
man, the study of his soul and of its origin.
These developmeJltS ..e quite recent if one considEl'S the whole history of the in.terest of
hum,enkind in the human soul. The westem origins of speculations on its nature date back to
p-e-Socratic scbools of the 6th œaRuy B.C.:! These investigatiOJ1S were furtber PUtSlled by Galed.,
Pista, Aristotle and later Greek and HeUenic writers. Their respective works IlIId theories will make a
tremendous impact Oft the deve1opmeJ1t of philosophical anthropology within Islamie tradition. By
the 11th and 12tb centlJries (the period covered by this study), the studyof the sou! el1cx>mpssses a

--' number of philosophical issues and physiological considerations (inherited from the medical tradition
of Greek physicius, namely Guen).

Like a number of important Islamic philosophen, Suhrawardï did net develop a philosophica1
antbropology thlt was grounded Ï!l a medical p-actice, unlike Aviœnna. He never wrote trearises on
medical matters, even. if he wu schooled in the traditional Peripaletïc curriculum (tbat included
medical theories) that he followed in the different intellectual circles he attended (Mlrighah. ~ahin,

Rum, or Aleppo). In faâ, Suhrawardî' 5 philosophical anthropology, Ji1œ the OJ1e of Avicenna, is
couched in a conceptual framewcrk that is essentially metaphysica1. For this reason, investigations
ther undertook into the JlatUte of the sou! a~ essentially philosophica1. hence, the emphasis of this
study on the terms of philosophical anI:hropology rsther chan psycbology. During tbis period, the
study of the soul still eJlcompassed philosophical investigstioJ1S iJlto ils nsrure and aU issues linked to

2 Cbristian Wolff, EmpinQl/ p ~ (1732) and RII/r04JllPs,Jdolt:f{Y (1734); â. Joba Locke,

..s-.rC~Hum., Und6r.st:mdiq (1690) aIld 71M CanrflAà oFiM Un~dI,., (1706); d. George
Berkeley, A NerY 'l'1N!1ot;r oF "'.".7
(1709) and Tn'lllise CDDœrnrDr flle PniJt:r~ oF HlTLllJU1 Knawlet:(ye

•
(1710); cf. Etienne Condillac, T~se OD ..t tellSRfioDS (1754) and ESS1I.f'S OA dJf! a p al" r.!H' HumJ16
Undt!n'l:lndly (1746); cf. René Descartes, TlM hs:siollS 0'~ SmzI (1649) and ~ Rules"" Ori'tfI:DDn oF
dM At,iAd (1701).
3 VoilqUÏJl, Les peDRua~Jlr4U6 SOtnIQ!!S, 47-8, 51-3,56-7.
 TNTRODucnON ::.

its fate, before and after death. Although the study of the soul WliS olten concemed with more
p-agmatic psycho-medical iJlvestigations. a Mere empiricist outlook is genera11)'. absent from
Suhrawlll"dï's ~orks. save some descriptions of pS}·chologica1 states associated with a number of
pessions (e.g.. anger).
ln the last decades. a number of warks on Suhrawardï have addressed a number of issues
(Ziai, Amin Razavi. or W albridge. Dïnin11. None ha""e provided a thorough analysis of bis philosophical

antbrapology. This study purports to shed some Iight on Suhtawardi's pbi1osophiœi anthropology,
but. more specifically. on the relation that it has with AviceWlS' 5 own philosophical mthropolog)·
For this purpose. we will use an essentiaUy comparative approach - S comparison. of Su1tnlwErdï' s
theory of the sou! with Avicenna' s.
SuhrawEll"di did contribute positively with 8 number of philosophieal inno-vations - in logi~
physics or metaphysics. As Ziainotes. Suhrawstdï'5 majorwork, the Ch"eJml-UiumintUir--e IVLsdam,
aumot be uilderstood in. isol8tion ftom bis other works - essentially the four dogmSlic treetises -
which "present system8tÏcally a new formulation of philosophy.'..:l Nonetheless. Suhrawardi does
daim that be had been, in his youth. an ardent foUower of Peripatetic philosophy. Suhrawardi
believed th. a number of Peripatetie doctrines and theses were valid 8.Ild constituted some of the
founding principles of bis own reformulatiOJl. This constitutes Suhrawardi's AvicelllUUl Peripltetï.c
heritage which we will try to ilIustraœ. We will try to show wbere Suhrawardi adopts Peripatetic
AviceJ1Jl8Jl positions and how be departs from the letter El"adition. 0.0. a number of issues related ta the
50U1. Our goal is not to depitt Suhrawardî as the initiatOl" of an original and typically Eastern
"I11uminatjonist" philosophy - others have done 50 (Corbin. Nasr).s Our mlÏ.D. concern is more with

intellectual history: What is the Perip81etic substratum of Suhrawsrdi's more personal contribution te
Isllmic Pbilosophy!

CHAPTERS OF THE THESIS

The tint chaptet' provides a generai historica1 backgrOWld to the advem of an Is1amic
philosophical anthropology. A quick incursion iIlto the Greek and Hellenic period - including the
iafJuential NeoplatoAic phase - inlroduces foreign elements into Islamie tnldition. th. heJped ta

creste a philosophical1y a-ticulated Islamic antbropology. Although Christian and !stamic theologica1
debates were of some importance. it is with al-Kiodï and al-Firibi th. a truly philosopbical tradition

• 4

5
2'iai., KJz"...Je~,4. 10. 14,115.
N......TheSpread cftheillllmjnatiOll1StSchoo1." 16G-71; d. Corbin. SldJnirFMdid'AJ~.
 TNTROD( renoN - 4

develops in Islam. A vicenna owes much to the latter. This philosopbica1 antbropology is men
iatrodueed with, first. an exploration inta what oonstitutes Islamic philosophical anthropology and,
second, a presentation of A"icenna's works where he discusses the hwnan sauL Finally, Suhrawardi' s
own endeavors a-e imroduœd after' the presentation of a brief sur"Vey of post-Avicennan developments
ti11 the time of Suhrawardi ta provide an overview of a span of more man a hundred and fifty )7eBl"5 -

Bahmanyir b. Msrzbin. Ibn Zaylah. al-Lawkari. al-Ghaziili. al-ShahrastiDi. Fakhr al-Din al-Rii2ï and
Abii al-Barakiit al-Baghdadi.

The second chapter reviews Suhrawardi' s seant biograpbieal data scanered in a few biographies
in arder to sketch bis early life and education (tram Suhrawsrd to Marighah. ~ahin. ROm, and then
to Aleppo). A brief presentation of the socio-political cornext and the moWJting opposition from the
Ulamas of Aleppo will &Rude to some of the possible causes of Suhrawardi' s tragic death in ..<\1eppo.
Tuming ta Suhrawardi' s works. a number' of problems arise with the study of the Suhraw..dian
corpus. First. the chronology of bis work can ontY be, at best, temati~"ely established. Second. a
dassifieation of bis works is also problematic. for they caver a whole speetrum of literary genres:
poem.s. Book ofHoun-like tens. allegorica1 treat1ses. philosopbical compendiums. original mystico-
philosopbica1 treatises. and initiatory 1laft"8tives and p..-ables witb mong symbolic language. Tbird.
the question of his idtelleetUa1 allegiance remains the bone of contention amongst Subrawardian
circ1Es: Can one claim. that he was sole1y a mystic or Suri or a philosopher. i.e., in the Greek or
Peripatetic: sense. or WElS he an. eeleetic thinker? In. spite of divergeJ2t views reg8l'ding bis works or
aUegiance, Suhrawsrdi writes about pbi1osophicat anthropoJogy in ail of bis phiJosophieal writings
(as he does in most of bis allegorical works). In fact. a number of bis works do co1lt8i.n sepante
sections that diseuss the soult the internai faculti.es. reason.. and so on..
The fint part of the tbird cbapter explores the nature of the soul in the works of both
AviceJUl8. and Suhraw..dL They provide a definition of the sours nature in. tams of ils petfectioa.-
i.e.. E an entelechy - and of its substantiality which introduces the issue of inœrpcreaJity of the
soul. TIte next discussion centers on the debste over' the pre-existence of the soul and the œnditions
they set for its existentiation. - i.e.• the physica1 and cosmoJogica1 conditions that me the sublunar
world II1d eommand the conditions of its existe11tilltion. FinaIly. a discussion on the soul-body
relation will oonclude chis section. The second part of the third chapter explores the philosophicaJ
concept of the vital spirit (pnelUllll - c.~..J) - intimately related to soul-body relation issues. Distinct
from the divine spirit. the viral spirit is divided into a naturaI. an 811im.al. and a psychic spirit. the

• IItter l:Jeiag the mos noble of all. Tbell. the different funetioas of these vital spirits and, more
specifica11y. of the huma psychic spirit whieh serves as an in.tennediary betWeen soul and body are
 fro-lTRODucnON 5

discussed. FlJUl11y, the association with or close proKimity of the psychic spirit with the rational soul
will bighlight its importance for the process of representation.
In the fourth chapter. we discuss the division of the soul ÏJlto v-egetative, animal. :'.J1d human
souls the latter being the object of furtber division, especially at the band of A "iœnna who iatroduces
1

a fivefold division of the inner senses. Suhrawardi' 5 critique of this Avicennan position seeks to
preserve the o.lltological unity of the soul More specifically, there are the issues of the loca1ization of
two interna! senses - the faculties of active imagination end est1m8.tion - in the same bodily organ
(the brai.n) and the related issue of I."ecollection. Renee, Suhrawardï proposes to rejeet tbis fivefold
division and replace it with a single facultythat can em.brace the three (AviceJUl8l1) facultiesrespoJ1Sible
for representauiott. Finally. the typically Suhrawardian.1ight motif reappears in bis interpretation of
the internai facu1ties.
The fiftb cbapter introduces yet &Dotber cemral. aspect of Suhraw..dï's philosophiœl
anthropology - sensible perception. The most important pel;"ception for Suhrawlrdï is vision. He
a-iticizes mlthematieany, physiologically. 8Ild physica11y both the "extnuDissive" theory of vision.,
associated with Plata, and the "intromissive" theory of vision, associsred with Aristotle. Altbough he
appeers to adope a theory of vision that owes mueh te the Avicennan tradition, he introduees his
"il1um;native" ~ 1~() thecry of vision for which be enumerates COJlditions: the notiOJlS of presence,
a face-te-face encounter. absence of veil and. most importantly. the presence of light. Finally. we
will discuss the role of the ruling light, i.e.. the Isfabbad-light. 85 the principle of vision st the besrt
of Suhrawardï's I."einterpretation of vision.

In the sixth ehapter, we discuss the most important of inner facuJties for Subraw8L"di' s
philosophieal ambropology- the facu1ty of imagination. lJl fset. the latter C8Jl only rea11.y be understood
once its JUltUre ud funetions are analysed which is, to some enent, sbapeel within. a general Aviœn nan
conceptual framework. although he does aiticize the A vicennan position by reintroducing a notion
of unity, i.e., of the fw1etions of the hume soul. This lesds to discussions on. the matErial or
im.m.aerial nature of the faeulty of imagination. Suhrawardï finally adopts a modified version of the
Peripatetic divisioJl of the inner semes. but which r8Îsesa number of difficu1ties, especial.1y with his
a:»nception. of a single iatemal sense responsible for representation.. e.g.. the nature of this single
facu1ty of representation (imegi nation), its content. and its independence from the r&ioJ181 sau1
(soul-body reJarion).
The first part of the seven.tb chapte' addresses epistemological issues. the first being self-
knowledge. Here. A~œnna's notorious bypotbetical example of the "suspended" person becomes a
p-elude to Suhraw..dï's discussions on self-knowledge. Suhrawardï's trestment of self-knowledge.
 TNrRODucnON - 6

however, exhibils a complexity to which Aviceana only alluded. la fact, Suhœwardï will offer 8

dWIlber of arguments to uphold a general conception of se1f-knowledge: the primary awa-eness of

one's own existence, self-identity. the unmediated character of this type of knowledge - i.e., not
through _ imsge, a form, a .notion of the seJf. or an attribute of the self - and the issue of
ÏJ1di:~iduation.

The second part of the seveJlth chapter focuses on intellection. We will see how Subrawardï' s
teinta-pretation ofPeripatetic philosophydoes not complete1ydo awaywith the latter' s epistemologica1
distinctiOJlS: re8Son divided into pntctica1 and theoretical or intellects divided wo material. habituai,
active, and acquired. \Ve will then discuss the types of pr-ocesses of intellection. More importantLy. in
Suhrawardï's reinterpretation of Peripatetie epistemology, a cenain aspect of the imaginative faculty
sppears ta preserve its inferior position ~7s-li-rti" the intel1ective principle - the rational soul.
Altbough the facu1ty of imagination is unable to acœss universal trlJths (on &Ceoant of its association
with materiality), il is responsible for mediating the rational soui' s particular knowledge by means of
its abiJity ta re-preseJll universals (truths, fint principles, cr diYÙle revelalion) for the latter . The
active intelligence is also of importance for intellection: as the source of the rational souls, as the
p"iacip1e of the aetualizarion of human. intelligence, and EIS the provider of fonns rD our souls and
pima1 mlltter'. These discussions will culminete with the debate over the nature of the relation huma
rational sauts C8l1 have with the IICtive Ù'ltelligence: Is it a union (,,)1,-;1) or a conjunetion (J~J )?
Finally. Subrawlrdi mûes a ftumber of parallels between the active intelligence and the divine spirit.
the logos, and light. The last plUt of this chapter analyses the relatiol15bip between philosophical and
mystic81 Jœowledge in terms of (wo epistemologica1 concepts - iatuition (U"'~ ) and mystical
contemplation (i~ ~ ). Suhrawardï' s emphasis 011 the latter is then explained in terms of the
OJUDlogy of Jighttbat structures bis persona! inlerpretation of mystical knowledge. FiJlaJly, an exposition
of the essence of bis presentïal lmowledge is provided.

The eight chapt« discusses issueJ 8Ssociated with Avieenna' 5 and Suhrawardï' 5
p-ophetologies. An ïmpOrtaDt discussion pertaùls to the nature of prophetie knowledge as opposed ta
theosophica! knowledge and the distinC%Ïons th. set them apat. More importantly, metaphysïcaJ
considerations - emlJ18tion (Aviœnnm) cr illumination (Suhrawardian), celestial iJltelligences and
souls (cr lights) as intermedi.-ies - md antbropologiœ1 considenaions - dispositioJIS. desire, spiritual
exerc:ises - must be discussed te provide answers to the question of the J18tUre of this lœowledge.
Once mOl"e the issue 01 i.ntelleetive eonjuncrion is raised. but wilh reg..ds ta prophets. theosopbE!l'S.

•
~~
saiJlts, and sa on, and the knowledge of divine - divine revelatioas, inspirations, visioJlS. or dreams.
~

At the he~ of the epistemological process that accouJllS for this type of knowledge lies the fscully
 TNTRODUcnON - 7

of imagination whicb. in this process, bas [wo func:tions. The firstfunction of imaginaion is negative,
i.e., il must not intervene in the prOCE!iS of reœption of metaphysical truths - it must fade away te
leave the intellect rule. This is particuJarly trUe of Aviœnna. In a number of passages, it is similarly
true of Suhrawardi' 5 COllCept of active imagination. thus paving the way for the ascetic life he
adVOeate5 and which is conducive to visionary experiences. ~{oreover, it is - as a faculLy unable to
access the universal- subordinate ta the rational soul, the Isfahbad-ligbt principle. The second role
of imagination is positive: it cao receive information that originates st the metapb}~caJlevel (mediated
by the light-intelleclive). It is essen.tially able to represent what the sou! perœives through its
experience of the light (Suhrawardi) - the inte11eetive (_~vicenna). In this process. notions of reflection
(i.e., the metaphor of the milTor) and imitation. become œ1llra1 to account for the process of reœption
by the faculty of imagination and its transfer ta the facu1ty of COD:UD04 SéY.!.W which is, in tum,
responsible for the sensible aetua1ization of these matters. This type of tnowledge requires mat these
divine signs be imetpreted.
The JIinth and 1ast chapter focuses on the JUItlIre and conditions of the soul and in the
aftedife - i.e.. its escbatoJogical fste. Bodily l"esU1TeCtÏon is the first issue to be addressed. For
AviceDJl&. a spiritual resulTeC%ioJl and not a bodiJ;y and physical re5UlTection is possible. But how is
sucb a spiritual I."esurreetion (Avicenna) or some sort of bodily resurreetion (Suhraw..di) co be

ex:p1aiJled in arder ta ICCOunt for divine retribution? Suhrawmtï's own stBtemenEs on. the possibitity
of some sort of bodily resurrection mises the issue of a possible metempsychosis. TransmigL"8tion of
the sout lise arises with the beliel in the pre- or post-existence of the soul, although both Avicenna
and Suhrawardi explicit1y negete such il possibility. They have, nonethe1ess, been. accused of having
"opted positions indicalive of the possibility of some tnIl1SJDigratiOll. This is especially true of
Suhrawardi, whose position is more ambiguous than the one of Avïcenna. Finally, the facutty of
imaginstion. is cenlnll for the philosophica1 explansrion bath authors previde of the sUI"YÎVal of
individuality as a condition for the advent of divine retributioll. Avicenna alloded to the survival of
the imagüuuive fac:u1tytbat Suhtaw.-di furtber develops. But can a fllCUlty initiaUy immAnent aetually
survive? To 8IlSwer tbis question. botb authors appeal. to the possible cosmologica1 relations that the
bum8Il souls can esablish. Suhrawardi, COfttrsyto Aviceaaa, proposes the existence of an independent
imaginai wodd. It is st this junetiOJl that cosmology an.d eschatology meet.

•
 CHAPTER ONE - 8

• ONE •

ISlAMIC PfllLOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLGGY

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
1
Islamic philosophical anthropologr owes much co the Greek tradltiOn. A bnef excursus iJlto
Greek philosophy will help introduce some of the central themes of Suhrawardï's philosophical
anthropology. These themes include the soul's nature, the seat of this faculty which imparts life.
motion ta the human body, as weil as will. intellection. the sours ongin.. its life before and aCtel" the
life of the body. and 50 on.

The debate about the sour s nature were shaped by two major Greek schools of thought
whicb remained influential for centuries. On the one hand, the Platonic tradition offered a radical
stance on transcendence; on the other hand. the ..<\ristote1ian lradition proposed an immanent position.
Pista (ca. 427-347 Bq distinguished betWeen the rational aad non-rational parts of the soul. the
former representing the ultimate reality of the soul and which could dispense altogether with the
senses. He assened that the rational part of the soul is immortal and offered proofs of its immortaJity
(in the rünlJt!lIS and the PAoedo ).2 In fact the rational soult as the regent faculty. is general1)~
lo~ated in the brain, as Hippocrates maintained. However. some texts name other organ.s as its seat
(e.g., the stomach or the liver).J Many other conceptions of the soul are present in Plato's works, e.g.,
that il is the source of morion and life, its rripartite division (exemplified by the metaphor of the
4
chariot rider and bis two horses), or its role in the weakness of the will.
These have found their wsy into Islamic philosophical anthropology, either in their pure
Plaronic form. or, more often. in conjunetion with acaetions of Galenic, Aristote1ian or Neoplatonic
traditions. Two other important Platonic doctrines find thar way into Suhrawardi' s works. Fit5t,
there is the doctrine of recolleetion (IUZ/UDDt:'sis ). This doctrine posits a prier existence of the soul

1 One of the farst contemporary studies of greek psyehologtcal studies was Snell, 71Je Ofsr::or--ez:y of

rJJe .A.fü.ld. Another important study is the one by Bremmer, 11Je EMJtyCirre.k CoACl.'JX ofiJJeSouJ.
. 2
Plalo. PIJ4lI!tIo, 70c-ne.

•
J Plata, TimeJlllS, 70d-e and 77b. The liver is said ta enable rea.son to project images on its smooth

reOeeting surface in cnler to be able ta exert an mfiuenœ on beast-like desires, d. Ibid., 71a; in addiaon, II
plays a role in divinalion through dreams and VlSlOJ1S, cf. Ibid., 71d.
4 Plata, Republic.437d-441c.
 CHAPTfR. ONE - 9

whicb. subsequently, becomes entrapped in the body and whose onl)P desire is to reJease itself from
its corporeaJ prison. This is the consequence of Suhrawaccfi's reintroduction of a doctrine of Platonic
Idess. albeit in a modified form. Avicenna does not seem to have adopted this doctrine. The c:econd
Platonic doctrine reintroduced by Suhrawardï is PIsto's conception of an intuitive vision which
associates knowing with the aet of seeing. This notion is crucial. to Suhrawardï' s epistemology.
Finally. Suhrawardï appesrs to understand the human soul as a.kin - to sorne extent - to the divine
soul. such that the journey to know itse1f amounts to a joumey to know the ulti.m~e reality.s

The other major tradition that offered original theories regarding a number of issues related
co the soul is the Aristotelian tradition. These theones are found in Aristotle' s (d. 322 BC) works,
essentially bis 00 cneSoui (the Pen·Psucoës. or the DeAmm~i of the Latins). This is perhaps the
single Most influential work for the development of later phiJosophical anthropoLogies. whether
Christian, Jewish, or [slamic. For instance, most major psychological treatises may be incLuded in the
eategory of De mzimn litenltUre, as mey consist for the most part of commentaries on chis work,
e.g., the commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias (fi. ca. 200 CE), Themistius (d. 388 CE), or
Avicenna. 6

lJ1 On die Sou1, Aristotle &dopts fi. more naturalist approacb to the study of the sou1. The
marked dualism ofPlato is replaced by a more organic relation betWeen body and sou1. Consequently,
Aristotle introduces a more monistic conception of the sou1. The body no longer entraps the 50U1.

Rather, the body serves the soul and becomes its instrUment, theit relationship being in agreement
with Aristotle' s hylomorphic conception of the world. The fate of the seul, as a form.. is now
ÏJltrinsically linked to the funetioning of the body. The soul becomes simultaneously ft perfection
7
( enlelecluil) of the body, while requiring the body in order to be instantiated. These conceptions
will find cheir way inta Avicenna's conception of the nature of the soul with sorne Neoplatonic
acaetions.

In bis bioJogiœ1 works, Aristotie argues in favor of the heart (the seat of heat) as the seat of
the soul, regent of the body.a Furthermore, in Aristotle's On rheSou1, important issues were raised
for wbich the Islamic PeripatEtic tradition was to oCfer some of its own solutions. Avicenna developed

5 PhilO, A-feno, 81c:; d. Idem, Pltilerlo which i.s on the sovl; d. Idem, R9'u61ic, 516.9-5181:1.
6 Guerrero, L.JI rt!CepadJ:1lirJ1h~ dei "Oe IUJrmJI .. de Arisrare/es: a1-KJod(Ylu-filnltu·.
7 Aristot1e, lm rheSou/, II, l, 412a26-30: cf. Ibid, 412all-12. Althougb the soul (mind) and body
~. are iategrated, there would IlOt seem. to he any room fOI'" a be1ief in persona! Unmortality.
B Aristot1e. Or:' plTtillus Jlnimu/ium, n, 7, 652al0-J 1 - The brain tempering the heat cf the beart, cf.

Ibid., 652b26-30.; cf. Idem., A-f&Upb.Jl»Cs. D,l, J0l3a4-S: cf. Ibid., Z, 10, lO3Sb2S-28.
 CHAPTFR ONE - 10

a classification of the inner senses thal tried to overcome the shol"tComings of Aristotle' s conception
and, thereupon, duferentiated betWeen different activities associated with the process of representation.'

AristotJe proposed a slightl}.. different classification of the different types of soul tL.m the
one found in PIao. He a1so depans from Plato' s theory of recollection and proposes a conception of
knowledge or of rational processes in tenns of an acquisition of knowledge chat is achieved through
a process of abstraction from an original st8te of rohu/~/rus~1 which Avicenna and Suhrawacdï will
deem insufficient. More importantly, it is the notion of intelJeet that is at the heart of Aristotle's
epistemology and which will be commented at length by both au th ors. Furtherm.ore. contrary to
Plata, Aristotle greatly emphasized the unity of the soul and the body. This. however. will not
prevent bis noetics from presenting signs of tensions evin.ced by the emerglng problem of the
number and the nature of the intellects. In short, the question that remained unanswered was the
nature of the human (active) intellect: wœ it immorta! or not, immanent or transcendent. Furthermore,
the perennial metaphorof light symbolizing intellection recurs inAristotle's works, where it becomes
the symbol of the active nature of the intellect.le Ail these dilferent issues were to shape laœr
Helleoistic. Christian, Jewish and Islamic noetics. l1
The fate of laler Hellenistic and post-Aristoteüan deve10pments will remain dependent, for
the most plll't, on the issues and problems raised and developed by these [WO major traditions
regarding the sou1. Numerous positions will be adopted that will vary according to the theoreticaJ
frame adopted: either Platonic or Aristotelian. This will become apparent with the presentfl.ion of
Avicel1Jla's positions which. although genenilly identified as Peripatetic. they share much with a
number of Platonic and Neoplatonic conceptions. The compromising attitude of Avicenna towards
both traditions will re-emerge in dte works of Suhrawardi, albeit bis greater inclination tow8l"ds the
PlatoJlÏc and Neoplatonic traditions.
A brief sketch of the Greek heritsge for conceptions and doctrines related to philosophicaJ
anthropology would Dot be complete without dte mention of Galen of Pergamus (c. 210 CE).
Altbough bis inlellectlla! legacy is mainly in the field of Medicine. he engaged in philosophical
debate (most of his philosophical worlcs, however, have perished).12 For instance. Galen's surviving

9 Aristotle, OnllJeSoaJ, m. 3,427al6-429a9.

10 Aristotic, On dJeSou/. III, 5, 430al0-25. The thoretical soul cao be inœrpretated as colWituting

•
the divine clement in man , or that God, or the fint principJe, is pure contemplation, cf. cf. Aristode, Md1amildJe-d/1
EJ:/Ilès, X, 7. 1177a12-1 l1BaB and Ibid., X. 8. 1178a9-1 J79a32; cf. Hamehn, LJidJècnetiel ïnrdlea, 25-8.
11
For a general background to Islamic noetics. a. Marcotte, Il Ibn Miskawayh's Concept, 10-63.
n

12 TieJeman, C'.liIIen, xix. His tracts On dJe Pamble and On the Firsr M'H~ (àgaiftSt Aristotle)
 CffAPTFR ONE - 11

works contain his extensive verbatim quotations from the otherwlSe lost On EDe Soul br the Stoic
Ch.,."sippus of Sol ai (c. 205 BC).I;j Gal en, 5 own attitude towacds metaphysicat questions was guided
14
by his own brand of empirici.sm. His ideas about the soul were often based on a syncretic perspectlve

which did nol constitute a precise and uniform system of thought - although they encompassed
Medical. physiological and psychological considerations. 1s
16
Nonethe1ess, Islamic philosophers did discuss a nomber of positions found in GaJen' s WOrks.

For instance. regarding the locus of the rational part of the soul. Galen, favorable to Plato's tripartite
division. opted for the bmin. white anger, associated with the irascible soul. resided in the hefrt;

desire. associated with the concupiscent soul, resided lJl the beUy (specified by Galen as the liver).1?

The problem yet ta be solved was the manner in which the other parts of the buman 50ul in the heart
and the liver couJd aetually communicate with the rational part in order to influence. as they

obviously do, volition. Others. sucb as the Peripatetics. Most of the Stoics and a number of physicians
16
located the main psychic functions in the heart. This was. in part. solved with Galen's theOl-Y of the
pneumatn or vital spirits that connected all the different facuJties of the soul, the laftier part being
the rational part of the soul and whid1 will be discussecl by Avicenna and Suhrawardi

-- .... NEOPLATONISM AND THE PSEUDEPCGRAPHICAL WORKS

Istamic philosophers greatly depended on lacer Hellenistic developments for their
understanding of ancient Greek philosophy. Neoplatonists like Plotinus and Proclus - heu-s ta the
Platonic tradition - had a great impact onlater interpretations. The Neoplatonists were. by and large,

Platonists, but they managed to introduce mystical elements - st times gnostic - into their philosophical

provoked reaetions, cf. Resc:ber and Ma'mura, AJer..mderofAplJrod.imls.

13 Tie1eman.. OJUeD, xv; cf. Jadaane. L üzIluence du S/"01àsme.
lel He refuses to take a stand on a number of issues: the soul's immortality and embodiement, the
nature of Gad (as opposed to bis existence), the etemity of the world. or whether the wood exi..sts in a void, cf.
Tiele.man., G.Ikm, xx, xx D. 22.
lS Siegel, (J;lfenanP-!J'dolqgy, 114.
16 Lyons," On dJe MIt~ of MIl8 lJ1 cAti Ibn Ric;iwin's EpItome," 181-171 [translation of Ga1en's

work]; cf. Idem, "The KLtiluu-.MlfsoCAli Ibn Ridwin," 65-71.

17 On the histoncal influence of GaJen, d. Temkin, t:rJ1e.m"sm.
10 Tieleman. Ciztlen xiii; Tielman wntes chat "Tbrough an exteDded process of syncretism. the
1

cultural ambiance of autbon like Plutardt, Galen. and others bad assinulaled many dements from various
sc:hools CO the point where they were no longer fdt to be dlst:J.nCtÎVe of these sc:bools. The proced'Dr'e of ferret1Jlg

• out 'Platonisms,' 'Stoicis.m.s" aJ1d 'AnsroœJi anisms, ln the pbi1osophic:aJ writings of the pcriod i.s barren
frCc:ise1y because it fails te take ECOunt of the UDplie:atiom of this process of synaetism," d. Ibid.• xvii-xviii.
Oalen had followed courses of aU four main scbooJs of phiJosophy, Platoniml, Aristotehamsm. Stoicism, and
Epicuteanism. cf. Ibid.. xviii n. 12.
 CffAPTER ONE - 12
19
specu1ations. These tater developments are net only crucial for the undet'Standing of the deve10pment
of philosophical ideas. e.g .. the introductlon of a tbeOl'Y of emanatiol1: they m-e cenlCa1 to a number of
AVlcenna's interpretations which Suhrawardï later deveJoped. One of the mO'it Îllterestulg studies on
the soul in the Neoplstonic period is Merlan's work in which an incisive analysis of the soul is
offered.zo

The single most important Neoplatonie work is perhaps the pseudo- 7JJealog;r of ArisrOlle
(translated by C Abd al-Mesï~ b. Nâ'imah al-J:limsï) for and revised by al-Kindi, during the reign of
al-Ma 'mün (r. 813-33 ).21 This work was larer artributed to Aristotle and, consequentJy, was responsible

for much of the Neoplatonic coloring of many lacer auempts at interpreting and understanding
..<\ristotJe's thought. 22 In light of eontem.pOl"81j" scholarship, it is now attributed to Porphyry (ca.
233-305) and bis fsngoge n and to Plotinus (205-270) and bis EnDends (parts IV, V. VI).24

Porphyry's authorship of the Arabie paraphrase of the Enoe~lds has, however, been contested on the

grounds that it contradiets bis views in ether works. Uncontestably, tbis work had a gre~ impact on
2S

Avicenna who commented it. 26

A mention must also be made of Proclus' Liber de ÛiusLs, widely commented on in the

Christian Middle Ages and similarly falsely attributed to AristotJe. It consists of a shol'tet version of
Proclus' Elemenrsof 71Jt.-;.oIor~7 and draws greatly from Plotinus' EAnœds.Zll Some works dealing
with issues usually related ta the sou! such as vision or dream, have also been falsely attributed ta

19 Anawati.. "Le néo-platonisme," 155-221.

3j Merlan, ~fonopsfChJSm; cf. Idem.. "GreekPhtlosohy," 14-132.
21 FathfY, Hisroty, 32; cf. Ibn al-Nadï.m., 71Je "F.iNisr" ofaJ-Nadfm, Il. 606; cf. Badawï, ;I/-/J.fldhu/
J1/- 'Aqff,YllÔ Il1-AOiï.f'iinfym. SB; cf. Zimmerman, "The Origins," 112. ~or the Arabie œn, cf. pseudo- 77Jeo/qur
ofAristode, 1-164.
Z2 It seems, according 10 N~ (in ms English LDtroduc;tion) that this erroneous attribution ocCUtted
sometime alter al-Kindï, cf. PIOtlDU5. Udni/iïp,Yü [Ermt:Wds "77JeoIqc: .. 77Je H-ant ofAODr.ül] (ed. Ashtiyanï).
6; cf. Zimmer.man. "Tbe OrigiJ:Ls," 213.
Z3 Jolivet, L 'iJudletT ~lan Kmm 74 n.2; cf. Peters. AnSt'cde and dle An/lis, 43; cf. W alzer ,
1

.. Fmrun)'iis," 949b; d. Endress, fl'odusllnlbus, 68-70.

:lA Fatbry, A HIsrœy of J"s/Jtmrc ~af'ophy, 32; d. F. W. Zimmennan, "The Origins of the
So-called ZWo/'iQ"of Aris1otle," 134; cf. K.rallS, "Plotin chez les arabes,", 263-95.
25 D' Ancona Cema, "Pocphyry." 47-88.
26 Avicenna, S1mr.h, 35-14; cf. trans. of a number of passages in Vajda, "Les notes d'Aviœnne,"
3045---406.
7:1 Walzer," BtJrlI91us," IJ39b; d. Pinès, "Une version arabe," 201.
3:l Ibn al-Nadim, 17Ie rrFiûisr" oF.I1-NiJdfm, vol. 2, 607; cf. Taylor, "The K~"fm.5~fJl/1f/itl-KlnIJ'T,"

37-52. FŒ' the Arabic text, cf. Badawï. ed., AniÏ!ii~)';lh;1/- lf,fubdlldJJIh mms JII- Mm 1-33. FOl" the English
1

1nnS., d. Brand. 7?Je Book of Qnrses, 13.

 CHAPTER ONE - 13

•
Aristotle (e.g.. the pseudo-Aristotelian texts of Gregorios Thaumaturgos). These have survived along
with other Arabic texts dealing with similar issues.'z"iI

THE ISlAMIC MILIEU

Articolate philosophical speculation similar to what had previously been developed by the
Greek and Hellenistic traditions simply did not erist at the time of the nascent Muslim com munity,
e.g.. the tribal sOClety of Arabia. It has been argued that the absence of a distinctively indigenous
philosophical tradition was due 10 the pre-[slantie ronditions of the Arab community as weU as to a
number of socio-historical factors partîcular to the rapidly expanding ~Iuslim society.:})

The situation. however, ehanged rapidly. The existence of a Christian commuait}" and the
thriving intellectual activities of its schoJars st the heart of an in.creasingly expanding Muslim empire
was of great importance. Originally, it was these Christian seholars who, as translators , were responsible
for introducing new philosophical. texts, issues and problems. Their role, however, was not solely
technical. Ùl faet, they made use of phiJosophical arguments to defend their own faith agaï.n.st
Muslim critics, who, in tum, l"8pidly leam.ed to be apologists themselves Hence, apologetic and
polemical debates and works must have been aJ10ther possible vector of contact betWeen ancient
philosophica1 ideas and the Islamic tradition.

The main Christian œnters were the School of AJexandna and the School of Barran, and the
Nestorian (Iranian) School of Jundïshiipür. l:Iarriin and other Syrian œnters were essentially the first
places where Greek thought fJorished, before the ad vent of Islam_31 These were centers that fosœred
much interaction betWeen Greek and Hellenistic ideas and the burgeoning IsIamic culture. ln those
Christian circ1es, the transmission of ancient knowledge into Arabie was achieved by way of a Syriac
interlude in the translation movement (from the Greek).3Z There is no doubt that the ~evelopment of

29 Gatje, St-udieJJ. This work, in addition te) an iJUroduetion on the Greek background of Aristotelian

psychology and the Arabie tl"llnSlatlons of Aristotle' 5 Ch dJ~ Sou/ • contains the texts and the German
tnnslati.ons of Gregorios' s t'Wo ver510ns (95-113, 1104-129), a pseudo-Anstotelian text on. Dreams (130-135), a
doxographyof Galen on Dreams (130-5), and a text of Alexander of Aphroc:hsias on Sight (140-63).
30 Nasr, 'l1m!eftfU51im~, 1-3.
31 Peœrs, Anstode mld die ArJlJs, 35-41; along with tbe Iranian rJ:IÙLeu, cf. IbId., 58-68 and the
medical clrcJes, cf. [bid., 163-5. The Sabaea.as of f:larrin, who oomidered tbemsetves the esoteric foUowers of
the Prophet Idns or Hermes, were a1so to iDtcoduœ Hermetic ideas into Islam, d. Corbin, Msrmn-, 041-2,

•
183-7; cf. Tardieu, -Simiens coramques et c$il)leJ1S» de J:farran," 1-44.
32 Peters, An"srr:xdc>s AraDW'; d. Madkour, L 'QyJUIDn d'An".srr:Jh!; cf. Lyons, ed., An ArJ!Jiç
TnmsfJllr"an of llIemisdus; cf. Idem, "An Arabie Translaion:' 426-35. See also the numerous editions of
Badawï.
 CfiAPTER ONE - L4

an IsJamic Peripatetic philosopbicaJ tradition to which A vicenna belonged couJd not have come to
life witbout tbe inrcoduction of a number of very important works from tbe Greek and Helienistic
traditions - works like Aristotle's On EDe Sou/ and its subsequent and numerous commentaries
which were crucial to the development of Islamic philosophical anthropology.

A vay good survey of the process of transmission is found in Petecs' .,..Jnsrode tmd die .4nJbs
, which de;aibes the transmission of the Aristotelian corpus as wel1 as a numb er of other philosophical
33
traditions. As Peters shows, the [sJamic philosophical tradItion owes a great deal to the efforts of

Is~iiq b. l:Iunayn for bis translation of important philosophical Greek wcrks, including Aristotle' s OD
me $oul and his On me SeDses- ond Senslibon. 34 and the works of Galen. A number of commentaries
on AristotJe' s On liIeSouJ were aIso transJated. 35 Is4iiq aIso produced abridged works and systematic
textbooks out of the GaJenic corpus, wbich had almost all been transh~ed by the end of the 9th

century and used br Muslim physicians.3î

This brief sketch of Greek and HeUenistic traditions indlcates the Înaeasîngly comple..x
philosophical heritage that helped to shape [slamic pbilosophicaJ tradition. To brand Islamic philosophy
a9 ecJectic and unable [() distinguish amongst the different Greek schoo1s is a hasty judgment whicb
does a disservice to IsJamic philosophy as ft whole. Hellenistic developments are, for the most part,
responsible for the misinterpretation of Aristotle and Plato - wbether in the form of commentaries of
Aristotle's warks (Alexander of Aphrodisias cr Themistius), or in the form. of original works (the
eclectici.sm of post-Aristotelian thinkers such as Galen). Tbe heritage of Plato and Aristotle was,
therefore,greatlyshapedbytheintelleauallegacytheygeneraœd. TheseJaœrHellenisticdevelopments
greatly der:ermined the fate of Islamic philosopby as a wbole.
Infsa, the Aristote1ian-Platonicversus Neoplatonic division remained strong. Distinct western
and ellSten1 traditions developed within Islamic philosophy. On the one hand. there was an Aristotelian
tradition that culminated in a revivai of Aristotelianism with the works of AVetToes (Ibn Rushd); on

3J For the Plawnie: lradition, cf. Peters, An"srodeiIDd dJe Arabs, 168-74; for the Bi!:UJÏyah movement,
cf. Ibid., 174-83; and fer the Peripatetics of Baghdad, cf. Ibid., 160-3.
)4 Peters, AnsbXI!'/es Ambus 140-5. It wu Abü Bisbr Mata b. Yünüs, a physu:ian, who wrote a
c:ommenray on ie; it al50 referred ta the PJ!IrwIlVaturJli." cf. Badawï, LI lr-mmzissioD , 80- L.
3S f:lunayn, the fadler of rsl,liiq, cranslated Aristotle's On the Soal into Syriae:, whiLe the first
complete cransJatlon into Arabie: wu done by Isbic[ b.l:iunayn, cf. Ibn aL-Nadim, 77Je 'rmn'st'wofa.l-NiIÔ.mr,
voL. il 605. For the Arabie edition. c:f. AristotJe, f i ;tl-N~, ed. •A. Badawi; d. Peters, AnStr:Jl'eies Anlbus,

•
1

40-5. The auribution of th:is cramJatlon to IsJ:1arl b. I:lunayn is que5tionable, cf. f:(asan, "Notes on the Edition,"
57- n; cf. An"srOla'es' De Jl/Zim1l.' eine Fl'r/aœoe SJ'JU4Iutik~PHntp/JnIse.iD anloiscIJer andper.ricIJc:'r VlJerkefervD,!l"
1ed. R. Amzen..
3IS Strohmaier, "Galen. in Arabie," 188.
 CHAPTER ONE - 15

•
the other h8l1d. an eastern Islamic philosophicat tnldition with its distinctively N eoplatonic ha11mark
thal was perpetuated by Avicenna and. even more so bySuhrawardï and bis successo~.The Neopl~onic
influence was felt within the circles as diverse as the Ismiicili tradition and the I.k.hwin aJ-$afie.
Neoplalonists in their own right.3'7

The question that remains ta be answered is the foUowing: What. then. is Penpatetic phiJosophy
and the philosophical anthropology it proposes? Sezgin has listed under the heading of psychology st
least fifty five German articles and books thS[ dea1 specifically' with one issue or another related to
the soul in Islamdom (along with reviews of a number of other works) 38 A numbe- of these works
discuss Perip.etic Vlews.

The philosoplucal anthropology proposed by the Perip8tetics finds its origins in the combïnatlon
of a number of factors. First, there is the lus ton cal devel.opments thst imparted a new impetus ta the

Aristotelian corpus, and, more impottantly for the purpose of this work, with the translation of
Aristotle' 5 On me Soul.
In addition, there is the whole post-Aristotelian corpus associated with this particular work
and the question of the soul, e.g., the tater Neoplatonic commentaries, but aIso Galen's medico-
physiological doctrines. Furthermore, the receptioll of the Greek heritage was shaped by the emergence
of a Neoplato11ic tradition, e.g., Plotinus' and Proclus' works. Finally, the importance of the tension
tbat arase between the two major traditions - Aristoœ1ianism and Platonism - with the Arabie
pseudepigraphica1 Neoplatonic works attributed to Aristotle (the pseudo- TIJ«:J/ogy of An'srork )
should not be underestimated. 39

Consequent1.y, Islamic Peripatetic doctrines adopted varying attitudes towards Aristatelian

doctrines, a phenomenon llot so different from the Hellenistic Peripatetïc tradition, for instance,
sorne (like Albinus) incorporated unportant Aristotelian doctrines in thei.r thought~ while others (like
Atticus) ïncorporated more Stoic and Platonic elern.ents. This seems ta have aiso been the case for
Philo of Alexandria.~ In. the Islamic context. Qu~lâ b. Liiqii and al-Kindï integmted a number of

on Necton, A-fllslim .Nr:opJ;trOlZisa; cf. Walker, éJIr(P' PJJilosoplliad SIu:ism • xii, 27-28; on the human
soul, d. Marquet, uplnlosophiedes 1J!W1Ïn ;d-~ 227-72, and on reincarnation and reSlKTec:tion, cf. ibId.,
t

383..0403; d. De Smet, .L4I QUJëtude œ-I mreUer:r.

38 Se7gUl, ed., Brl1oqp7lplue der LJ~cIr~e.JrAntbislié undIs13mku.odt!. vol. 5 (1991). 170-5,
175-7.
39 Rosentbal, •Al-Shayk.h al-Yüninî," 42-66.
4J BlumeDthal, P/otJDus'.PsyrhO/qgy. 134, 134n.2; austryn, Pltilo.
 CHAPTFR ONE - 16

elements from the Galenic tradition. 41

Caution should. however. be execcised in the attribution of an epithet such as Peripatettcs

("",,; r '< ) ta Islamic thinkers. The notion of a Peripaletic scheol in Islamdom embraces a number
of philosophica1 doctrines inteoduœd with Neoplalonism along Aristotelianism. For instance. af-raribï
and Avicenna incorporated within theil" persona! syntheses a Neoplatonic metaphysics. e.g., an
emanlltionist scheme,42 as weil as physiological and psychologica1 ldeas borrowed from Galen -
especially the distinction between the spirit (c..JJ) and the soul (~) and the notion of vital spirits.
i.e.. the pneuml//"o.aJ

Nourished by the Aristotelian corpus, Penpatetic phiJosophy. nonetheless. whether Hellenistic

4a
or Isiamic departed from the former by adopting Platenic or Neoplatonic doctrines. This is already
true of the fL1"St commentators of Aristotle. e.g., Alexander of Aphrodisias. Furthermore. the closing
of the School of Alexandria (529) led ta the introduction of philosophy at the Siisinid courts (the
court of Khusrü) which lncluded Ari~oteJianism, Platonism as well as Stoicism, Pythsgorism and
Neoplato1lÏsm.45

The intelleetual and spiritual horizons of the Islamic milieu by nature moootheistic. rather
man monistic, he1ped shape !slamic PeripatEtic thought. 46
Cesmologica1 conceptions were influenced
by creationism, while eschatological conceptions were elaborsted to account for the re1igiousty
revea1ed texts. Islamic phiJosophers were primarily concemed with integrating tbis religious data
witb a view ta elaborating their own philosophicaJ systems.

Moreover, while modem schelarship would consider someone like A verrees as a Peripatetic
parerœUence,47 the Peripatetics whom Suhrawa-di had in mind in his numerous sttacks against that

41 Amid, &s;u" sur.lil ps.J?dtaLo.Pe dA ~"e:'emJ~ , 14, 22-23; cf. Walzer, -L'éveil de la pluJosophie

islamiClue," 11-3.
4Z Calverley, "Doarines of the Soul," 257.
43 Sam.e Stotc e1ements cm alse be found in the worts of the theologians who wcre influenced by the

cultural centers cJose to the Christians, and through a Vlriety of sources such as the c:om.mentalors of Aristotlc' s
works, c.g., Alexander of Apbrodisias and the transl~om of the Greek. physiCla&lS such as Galen., Hypoaales,
and the school of the pllewnatics (rii/liïJt[rrïn), Mlskawayh' s 1ranS1alien. of the Lillhz Q;4l1.rs (TJ1f:Ju.lu of
Cebes) CIl" same of the moral writiDgs of aJ.-IGn.dï, cf. Jaadane, L 'iLt/lUI!na! du Sœu:rsme, 45; cf. Amine "Le
stoletsme," 90-1,81-5.
401 Jolivet, "The Development ofPbilosoplucal Thovght," 37-68; cf. Ivry, ·'An Evaluation.,'· 135-45.
45 Badawï, ADiJ!;ïn mdilM- ~b.

•
46 AJthougb some authors - like Ibn •Arabï and the proponents of a lItDty of existence (,J~.,J1 a~",)
- cm be quite momstlc.
47 Averroes' critu:ism is directed toward bath al-Ghazali and Avicenna' 5 Plaronising Peripateticism,

cf. Urvoy, /lJnRuslld(AfIl'ITOt'S) ; d. Arnaldez, "Ibn Rushd," EL':' vol. 3 (1971), 909b-920a.
 CHAPTER ONE - 17

schoo1 was none other than Avicenna. Avicenna' 5 philosophical heritsge classifies him as a proponent
of Peripatetic phi1osoph}~ (this is how he is usually considered by !s1amic philosophers). akhough
sum a general eategorizaion of his work does not account for the numerous Neoplatonic influences
th. be incorporates.

Suhrawardï. on the ether hand. concaves bis own thought. especia11y after bis dream-vision
of Aristotle, to be di5tÏJ1cl from tbat of the Peripatetics, i.e., distinct from a number of their doctrines
in. philosophical 8I1thropology. especially their conception of knowledge.
ln the development of an Islamic philosophicaJ. tradition. the Queanic tradition occupies a
place of choice. The Qur'iînic ",iew of the human soul had an. impact on inteliectuaI debates. giving
rise ta the theological debates regarding its nature and life. It aIso influenced most philosophical
works. There seems titde doubts that philosophers sinœre1y tried to incorporate a Qur'wc conception
of man, soul, aftedife, etc. Whether or not chis was successfully achieved, the rehrion between
philosophicand Qur'inictraditionswas 81beststrained. This relationshipis exemplified byal-Ghaziili's
aiticism of philosophy in his /Acoherenœ ofdJe PlJUosophtrS , i.e., philosophicat stances taken by
al-Firiibï and Avice.ana. Nevertheless, the distinctive characteristic of Is1amic philosophy may be
truJy undEl'Stood only Ol1ce the religious elements are all in.tegrated within their respective philosophical
systems.

TheQur'inisessentiallyare1igiousteKt:God'srevelatioDtohumankiJld.ltisnotaphiJosophical
treatise, although it wu influential in shaping not only notions about the soul and the spirit, but aiso
the nature of theological investigations into the nature of the SOU1::18 More man a century after the
revelation, theological or philosophical investigations or speculations on the nature of the soul had
not yet flourished. Furtbermore, the Quriinic tradition did Dot offer systematic views on such notions
as the spirit (C'"'..) or the soul ~ ).49 Theologians, on the other hand, adopted Qur'iinic notions on
r
the soul, defining the spirit (C,",..), more or less, in terms of subtle body (~ ~), although their
views varied from a re1ative1y materialist view ta extreme spiritualist interpretations that helped to
foster the creation of an. Islamic philosophy often described as resolutely theistic.5()

48 The Qlru stales that, -They put questions to you about the Spirit. Say: 'the Spirit is al my Lord' s
commando Little indeed is the knowledge vouchsafed ta yeu' ," Q., 17: 85.
<9 CalverJey, -Doc:1rines of the Soul," 2504-264; d. Macdonald, "The Deve10pment of the Idea of

Spirit in Islam," 307-51.

!LI De Boer, -Soul (Mus1im.)," 746a-747a, esp. 745b-746a; cf. Walzer, -L'éveil de la philosophie
islamique;" d. Macdoaald, "The Development of the ldea of Spirit in Wam," 317.
 CHAPTER ONE - 18

The MuCtazilites. the first rationalist theologians. 51 with individuals like al- CAllai oral-N8:?~iim.
contributed ta tbese debates by discusSÏ1lg sensation. perœption, imagination, pleasure and pain. as
weJ1 as issues related to the will. to freedom. or to the nature of the soul ~ For instance. pLc.AlLd!
(MuJ;aam.m.ad b. al-Hudhayl) seems to have believed chat the soul was distinct from the spirit. that the
spirit was distinct and different from life. and that liCe was an accident like the five senses. while
5J
reason wœ a distinct faculty altogether capable of grasping the general and the abstnlet.

Al-N~~iim (Abü Is1)aq Ibriihîm b. Sayyar) , on the other hand, believed the sool to be the
living part of a human being thal accounted for life. while the spirit, a subtle matenal substance 1

penetnlted ail parts of the body and was a mere insteumentfor the soul. It 15 with the MuCtazilites that
probably OCCUlTed the first linking of the soul with the body as a condition of its rewards and
punishments in. the aftedife.54

Theologians (ù-' .IC;-. • )55 also discussed issues pettaining to philosophical anthropology,
e.g., Abu al-l:Iasanal-Ashcari (d. 324/935) and later expounded by such men as Abü Bakr al-Biiqillinï
(d. 1013).56 They rapidly spread throughout the different centers of learnïng that were esrablished to
teach Islamic lenels and doctrines. But with the development of systematic theology arase issues chat
pertained specifically to the soul, e.g., ta the distinction betWeen the soul and the spirit or to the
nature - materia! or spiritual - of the sou1.57

The burgeoning intelleetual life in Islam did not, st first, elicit much interest in the question
of the soul ~I r-l& ). The tnUl51ation of aIder works recovered mostly scientrlic works in
58
medicine, mathematics, optics, and so On.. The emergence of wh. we label here philosophica1
8I1thropology appe8l'5 ta have occulTed only during the 3rd 1 9th century, when. Aristotle's On die
Sem had been translated dong with its commentaries. These became the foundatiOJ1S of most leter

51 Fakhry. "The Mu'tamite View of Man," 107-121; cf. Nader, Ir sy.sA:me p1lilosopmiful;'" ~
.Atfu'bIzùll; cf. M~ud, u~/c.Pe; cf. Frank, -Severa! Fundamenta1 As su mptions," 5-18.; cf. Bemal'd,
-La notioJl de 'dm ,n s.I. 36 (l9n): 23-45 and 37 (1973): 27-56.
52 Bad Inri, HDrairt-, vol. t, 54-99. TWi, Contnbllt:ion, 65-77. For the historica1 conte:n of the
deveJopmeJlt of theology. d. Gardet and .A.aaw-=ï, foh1:Jo'ua'iao, 21-93 and 101-124; d. Dhanani, 7DePl{psiaU
17J«JtyofKiWIm.
53 Tlili, COlI/nDUI10D, 65-66.
54 Nader, I.e sy:sremepJmo.sop.!Dvue c:ks' mu 'elzi/;" 2B 1.
~ ~
ArnaIdez, -Ibn Rushd, .. E I.- (1971), vol 3,909b-920a.

-. ~ Na.sr, ~~fl/SJrm SlIJfes, 52. Cf. WotfsOJl, 71Je P.lJiJosop/!P oflite KalJim .
'!il For a general. OVer'V1eW of the issues related ta
al-Jawziyah, KlnD III-RlÏ/J.
58
the soul in theologica1 cirdes, cf. Ibn Qayyi.m

Badawi, LJll:nI4m1issioJ2; cf. Kraus, -Plotin chez les arabes," 263-295.

 CHAPTFR. ONE - 19

•
!slamie philosophica1 developments and. by the same token. of most works in philosophical
anthropolog}"r. It is primariIy. but not solel}'. ta this tradition tbat Avicenne. and Suhrawardï beloa.g.

Muslim and Cbristian philosophers writing in Arabie elaborated eomplex doctrines and
S9
systems to account for the nature and funetioas of the sou1.
Al-KUldï (d. 866). geaera1ly considered the father of Islamie philosophy. Wa'5 the first ta
have introduced Neoplatonie doarines of the soul inro what are. perhaps, the esrliest works of
Arabie and Islamic philosophy. He may have done this after revising ~Abd al-Masû:l al-Nitimah's
translation of the pseudo- 77te%ff oi'Ansrodt!.

Al-Kindï's interest in philosophical anthropology is best illustrated by at least [WO works on

the subject that have been ascribed te him: ~esoftu-KrodfoL1r.lJeSoul A ConaseSummmy of
6JJ
Aristotle' 5 On dJeSoul. Like Thiibit b. Qurrah (d. 90 1), al-Kindï wrote treatises based on N eoplatonic
coneeptions.61 For instance, he adopted a three-fold division of the human soul (vegetative, animal,
and rational), the highest being the rational soul. His treatment of the rational part of the soul
(noetics) bas a1ready been studied by Jolivet in a remarkable work. 62 What is here important is the

faet that the emergence of philosophica1 speculations on the soul eoincided with the first anempts, in
the Islamic world, at philosophising in the Greek sense of the tenn. It is. therefore, not surprising that
the soul became a subject of philosophieal enquiry in the warks of Christian Qu~ b. Lüqii, Tbiibit b.
Qurrah, and the M uslim al- Kindï.

Qu;aça b. Lüqii (d. ca. 912). a contemponuy of aJ-Kindî, a physician and a mathematician,

was one of the fl1"5t te write a psyeho-physiologicaJ. tr'estise on the difference between the spirit and
the soul, a work that owes mueh to Stoie tradition and the works of Galen. In this work, he identifies
a purely physiologieal aspect of the spirit, which he considered a subtle body circul8ting throughout
the body. through the veins and the arteries. It 15 responsible for sensation and motion. Although the
heart contains more blood in the right ca.vity, the left cavity contains more spirit, which it aoquires
through the pulmonsry artery and then transmits ta the whole body.53

59
Monnot, "La place de l' homme," 86-9-4.
fi) al-Kindi:, Jd-Ç18wIû";t/-Kinm/iII1-Nm. Mu.éhl4t.sar "7ïft"z Ù1 Idem, llisiUaraJ-Kintff, ed. M. Abii
R1r;tab (CalI'O , 1950), vol. ). 2n-81; mentioned in T1ili, ContnOlH.iOD, 89-149.
61 Peten, AnSr«Iennc:lrlJeAntbs. 169.
62 Jolivet, L J~seJaDKindi.

• 63 Louis Cheikho, Les -RH'UIl/S m-Jtre:s çlJnitrens en ,iVJlm (Beirut-Rama, 1983), 201-4; cf. J. W .
Livings1Dn, .~ lbn Liiqii's Psycho-physiological Trealise On the Differenœ between the Seul and the
5prit (.fj:'j-F-v bi!n:I JlI-Mtfs J1J"I-.I-Ru/l)," s.M. 2 (1981): 53-77; cf. Qustii b. Luqa, KifiïlJ uI-Fltnj bayn
a/-Rü,fl ,." JII-NIIfs ed. Louis Cbeü.ho, ln N-~fJIS!JntT (Beirut) 14 (1909) and reedued 111 Tnu"n!s incidi/"s
1
 CHAPTER ONE - 20

Qu~Çi b. Lüqi also reviews a n.umber of definitioJ1S on the soul that are found in the works of
Plata, Aristotle, Theophrastu5. Galen. and Hypocratus. He refutes the materialistic interpretatïon of
the soul byarguing tbat the qualities of the sou1 are not objects of the senses and that. therefore. they
must constitute something other than the body and the bodily. He goes on [0 distinguish between the
spirit and the soul, the latter being an immaterial and impenshable substance separated from the
body 64 The former is bodily. morta! and perishable, serving as an mtermediary entity between the
soul and the body.oS These conceptions will recur throughout the history of Islamic philosophical
anthropology.

Al-Farabi (d. 950), the .. second master," was greatly influenced br the Aristote1ian school of
Baghdad and the Alexandrian ideas that flourished in the lOth œntury in this intellectual capital.66
He was familiar with Aristotle' s On dieSou1, wl1ich he mentions in ms Lerrer on the LnreUecr .67

Following the first master, he conceives of the souL as the first perfection ( enre.l~1LJ) of a
natural body and the form. of a materia! body. The 50ul, nonetheless, remains a simple and spiritual
substance whose nature is completely distinct from the nature of the body. He does not, however,
adcpt Plato's notion of an eternal soul, which is contt"'Bry ta Islamic teachings. Like Aristotle, he
p-oposes a hierarchical arder of faœllies - {rom the senses to the intellect - which will be furtber
deve10ped by Avicenna and slightly modified by Suhrawardï's criticism of the latter's five-foid
division of the inner senses. Al-Firibi's conception of knowledge will inciude intelJectuaJ.
contemplation and prophetie visions. where the active intelligence plays a great role.lie Similar views
will find cheir way into Avicenna's own reformuIation of intellectual contemplation and prophetic
visions.

dmciens philosophes Llrolhes, musulmJU1S" « dJn:lieos, ed. L. M'lour, L. Cheikho, et G. Eddé avec des
traduaions de rraités grecs d'Aristote, de Platon et de Pytbagoce par [shat ibn Honein, pubhés dans la revue
aJ-J,fildJnq par les péres L. Malouf, C. Eddé et L CbeiJcho (Fran.kfurt: MuJerva. 1974); mentloned in TWi,
COI1tnbmiOD, 78-88. It was also edlted in Ibn SinJi ileSl'lLlU7-.
601 The jmmatenaIity of the soul is proposed by the pseudo- 71reologr orAnsrode, 45.1-9.14.
6S Tlili, Conln"bulioD, 78-80.
66 Rescher, Af-Finitn; cf. TWi, Cootnbur:ion, 150-205. One of bis teachers Ut philosohpy was
Y\ilIanni Ibn Kailin., a Christian who belonged ta the Alexandrian 5chool of plnlosophy, and who instructed
JWn in B.bdad mer 940. al-rarii:Ji was aisc close to Abu Bisl1r Mana Yüois (d. 940), one of the great figures
of Chri.stï.an Peripatetic sr=hool that Oorished in Baghdad, cf. Arnaldez, "L'histoire de la pensée," 117-68; cf.
Walzer, A/-fiïnmfsPerfecr ~4e.

•
67 al-~iriibï, .IlJSiiJnIJ fi JU- ~VJ, 15; for an English trans., cf. Hyman, .. Alfarabi: The Letter Cone:erning

the Intellect," 215-6; cf. Badawi. Histo.t1l!, vol. 2,549-50. A French translaioD (based on the I.atin and Arabie:
texts) is being prepared by Professor-s Herman Landolt and Fabienne Pircnnet.
6e Rahman, Prop1Jet:;yin IsIJlD1; cf. Nœoa, A/-Rïn"""bilUld HIs SdJool, 31-54.
 CHAPTER ONE - 21

Al-F8riibï is not. however. a full-fledged Aristotelian. He departs from Aristotle. for instance.
with respect to the role he attributes ta the imaginative faculty6~ Latet" thinkers. up ta Mulla ~adri
and Sabzavirï. incJuding Avicenna and Suhrawardi. will debate this faculty st length - which fsculty
is the hesrt of the human soul' s ability to represent images and to concave of abstract forms. This
fscull,... becomes centraI to the elaboration of a prophetie epislem.ology, in the works of both A vicenna
and Suhrawardi

A general evaluation of al-Füriibi's philosophical thought must conclude that the [wo major
Greek traditions (Aristotelian and Platonic) coexist side by sîde. e.g., in Ine Hnrm~yofli1eOpimOns
of'die Tff-·o Sqges.7O Al-Farabi' s understtUldin.g of ancient philosophy or CO the Islamic tradttion is

not unusual. In. faet. similar syncretic views had a1ready been held by Galen..71
Philosophical amhropology served another important purpose. It provided the theoretical and
philosophical foundaions of ethica1 disoourse and specolation 72 Central ta most ethicaJ treatises is
the question of the soul, ils conditions of perfectibility, its passions, weaknesses. and diseases. Ibn
Miskawayh (d. 1030), with bis works on elhics, illusttates weil the extensive use of the usage of the
notion of the soul in ethical treatises.7J He was not, however, the first to do 50. The Christian Ya.f:Iya
b. CAdi bad written an. earlier work on the Relinemeor ofCÔlU7Lâtr whicb Ibn Miskawayh cakes as
amodel?'

Neoplatonic conceptions of the soul found their way i.nto Ibn Mistawayh' 5 Refinemenr of
CnlUliaer7S and bis A-:linor SUcces's ,76 in particular, the belief in the duality of soul and body. The
Aristote1ian notion of the "mean" forms part of Ibn Miskawayb's notion of equilibrium (Jf~1 ) of
the humours, which is composed of the temperaments (~f,,;..o ). Furthermore, Mi5kawayh discusses

tR Walzero, "aJ-rariiJï's Tbeory," 206-219. A reevaluation of Walzer's and Rahman's contribution is

~oposed in Daiber, "Prophetie und Ethik," 7.l9-753.
'li:) al-F3ribï, OeUIlnlitéspIJiJosophr~ues.
71 Galen, Three Trt'!lIrises DA dieNuruœ aISaim~.
72 De Fouchécour. Afonllill.
7:3 Fakhry, Edn"atl Tltr!on"es in klJlC1; cf. Clzzat, A-JisblWl!rfJ. F3lslÛJltrJlJu Id-Akh/-.iytp;I/J
7~ Ibn Adï, TJI1JdJtlb 111-AkltliïrJ (Tnltté d'dinljue ).
C

7S Fathry, "The Platonism of Mlslcawayh," 40-57.

76 The second chapter of bis ,ft-finCJr Suct:%"S:S deals excJUSlvely with the soul, ",.hile the tlurd chapter

•
pertain.s &0 propbecy, d. Ibn MlSkawayh, a/-Fdwr ;I/-A,s',j'I1ir. ed. Sii1i~ ·Udaymab with French uaJ1S. by Roger
Ama1dez; cf. Idem, .. a/-FlIwz ilI-~Imr," EngL 1ranS. Sweetman in Idem. fsf.am atf Cltn:mz l1Jeol~, vol. l,
pt. 1,84-185; cf. Idem, "Maqalah ... fi al-Nafs wa al_eAqI," in Arltoun, ed., "Deux épitl'es de M.ïstawayh,"
B.Ea 17(1961-62): 20-65 (Arabie numbering, 10-55); cf. [dem, "Maq,iJah li-l-Ustidh Abu eAli Miskawayh,"
in Badawï, ed., OirJsiït,57-97.
 CHAPTER ONE - 22

the imaginative faculty and its epistemic role and, tïrst and foremost. the prophetic episreme - as
7ï
do Avicenna and Suhrawardi These and many more issues related to philosopmcal attthropology
discussed br Ibn Miskawayh will find their way mto the works of later ethical works. e.g.. in those
of al-Gbazili. 7B

AU these precursors to Avicenna and Suhrawardï bOlTowed ideas, concepts. doctrines, and
arguments from what was an increasingly important HeJlenistic philosophica1 heritage. At times,
Islamic philosophers opted for an Aristote1ian conception of the soul. At other tintes, they opted for a
more NeopJatonic conception. Most often. however. they generally integrated within their own
philosophical systems a mixture of e1ements borrowed from both traditions. Both Aristotelianism
and Neopl81onism - the [wo major CUlTents - were thus cenlral te the deveJopment of an Islamic

philosophica1 anthropology.

The philosophers who made use of the anaI)'tÏcaJ taols, the concepts and the methods of
HeJ1enistic philosophers were essentially the proponents of Peripatetic philosophy. al-Kindï uS"'.Jally
being considered the first Islamic Periparetic philosopher. The term Peripatetic, however, ÏJlcluded a
widespectnJm of philosophical ideas. Nonetbeless, ita1ways reflected theimportance of the Aristotelian
substratum of Islamic Peripatetic philosophy (~~ ). It was the incorporated, integrated, yet
CX>lTUpted eJements of Aristotelisnism lhat defUled one' 5 affiliation with the Islsmic Peripaetic
movement.

This poses certain difficu1ties, since the pseudepigraphical works attributed to Aristotle had
become part of the Islamic Aristotelian tradition. There seems to be no eutspoken Aristotelian
tradition, save Averroes' (d. 1198) effort to retum ta the basic teachings of Anstotle. For instance. in
Iraaian tradition, figures like Mir Dimiid (MuJ:tam..mad Baqir Astsribidï) (d. 1631-2) cannet be
easilycJassified. Heis oftenassocisted with thePeripatetictradition. Yet,he wrote "ecstatic confessions"
which associate him. more readily with the Plotinian II"adition, with its doctrine of mystical union. 79
Another example, are the writiJlgs of Mir Abü al-Qisim. Findiriskï (d. 1640-1) who is, on the one
hand, considered a Peripatetic for bis anti-Platonic treatise on movement; and. on the other hand, a
Plstonist for his Ireatise on alchemy. which contaias overtly .. esoteric" views.eD In spite of the

-. TI

78

79
MilI"Cotte, "Imagination," 45-55; cf. [dem, "Ibn Miskawayh," 1-13; cf. Idem, "The RaIe of
Imagination," 37-72.
Sberif, OhJlZll1J'$ 7Dl!Q;Ym l-~.
Corbin, Hisroire, 463.
eo Corbin, Histoire, 466.
 CHAPTFR ONE - 23

coexistence of these [wo major traditions. philosophical works seem to have generally preserved (at
Jeast for purposes of classificstion) the original opposition e~ablished between the two major anciem
pbilosopbicaJ traditions - the Peripstetics and the Oriental-llluminists (.)~I~! ) or what Corbm
œ11s the "Neoplatooists of [slam."Sl

AVICENNA'S (980-1037) PHILOSOPHICALANTHROPOLOGY

Avicenna's scientific ÏJ1terests are impressive: he excelled in medicine, mathematics. logic,

phsrmacology, along with philosophical speculation. 82 His metaphysical system bas always fasci11ated
those who studied bis works - both Muslim. and Christian, commenlator and detraetor. The importance
of his works was such that the Avicennan tradition became quickly the standard teaching on logie,
physics, philosophical anthropology, and metaphysics. It was taught. commented, aiticized, and
refuted all over the Islamic world. It constituted the fundamental tea.ching for Suhrawardï. who
developed bis own thought in Mariighah, or I~ahint wbere he studied the works of the proponents of
Avicennan tradition, e.g.. al-Siwï (or al-Sivajï).

Avieenna's philosophica1 oudook determined bis positions on a number of issues reldting to

hum,8Il souls. Like mast Peripatetic tbinkers. bis philosophica1 perspective is, at rimes, certainly
empiricist - bis doctrine of the soul' s individuation hEIS been. labelled by sorne as .. introspective
empiricism:63 whiJe others bave ch8l'1lcterïzed Avicenns's concan with the empirical phenomena a
.. sensualist tendency... 5a

In fact, A viœnna' s empiricism refJeas the Aristotelian substrats of bis philosophiœl

anthropology and the sci.entifica11y oriented mind of the physician mat he was, like Galen. This
determined, in part, some of the more empiricist positions that he advoested - st rimes adopting
ancient doetl'Ùles, st others taking issue with them. For instance, he posits the existence of the body
as the con.dition for the existentiation of the soul as well as its individuation, e.g., the notion of
pneumo (see chapter on the nature of the soul).65

81 Ccxtlin, HistDtrr!, 219, 288, <462-3. The Jau«.e said "co inlerpret the Plaonic archetypes in terms
ofZoroastrian mgelolcgy," cf. Ibid., 288.
82 Ccxtlin, HiSTOln!. 219; cf. Mlchot," Les sciences physiques," 64-71; cf. Anawati. "Les dIvisions ,"
323-335. Logic, fcr Aviœnna, is the instrument that enables us to grasp the higber tnltbs, cf. Goichon. "La
nouveauté," 41-58; d. (dem, "La place de la défimtion." 95-106; cf. Sabra, .. Avicenna on the Subjea," 746-&4.

•
83 Marmura,"Avicenna. and the Problem.," 238.
801 E.g., Mustafa Bey Nazif. cf. El Ahwani, .. La théorie de Ja coDnnzssance," 31.
85 Jaussens, An AADomrt!fl BibliCfl17P1Jy, 53-5_ Janssens refers to Mahdavi's F.iJJn"sr NuskImhiï-yr-
MUSIII1AllÜr-r1bA-i Süu and ta Anaw.ci's &SlIi de bibliqp71pme A ~~"a!Dmt!nDe, 142-169, §§ 77-109; cf.
 CHAPTER ONE - 24

•
A VlCenJla' s philosophiœl anthropology is essentially concemed with everything w hich pertains
to human beings and, more specifica1Jr, to the human soul and its various states and faculties. The
human sou! in philosophical enquiry is an abject in i15 own right and is included within the more
general framework of bis philosophicaJ investigatioM. Enquiries into the naOJre of the soul are
distinct from other concems of the P1J..PS'ics. which aIse diseusses the naturai sciencES {e.g., Cure
contains a seaion (VI) on the soul in the Nn/linllûJ ).86

A distiJlction within !slamic phiJosophy is often. made beeween an eastern and a western
philosophical tradition At the heart of this distinction lies the Aristote1ian and the Neoplatonic
traditions inherited from the Greeks 6i Both traditions were metamorphosed into ft more indigenous
philosophical tradition as a more IsJamic theological, ethicaL psychological, and mystical charaeter
gradually emerged.
The eastem tradition to which Avicenna belongs is resolutely NeopJatonic. Avicenna' s
Peripateticism is, in fact, greatly indebted to Neoplatonism and, thus, exhibits what might be caUed
an accentuaœd "spiritualist" tendency. This has bem argued by El Ahw8OÏ, who does not deny that
there is a certaiJl empiriœl basis to Avicenna' 5 philosophical speculations, but wbo a1so notes mat
the concem for the empirical rea1ity of experience is nothing but a prelude to "inspiration, ta
,,-....
illumination through the dire<% umon with the Agent Intellect. tom For El Ahwanî, it is the acquisition
of this non-sensible knowledge that is al the heart of Aviœnna's epistemology: the soul's knowJedge
of itself does nat require any input from the bodily, or as a consequence of its attachment to the
material body. Avicenna's Perip81eticism is best illustrated with respect to the intrinsic differences
that exist betWeen body and soul, the origin of the souJ's knowledge (i.e., the Necessary Existent),
69
and the possible union of the soul with the inteUeetual world. These different issues will be dea1t
with in the followiJlg chapters.

There are, however, a number of possible readings of A vicenna' s phiJosophy: (i) a rationalise
interpretati.on exemplified by the studies of Amélie-Marie Goichon and Dimitri Gutas; (ü) a religious

Anawati, .. La tradition manllSa1te," 246-49.

ll6 This is the r:::la.ssical. Peripatetic classification of knowledge in which the study of the soul bec:omes
one of the abJects ta be rati.onally Dawn and investigated. The same bolds true, fOt" inst:ance, (0[" Abü
al-Barakiit (Hibat Allah) al-Baghdidi whose CanRi:fft'1UrOD ccntains a section on the S01Jl Ùl the .Mlnrm/ril. cf.
Abü al-Bankit al-Bagbdadi, ld-hfu'l1l0IVffll1-[UbnJl!J, J vols.; cf. Ibn Marzban, "'-T~iJ
87 For a fa1l'ly good account of the transmisSton of Gr-eek tbcught te the Islamic world see the works
of Petcn, especiaUy for the transmission of the Aristotel1an corpus, cf. Peters, Ansœdt! 8r1d dte ArJhs-; cr.
Idem, AnStt:JldiJo An/bus.
88 El Ahwani, • La théone de la connaissance 1" 33-38.
 CHAPTER ONE - 25

.-
•
interpretation which highlights bis concerns as ft rehgious Muslim thinker exemplified by the swdies
of Louis Gardet; and (iii) a mysticaJ and gnostic interpretation of bis works illustrated by a number
of Henry Corbin' 5 works.

In faet, Avicenna' s distinctive brand of Peripaœticism has been associated with the whole
"Oriental" philosophy debate. Positions have varied !rom total dismissal of the existence of ft distinctive

"Oriental" philosophy (Gutas),90 to a total endorsement of this interpretation, at tïmes, conceiving it

as the true Avicennan position that exhibits bis mare mature and esoceric thought (Gardet' s conclusion
that a "naturaJ mysticism" is expressed in the cancluding chapters of Avicenna's NemlirKs) 91 Nasr
draws the same conclusions as Gardet about the RemlUÉS and Avicenna' 5 three visionary and
allegorical treatises. FOl'" him. they illustrate bis" Oriental" philosophy.92

Other contemporary authors have highlighted Avicenna' 5 mysticism (Morewedge,93 Anawati,

Mehren who edited st the tom of the century a number of Avicenna's allegorica1 tre8tÏses. Wstt,94
and Inati~. For Corbin, Subrawardi is the ~true successor," the heir of Avicenna inasmuch as he
pursued the Avicennan project of ft truly "Oriental" philosaphy.9Iï These different readings of the
A vicennan tradition lead ta a number of conflicting conclusions regarding the true nature ofA vicenna' 5

philosophy. especially, on the nature of the soul. Within Islamic tradition, Suhrawardï sought to
depart form AvïceJlJ1a, whom he considered ft Peripatetic.

There is no doubt thal phiJosophical anthropology constitutes an important faeet of Avicenna' s

philosophical preoccupations. A glance at his writings on sou! suffices to convince us that his
Înterest in. human psychology did not wane throughout bis liCe. Far him. philosophy aims st perfecting
the human soul through its perception of its true reality. Here, the speculative supersedes and roles
over the practical (i.e., actions).97

89 El. Ahwa.ai, .. La théorie de la connaissance," 40-3.

90 Gutas." Aviœn.n.a," 79b-80b; cf. Idem, A JZl::r!m'JII, 1040-1. For a criticism of Gutas' apprcach to

intuicive knowledge (!J1lik), d. Marmura, "PloŒi.ng the C01H"Se," 333-342; cf. Gutas' i..n.tetpretation. of Ibn
Tufayl.'s mowJedge (ont Y through the M-S1Iffiï of the existen~e of an AvicennaD. Eastem philosophy, cf.
1
)

Idem. "Ibn Tufayt," 222-58.

91 Gard et, hi cmm_SSJl11cenJ.nbilue.
92 Nasr, "Ibn Sini's," 249; ~f. Idem, "Introduction to the Myst:i.cal Tradition," 368.
93 Morewedge, "The Logi~ of Emanmonism:' %7~74.
9-4 Watt, IsfllmicPJn10.s0p4Yllnd TheolOJ[Y, /J.
9S Imci. A(~, 3-4,62; Rahman ... Avicenna and Orthodox Islam," 668 11.2,669-670.
96 Corbin, IUstDrr'e. 246; cf. Idem, A Fit::l:"mm. 39.
97 Fr.- rhiit r.lllImfiCitinn ri H,.,.th AII,aunrv n n l' r.f rmr~~ A r:'Ù-p,mn 14S' ~ rmhlnuln Th,..
 CHAPTER ONE - 26

Compared with Avicenna, Suhrawardi's works have a distinctive division of knowledge.

AVlcenna's philosophical anthropology is found in the }V;HlJhuio or the pn.rsics of a number of bis
works,~ ft Peripatetic tradition. Suhrawardi, on the other band, inc1udes the study of the soul i"1 ~"te
NlUurnlin of such works as bis fnamorions, Ro,rs of4irbr, or again Templ~sofLJ..tr:J/FS, but, on the
other hand, attempts to introduce e1ements of philosophical anthropology within the framework of

bis metaphysics. Fol" instance. in bis C)rieJl"m-UfuminofJ-ve f.Visoom. psychoLogical considerations

are introduced at the begi.nn.ing of what is usually oonsidered to be the rnetaphysical part of this
wode.

In this more persona! work, Suhrawardï thus re8lT8lJges the Peripatetic classification 50 as to

incorporate considerations of philosopluca1 anthropology witJiin the seaion on metaphysics. This

sbift might be the precursol" of Mulla $adrii' 5 later departuee from the classical Peripatetic classification,
whicb placed the study of the soul within the realm of metaphysics. 99 It is, however, noteworthy. that
even A vîcenna, at the end of the Jl.f~4p.»'cS of bis Cll.œ, inlroduces and discusses certain issues
that a-e usually included in the sections On die Soul of the NNlInlILO, e.g. , prophets. 1 00

A vicenna' s philosophical anthropology is not t1 mere commen.tary on the Aristoteliao and

pseudepigraphical corpus. AJthough he did write a commentary on Aristotle' s OA riJe Soul and the
..-...
pseudo- 71JeolO§Y ofAnsroUe, AviceJl.Oa departs from the AristoteJian division of the On dJeSouJ -
originally in three parts. He ignores and dismis5es the historica1 part originally found in the first
book of the OA die Souf.
furthermore, although Avicenna'5 discussions on the sou! follow the general stnJC%ure of
Aristotle's 00 the SOuJ, he introduces issues not raised in the latter. e.g., the theory of vision.
Avicen.na's depa"tUre from purel.y Aristotelian positions is illustrated, for instance, with bis nuanced
stance on Aristotle' s cJaim that the soul is merely the form. of the body. A more ma-ked difference,
however, is Avicenna's discussions regarding self-knowledge and his "f1ying person" hypothesis
which a-e evidently absent not only from Aristotle's work but from bis philosophical preoccupation.
These discussions about self-knowledge will come to occupy the center stage of Suhrawardi' s
epistemologica1 conceptions.

In. some instances, Avicenna goes beyond Aristotelian conceptions on the human soul - e.g.,

'lB AJ1awati, M~~ue du Slnnï" 1 I-IV, vol. 2, 87-280; cf. Ana:w~, "La classrlïcation des
sciences, 62-66.
w

ll9 N.t "Sadr al-DiD Shïrizï," 953,953-8.

100 AV1C:enna, SII.ifiï~ ~feta., IX, 5-7,0410.1-432.17 (Md3., 1045-65); d. ibId., X, 1-2,435.1-443.11

(Mcb, 169-77).
 CHAPTER. ONE - 21

•
he introduces a fivefold classification of the internai senses and di.scusses the ultimate destiny cf the
hurnan soul in the afterlife..~vicenna's works on the 50ul are far from simply Atistotelian; he adopts
a ratber Platonic division of the soul and ai Neoplaloaic cosmol ogy with ils hierarchy of divine
intelligences and souls of the spheres. lOJ Moreover, A vicenna adopts a more dualistic position regarding
the soul tban the one adopted by Aristode. He assumes mat the soul is an immaterial being united
with the body afterit comes into being (~.J~) Similar dualistic conceptions about the human soul
fmd their way œto Suhrawardrs wcrk. However. ~{ullii $adrirs metaphysics later tries to overcome
the dualistic approaches of Avicenna and Suhrawardï. t02

The probJem of chronology of A vicenna' s different works makes it difficuJt to envision a

clear evolution in bis thought. A number of bis works can, nonethe1ess, be divided ioto different
periods.1al Br the same token, Avicenna appears to have adopted different positions regarding

important issues of bis philosophica1 anthropology. For instance, bis FDClJ/lies ofrileSouJ (dedicated
to the Amïr Nü1.J b. M~r) is an earlier work that presents positions - especially on the definition of
the soul- th81 are different from tbose of 181er works like llemorks. In earher works, AVlcenna more
readiJy lIdopts AristoteJian positions. The sout is defined as an entelechy. In his later works, there is s
shift towards a new conception of the soul in tenns of its substantiality. tO<:l
The problem of the historicity of the vlrious elements of A vicenna' s philosophical. antbropology
is beyond the scope of this study. However, we will prefer bis middle and later works, sinee they
exhi.bit Avicen.na·s resolutely more mature ideas. These will belp us explore bis different views of
bis definitions, conceptions or arguments of bis philosophical anthropology, especially in the sections
On ll1e Soo./ - e.g., of the ~. the ~lIVlll'ion and the Remaries. Other important later works

containing discussions on the soul will complete passages from the aforementioned works; these
include such works as the DiSCUSSIOns, the Com.meol'ay on the pseudo- TAeologyofAns-rQ{:/e and
the Glosses an Aristotle's On roeSoul, where Avicenne presents, st times, interesting departures
from cJassica1 interpretations. especially in bis eschatological positions. Sorne smal1er wcrks, such as

101 El Ahwany, "La théorie de Ja eonnaissance," 23.; cf. Monnot. "Laplaœ de l'bomme, " 90.
102 MuUi ~adrii proposes that, based on "sub5taJltial motion" (~~~ 45~ ) and on "systematic
ambiguity of exIstence" (,)~~I ~I~ ~ .&I~S,':.' >. the soul is first gen.erated corporeaUy. beside the body
oc as a bodiJy form; then, lhroUgh substaDlial motion il changes into an immser:ial entity, cf. Morris, fJ'Zsdom;
cf. Haq. "The Psychology of Mulla ~adrii," 173-181. For bis definition of the soul and bis solution to
Suhrawardian dualism., cf. Jambet. "L'âme humaine," 211-36; â. Nan, "Post-Aviœnnian.,"J31-44.
103 Michot, Ot'Slinl!t!, 1-9.
104 B Ahwany... La théorie de la connaissance," 22-3.
 CHAPTER ONE - 28

the Lt!lTer on die PiSOppt:WnlDt:e 0/me ~.~ ./ore/kirihle Forms l1IÈèY lJeodJ attribuœd to Avîcenna,
are aJso important for discussions that pertain to the ntional soul lOS Below is a liS[ of the works of
A vicenna that address issues of philosophica1 anthropology.

1. Earlier works

1. SrudiesonlbeFiICU/t;rofd1eSoul (~~I (,$.".iJ1 ~ .,.;,"; =);105

2. 71Je Pro ven~iAce~U1d.J)e.fr.ûJ~CÛ}n (.) W ' 3 i ~ 1); 107
3. TlJeSruresofmeSoul (~I Jlya-Î), ItsPennanence. andhsIJesdnnrioo (~ LJL...,J
UI..)L.-", ~~'" ~I ):100
4. /mmo/dE.rofJ (~~~I); lOS
II. Middle works

5. 7OeCllnonofMetliane (~I ~ ~~I);

6. TAeCu~ (.~I), Po,rsiçaJ Trairises (...::,,1_.::6 Il), ~7. OnlbeSou/ (~I);lIo
7. Various sum.m;:.nes and handbooks closelyrese.m.bling 71Jt:o C/n2:
i. The Guidllnt:e (.41~1); III
Ü. TJJeSalr-1lLion (O~I);IIZ
iü. E/emeors orPMosop~y (~, r:J~);
iv. The P~~a of the BookofScrènce {~~ ,,-~I.J);I1:3

ll)5 Michot, lite &gin, Anawati and Mahdavi, believes that the JII-N.rS1Wll2 IF aJ-$ürJlJ aJ-lvF;tlJüJ~r
JlI-MaéllJiJifJIIr Ji RI-ffatI'l i5 mœt probably A vicennan, cf. Michot, "Avicenna' s . Letter on the Disappearan.ce,"
96; cf. Idem, "«L'Epire sur la disparition," 152·170; d. Black, "Avicenna on the OntoJogica1;' 425-53; cf.
Micbot, ·Prophétie et divination,· 507-535; d. al-Mac~, "A Treatise On the Soul," 13 1-44.
106 Edited by Landauc:r', "Die Psychologie," 335-418 [reechted byVan. Dyck (Calfo, 1907; reprinted in
Beirut: Dar al_oUm h-al-Jamî, 1982) and U1 RllSw SbJIyk/J iJ/-bSs... 1lJn Siniï (Qum: Intisha-ât-i Bidar,
(980). 143-219]. An English transJalion WlE made by Van Dyck, A Campenl/ram an J1Je SouJ (Verona, 19(6).
It i5 also known under other names, JJ.fJl'lDJIh.6iII-JVJÛS, Kri:J1b 6I-NJIIS, 41/- 'Asihlntr Fu.sr1I.
107 Aviceno.a, RrS'-Jl. a/-MIlIJdij" W1Im-AfJlld , 00. Nurin.i [cf. ed. Kurd °Ali, in Idem, A-fJifloüi1r

il/-bsiïrJ t 250-56. cf. MIchot, " .l 'Epirre sur f;t rœ~.sc," 104-118; many passages translated ÏJl French. cf.
Micbot, Destinée.
108 Michot considers it to be posterioc to ;u-S./aO", cf. Michot, Ot:.stinét!' , 6, 6n29; cf. Michot .
• Aviceaoe, .u OHimhO..a de J'ibne Section [ de l'Epilrr!' «S :!Ua lM Fiiml!'," 239-256. FŒ' a lnUlslation of
section 13, â. Mic:bot, "Prophétie et divination selon Avicenne," 507-534. Passages lnUlSlated in French, cf.
Idem, OesbDée; d. Mic:hot, "Les questions sur les étaU de l'esprit," 44-53 (he altributes it Mistawayb or ta
someone be10nsiDS to the circle of the Ikhwin a1~afa' ). For a translation of section. 16 (Epilogue), cf. Gutas,
A ~Cemzlt, 32-3 and in French, cf. MJ.chot. J:Je.s&int!e, 3 -4.
109 Numerous passages aretraDslaed in French, d. Mlchot, udesaÀéec:/l!'l"homme.
110 Som.e passages ace U'ans1o&ed in French, cf. Badawï, H.istl:1ire. vol. 2, 6n-4, 678-9.

•
111 Partial Fn:nch translation, cf. Micbot, "L' eschatologie dans Je <d.ivre de la guidance» d'Avicenne,"
138-152; d. Idem, Oe.uiJ1~.
112 For the English translatl.on of the On rh~SouJ, cf.
113 Achena et Massé, ulir-redesciazt::e, voL 2. 13-92,
 CHAPTfR ONE - 29

III. Later works

8. RemllrksnodAtfOKJmi:ioos (~Iê': ;',--. "" ~I J~~I ):114

9. Discussioos (~~411 ):115
10. CammeOEtlrJ7 on the pseudo- TéeoLt{/{r-ofALisrode (y~1 "~.",.J~Ia. y~ C~
~)~I):
11. Gosses on Aristotle's OndieSoul ( .. ~I .. yts~I~~~lë.:I.-.11
~.)"'I): 1 l6

12. On die HumdH FncuB;Ynndhs Perr:eprioos ( 4-:i lSl J,J! .3 ~ .: '. L....:: ~ 1 <.,S"AJ 1 u-i):
13. A Few H'OrdsOorbe!lHfiooluSou/ (~ljJl ~I ~ r~ ~):117

Avicenna' 5 symbolic tales - such as ff'!JY .lOA Yilrj~iïn and Snliimlln undAbsiil - contain
discussions relev8J1t to a study of bis philosophical anthropology. These works, however, will not be
the main Cocus of this study. These types of writings present their OWll bl"lUld of difficulties when

attempting to unearth their philosophical substnlta. Moreover. we will not undertake an extensive
and detailed !LUdy of the development of Avicenna's own philosophical anthropology.l1a Let it be
said that our omission does not imply that these treatises are mystica1 and. therefore, devoid of any
philosophical principles. 119

114 GoichOJl, Orn.~liJ·J!'S. Dl. 303-35; cf. Michot•• De la Joi.e et du bonheur," 49-60; cf. Inati. A-[ymc.
115 Ibn Sîna, MII6Ji1J.ltdnU, 122-239, §§ 1-500. For a partlal French lI'aJlS1ation of sectl.ons §§ 259, 252,

353,355, 365,366,378,464, 468 and parts of the seaions f§ 274,238, 364,368, 383,425,427, cf. Miehot,
Destinc-e; the tramlauon of §§ 457 and 467. For a partial French translation of seet10ns §§ 55,331,332,346,
358,370,376.380.381,421-23,426,427, d. Pines, "La conception," 21-98 [reprinted in Pines, CoUecred
W"anb-, vol. 1,181-258]; cf. Mic:hot, "Cultes, Magie et intellection," 220-233; d. Idem, "La réponse d'Avicenne
à Bahmanyâr et al-Kirmâni," 143-221. There is also a translation of a L~rlO un AAonymous DÜCTp/e, cf.
Gutas, A r-:iannll, 56-60 wbieh cCXTesponds to ~fu6Jl1JadJiïJ',245, 225-8. § 258, 246.
A translation of the Memorr of;l LHsople Jir:Jm HlI,Y,Y is absent from Badawï's edition, but ontY
extant in the Oxforn-recennon of JJfiM.lÏI1J1r:1Jïr , d. the outJine of this leuer in Plnes, .. La .. PhilosophIe
Orientale" d'Avicenne etsapo1émlque contre les Baghdadie115," 35-37 and "appendice."
116 Fragments translaœd, cf. MIchot, Deslinl!e; cr. Idem, "Tables de correspondances: 231-2$0. TIus

is diffen:nt from the Mu~.5Jl/-Nafs (Summary ofAnstode on the Sou/) aaributed tG Avicenna, but
wntten by Gregorios Thaumaturg05, cf. Gatje, SNe/id], 114-29 [Arabie cen].
There are two other warks whose authenti.city is doubted by Mtehot, the f i ~fJl hfar .-MlIS
117

Mw-.ilrhJi (Ahw-;jf JI/-Mûs 181-92) and A-fJtSiï~ lm AfJWJÜ III-JV;Ifs, cf. Michol, Oesrinr!'e,
lII-.Niïpi;lI1I W;t 1

Dix-xxx. Gutas also ccnsiden the first as spurious, cf. Guta'5, AnCtmll , 331;cf. Broc:te1mann, vAL, J,
591-%, and Idem, vAL, Supp. l, 813-22; cf. MICbot, "«L'épître sur la connaissance," 479-499.
IlB Anud, E.ss;u·.
119 Perhaps the first translation 111 an European languagve is Mehren, • L' OlSeau: traité mystlqQe
d'Avicenne," Il pages; d. Me1tren, Tn/iléS mysrNJues; cf. Goiehon, Le n!f:If' de H";y b YIWf~Jn (Paris:
Desc1ée de Brouwer, 1959) and Corbm, A J7èr!nDel!'l'/erécir.
 CHAPTER ONE - 30

POST-AVICENNAN DEVELOP~fENTSTILL SUHR..-\W.-\RI)[

It is not the purpose of this study to enumerate aIl chose who, in one way or another, felt the

influence of AV1cenna's works. Nonetheless, between Avicenna's death in 1037 and Suhrawœ-dï's
own passing in. 1191, there e1apsed more man a hundred and rlfty years. More than five generations
of Islamic scholars came to be. a great number of whom disseminated A vicenna' s thought.

Both disciples and critics wrote commentaries on the master' 5 most important works as weil
1ZO
as ft number of origl.Oal works. The Avicennan tradition includes Avicenna's own students and
mer disciples. The first genemtio1lS of students are mostly commentators, translators and proponents
of the Aviœnnan tradition. A number of thei.r texts have survived, sorne in tbe fonn of eitber
commeatarÎes or correspondence, i.e., Avicenna's responses to the queries of bis disClples.

Avieenaa's disciples inelude Abü M~ür b. Zaylah (d. 1048), who also wrote eommentanes
on fI"..JY IDA Ynf/pTn;IZI Babmanyiir Ibn Maabin, whose questions are a.nswered by Avicenna in the
Oiscussions;lZ2 Abü CUbayd JüzjanI (d. after 1037). Avicenna's disciple and student, close companion
8Ild biographer,lZ3 Abü cAbd AIHih al-Mac~ (d. 1038 or 1058) for whom Aviœnna wrote bis

T~oti~ OLi .1,0 y~. There is aIso a con-espondellce between Bïrünï and Avicenna which comains
--- al-Mac~m.ï's defence of AvicennalZc:I

It is not yel clear if any of cheir works contain. substantiaI person&1 doctrines specifie to
philosophical anthropology. A closer analysis of these early teK1:s might reveal inœresting llew daa.

120 Rahman. "Avieen.na and His Contemponnes," 75-87. For a more exhaustive hst of his 5tudents,
cf. the Perslall introduction of Dibiji's ed. of Lawlcari's Bi!J"'h Jd-HUIl9," 74-6.
121 Mebren. TrJiœs ~":Ri~lk!S. Case.!. He WI'Ote a summary of the PÔ.J"S7CS of the S1Jifir', cf.
Bayhaqi. TJlDDzm3l' $ifrJo aI-lfikmab, 92; in addition, he wrote a book on the soul and some leuers (rJS"f'Sl >,
r.
cf. Ibid .• 93; cf. Brodcelmann, OAL. Supp. 600.829,817.
122 AviœJlD.a, 1II-~fulr~Jr. 119-246; d. Ibid., ed. Bïdirfar; cf. Daiber•• Bahmanyar, Kïa," SOlb;
cf. Miehot, • La réponse d'Avicenne à Babmanyâr et al-Kirmâni," 147-221.
123 al-JüzjiiD.i• .5'InIr JII-S1J.It.ykh ;t/-fl61 ÎS, 16-42; cf. the review of UILmann. For a review of the editlon
and the German. Enghsb and French translations (p. Krauss, A. J. Arberry, G. M. Wictem. M. Achena and H.
Massé), cf. GlItaS, A~a"11R;I, 22-30. Abü lJbayd Juzjinï (d. after (037) wroœ a Penian vernon of ffil..y'yb.
Ya;~, wbile an ArablC eommenrary of the worle was done by J:Iusayn b. zayJan of Isfaban (d. 440 1 1048).
wbi1e seme frasments of Jns KlI,yjfp;rr TJIl'bD IlI-ABa have SUl"Vlved, a. Brockelmann. OAL, Supp. 1. 828; cf.
COl'bin, Histl:MTe.246.
124 AVlœnna. RirJ/il4l11-7s.f19 ' 1-27 (Tnuœs 1-15; RLsiïJa 109-34); cf. Birûm and Ibn Sina,
1 1

M-As J1l1Ô WiI ;d-Afwfb6lJ. Macsiimi aise wrote a Risii/;u fi ftIJbiù ;tI-Mufiïnlrpir, d. Brockelmann. vAL, Supp.
1. 828; cf. bis Proofs of me Four AbsoJute AppeJlrJnces of Forms (" Beweise der Vlel" absoluten
Erscheirungsformen"). ef. Broekelmann, CiAL, Band 1. 599. There is also a af-lvfuliinllJlÎt WlI A ô'.;if w- 'l/(jü/
W1I8I-AOiik wa TJIr1JD 1l1-,A,ful1t1rw- and a Ris;i/ilÔ li ~um.[~ADJiIJ Ta'mii (the Jatter auributed te him); the
last two tit1es are metjoned in Baybaqï. TJNZmmilr Sùrdi1 iII-(fikmJlfJ, 95-6.
 CHAPTER ONE - 31

if not on Avicenna, chen perhaps bis disciples. Al! these rnsoL/ and tex:ts exist, in one fOral or
anomer, and a thorough study of their content, name1y, their philosophica1 anthropology, remains to
be uodertaken..

Avicenna's students and disciples kept alive an Avicennan Peripacetic tradition. Some wrote
compendium-like works in which issues related ta the human soul are found, e.g., Kia Bahmanyac b.
al-M8l"2bin(Adharbayjini) (d. 1066), one or Avicenna's pupils during hisstayin Hamadan.( 1015-1024)
and ~fahin 0024-1037). Besides ilÎ5 role tn the composition of the Ois'CUSSLOns, Ibn Marzban
oommented and transmitted Avicenna's philosophy with his 7l1e Aunùunenl" (a summary of
Avicenna's Book ofScrènce) which contains a book OA I"beSoul (section on the N8lVni1rÎl ).125

Issues related to philosophicai anthropology were part of ongoing debates. Bahmanyir, for
one, wrote a more persona! work entitled OA die Opinions ofrne PenpoI"N.ics- lleg,wi4,.1!' hfOit'dY 00
me Souf //oô ilS FoCllI/ies. l215 F ~1 b. Mu~ammad Abü al-' Abbas al-Lawkarï (d. 1123), Bahmanyiir' 5
student, was responsible for the dissemin~on of Avicennan tradition throughout Khurisiin. where
he WIS bom. He wrote a popular work whose objective was to presen.t the thoughlS of al-~ara"i and
A vicenna entided the Erp./nmlbOO oftlJe RetilLi;Y BeJooçiog 1"0 the TrutIJ, which contains a book 00
Logic, Ph.,P5Les and JI..fer~.ps.rcs.121 A study of the philosophical anthropoJogy of Bahmanyiir b .
M.-zbin and Abü al-'Abbis al-Lawkari remains to be written.
•

A parallel tradition, more critical of Avicenna's Peripateticism, deve10ped mostly at the

hands of theoJogians - al-Ghaziilï (d. 1111), al-Shahra~ (d. 1153), and Fakhr al-Din al-Riïzï (do
1209), a contempora-y of Suhrawardi They were critica1 of most philosophical doctrines, theories
and ideas which doctrines they deemed capable of undermining fundamental. Islamic doctrines and
beliefs, although tbeir thoughlS were greatly influenced by Avicenna' 5 Peripateticism.

Avicennan Peripateticism. therEiore, found itse1f at the heart of philosophica1 debates, and

125His JII-T~ was aimed at solving difficulties foUJ1d in Avicenna's m-SlnIii', cf. Ibn Marzban,
.d-T~ FOl" a Peniaa CI"aJl51ation of the ;lI-T~, cf. Idem, ./iïm-i .rJ1Jiin Numifr ; there exists a R'Wisian
translaion. made by A. V. Sagadeeva (1983-1986), cf. Daiber, -Bahmanyar-, Kïi," SOlb and S02b.
1Z6 The ~f~JililIJff Am-
M-~MslJslJ~m li Vmr M-NaIS' w;r ÇJuwiih~. cf. Daiber, "Bahmanyâr. IGa,"
S02a; cf. Broc,ke1mann, OAk , Band 1,594 and 600. Two leUers of Avicenna appended to the ms. of the
Mu6JÏ1N1r.hk JrCserved in Egypt are addressed te Sbaykb al-F-'iJ, Most probabLy Bahmallyir, cf. Daiber,
• Bahmanyir. Ki.," S02a.
1Z7 The ~i:' and ~fl!taphy:sra, cf. Dibichi's inll"oductlon to bis edition of Lawkari's B~rJJ7
6I-ffilifJ'l DJ-PinlJin lI1-$rdti [Metaphysics}, 23, 26-7. Amongst bis students were Abü •AH Qattan al-Marvazi
who "'rote a BDOk on tIJ~ Know.letfKe ofdit" lJ"adtl ( KLtiih-i KnybM SbrnJlk1tr), Af~al a1-Din b. Gilin who
wrote a book on 71Je Cil!s.m04 ofdie ~Vodd ( /futlüdJ 11I- ~.mt), and As"ad a1-Mayhinï who bec:ame a teacher
• the famovs Nizimîyah scbool in Baghdad, cf. the English pr~aœ by Mohaghegh lD a1-Lawkari, B;!ydn
lII-ff.,qbi-IJimiin"'-$ia:, [Metaphysics), 7-8; cf. Daiber, uBahmanyir,IGi," S02b.
 CHAPTER ONE - 32

rem8.ÎJ1ed 50 until - and beyond - the time of SuhrawarcH. e.g.. one of Suhrawardî's teachers in
Isfabin, af-Siwïs glosses on Avicenna's lu-1vi!llïr in response [0 al-Shahrastini's criticism of
Avicennan Peripateticism lived on in al-Tüsï's (d. 1274) Commenr~11Y on Avicenna's
IZB
Avicenna.
Remorks, a defence of the Jatter's philosophy ag&1Ïnst the attacks of Fakhr al-Oin al-Rizfs own
commentary on the same work 129

Al-Ghaziili studied the thoughts of the philosophers which he summarized in 71Je Pmposes
a prelude to bis famous 71Je IncolJerence of me Plli/osophers
13iJ
oftlJe Plti.Iosopht!r5. (a faithful
Arabie rendering of Avicenna' 5 Persian BookofSaence). The lŒterworkisan attackon ph.ilosophical

doctrines which seemed to contradictthe tenets of the Islam. - essentiaUy Avicenna's and al-raraoï' 5. 131

Consequently, philosophy was to lose a great deal of its credibility as an [slamic discipline.
The blow which al-Ghaziili srruck against philosophy û"oJ1Ïcally caused its disse.mï.natloJ1 to centers
far from Baghdad. It travelled westward to Andalusia, where it flourished with sucb authol'S as Ibn
Bijjah (Avempace) (d 1139). Ibn Tufayl (d. 1185>, and Averroes (Ibn Rushd), and eastward CO

Maghiqah, I~ahin or Khuriisin. 132

Al-Ghazilïs &ttact on philosophy, coupled with the end of Peripatetic philosophy ÏJl the
west after Averroes, prepared the ground for the spread of UlumiAationist doctrines of Suhrawardi,
the gnosis of the school of lbn cArabi (638/1240), and according ta Corbin, the m.etaphysics of
Sufism. and the traditional teachings of the Imams of Shïcism (Haydar Amü1i, Ibn Abi Jumhür,
lS-16th C.).IJJ

Moreover, a number of al-Ghazilï' 5 worJcs address issues pertaining ta philosophical

Iza al-Siwi, .hiWJlb ~ U/-S!J3lmlsIiïm-, cf. Brockelmann, GAL, Band f, 763.

129 al-Tüsi and al-Rizi, Shar.ha.r.u-/shiïriü.
130 al-Ghazili, jJ.f;lij~d JU-F;l/iisifJl!J . An English translation bas been done by Davld Burre11
(fortbcoming). This work 15 an almost word-for-ward translation from the Persian into Arabie of Avicenna's
1ÀII1rs/J-ANnlllt-i ~Î, cf. '71lrt!te Mmrm Sales, 148 n.5; d. Jenssens, -Le D-.inesh-Diimeb ," 163-1n; cf.
Wensute.t, Li.Pensée de Oôazzah:
l:ll Ghazili' 5 T;l/JïiM Il1-FlIIiitffJlh (11Je Inc»Dt:n!oœ of dte P.1Jilasopd'3' ], ed. Marmura. Three
cardinal accusations were held agaiost the phùosopbers in general, but against AviCCllJ1& (and aJ-raribi) in
particu1ar: their Jlegation of(i) creation. ~rmb.tlo,(ü}God'sknowledgeofparticul~,and(iü)bodil}7resurreeti.on.,
d. Watt, 77M FJUUllIDdPl7laiceofil/-01Jilzmli, 37ft. zayn al-Dïn al-~usayn aL-Jurjinï (hving in. 1136) seems
to bave writtell a Bcok d'RduDUJ"on tNdJeP1JOosqm~ (.KriiD fi ilI-RJIdd mïu/-FnJbrfah >, cf. Baybaqi,
TJIlliDmJ#SùrJi1 ;t/-.{UbDa/r, l n-6.
132 Avennes bec:ame the gr~ comme11t;&Or- on Aristotle, n:p1ying la al-Ghazili' s aiticism of the

philosophcn widl .b1s own fDcoJk:rr!Dce of tIIe Inco1Jt:n!Dœ of the Philosophent d. Englis.b trami. Van den
Berg, A J'B7't7es' TR1JJüw 111-Talûfw.
133 Nasr, ~ Muslrm S.,.es, 55; cf. Corbin, HisrDIre, 220, 352.
 CffAPTER Ol'.'E - 33

•
anthropology along with a criticism of some of its tenets. especialJy in bis Encoh~ocp 0/ me
34
P1JiIoSOpher:s.I His A-1!SAkl tu-Anwiir tS another important, often negleeted work of his which
l
should be studied for its psychologiœl elements. especially regarding intellection. 3'5

The great poJeutist al-Shahrastiioi also criticized philosophy on theoJogicaJ. grounds, in

particular. Avicenna's cheory of emanation and the fate of the soul in the aftedife. l3rS Moreover, his
Book 00 the lle~iriorJS"mddie Seas contains an entire section on Avicenna' s ütought and some of
its un-Islamic tenets. l37 He wrote a number of other works which attacked specifically tbe doctrines
of the philosophers. but which have yet to be studied for bis aiticism of their' philosophicaJ.
anthrop 01 ogy. 136

And finally, Fakhr al-Dm al_Riizï,l39 like Suhrawardi. studied philosophy and jurisprudence

with Majd al-Dm al-Jill in Marighah. Afteral-Ghaziili, he was thestaunchest aitic of the philosopbers
with bis Comme.omr;v on Avicenna' 5 Remorl:s and his ()uiAiesseoce of the Remtds 14) His

aiticism is round 111 a number of warks such œ the lÂt~ÙM of ~J'isdom and bis polemical Book of
CODi'.1VfH':5".IeS ; white bis CoU«:lions. a summn of the doctrines of the philosophers and of the
theologians, contains a refutation of Avicenna' 5 argument against the transmigration of the soul and
against bis proof for the sours immortality.141 His most important work is, perhaps, bis Onenrlu

1301 Jabre, La nOblM de c:~~1illlde; cf. Pines, "Quelques notes," 11-l6; ef. Kempfner, "Rationalisme et

mystique," 153-60; cf. Gianotti, "The Seaets of the Sou1."

135 Gbazilï, Jl,fishk-4ÏrJII-Anff7T, 00. cAffifi; cf. Idem, 71JeM(;heafLit'br(JJ..,..J~/;~} ; cf. the
Eaglish tcaIIS. of Buchman (and the aLder Gairdner) and the French trans, of Deladrière.
136 Made1ung,· Aspects of Ismaw Theology; the Prophetie Chain and the 000 Beyond Bei.ng," in

Idem, Re/{f/2Ous Sdiools IlDd Seçrs in Jl..fedier;;U /slum, XV]], 61; cf. Bayh*[ï, T#bmntRr .$rWJÏJ2 61-Mkmah,
l37-40.
137 al-Shahrastani, KLt:l7J JI1-MuJl1 WJf aI-NJ!14lI. For a French tcanslation, cf. al-Shahrastani, LiFn: dt:'5

re/.{ipims 6' des ~ . tram. and inlro. Gimaret and MOlUlOt, vol. 1; for a partial Englisb t:ransJation, cf. Kan
and Flynn, .ll-fuslzm..5er:t:F andLJinsians; cf. al-Sbahrastiiai, L.iron- des rt"fJpems cr des .R!des, trans. and intro.
MOIUlot and Jolivet, vol. 2; d. Steigerwaid. LJi ~ plLdoscp/Ji;ue er tlIeoIopiJue de Sh~Jinf. 01.
.>I8'I/5.1.
138 Shahrastillï, Jl,f,,*J'iïr JI1-FNJIsz/;-rIt, ed. al-Jabr. He aise wrote glosses on Avicenn.a's Ish.uiïr -
the /'rinidlïr 1I1-S1JJIIJnIsrJllti ÎllJi" KJI1JÏJD ;t/-IsIJ6nïr Cextant but unpubllshed), cf. BroclteLmann, OAL., Supp. J,
817 (witb a reply of 'Umar b. Sahl al-Qa.;Iï); cf. lbid., 762.
139 Hecorresponded witb Ibn -Arabi, cf. Corbin, HisroU-e,374.
140 al-TOsï and al-Rau, SJmr./Jl!Y ;1I-k!Jiir:ê; cf. F. O. al-Razî, L.ubtib II1-IshiirJr, ed. of Shahibï; cf.
Horten, Oie spebdJll:in-lIDdpost/irle 71Jeolop"e; cf. Kraus, "The Contr'Oversies of Fakhr al-Dïn Razi," 131-53;
cf. ldem., "Les 'controverses' de Fakhr al-DiD. Rizi," l87-219; cf. Nur, "Fakhr al-Dia al-Rizi," 642-656.
141 Broeke1.maJln, vAL, Band 1,593; cf. Ibld., Supp.I,817.; cf. F. D. al-Rau, K.rt-.J/JJÛ-A-fun~Ï/'.
m-A-fU/JJ~s;U, 233-4 and 234-35; cf. Michel, "L'eschatologie
ed. and tnuLs. KhoJelf, 4-63.; cf. F. D. al-Rau,
d'Avicel1Jle selOJl. F.D. al-Rizi," 35-63.
 CHAPTER ONE - 34

/or-PqIlllOns (which contains a book On die ~oui). s work critical of Avicennan Peripateticism
and presenting doctrines similar to those found in Suhrawardi I~ He aiso wrote a work On die Soui
tmd t:lJe $pmi" llOd an Erp.!l/Ot8ioA of r.heù nlcul/J'es. an important work for understanding his
philosophical anthropology.l43

Avicenna's thought was to be subjected to anotber kind of criticism. essentially philosophical

in nature. by individuals like Abu al-Barakiit al-Bsgbdidi and Su1lrawardï. Abu al-Barakiit b. Malakah
al-Bagbdidi (d. cs. l070) wrote the Consûlenllioos on «-Lsdom of which the second volume, the
equivalent of a book On iDe Sou.!, contains bis original reworking of Peripatetic philosophical
anthropology.l4a He aIso wrote a work on noetics, the Sou.lldness of de CHUSes From dit? Tmdraon

Regan:fLog l1Jtt ÇJlliddJ'!Yof me IAreUea.

1a5
NIore importantly. there are striking similarities between
the thoughts of Abü al-Barakiit and Suhrawardi - e.g., thar ange1010gy: the soul's perception without
the need for images; a certain unity of the internai senses; the notion of vision. 146 On occasion.
147
Subrawardï rejects Abü sl-Barakiit' s theses. e.g.. on wisdom or on perception. The whole question
of the relationship betwee.n these t'Wo autbors has yet ta be analysed in the ligbt of devel.opmeJlts
within !stamic phitosophica1 anthropology, betWeen the time of Avicenna and Suhrawardi.

",,-.'

l<a F. o. al-Rm, ilI-Atfilbiilnib IlI-MIlShDf/f;f7t/J 12 vols; cf. Pmes, .. La conception de la con..aaissance de

soi," 54-5.
143 F.D al-Razî, K1ilïl!t .u-M'Ûs W;I m-Rii/J and the English tnns. by Ma·~mi entitled Imiim Riïzfs
7Jm id-AJ:IJJMi .
144 Abü al-Baratil al-Baghdadï. ilI-t'vfu 'tubnr.li" oI-(fJkmab, vol. 2. According ta S. Pines, this work

consisu of a aitiQsm oftbe Peripatetic pbi1osophy of Aviceona and a reformulation of some of its philosopbicaJ.
percepts, cf. Pines, " La conception," 217-218; fortbesectionon Abual-Barakat, cf. Ibid.,::1l7-58; cf. Brocke1mann,
ûAL. Band 1.602 and Idem, CTAL., Supp. l, 763. A certain Ibn •Ali b. Fariimacz Malik Yazd defended him
against bis enlies and wrole 17Je l/~t1i61of U,m'{Y (MufIPr JII-TJlw/JJo) , cf. Bayhaqï, TJlIimm~ $iwiü1
ilI-fUkmu, H()"l; cf. Pines. "Notes on Abû-l-Baradât," 175-80.
145 HIS Book on die ~r...so~Ii'om UJe TrJdrbon.ll~ die (Jur,,"!yofdie JAle/ka (KJd6

$ll6i:!I Adi1IJIl RI-Mlt.iJ.Ii Jl..f.tlbfyar 1I1-~/ ), ef. Brocltelmann. OAL Supp. 1. 831. He is aLso said to have
1

writtell a Book 011 The SOu./IUJd ~ O n (KJtiib il/-ND W4I aJ-TJÛsü ). c:f. Bayhal{ï. TJlli.aJmar ~.",_ÏQ
w-IfM:mAIJ, ISO.
146 Pines, "La conœprion de la eonnalssance de soi," 54-5; cf. Al-KhelaUl. "The Psycholegy of Abu

al-Barak& al-Baghdâdî," 245-57.

147 Subrawardi, ilI-t'vfllSDi#7", § 171,436.1-437.12; d. aise 468 n. for hne 5 and 4n where the theses

he rejec:ts are tbose of Abü al-Barakat al-Bagbdadi.

 CHAPTER TWO - 35

• CHAPTER TWO •

SUHRAWARDï

BIOGRAPHICAL SOURCES

There are severa! Arabie and Persian biographical works wltieb contain entries on Suhrawardï.
of which si..x wet"e written within a century of ms de~. some written only within a few years. The
most comprehensive source for his biography, aceorcfing to o. Spies. is the SIrOD oft1Je Spuii"s ~lOd

tl1e OnrUl?O of me Fesrz·f7bes, a biographical work written by Shams al-Dm w-Shahnzüri (d. after
1288).1 The notice in this biographical work. although from a lster period ,2 contains the most
extensive bibliography of Suhrawardfs wodcs. most eertainly because of the fact that al-Shahrazüri
wu the first commelltator on Suhraw8l"di' s Cb"enra/-Dfum.Înab·r-"e 1J'Isoom as well as a follower of
what bIS DOW become co be known as the "illuminative" or "fs/uiirtI" tradition.3 This wode is.
iJldeed, invaluable for the information it provides of Suhrawm-di' s biogmphical data and of bis

- WOl'ks.

Nevertheless, tbis work depends greatiy on information provided br esrlier biographical

accounts such as the OeodJs ofLJisri4{luisIJedIAdif-70lNl!s and.lt:ûonnNLon On rAI? OffspnOg of Time
of Ibn Khallikiin (d. 1282).cl Like most histarieal works, Ibn Khallikin's own biographical work is
tributaly of data provided by earlier works sueh as the Soun:es of UûonruliJOn NegordinC die
BiograpAiesoFPAysr"aims, a work of Ibn Abî U~aybic;ah (d. 1268), whom he cites more than once. 5
A still earlier work is the PicbOHm;YofLirtnui of Yiqüt (d. 1228).6

1 Spies. 71Jn:~ Tr:!;uiS"eF, 1. fOl" the Arabie editlon, cf. Spies, ~ Tœ8DSes. 90-121. ThlS edltion
is superiorto Sbams al-Dm al-5habrazUzï. 11ïriVJJII-ffubœrJ~ed. Abü Sbuwïrab, 375-96.
2 There are dlsaepaneles between the Arable and the Penian translation, e.g., &he Arabie text
report! th. the death of Suhrawacdi aecured at the age of 36, whiJe the PersiiUl 1nUl51Kion mentions that there
Il"e reports tbat he was 88, or 50,. See Shabrazfirl, Nuzihlr m-ArJJf'JÏ/J, Persian. u-ans. of Tabrizï, 454-474, esp.
463. Another Ptnian translation, made by Dii' al-Dia. Durri (Tebran, 13171 (938), is reported by Nasr. who
used tbe Izmer for bis worlc. d. Nasr, 71Jree Afuslr.m S~, 150 a13.
J Corbin, HrSrmœdeJJlphiJosoplne, 302.
4 Ibn Khalljkin, rJ'jtfgyiir aJ.A ftïn, vol 6.268-14 (/luI K1mUibtn S, vol. 4, 153-9). Ibn Khallikin
bcgan.to wnte this wexit in 1256 in Caïre, intemlpœd bis work for some time, earried on bis work in 1271, and

•• finished lt in 1274, see fuck. "(bn Khallikao," 832b-833a.

5 Ibn Abi U~ybÎah (1203-1268), Vyiïnll1-Anhii'fi TalnItIiïrlll-ArrbDiï', 642-6; cf. Ibn KhaUikiin.
WllIi!nït, 267, 268 (Jho KlJJIULbm s .vol. 4, 153, 154-5).
6 Y~iit. [bn "Abd Allah al-Hamawï (1178-1228), MUflun JII-Ud;ll1iÏ'û"-'-Y;qiil', vol. 19,314-20.
 CHAPTER TWO - 36

In addition to these WOl"ks. there are [wo informative earlier works. Fint. there is the Glrrden
of die A-fo.5Yjue for oB die Mdories 0./ die Time, a work which is almost contemporary with

Suhrawardï's desth, having been writtenin 1195-6 by a judge (~li) named cImiid al-Din al-~fahinï
(not $aliiQ al-Din' s secretary),7 residing MOst probably in Aleppo • the cime. It relates. in great

details, the events mat sulTouaded the aceus~onwhich le<! 10 the execution of SuhrawardL8 Second,
there is $a1aJ,. al-Dïn's biography written bya Judge of AJeppo, Ibn Shaddid (d. 1285), entitled lOt!
Empeniil Prod'{e.tes- ~Jnd rôe Yiïsull ilft!nts. 7De BLOgrtipkr of SolO/! m-OÜ1 which is the source of
Yiqüt's information~ These sources rep-esent the meagre data from which a reconstruction, indeed
partial, of Suhrawardï' 5 life can be attempted.

HIS EARLY LIFEAND EDUCATION

Suhrawardï, whose full name was Y~yi b. l:Iabash b Amïrak Abü al-Futü~, Shihib aJ-Dïn.
al-Suhrawardi, was bom, ia 1154, in the village of Subraward, near the modem city of Zanjin in
what is now northwestem lran. His earJy studies in phiJosophy and jurisprudence (he was said to
have foJ1owed the Shifti school- ~.i...)IOwel"eundertaten with the Shaykb Majd al-Dm al-Jill (a
teacher of Fakhr al-Dm al-Rizi) teacbing in Marighah. 11

Mariighah was. at that time, a center of learning which was to become famous alter Hulagu,

the Mongol conqueror, had built the well-known observatory near il and assemble<! the greatest
astronomers of the day onder the direction of Khwijah N~ al-Dm al-TUsl (d. 1274). After some
time spent tbere. Suhrawardï is reported to have left Marighah in search of isolation. Accordiag ta

Shabrazüri. he went to I~abiin to carry on his education, continuing and completing bis formai
training with ~ir a1-~arisi.12 a logician with whom he resd the N6;sirauJ It1s~lJrs itJro LoSiclJ

7 11us was probably *Imid al-Oïn aJ-Isfiihïirü (d. 1201) who wroœ bis ilI-Filr/J ilI-Qudsr- ff /1i-FilL/I

6-ÇJudsr; foc a French U'aI1S., cf. Massé, CaDrj~t:k.lilSynedo'elilP;lIt!StiDeparS8.1JldiJ:t , and an English

trailS., cf. H.A Gibb, 77Je life ofS4.Iilt:5n [No mention is made of Suhrawardï].
8 "Imid al-Dïn al-Isfahaoî, BusdD aI-Jiïmi" li-.hœu- TnJrJÏrfk/J Jll-Z4unü , esp. 114. The Busriïn
JII-.liüm" was written in 1195-6 and 1I5ed by Ibn Kballikin, cf. Idem. 114.
9 Ibn Shaddad (Babâ al-Dio Yüsuf b. Rifl") , Nnw-..iW- il/-Su/.Dïrt[rJlJ "., 1l/-M~ 1lI- YÜ~r;l/I.
Sfntr $nIL!J lI/-Om 1 10; cf. Idem, :5:1r/'.lIO'm:· or. W1Jar BefeJJ Su.lUD Yr1svf1$llI6!J er/-Dm) (1IJ7-.I193 A.P.),
10-11 [ a reprint is tbe one of Labore, IslaJlUC Book Service, 1976]..
10 Yaqiit. Muflim, 314; cf. Ibn Khallikao.. WilIi!nït, 2n (Ibn KhJlllibln S, vol. 4, 156).
Il Y*{üt, Mu;'_ , 314-15; cf. Ibn KJlalJitin. JJ'ilfi!nïI", 269 (.Ibn K.I!3Uiblns, vol. 4, 154).
12 The account of bis sœy in Isfihin 1$ abSeJlt from V-aqut's ~fuJilm and U~ybï'ah's T/;Fiin and Ibn
Khallikin's WJIIit.J'1Ïl, â. 5babrazüri. Nvzlnt/: ed. 5pies. 94; d. ed. Shuwaynb, 378; cf. Persian tnlIlS. Tabrizi,
1

458. Perhaps. he was ~a1Jïr aI-Dîn aJ-Qiri, cf Nasr, 71Jre~~fvslrm.54f"e.s, 56.

13 al-5awi, Kii4i!l iIJ-B;t.#ï7r Ill-NJlsiayJlJ ff ilI-A-f/ld.triy. He aIso wrote a PerslaD. treatise on. Logic cf.
1

'Umar b. Sablin al-5iwï (Sâwajï), Tnb~ ; cf. Rescher. 77Je Oew-lapmeDl' ofArJ/nc Lope, 57, 175.
 CHAPTER TWO - 37

of the logici.an Zayn al-Dïn 'Umar Ibn Sahlin ftl-Siwï or al-Siivaji (d. cs. 1170),101 a work whicb
15
greatly influenœd him. Once his formal training was completed and he had learned aIl that was
possible from ~ahïr af-Fiirisi. he set out to trave! in pursuit of knowledge.

The next period of his life was marked by bis acquailltance with a number of Sufi masters.
He devoted this period of travel to Jes-ning from the inspired men he met. Shahrazüri, the disciple,
mentions bow he used to pœctice spiritual exercises (...::.a~l: -' ), harsb (even if they were brief)
retreats (=i ë .: 1•• ..; ol~ ). and mediration. He set out ta live the Me of a true ascetic. as emaciated as

Christ, as an itineranr mystic (~I ~). <Îi ~ 1 ~ - Jesus being the prototype of the ascetic.
white the Qalandar being a type of Sufi mystic who abandons everything and wanders in the world
in search of spiritual nourishment) engaging in severe and extreme ascetic ecerci.ses, at times fasting
up to a week. Ils His pilgrimage for knowledge brought him aIl over Iran (from Mariighah ta I$'ahin),
and Shahrazûri mentions that he travel1ed into AnatoJia (the then Biliid al-RÜID.), Diyiirba.kr (city
north of lvIiridïn and the Presem day Turko-Syrian borders). and retumed ta Syna. ending bis crave!s
in AleppO.17

Il was Most pl'Obably during tbis period of wanderiJlg that he met many of the Sufi masters
u1
sucb as Shaykh Fakhr al-Dm al-Miridïnï (d. 1198) in Maridm who seem.s ta have had gr~at respect
......... for the lad whom he befriended.19 In the lar.er sources, e.g., Shahrazüri, Many anecdotes are reported
about Suhrawardj's total detachment of worldly affairs. These reports, of which it is impossible to
asœrtain the degree of veracity, could be explained by the dynamic process that hagiographic

14 al-Siwï f10unshed ca. 1145 whose cammentaries on Aviœnna were to.defend him especially
against Ibn MalkiiAbu al-Baraka al-Baghdidi' 5 (d. ca. 1170) critiet5m. Hewroceglosses(extantbutunpublished)
on. Avicenn.a's ;l/-Ni!fiU, responding ta a1-Shahrastanï's criticisms (esp. on Jogic). He is said 10 have written a
PersiaA com.mentary on Ibn S"ma's Risiïln/" ;l1-T:"!pr, cf. Corbin, A via-nne e.r Ir: n!ai p:isro~, 201; cf. Ziai,
"Ebn Sah1ân SavaJi," 52a-53a; cf. Bayhaqî, T3timmJd Si~iin;u-flikm;u, 127-9.
IS MUlilÎWlIHlfr, 146; cf. AfJlSltiiri', 278,352. In rSÏahan, he would have studied with Fakhr al-Drn
al-Rizï (d. 1209). the great adversary of phiJosophy, cf. Nasr, 77Jree Atfuslim SJ{1Tl!5", 51 [but no indication is
f ound Ul the SCllr'Ces].
16 Shahraziiri, Nuzft;tr, ed. Spies, 94-5; d. ed. Shuwayrib, 378; cf. Persian trans. Tabrizi, 458-9
17 ShahrazUri. Nuz!Jllr, ed. SpIes , 97; cf. ed. Shuwayrib, 379; cf. PerslaJ1 traDS. Tabrïzï. 460.
Suhrawardï mentions tbat this wandering life ln search of knowledge bad led him, when he w~ about 30
(lu.n..-) years oid. co find no one ta teacb him something new (the Iast part of the JII-A-fumiià' ,..., iI/-MU!iinl/liï!),
cf. Shahrazüri, .Nuzhllr, ed. Sptes, 379; d. Persian 1ranS. Tabrizï, 460. Most probably Diyiïr Bakr, the region
c;ontroJed by the Artutids, cf. Humpbreys, From Sir/iJdiA ro dJ~ /t,fonço!s 73; cf. Cahen, .. Le Diyir Bakr du
1

temps des premiers Uruquides;' 219-76.

••
18 Yiqiit, lf,fuJmn, vol. 19,315.
19 Mârdin is a city of present dayTurlcish Kunhstiin., cf. MU"ïn, F~-iRïr:sf, sv ~.Jj~ • Ziai
reads lt to be I~ahiill (although he aludes to the fact that it nught be Mardin), see Ziai., "Shihib al-Dm
Suhrawardi," 434. The Penian Mirdinï becomes al-Ma-idini once Arabized, cf. Yiqüt, lf,fuJÎIm , vol. 19,315.
 CHAPTER TWO - 38

litentture undergoes. a process that could. perhaps. account for the tranSmission of the reports this
literature makes of the lives of the sh8}"khs whose memory it purports to preserve:3:I It is aIso during
that period. before reaching Aleppo. that Suhrawsrcfi wouJd have met such individuals as clmiid
al-Da Abü Bake. the son of Qarii Arslin b. Artuq (d. 1166). who roled (r. 1185-1204) Kharpüt
(Khartpurt) aiter the death of bis fatber. and for whom he wrote his Arabie Tob.lt'/"s LJetlicored /"0
'lmiid IU-L)fnZl Nothing in Ibn Abï U:':iaybicah's Sou~ o[lnformolioo Reglrdrf{tr tilt? Bio..ifFlipbLes
22
0./Po,FS'LCÛiOS. however, relates bis stay st bis courts or their eneounter.

HIS STA Y IN ALEPPO

Shaykh I;:>iyâ' al-Dm b. $aqar is said ta have reported that when Suhrawardï retumed from
Anatolia in 1183. he went to Aleppo2J at the tinte when al-?:iihir (Ghiyith al-Dm) Ghizi b. Ayyüb (d.
1216) - the son of $aJ~ al-Din al-Ayyübï (Saladin) (d. 1193) who ruled over Egypt, Yemen and
Shim (roughly present day Lebanon. Syria. and the whole of Palestine) - had just been assigned the
govemorship of Aleppo.z4

The same year, Aleppo had just been conquered by $a1iiJ;1 al-Dm. According to Humphreys.
..AJeppo had always resisted Saladin more strongJy than uy other place. It was far more closely tied
to the Zangid dynasty than the other Syrian towns, and both Its amïrs and re1igious notables had a
clear sense of cohesion and local identity. l.n addition its urban. militia was still a lively organization. .. ..25
Conquered, Aleppo was given, in the form. of a land grant (t. LL.iD, ta $a1~ al-Dïn's fourth son
26
al-Zahir who was made Sultan and who, at that time, was only eleven years 01d. ln the same year,
but six month laler, the land grant was, however, transferred to one of bis brothers, al-cAdi! (d.
1218), and Ibis would be. according to the biographers. when Suhrawardï anived in Aleppo; it would
have occulTed during the six month al-?ihic had been the ruler of the city. By 1185. $a1iIJ al-Din
was still trying ta curtail the power of the Zangid and Artuqid princes and attempting to reduce them
ta vassaldom.Z7 A year h~er. al-cAdi! resigned bis possession and control of Aleppo in whst appears

20 Shahrazüri, Nuzh;tr, ed. 5pies, 95; cf. ed. Shuwayrib, 378; cf. Persian trans. Tabrizï, 459.
21 PUfJavidi," Shaykh-i lsltt&:i," 2-8.
Z2 Ibn Abï U~aybi·ah, Vyün ,646.
23 Yiqiit. ,A,fup vol. 19,315; cf. Ibn Abï U~aybi·ah. 'ltpiin ,643.
1

<l4 SaI~ al-Oïn. (1137-93), barn of Kurdisb descent (Titrit, Mesopotamia), was the flCSt Ayyiibld
sultan of Egypt (1175). He entered the army of Nür aI-Din, l'orhng under the service of his Oncle (Asad

•
al-Dïn b. Shadlnl Shirku.h, tarer becam.e vizier in Egypt aiter the death of Nür al-Dïn (d. 1174) and then.
p'0claimed bim.seJf sultan; fjghtiJJg the Ccusaders. he l'as able ta capture Jerusalem in 1187.
2S Humphreys, From Saladin 10 dte MOAJfo/s, 55.
26 Humphreys. Fl'r:1nI SiUldin ra me M04Jl"O/$, 54-5.
 CHAPTER TWO - 39

•
to have been a politically motivated move in favor of an. exchange of territories in Egypt. Hence. in
1186. al-Zihic. now fourt~en. years of age, was sent back te .AJ.eppo as al-Malik al-~. prince of
Aleppo, accompanied by [wo experienœd commanders (.J-:-A i ) who were to be in charge of
28
administrative and milirary m.ters.

U pon bis anival. Suhrawardï went to the religious sehool (~ .,;~ ) al- Madrasah al- I:I alaw ïyah29

where he auended the tessons of Iftikhür al-Dm. the head of the E;Ianafiyah schooL 3J At al-Madrasah
al-l:Ialawïyah. he debated with the jurists (.l.f.i.i) and their students and was able to gain. respect from
Iftikhir al-Dm. It is reported th. Suhrawardï:

Attended the lesson of its shaykh. the distinguished Iftikhir al-Din [of the I:Jaliiwïyah
school]. He discussed with the juri~s amongst bis ~dents and others, and he
debatecl with them on a number of questions. None of them were able to keep up
[inte11ectuaUyJ with him.. and he gained the upper hand over them. His superiority
becamemanifest ta theShaykh IftikhiraJ-Dïn. Renee. he becamepa't ofhis gathering.
grew close [ta him] and came ta find his place amongst the people [of theseg athering 5].31

It is most probably in Aleppo th. Suhrawardï wrote bis On"eow-Ofuminntive H~s(/om

which he completed in 1186.32 the year before ~aIiJ:t al-Oïn liberated Jerusalem from the Franks.
According to Shahrazüri, this period would cOlTespond approximately (0 the tï.me. when Suhrawardi
would alsa have finished bis Paœs lIDO ConJUYI6IOr.zs. st the age of nearly thirty yeln oid (ca.
1185).33

This is the period which would prove to be fatal to Suhrawardï. The biographers have
recorded tbat he was a man. who would always come out vietorious from a deb81e. most probably on
account of bis ability at expressi.ng bis thought in the most eloquen.t ways. But he also seems ta have
behaved in such a way as to display a condescending 8ITogance for the scholars of Aleppo.34 Ibn Abi
U~aybicab notes. reporting from Shaykh Sadïd al-Dîn b. CUma-. that a friendship had developed

between Suhrawardï and the Shaykh Fakhr al-Dm al-Miiridïni whom Ile would often visit. And the

r7
Humphreys. From SllIMIu1 ~o die MOdIfOIs. 56.
28 Humphreys. From SJU;lÔÛJ ID tlJe Mo~, 61-2. c;cr the political implicatlOns tbis had on
lueaghteJlidg ~alih al-Din.'s position in Cairo and Aleppo through the nominal sovereigmy of al-Zihir and the
rule of al- cAdil. cf. [dem, 62-3.
Z9 The editlon of the 'Uyl1n bas ~.J~I wbicb is most probably a typographical mistake, cf. [bn Abï
U~icah, V}wD,643.
30 Yiqüt. Afupm, vol 19.315; cf. Ibn Am U~aybicah. UJ'lÏD, 643.
31 Yiqüt. AfuJiIm. vol. 19.315.
J2 {fiJ:mlU, § 279,258.4-5 ( SJtyesse, 231).
33 Sbabraziirï. NuzIJ,aJ-. ed. Spies. 96-7; cf. ed. Shuwayrib, 379; cf. Persian tnlns. Tabrizï ,460.
34 IbnAbï U~aybicah. VyiïD, 642.644.
 CHAPTFR TWO - «>

Shaykh Fakhr al-Dia used ta tell ms disciples that there was no one more intelligent (~i) man this
youth. or more eloquent (~i ) and unequalled. Fakhr al-Dia. bowever. was conceraed for the lad.
whose carelessnes5. rashness and unrestrained recldessness would one day. be the cause of bis
1

downfaU J5 In spite of the existence of a number of anecdotes in w hicb he is described as often going
about dressed as a pOOl' man36 and without any pretension. reports about the heedlessness of bis
cbaraeter round their way into the biographicaJ WOrlcs. 37 This latter information. indeed. would easily
account for the fact that. with the passing of time, the anger of his adversaries mouRted ta the point
of cavsing bis downfall.

THE SOCIO-pOLmCAL CONfEXT

In. arder ta understand the events tbat led CO Subrawatdr s execution. it is necessary ta

provide a gJimpse iota the sociopolitical conœn of the time. It bas been suggested mat Suhrawardi
might have unwillingly exacerbated the animosity that was mounting against him by writing a work
dediœted to 'lmid al-Dia the so.o of Qsrii Arslân (Diwud) b. Artuq. the Saljuq prince (.J":!-8i ) of
Kharput {Khartpert}. who in 1185 establisbed a collateral bran.ch of the Artuqids (he died &round
1204).36
..--..
The Artuqids were a Tutkish dynasty who bad sett1ed in Diyirbakr, North of Miridïn and
the Syro-Turkish barder, lt'oWld 1Ji~ Kayfi and Amid; a collateral brancb had settled &round
Miridïn and MayiJariqïn. They ruled over some territories, often as vassafs. for almost three centuries
until the Ayyübid conquest in 1232.

The tise of the Zangids halted the expansion of the Attuqids who became the vassals of Nur
aI- Dm39 This was most probsbly Nul' al-D in MaJfmüd b. Zangi (t. 1146-1174). H umphreys mentions

tbat the Artuqids "represenœd more the Turkmen than the Great Safjuqid tradition and hence were

even more clearly oriented toward the politicai value of the steppe... hence, ~a1~ al-Dia had ta
reconciJe the gui ding princip1es of "shared authority and local autonomy" with these local rulers in
arder "ta balance the uJtimstely irreconci1able daims of the absolutist suJtanate and collective
sovereignty. ,,'10 The Zangids l"Uled ovet" a century in Mosul and Aleppo with a collateral branch in

3S Ibn Abï U~aybicah. V,Yiin, 642.

J6 Ibn Abï U~aybicab. Vyün 644. 1

n Ibn Abi U~aybiaJt, Y,yiiD 644.1

38 Bosworth, 71JeNew Es/mmc lJXn;iDt!s, 194; cf. Idem, ··Saldjüki.ds," 946b-9S0a.

39 Bosworth, 71JeNew Es/.JlDVC lJ,)'DIIsties, 195; cf. Cabe:n... Artutids, " 664a.
40 Humphreys. From SlIIadiL1 ro die Mangals. 73.
 CHAPTER. TWO - 41

•
Damascus and. at limes. in Aleppo."u They were also of Turkish origins like the .~qid. while the
AY}'Übids wereof Kurdish origin. lnevitably. with theirexpansionist policyinDiyirbakr and al-Jazïrah,
they were ta clasb with the Ayyübids. Twice ~ali1) al-Dïn failed ta capture Mosul (in 1182 and
118S)~ eventually. however, they bad to give way under bis might.
a2
By this tUne. the Zangids and
the Artuqids were clieJ'lt states to the Ayyt1bids. and the undeniable jealousy between the (Wo was
still ft[ work at the political JeveL<t3 A further eJement of discontent between the two political powers
was the telTitorial expansion of the Ayytïbids, at the expense of the neighboring roling dynasties, in
partiœlarthe Zangids of Aleppo and Mosul. as weIl as the Artuqids of Diyirbakr.a.a

In the politic al arena, another btUition of dissension threatened the political stability of
Aleppo and its sUlTOundings. This was the 5tronghold of the Ismicllis (the Assassins) of Jabal
~iriyah. between Antioch and Hamiih (southwest of Aleppo). Althaugb. in sorne sense, they were
vassals of al-Malik al-Zihir. they were not entirelf under his contro1.<5 The Ismacïlis of the Ni~
branches were aften suspected of being st the origin. of many of the outbreaks of social and political
discontent. In Pet"Sia and Syria, they often resorted to spectftcular religiaus assassinatian, e.g.. the one
of Ni?iim al-Mulk (d. 1092), and launched raids from their mountain fortresses. ~a1~ aJ.-Oin was to
be abject af two attempts of assassination (J 174-5 and 1 L76).~ As a result, an atmosFbere of terrar
wu gellerated.
In Syria, their presenœ was to be felt from about 1100 to 1273.<f1 In Aleppo, the fire that
ae
damaged the Great Masque in. 1167-8 had been attributed, by sorne, ta the work of Ismiicilis. Still,
in. 1176-7, the Ismiicm Nizarites mounted a military expedition in the south-west of Aleppo.a'if In

1179-80, three years before Suhrawardi arrived in Aleppo. after the seizure of one of tbeir fortresses.

Niziri agents wa-e sent ta AlepFo, where they set fire ta severaJ locations in the city's market place.
The newly established Ayyübid rulers in the regian of Aleppo· and Damascus weI'e weil

41
Gibb "Zer1gi and the Fall
l or Edessa," 515-6.
4i! Boswonb, 77Je New fs/itmrc L1.J11211stil!'S, 19l.
43 Humphreys, Fnmr SaJJldiA fJ;:J die JvIOdJfols, 18, 29-30.
44 Humphreys, FnMZ SllIIIdiA ro dJe MODJrOIs, 45.
4S Humphreys, Fnmr Sa/4IefOr fJ;:J die A-IOJ{lI"ols, 8l.
416 Daftari, 71Ie fsrDJ'-ufs ,399.
<n Bosworth, 7be fHllnz/C L?rnll#ies-. 68-9; cf. LeWIS, "The Ismi'îlites and the Assassins vol. l, 1"

99-132. for the iDtellectual history, especi.ally of the doctrine of the trfJlZimRlt, cf. ElOdgSOD, 71Je enta- of

•
~,15O-209 .
48 ElIsséeff, "Les monuments de Niir al-DiD. Inventaire. notes archéologiques et bibliographiques,"
1....
49 By Si1~ Is.mall, cf. Eddé, "Une grande famille," 64.
 CHAPTER TWO - 42

•
aware of the potential thre~ that these different political aspirations represented. The sociopolitical
context of AJeppo and. by extension. of the sulTounding ten'Ïtories rested on a balance of power that
theru1iJlg Ayyübids.especiallyatthetimeof$alm, al-Din. weretrY1J1g ta achievewitb along-establish~
indigenous aristocracy, or, as Humphreys bas labelled them. the "turbaned" c1ass (~ .-.':<.) "whose
so
power was based on its religious leadership and its large scale mercantile and landowning interests."

Il was chis indigenous "ari~ocracy" whicb engaged Ï1L the construction of public <mosques
and schools) and private (baths and houses) buildings which were to earn them the "propinquity ta
God" which issued from good deeds ('~.~ ) 51 lt was aIso this indigenous class chat held unportant
political positions and orten recei.ved stipends. Their leadership. however. was most strongly felt
with their moral authority which was refJected by the upper layer of the leamed class, represented by
the professors of the madrasah to which they were associated. and by the judges of the major
towns.S:Z

This is the period in which religious schools become indispensable as tools of propaganda
fOl"polirica1 powers. lnitially, the instimtion of the religious schools was fostered by a will te counter
the development of the FiJ,imids' propagation of the Shï1ï (lsmicUi) thought through their own BOl/se
ofKDowler:(fre (rJ.aJ1 .)IJ). The establishment ofthese learning institutions was most aptlyachieved
by the Saljuq vizier N~iim aJ-Mulk (d. 1(92) who tried ta foster the instruction of Ashcarite knliïm
and Shificï jurisprudence. His name remained associated with these Sunnï leaming centers, the
M~mrn.J'RD schools; in Iraq (opened in Baghdad in 1067 and Mosul), in Jazïrah, and Khurisin
where the first school opened (Nishapur, Balkh, Harat, and Marv).5J Chamberlain and Makdisi, on
the other hand, argue that madrasahs were "private" waqfs, i.e.. religious endowments. and not as
activities of the state, although the waqfs had social. ideological and political usage. In any case. the
"turbaned" class were, indeed. closel.y related to the rulers.S4

The city of A1eppo itself hac! a history of Shî ah aetivities, having once been dominated by
the most celebrated of aU the cio/'s ruling dynasties. the l:Jamdinids who were Arab tribesmen, with

50 Humphreys. From SIl/..·ufin ~ die M04f"oIs, 25.

51 Morray. AAAxyubiriNot-J!J/e, 128-9.
~ Humphreys. FnJm Slt/adin ~ die M04!f"oIs, 23-4.
53 On the creation of a netwcrk of the madcasahs by Ni~ al-Mulk, c:f. Makdisi, "Muslim Instianions,"
1-56. For a good inlroduetlon on the Ulsbtution of the madrasah, its origin, its deveipmenE, and its methods of
iJœnJeti.on, d. Ma1tdisi., 77J~RüeofCoU~; d. Sourde1, "Les professeurs de madrasa à Alep," 113-5.
54 Chamberlain writes that "rulers supported the elttes upon whom they depended direct1y ... By
founding madrasas. powerfuJ howeholds eould insert thc:mseJves 1IJtO the eulnraJ. political, and sociallife of
the eity, and tunl e:xisting practic::es and re1ationships to their own benefit. This is how charitable foundations
becam.e in!truments of politics," cf. Chamberlain, Know.Jt!'dgl:, 52.
 CHAPTER. TWO - 43

two branches one in Mosul (905-991) and one in Aleppo (945-1004), the latter ruling over Aleppo
for ove.- balf a century (with the capture of Aleppo by Sayf al-Dawlah) until its conquest by the
C':;.
[""a~tmJ
'd s.5S

The introduction of the institution of the re1igious schools in Aleppo served as a means to
oounter the influence of these dissentin.g Muslims. i.e.. the Twe1ver Shtis. but aIso the Ni?:iri
Ismilli. just as had been done in the eastem part of the Muslim empire. The first religlous school in
the city was the al-Zajjipyah school. begun in 1121 or 1122 by 'Abd al-RaJ;unin of the Banü
al-'Ajami, encouraged by the govemor of Aleppo (Badr al-Dawlah Sulaymin). At first. the opening
of these Sunnï religious institutions was met with tierce objection from the Shli commumty which
represented a large portion of the population and which sensed the new UlStitution to be a threat to
the growth and the survival of their own religious community (this shti opposition had almost
disappesred in. the beginning of the role of Zangi [1128-1l46] ).:6

The establishment of further religious scbools was done by bis son Nür al-Din b. Zangi
(SUJ1JlÏ) (r. 1146-1176) who, st the beginning of bis reign was tolerant of Shtism. but who 181er, in

an attempt ta counter tbese unorthodox be1iefs established both madrasahs with the heJp of re1igious

-. endowments ( {f.!J), and a Diir llI-fIl1d1ô in the Grand Masque of AleppO,57 greatly encouraging
the revival of the Sunnï faith.56 He saon abolished (in (148) the Shti forms of praye..- previously used
in Aleppo.S9 He had, at leasc. three Shificï madras ah S, one l:Ianbalite and one Malikite a/w{.YII
established during bis reign.60 During the same period. he also established a few convents, i.e.,
/dNiQynh (et.a.:,l:..) or n'b~/' (.J..4_J)' e.g., the Khinaqih al-Qadim, the Khinaqiih al-Q~r, which was

build under the citadel, and a khinaqiih exclusive1y for women.61

The aJ.-ljaliwiyah religious school, where Suhrawardï first ÏJ1troduœd himself upon his
srival in AJeppo, seems to have been, at that time, the leading I:Janafi school in the city. It had been.
one (Saint HeJen) of the four churches of the city turned into masques. in 1124, by Mu~ammad Ibn

$ Bosworth, 77Ie New1s/;lJ11rc L!.mluties, 85-6; cf. Canard, Mseoirr vol. 1. 579-712. [0 1001, a
1

peaçe treaty wu signed between che ratlmid callph al-f:(itim and the JImir of Aleppo, cf. Canard. "H amdinids,
n

13Ob.
56 Eddé, "Une grande famille," 63.
S7 Elïsséeff, "Les mOJnlments de Niiral-DÜl," 5-6,15.
58 Gibb. "The Career- of Nür al-Dm," 513-27.

•
59 Daftari, 71Jefsmaufs,380.
60 Elisséeff, "Les monuments de NUr' al-DÜ1," 9-11,15.
61 Elisséeff, -Les mOD1Jmenls de N'Ur al-Dm," 9, 12, 13. He restored the fU'5t convent for dervishes,
establisbed by Shams al-J:Iaw~ Lü'Jü' in 1115, cf. Ibid., 17.
 CHAPTER TWO - 44

al-Khashshih. a member of a prominent Shï"î family of the city.62 with whose familya member of
the Banü aI-CAjamî (who died in 1166) was constantly in conflict.03 In 1147-8, the mosque was

restored and transfonned into a school where Burhiin al-Dm AbU al-l:Iasan cAli al-J:lasan al-Ba.lk.hî
64
was appointed. Later. [ba al-"Adïm (d. 1262). having the directorship (4.:~.s) of the school. lJecame
65
one of its teachers. [t is interesting ta note that more than fifty percent of ail the professors of

Shifîïte religious schools in Aleppo and more than a third of the l:Ianafite schools. between ca. 1155

and 1252. were "Eastemers," i.e.. scholars who came from Kurdistan. upper Mesopotamia, and
ti6
Iran Most probably. however. it seems that the bulk of the new arrivais eotered Syria in the lime of
Nûral-Dïn(d. 1 l 74).67 In Aleppo. therehad beenconflictsbetweenthetwo majorreligiouscommunities.

the ShÎi (essentially the Banï al-Khashshih) and the Sunni; but these, however, were not ta last long.
This wss less than aine years before Suhrawardï arrived in Aleppo:

Sauvaget bas suggested that praof of the efficacy of what he term.s the 'Sunnï
propaganda machine: is colltained in the failure of the auempted coup by Shti
e1ements in 552/1157. It also eaabled the city to survive the sectarian riots of
570/1174. Br al-Malik al-~ibir's time. relations betWeen the Sunnï and Shtï
68

communities were g ood.6'J

-- The policy of al-Malik al-?ahïr (who took over the city in 1186) toward the Shïcis of Aleppo

seems ta have been ta try ta win them over. He is known to have extended the distribution of

patronage between the four Sunnï schooJs of jurisprudence, amongst which the Sbif1ï and the
l:Ianafi predominated. but aI50 to the !mimi Shi"i schoolof jurisprudence. The Imim.ï or Twelvef'
Shtïsm. with its Jong bistory of quietism, was an officially tolerated schism.~ According to Ibn

C Adïm. al-Malik al-:?iihir settled a generous religious endowment on the newly completed Mashhad
al-l;Iusayn in arder "ta win the hearts of the Shtah of AJeppo ... Lesser gestures included interceding
with the roter of Âmid for the relœse of a Sb~ï genealogist. "71

62
Marray, An A.P.J'U1:m:fHab/ble. 128.
63 Eddé, "Une grande famille," 63-4.
6<1 E1isséeff, "Les monuments de Niir al-Dia." 8.
ES Marray. AJ14f7UDroHœible.41-2.
66 Sourde1. "Les Jll'Ofesseurs de madrasa àAlep," 113-4.
67 Humpbreys, From S8fildmlO t:bell-folllols, 26. Nür al-DÜl (Matunüd b. ZargJl. Amïr of Aleppo
and Damasc;us (d. lI74).
68 Abü al-fadl b. Yabya: b. al-Khashshib, a Smï, was exe-:uted a:s the leader of the revolt, Eddé,

'.
"Une grande famille," 64.
69 Marray, An A.FYUI:m:fNornble. 13l; cf. Sauvaget, "l:ialab," 87.
7C Morray, AD A;,Y,PUbJ"dNo/JIble, 148.
71 Marray, An A..y'yuDrONœible, 132.
 CfIAPTER TWO - 45

•
Furthermore. reasons for friction between the Sunnî 5 .E:Ianafi and Shaftï schools of
jurisprudence had just appeared. For one tbing. once $aliJ;1 aJ-Oin took ove- AJeppo (in 1183). he
removed from office people who were not Shiiftï. hke the father of Ibn •Adim. <AJ;tmad b. Hibal
Alliih). a l:Ianafi judge. Suhrawardï, coming ta Aleppo, was entering the domain of this indigenous
aristocracy. the "turbaned" class whose members were judges. teachers. and Imams of Aleppo still
negotiating with the new Ayyübid rulers cher religlous authonty in the cit}'. The Ayyùbid rulers. in
talcing ovec the control of the city. had their own agenda. The new rulers needed the legitimising
acquiescence of this indigenous aristocrac;;n which occupied important functions, in particular, in
the religious schools, teaching Islamic jurisprudence. These were the positions where the interests of
the roler and those of the leading Sunnï families merged. n
Another cause for concem was the nature of the religious class. The jurists of Aleppo. who
were the bulk of the teacbers. were deeply conservative as a whole. 74 In spite of the Ayyübid role and
control over the city, the men of the turban" remained an indirect thl'est (albeit lacking in military
U

forces):

The men of the Turban ... in the re1igious establishment couJd seriously emb8lT8S5
Saladin br public1y cslli ng him to account for bis actions; they couJd aIso undercut
bis cJaim. to be the true spiritual har of Nür al-Din7S by refusing him moral and
propaganda support. 76

The situation in Aleppo was net exceptional nor different from other great centers such as
Baghdad. The social climate, in which this indigenous aristoaacy - the" men of the turban" - who in
fact represented, on the whole, the orthodox religious class, did not allow much freedom for dissenting
voices, no matter how well tbought out any new ides might have been. Any .. deviant" belief which
might be aired in the religious hospices (4.:,,1 j) of different orders, couJd be viewed br the orthodox
religious elass as a threat to its reJigious authority. The popularity of individuaJ sbaykhs could also
be seen as a threat, which could lead - fostered br resentment and jeaJousy on the behslf of the
indigen.ous religious cJass - to agitation requiring a response by the ruler ~ One such tragic case
appears to have been tbat of Subrawardi.

72 Marray, AnA.p'yuIn"dN«nble. 123, 124.

73
Marray, AnA,~lndNOIJJble, 130.

74 Marray. AnA,JyUlndNOIJJble. 136.

•
75 Nür al-Dm roled between 1146 and 1174 as a defender of Sunni [siam. against the Ri~ids and the
CrusaOers.
76 Hwnphreys. FromSu/mlil1lOr:l1eMooso's.29.
n Morray, An Axruln"dN«4lbfe 142.
1
 CHAPTER TWO - 46

MOUNTING OPPOSITION
At the t1alawîyab religious school. Suhrawardi. having become a close friend of Iftikhir
al-Dia. was gradually fostering the animosity of the local and indigenous jurists. He. who had come
as a stranger to Aleppo and in the garo of a wandering mystic. was surpassing aU those that were
present. And from tbat time on... the jurists colluded against bim. such that tbeir slanders agailLst him
inaeased...78 Having had wind of Suhrawercfi's intelleetual abilities at disputation. al-Malik al-~ir
is said ta have convened a gathering of Jurists and theologians of all schools of jurisprudence in the
citadel. It would be there that: i9

They discussed and debated Wlth him. and [agamI he gained the upper hand over
them with bis proofs (~) and bis logical demonstrations (~I ~) His superiority
became manifest to al-Malik al-?ibir- Hence, he became close to him. took interest
in. him, and devoted bis attention. to him.. 6J

As a result of his ability st defeating bis adversaries in disputations (~ ) and debate

(o~~ ), al-Malik a1-~ took a liking to him and invited him at his court in. Aleppo (the
citadel). Bl

Al-Malik al-?ibir was, in facto a patron of the arts, e.g., he gave a land grant to Abü Ghanim
--'. al-Sharaf, an Aleppine literary figure. B2 At bis court, Subrawardï made Many enemies for himself,
especially among~ the jurists of aU the different legal schools and the theoJogians with whom he
used ta debate. The wrath of those who bad disputed with him was not long to oome. They" accused
hint of apostasy [heresy] {.)~D and of professing un-lslamic be1iefs (~~j ).,,63 JeaJous and envious
of this stranger who bad gained access 50 quickly to the ruler of AJeppo. they were preparing to seal
Suhrawardi' s fate with a religious decree demanding bis deatb. The onJy account of how these
accusations came about - notwitbstanding the accuracy of the report - is found in cImid al-DiD
al-~ahiinî's work, written in 1195-6, just afew years alter the incident:

The jurists of AJeppo coauded against him, with the exception [?f of [wo jurists,
sons of .f:Iam.ï1; they both said, 'This man is a jurist and il is not suitabJe that bis

78 Yaqût, ~fuj8m, vol. 19.315; cf. Ibn Abi U~aybicah. Vyün, 642.
79 Ibn Abi U~aybicah, Vyiin.644.
80 Yaqiit, ~fu:tJm,vol. 19,315.
81 "Imiel al-Dm, BusdD JtI-./iïm/ ISO.
1

82 Marray. An A,y'yu1nr:fNdJlble 126.

1

I~ yaqiit. Jlfujàm, vol. 19,315.

~
83

84 ln fact, the sons of ~amîl were, mon probably, the leading figures to plot these accusation, cf. Ibn

Kballitin, WJÜI!nir 2 n (Ibn Kmillibtn s, vol 4 156-7).

1
 CHAPTER TWO - 47

debates in the ci.tadel be brought ta the masque.· And all the jurists gathered and had
an assembly convened for him. A..mongst aU of bis works, tbere was an exegeticaJ
work of the Qur'in. according [0 his own opinion (~; J)' ft book which he entitled
TkD.ù-'ÜJeRecorrf ('a"""""~1 ~;Jl), and anodterbook whicb was said to be10ng to
him, the Tdh./trs L)edù:oFMFO 'lm17d aI-L).f.o used against mm in the dispute. They
did not know. however. wbat to say to him regarding jurisprudence (J"...-~' ~ ).
They said ta hint. 'You said ÎJ1 your works that God is able to create a Prophet.
wheress this is impossible: Then, be said to them, 'There is no limit ta His divine
foreordainment [divine decree] 15n't He the All'-mighty? If He wills something. il
cannot be impossible.' They said, 'Indeed.' He said. 'SOt Gad is capable of aIl
thiags.' They 58.1d. 'Except the creation of a Prophet. since it is impossible.' He said,
'SOt is it impossible msolutely or net?' They said. 'You bave ÎJ1deed become an
in!idel ('..::.a.,;is )' They oonstrued grounds [for bis eondemnation]. because. on the
whole, he was lacking in. reason - lOugh Ilot in knowledge,E15 and amollgst this [i.e..
aU the signs of bis lack of reason] was chat he called his [own] soul "inspired br the
world of Malaküt" (~~l.: ~;.L' 4Il::.."J).86
Afterthis incidellt, whether or not the incident ae:tually oCCUlTed in these aceual circumstanœs,

the orthodox religious elass, most of whom were jurists. agreed upon issuing a legal decree (,$~ )

against hïm. asking for bis ex:ecution. Two of bis most ardellt opponents were the Shaykhs Zayn
B7
al-Din and Majd al-Dïn. sons of l:Iamn.

The same accusations of ÙTeligiosity found their way into thework of Saliil:a al.- DiB' s biograpber,
Ibn Shaddid. who writes th. $al~ al-Dm was very observant of the precepts of religion and a
sincere be1iever in the teachings of the Divine Law; but, he:

Detested philosophers, atheists (~ ), materialists (~,;,;~) and aU adversaries of

Islamic law (~~ 1 ~~ ~ ). He even ordered bis son al-Malik a1-~, Prince
of Aleppo ... ta put ta deatb a young man named Suhrawardi It is said that he had
been aocused of not reeognizing the ordinanees of Islamic laws (~I ~ 1~ ~
~),
E13
... . and of payi11g no regard ta the doctrines of the faith.
It i!i not yet clesr wbat a.etuaUy thell took place. According to Yüqüt' s accoual, it was the
religious leaders of Aleppo who informed $a1i1) al-Oin:

They then wrote about chis to al-Malik a1-N~r ~al~ al-Dia and wamed him against
the conuption of the [right] beliefs of bis son through bis friendship with Shihiib
al-Suhrawardi. as well 85 the [right] be1iefs of the people, if he were to remsin.
amongst them. Rence. $a1iû.l al-Dm wrote to bis son a1-~ and ordered him to kill

as He had a lac:k of pnetlcal wisdom, net being able to defend himself without jeapar'dizing bis
security.

•
86 CImiel al-Dm, Busdaal-o/iim/, 150-1.
87 A later work identifies them as the sons of Jahbal, cf. Ibn Khallikan. fiJJih!yJ"J". 272 (/bn KIJJlI1Lbm 's
1 vol. 4, 156-7).
88 Ibn Shaddid. ;I/-M/JJ-;ir:fir. JO ( 'SJllIldJD: 10-11).
 CHAPTER. TWO - 48

(Suhrawardi]. pressured him into (Suhrawardïs execution]. and insîsted..>\nd the

jurists of Aleppo issued ft religious decree ~;) for bis e.xecution. 69
ln the version of Ibn Shaddiid. bowever, it was al-Malik al-~8hir. the ruler of Aleppo, who
had Suhrawardï arrested. because he had been accused by the religlous leaders of holding tenets that
were comrary te Islam: "al-Zahir. having sent lhis man to prison. reported what had occulTed to bis
father. the Sultan. who ordered bis son to have him killed."90

ln any case. it is, tberefore. not surprising tnat $alih al-Din. grappling with the jurists'
discontent. so readily acquiesced ta the wishes of this "turbaned" class. most probably in order not ta
itritate this very influential group of people whose support he needed ta &Void any possible social
unrest in Aleppo.

Ibn Abï U~aybicah reports tbat Suhrawardï had been accused of being an infidel (o';a.s), and
that "$aliiQ al-Dm sent a letter to his son al-Malik. al-Ziibir who was in Aleppo. which contained a
deaee by the hand of the judge al-Fic;lil which read as foUows ... It is necessary that this Shihib
al-Dia al-Suhrawardi be .killed. and there is no possibility for him to be let free, or that he continue ta
exist... "91

Ibn Khallikan, however, acknowledges, more than hal! a century after Yaqüt, that conflicting
reports existed reg.-ding the cause of Suhrawardï's death - of disbelieving in Gad, of following the
system professed by the philosophers of ancient times ,9Z of speaking bis mind, of being accused of
zmJdtNjtllJ (4i~j ), i.e., of holding heretical beliefs, and of heresy (apostasy. unorthodox views]

(,JW! ), white others took him for a saint and capable of miracles (some occurring after bis death).93
Ibn Abï U~aybicah even reports what he heard !rom al-J:Iakïm Ibrihïm b. Abï al-Fa~l b. $adaqah who
retells one such occasion in which Suhrawardi would bave perfonned sorne sort of wondrous deed.94
It is reported that he had been involved with weberny. Say! al-Dm al-Anudï recounted bis encou.nter
with Suhrawardi and his professed knowledge of future events.~ He is said to have been accused of
cla;mjng prophecy, an accusation that Shahnrzüri, the disciple, refutes.96 Most of the reports are

ll'J Yiqüt, ;JIu/JIm, vol. 19, 315-6.

90 Ibn Sbmdid, ;J/-M#nœr, 10 ( 'SM/1IdJo: 10-11).
91 Ibn Abï U~aybi·ah, 'l[Plln. 642.
92 Ibn Khallitân, WiiI'i!J'iit, 272 (/bd KhJllf~ S, vol. 4, 156).
en ·lbn KhalJ:itan, "~!}'ÜI', 273 ( /bn KmiUibm S, vol. 4, 158).
9llf Ibn Abï U~aybi·ah, 7/yiin Id-AAbn-, 642.
95 Ibn Khallitin, WNt;!JIiir, 272 ( /bn KhJlOrbut S, vol. 4, 157).
96 Shabl1lZÜri, Nuzlmt', ed. Spies, 97-8; cf. ed. Sbuwayrib, 379; cf. Persian trallS. Tabrili. 461. This is
absent from. Yaqùt's MuPm. Ibn Abi U$ayb1cab's Vyü~ and Kallikin's W.ui!J"lU
1
 CHAPTER TWO - 49

•
merely speculations of che OCCUlTence of an earJier event.

The accusation of z/mdlHfuil is. perhaps, the most reved1ing. A vague term, it might
encompass any type of iITeligiosity, essentially a rejection of the revea1ed law. le could, however.
also include unorthodox beJiefs like the ones which are easily identifiable in the works of Suhrawardï.
The wave of zaodlKjolJ accusations had previous.ly oa;urred during the role of the caliph al-Mahdi
(between 782 ta 786) w hen a great number of seaeraries of Persian descent were condentlled for
97
what migbt have been their Maruchean beliefs and their ascetic practices. A number of elements
found in Suhrawardi, similar ta those just mentioned, May have led ta these accusations of zaodaqolJ.

Furtbermore, Sha.hrazüri, echoing IbnAbï U~aybi'ah'sreport, hints to thefactthat Suhrawacdî,

endowed with impetuosity and temerity. fame. and. not least, heedlessness and rashness, mightbave
put off bis guard and been careless 1Jl bis speech, thus contributing ta bis downfaJ1. For Shahrazüri.
this would not exclude the possibility that the religious leaders of Aleppo must bave fostered such
ge
resentment, not excluding the possibility of their collusion in 8lT8.dging for his death.

Most of the reports would. then. tend to corroborate the thesis chat Suhrawardi wouJd bave
been executed for sociopoJitical ressons, i.e.. in order to appease the religious class of AJeppo. on
whom the Ayyübids depended for the legitimaey for tbeir rule over the city. and whom Suhrawardï
bad - perbaps even inadvertently - infuriated. SociaUy, debates were of the utmost importance for
the learned elite as "the most pure1y agonisricform of interaction," iJl which the" honor" ofindividuals
could be afÎumed. strengthened or ruined. Furthermore. it was one of the ways for any newcomer to
gain a good reputation.99
More importantly, sinee there wEI"e no state or corporate bodies that promuJgated COlTeet
oo
doctrines. there a1ways existed a "struggle" over the capacityta definecolTect beliee As Chamberlain
bas tried ta show. there Wel"e shaykhs who would .. approach rulers especially ta silence others
through violence," and one such example of mis type of social struggle amongst the learned elite
would seem to be rhe accusation chat was laid against Suhrawardi 101

This tragic event may illustrates the balanœ of power that was stnlck betWeen the ruling

'17 Walt, 17Je Farm~.,&iJ'r! ~riod offs/anue 71Jour.fJ1' , 171-2.

98 aai, "The Source and Nature of Autbority ," 294-334.
99 Chamberlain, Knowle~ llIKf 50&111/Pnlaiee, 164. 164 n.83.
100 CbamberlaiJl, Know/~llAdSocinlJ+naiœ, 167-8, 17L.
IQI A staIe of c:oJJusion of instated betWeen the leamed eJite (J/)';iO) and tbe members of the ruling
groups, cf. Chamberlain, KnowJec/rellJ1c1Soc:ill! Pr,JÇl:Jt:e, 172-3. 1n n. 132, 174-5.
 CfiAPTFR TWO - 50

•
Ayyübids, namely $al~ al- Dïn. and the "turbaned" c1ass of Aleppo and, this. in spite of the relationship
that was establisbed between Subrawardï and al-Malik a1-~r. Suhrawardï having made mostly
enemies for himself could nat count on the Ultercession of powerful men or rulers which could. ~;:
102
some instances, make it possible ta escape from a condemnation of death. Il seems that the "raison
d'état"' of the Ayyübids was mightier.

Furthermore, it is not improbable that Suhmwardï's end was precipitated by bis involvem.ent
in political circles or. at least, by bis association with men of power and of influence. It might be
more difficult, however, ta argue tb81 he tried ta put mm practice the political side of bis "iJluminstive"
philosophy which he is said .. ta have taught" ta Many leaders of the region. 103 lt is one thing to be
commissioned to write a work for a ruler who would act as a patron, and it is quite another to
aetuaUy engage in an oven political program of propagation of one' 5 own political philosophy. The
difficulty lies mainly with the bistoricaJ data chat have survived and which do not oolToborate such
c1aims, This does not preclude the existence of political implications of Suhrawardf s phiJosophy.
The only facts that can be corroborated are that Suhrawardï was requested te write ft summary
of the thought of the theosophers (.-. c, ~~ - ~4-fJ1 ~~ ) for someone desEl"Ying, moS[

probably "Imid (al-Dia Qara, the son of Arslin b. Artuq),ICJol and that he befriended al-Malik

-
.... al-~iihir, even beiog invited ta the citadel.

There is no historica1 data, however, ta colTOborace the claim chat Rum al-Din Sulaymiin
Shih, Saljuc[ of AJlatolia, befriended Suhrawardï and commissioned mm ta write his RoysofLi!rbrs
:05 This would be impossible if it were Ghiyith al-Dunyi wa al-Dm Sulaymin Shiih who died in
1161,106 as Suhrawardï would have been but six years old, and still quite impossible if it were Rukn
107
al-Dm SulaymiJl Shih, in Anatolia. since he l"Uled after Subrawardï's death, f..om 1197 to 1204.

1/)2 ChamberJaiJl, KAo",.Ieq,e nndSaciulPnlazœ, 173.

103 Ziai, "The Source and Nat1Ire of Authority," 322 a. 48 [do Idem, "The Source and Nature of
Politlca1 Autbority 1Jl Suhrawartfi's Philosophy of Wnminatian," in 1tPc'~ of t:fJ1!' Canf~ 00 t:fJ1!'
Polilù:aI Asper:rs al'Is.l6mi&' P1u7asoplJy (l988)]. The sources ta which ZiaI refers do DOt, however, contain
such facts, cf. M.hkür's introduction ta Ibn Bibi's ~~ al-Dia I:lusayn b. Mu1;lammad) whase wor.kdoes not
plOvide any hard fact about die daims that Ziai mates, since the Sufi who is memioned in this work is DOt
Suhrawardï S1nIfkh Il1-Is1Jnïi.I, d. Ibn Bibi, AkhlJiïr-i SaOjiipth-.J'7"RÜRI, 93; no infann~oJl is found in the
otber primary sources coUected in tbis work suclJ as the '7ii7k/J AI-J" SnfIiiv . . AnJi!rÜr, cf. Ibid., 345 or the
MIISliiRinIt .-AkhlJJir, cf. Ibid., 402-3. There is no mention of Suhrawardï in Talbot Rice's wort on whicb
depends M. J. Musbkür's introduction, cf. he, 71JeSeJ.iuh inAsia Afinar, 61-4.
104 A/WlifJ-i 'lmïr:D, § l, 11 0, l2-111.1.
lOS Ziai, "TheSowœ and Namre of Authority:' 322 n. 48.
106 Bosworth, 71JeNer fsllUl'UC J)fDJIstle"s, 186.
107 Bosworth, 71N!Ner fsJJlDIIC J)ftRlsties. 213.
 CHAPTER TWO - 51

• Neither is there say historical fact ta claim. chat Suhraw.dï was at the court of the Saljuq cAli al-Dm
Kay-Qubid.I08ThiswouldbeimpossibleasheruledinAnatoliabenveen 1220 and 1237.I~Furthennore.
the biographical sources do not warrant the c1aim that Suhrawardï was. in fact. an "advisor" of
IIO
al-Malik al-Ziihir. It is perhaps more cautious ta only affinn that:

Given the conJ1ections between at least the Banü al- C Acfun and the ~ mIS. the appeanmce
of controversial thinkers like aJ.-Suhrawardï could test the partnership of the mler
and the mU/"~1 ~iïn [i.e.. the "turbaned" c1ass]. But. while a wariness probably
remained. tbere are no reports of &DY more confrontations like chat between al-
Suhrawardï and aJ-?:iihir. One of the reasons for this may have been a dearth of
tbiakers Iike al-Suhrawardi Il L

Furthermore. one report mentions that he had disciples or partisans who. upen bis death,
"dispersed. and left him.,,112 Although the report is of a later date. il would, in a way, corroborate the
fact that Suhrawardï. with bis own disciples - i.e., as a Sufi shaykh - or students - i.e.. as a teacher
of philosophy, jurisprudence, or theology - would have started ta represent a threat to the re1igious
class of Aleppo. There was no way they would let him. remain. amongst them.

THE FINAL MOMENTS

ln the end, Suhrawardï is said ta have lea"J1ed from al-Malik al-?:iibïr that he would be
imprisoned, deprived of food and driJlk U1ltil death arrives. Some accounts report that mis is what
OCCUlTed. Yiiqüt, howevet", reports that al-Zfthir ordered bis execution by strangulation, at the age of
38 (36 sol.. years) lunar years:

Titis [.news] reached al-Shïhib, and he asked aJ-?:iihir tbat he be imprisoned in a

place and be deprived of food and drink ti11 he died. So. this is what was done.
However, it is said that a1-~ ordered mm to be strangled in bis œll. He was
strangled in the yeu 587/L 191. 113
Ibn Kh.llikin reports that this occurred in. the citadel of Aleppo, on the 5 th of Rajah. 587
(29t11.1uly, 1 L91).11<1 Ibn Abï U~aybicah omits al-?iihir's order for bis strangulaion, and adds a report

108 Ziai, "The Source and Nature of Authority," 322 Il. 48.
109 Bosworth, 71Je New1slllDl1C J;?YDJISâ"es. 213.
110 Ziai, "The Soun;e and Nature of Authority," 338.
III Morray, AA4y'yubrdNœtble, 142.
112 Ibn nallikan, W~riït.l73 (.Ibn ~ S, vol. 4,157-8).
113 yaqUt. Mujilm, vol. 19,316. This is aiso reported in the f,J'6it.,J-'W, cf. [bn KhaUikin, liJ~rH,

273 (Ibn IahtUzbm"'s, vol 04, 157). Sbahrazi'iri cstablisbes bis death te have been. in the ye.. 1190. see
Shabrazüri, NuzfNu, 0463. AmiJI. Razavi reports wroogly that Suhrawacdi wm killed in 1178, 1181, or, aa:arding
10 (bD. Tagbribircfi (in ms
JJI-NI1Jiim M-.?ii/Unm fi A-fuluk b~:V W1i lll-QJi/JinIIJ) 1208, cf. Amin Razavi,
·Suhrawardï' s," 11,46 and Idem, SultniJlTJlrf5,l, 7.
 CHAPTfR TWQ - 52

by the Shaykh Sadid al-Dm M~mud b. cUmar who said. "when the news of rus execution resche<!
our Shaykh Fakhr al-Dîn a1-~Iiindinï, he said [0 us. 'didn'[ l use ta say that to you about him
before· ... 115 Ibn Khallikiïn reports that in the historicaJ. work of Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi that Ibn Shaddad has
said that:

On Friday. the 29th of d1JO ~i/-h.Lj)im. 587 [17m January, 1192),136 aCter the hour of
praya-. the corpse of Shihib al-Dm al-Suhrawardï was carned out of the prison of
117
Aleppo. and all the partisans of that mfiJl dispersed and Ieft him..
In facto Ibn Shaddiid wrote that, "he hung upon a Q'oss for severaL days~ then, he was
killed ... 118

Shahrazüri writes that the real cause of bis de81h is not certaiJl. since sorne sources sa)y that
he died of deprivation of food. others that he starved himself to death. still others that he was
strangled. and others th. he was killed with a S'Word: moreover, it is even reported that he was
thrown off the walls of the ci.tade1 and set on fire. 119

Reports of aI-Malik a1-~ihir's reaetion. however. might be indicative of the reaJ tragedy of
these event5. Soon &fter the death of Suhrawardï. al-Ziihir regretted bis deeds. and took revenge on
those who had issued the decree for bis death: apprehended them. arrested them.. made them miserab1e.

-- and confiseated from them a great sum of money.IZO AJ-Malik al-Ziibir. a1though a young nder.
might have come to understand the rea1 motives behind the religious class' accusaions, to which he

had been. the instrumental hand that resulted in Suhraw81"di'5 death. Perhaps couJd it be aIso al-Malik
a1-~ religious inclinations and bis sympathy for religious men which motivated bis 1ater reaction.
According to Morray:

The Suhrawardï affaic had been. at the beginning of bis rule. when he was young and
inex:perienced enough ta be in awe of the o~odox ~/amiï3. By the summer of
1201. though. as we have seen. whea he thought he was dying. he summoned a
group of the nwliyii~ to the citade1 to obtain their blessing. l21

114 Ibn KhaUitan. liJJi.Ii!più, 213 (/bn.KmilIibur S, vol. 4, 157).

ilS Ibn Abi U~aybicah, Vyt/n, 642.
ll6 This is not reported 1ll Ibn Shaddid' s MIWJÏdir. Ibn Khallikan also rejeets the reports which place

the date of bis death in 1163 arter January 1192.

117 Ibn Khal.litan. liJ~~, 273 (Ibn K!JJlIIibtI1 's. vol. 4. 157-8).
118 [bn Shaddid. Mlw6dir, 10 ( 'SitIJItfin', lI); cf. Ibn Kha.1Jikan, liJ';tf"I!JI4u. 213 (/bn KhJlllik-Jn S,

•
vol. 4, 158).
119 5hahrazùri. NuzhN, ed. Spies, 98; cf. ed. Shuwayrib, 380; cf. traItS. Tabrizi, 461.
120 Yiqiit. A-Iu.!_, vol. 19.316; cf Ibn Am U~aybicah. Vyün. 644.
121
Mornay, An A"p'yulndNatabJe, 142.
 CHAPTER TWO - 53

This. however. could in. no way change the course of things past.

ENUMERATION OF HIS WORKS

In the SIrOd ol"ilJeSpùri"s. Shahrazüri mentions 49 works written or attributed to Suhrawardï.
lZ3
ineluding Suhrawardî' s translations of bis own works lu About 15 of these tities have been lost.
The extant WOl"ks of Suhrawardi. including the translations of bis own works. May be classified into
the following five generaJ categories.

1- MAJOR DOCfRINAL WORKS

The major' doctrinal works of Suhrawardï could be said to constitule an organic whole -
in.deed. a corpus. The first three works (of bis tetralogy) lead to his opus mD...enum. According to
Suhrawardî's own indications, bis earlier wodcr consist of preJudes to the 181er ones, . By and large.
the first three works discuss Many philosopbiœl issues that are part of the Peripatetic tradition. In
addition, they contain elements of Suhrawardï' S own philosopbical and anthropological ideas. This is
especiallyrrue of thethird work of bis tetraIogy. which is. according to Suhrawardï. the introduction
to bis main work, the OrieJlhtl-U/unllnoLir·-e ff-LSOOLZ! .124 The following order represents Suhrawardï' 5
own cl&1SsificŒion of these works.

1. Uximll,ions (Arabic)
2, Oppositions (Arabic)
3, Pndls IlOtI CODH:n'urions (Arabie)
4. On"eJxm-LUuminllb'r-oe ~fLSdoLZ! (Arabie)

Il - MINOR DOCTRINAL WORKS

The minor doctrinal works are mostly shorter treatises and they include a great deal of issues
similar to chose round in his major doctrinal works. They do not, however, form a similar corpus;
racher. they aU expand on ideas discussed in the lacer works, often with simiJar developmems.

122 Sbahraziiri's biographicaJ note on Suhcawanti was ed. and traDS., d., Spies atl.d Khatak, 7'1Kr!e
Trrmsl!!S on Attpsbt:::ism, 90·122; the 1ist of bis warb is on pp. 101-2. Foc the editiOl1 of the Penian traIlS. of
the lext, d. Shahrazüri, Nl17JJJI m-ArwiiIJ, trans, Tabrizi, 454-75, esp. 473-4. The Persian tcaDs. of Tabrizï is
quite faithful ta Spies's ed. (omission of tbree titles). A new non-critlc:aJ Arabie edition of the text, onJy
mentions three of bis woms and is thus lISeless, cf. Shahrazüri, ntnkIJ ii/-ll'u.buttii~ ed. Abü Sbuwîrab. 375-92,
esp. 381 n.l and the Index, 421.
1Z3 There is a mention of 8 'WQI['ks in Ibn Abï U~)'tJ1'ah, VyiiA, 646; 5 worts Ul Ibn Khallikan.
WJlIi!yiïr,170 \,ibn KôJlIIibfn"s, vol. 4, (55) and the IlSt in. V-aqiit meJlt10ns 10 works {on {/sû1 JII-FiI(IlJ [2] and
on iII-""lInn/[7), cf Yiqüt, JJ,fuJUz. voL 19,316.
1:" Hexten, OieP.lJilasoplu"e d'cr8feuchruq,
 CHAPTFR TWO - 54

discussions and arguments. Some of these treatises (no. Il and J1) bave been attributed to other
thinkers like CAyn al-QuçUl al-Hamadini (d. 1131). or Sayyid Sharif al-Jurjinï. even Baba Af4aJ

Kiishinï, Avïœnna, or Na~ al-Dm Tüsï. 1ZS

5. Temples of4ir.br (Arabie - Persian)

6. TnbltVS LJedimredro 'lmiïdol-lJiO (Arabie - Persian)
7. TrerKLse on die Liç.IJr Ruys (Persian.)
8 Tn?IDSe on dN:> BehèlS of "'Lse ,i-.Ien (Arabic)
9 F/liSAes o[ue-.br (ArabiC)I26
ID. Remllrks o~ Sulism
• aIso known as A-!YStiau Sklrions (Arabic)
Il. KAow/t'dge ofme Dir-ine (Persian)
12. Gtrden ofrhe He~lt'Ts (Persian.)

III - INITIATORY NARRATIVES AND PAR.ABLES

Another caœgory distinct from the previous [wo groups is those works which Corbin bas
caUed the JY!cirs »".s7on.nllires and which Thackston bas rendered as "visionary recitaIs." They

consist essentially of initiatory narratives, mostly short rreatises ~L....,J ). that are very symbolic in
nature and wntten with esoteric undertoa.es (some adapting Zoroastrian and Gnostic terminologies).
Written almost exelusively in Persian. these texts often depiet the initi.ory joumey that ieads to the

experienœ of a more direct type of knowledge. e.g., gnosis ~ ~) and illum.iaalion (~J ~D.

13. T.lJe CABAL" of Gobn"el".Jo IJ'ü{1f (persian.)

14. TAeRedIoh"Uea (persian)
15. A Tille ofrAe Oeadmrm&de (Arabic)
16. ~ LIiO§UOCe ofde Aors (Persian)
17. Tn:wrise 00 die SrNe ofCIU/d1Jood (persian)
18. A DII.YAmongsrrAe SU/iS (persian)
19. 71Je Sound ofroe Si'muqr.IJ (persian.)

IV - PHILOSOPHIe AL"fD INITIATORY TREATlSES

A fourth eategory includes Suhrawardi' s commentaries, transcriptions of earlier philosophie
and iJlitialory texts, sacred scriptu1"es. It ineludes some poems (J ~i) and .. subtleties" or "witticism n
(.....&.:, lbJ) attributed rD bim. the latter having been collected in. Shabrazuri' s biographica1 notice.

20. Trt.WfJSe 00 dIe Renll{Y 01'Lor--e (Persian)

• also knOWll as the Lor--er,y' Fnèna
21. Treadse OA me Hjt'1I Towers (Arabic)
22. Tnwrise on me Dird (Persian)

t25 Eg., in the YlUdiïn SniniïklJr and the Busriin ilI-Çulüb, cf. Nasr's introduction in C!/JenI, In,
(55), (57-8).
126 Marcotte, "S1Jhrawacdi's Psychology,n 51-64.
 CfiAPTER TWO - 55

• also known as Tnms/aboo o[t:ôe TreNise on roe Hird

23. SomePoems (Arabie)
24. Subdeaes (Arabie)

v - LlTURGICAL
Finally. there are seven texts that eontain prayers. litanies, and invocations. These worJcs 1

c:onsisting of hyJl1J1S for each day of the week and dedicated to the "augets ruling the cosmos" with
whieh they share a similar purpose, cao be caUed .. Book of Hours. "1Z7

(Arabie)

PROBLEM OF CHRONOLOGY
Suhrawardï was a prolifie writer. considering the faet that he died at a fairly young age.
There ace. however, scarceJy any bibliographica.l indications to be found in bis works. This absence
of internal evidence makes the classification of bis works ver')" difficu1t. Moreover. a classification of
bis works according to their genres does not provide Many clues as co the chronology in which chey
were wriuen.. It is quite difficult. if not impossible. to date mast of his works.

Il was Corbin who first provided the best analysis of the problem raised by the chronology

of the works of Suh~wardï and who suggested tentative dates for some of the works on the basis of
Massignon's and Ritter' 5 eadier studies. l28 It is, hawever, possible to make sorne use of Suhrawardi' s
indications to establish some arder. In the introduction to bis Ch'enw-I1Iuminab'Jo"e JJLs'dom, he
lZ9
distinguisbes between. bis earlier works and this particulac book. He offers other indications for
readers interested in studying bis works. In the inrroduction to bis PndJs, he mentions that the Pntôs
sbould be read before the Q7~fJlRI-Dlumin/lh·J-"e J.f1jSdom, but aftEl' the IndmObOnS. 1:JO Furthennore,
in the Opposirûms, he mentions that this work: is an appendix (~J;J) to the InW.lUilrOnS, the latter
bei.ng too succinct to dea1 with al1 the issues he had inte.nded to discuss. 131 Wben one follows these
few indications intended for the n.ovice, the logical ot"der intended fOl" tbose wishing to acquire
knowledge gradually should be as follows:

IZ7 Ccxbin, 0'e17l, r, xvii.

128 Corbin, ~. l, i-xviii; d. Massignon, llecueiJdetem:s and RJ.Uer, "PhiloJogib. IX," O.I. 24

•
(1937),270-86 and Ibid., 25 (1938), 35-86.
129 ffikmar, § 3, 10.4-7 (Sir-. 87-8).
130 J1,1'4ddD.~, 194.6-8.

131 MlI11iï~. § 19, 124.2 and lbid.• § 61,192.7-8.

 CHAPTER TWQ - 56

•
2 - 0ppoS.1t.100S
3 PIIFOS nod COD VerYlllions
4. Orienrlil-Dluminllb·ve ~f'ïsdom ( opus OJlllrnum)

Nonetheless. one should remain. cautious when using Suhrawardï's own order of sludy to
infer their chronological classifications. His classification reflects primarily pedagogical concems
rather than r-epresent the true sequence of composition. Some indications of this ire found in his
Oppos.1bOOS where he mentions both me OrÛ:whJ1-IUU.m1nlH.1·r-~ f.J'istlom and the Por.1Js linO
Conversolioos .l:t:: A closer look at some passages of the Flashes of L{i{hr aIso reveals that
Suhrawardï mentions by name bath the Enlmu/boBs and the On~n;n/-DluminlJlif'e frisdom .l33

Therefcre, these works must have been either finished aI that t1Jl1e, or in the process of being
completed. Furthermore, in the Ptil"Ôs Imd Coor"'f:YSotions, many references are made to the Orr"enrm-
UJunzioUlir"t? f~sdOQ1 ;13o:l the former even notes, just like the Oppositions. that it is a completed
wark. l3S
Another work, the Remora 00 SuIi"sm mentions the On~nlB1-DluminlJf.ive nJSrlom .l:J6
Corbin aIso notes that the Tab/ers PœicOTer:! lo 'lmlïd 111-LJfn mentions the Oneokil-D/umioorir-??
&~Sdom, that the Tt!01ples- ofLi!l"br (N to VII) discusses the same doctrines and ideas as those put
forwsrd in the On"eohll-Ulu.nuOolir--e U~Sdom, and that most of the initiatory treatises presupposing
bis .. oriedtal-illuminative" <,.,..1 ~D doctrine are usually expounded in the latter work. l37
Corbin. offers a good discussion on the diffiClilties in distinguishing the specificaUy
phil050phica1 works from the specificaUy mystica1 works. l38 The few indic.ions which Suhrawardi
offers point ta the possibility that a number of these works might have been written simultaneously.
This was certai.n1ythe conclusion drawn by Shahrazüri, who mentions that Suhrawardï was probably
writing simultaneousJy the FlJlS'1Jes ofL.t;g.IJ~, the lnEimaLions, the ParOs 4Dd COD~ttœs, and the
Orient:lll-mumi.mJlir--e "~SdOOJ.I~ Q. D. Shirizi mentions that the Fl8SltesofL{{rhr and the Enci.mulions

were not finished when Suhrawardï began composing bis Orieow-Ulu.miom:ir--e f.V.tSdom.l~

132 MIhjJÏWJtmN. § 61, 192.3-5.

133 L41a.tafnïr (ed. Mwouf), 142.10 and 146.14; cf. LJirna.{r.ïr in Sm Risii/ah (mentions the fUbrtitr) ,
§ 52,175.19-20.
134 AtfJlSI.t"i~ § 144. t40 1. 12; cf. Ibid., §l8S, 452.4 and 453.6; cf. Ibid., § 208, 484.2; cf. Ibid., § 215.
494.5-6.
135 ~fJUfJ6n"', § 111,505.12-14; d.lbld., § 111,361.8-9; cf., ~flltliïJIf'JUDiïr. § 61,192.3-4.
136 K.it.lJmk, § 55, 117.14
137 Corbin, q,tnI. l, vii.
138 Corbin, ~ 1. xii-xiv.
1

139 Shahrazûrl, SIt.-.b, 19.15-17.

ICI Q. O. 5hïri7I, SlrJr!t, 15.13-15 (.s.w:, 240 n.18).
 CHAPTER TWO - 57

• Furtbermore. the problem of dating is not restrieted to Subrawardi's major works. le seems
almost unpossible to date bis sborter works. Suhrawardï himself mentions thac a number of works
were wrilten during the same period: OnimI8l-Uiumio.rlr:àre
urhl
~Visclom, fniiml/lioos and Floshes 0/
(a concise acoount of the three main disciplines. i.e.. 10gic, physics, metapbysics).I..1l Taking
all these indications into consideration. onlya paltry few of bis works can be daced, and chen only
.
approX1D1ate 1y. at b est: 142

PtIi"AS IlOtI COD Vt:YS'llrions • ca. 30 years old. ca. 1183

7ilble&s IJedia/Eed 1"0 'lmiïd 111-IJÜJ • after t!müd al-Dïn's ascension to the throne in
1185.
!nlimolions • not finisbed wben he started the Onenbi./-
UluOlùml'ir--e IJ'isdom
One.obll-UlunuAliLir--e ~f'isdom • was completed 1186. st 33 years old
• d. 1191

The classification of the different types of writings adopted by other contemponuy

Subrawardian scholars does not differ greatly from the one proposed by Corbin. Nasr has, by and
large, adopted Corbin' 5 sU"Uctural appreach, the only difference being bis inclusion of the K.oowledge
of dIe Dir-me (a work unlikely to have been written by Suhrawardï)loO in the group of minor
ueatÎSes. [n addition, Nasr distinguishes between the symbolic and mystical narratives, on the one
band, and the tnulScriptions, transiations and commentaries associated witb earlier philosopbical
warks, on the other. He completes bis classification with a fifth cstegory, i.e., of prayers and
supplications. 144

Amin Razavi' s work fallows a simila- classification and highlights the importance of the
firth categOlY of writingS.I45 Amin Razavi concludes that it is impossible ta c1assify Suhrawardï' s
works into earlier or 1ater works and regards them as a comprehensive whole. l45
l:fabïbï holds the same opinion and prefers to let Suhrawardi guide the arder in which bis
works were intended ta be read, acknowledging, bowever, the fact tbat Suhr&wfrdi himself. in. many
places, refers ta a number of works in progress. l47

141 .{5bDw, § 3, 10.4-7 {st~~ 87-8).

142 Corbin., ~er;I, l, vii, xiv_
143 Soudavar, "The Concepts oC" ;d-Aqt:krmoArd/i/J" and" YnqirI-~SïfJCV"," 267-69.
144 Nasr, 71tree Muslim .5it.r~, 58-9; d. Idem, "Shihib al-DiJ1 Suhrawardi," 125-53, He adopts a

threefold division for bis Persian wlXts, cf. Nasr, "The Persian. Wor.ts," 4.
145 Amin RazavI, "Theory," 48-9; d. Idem, SulJn1wan:1i. 8-9 The Af8l/JÜDiir aI-$iifi;p;rh aiso known
as the Killim;u JII-TJl,f4IJFWufis conspicuously missing from this li~.
146 Amin Razavi, SuhrJrntrr:li,25.
 CtfAPTER TWO - 58

•
FinaUy. Ziai reiterates the observations of earlier Suhrawardian scbolars that it is impossible
to make a real and sharp distinction betWeen a Peripaœtic and an .. Il lu mi nationi st" period. 1ol8 Ziai has
actually set out ta tevise the generally accepted views of a mystical Suhrawardï represented essenr ;a1l)
by Corbin and N~. His book KnowLedg-eHAd/DUnuAHbOr/ presents a general synopsis of the most
neglected aspect of Suhrawardï's works, name1y the sections on logic. especially those found in the
OrieoI"N-ULu.r/UÀ8a·r-"t? IJ':isdom and bis otberma3or doctrinal works. The forthcoming English tnulSJation

(Zi8Î and Walbridge) of tbis WOl"k will include the f"trSt part that contains the section on loglc as weU
as Suhrawardï' 5 critique of some Peripatetic philosophical principles which Corbin did not include in
bis own Frencb translation. ln contrast to other schoJars. Ziai prefers to limit the categories of
Suhrawardî's works ta three groups: the major works. aJong with sorne of bis shorter treatises. the
symboJic narratives. and, fÜl.ally, the devotional prayers and invocations.l49

PROBLEM OF' THE NA11.iRE OF HIS WRlTINGS

An analysis of Suhrawardï's warks raises yet anothEr difficulty, i.e., of defining the nature of
bis works. which is just as great as the one raised br theïr chronology. Although he was schooled ÜI.

-. the Avicennan tradition, bis inte1lectual output was quite diversified. He embraced a whole spearum
of genres and subjects, ranging from poetly to prose, philosophy te commentary on the Qur'in and
the hadiths, and mystical thought (Sufism).
The diver.nty of bis writings renders difficult any attempt al classifying bis works. Most
l9J
interpreters have disagreed oVe!" their nature. Many scbolars - Massignon. Corbin. Nasr. Amin
Razavi, and Ziai - have auempted to distinguish between the more philosophically oriented works
and tbose that exhibit more allegorical stnJctures. Some scholars (Mebdï B:i~ Yazd!, Sayyed
I:lusayn N~, Henry Corbin, Ashtiyiini) bave argued that Suhrawardfs texts .e essentially mystica1
in J181Ure. ra.n.lting philosophy and ils method a good second whiJe for others (Hussein Ziai, John
Walbridge. Mehdi Amin Razavi), bis works combine the mystical and the philosophical. as (wo
oomplem.entary methods or "options" to uJtimately seeing the same reality. Conceming these [WO

methods, some (E:la lri Yazdï) have argued th. he hai proposed a process which starts with philosophy
as a stepping board tbat leads to the hig~est level, that of mystica1 experience. Others still (Nasr)
bave argued that through asceticism and philosophy one atrives at the mystical stage; whereas same
autbors (Amin Razavi) have proposed that besides the use of philosopby. as a valid method to attain

147 ~hbibï, -Muqaddamah-yi M~," in Su~wardî. SiJlJàSiïlJtlJ, x-xi.

14B Ziai, "Shihib al-Dm Suhrawardï," 435.
149 Ziai, "Slnhab al-Din. Suhraw.-dï," 436-7.
 CHAPTER TWO - 59

truths. "it was praetising asceticism that resuJted in illumination... 15t It is quite obvious that
interpretations regarding the Suhrawardian method do not rally unanimity.

The allegl')ric& works Ire more clearJy mystical and heaviJ}' infJuenced br gnostic or hermetic
etements. However. a distinction of titis kind is not very useful for classifying Suhrawardï's works;
first. because both types of works seem to have been written sïmultaneousl)T; and. second. because it
seems. at least according to Corbin. almost improbable tbat there was, indeed. a purety Peripatetic
l52
period. especially in view of the short period of bis life which he devoted to writing ali bis WOrks.

This might best be exemplified b)' sorne of bis minor doctrinal works which contain many typically
Peripatetic elements. e.g.. the Temples of L{e-Ol" and the Tllblea Perfialred to 'lmiid a/-Dio. but
which contain simultaneously numerous elements oÏ SUMawardts own orientai-illuminative wisdom
philosophy. In facto even bis alleged Peripatet.ic works go beyond the A vicennan Peripatetic tradition
- perhaps with the exception of the F/JlSoes of Llgnl" and. ta a lesser extent, the TrelKise Ofl the
Behefs of Wüe A-ft:Y1. primarilY because of their brevity.

In the prologue of the On'ent8l-Dlumioorive IJ~sdom , Suhrawardi mentions th. he has

written warks following the Peripatetic doctrines. giving as example the Inrinumons and the F/asAes
of L.i§hl" (a sum..mary of the former).I53 Even this stalement is a less chan accurate description of
these works. Corbin has iJldiœted that in the Enlinlsdons, for instance. he departs from the main goal
he bad set out to pursue. i.e.. exposïng the views of the Peripatetics. At the end of this work.. he
mentioJlS bis dream about Aristotle (which will be discussed Latet") who speaks te him but who 15 far
from presenting Aristotelian or Peripatetic views. Aristotle speaks more like Subrawardi or. for that
matter. 1i.ke a Neoplatonist - Plotinus and bis vision - than the historical figure he is supposed ta

personiCy.l54 In another passage of the same work. as well as in the Pndls IlOtI Coor-tn"~Ons 155 and
in bis OpposiciOL/S,l56 Suhrawardi opposes bis own vision of Aristotle ta the views of the Peripatetics. lS7
In the PodIs linO Con~otions,158 he even goes as far as to criticize some Peripatetic positions.
Consequently. the stands and positions he adopts and defends are more indicative of bis own views

ISO Maalollf in the preface of bis editiOJl, d. JI-fJl9_ar a1-$iilf~. 2; cf. 0'cnI, J. xiv-xv.
151 Amin. Razavï, "Suhrawardi' 5," 1~2-4.
152 Corbin. Openl. [. vii-vm.
153 ,ffLbDIII; § 3,10.4-7 (~87-8).
154 Tmwi"./NU, § 55-7. 70.1-78.6.
1$ JJ.fashiin·~. § 11,361.1-13; cf. Ibid., § 144,401.7-18.

•••• 156

157

158
MJI4lMnlmiïr, § 24, 147.15-148.2; cf. Ibid.• §§ 52-61.184.6-192.14.
TJI!wi!J;it, §§ 75-90,105.1-121.6.
MlIJ"lJib'~ §§ 98-1 13,340.4-364.16; cf. Ibid., §§ 69-71, 308.4-311.17; cf. Ibid., §§ 72·8,312.4-319.17.
 CHAPTfR TWO - 60

•
than chose of the Peripatetics he is S\lpposed [0 expose. 159

Anotber departure from the A vicenna.n tradition or the craditional A vicen.nan corpus is found
in Suhrawardîs Orienbll-/Huminrllir--e Wisoom. Inscead of simply following the fourfold divl!'>lon of
knowledge - logic. mathematics. physics and melaphysic:s - round in such works as Avicenna's
Book ofSciena? or RemlirKs or the more common threefold division (excJuding mathematics) chat
finds its way 111 most of bis philosophical works. Suhrawardï divides tbis partic:ular wock into [wo
major sections. The first seaion contains discussions on logic followed by a critical analY51s of
certain fundamental principles of Peripaœtic philosophy.l60 The second section presents, in delail. bis

own philosophical interpretstion of the Avicennan tradition and covers topies such as ontology.
angelology, physic:s, eschatology. prophetology and. significant for this study, phil os op hi cal
antbropoJogy.

Furthermore, as Many works appear to have been written a the same time, il would be quite
futile ta mate a forma! distinction between warks which Suhrawardï himself considered ta belong ta
bis Peripatetic phase, before he aaually "saw" the light. 161 A proof ta the contrary is round in his

assertion (in the prologue of the OntaDlIU-D/umioldif-e JJ'isdom) tbat bis IAdmmions was written
according to Peripatetic tradition, although it can be shown chat this work contains elements of
Suhrawardr s own reading of the Peripatetic tradition. even allusions ta bis own persona! positions. 162

In spite of the persistent difficuJty in dating the compLetion of the majority of Suhrawsrdï' s
works. most scholars do acknowledge that he composed MOst of his treaises OVE!!" a span of about ten
years. The brevity of this period maltes it difficuJt ta conœive how [WO distinct styles and modes of
thought migbt have OCCUlTed in succession. By way of conclusion, let us restate that it is Corbin who
more tban haJf a century ago wrote mat a conclusive chronological cLassification of Suhrawardï' s
work was impossible. 163

HIS lNfELLBCTUAL ALLEGIANCE

Suhrawardï's inrellectual allegiance or allegianœs are an issue just as difficult to settle as
that of the nature of bis writings. Altbough a number of scholsrs have addressed this issue. some

lS9 These have already been disc;ussed. cf. Corbin, ~e'nI. l, viii.
160 Fakhry, "aJ.-Suhrawardïwa Maitltidhubu," 151-68; cf. Fakhry, "AJ-Suhrawardï's Critique," 279-84.
161 Introduction ro the f5.km4tr, § 3, 10.3-10 (S~I 87-8).
162 T;l/wf/Jiit, §§ 55-7, 70.1-78.6; cf. Ibid.. §§ 75-90, 105.1-121.6; cf. the lan chapter': cf. Corbin,
~,I,xi

163 Corbin. Les motifs zorwlsuiens. 17.

 CHAPTER TWO 61

•• ftfty years of Suhrawardian schola-ship have produced a variety of opiJUons regardtng the intel1eet'.Ial
allegiances of Suhrawa-di and the possible ongin of a number of bis ldeas. The following discussion
will offer a panorama of opinions that have been proposed regarding Suhrawardf s intellf'~tual

doctrinal affiliations, in the hope of illustna.iJlg the complex natUre of his intellectual heritage.
and

Suhrawardï aiticized, reinterpreted and adopted ft modified Peripatetic philosophical

anthropology. Describing .bis own intelleaual jouroey in the prologue of the Orienr~i1-1UumlÀdbr·-e

~Visdom, Suhrawardï writes that he had started out as a staunch Peripatetic, before experiencing true
knowledge. His original Peripatetic training. therefore. sets the stage for two distinct facets of ms
work. Such a supposedly genuine shift of intelleetual allegiances cannat, however, be objectively
identifiedinhisworks solelybased 011 thenatureofhis different writings. Hisplulosophica1background
is esseotially Peripatetic and dependent on the Avice.nnan corpus. Indeed. numerous elements of the
Peripatetic traditions were aIso incorpot'Sted from bis predecessors (e.g., al-Fiiribï). Again, it is not
the purpose ofthis work. to identify these aider elements which have, quite naturally, found theirway
into Su.hrawardï' s own works via A vicenna' 5 Peripateticism.
Neoplatonism and Plotinian ideas, essentiall)7 mediated bythe pseudo- Tllt!OlogyoEAn'"srode
in circulation in the .. Islamicate" world,l6a were of undeniable importance for the elaboration of
Suhrawardi's thoUght. l6S Avicenna's own writings bear the ha11m.ark of strong Neoplatonic features,
which are, in lqe part, responsibJe for the spiritualization of Peripatetic philosophy.l66 Another
imPOftant tradition responsible for the incorporation and p-opagation of Neoplatonic ideas within its
own philosophico-religiolls system was the Ismaili tradition, w hic.h bad incorporated many Neoph~onic
concepts, notions, and ideas. 167 The debate over the notion of an "oriental" tradition in which these
Neoplatonic philosophies share, as opposed ta a .. western" tradition, has not been concll1sively
resolved. This debate originales wit.h A vicenna' s own allusions ta such oriental tradition. A 11umber
of scholarly discussions have tried to address mis issue - de Vaux. l68 Massignon,l69 GUtas,t70 Pines,t 71
and Nasr. l72 This is the tradition that SuhrawEnii himself claims ta have pursued!73 Walbridge and

164
Hadgson, 77Je ~~ offsIJIm, vol. 1,56-60.
165 Marcotte, • M éCaphysique néoplatonic:ienne ," (forthc:oaung): d. Netton, "The Neoplatonic Substrate, ..
2...7-60: cf. Marcotte, • An Auempt al DecoJ15trUetion," 89-99: d. Idem, The "Semiotlc" Fn.tel'pf'-se," 1-14.
166 Walbndge, LdI~.
167 Neuon, ~fusJim Neopklromsrs.

•
168 De Vaux, "La philosohie iUuminative," 1-82.
169 Massignon, "La philosophie onentale," 1-18.
170 Gutas," [bn TufayI," 222-241.
171 Pines, -La ·philosophie crientale" 5-37.
t
n
 CHAPTER TWO - 62

•
Ziai have discussed a further possible influence on Suhrawardi, namely possible Stoic doctrines or
conceptions that may have been ~ the root of some of Suhrawardi' s cril:icisms of Peripatetic
17<:
phi!osophy_

Another element of Suhrawardïs thought which commentators have highLighted is Shlîsm.

AlI the biographical works, howevEr, report that Suhrawardï was a Shafi'i and. therefore. a SunnL
None refa- ta him as a Smi or, for that matter, an Ismifili. The former position is held by Corbin
who alludes ta bis "aypto-Shi'i" positions, e.g .. in the prologue te bis Oneo/ti/-U.lvmiolilir-t:? ~VISdom
. whEre Suhrawardï sounds as if he regretted the disappearance of the Fii~id caliphste. But. more
telling is his establishment of an ideal hierarchy of leadership (:L...l: J - Li ~ ) of which the ea-th is

never devoid. This leadership is both poLitical and spiritual and it cm be filled by someone. e.g., an
Imam who possesses some sort of theosophicaJ knowledge (.ub... ,L. r ) This individual is the one
who receives divine guidance. He becomes the spiritual leader orthe "pole" {~).17S

The notion of pole is often identified with the Hidden Imam of shti tradition. For instance,
Abü Rayyin associates this notion with the beLief in a notion of divine guardianship (~'(,), a Sbli
notion. l76 This notion of "pole," however, does not automaticaUy have to be associated with the
ShÎï. It is more com..monly sssociated wilh the mystica1 tradition, in whicb the pole becomes the

~ .. - spiritual leader (e.g., Hujwïri). N~r also notes chat Suhrawardï bel.ieved in the institution of divine

guardianship (4.: ,,~'" ).I"n Corbin notes that it could have been against similar ideas that the SulU1Ï
reJigious class (the ulamas) of Aleppo reaeted. li8
It was, again, Corbin and, to a 1esser extent, Landolt who have mentioned the presence of

Ismiw ideas in the works of Suhrawardi This is the explanation someti.mes offered for bis own
exeeution. The SUnn1 Ayyübids had triumphed against the Ismicill F~d dynasty of Caïro. The
"Great Resurrection" which was said to bring the pure spiritual [sIam had reœntly been proc1aimed
l
at Alamut (August, 8, 1164), in the Mountains southeast of the Caspian Sea. 7'; The newLy conquered
Aleppo was still threatened br the Ismicilis. It is possible that the ulamas of Aleppo or the Ayyubid

172 N&'5I', "Ibn Sïni's "Oriental Philosophy" ," 247-51.

1?3 Cc:xbin, EA rSlmn ÜJIm"eD, vol. 2,26-9. esp. 28-9.
1?4 Walbridge, "Suhra~ardi," 5J5-533; cf. Ziai, KAt:)"'J~. 51,58-63,59 n.3, 62 n.l and n.3, 63 n.3.
115 Mbmtr, § 5, 11.12-12.13 (.s;,:. 90-1).
176 Abii Rayyin, l/.sÜJ JII-FilISlÛJIIr JII-lsIIrJiI[.tIR1J, 88-9l: and strongly influenced by the Qarm~,

•
cf. Ibid., 91.
ln And does not believe he was an IsmaoiJj, d. Nasr, "Shaykh al-lsbra::t.," 21.
178 Corbin, Eills/nm inmil!D, vol, 2, 71-2, n n. 89; d. Ibid., l5-16.
119 Corbin, TnJ€NZÎ!' rSmllélimne, s.v. Abanut.
 CHAPTER TWO - 63

•
rulers of the city suspected Suhrawardï of affl1iation with these groups - any suspicion of secret
Jeanings towards the Shi'ah raised the spectre of conversion ta Niziri Ismii'ilism. or BSljnïyah
during Ibis period of social, politica1 and re1igious unrest 160 The Assassins of the Jabal An~yah.

who were supposed to he the vassaJs of al-Malik al-Zifur. the rulEr of Aleppo st the time of
Suhrawardî's destb. were not entireJy under his control. Mereover, the D.rr,,~oe llecL'rds (~~,

..,......J.iJ 1 ), perbaps sirrular ta the lnFtx::mions nnd A7!YéFY , includes numerous Zoroastrian elements
thal couJd easi1y be adduced against Suhrawardi 161

Furthermore. LandoJt suggests chat the daims attributed to Suhrawardï that he was receiving
spiritual assistance (~b) couJd easily be associated with Ismii'lli positions found. e.g., in the works
of J:{amïd al-Dîn Kirmam (d. 1021), because "[his very notion WE one of the comet'5tones of Ismâili
theoJogy and a technica1lerm for the "divine guidance" of the Imams, by wmch the Daewah refelTed
to itself, œ for instance in N~ir Khusraw' s frequent references ta the nhl-i roJ'i"d." IB:Z

The nolion of the ,. maintainer of the book" (r= u ) to which Suhrawardï alludes and which
could be interpreted as a vision of an arder of Oriental-Illuminationists (,,~I~! ).183 ln the Shiei
OOm..munity, chis notion automatically refers ta the Imam as the maintainer of the reve1ation, i.e., as
theinterpreter of the Quran (as mentioned inmany ShÎï hadiths).184

DespiteSuhrawardi' sovertrejection of the transmigrationofsouJ, hisworks contain ambiguous

passages on bodies (tjl..J-!) which echo Ismtm texts (e.g., aJ-Sijistini) and which could support the
opposite conclusion (see section on the nature of the SOul).IBS In one of bis works, Suhrawardï
himself alludes ta a seaet key. a sort of seaet writing of which he onJy provides a sample,l86 and
which, according to Corbin, strangely resembles the secret alphabet used by the Imi'ilis. l67

However, some of bis stances, e.g., for independent judgment (,)~l ), are in opposition to
any Ismt'ili doctrine of exclusive diree::t spiritual instruction (~). as proclaimed by I:Iasan ~abbËiQ.
Furthermore, bis identification of the Necessary Being with the Light of lights is incompatible with

180 Morray, An A.y'yu"idN«»hle. 149.

lel Landolt, "Suhrawardi's," 481a-482b.
l8Z Landolt, ·Suhnnvardi' s," 482b.
183 COl'bin, El /slJld/ inmic"D, vol. 2, 22-3
184 E.g., in K'Ulaynîs {/sûl.· K. JlI-Hu.iJilr, chap. l, 3rd haditb. ed. Arabo-Persian (Tebran, 1381),
314-15; mentioned III ComÙl, a/sIumJnim"eD, vol. 2,23 n. 22.
18S Landolt, "Suhrawardi's," 482b-485a.
186 Masmtn·~ 194.12-195.2; cf. Ibid., § 225,505.12-16.
187 Corbill, E8 rsr,un nme4, vol. 2, 21-22, 22 n.20; cf. blS "Prolegomena" in q,d7l Il, 27 n. 58. He
ilOtes dlat 00 warks of Suhrawardï entirely wriuen in tins language mere ever ro'Uod.
 CHAPTER TWO - 64

the negative (apophatic) theoJogyof the Ism~ilïs. He rejects some beliefs he explicitly attributes to
the Assassins (:4.! ';'2 'i;.,. ), e.g . in his "'(.r-YEiali SrOEr"ons. also known as the Rem/urs On Sulism lfI8

Ziai. argues that there is 00 evidence in Suhrawardï s writings to support claims of any strong
!smitUi inclinations. There is no reference to any association betWeen him and the BiÇinites by bis
biographers. 189

The mystical affiliation is, perhaps, the m ost common reading of Suhrawardï' 5 works, especiall y
iJl. his "visionary recitals," where there are numerous al.lusioos to asceticism and quotations of
mystical poetry. Corbin notes that the notion of pole (~) aloog with thatof mantle (.ü.~). found
in Suhrawardî 5 works belongs to the mystical tradition. For Suhrawardï, the world could not be
without these pales, whether they exist or are in biding (occultation).

Another indication to this effea are the biographical works which report Suhrawardi' s Sufi
inclinations. Moreover, inhis own works (not onJy the visiooary treatises) ,there are freq uent expressions
of sympathy for the Sufis. as well as his "insider's" description of the Sufi praetices of "audition,"
(eL..........) and "rememoration" (..tS,j). e.g., in the SouAd ofrheSÜl1iHylJ and OA dJeSrare ofC1JiJdltood
. In bis dream vision, the true phil050phers were Sages such as Abü y azïd B~ or Sahl Tustari
191
(the disciple of Dhü al-Nün al-Mi~),I90 as we1J as Junayd and Shiblï. In. Suhrawardï's "visionary

recitals:' ~alliij is also quite important as one of the spiritual leaders or poles. l92 And finally,
Subrawardï advocated spiritual exercises, altbough this was aIso the case for A vicenna, espeàally in
lV3
the last section of the llemnrks.
Anotber possible filiation of Suhrawsrdï's thought (e.g., in the nue of Ocaoenhu Erile
and the Red kJreU«:r ) is the Gnostic tradition. an influence already at work within the Neopl81onic
tradition adopted by a number of Ismitili works. It is, therefore, conceivable that some Gnostic
elements have found tbeir way into bis warks. Suhrawardi' 5 two-winged archangel (found in the

188 lI-f8iJAmiir <lv-$üffyalJ. 60.1. This i.s the KJl1uDz iI1-1il,S:;lwwuf. Although a fair amoWlt of this short
treat:Î5e is translated by Corbin in ArcJr~. this pan:icu1ar passage 15 not and neither (!) is Il translated by
Tbac:k-on in bis lI-fptr"all . Assassins is a loc;a1 Syrian epithet given te the followen of the Niziri branch of
the Ismi·iJj sect, cf. Lewis, .. .fTIISIdsJuj:y;l ," 267b, 268b. TJns epithet was used in a poJemic:al tract issued by
the Fitimid Caliph a1-Amir against bis Niœi opponenu (â. A.A.A. Fyzee, Jli-HXti[rae aI-Ami7yu (London-
Bombay, 1938,27]), d. Idem. 268b. .
l89 Ziai, "The SOlIl"Ce and Nature of Authority ," 342 n. JOS.
190 rM/wf!r;Ït". § 55, 70.1-74.8; d. /a:Y-Jd. § 7,267.1-2; cf. Tulü4)1u/t, § 9, 259.8-10; cf. /ùSiilill

•
iiI-AbntJ. § 16, "'65.17-18; cf. Bus/U, § 52. 370.9-L2 and Ibid., § 60. 377.L-2.
19l P6rt1l, § 87,75.15-76.4 (Book, 19-80).
192 L1161n1r. § S, 297.1-3 and § 10.302.1-4; cf. S8fi:r. § 13,328.6-9.
193 Avieenna, fsltiïrM, vol. 3-4, IX. 828.1-845.3 (LJù;48J-502; Mysr, 85-91).
 CHAPŒR TWO - 65

CJld8FofGabn"el's IJ~) ma)' be an allusion to a "gnostic dualism," which would colTespond to the
two-faceted nature of the second emanation found in al-Sijistinï's universal soul.l~

Gnosticism May cettainly be traced to paralleJ deveJopments that originated in Anc:ent

Persia' s religious traditions!95 or the Hennetic (e.g., Egyptian) tradition that was introduced iota the
lQ6
Islamic tradition. For Corbin, Suhrawardï was transposï..ng the idea of a communityof chosen
people amongst the people of Moses to that of the elite of ancient persia. l97

The whole idea of light is aIso quite important witbin Gnostic circles, sharing much with
Zoroastrianism and responsible, according to Ibn Taymiyah, for charges of ZIlOdlKfuh agaïnst
Suhrawardï. l98 The Gnostic elements are more evident 10 his conceptions of the human soul defined
in terms of the "guiding light'· (~~ .J~ ). This guiding light shauld never be substantially affected
by the world of darkness or the tenebrous matter of the sublunar world, or cantaminated br its
"obscure substance" (c.:;....l.&..,>A~ ).199 The fate of the human soul is ta retum to the rea1m of pure
Lights, where it belongs in the first place. aXl

There are, therefore, a varietyof ideas andinflue.ncesthatcan accountforsomeof Suhrawardï's

positions. A few have been alluded to, but it is these various influences that shaped his own
philosophical interpretation of the Avicennan tradition. A case could probably be made for an
i1lterpretation that views Suhrawardi' s multiple bOlTowings as an edectic attempt ta llnify western
and eastem traditions - Greek, Gnostic, and hermetic, Islamic IUld ancient Persian traditions. But, it
might be more îruiâul to conceive of bis work as a "genuine" 8ttempt, notwithstandiAg possible
ec1eetic bOtTawings, at pursuing the Avicennan project of an "oriental-illuminative" (~~ )
philosophy.201 This would a1low for the acknowledgment of Suhrawardï' s ingenuity in incorporating
a great number of these different e1ements.

SUHRAWARDI'S PHILOSOPHlCAL ANTHROPOLOGY

Corbin is, undoubtedly, the father of modem Suhrawardian studies. His numerous editions,
translations, and, most importantly, bis studies on Suhrawardï have braught back to life a figure thal

194 La.ndolt, "Suhrawardi' S," 482b, 483a; cf. Mac;ush. "Greek and Oriental Sources," 9-13.
19s CarbUl, Le.s m«és ~ ,24 n.20; cf. Idem, ED Islam inmie:J , vol. 2, 28 ff.
191i Corbm, arS/am inlt:um, vol. 2,24-6; cf. Affifi. "The Influence of Hermetic," 840-55.
len Carbin, ED u/llm inurieD, vol. 2,29 n. 32.
198 Laoust, Les shrSmI!S d4ltrS rislJlm 231.
1

199 Fùb.D.lrJ', §§ 109-111, 107.9-109.16 (~,99-101); d. Ibid., § 129, 121.8-122.11 (5.t~1 112-3).
zen As S\lc:h, S"hr'awardï shares mach Wlth someone like the SUfl Najm al-Dia Kubrii (d. 1221), cf.
Lanclo1t, "S"hrawardi's," 481a; cf. Corbin, 71Je lf,fllD ofLiKlJrin li7Imim5lf5sm.
 CHAPTER TWO - 66

•
had been forgonen by history. In his numerous srodies, however. Corbin focused maully on the
metaphysical aspects of Suhrawardï s works and negleeted the logie and the physies of bis longer
and more substantial works.ZU2 His editions of the wot"ks that serve as a propaedeutie to the CJne.-:rlll-
UlumiA/llir-p 1J7sdom oniy include the 41-fdDpoysics; the Logics and P4y.ga remain unedited.

Indeed, many sections of the Jl.ftV~l!.P.S'fa of Suhrawacdi' s works do. in f aet. discuss aspects
pertaining to his philosophical anthropology. This charaeterizes Suhrawardi' s philosophical enterprise.
Nonetheless, the fset remains that the books On me Sou/. usually found in sections on Pn,J-:sJCs-.
have not been readily available. This might account, notwithstanding Corbin' 5 own philosophical
inclinations towards Suhl"awardï 5 metaphysics, for the laek of studies dealing specifically with
Suhrawardï's Jogic and physics and, by extension, bis philosophical anthropology. Moreover, Corbin
has discussed Suhrawardï s philosoplucal anthropology ontY with regards to specific issues such as
the imagÙlative faculty, because it is intimately associated with Suhrawardi's imaginai world, one of
the foeus of Corbin' s studies on post-Avicennan thought. Corbin' seditions bave un.doubtedly
detennined the fate of Suhrawardian scholarship for the most part of this century.

N~, a roIJeague of COl"bin during his numerous stays in Tebran and motha- important
modern scholar of Suhrawardî. wrote a number of studies on Suhrawardi's oriental-illuminative
philosophyand his overaU. conuibution to (stamic thoUghL Nasr, however, devotes only a few pages
ta Suhrawardi' s philosophical lUlthropology. In one of bis earlier studies, Nasr presents the (wo
central principles that detennine the psychological system of Suhrawardî: a principle of dominance
(~ ) and a principle of love fi;,' ft ).203 He then sets out to enumerate the different souls and the

differellt facuJties attributed to each of these sauls. Afcet" this short exposition of psychology, he

201 Nasr, ·Sbihab al-Din Suhrawardi,n 125-53 [reprint of Nasr, "Shihab al-Dm Suhrawardï," 375-6].
Fer Suhrawardi's chain of tr'aIlSmission of illurninaive doc1rine, cf. Nasr, 7l:tree A-fus.Jrm ~ 62; cf. 1

Amaldez, .. IsJritiyy\in," 12 L.
Hermes
+
Asclepios
Agarhad&imon (Seth) +
(Persilll priest-tiJlgs)
PytJucotllS GayQmstb
FmpedodES FaidOn
Plato (od tbe Necp1stoaists) KayKJ1wnw
Oblat-Nan M~
Sahl Toari AbO YazId 8ÏS1fml
~E:lalJli
Abo al-I:tasan Khataqilfti

20Z Seethe bibliography for Suhrawardi's wodcs.

203 Nasr, ·~hihab al-DÜl," 392. The psycbologica1 elements he discusses in tus oth« study on
Suhrawardî do not add anything substalltially new. cf. Idem, 'l1Jn!tI!' A-fusiim~, 75~6.
 CffAPTER TWO - fil

describes Suhrawa-di:' s es ch atology. wbich extends bis psychology and analyses the fate of the soul
ZOd
after death.

ln the b~in.ning of h1S recent study on Suhrawardî, Amin Razavi, Mother Suhrawardian
scholar, relies for the moS[ part on Nasr' s studies for bis discussions on Suhrawardi' s psycholog}"'. In
chis work. he enumerates a number of central themes present in Suhrawardf s work. but, again. only
a few pages are dedicaœd ta his philosophical anthropology205 Amin Razavi's work focuses on the
epistemological foundstion of Suhrawardis thought. Nasr's and Amin Razavi's accounts propose a
very" general outJine of S uhrawardî' s philosophical anthropolog}'" that amounts ta a lise of the different
parts of the soul (vegetative, animal, and 50 on), the different faculties th. belong te the different
souls (appetitive, irascible, and 50 on), and ft few words on the soul-bodyproblem.
More recently, there has been an attempt ta COlTeet this uneven emphasis on metaphysics in
Suhrawardian circ1es. Ziai, also concerned with Suhrawardï's epistemology, has focused bis analysis.
206
for the MOst part, on the logical and, again, the epistemological aspects of Suhrawardf s works. ln
addition, he has written some articles focusing on the foundations of whst he calJs the "philosophyof
illumination," especially the epistemological strUctUre which uaderlies Suhrawardf s syscem.207
Although Walbridge's work focuses on Quçb al-Dm Shiriizï, he has discussed Subrawardf s "SClence
of Jights." His exposition of Suhrawardi's thought, bowever, bas not addressed specifically the issue
of philosophical anthropology.2OB

WORKS ON ISSUES ON PHILOSOPIDCAL ANTHROPOLOGY

Suhrawardi does not present bis philosophica1 anthropology in any particular work. Moreover,
he did not write indepen.dent epistles on the subject as Avicenna and other scholars did. Nonetheless,
most of bis works do oontain passages, at limes 1engthy, on a number of issues re1ated te the human
soul. These passages are, for the Most part, found in the sections on metaphysics and on physics.. For

204 Na~, "~hihâb al-Dïn," 393-5; â. Amin Razavi, "Suhnnvacdi's," 33-4 and Idem, Su1Jnlwan:ty,

49-50. The latter is the publiccion of a slightly modified version of bis Pb..D . Dissertation Wltb the addition of
a transl.wn of the tot and commenwy of the C'1JJuJr of Û4/ln7d 's ~Vo.w; cf. Idem, SuhrJJQTdy, 48-9; cf. the
revicw on the laœr WOl".t, cf. Walbridge, "Review." 615-7. Amin Razavi refers te Hrkmar. 225 and Partü,
53-63.
20S Amin Razavi, "Suhraw~dî's:' 31-3.
206 Ziai, KrJowledJr~.
2U1 Ziai," 5hihib al-DÜl Suhrawardï," 434-64. In another arttcle on tbe "illuminiCollÎSt" tradition,

•
psychologylSJlOt evendiscussed ,cf. Idem, "The WllminatlOJUstTradition," 46S-96. 1lisiannouncedafortbcoming
adide entided. "La Sagesse illWlW1a1ive et la Logique selon AJ-Suhrawardi le Mmyr," cf. Tlisi, Contnbmion,
128.
208 Walbridge, Scimœ, 27-78.
 CHAYTER TWO - 68

instance. some of the shorter treatisES provide extremely concise discussioJlS on the soul witbin
sections that discuss tapies usually fa und in the chapters or books of Pépia It was traditionally
tbese books on physics (of philosophical works) that usualJy con.tained a book ()n /he Soul.

One such book or. in this partïcular case, a section on. the P4,p.rr0" has been. edited: the
FlMlIes of 4q-ér. This is more a Peripatetic compendium. although in some places il hints at more
personal interpret8tions and concerns. The fouM book of the P~.P-SIO" Πthe ln/im~lJfions aIso
contains ft book 0.12 die Sou.J. as does the sixth book on the Ph.,psics of the Ptllés ,209 It has been
impossible to obtain a complete copy of the manuscript of the lal1er work. and it is hoped mat an
edition of the text as weil as the chapcers On loe S:Ju./ in Suhrawardï' s major works will saon be
made available. The section in the InIr'"ntIJlÙJDS. however. is much more Peripatetic chan might he
expected.zlo Suhrawardi' s more original contribution is found in the edited A-1'~hyn~ of tbat
particular text.

ft might be useful to offer a list of the wocks Md the sections which discuss issues reJated te

the human soul. This list does not include references ta Suhrawardi' s symbolic or initiatic tales.
although the latter present philosopbically relevant information regarding philosophical anthropology.

--. In general. these latter works do not present philosophical arguments, but illustnlte or present
philosophical ideas with a symbolic rendering of their own. Here is a list of the works that contain
sections on the sou!:

1 - WORKS IN ARABIe

F.JllSiJes 01'L{q-ht - Second section On P~y.s-JCs

Pillés
lnlinJolûJDS
Oppositions
O,ienœ-U/umLoOh'r--e If~Sdom
Temp./es ofLif'nr
7iib./eI'S LJwa/l'edro 'lmtÏd

Il - WORKS IN PERSIAN

Roys 01'Lishr
Temp.Jes-of4,it.1Jr (cf, original Arabie)
ll
Tob./eIS LJemœ/'edro TmiId (cf. original Arabicl

• 2œ

210

2U
MJtSINïn·~, Berlin, ms" JlO. 506; mentioned ln Ziai, Kno"Jedge, 147.
Tll1wi/1iif:, microfilm of Leiden ms .. no. Or 365. Inslltute of lslanuc Studies, McGill U niversny.
The Penian tr'a.I15. is probably net by Subraw.-di, cf. Pürjavidï. "Sbaykh-i Ishriiq." 1-2.
 CHAPTER. THREE - 69

• -THREE •

NAlUREOF THESOUL

Philosophical discussions on the definition and the nature of the soul find their origin in
ancient Greek traditions, where a notion of the soul probably emerged out of an identification of the
phenomenon of life with the breath of wr wbose presence is fundamental for its sustenance. A
graduai transformaion took place from the view of the sou1 as the breath of liCe ta the view that il is
a superior entity, distinct from the body. In the Judeo-Christian and [slamic traditions this idea was
preserved.
Ancient notions of the soul as the breath of life thus took on a more theological coloring
within the prophetie traditions. Within these traditions, the soul came to be seen as originated by
Gad and as God's breath of life. l Here, one cannot underestimate the role played by the Qur~inic
tradition in the shaping of an Islamic conception of the sou1.2 The iatroduction of philosophical
considerations in Islam led to a philosophicaUy based theoretic distinction between the sou! and the
spirit (see section on the pneumo ). Suhrawardï's own conception of the nature and the role of the
soul is embedded in this IsIamic tradition.

THE SOUL AS ENTELECHY AND SUBSTANCE

Aristotle's conception of the soul survived in the Islamic tradition. ln bis On me Sou/ ,
Suhrawardi cooceived of the soul as an entelechy, i.e., as the first perfection of a material subject.
The soul was essentiaUy the Conn of a maleriaJ body, in conformity witb the bylomorphic theocy of
the time.J lt was the principle of life belonging to a1l things.
For Islamic thinket"S, howevB", an Aristote1ian hylomorphic defanition of the soul did Dot
provide the latter with sufficient independence. Aristotle's I1aturalistic interpretatioo associated the
soul tao intimarely - a1.most in an organic manner - with me body and ilS bodily constituents.
makiAg it difficult for Istamic thinkers ta uphold bis defU1ition of the soul as being only the firsl

•
1 Verdi1lkere, "L'âme ou nepesh etruâh," 59-69.
2 Macdonald, "The Develpoment of the Idea of Spirit in Islam," 307-51 [reprint Ln. ~f. IV 22
(1932): 25-42 and 153-68].
3 Aristotle, OndJeSouJ. II, l,412a-413aand n, 2-3, 414a25-29.
 CHAPTER THREE - 70

entelechy of a natura! body having life.

The !stamic tradition often provided the soul with a divine nature. For instance, "the soul,"
wroteAbü Sl"ayminal-Sijisti.nï (al-M~qï) (d. 1000), "is a divine power, which is the [intermecii.-y]
meaos baween the nature which governs the disposed Elements and the reason which lights il up,
penetrates it and envelops it;..a it is "simple, of high rank, incolTUplible and inaIterable;" and because
it is simple and does not aecept opposites, it is immortal, and not susceptible to corruption and
destruction. 5
Such a conception of the soul did not, however, sit weU with Aristotle' s interpretaion.
although al-Sijistinï did adopl a general Aristote1ian notion of the soul. For al-Sijistam, the soul is
neitber body nor accident, and that it is that which provides the body with its consistency. its
organisation, and its perfection. 6 This conception of the soul provides some Evidence of the greatly
Neoplatonic type of definition of the soul in vogue st the time of Avicenna.
For Avicenna, souls inhabit the whole cosmic universe, and are essentially of two types: the
seperated sauls and the non-separated sauls. The separated sauls, simple and immortal. are those
which animate bodies of which they are the subsrantial forms. They- are distinct from non-separated
souls, because they ..e not imprinted in matter. as in the case of the souls of plants and non-rational
animaIs. Separated sauls, therefore, depend on the body only for their origiJlation, but not for the
rea1imtion of their ultim.e end and finality. Separated simple and immorta! souls are further divided
into two types of seuls: celestia1 sauls, which are the seuls of the spheres of Peripatetic cosmology,
and human souls.7
Similar distinctions underline Suhrawardfs own cosmology, where separated simple souls
..e of two types: ce1estia1 souls that are the souls of the spheres and human souls. Suhrawardi
aetually provides scriptural proofs, in a way Avicenna had deemed unnecess.-y in bis philosophical
works, CO COlToborate this patticular Peripatetic philosophical claim. He appesls to the Qur~c text,
which states: .. Br those who advance the first" (Q., 79:4). He t*es this to mean the intelligences. He
takes .. By those who are the ministers of an OI"der" (Q., 79:5) ta mean the sauls, i.e., the celestial
sauls. 6 According to the philosophers, Suhrawardï writes, the celestial spheres (~~ 1 ) aIso possess

4 al-TawQidi, JU-Imm', III, llO (Calfa, 1942); C[\loted in the ÎJltl"O. (pp. 3-44) of Badavri's ed. of the
$i"., cf. a1-5ijiDm, .$Jr. JI/-.{fibnnr, 25.

••
5 a1-Taw~di, JII-Imtl, DI, 1Il; C[\loted in Badawi's intro., 20.
6 a1-Taw~dï, .u-Imm-;I, 202-3: quoted in Badawî's intro., 28.
7 Avicenna, fsAmu. vol, 2, m, 19-27,407.1.4127.3 (Oir., 341-50); d. Goichol1, OiSOUCDOO, 456.
8 rdr;JÏd, § Il,269.11-2 (An:-h. 21); cf. Corbin, An:-hill.We, 28 n.36.
 CHAPTER THREE - 71

•
rational souls (4iJ.l:J ~~ ) thatare living (~ ). knowing (;U~ >, and desiring (:ië t&'~ ) their
prin ci pIe..,

AV!cenna has provided a number of proofs for the existence of ail inéependent soul: arguments
re1ying on physico-physiological considerations (souls as the principle of lire). on the notion of the
self, on the continuity of the psycbologica11ife. and on the bypothetical exampJe of the "suspended
persan," Most of these arguments serve te demonstrate the existence of the human soul. its nature
and ïncorporeality. Subrawardï provides simiJar arguments based on sucb physico-physiological
considerations or re1ying on a notion of the self. The latter argument 15, indeed, more frequently
envisioned by Suhrawardï in a number of bis works than it was br Avicenna. Arguments based on
the contin.uity of psycbological life are, therefore. to be compared with Avicenna's hypothetical
example of the "suspended persan" (see section on se1f-knowledge).
A vicenna offers a synthesis of the views of bis predecessors regarding the notion of the soul.
ln so doing, he develops a complex theory whereby two complementary conceptions of the soul
a>habit side by side.1O In the Cure, Avicenna, first, esrablishes the reJationaJ chsracter of the soul
from which proceeds aU other activities. 1l As a priJlciple (i~ ) which completes or perfects the
species, the soul is a perfection (Jl..S) - an entelechy.12
'-' At the anthropo1ogical. level, the soul finds itse1f in relation with matter, i.e., the body
bea>miJlg its receptacle. 13 1n.Avicenna's defi.n.ition of the soul, the body does, indeed, play a role; for
instance, when he writes that, .. the name 'soul' does not appLy to [the saul] because of its substance,
but, rather, because it is ruling (0;;;" ) over the bodies and is brought into relation with them
(~! :i ",.:ë • ).',14 Sîmilar discussions are found in bis Commenhly on the pseudo- TAeoJogyof
An'srode in which the soul "ïn-forms ,n i.e.. provides a form 10 the body and perfee:ts it by
exercising over il its deliberate actions. 1S Furtherm.ore, in bis CUrt', he writes that "the soul whicb we
S"e defining is the fint perfection of a natural body which becomes instrumental (~i ~ ~
.u ) for accomplishing the activities [associated with] life (o~1 Jwi ).,,16 Avicenna adds that "that

9 rlitJ'i6I, § 11, 269.13.4 (Arrb., 22-3).

10 Jambet, "L'âme humaine," 217-8.
Il Avicenna, Slntii~ NaIS, l, l, 4.10-12 (R!~I 5).
12 Avïcenna, SItitii~ NaIS, l, l, 6.9-10 (P~ 6).
13 A vicenna, Sln.Iiï~ MilS, l, l, 7.10 (R!,-:, 7).
104 Avicenna., Sltifiï#, M'Ifs, l, l, 10.17-9 (P-f.V, 9). Avicenna adds Chat "the study of the soul has

become pan of the .naturaJ sciences ~ rk ), because the study of the soul, as it is a soul, is its study with
respect to the relation (üh) it possesse! with malter (iL~ ) and motion ~p.)," cf. Idem, SJnfiï~ NaIS, l, l,
11.1-3 (Rs,.,-:. 9); cf. Idem, A/JwJÏ!8l-NalS. 1,53.11-13.
 CHAPTER THREE - n

•
whieh is attributed to [the soul] is the execution of the aets of living beings (~lS J.=..a:.Lii) by means
of weU thought-out chOlees (':?~ J~i) and deduction through discemment (~i ~ l: ..b~l ),
as it pereeives universal matters... Iï

CeLestial souls, however, do not faU under mis definition. because they are devoid of organs.
They themse!ves command operations. e.g.. intelleetual conceptuaJization and motion. They are the
fonns and perfections of the ceLestial spheres. 18 It wiU suffice here to mention that A vicenna' s notion
of perfection associated with the definition of the soul is similar to, perhaps derived from, the notion
of entelecby found in Aristotle's definition of the soul in the OA rheSoul - something Plotinus. it
seem.s, had rejected. 19

Avicenna, however, innovates and divides th15 capacity of actualization of the soul into two
types of enœlechy or perfection. There lS a first perfeaion, "through which the species (e."':')
becomes a species in aetuality ~ l: ). like the form (~ ) for the sword;" and a seoondary

perfection, which is "something that follows the species of the tbing. coming from its aaioas and its
passions (~~~I ),1ike the aet of cutting of the sword. and like the [aet of) disaimination [i.e.. of
judging or deliberation] (~), ofthinking (:i.:"J)' of sensation (~~! ), and of motion."20 The
soul, as the principle of actualization (of the species), is a first perfection; and. as the principle of the
exercise of the actions and the passions (coming from the species), it is a secondary perfection.

For Avieenna, the soul' s life - i.e., the sout' 5 immortality - and its perfection wauld appear
ta be, in faet, synonymous.21 Furthermore, there seems ta be a notion offinality (final. cause) implied
in the first perfection of the soul whose uJtimate end is the perfeaing of the most elevated specie:
(human beings). lt is, however, precisely this notion of a perfeetiJlg principle which precludes any
immixion of the soul with material constituents, since the sou! is not the fam of the body, in its
c1sssieai Aristotelian sense.Z2
Suhrawardî adopts ft sim.i1ar conception of the soul in terms of its perfectibility. He is

15 Avic:enna, SlINr./J, 66.6-7 (Vajda, "Noces," VII, 1, 393). Funhermore, he me.Dti.o1lS tb. "[the soul)

bec:omes ped'ect ( "r=u )

through the body (,,-'7-'~ ) and perfects ~ ) itse1f by exercinng over il, its
[deliberated] action (J~~)," cf. Idem, Sb..~, 67.7-8 (Vajda, "Notes," VIl, 4,395).

16 A vïcenna, S1trN~ Hm, J, l, 12.6-8 (P~ 10); d. Idem, NRfi"ïr, .MUs, 1, 3 L9. LI -320.6 (A wc., 25).
17 Avicenna, SJufil, Hm, J, S, 40.2-4 (~~ 28).
18 Avicenna, S1t~ NlÛS. l, l,12.10-14(Psy;; lO-iL).
19 Plotinus, EDneads, IV, 7,8(5); cf. Blumentbal, P.loanus·P.sydJolqry, 12-3, 17.
20 Avicenna. Sbéü~ Nm, l, l, 1 L.8-11 (P-!J'=, 10).
21 Avicenna, SHitiï~ NHfs, J, l, 12.17-13.2 (~~ 12); cf. Amid, Es:mi, 119.
22 Usbida. ElUcIecompw-aliw. 30-2.
 CfiAPTER THREE - 7J

exp.licit: the soul in. me body is a perfectlon for il. 23 Furthermore, "the most perfeet mi..~ture ( G.' ~
"'~j) is the one belonging to human beings:' be writes, Mand it calls from the Provider [of fonns]

(~'.,,) [the gut of) a perfectlon.',zo.l Its perfection is. indeed. the human rstional soul whose origit: is

in me intelligible world.2S
Suhrawardï does not merely adopt A vi cenna ' s position. A distinctive trait of bis interpreration
of the perfea.ibility associated with the rational soul is the new tenninology he uses. The rational
soul is now discussed in terms of the inteJlSity of light that it possesses, as well as its capacity ta
accept the emanation or, more typically, the illumination chat originates from the intelligible lights ta
which human souJs are subordin.ed. In Suhrawardï's interpretation. the rational soul bec::omes the
ruling light (";".)..tt) and.like Avicenna's rational sou!. itrules over the faculties that are attached to ie
and wbich allow it ta rule oVe!" the different activities of the human soul 26

The human soul is what he caUs the Isfahbad-light ( ) .' f;' ,~ ), which serves as the
27
princip1e for the vEU"ious faculties. This Isfahbad-light is but one of the Many terms used in what
Ziai caJls a special technicallanguage" which employs the symbolism of light ta .. describe ontologica1
M

problems, and especiaUy depict cosmological struccures."ZfJ Literally, Isfahbad (Arabized fonn of the
PahlaVi splibIJod, esptlblmtff~ is the "anny commandant." Its use by Suhrawardï - as the dominating
light - is reminiscent of the Stoic notion of otyemo.DikoD. 30 It identifies the light possessed br every
human soul as the ruling light (,.H,)..A .)~) that rules over all the facuJties of the soul, like Avicenna's
rational soul.

A nolion of perfection aIso applies to Suhrawardï's understanding of the notion of light. The
intensity of light is similarly defined in eerms of its perfection or its deficiency, e.g., when he
discusses the intelligible lights, i.e., the dominating lights (ijA Ü .), ~j). In fa et , in his light tenninology,
petfection is translated iota a quest or a need for light. ln a sense, intensity and perfe<tibility
ch.-aeterize luminosity. Suhrawardï writes that "the difference in luminosity (~~ ) is only of

2:3 TJ1/wlfJilr, § 59,81.4-10; d. HJJyJB.7J, IV <a> 65.1-8 (p) § 22,96.19-91.7 (Arrb, 52; fsmili7,
157-8).
24 f5kmIlr, § 210, 200.2 (S~, 189).
2S (flkmur, § 210,200.8-9 (..sig, 190).
26 For Avicenna, the soul is like the captain. who is the perfection of the ship, Cl" the ruler who is the
perfection orthe city, cf. AVlc:eJll1a, ~, Hm, J, 1, 6.13-1<4 (~.v.. 6).
(frbn•. § 2 t 6, 205.4-5 (S" 193).

•
Z7

28 Ziai, "Shihab al-DïJl Suhrawardï," 444.

29 Corbin, 0'cnl, D, 4On. 85,414-5.
30 Comm, En Is/;un Jnmic-4, voL 4, 88n.118, 115; c:f Walbridge, "Suhrawardi," 528.
 CfiAPTFR THREE - 74

• intensity f.ii~i

and deficiency (0 ~ ).3Z

) and of perfection, and the intensity and the perfection of the luminosity of the
Light of lights is infiJlite. "31 The substance or the realit}"" (:4 ë.: ë = ) of light anl}"" differs in perfection

Suhrawardi' 5 departure from the A vicelllUU1 system is characterized by the absence of a

distinction becween the tirst and secondary perfections. J3 The Isfahbad-light is not made inro [WO

distinct types of hght. Ligbt could not correspond ta or be identified with [WO distinct types of

perfeeting principles, light constïtuting one reality. Nonetheless, for Suhrawardi. the human ratiollal
soul remains the principle of bath the aClUalizlaion (of the species), i.e., giving life te the body, and
the prin.ciple of aetivity and the passions (coming from the species) which are necessary for its role
over the body.

A vicenJla' 5 definitioll of the soul in teons of perfection does not, however, provide a clue as
10 its nature: Is it a substance or not?

The question of the sou1's substantiality has been discussed by earlier Hellenistic writers.
3d
Plotinus bas criticized the Peripatetic view that the soul is the entelechy of the body. The Neoplatonic
approach ofPlotinus proc1aimed i15 substantiality in arder to account for the soul' 5 different aaivities,
i.e., actions, motion, facuJties (such as sensmions, memory or thought),35 and to account for its
relation with the more divine form of being and of the etemal, i.e., the intelligence (the OOUS).36 A
similar tbesis is upheld in the pseudo- TlIeofogY ofADsrode, where the seul i5 immaœrial and net ft

body. 37

Anotber eiementin Avicenna's conception of the soul, perhaps as a result of these Neoph~onic
e1ements. is its definitiofl in term.s of substantiality, e.g., one of bis works is entitled "Ten. Proofs
Establishing that the Rational. Soul 15 a Substance."Ja Although the soul seem.s ta act like a form. for
the body, it is only attacbed ta the latter. The relation of the soul' s substance with the body is closer

31 A
.(frbmu. ~ 174. 168.5-7 (~ 159).
32 .(fLbnw, t 125, 119.12-5 (S..,:. 110).
33 FUbnltr, §§ 216-7, 204.8-206.3 (S.I(4'=, 193-4).
Blumentbal, PJotinus·P.syrbo/~.12; cf. PIOCUtUs, Ennesllls, IV, 7, 8 (Mackenna, 352-3).
5
301

3S Blumentbal. PlaùJus'PsydJoIqgy, 10-1,11 n.10, 13; d.Plotinus, EDAeack,IV, 7.8(1-3) (MackeJ1Jla,

349-51).
36 B1ume.atbal, Plormus' ~rcJJaJo..V, 13; cf. PlotiJlus, Emtt"llds, rv, 7, 10 (MacJœ.nna, 353-5). On
the indivufual soul, cf. Plot:unls. Eoneads, IV, 3,20 (Madcenna, 276-8).

• 35
:T7 Pseudo-71JeoIogyafAm-lDde, 45.3-49.14.
Anawati, "La &nKiition manuscrite," no. 84. 247. This work is mentioned in Mulla ~dri's
<:ommentary. d. Mulli ~dri. üotJ1ÏI, 493 (51$=, 633); cf. Amid, &s;li, 124-7; d. Goodman, "A Note on
Avicenna'5 Theory of the S'Ubstantiality oftbe Seul," 547-54.
 CHAPTER TfIREE - 75

•
39
to Aristotle' s view chal there are distinct faculties that do not exist as separate pam of the sou1.
Although for Avicenna, the substance (~.~ ) of the soul is, in a sense, a fonn (O...l""-' ). it is not,
howevEr. a fotm ~;hich is in a place of inherence (t.~;" ) As such, it cannat be the form of the
40
body in the Aristorelian sense.

Perhaps more important is Avicenna's definition of the souJ as a separate forme For Avicenna,
a form which depends on matter cannot be immortal. The soul must, therefore, be separated from
matter, because it survives the death of the body and is immottal. ConsequentJy, the soul' 5 immottaJity
implies its immaterialityaI The soul, as a separated entity, therefore. finds its place within the realm
of the pure inte1Jigenœs.<12 The (empiricist) naturalism detectable in Aristotle' s system is absent from
Avicenna's juxtaposition of che spiritual substance - that constitutes the narure of the soul- and the
body. As such, there exists a greater spiritualization of the soul' s essence in A vicenna' s philosophical
anthropoJogy.43

For Avicenn.a. the notion of perfection embodies more accurately what should constitute li

more general. notion capable of defining the soul,4<I as œstified by a passage from his Gloss"es cn
Aristotle' 5 OA dieSoul. in which he writes that:

.-- By perfection U' .S-. ,f ), [Arislotle) designates a reality ether than the one he

"- indicaœs witb the fonn, although tbese mo notions do bave a close relation, [Aristotle]
œ11s something a fonn in relation to its subject (~.,...;..."...) and he œ1ls it a perfection
in relation ta any being which it perfeets. Sometimes. petfec1ion perfects the subjeet
or mater <uJ~ ) witbout being part of it, Sometimes, [il perfeets] the composite
(~>-- ) which atXIuires a specific nature [so that] it is known to be a part from
which the aetivities emanate,<5

Contrary to the more naturalistic approach of Aristotle, A vicenna defines the essence of the
soul in a way that avoids taking into account a number of aspects associated with the animaœd body.
He provides a definition which the natural sciences do not explain. i.e., the soul is an independent
entity having its own existence. Avicenna aetUally combines the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic traditions,
Hence, he defines the soul both in tenns of it being a substance and of its perfectibility. As a median

39 Aristode. OJ:IMewSoul, n, 2,413b27-30 against Plata, TUnIleUS, 69d-e.

40 Avicenna, Shi5i~ Nars, 1,3,27,15-17 (P.v:.20) and [bid" 29.7-8 (p'!r., 21); cf. AVlcenna, SJtrN#
• Mela" V, 3, 215.4-6 (""'fc!t6~ 246),
41 Goichon. o.rstZoaiOD, 450.
~ Goicbon. o.rstZDaioD, 454 D,3. 454-5, 455 n.l .

• 43 B Ahwani, • La théorie de la COl1J1aissance," 25.

44

45
For an analysis of the argumeDts offered by Avicenna, d, Ushida, BuclewcomprRliJ.·'t!.24-8.
AviceJlRa, TJim,ar IdJÏ !fllWJÏsllrn, 91.8-12 (Ushida, Butle, 23 n.2).
 CHAPTER. THREE - 76

•
alternative. Avicenna's position incorporates the .-\rÎstotelian position from which he. nonetheless,
atempts to depart.
Subrawardi proposes. not surprisingJy. a similar Neoplatonic conception. of the nature ct' the
soul in terms of its substantiality. He is equally concemed to posit an entity radically distinct from
any type of corporeality that could be associated witb the body. There is a similar desire ta depart

from the Aristotelian conception of the soul in term.s of the hylomorphic conception of the soul (as
the form of the body).
For $uhrawardï, the Aristotelian conception of the soul does not provide it with sufficient
independence. Hence. the rationaJ soul. principle of the different faaIllies (svch as those of growth
or of nutrition) which are its first instruments. cannot he sometbing imprinted (~.;L'".) in something
else.45 Subrawardï writes chat, "if it were supposed that the faculty [e.g., growth or nutrition]a7 was in
a [particuJar] part [of the body], then that which wouJd be in [that part] would cesse to exist.d6 and
the evedasting [principle. i.e., the sou1) would be divided [or eliminated] (;~ ) by the dissolution
(~) incurred by the intake [of nutrients]." Since bodies are always subjeet to traJ1Sformation and

are in a constant state of flux, "it is impossible that that which preserves the mixture (~I ~ ) would
die (~li ).',49 The crux of the argument is tbat if the soul were associated in. any way wbatsoever
with the body or anything bodily, the constant transformation in which the body is majntained (i.e.,
in a constant state of flux) would cause the disappeanlflce of that which is associated witb it, or
anything reJated ta it, i.e.. in this case, the soul. Moreover, if the rational sou! were te cease to exist
once it disappeared as a result of tbis constant physiological transformation, it could no Jonger have
any effect on the body.~
For Suhrawardï, the soul is not in itself a form, but can be viewed as sucb only in a sense
similar ta the one proposed br Avicenna. It is a form only inasmuch as it i5 the principle ruJing the
body, separate from matter and, chus, everJasting. S1 In one passage, he write5 that what he means by
a form is "any simple reality that is species-like (~~ :.i L.: '! 4 ë.: ë, JS ) ,wh eth er it be substantial
(4:;'.~) or accidentai Fi.: .'~ )," adding that, "the elements C~~) "onJy contain corporeality

4) ~fUViÏ"'JU1Iiit, § 50, 191.3-4,

47 FacuJties JUch as growtb or nutrition.
4B Because the essence of sauls 15 "monadic" (~I~"" l+il..:-&u ), i.e, whose unIty cannot be

•
Jeopardized, cf. ~fUVJÏWR/Diû, § 60, 191.8.
49 ~fUViïWJUDik, § 60, 19L.4-7.
50 ~fUViïJllTROliû, § 50, 191.7.
51 Tmwf!;iû, § 59,81.1-2.
 CfIAPTER THREE - 77

•
(:4.:;, :? ) and [maleriaJ] qualities (<.:.J~ ). and nothing e1se, .. 52 The 50uL however. is a "monadic"
unitY (:i.: .,,~-, ) which is in 8Ccualit)T, such tbat the accidents (~~) and the forms (~;- ) which
belong ta it are in the substrate. i,e., the body. because the soul is not ~e bearer of tbe_~,5:3 For
Suhrawardî. the soul is, indeed ... ft substance. w hose essence is distina (...,:., 1jJ 1 ~ ~ r from
5al
anything bodily or corporeal.

But co what exactly does this substance whose essence 1S distinct correspond? In Suhrawarcfi' 5
ontalogy of light. it is, in facto a luminous substance ta which is opposed a tenebrous substance
(~li...;A~ ) - that of the bodily,'5S Furthermore. an the charaeteristics traditionally ascribed to
souls, e,g,. that it "is self-subsisting, not inhering in a locus, living. knowing. and ruling over
bodies." are a1l privileged elem.ents of interpretation for Suhrawardï for which he provides again
Qur'iinic references (Q., 79:4),56 They are. however. rendered in. terms of his Jight tenninology.
More generally, it can he stated that the incorporeal substance of the soul is assimilated ta the
Ùlcorporeal substance of light.

INCORPOREALITY OF THE SOUL

A vicenna offered a few arguments to demonstrate the ïncorporeality and the immateriality
of human souJs. These arguments were not. bowever. accepted wholeheartedly by all philosophEl"S.
They were soon ta be challenged by al-Ghazili who objected to Avicenna's rational demonstrations
ta prove that human souls were self-subsistent spiritual substances. 57

One of Avicenna's arguments for the incorporeality of the soul is base<! on the n&ure of
thoughts. Intelligible thoughts. bei.ng indivisible, can only be present in an indivisible substratum.
The soul. as the receptacle of abstract entities, must possess a nature simiJar to those sbstracted
entities. Hen.ce. it must be independent of any type of matter or corporeality.S6 Consequendy. the

52 HiJ:mlU, § 87,87.7-11,
53 TJtlFYZ/JJfI, § 59, 80.15-17.
~ T.;lIwi/liU, § 59, 81.4-5 and Ibid., § 59, 81.5-10. Suhrawardi writes that "ali substances are dlvided
iJIIo eorporeal and incorporeal; the incorpcreal dominates the corpocea1, and it is abo its abject of deSlf'e," cf.
HI!rJki/, IV (a) 77,9-78.1 (p) § 32. 104.1-3 (Arm., 65; fszDR"JJ, 192). Immatenal substançes are divided Ulm
superior dOJD.lJ1ating substane:es and iJlferior domiJlated substances tha are causeeS by those that are superiar ta
tbem; Ils for bodies, they are of t'Wo types: etherical and elemental. the etberic:al bodies being. tbemse1ves,
furtber- subdivided. cf. HlITJkiI. IV (a) 78.1-79.4 (p) § 32. 104.3-10 (ALm., 65; fsma-U, (92); cf. (fzkOIiIr, §
1048.137.6-7 (S"'!4'=. 132).

'.
55 The luminous substance is of t'Wo types - pure (;~ ) and accidentai (udJk >, cf. .(fibnllr, § 109.
107.12-16 (S.",., 98). For the differeDt categories of hghts. cf, Ibid., § 156. 147.5- 148.5 (SJfll"~ 143).
56 rlirpïd. § 11.269.10-12 (Atrh~ 21).
57 al-Ghazali. TJllJ8fu/", 186-204 (/oCDht!'.rmce. 186-2(4).
 CHAPTER THREE - 78

-. soul must be an incorporea1 substance, as opposed ta bodies which are divisible entities.

of complex
Suhrawardï provides a similar line of argumentation, by appealing to the process of cognizance
lIi~ntal e.ntities (~Lt.. ). The OCCUlTe.nce of the res (a particular thing), cf its true
rea1ity or, as one might say, of the "thingness" of uy sort of entity is achieved independently of any
of its attributes, i.e., the accidents associated with the thing. The substratum of the concept itself
cannot be in a body or in anything which is divisible, because the oCCUlTence of such entities in the
mind must take place without any materiality. Suhrawsrcfi writes that, the .. substratum (-.j..::-.a ) [of
the concept or, in the Persian version, the "abstract form"] in you is aiso non-measurable: it is your

rational souL because that which is not measurable cannat be inherentS9 in a body [and without say
chS"8.eteristics]. Therefore, your soul is neither a body, nor a cOl"poreality... t{) ln. the Persian version
of the same text, he says more explicitly, "it is necessary mat the substratum of that form be devoid
of [any) measure (.JI~) and of particular chara<%eristics (U8~):61 He writes that:

They are neither interior ta the world nor exterior to it ,62 and neither contin.uous (
j..-":a... ) nor discontiJluOUS [from it] (~ ). AlI of tl1ese [cbaraeteristics] are
amongst the accidents of bodies.53 But .:bat which is not a body is free from [the
accidents]. Therefore. che rational soul is a substance which cannat be conceived to
be indicated by the senses, and whose stale (J~) - or nature (..,;,~ ~ ) - is to rule
(~~) over the body.64

Another argument for the immortality of the soul offered by Avicenna is the absence of
factors that wouJd contribute ta the destruction of the sou1. A11 objects th. aetually erist and that are
subject to destruction passess two distinct factors: first. the ac~ality of contin.ued elcistence and.
second, the possibility of being destroyed. The soul, however. cannat contain distinct factors. because
il is a non-composite substance. Consequently. it cannot possess the possibiJity of being destroyed.6S
Al-Ghaziili. bowever, criticized this idea for being at odds with religious tradition - maintaining that
God CSJl do away with anythiJlg.f6

The same argument is used, in the Pill:OS. by Suhrawardî to establish the eternity of the soul

58 Avi cenna, SIuN', Hm. 1. 2, 26.15-27.12 (~p; 19-20).

59 The translation follow5 the reading of the [OOO1Clte of the editi.on. cf. H4!J'iïbl, Il (a.) 50 n.S; cf.
HI!niki/, II (a) 50.6-8 (P) § 6. 86.12-17 [slightly differ'eDt) (AtrA., 43; IsmïjJ, 102).
60 H~, II (a) 50.6-8 (p) § 6. 86.12-20 (51ightly different from the ARbie] (Arr.k, 43; Fsmall.
62).
61 Hl!riikil, II (p) § 6. 86.12 (~.h., 43; fsmï'iJ,62); cf. A/wiifr, D, § 23,125.18-126.2 (.An:-4. 99).
62 The Persiall version adets .....because interna! and external. lIl"e aaributes of a. body. L1kewise, they
are...... cf. HllyJb:l, TI (P) § 7. 87.6.
63 The Pem.an version adds .. An)'thing which is Mt a body cannot be attributed [01"" belong] ta bodies.
ait is devoid (;~) of the Gributes [be1onging] te bodies," cf. HI!yijki1, II (p) § 7,87.7-8.
 CffAPTER TEfREE - 79

•
and its incorporeal nature. The argument rests on the presence or absence of a potentiality for
destruction (û~ o~) Hence. wbat 1S. by essence, a simple entity - i.e.. Qot composed - cannot in
aetuality possess such a potentiality (LA~ ~ "1,3 4:i'~ ~ "1 ) for being destroyed. This potential
for destruction cannet be applied to the intellect or prime maaer (~~ ). which are simple entities
in acwality. Souls are similar simple entities - inasmuch as they are abstnlet entities (6;~ ) like
6ï
intelligences - that cannot possess such a potential for destroction. In the Onen[;{J/-.IUuOLinllh·f--e
f.Visdo01, Suhrawardï cOflSlders the argument for the immortality of the soul based on the absence of

a capacity to be destroyed to be fiawed. because the term "deficiency" (~) is understood in a

number of ways.

Suhrawardi mentions another objection. that 15 sometime leveUed against the eternity of the
soul. The etemity of the soul, it 15 objected. cannot be upheld considering the fae1 th~ its existence 15
only possible. lt is, like aIl other separated entities (~li.;u.... ), an entity that is aiso potentially

non-existent (,,,..,J 1~ "~."JI ùS- JS ). To such an objection, he replies that the non-existence
of all these human souls can ooly l'est on the disappearance of their cause. This is impossible,
because their cause is the active intelligence, itself dependent - lite everything that exists - on the
ultimate cause, the Necessary Being.68 Therefore , the eKÏstence of the soul depends on the ontological
status of ils cause, itseJf immortal. This 15 the active intelligence. or the Archange! Gabriel with
wmch it is identified br Avicenna.

In. &nother passage, Suhrawardï presents yet another and most forceful argument for the
ïncorporeality of the soul. The argument posïts a materiai nature - perhaps someth.ing akin to a
subtle body (like the pneumo) - be10nging ta the soul. and shows Il COOlnlno that the souL could

Dot be material. if it were to ascend through the cosmological bîersrchy. He writes chat:

If chis were not the case [chat the human spirit (c..J.;) - i.e., here the rational soul -
were incorporea1], then., how oould it he conceived chat the divine spirit, i.e., the
rational soul, be piercing through the heavens. and be gradually ascending. since

64 H~, n (a> 51.1-4 (p) § 7,87.5-9 (AJ'd., 43; ISmlfu.l03)..

65 DavidsoJl. Alfilr'llDi 106, 152-3. Al-Ghazatï altacks Avicenna's praof! on the aatUre of the
1

aŒaChment. Tbere mu~ exist a factor that parQ.culari2es the souI and wbicb c::ould be a oondltion for the
cominued existence of the souI. There would then he a possibility tha, once the aaacbmeJ1t (body-soul) is
severed, the saut cculd perisb 'Wlth the disappearmce of this factor. In addition, notwithstanding an independem:e
of the souI witb regards to the body, a possibwty of the souJ' s destructIon by Gad (or another cause) must eDst
and be c:onsida'ed, cf. aJ-Gbuilî, TJllJaTur, 205.1-209.... (fDt:oJ1en!!J1c:e, 205-209); cf. Davidson, AffI1l/n,

•
152-3.
66 al-Ghazali, TilIJUur, 209.5-211.13 (IDC'OA~a-,209-211).
67 M~", § 217.496.17-497.5; cf. HlI,rJbJ, II (a) 49.6-10 (P) § 5,85.11-86.2 (Atrh., 43; /smJlU,
101).
 CHAPTER THREE - 80

•
piercing and passing through celestiai spheres 1S inconceivtble. because ce1estial
spheres perslsteternallyin [their] circular movement. [and it] is impossible to conceive
of [the Sphere] as moving in a straight line. because movement in ft straight line is
not in confonnio/ with its nature. If [the ce1estial spheres] came back together arter
having been ripped, therefore. it would have to be moving in a straight line.69

The aux of this argument would seem to rest on a particular cosmological configuration of
the unïverse. Celestial spheres consist of an impenetrabJe. unp1ercable. and untearabie (as a result of
their circular motion) "subtie matter" In this particular cosmological scbeme. it 1S impossible to pass
from the oroit of one sphere ta another. One is only sucked into the etemaJ curvature of its circular
motion.70 It is for this reason thac the soui cannat be material. no matter how subtle such a materiality
is defined. because the sour 5 ascent toward the Light of lights would then be impossible. A similar
appea1 to cosmological doctrines OCCUl"S in some of SubrawŒ"di' s arguments witbin bis themy of
vision (see section on visual perception). The l81ter occurrence of the argument is, perhaps. ac the
arigin of this psrticular dem.onsteation of the incorporeality of the soul. We will have ta retum ta
ether arguments prop05ed by Suhrawardi ta demonslc8te the existence of the soul (see section on
self-knowledge).

_. SuhrawardCs main concern. is ta estabJish the conditions tbat guarantee the soul's access, on
its ewn terms, to the F~ Bei.ng, itself devoid by essence of any type of materiality. Therefore, the
soul mus/, be defmed in tenns of the ïmmateriality of ilS substance. The argument be provides
appears, therefore, to be more ontological in nature. Hewrites:

The existence of [the soul's inteUective substance] is inconceivable in the world of

bodiei, because, if it were in the worJd of bodies, it weuld be inconceiv8ble that it
perceivesthe unity of the First Being U",~'-~I o~.J ) [i.e., Gad] ... because the
One (~I,,) œn only be perceived by an entity whicb is itself monadic (~I~,J ,;-al).
Bettet" 9till, [this inteUective substance] is itse1f a monadic entity, as I;Ia11iij bas said,
while being aucified:

What is sufficient for the One (~I.3) is that the One isolEites mm [i.e.,
maltes him One]?1

And nothing which exists in the world of bodies is a one [i.e., a monadic entity]

69 rJigld, § 7,268.2-6 (Aa-h.. 20).

70 The ascent of the sou! cannot c;onstitute a cOl"poreal ascent through the beavens. lt 1S, according to

Corbin. "an involl1tioJl of the inner spiritual heavens," if one uses Avicenna's TrlWioW ordle Bird [~ml
JlI-An'] oc the Book oFAsceDr [.Jt.til4fi:'mi".Qmh J, attrib11ted te mm. Fa Corbin, the _cent is chrOligh the
heavens of the inner imaginaI worJd, cf. Corbin, ArdJ., 28 n.28; cf. [b:id., 366; cf. Rüzf, § 10, 248.11-12
(.Ard., 374). For the debate surrounding the alUhorship of the A-finïj-DiùD8fJ whicb cannet be proved. cf.
Heath. AU~OIYill/li A J7Ce.Dnil, .. Appendix 8: On the Attribution of the .Jt.ti"ny:,mïru.;th." 206.
71 aa11ij, Abtb.r.Tll-.{nulni. 36.7. of the Arabictext(LJ ~1.,J1.)1""1 ~.I.,.JI ~).
 CHAPTFR. THREE - 81

• (~J.J) The existence of the soul is therefore not conceivable [as being] in the wodd
of bodies.
72

Furthermore. Suhrawardï. more concerned than Avicen.na to illustnlte philosophica1

and doctrines with QUl""anic verses and hadiths. does just that regarding the soul' s ïncorporeality.
the~es

Although these are not souiao sensu arguments. chey are presented as proofs or corroborations
(J.=.I,J) of this perticular interpretation, likewise a central tenet of Peripstetic philosophy. He quotes
the Qur'inic verse which mentions those who will rem.ain "in an abode of truth. at the side of a
Mighty King," (Q.. 54:55). and wmcb be interprets as foUows:

[The existence of the soul] is neither a body, nor corporea1. since these attributes
(~u....-) are inconceivable regarding the reality (~) [i.e.. the substaJlce] of bodies.
Ratb~, these anributes (~~) belong ta the divine spirit ~l c."J)73 which is. on
account of its substance. [radica11y] separated from the world of bodies. There is no
difference between [the divine spirit as the rational soul] and the Angels, except that
[the rational 50ul] has bodies at its disposal ta govem..7<:
Suhrawardï then quetes &nother hadith where the Prophet says, .. 1 spend the night near my
Lord; he Jlourishes me, and he quenches my thirst. n7S To furtber corroborate these quasi-praofs taken
from the religious tradition, he then appeals to the mystical tradition. He introduces the statement of
a shaykh on the charaeteristics of a Suri "who is in the company of Gad without ft locality,,7fi which,
for hint, indicates that the existence of the sou1 is to be understood in temlS of an ïncorporeal entity,
because bodies which occupy specifie locations are material, composed ('. :s;.. ) and divisible
(c ,;i.... ft) and, chus, that "which cannet tle divisible - neither in the mind (~.,.JJ ~ ) nor concrete1y

(~I ~) - cannotbe in this world,n77It must, therefore, beimmaterial.

The spiritualization of human. souls is inescapab1e and somehow unavoidable, as the purpose
ofSuhrawardï' 5 philosophical anthropology is to e1ucidate the natureofan entity capable of approaching
and being near God, no matter how metaphorically sucb expressions are taken.

PRE-EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL

72 rlit;iÏt!, § 7,266.13-267.2 (An:'h., 19).

7:3 These qualificaliOJ15 w01l1d determine the relation chat is estabhshed betweeA human. souls and the
.. Anget-DiVUle-Spirit" from which they onginate, d. CorbiA, AJ'rh.• 27 a24.
74 rlit;Ji:I. § 7,267.5-7 (Arm, 19).
75 Majlïsi, Sm.1JJlrBi,fnTrm-AnHir (Tehran, 1355 h.1.J 1936), vol. 2,85; memioned 111 Corbul, An-h,
27 a2S; â. rrirJH, § 7.267.8.
76 For CarbUl, titis is simiJar to the "nowhere-Land" (,)l..:T ~ ü), d. CorbiA, ~~. 27 n.26.

77 rlJqMd, § 7,267.9-11 (Airh., 19).

 CHAPTER THREE - 82

•
Now that the nature of the sou1 has been di5cussed. let us eum to its existence in the
intelligible wodd before its roming into being. This has been a thomy issue in Islamic philosophy
essemially because it is at odds witb the doarine of aeation. one of Islam' s central theolo~ica1
7S
tenets. The Greek doctrines of the poe-existence of the soul were well koown to Islam.ic thinkers
The rivll1 Platonic and Aristotelian views on the soul are not unre1ated to the laler Islamic debates
over ils pre-existence.

The Platonic belief in the sou1's pre-exislence was a commonly heJd position. seemingly
implied in the demonstnltion of its incorporeality. itseJf an argument for its immortality. The pre-
existence of souls having access to a world of Ideas was a central epistemological lhesis of Plato's
doctrine of the reminiscence (1lD1LOll1e5'e) of human souls. For Plato. our knowledge of universals
does nat originale in particulars. but rather in the metaphysica1 world. This knowledge consists of a
recoUection of the Ideas of things which have been forgotten al the time the sou! re-eatered the body.
79
Coasequent1.y. our souls would have had sorne previous. non-bodily existence.
Aristotie attempted to steer away from Plato's grœt1y dualist position and to ground the.
existence of the soul in the material world. Hen.ce. the fate of the soul and the body are inextricably
sealed - they are inseparable. The coming into existence of 50uls is simult...~eous to the coming into
existence of individual bodies.
More important. however, is the place occupied by the Neoplatonic pseudo-llleoIO§Y of
AnSroi/e (the Arabic collection of excer-pts from Plotinus' EJmelitls). It stands at the crossroads
betWeen tbese t'Wo central figures of Greek philosophy and Islamic thougbt. Thinkers like Avicenna
and Suhrawardï found in this work a doctrine of pre-existence of souls that w as more easi1y reconcùable
with positions held by Plato. Avicenna and Suhraw..dï have both, however. more or less successfully
avoided the PJatonic-Neoplatonic position on this issue, so manifesdy at odds was it with reJigious
tradition.

To understand Suhrawardf 5 position, it is impossible ta overlook the interpretations of two

modem Avicennan scholars who have interpreted Avicenna's position on the issue of pre-existence
of the seul in opposite ways. They illustrate quite weU the difficuJty of identifyï.og Avicenna's true
position and, by extension, Suhrawardï' 5 stance.

On the one hand, Corbin holds that both A vicenna' s poem (ô ~ ) 0.11 dit! Sou/ 00 and bis
-..
lleci1ll/ of t1Je Hirri 61 rest on a docrrine of the pre-exisœnce of souls, 50 long as one does not

78 As the HiAdu traditions, cf. pibnnr, f§ 230-3, 218.7-220.6 (5.t.v:. 204-6).

79 Plato, Philedo, 72d-73b; cf. Idem, Pbllerlrus, 246b-d.; cf. Idem, Republrç, la, 6LOe-6l1a.
 CHAPTER THREE - 83

•
interpret or, as he writes, .. degrade" the texts as mere "allegories.,,62 For instance, in the poem On ilJe
Souf, the soul is likened to a dove that descends upon the body.8J The same image recurs in the

lltfC,/hU of dJe Bird which mentions the descent of the soul into the body. 50mething that is
interpraed as strongly implyin.g the pre-existence of the soul.

On the other band, Amélie-Marie Goichon, contcary ta Corbin, does not be1ieve that these
texts postulate the pre-existence of the soul in the supra-ten-estrial wodd - 811 idea she be1ieves
be10ngs to the Platonic tradition. This is not to say that Avicenna's system does not bave any
affinities with the Platonic-Neopl8tonic tradition. On the contnuy, tbis tradition constituted a major
influence in the development of bis tbougbt. Goichon holds that individual human seuls could not
have pre-existed their aaachm.ent to their respective bodies. The main bone of contention is that
individuation occurs onlyas a resuJt of an attachment with the body. the particuJarization that sets
souls apart !rom one another. Nonetheless, the problem of the nature of their existence prior to their
attachment to bodies remains unexplained.
Goichon oCfers ahypothesis: Cirse, souls could be somehow contsined in the active intelligence;
second, however, and based on Avicenna's C~ (and the Snlr·wioo), no individual and concrete

existence is possible for seuls before their union with the body; and, finally, an individu al soul is
dist.ingui.sbed from another sou! only by the quiddity or the relation to the elements (matter), because
souls cannot pre-exist bodies and be numerica11y numerous.f3o::l

These hypOthesES are not without problems; for instance, How is the scul's existence in the
active intelligence ta be accounted for? In a number of works, Avicenna specifies, first, that the
human soul never eJcisted independently from mauer - 15, for example the intelligible forms do.
Second, he aIso says that the human soul possesses, in its nature, an attachment and an inclination
towards the body. Moreover, I5suming the temporal ongin of the soul allows him to rejeet the
doctrine oC pre-existence of souls, by relying essentially on the notion of the individual soul

Another .-gum.ent for the rejection of the doctrine oC the soul' 5 pre-existence, found in

ID ft is round Ut the inlroductlon of Aviœnna's lf.fJtD!Ztl iII-MilShr'lf".Yrïn, kb-kJ; cf. Ibn K.hallikin,
WJÛlI)Iiïe, vol. 2, 160-1 (RIo KJmUibïn's. vol. 1,443); cf. De Vaux, -La Kaçidah d'Avicenne sur l'âme,"
159-73, Arabie ed. 159-65. An English translation is round ln Browne, A ul't!ralY Hi.st"lJtY of Per.s:iJI From
F6dRwnroSJIéfi. vol. 2.110-1.
8t AVlceJUla, RJSiïM JlI-TIIJ'T (ed. Mehren). For a French trans., cf. Corb i.n, A r;z&eA.Oe 1 203-9
(AJl747un1.186-192).
82 Corbin, A rlZt::enne, 96 (A r;zcmnn, &4).
ED Massé, "Le poème de l'âme," 7.
&4 Goichon, nrstLl1aiOD 452 n.2.
1
 CHAPTER THREE . 84

•••
Avicenna' s Commenrmy on the pseudo- TiJeolog;y of An:srOll~, relies on the notion of perfection
Had the soul pre-existed the existence of the body. it wauld bave possessed a perfection that its
desirefortheintelligibleworldwouldnegate.becausetbenotionofdesireimpliesinlrinsici.mperfect~::)fi.

But the soul tacks a need ta strive for the perfection. In bis commentary. Avicenna deme5 the
possibitity of any pre-existence of the soul:

[Platinus - the pseudo-i\ristotle] does not mea.n that the buman soul existed before
the body during a period in which il had not been takeo over and clothed br a body,
ont)" entering it hller, because this matter has been proven. absurd in [many] books,
even if the soul does not die. Its meaning, rather, is that the soul. since it cannat exist
disembodied Iike the disembodied intelligible matters mentioned in the A-fN~~lJysics
,bas by nature (~) a relation (:ii~ ) with the body from the very beginning and
has an inclination (J::-) to it. 8s
The divergent views amongst Avicennan scholars over the COITect interpretation of the
question of the pre-existence of human souls has, however. a bearing on the ÏJlterpretation of
Suhrawardfs own position. Suhr&wardi is often interpreted. and rightly 50, as having adopted an
ambiguous stance, especially in the light of Avicenna' 5 own position.

Moreover, for Avîcenna, the soul cannat exist disembodied pn"or to i.ts life on esrth. but it
can Illier, in the afterlife. As for Corbin, he interprets Suhrawardï's position as emphasizing the
necessity for the pre-existence of souls before tbeir lUachment to bodies. la fact, earlier commentators
had interpreted Suhraw..dï' 5 thought in the same manner. For example, in bis Four l-~nte"es 1 where
Suhrawardï' s praofs ag8ÏJ1S the pre-existence of the soul are discussed, Mullii $adt"ii attributes the
be1ief in the pre-existence of me soul to Avicenna. e.g., in the RecJi8J ofme Bird and the poem 0'1
rAt! Soul, w hich works he considers as a possible source of Suhrawardï' s own ambiguou5 position
(perhaps the source of Corbin' s own interpretation).86

For Corbin, Subrawardï's works. like Avicen.na's mystica1 recitals, are "ciphered texts."
87
Tbese teXt5 are intelligible ontY if the pre-existence of the soul is postulated These texts express
"an initiatic teaching, in the Corm of symbols and ptnbles.'.e8 Corbin then goe5 on to identify a
number of passages ta cOlToborate bis interpretation. In a passage of the TiIbJtrs IJet!LaKeO 1"0 'lmiïd

85 Avicenna, ~ 37.5-9 eNotes," l, 1, 349; Watbridge. Sam~, (35); d. GoicboD, OisDDaiorJ ,

1

451-3. Anawati addresses the issue of the Goichon-CotbÙl int.erpretations, cf. Anawatî., -Gnose et philosophie,"
291-305.
8I!i Mulla ~adra. KriJïlJ III-Amïr Af-Ad163h (Tehran. 1282): 814; 'luoted in Corbin, A r.7a-mtc", 96
D.l35 (A J11Î:mmI, 84 a9I).
87 Corbin, A wcemze, 96 n.135 CA ~cennZl, 84 a91).
88 CorbiA. Atd~. n n.22. 5imilar 5tacements exist dlroughout Corbin' s studies on Suhrawardi' s
wota.
 CHAPTER TfIREE - 85

• nI-.Dï.o, Suhrawardî mentions the figure of Christ 8Jld states that, "omy rises ta Heaven what has
descended from it:' a statement that Corbin traces back ta the Gospel of St. John (3/13) and which is
adduced as a proof of the sour 5 pre-e.xistence ta its coming into the body.!P ln the inteoduetlon of ms
Red kJreUecr, Suhrawardi symbolïzes the soul with a falcon (~j4) imprisoned in the material
wodd. In the S{~&' of m~ ZodJilC, Suhrawardi comments on a passage in the Qur'in: "0 you
appeased soul, retUn1 to your Lord, wel1-pleased and well-pleasing" (Q., 89:26-7) which he interprets
in the following manner: "Indeed, the retUm implies the anteriority of the presence. It is never said
to someone who has never seen Egypt: 'Retum ta Egypt'." Corbin considers chis passage as an
implicit recognition of the pre-e.xistence of the soul.90 A similar statement is round in Suhrawardi' s
On rhe ShKe of Childhood where it is written that "if someone dies, much of ms life remains.
because he onJy comes to this world from the other world...91 And, finally, in Suhrawardi' s uU{i{UP/!'e
0/dJe Anrs, the story of the peacock,9Z simiJar to the stoty of the gnostic in the nt/es ofOccidtWhll
Erue or the story of the faIron in the /led /DreUect, is again interpreted by Corbin as an explicit
affirmation of the pre-existence of the soul These symbolic or allegorical tales echo the Platonic fall
of the soul into the body, when it forgets everytbing it knew before, but, nonetbeless, aspires and
seeks to retum te its former abode. This "retum" is interprd:ed as requlring the existence of a prior
state. i.e., a concept of pre-existence of the soul expressed Il symbolically" and on an .. esoteric
level. ..93

Similor views are upheld by Thackston, who discusses Suhrawardi s "esoteric" view of the
fall of the soul, a view that Maris aIso seems te espouse~ There might even be some Gnostic
e1ements in this .. desœnt of the soul" motif. Thackston actuaUy conceives of a twofold Isfahbad-ligbt,
an interpretation that divides the - rationa1- soul into [Wo parts: one part remains in the spiritual or

angelic rea1m., whereas anotber pan descends into the prison of the body. The loftier part of the
Isfahbad-light ultimately corresponds to a celestia1 and primordial self, the angelic hill of the human
soul.~ This would, however, leave un.answered questions that pertain to the nature of the lower half
of the buman soul: Does it correspond ta a telTeStriaJ self that is reducible to a psychologïcaI self?

89 AJwJÏ/J. n, § 26, 128.16-1295 (Arrb., 102); d. Corbin, ArdJJU{~e, 96.

90 Abnfi, § 2,462.9-11 (AJ'rh., 349); CorbiJl, ArcIJmwe, 344.
91 Tu.fii~, § 13,262.11-18 (-"'{yStrCil1, 58); cf. Ccxbin, Arr;/JJU{~t:, 410 n.22.
92 LlIJFlIl", VIII, §§ 12-14,305.4-308 t 1 (~., 428-30; -"'J:yStratl, 83-5); cf. Corbin, Arrh4lJ{Ke, 437

•
n.34. Cr. Aviçenna's RisiïlI/rll1-7ï,n- in Corbin's tram., d. CortJin., A Ji7C~t:, 154-65 (A Ji7œ.nn;r, 137-50).
93 *A'1J , § 2,226.9-227.7 {Arrh., 201-2; ~{yStrQl1, 35); d. Corbin, Arr:IJ;I/{~e, 214 n.2.
94 Moris, "Revelation," n-3.
95 Thr.dston, lmoDaJ;V, 103.
 CHAPTER. THREE - 86

•
W ould such 8Jl interpretatïon make Suhrawardi' 5 human soul subjeet to some of the exigenCle5 it is
subjected to in. Isma~îlism and, chus, make the human sou! part of a univers al soul?

In chis respect, Tbackston's interpretstion, although he never makes this explici:., greatly
depends on Corbin who, in bis A ~7œnne er ft! n?cir ~is<ionnrlirt:', had distulguished the [Wo faces of
the soul E it were. or the [WO selves: the celestial and terrestrial. the former eorresponding by and
large to the contemplative faeulty of the rational soul (theoretica1 resson) and the h~ter corresponding
byand large ta its praetieal faculty.9fl Ù1 fact, Corbin's interpretation rests on the premise of the
existence of an archetypal "L" i.e., a "primordial Self" or a tutelary angel of the soul, a œlestial
counterpart of the psyehie self or facuJties.97 This interpretation offers. in facto an even greater
spiritualization of the notion of the (rational) faculty.

These passages do highlight the difficulty of accurately judgiJlg Suhrawardi' s true POSltiOn.
Perhaps. tbis difficuky arises from the nature of the different genres empJoyed by Suhrawardï - and
Avicenna. Suhrawardï does, however, provide arguments to sustain a belief in the negation of a
pre-existence of the soul before the existence of the body ta whieh it attaches itse1f. He asks:

What would have forced the soul to become separated from the world of the divine
and [eternal] life (o~1 .J (,)"'.Jo.iJ1 rJ l& ). and the world of Jight. and to become
attached (J'le;) to the world of deatb and of darknesses (~L..JJ.iJI.j ~",..LI ~~ )?
Who would dominate and capture such an Etemal soul? (How could it sulTender to
the attraction of the faculties of even a suckling infant) sa E ta be brought down
from the spiritual as we11 as luminous world (.J~f", ~~ 1 )? Moreover. bow
would eacl1 one of [the souJs] be differentiated (jl:&....1 ) in pre-etenlity lL), since
their species would constitute one thing. and whiJe [they have] no substratum, no
locality, no action. no capahility of being affected (J~' ) before [Ûley become
atached ta] the body. and no acquired qualities (4: .",<; ~ ~ as is the case
ft ).

after [their attaehment with] the body.96

He concludes this statement by saying that the rational sou1 starts to exist at the same time
E the body.99 This second position is more in line witb !slamic a-eationism. Moreover. Suhrawardï
p-ovides a number of philosophical arguments ta reject me belief in the pre-existence of souls. In his
Oneoml-U/uOJ.iNd.i~'"e1J'i"sdoOJ. the work which is smd to contain the quintessence of bis .. illuminative"
wisdom, the final stage of the deve10pment of bis thought for which bis more "philosophica1

96 Corbin. AJi7œnne, 98.99 (Aw4:emlll,86. 87).

rn CCldun wrïtes. "par ces tl"aDSparitiOJlS successives d'une même flgures. nous sommes en effet
reconduits à la vision mazdéenne de la Fravarti comme Personne cëleste, Moi archétype, Soi primo['chal. ange
cutéJaIre de l'ime dont eUe est la conttepartie céleste," Ar.iœane, 103 (A~cmml, 91).
98 H#lyiïk.iI, D (a) 55.6-56.1 (p) § Il.90.8-16 (Atrh.. 46; fsmii'IJ, 107).
99 H~~, D (a) 56.4-6 (p) § 11,90.18-19 (AIrh.• 46; Isma7.107).
 CHAPTER THREE - 87

• treatises" served to pave the way. Su.hnrwardi offers four arguments to show chat the soul does nor
e.l1srpn"or to its coming into existence inco the body.lOO

Suhrawardï's first argument appeals te ft notion of unicity that WtlS

prove the nfttUre of souls. He writes that if the soul eristed pnor to the existence of the body. il
used by Avicenna to

would be neither one nor Many. If souls e..xisted before their aaachment to bodies, they would be
many individual souls. This is absurd, smce a unity of substance is postUlated. as ail souls share in
101
the same species. Furthennore. how could a unique soul berome divided and, chen. distributed
amongst thedifferentbodies. sincewhat is incorporeal ca.nnotbe divided. Furthennore. eacb individual
soul is aware of its own self and conditions. but ignorant of the self and the conditions of others. The
buman soul couJd not, therefore, be ft single substance shared by a multitude of individual souls. If
the substance of eacb individual soul shared a smgle unique and identiœl substance. chen each of
I02
them, individuaUy. would know what the other souls would knoW. Suhrawardï writes that:

[The soul's] quiddities (~~L. ) are a unicity (~I~,J ) that are not romposed of
something which perceives (~..J~ ) and a nature which would be devoid of the
capacity of perception (~I..J,)! ). We are, in reality [the soul]. white we possess no
information about it or of the patticular modes of its states (4J ~ ~ ), except by
means of an inference (J~ ~I ).103

Another a-gument Subrawardi provides for the dem.onstcation of the unicity of the soul rests
on the notion of unicity itself. a notion wbicb does not accept divisibility at ail. He proposes a
number of premises: first, if the fonn were in a body: second, if a body accepts division; tbird, and if
everytbin.g whicb is in something divisible. aIso accepts division; and fourtb, if the fonn of unity
(o~", ) were in a body and dependent on it. tben it would aIso be divisible. He chen concludes that
the form would. therefore, not be one or a unity (~~,J).U)4Similarly, he argues (with )Tet &nolber of
bis favorite arguments by reducdo ad oOsurdum ) that if the One were "in" a body. ete.. il would
DOl be One. Therefa-e, il is oor in a body.

The notion of the soul, expressed by Suhrawardï's typicallight terminology. aIso alludes to
ics incorporeality - like the incorporesJ. nature of light. The soul becomes itself an incorpa-eallight
(;~ ..J~ ) which nIes over human bodies (~·~I ~L;..-J 1~ ...,j~~ ). lOS Such a concept

lCO
FükAur, f§ 211-4, 201.5-203.3 (S.tt~~, 190-2).
101
PJImï, m. § 32.25.14-26.1 (Book, 26-7).
lŒ
HJbmlr, § 211, 201.8-9 (~.. 190).

~
103
ilfuyiïw8DIiU, § 60. 191.8-10.
104
PJIItiï, § 30,24.14-18 (Book, 25).
lOS
lIikmll/', § 210,201.2-3 (.5i..~. 190); d. Ibid.• § 164,154.8-9 (5.t47=, 149).
 CHAPTER THREE - 88

•• as light - ~ essentialligbt - precludes any types of particip«ion with the bodily. Moreover. not only
is the sour 5 nature conceived in terms of light. but 50 is its perfection. as we have seen.

Suhrawardi simultaneously appeaJs to a similar notion of unity. This is not surpnsing. as the
lwninous substance is. in faa. an Equivalent of the inteJ.Jective substance. Fint. if these luminous
substances (the rational souls) pre-existed the existence of the body. tbeirunity (~~'" ) could not
be conceived of. This umey could not be divisible. siJlce mey would neither be defÎJled through any
type of extension or measure (o';.JL..o ) nor be in anyway corporeal (:i.:;' j..>-! ).1(16 How, then. could
their individuality - as individual ligbt-souls - be conceived 9

Second. then- mUltiplicity would also be inconceivable. because these immaterial lights
would not be distinguishable from one anothet". in term5 of their intensity or weakness. befcre they
are associated with their bodies (litera1Jy. thar "citadels"). Furthermore. each degree of intensity (or
weakness) is something numerica11y uncountable (~ ~ La) and does not amount ta a distinction
in. terms of an unspecified accident (~~ ~.Jl& ~).I07
Suhntwardi cao then conclude that since neitber their multipliClty, nor chen- umey is possible
before they attach themselves ta the bodies, and rule over them. fv- 4--1' ~...~ ). their existence
is not possible prior to their coming into existen.ce with the body.U)fl Even where he couches bis
argumentation in bis ligbt tenninology, Suhrawardi, in fact, faithfully psrallels the previous passages
which discuss the incorpOt"eality of the rationalsoul. Elsewhere, Suhrawardi will use similar arguments,
10Cil
but in terms of the logos (L-LS), ta discuss the incorporeality of the rationa1soul

The most powerfuJ argument, however, is one from authority: religious tradition. The soul is
neither pre-etemal (~jf) nor eternaJ. (r:..).i ), "it is aeated witb the body" once the disposition
(.,),~,) of the body is complete in order ta receive the soul; and moreover", "it is written mat Gad
aeated it with the body, not before and not aftet" .....uo Suhrawardi' s philosopbiœl arguments are
aptly used ta colTOborate the religious rraditian. It should be mentioned Ihat the notion of a primordial
(X)venant 50 frequently adduced for a possible the pre-existence of souls, e.g., the CQvenant that God
made with Adam, is absent from bis works.
A second argument for the negation of a pre-existence of the soul before its origination in a
body rests on the JUUure of the soul. If the soul existed at an esrtiet" time in the intelligible world, it

106
ffrbnlU, § 211.201.7-9 (~. 190-1).
107
ffrkm., § 211, 201.9-202.L (s..w:.
19L).
108 §
.{frkmnr. 211,202.1-2 (~.v:, 191).
109 Kldim., DI, § 20, 93.L2-17 (Arrh.. 161).
110 Hl!yMi/, D <a> 56. L-3 Cp) § 11,90. L6-19 (AJr.h., 46; Fsmn7, 107).
 CHAPTBl THREE - 89

would have to enter this wodd with its own perfeet nature. He argues tbat if immateriaJ souls existed
~
~~~.
before the existence of the bodies. tben. nothing - either veil or preoccupation - could interpose
itself between them and the world of pure ligbt. i.e.. the intelligible realm. In other words. there
would be neither agreement nor difference. Again. the argument proceeds by œOuclio dO nbsurdum
- the souls would then be perfect and their ruling ove.. the body would amount ta waste. There
would be no superiority (4:."..(,1) with regards ta the quiddit)" in arder ta assign specifically some of
them ta a particular body Cu - .;,;) As for contingencies (~li W 1) - Like the necessity of movements
- they take place in the world of bodies (V-- ~ 1 ~ ~ ) whicb are apt to possess a certain light, on
secount of their motions. No such contingencies cano however. occur in the world of pure ligbts. 111
A third argument relies on the governing characteristics aaributed ta the ruling .lights. If
niling lights - rational souls - existed priOl" to the existence of bodies. some wouJd be niling (those
in bodies) and others would not (those remaiJling in the metaphysiœl world). However, souls that do

Dot govem bodies could not. in fact, exist as ruling llgblS. On the COfltrary. if ail rationa1souls were
ruling (over bodies), then there would be a time wben all of the sauls would be united with the
bodies. Thereupon, 110 more rational souls could come into existence, because such a conjonction
would have ta occurinpre-etenlity U' JI), and no ruling lights would remain. AU souls - ÏJl order to
be goveming - would have conjoined witb the body or departed from this worJd, somedting that is
absurd. 11Z

And finaUy, Subrawardï pl"ovides a fourtb argument which rests on the existence of endless
aeations. If souls did not start ta exist, i.e., originated (~.J~ ) with their bodies, these souls would
be Ù1finite. The existeflce of infinite dimension (~~ ) would then bave ta be postulated in the
sepanted substances (~li_-,u.:.) - which is, again, impossible. ID
These four arguments provided br Suhrawardï against the pre-existence of the soul were
deemed inconclusive br Quçb al-Dm al-Shirizï, unpreoccupied by the religious data. He considered
them. weak and floll-demonstrative, primarily because the proof depends on the unproven assumption.
that there is no transmigration of souls. 114 Moreover, most of these arguments rest on the assumption.
that souls can omy be individuated by their attaehment to some sort of materiality. as souls belong to
a single species. A similar assumption is round in Aviœnna' s works.

§ 212,202.3-10 (5.t~ 191).

•
111
prkmlU,
lU ffrkmur, § 213,202..12-15 (5fr., 191-2).
113 .fUbnll/', § 214,203.1-3 (S",!~ 192).
114 Q. o. al-Shïrazi, SlliIffJ 1 447 (~378 not fO[' line 25); â. Walbridge, SQ'C:wŒ, 138, 138-41.
 CHAYTFR THREE - 90

•
Suhrawardi' s arguments based on aspects ofunity, of perfection, ofgovernance and creaedness
can aU be traced back to arguments round in Avicenna's works. Bath authors, however. seem ta
have adopted views on the pre-existence of the soul that were interpreted in a number of ways. 'Tb!S

is more evident in Suhrawardrs works where seemingly opposing views are found, in bis
philosophically argued tens and in bis allegorical texts. The huer texts are often associ81ed with the
"esoteric" position of Suhrawardïs initiatory teachings, bis "oriental-illuminative" wisdom, often
identified as bis trUe position. This interpretation has the ment of explaining how some Plalonic
idetlS like the pre-existence of the soul could cohœ,it with more orthodox Islamic be1iefs, such as
aeationism. Ithas the merit to aaribute a "hidden" consisten.cyto Suhrawardi's works that uanscends
the different genres. But, more importantly, it renders use1ess any attempts to establish a chronology
of bis works.

Another solution ta the presence of [wo seemingly contradie:tory stances consists in considering
the various allusions to some sort of pre-existence of the soul as Suhrawardï s attempt to describe
the soul's abode, the divine world - i.e., the aaive intelligence - the source and the cause from
which it originates. Suhrawardi' s paradoxica1 (even contradietory) stance reflects bis attempts to
_. iJlcorpOI'Bte a vsriety of elements.

The implicit affirmation of the pre-eristence of the soul, on the one hand, ecboes the
Gnostic motif of the "fall n or "descent" of the soul, somethi.ng tbat is found in Avicenna's own
allegorical tales. The allusions to its pre-existence constitute, perhaps, the logicaJ. outcome of the
adoption of a Peripatetic cosmology, something Islamic philosophy inherited from Neoplatonism.

Emanation becomes the œntral theme of Peripatetic cosmology, where the aaiveintelligence
(closest to the sublunsr world) p-oduced human souJs. In such a scheme, the active intelligence
contains a11 the lower souls and is responsible. ta a great extent, for their existentiation. This position
does not, however, provide any answers to the difficulties raised by the possible existence of souls
witbin the substance of the active intelligence.
More problematic is the unambiguous stance Suhrawardï explicitly upholds in bis OneorMl-
UllU.IIiDJJlif-p J~m (his opus DJHgAllO/). Suhrawardi, on the other band, explicitly denies the
pre-existenœ of the soul and offers a number of arguments ta support it. This expJicit denial has the
advantage of providing a solution fer the integration of the re1igious imperative of createdness. More
striking in chis work is the "illuminative" character - i.e., the light terminology - of bis philosophical
qumentation central ta the negation of such a pre-eristel1ce. One would not actually expect this in

•
-~
".
view of the alleged .. esoteric" position he is said to have he1d.
 CHAPTER TfIREE - 91

•
EXISfENTrATJON OF THE saUL

The active intelligence is the principle at the heart of the existelltlation - the com..i.Jlg inta
existence - of individual souls. This is central ta A vicenna' s ontology in which a NeopLatonic
emanative scbeme is developed. Sucb a concept of the active intelligence as the source of aU the
lower souls raises a number of issues, especiaUy regarding the unicity of tbis active principle. These
are objections usually addressed to this particuJar type of emanationist ontology. Tlus conception of
the active intelligence transfŒms what is supposedly a single and monadic entity ioto an entity that
is simuJtaneously one and many - i.e .. in whicb our souls aJreadyerist (in p«enlû/). This objection
was raised by Fakhr al-Dm al-Rizî against Avicenna (which Corbinidemifies as an entire1y theoretical
dilemma).115 Other difficulties arise in discussions about the mysticaJ union of buman souls witb the
One (see sections on intellection and prophetology), 116 and about the SUt'"VlvaJ of the soul' 5 indi vi duality
iJl the afterlife (see section on escl1atology).1l7

The origination of souls with bodies guarantees their existentiation regardless of the nature
of the fonner's existence in the active intelligence. Souls come into existence oaly once they are
attached to living bodies. For Avicenna, evety human bei.ng and ever:y animal possesses a 50ul of its
116
own. This is not a tandom or haphazard process. The individuation of souls depends on conditions
associated to the conditions of theirexistentiation. Although distinct analytically and logically, tbese
[WO aspe<%S are intimately associated. It is the existentiation of the 50ul which not only provides il
with an existence. but wbicI:J, simultaneously, guarantees its individuation.
For Avicenna. is the soul a form. of the body in the Aristotelian sense? We bave seen tbat
this is not the case, but chis que~on was raised by Corbin and Gilson. Corbin, who implies tbat
Avicenna's didaetic Ireatises provide no clue to the problem, refers to Avicenna' 5 "visionaryrecirals. n
For Corbin, conceiving the sou15 as separate forms implies: (i) that the sours unity with the body
constitutes an "indispensable umty" for a human beïng, conceived only rerrospectively; and (ü) chat
El pure form is necesslrily unique in species and whose iJldividuality ~::n onJy be similar to the
iJldividuaJity of the celestial souls - i.e.. colTesponding to their species. 119

Ils Corbin. A~e, 102 (Ar.7ceDI.IlI, 90) who distinguishes between a conjunetlon Ul..-:il ) and a
union (,)b:sl) ta which wc will return (see sec:tLOIl on intellection).
Morewedge, "Ibn SiJ1i's Concept of the Self," espcially the see:tloa. entitled ".A1talysis of Ibn

'.
116

SïnianParadoxe5," 00-7.
117 The eighth section of the second chapter is entid.ed "Pédagogie angébque et individumon," cf.

CorbUl, A ~, 88-1 OS (A f'7i:em1n, 80-93).

118 Avicenna, S~, 41.7-8 ("Notes," l, 9, 356-7).
 CHAPTER THREE - 92

There is a certain inescapable necessity for souls. whether celestial or human, to come into
being aIong with the coming into being of a substratum which awsics its principle, its perfeaion.
These physico-psychological conditions. however. constitute conditions of the existentiation of 50 u Is.
At issue, however, is the interpretaion Corbin gives of Avicenna's mare symbolic texts and the
oonception of the soul's pre-existence.
Suhrawardï. on the otber band, reassel1S the thesis that the soul CaJ1Jlot pre-adst its coming
to life with the body. The twofold origination - body and 50ul- accounts for the individuation of
human souls. In the R~!ps of L{irbr. he wntes, "[body and scul] both come into existence together;
and a mutual [dynamic] attachment - love and desire - exists between them, unlike the [corporeaJ
and static] attachment thal exists between bodies and accidents...120 In another passage !rom the Saale

work while he discusses the Necessary Seing. he adds that "you know that rational souls cannat
exist prior ta bodies and are, thus, temporaUy generated possible beingS."IZI And again, in the
(À'ienr4l-U./umimllioA &f'iSdom, the body is the first abode of the soul in the world of bodies. 122

The coming into existence of soul and body together guarantees that Peripatetie philosophy
incorporates aspects of creltedness. Suhrawardi appears to express a rea1 concern for preserving the
soul' S aeatedness. His concern would then provide more weight ta bis stance on the negation of the
pre-existenoe of souls. As for the conditions of individuation of each soul, it rests with each individual
soul' 5 EXperiences and the abject of its individu al contemplation, each soul differing in degree and
perfection.

PHYSICAL CONSTITUENTS AND COSMOLOGICAL CONJUNCTION

The Peripaletic system in which cosmologieal configurations detennine the structural
organisation thal eJements have to undergo before tbey cm receive a sou! sets some pre-conditions
for the existentiation of souls in particu1ar bodies. First, material elements undergo the influences of
the celestial spheres and of the actions of the active intelligence, the tenth and last of the intelligences.
It is from the tenth active intelligence chat the sublunar world of elements and human souls is
origiJlated. CeJestiai forces possess the ability to impart motion to the elements and to mix them.
They are thus responsible for the production of aU existents. lZ3 The sublunar world (below the

119 On individuation, cf. Gilson, "Les sourœs gréco-arabes," 50; cf. Corbin, A l"7œlZDe, 92, 94-

••
(A P7t:emm 80, 82-3).
1

lZO PJirrü, m, § 32,26.9-10 (Book, 27).

121 P8mï, IV, §42, 35.17-18 ( Book,38).
lZ2 .ffikmllr, § 229,217.1-3 (SJfT.. 203).
 CHAPTER TtIREE - 93

Sphere of the Moon) is. thereupon. subject ta a number of necessary cosmologica1 canstnWtts.
According ta AviceJ1J1El. bodies are the product of the different mixtures of elemenrs,lz,::
which become the recipients of the sauls (~.:;i ;f,Jl.,. ) once matter has been readied ta receive
tbem. 125 The eX1stentü~ionof the 50U1. however. requires specific conditions al bath levels - sublunar
(material worJd) and celestial (heavenly spheres). Sublun8r elements must. first. be amalgamated
mto a harmo.Dlous mixture. Bodies that possess El more balanced or proportionate (J I~I ) mixture
become the conditions for the existence of sauls. AlI this ocganisation of the elements. and bodies
takes place with the help of the powers of the heavenJy badies. 12il) Thereupon, a soulatlaches itself ta
this particular body. alread>? detennined by its particular mixture (-~~ ~I~ ) and its partîcular
qUality (:L-t=.. ~ ). that it may become its first perfection. The soul becomes the principle that
50

p-ovides a form ta this matter. lZ7 As ft second8ljT perfection. the soul then becomes the cause of the
sctualization of the different (particu1ar) souis (e.g., vegetative, animal or human) and of their
respective faculties. l2fl Avicenna expresses the existentiation of souls that OCCUl"S only under these
particular circumstal1ces in the following tenns:

The sau! cames into existence (~~ ) whenever a body fit to be used by it comes
inta existence. The created body becomes ilS dominion (~ ) and its instrument
(4Jl). In the quality ~ ) of the substance of the 50ul created with a particular
body, i.e., that body that is made suitable ta receive [the sou!'s] ongination from the
f~ principLe, there is a natura! ye.mng <t.1 ~) ta occupy itself with [the body], to
use it. ta concem itself with its [differem] states, and ta be attraeted by il [rbis
yeaning] binds the sau! specifically to [the body]. and tums it away, by nature, from
all other bodies different from it [sa that the soul does not attach itself ta matter]
except through it. Therefore. it is necessary that when. it becomes individuated
(u ".; 10_,. ), i.e., the principle of its individuation occurs ta it out of the qualities

(~~ ) which impose ta it an iIldividuality, these qualities deœrmine its particular

attachment and the relatianship (~L::.....) ta thal body for the benefit of each one of
tbem, despite [the faet that] this condition and this relationship may be obscure ta us.
And it realizes the principles of its perfecttbility it possesses through [the body], and
l29
its subsequent deve!opment is not through it, but by lits own] nature.

I~ Avicenn.a, ~, P.hys.. V, 308.6-7.

IZ4 AviceDna, .lsh4irifl', vol. 2, Il,302.2-305.2 (O.rr., 297).
125 Avicenn.a, Slti/il'. Nllfs, 1,3, 27.19 C~, 20).
1Z6 AVlceJUla, .M1,Pil', NiiIS. 1,319.4-8 (AJ"i7ê::, 25).

••
1Z7 Avicenna, SJHfij', NJÛS, 1.3,28.1-3 CRs".:, 20).
Ize Avic:enna, SltOii', Nm, l, J, 28.3-5 (~y, 20); ci Idem, DifnrsIJ, Pltys.. 101.1-102.5 ( LiFn-, Il,
65).
IZ9 Avic:enna, MUiü • N;us, l, 37615-3n.9 (A J'7C, 57.29-58.9).
 CHAPTER THREE - 94

The active intelligence has many functions. One of its functions is to provide the conditions
chat will be conducive to the proper preparation of matter in the sllblunar world prior to the coming
iato existence of the souL The active intelligence pleys another role as the provider of - ralional -
souls. And finally, the active l1ltelligence acts as the active principle responsible for the aetualization
of the potential intellects possessed bya.ll human souls (see section on inteUection). The principle
responsibJe far the origination of souls is simultaneously responsible to provide the physicaJ and
cosmologicaJ. conditions that govern the origination of human bodies. This twofold origination is
highlighted by the inclusion, in Avicenna's theory of the sou!'s origination, of an embryology in
which the role of the active intelligence is highlighted as the source of life. 1JO

Likewise, Suhrawsrdi is concerned with similar physicaJ and cosmological issues. The same
exigencies commanded by the cosmological structure he adopts account for the initiation of the
process that leads, through illumination. to the eristentiation of a soul in a body Suhrawardï, like
A vicenna. attributes to bodies a state of preparedness that renders them capable of receiving souls. In
the Onenht/-IUumiooEir-"e If'isdom, he writes that "[the body's] state of preparation (.,)I~I ) [to

receive souls] originates from the retum (;~ ) of the eœmal movemems" of the spheres. 131 Bodies
of human beings are constituted of the most perfect mixture and, thus caU to themsel.ves a human
rational souls, the most noble of sau1s.

ADothero, lengthier, passage from the same work e10quently illustrates the similarities that
exist betWeen Aviœnna's 8Jld Suhrawardi's understs.nding of the existentiation of human sauts:

The most perfect of mixtures (r=J

~ 1j..e ) is the one possessed by human beings. And
il requests, from the Provider [of fonns] (~I,,) a perfection (JL.S ). You have
leamed that it is impossible for the dominating lights (ijAu JI~I ) te suffer any
change, as their transformation would only occ:ur by the transformation of the agent
(~li). i.e., the Light of lights. And, this is impossible. Therefore, alteration (~.ï )
œn nather occv ta [the Lights of lights] nor to [the dominating lights]. Indeed,
things occw" from some of [the dominoting lights] on account of an. ever new
preparation (,,1 ~I), because of the renewal (;~) of etemal motions. It is possible
that an agent be complete ('rb), and that [its] actions depend on the preparation
(,)1 ~I) of the receptac1e, fer il is ta the extenl of its temperance that [the receptacle]
receives the qualities (~~ ) and the forms - which we have mentioned regarding
the iDtel.1ectual relations (~ ~) [that exist between] the dominating lights and
those [lights] relative ta a position be10nging to the fixed stars (~I~ ) - which
colTespond [to its degree of perfection). From one amongst the dominating hghts
(ijAu ) - namely, the (possessor of the) talisman of the rational species (~t...-

• 130

131
Hall, "A Decisive Example:' 52-54.
.ffrkmN, § 210, 200.4-5 ( ~, 190).
 CHAPTER THREE - 9S

~w r t.."..=tJ 1 ~ ). i e., [the Archange!] Gabriel, who is the cJosest father (yi
~,>iJ1 ) amongst the magnificent leaders of the dominating celestial rea1m (of
Malaküt) (o..,.,.~1 ~",s..ul ~~3J ~~ (J-A ). the provider of souls. the spirit of
holiness «(",)'J~ r C.3..J >. the provider of knowledge (rU) and of [divine) assistance
(~'b ). the bestower of life I1J1d virtue and immateriallight - an unmaterial light
OCCUr.i to the perfect human mixture. It is the ruling light in the human body

(~~I ~l:---l' ~ ....i~1 ). It is theruling light (.::J-e ..}y ) which is the

Isfahbad-ligbt [i.e.. the rational soul] of humankind (~.".....~I ~ I ) [and] wbich
indicates itself by [its capacit)" to bel an ipseity <=i:·.l.:ti ) [i.e., its own individual
. or seJf] .132
b emg

Suhrawardï completes this discussion with a lengthy passage on the pre-existence of the soul
(the four proofs discussed earlier). The above passage. however. aptly illustrates Suhrawardï' s
willingness to incorporate the Avicennan cosmological fnunework. where bodies have ta acbieve a
perfect SUEe of preparation before they can reœive souls. This state of preparation of the receptacle
is dependent on the motion of ce1estiai spheres as wel1 as the qu alities elemental matter will receive
- i.e.. depending on vario\Js cosmologicat conjectures. The sublun.. wodd is thus ruled according ta
the configuration mat the celestial spheres and the fixed stars will adopt

Likewise, the active intelligen.ce plays a mIe as the provider of buman 50015. Suhrawardï
n
expresses its latter function by identifying it as the "possessor of the talisman of the rational species
(~~ r t.~ 1 ~ ~L.-) which provides life - their souls (the prinàple of their individuaJities)
- ta bodies. This is the work of the Provider of fonns (..J",.-J' ~',J) that bestows a (rational) soul

to bodies once its mixture bas achieved its completion,l33 as it is the mixture which appeals ta the
Provider (of forms) for its perfection.1:l:a Moreover, each reïgn - plants, animais. and buman bei1lg5 -
has a Lord ruling OVel" its species. such that the emanating intelligence ovedlowing upon the human
soul (~ u84AJJ üi.c.~.J ) is the Lord of the human species, the strongest and noblest of aU the
Lords. l35 In the latter case, it is. in faet. the active intelligence identified with the Archangel Gabriel.

MOt"e typical of Suhrawardï's work is. again. bis appeal ta an ont 01 ogy of luminescence.
Light is attributed to all bodies, whether they be human. or not. 136 The body is, thereupon, defined as

.. a luminous body" ('r1..J~ t.3~). Suhnlwardï writes that:

132 .Hr.bmtr. § 210, 200.2-201.4 <5.y"., 189-90); cf. T.uwZ!Jk-, § 59, 80.17; d. PltrriJ. IV § 33,
26.13-15 (8"',28).
rlir;MI, § 8, 268.9 (AJrh~ 20).

•
133

134 F5bmtr, § 210, 200.2 (S.(l{.. 189).

135 MJIS1Nïn'~, § 190,459.8-12.
136 Walbridge• .S'ë:7m~, 61.6.
 CHAPTER. THREE - 96

AmOllgst the mineraIs. everything which possesses a luminous body and which
persïsts in this luminescence resembles the ce1estiai bodies and thei.- lights - like
gold and hyacinth. They are abjects of love for the souls. they rejoice them. they are
precious by the perfection of their stability and because of the brightness which
shïlles and which is of the same nature as love. l37

This Light is. however, in contraposition to the essential light of intelligences and human

intellects. oaly an accidentalligbt. This material and accideotallight constitutes but qualities (~~)
of a body. 138 Formally, bodies participate illluminosity. They receive Il cettain quantio/ of - accidentai
- light, whose source is the pure lights inhabiting the metaphysicai world. Bodies are, nonethe1ess,
detined in term.s of their poverty of light such that Suhrawardï can write that .. ail bodies are of a
tenebrous substance. "139

A hierarchy of lights is responsible, through a procesS of illumination, for the production of

the elements. lt is the lights farthest from the Ligbt of lights that are the causes of the elements that
exu1stitute the physical world,loIJ the materiai substratum of aIl bodies. In the corresponding Peripatetic
system, the funaion of originator of the sublunar world is attributed ta the active intelligence. The
(rational) souls, the perfection of bodies, it produœs become. in Suhcawardî's interpretation, the
light whicb in. its purest fotm becomes the perfection of bodies.

Mcreovel". the notion of perfectibility - opposed to deficiency - whicb dermes the nature of
the sou1 is also applied to the reality of the lights tbemse1ves,141 such that the uJtimate perfection of
light is the perfection that is intrinsic ta the Light of lights - i.e., GOd. l42 On account of their
deficiency of light, bodies are tbus deprived of their ultimate perfection. Bodies, therefore. requite
and desire light, i.e., their perfect10n or, in the traditional Avicennan system, the rational soul. The
luminosity of immaterial entities - ce1estial souls and intelligences - actual.izes the luminous qualities

137 Hibn;r, § 208, 199.3-5 (.s'..w.. L89). The dominating lights <..~~u )- Isfaodicmudh - whose
the'Ul'JY is the earth (~.J~I ~) or the lU1t1Jnl1 elements, cf. HLémJU. § 209, 199.7-200.1 (~.v:, (89); cf.
Carblll. Caps spmtud. 85-86.
138 AJw4IJ, § 90, 182.9 (ALrh., 108).
139 Hibnar,§ 109, 107.17-108.18 (SIS;, 98). Corbin has studied and highlighted the aneten.t lraruan

roots, partic:ularly Zcroascrian, of bis conceptions of lighm-souls and dackness-bodies, cf. Corbin. Leç mOllfs
Z«'fJJIstriens CÛDS11philDa'pln"e de SoI1nlwJTâi' .
I~ Hibmlr, § 182, In.6-178.4 (SJt.,e-. 169). He cri.tlcizes the Peripatecic conception of malter
fuJ~), c:f. (5bzlM, §§ 72-90. 74.13-90.4; cf. Walbridge, SQm&t', 65-73.
141
Hibmlr, § 125. 119.13-14 (SIv., 110). The soul - perfection of the body - ca.n only find
perfection aCter i:s separation from the body and its a'ScensioJl co the realm of metapbysical hghts, cf. HLémar,
§ 232,219.3-7 (SJ{t:, 205).
142 F5.bn.. , f 147. 136.5-8 <Stw:, 131). This notlOJl of perfee::tion. is also usoCÎ.a&ed with chat of
pieuvre (i.e., the conscience of a perfe~on eX1stulg 1.Jl actuality), cf. -f5kmIl/", § 210. 200.2 {~.g:, 189).
 CHAPTER. THREE - 97

of bodies thlOugh the mediation of the light-soul (the Isfahbad-light). i.e.. the ratlonaJ part of the soul
(see section on inteUeetion).I-G Consequently. Suhrawardfs light tenninology mirTors quite J11cely
the Peripatetic system.

SOUL-BODY RELATION

The previous discussions on the nature of the soul. its immateriality. the issue of its pre-
eKistence, and the conditions of its e.xistentiation have provided some indications of the relationship
the soul enjoys with the body. Avicenna's and Suhrawardï's position on the soul-body relationship
..e, on the whole, fairly similar.

Their dualist perspective regarding the seul-body relatioaship rests on the betief of two
distinct worlds: Il msterial and a spiritual world: it is the latter world which contains the immaterial
souls. The main difficuJty of any dualist approach is ta provide a satisfactory account of the relationship
that exists between the (spiritual) immaterial substance - the soul - aJld the corporeality - the body -

ÎJl which it finds a place. Any dualistic perspective raïses, however, the question of the type of
relation that these two entities must enjoy. One solution is to concei.ve of an existence priOl" to its
existen.tiation in a body and an existence once it has bem existentiated in that body. This is Most

-,. apdy illustrated by the Plstonic position.

Avicenna's theory of the soul postulates an accidentai dependence on a body, but this
dependence jeopardizes me distinctiveness and the separaleness ofthis substance whose existence is
independent of the body. This particular solution provides an answer to the actual. differentiation mat
must exist between individual souls.l 4<l While Avicenna concedes that the sou! is a separate and
independent substance and that his position cleady in.troduces a dualism of soul and body. as
substances radicalJy opposed ta one another, none of the two eerms can, in fact, be reducible to the
ether. Avicenna' s dualism is best illustrated with his hypothetical example of the" suspended person, ft

a beiJlg devoid of any corporeal attachment, an independent conscience, as ie were (see section on
self-knowledge).I4S

Avicenna's dualism is also shaped by the necessary relation body and sou! enjoy. The
human soul, as a pure !ubstaDce and principle of life possesses, in faet, ties with the material bodies.
This intrinsic relation of soul and body is a condition of and a prerequisite for the soul' s existentiation.
Such a position, on the one hand, confonns ta the theological requirements laid down by the

143 #rbztRJ', § 147, 136.4-5 (%-. 131); cf. [dem, Ih;pi;, § 13, 270,4-6 (AJ'rb~ 22).
144 Teicbman. 71JeMmdiU1ddJ~SouJ, 16-7.
145 Michal, "Cultes, magie et Ultelleeti.on," 220-33.
 CHAPTER THREE - 98

•
aeationist per.;pettive of Islam and. on the other band. reflects the Aristotelian elements that have
been retained in Avicennan Peripatetic anthropology, such as the soul as the perfection of a naturaI
body and the soul' 5 actions tbrough the body. 145

Avicenna's soul does not come ta e.xistence before the body lbat receives it. which ruas
contrary ta the Phltonic or Plotinian views. l47 He upholds a more Aristote1ian position regsrding the
relation of soul and body. perhaps as much for phiJosophical reasons as for its coincidental compatibility
43
with theologicaJ positions.l Viewed in this light, Avicenna' s dualism becomes less radical than
Platonic dualism, inasmuch as it requires the presence of the body for its existentiation. Aspects of
Aristotle's more materialistic conception of the soul-body releltionship have been preserved and
interpreted in ligbt of Islamic creationism.
AVlcenna's position is. however. resolutely more spiritualist than Aristotle's position. as he
emphasizes the soufs substantiality and its incorporaility - the body serves onlyas its instrument.
The soul survives the body. slong with sorne of its representation (see section on eschatology). The
body and the harmonious mixture of its elemeots are but "aa::idental causes" for the existeotiation of
the soul la'9 Moreover, the different faculties that are associated with the body divert the soul from its
own activities.ls.!

Suhrawardï upholds a similar dualism. - the soul and body are radically different substanœs.
The soul, however. possesses an atachment (~) witb the body (illustrated bythe reJationship tbat
unites the Mer- and bis subjeâS - used by Avicenna). This somewhat natural Elttaehment of body and
soul guaramees that the life the 50ul provides ta the body lasts as long as the attachment is not
severed. l5l This 8tt8chment is st times defined as an (accidentai) desiring relation (:;.: ë"":;' u~ ). l52
Il is net only "accidentai," but aIso "relational." The cessation of the relation does not entail the
cessation of the substance of the soul, because the cause, i.e., the active intelligence. of the substance
of the sou! is. infact, eœmal (~',J).l53

The body and the soul share affinities with one another. On the one band, the body with its

146 $aJibi, Sudes, 172; cf. Amid, Es:s;u', 121.

147 011 dualism, c:f. Tea.c:hma1l. 77tehfiddWlddJl!SouJ. 18-27.
148 $ah"i, .Min ADiiIiiD uiï Ibn Si:mï, 107.
149 A vicenna, ,,",p, NlIfs, 13, 380.4-5 (A l'le, 59).
ISO Avicellna. MI.fÏiJ", NRfs, 11.373.11-374.3 (A J'7(;:, 56).
151 r~d, § 7,267.12-14 (AJ'rb. 19-20).
152 H~nïkil, VI (a) 80.3~ (p) § 34, 105.5-7 (AJ'rh., 61; .lsm...~, 213).
153 PJirtii, IX, § 73,65.15-66.6 (Book, 69).
 CHAPTER. THREE - 99

'. bodily mixture (~j~ Cl >-0 ) needs to appeal to the Provider of forms in order ra receive a soul
acoording to its preparation (,JI ~I ).l~ It needs to be provïded with its perfection - a buman soul.

The soul, on the olher hand, aIso possesses a certain affinity (~I) with the body (:..1
Subrawardï expresses in terntS of poverty (~).I55
n' '0 ) that

The poverty that chs-acterizes the Isfahbad-light - the (rational) soul - is to be understood

witb regards ra the luminous entities that are above it. These spiritual and intelliglbJe entities are
uncon-upted by the tenebrous substances that lie at the level of the sublunar worJd. Bodies. however.
whicb are imparted wilh a certain dynamic principle of light, are only the locus of apparition or the
place of manifestation (~) or the receptacle (~) for the activities of the light principle - the
rational soul. The body becomes only a "vase" for the effeets of the soul and a "battle field" for its
faculties. 156 The crue nsture of the soul is luminosity', whereas the body is (almost) totaUy devoid of

il; worse, the joumey of the soul in the world of bodies is responsible for the contamination of the
soul.

In. Suhrawardï' 5 theory of the soul, the A vicenn.an dualist position is still at work. SuhrawS"di
introduces once more bis light ontology and, thus , appears to depart from a strictiy dualistic perspective.
The ontological. distinction he establishes between light-souls and bodies is now voiced in tenns of
,-.' 811 indigen.ce of light or luminosity.l57 As such. the perspective he inlroduces appears to be more

"participationist," i.e.,lightbeing present in aU tbings.

It has been claimed by AmiJl Razavi that the mind and body distinction is a Il superlicial
one." ooly based on SuhrawS"dr s demonstration of the existenœ of an immaterial soul understood
as the self. Amin. Razavi adopts the view that SuhrawardI' s theory is a "spiriwal monism." The self
and body are two entities thal partake of the "same ontological texture," i.e., as "intensity" of light.

This, in tum, permits him to appea1 to such notions as love (~ ) and domination (~ ) to
158
illustrate Suhl'awardi' s monism..

Although Suhrawardï explicitJy rejeets the Platonic idea of transmigration or metempsychosïs

(see section on escbatology). bis concems do remaiA the preservation of the soul's immateriality,

154 .{IïkmRr, § 229,216.10-11 (.sïw=. 203).

155 Q. D. al-ShïI"izï explains that this l5 a potentiality mat requlres ta be aetua1ized, a reason for which
the seul attaches itself to it, cf. Q. D. al-Shïri2Ï, SJmr.!J, 478.8-10 (S.yf'.. 393 J1.2). Acc:identallighls are in the
animal pneomJl (~f~ c.f.,,)} and psycbic pneumll (~l...4:s), cf. Ibid., 478.12-13 (5.t.v:, 394 n.4).
156 H.ikm., § 229,216.10-13 ( (5.t.v:, 203); cf. .{fiJ:mIlr, § 217,205.12-206.3 (SolfJ{., 194).
157 Jambet, "L'âme humaine," 219.
158 Amin. Razavi, SuhrJWJtrdi, 39-41; cf. the slightly different vernon ln Idem, ·Suhrawanh's," 127,
129.
 CHAPTER THREE - 100

even once the soul has come inta existence in the body. Sîmilsdy to Avïcenna, Suhrawardï holds
thal the rational soul (the Isfahbad-ligbt) is immaterial (see the section on the intellection) and
inhabits the world of pure lights, from which it originales. In its purest form, the soul does Ilot
contain any type of i.mmi.-X1on with the corporeaJ darkness (4.!':"'jJo:l ~ ).159 It 15 only once il
estabJishes a relation with the body thal it suffers contamination.

What is not elucid.ed by Suhrawardï s texts. how ever. is the extent of the sour s participation
in the body's corporeality during its sojoum attached ta it. On the one band, the sours attachment to
the body severs its association with the wodd of pure lights to which it will seek to return; white. on
the other hand, the buman body has been created (~) to recei.ve a seul as its perfeC%Ïon 160 But
the body remains "the first abode for the Isfahbad-light, in the .. world of bodies"
ft {t jl ~ 1 ~ ~) ... 161
The ontological indigence of bodies alluded to by Suhrawardï. nonetheless, necessitaœs the
presence of a longing relationship between soul and body, one in which the tenebrous facu1ties
(~t...:lb
l62
) associated with the body impart the body with El desire for the world of pure Jight.
Suhrawardï wnleS that:

When the tenebrous faculties cling ta [the Isfabbad-light] with a longing attachment
~ ,,.;-: Io; ), and they attractit to their world, from the world of pure (~)

lightin which absolutely no bodily darkness c;.1.: è j..;! ~) is mixed, [the Isfahbad-
' ..
light's] desi.re (~."...:.) is severed from the world of pure light [and diverted] towards
'

[the world of) darkness (~~).16J

Suhrawardï asaibes two types of longing desire (~~) for Jight on the part of the teJlebrous
substance. The ftl'St is its desire for an accidentalligbt thet will manifest it. The second is its desire
for an immareriallight (;~ ~ ) which govems it and gives it life. It is net difficult ta recognize
here in the second desire the Mional soul, whicb in other passages Suhrawardï identifies exphcitly
lB such. The tenebrous substance originates out of the dimension of poverty (Jeië 11 ~ ) of the
domins1ing lights (~I.,.i ) from which the substance of the world em.anates - a process. in. many

159 M.b.71.Iu, § 229, 216.14-217.1 (5.t~, 203).

160 AccOl'dUJg 10 Q. O. al-Sbirizï, it is complete because the temperame.Dt (t:..I~) is the most baJanced
and the most apt (-,1 ~ 1 ) at receîving intellective effusions ~ ~ ); and it is thus the first attachment
(J,,1 ~) and the first stage (J).U) foc the [sfabb.t-light, i.e., the ratlonal soul. cf. Q. o. al-S1ürizi. ShiIdJ,
418.18-479.1 (SIyr., 394 n.7).
161 . . §
Prkmw, 229,217.2-3 ( 5.t~, 203-4).
162.{fikm6, § 229, 216.13-14 (S..,. 203). Q. D. aJ-Shirizi writes that the sou! is the principle of the
lower faa:uJties which are tbem.selves derived; hence, what is UJfencr des:ires from ",hal is superiOl", d. Q. D.
al-Sbïrazï, SbJlr./J, 216 ft. for hne 13 (S~4'=, 394 n.6).
163
plkmae, § 229,216.13-217.1 (54t:, 203).
 CHAPTER THREE - IOl

•
ways. simillr ta the emanationisl Avicennan scheme. l64 For Suhrawardï, the "obscure has a nostalgia
(~~ ) for the light:· 1oS and mis desire characterizes everything which cootains but ft parcel of
light. including bodies. Furthermore. the human soul sees its own desire (J""'::' ) severed from the
world of pure lights and divel'ted to the wodd of darkness once it is attached to the body. In spite of
its attachment ta the body. the human soul is able to contemplate the metaphysicat entities ta which
il is subordinate. precisely because of its own luminous nature.

The relation that Suhrawardi: establishes between body and 50ul is. therefare, one of desire
The question that begs to be answered is the following: Did such a notion of desire or longing
(J""'::' ) already define the body-soul relationship in the works of Avicenna? Traces of the idea of
yesming can be found in A vicenna' 5 works such as the Remaria, where the soul' 5 yeaming for
happiness and for the other-worldly pleasures is part of the discourse on the love and the yearning
chat natural bangs have fortheir perfection. Avicenna writes that:

If you study things and refJect on them. you will find that every corporeat ching has
a proper perfection, a voluntary or a naturallove (4 -.: : b "i l:,JI..)! ~ ) for tbis
perfection, as wel1 as a voluntsry or natural yeaming (li~ ) for it, when it is
separated from it. This is mercy from the First Providence l,J"i ~~) inasmuch as
l66
[God) is Providence.
Hence, every corporeaJ ching - bodies - has a perfection. More importantly, however, each
has a voluntary or natural Jove for this perfection. Avicenna's own ontology is impregnated with this
notion. of love. In the foUowing passage from the same work, he writes:

The First loves His essence and is loved br His essence ... and by many other things
... These are the saintly intelJectual substances (~.ü ~ ~ 1~ ). No yearning
œn be attributed ta the First. the True, n.ar ta those that follow ... The rank of the
yea-ning comes after the above [wo ranks. 167

This love and yeaming belong to metaphysical entities. H uman souls do possess a similar
desire and yearning which they williose only in the other world, presumably once they - the perfect
souls - have compJeted their retunl ta the world they had striven to attain (see section on eschatoJogy).166
Il should also be mentioned that chis notion of desire echoes the mystical impetus found in the
Neoplatonism of Plotinus and which bas fed a whole mystical tradition of which Avicenna was not

164 lIibrrllr, § 229,217.5-6 (Sote:, 204).

165 .(fikmrll, § 229,217.3-5 (Sigr:,204).
166 Avicenna, fsllibir, vol. 3-4, VITI, 19, 787.8-788.3 (DU:, 481; /11(1'#:,79-80).
167 Avicenna, .Ishiïiir, vol. 3-4, VITI, 18, 784.2-785.6 (Dû:, 480; A-(y:st:,79).
168 Avicenna, Rir.ïlllirffaJ-'ls/ly. (ed. Mehren). For a French trans., d. Sabri, "JlisiiIafil-'lftr. Le
lraité sur l'amour d'Avicenne," 109-134.
 CffAnrR THREE - 102

•
unaware. 169
We have seen how Suhrawardï. following Aviceona, has adopted a notion of the soul tbat
œn cOJÛorm to the tbeologica1 requiremems of ae.edness. More importantly. the soul is defined in

terms of immateriality. ft condition of its survival in the afterlife. another religious doctrine whicb
ourphilosophers are Iljing to establish in the most rationally arguable manner. A series of philosophical
arguments have also been provided by our two authors. The soul' s indivlduation in terms of the
sour 5 lnachment ta the body does. however, raise questions related to the preservation of the sour 5
individuality in the afterlife (see section on eschatology). Some of the philosophicaJ positions adopted
by the Peripatetics have fostered the elaboration of a notion of the soul in tenns of ils subsrantiality,
something which entai1s its immateriality. and a fortiori ilS immortality.

169 Trouill-.....
Al.Y
, Lii pur.i5Q1/:1On pIolimenDl!', 154-65; cf. J abre." L 'extase d e Pl otm
. et le fllHii # de
Ghazali," 101-124.
 CHAPTFR. THREE - 103

• THE VITAL SPIRIT

The pervasiveness of a number of Peripatetic ideas in Islamic philosophy is highhghted by
the pJace some of them ocœpy in the philosophical anthropology of Suhrawardï such as the concept
of vital spirit (C.3 J - the pneumo). distinct from the divine - the Holy - spirit of the scriptures. This
concept of spirit goes as far back as the Greek tradition, where it was calJed vital spui.t. the poeum~1

responsibJe for life itself l lt becomes spinms for the Latins who. unlike the Greeks. introduced
religious elements from the ludeo-Christian tradition.

What is the type of relationship the vital spirit has with the soul !lJ1d with the body? A brief
look at the Judaic as welJ as the Islamic backgrounds will introduce our discussion about the nature
of the vital spirit. its divisions. and its funetions in the worts of AVlcenna and Suhrawsrdï. On the
whole, the foUowing section compares Avicenna' s and Suhrawardï's conœpt of the spirit to illustrate
how Suhrawardfs philosophical basis for the concept of spirit is derived from the anthropology of
Avicenna. We will pursue the discussion with some remaries on the relationship between the notions
of spirit, light, and rational soul in order ta discuss the role of the psychic spirit in the process of
representation. We will conclude with a discussion on its COlTUptihility.

THE RELIGIOUS TRADITION

The concept of spirit - Greek, poeUOlH ; Latin, spinius - is not unique to Islam. It oecors in
the Judaie tradition where the term spirit - rûu - means the wind or breath received from without,
from Gad - Yahveh.2 The spirit chus becomes the principle responsible for life. by analogy with the
breath th~ is required for the sustenance of life itself; without it, there is suffocation, and ultimately

death. The spirit aIso shares Ù1 the creative power of God. i.e., in proportion to its participation in the
divine from which it originates. This ju:xtaposition of the notion of the life-providing spirit and chat
of its aeative power can even culminate in the under.itallding of the rtiniJ-poeomn as a divine
attribute (raising the problem of the hypostasis of the spirit). Generally speak.ing, in the Christian
tradition, gready indebted to the Hebraic tradition, the spirit is usually likened te the Roty Spirit. In
the Hebraic and Christian traditions. the two terms - "spirit" (C.JJ) and "soul" (~ ) - are so
3
closeJy related that sometimes ther are undiffere.l1tiated from one another.

Fer Stolçs, the "psychic breath" is the unifying principle between the soul and the body, cf.
Go1lrÏJUC, Lessroraens el' J iime , 28-32, esp. 30.
Z Verlcindere," L' âme ou nc'1'IJes-.IJ «. lVJI1J ," 65, 67.
 CfIAPTER THREE - 104

• ln the Is18lIlic tradition. the concept of spirit is not one-faœted a AI-Ghazili (d. 1111) noted
thal this tenn wss not used unequivocally in the Qur"an.. In bis works. he discusses the existence of a
variety of spirits. induding the vital spirit, the spirit associated with the appeased soul or with God's
command, the particular spirit ta whieh the senses eommunicate, the pa55Îve unaginative spirit

responsible for representatlon. the tntellective spirit. and, finally, the divine and prophetie spirit.'3
Early theologians distinguish the spirit from the soul from the spirit in the Qur"ü.5 Out of its
Qur~anic context, it has developed into a eomptex, at times ambiguous concept with the introduction

of a variety oftheological. philosophical. and mystical considerations round in the tradiuons (hadiths),
or made by the theologians. the philosophers. or the mysties.

COJltrary to the p.hllosophical tradition, Sufism has ascribed a lower position to the soul and
elevated the position of the spirit. The soul is associateci with the .. flesh" or the baser side of human
beings, the farthest from the divtne. It is orten identified with a "veil," e.g., in Dhu al-Nün. an
obstacle for the .. aseent" [() the spiritual world. e.g., Abü Yand BistiimI, or the prison of the spirit. Î

ln the philosophical rradition, the opposite is true. The spirit is more readily associated with
the physiologieal, and as will become huer apparent. with the Greek pneumo: wheress the saut
usually refers to the rational part of human beings in its most perfect form. Suhrawardfs voeabulary
identifies him more readily witb the philosophical. than the Sufi traditioQ. It is notewotthy thlt he
does net often use the tenn spirit in bis more mystical or visionary treatises. A doser examination of
bis .. initiatolY" tales, howeva-. might reveal mother usage of these two tenns. We will foeus mainly
on bis philosophical works. both the longer and the shortet' versions.

3 Macdonald. "The Development of the ldea of Spirit in Islam," 25-30; cf. Calvc:dey. "Nafs,"
880a-8M..
4 A good and extellSlve bibliography on the subJect is round Ln Neuon's "More Recent Works:'
appendLXed ta Calverley, .. Nafs." 883a-884a.
5 FŒ example. in al-Ghazili's JJfisbkiïr m-A.DWJir discussed in Ma,;donald, "The Development of
the Ide. of Sptrit in Islam." 157, 154-61; or U1 al-Ghazali's ~rJ.I V/Ü.l11 af-OfA discussed in Jabre, Es:saisur
Ie-Ienç;oede ClIJJIZafi, 109-13, esp. 109, 109 n.7.
6 Macdonald, "The Deve10pment of the [dea of Spirit in [sIam." 26.
7 Sajjidi, F~-r ~l1lli/nk f71 TiI'bü;ïr-r· 'lrfiinf, 763b-768b and 427a-432a. By way of succ::im:;t
summary, Kuspinar men1ions that. -roughJy speaku1g, the Quran. beSldes the verse narraœd above wbidl
und~CI'es the unknown aspect of the spirit, refers elsewhere to the souls (Jlnfw) that will be taken away
from human beùtgs at deatb [Q, 39: 042], and aiso to the three ages orthe sou!'s deve1opment, i.e., (i) the soul
iJlcliJled to evil (ill-on aJ-JU11mJinl6i1-su1 [Q, 12: 53]. Cii) the bJaming soul (ilf-J1JÛS a1-lawwiima) [Q, 75: 2],
and (iti) tbe soul at satisfaction (a/-mlfs aI-murma'rnmt) [ Q, 89: 27]. In view of these two apparelltJy
inc;onsi.stent usages, one still awaits a tenable answer te the question of wbicl1 one of them. riïb or n;lfs. will
be removed from the body and kept away till the Day of Resurreâion ," c:f. Kuspinar • .Ismïj7 , 130.
,'.
CfIAPTER THREE - lOS

NATIJRE OF VITAL SPlRITS

The nature of the vital spirit in Suhrawardi's works shares many of the preoccupations of the
Peripatetic tradition. Let us, first, rom ta the vital spirit and its nature. We will then prov1de a sketch
of its division. .And then, we will see how the vital spirit functions.

An ÎJlStrUmenralist ides of the vital spirits W œi inrroduced in the [stamic uadition by way of
translations of the Greek medical treatises 6 These ideas were to become the basis of all discussions
on the nsture of the spirit. Typically, Greek physiologica1 concepts like humocs and the subtle
substance of the spint were genera11y adopted by the Peripatet1c tradition and most !slamic tbinkers.
They constituted the physiological basis on which individu al thinkers like Avicenna and Suhrawardi
e1aborated cheir own pbi1osophicaJ systems.

The uaditionaJ concept of vital spirit rests on a particular notion of temperament (~/~) and

bumors (.La ~i ) with which all living things are characterized. In the human rea1m, each typically
possesses a particular mixture (of primary qualities, i.e., those that are associated with the four
e1ements) wbich, in tum, determines the temperament of that particular individual. In this way, the
eJ.ements are either balanced (one) or unbalanced (eight ).9

The mixture out of which the temperaments are forme<! origjnates with the coming together
.-.... of the four primary elements.ID These elements are acquired at conception (through the parental
seed); lit the embryonic sage, il is the mixing of the humors wbicb heJps the formation of the solid
1l
parts of the body (the instrumental or organic parts, i.e., the composites). It is the balancing of the
mixture of tbese four humors that constitutes health.

These elements were considered the essentiais of physiology. In Greek philosophical tradition,

8 The medu::aJ corpus 'Was the rIflt ta be translated llltO Arabie, cf. Ullman, fshmuc ~rw'ci.l1t" 7. 1

20-4.
9
There are thus nille types of possible humCX'S eorresponding co the different possibilities of
aaangement of the difIerent qualities, cf. Jacquart and Miebeau, .. La médecine arabe," 59.
10 The faUowing chirt illlJSCrates the main correspondenœs ~lished by traditional Arabie Medicine,

cf. JaeqUaR and Micheau, .. La médecine arabe," 58-9; cf. Ullman, Islami&' Aft!dicine, 56-60.

rOD!' l!'Ï,mary elemems earth !ire air wster

q1Jalities cold 1 dry bOl 1 dry bot 1 hnmid cold 1 bnmid
corres.pondinJ spleen gaLL-hladdet' hea~ brai.A
~
midd1e or secondaly black bile - me1llJlcltoly <- blood <- pb1egm.
<- bile
e1emel11S - hum.ors (least pure) (purest)

11 Jacquart and Micheau, "La médeciJle arabe," 58-9.

 CflAPTFR. THREE - 106

•
although the soul itself was. aI limes. thought to be blood (e.g .. attributed to Critias),lz the vital 5pu"Ït
- the instrument of the soul- was generaJly said to be catTied b,r the blood and, therefore, distinct
from it. It was the subtle body that linked the material and the spiritual natUre of man. 1:3

Suhrawardï discusses the concept of vital spirit in a simiJar Peripatetic fashion. He shows
littJe hesitation about linking the vital spirit la the humors exaetly as they were inherited from
Medical ttadition. ln this, he follows Avicenna. He speaks of the nature of the vital spirit possessed
by animais in terms of "a subtle vaporous body. generated from the subtlety of the humors (.....i:?u..J
.b~"~1 )... 14 In another work. he specifies that all the faculties of animals subsist by the actions of

this subtle body, again. the vital spirit.1S It is through the spirit that ail the other faculties can
fUJ1ctiOn. Conversely, the spirit is bound by the bodily processes such as to be linked (~;.;.; ) to
16

the transformation (J;.:j) and the process of dissolution (j1.:.::;) of the body.17
The relationship that was believed to exist betWeen the vital spirit and the humors was often
defUled in terms of cOlTespondence. Traditionally, there were correspondences to be found between
e1ements, different bodily organs, differentquaJities, or humors. For Avicenna, the relation estsblished
betWeen. the vital spirit and the body is defmed in terms of the reJation th. the vaporous nature
<4:..)~) of the vital spirit has with the subdety of the humors (.la -J.à~ 1 üu..J ). This relation is like
IB
the reltaion between the bodily organs and the density of the humors. In filet, the vital spirit
possesses its own particular mixture (Go' ~ ) which varies according ta the need of its "diversitylt
(~ if.: ~~I ) in ordel" ta become. thraugh it. a carrier of the different faculties. 19
The vital spirit
thU5 originates out of the mixtures and the evaporation of the subtle part of the humors. 20

Vital spirits were generally caUed upon to expJain the various states of the soul - e.g., anger,
21
fear. etc. - which were considered ta be accidents of the soul. Variation of these states resuJted in

12 Aristotle, On rbeSouJ. l, 2. 4OSb, 5-6.

13 Ullman, /s.llU1Ui; Mt."r1it:me, 62.
104 Hliyiïkil, II <a> 53.7-8 (P) § 9,89.1-2 (AIrh, 45; !SmaJ1, 105). ln the Persian version, he refers ta

the subtJety of the body~ I-ÜUsJ) and the mixtures orthe body~ ..Ja.~I>; cf. KmmlU, IV, § 22.96.16-17
(An::It., 163).
IS AJJQ!J, JI, § 30, 133.5.
16 KIIIimJU. IV, § 22, 96.16-17 (.ALd., 163).
17 Am•. IV, § 75, 168.14-5.
18 Avicenna, Shüiï~ Nm, v, 8, 263.13-4 (~r:, 186).
19 Avicenna, SInN', Nm, V, 8, 263.15-6 (~~I 186).
a:I Limbs cr orgaos mo originale out of the nuxture of their coarse components, cf. Michot, Destinée
,174.
21 TIns is wbat Descartes c:aUed the "passions" of the soul.
 CEIAPTER THREE - 107

•• the production of physica1 modifications. These were explained. within. the medical tradition. as an
alteration of tbe vital spirit driven in the heart. the organ traditionally considered the seat of the
passions. For physicians. emotions and passions (just Iike motion or rest. sleep or wakefulness) were
among the non-natural things (or necessary causes)22 which conlributed to the health or sickness of
the body.Z3

The idea of correspondence associated with the spirit aIso figures in Suhrawardï. He adopts
a similar notion of cotTespondence (~~). by which he is then able to define the relatiollship that
exists betWeen the vital spirit and the rational sou! - the immeterial part of the soul, ruling over the

body 201 Moreover. Suhrawardî alludes to cocrespondences. especially the one between the vital spirit
2S
and light.
Avicenna and Suhrawsrdi derme the vital spirit as a subtle body. But how is its nalure to be
understood? For Avicenna, the concept of the vital spirit corresponds to a variety of things. At times.
it cotTesponds to an. immaterial spirit (even to the soul). Most often. however. Avicenna conceives of
the vital spirit as being material (at times, it can even be opposed ta the immaterial soul) which the
differeot faculties, possessed by human bodies, obey.:a5 The materielity associ.ated with the vital spirit
is reminiscent of the Stoic position on the soul alluded to es-lier. Human beings, however, do
possess an jmmaterial soul fat least, the rational pan of tbehuman soul) tbat is quite distiAet from the
vital spirit. 27

Avicenna's main s-gument for the corporeality of the vital spirit - a very subtle body - is
based on medice1 experiences which have shown that an obstnJetion of the flow of this vital spirit-
as the vital principle - in any part of the body (e.g., a limb) leads to the death of thal member. The
absence of the vital spirit in any part of the body prevents the aetivities of the different faculties
aBsociated with that part ta function, e.g., "the effeetiveness (~~ ) of the faculties of motion,
sensation, and also the active imagination (:f Ci;,'-/ .).,,ze The vital spirit, therefore, serves as a support
for the Most basic of faculties, e.g., motion or perception, but aIso for the Most complex ones, e.g.,

22 Tbese dûferent states wauld be Galernc in origin, cf. Ballester, On the Origin of the 5T.....
10

NoD-NJI!tUnI/ TIJùJIs in Galell," 105-115. The doetnJle of the hvmors wu etaborated by Gaten, cf. Ullman,
Isliltl1ic ~fedicine, 2 L.
Z3 Jac:quart, • Les choses non-naturelles," 173.
~ Pdm., § 218, 206.8-9 (~ 194).
25 Prkmat, § 219, 207.6 (.5iW= 195).
1

26 Avicenaa, S1Jdiï', HlIFs, V. 8, 253.9-10 (P-!J'=. 186).

Z7 Gaïman, O~aù'l!S, 321 n.?
28 Avicenna, SJntii~ .Mûs, V, 8,263.10-3 (~,,:, 186).
 CHAPTER THREE - L08

•• representation.
In Avicenna' s physiological analyses, the first organ created (0:;<-: c) is the heart, because ie
is the first place (~~) appropriate for the genenuion orthe vital spirit (C.,.,.JI JJ~) In support:>f
this, Avicenna again alludes to fine anatomical examination.29 For Avicenna. the ph)'sician. the
physiological explanation lies st the hem of his philosophical arguments on the existence of vital
spirits. The heart is at the center of the body' s life and atlÎmation - all the other functlons of the body
depend on this organ. The soul is mus dependent on the functioning of the heart which, as an
Ù1tennediary, pro vi des the impetus for the activities of the bntin. The hem, being the cenœr of the
animate life of the body, is at the origin of the flowing of the agent (ending its course in. the bt'8lJl)
responsible for a11 the body's activities - the vital spirits.)()

AVicenna provides intricate explanations regarding the re1ationship between the different
organs and faculties. The diversity of the activities attributed ta the vital spirit places it st the hem of
human life itself. Although it is certa.in1y true that Avicenna's discussion regarding the spirie i5 not
as detailed as it is in the works of Suhrawardi, nonetheless, to state that Avicenna never used the
term spirit ta mean the vital principle, as Goicbon seems ta imply, cannot be convincingly
substantiaœd?l

Very similar ideas are found in Suhrawardï. For him, the subtle nature of the vital spirit is, in
faet, characterized by some sort of maleriality. Let us not forget that it is defined as 8. subtle "body."
Moreover, it is linked ta the transformation and the dissolution of the body. The spirit also possesses
heat (i.J 1~), a cbaracteristics only bodies can possess. 32 In one work, he specifies tbat, "there is in
animaIs a subtle and hot body which OCCU1'5 out of the subtleties of the humors. ,,33 Suhrawardi' 5

Ùlterpretation ascribes ta bath of these charaeteristics a con-espondence (~~ ) to light or, more
preclsely, to the accidenta! light ~.) ~ .),:,:., ) which bodies and che humors receive. It is the
corporeal nature of the vital spirit that transforms it inco whst he caUs an obstacle (~~~ ). The
opaque nature of this subtle body can selVe ft§ 8. receptacle of light which can then preserve and
refleet light onto the body.34 We will have to retorn co this particular colTespondence he establishes

29 Avicenna, .5Infïr, Nm, V, 8,263.21-364.4 (~~ 187).

JO Avic:en.na. Slnfiï~ NZlh. V, 8, 264.6-21 (~. 187-8). The whole dIscussion th. follows develops
l
aphysioJogical explmation; cf. AVlCeJU1a, Slnliï NaFs, V , 8, 266.19-267.2 (P-9'=. 189).
,

31 GoicbOIl, Le.Dtjlle, no. 280, 144-5.

12 HibnJU, § 218,206.11-4 (S.I(,f:, 194-5).
33 KJdim_, IV, 96.16 (.ALrh., 163).
34 HIbnJu, § 218,206.11-2075 (.siw:. 194-5).
 CHAPTER THREE - 109

•
between the vital spirit and light.

TYPES OF SPIRITS

Traditionally. pbysicians have explained the existence of the different types of spirits by
resoning not ont Y te phYS101ogica1, but to philosophical explanations. e.g.. a theory of cOlTespondences
overseeing the aetivities of the different organs of the body or faculties of the different souls.
According to the uaditionaJ physiological explanation, the vital spirit is the dynamic principle of the
body. Il is renewed with nutritional malters and. then. transformed Ulto the blood. As this process
unfolds in the liver. a vapor cornes into existence and produces a natural sp1rit. This natural spirit
(the more primitive type) then travels ta the heart where it is purified and mixed with the air tbal is
in.ha.1ed. The outeome of this proœss is the formation and production of an animal vital spll"Ït. Once
it has been mixed with the tnhaJed air. the vital spirit then travels to the base of the bl.'"8În, where il is
again transformed and becomes a human vital spirit, generally identified as a "psycbic" spirit (i.e.,
the one relsted ta the human soul)J5 Before Galen, the hem was the locus of the mind. SimiJarly,
Sufi tradition attribuees a privileged place to the heart - at times it is analogous to the soul or the
315
iJltellect.

In the CUn>, Avicenna proposes a sJightly different version of the process by which the vital
spirit trave1s through the body and transfonns itseJf inta the diffE!l"ent naturaI, animal, and psychic
pneumo. He alludes ta the upward motion of the spirit !rom the heart, the first principle of life in the
body, to the brain and its return te> the lower part of the body responsible for the naturaI faculties,
i.e., the liver?7 The first principle is the heatt from which a11 other activities originate. The liver and
the brain become simillr to "secoJldary" principles st the heEl"t of the different facuJties of the
natural, anima!, and human sou1.311

Suhrawardï's own concept of the vital spirit is grounded in this rraditiona! distinction between
these three different types of spirits - the natura! spirit, animal spirit, and human spirit. He is
generaJJy in agreement with the pbysiological and philosophicaJ explan-.ions of the Perip.etic
tradition adduced for the existence of a variety of spirits. His concept of vital spirit prolonged an
already existing philosophical tradition.

'.
3S Jacq,uartand Micheau, "Lamédeane arabe," 59; cf. Ullman, .Is/amicA-fedic:iAe.62-J.
36 aJ-GhazâIï, J!Jp-', m, 31; quoted in Jabre, Esmi surlele.nilue dt!' OlNlzali, 112, 112 n.2.
~ Avicenna. Sltrhï~ Nrûs, n,3, 72.9-17 (RsI-:;SO).
38 Avicenna, Sl1ilii~, NiIfs, V,8, 264.6-266.5 (R!P:, 187-9).
 CHAPTER. THREE - 110

Likewise, Suhrawardï adopts the Perip81etic scheme where the heart 15 the tirst principle.
Nonetheless, he slightly departs from Avicenna's production of spirits. For Suhrawardï. the viral
spirit tbat originates in. the left cavity of the he8lt is called the animal spirit, a position already
developed by Qu~tii b. Lûqii. From the hem. the patb taken br the vital spirit branches off ÎJlto two
different directions. One path is towards the liver. This producesthe narural spirit similactoAvicenna' 5
priacipIe, which 15 at the origin of vegetative faculties like nutrition. ete.3Ç

For Suhrawardï, the natural spirit is the most elementay of spirits, associated witb the lower
(biological.) activities of the body. lt is associated with "the actions of the vegetative faculties,"<30 and
originates in the Ieft cavity of the heart.

When it emerges from the heart, the vital spirit aIso takes another, upward path. Whea il
emerges from the heart and flows to the brai.n, it becomes the human or "psychic" vital spirit similar
to Avicenna's principle.41

Like its oatural counterpart. the animal vital spirit is similarly defined as "a subtle steamy
body, generated from the subtlety of the mixture. and issued forth from the left ventricle of the
heart."42 The animal spirit 15 the source of the various functions of the animalsou1. In the 7"emp/esof

L~.hr, Subrawardï provides llJ1 overview of the different faculties of the soul whicb the animal spirit
oversees, e.g.• concupiscence orirascibility as well as amotive facu1ty 'Nhich communie.es movement
(~,;.::;) to limbs. The bearer t..t-~) of aU the motive and perceptive facuJties of the animalsoul is

the animal spirit.43 The animal spirit then cravels throughout the body and obtains its impews from
the principle which provides it with guidance. This principle is none other than the "goveming light
(r.,F~ "Ua:!- )44 [ebat originates] from the rational soul": and once the animal spirit has received
this ligbt "it begins to spread throughout the body. .AS

And finaUy, like the [wo previous spirits. the .. psyehic" spirit i.s &ssocitUed with another part
of the 50ul, the human sou!. This psyehie spirit originates with the upward motion of the animal
spirit. In another WOl"k. he mentions that the vital spirit whieh .. rises to the brain" and whieh chen

J9 ~ . PAp, IV,3, 116.3-5; cf. P..vrtü, IV, § 36, 31.7-10 (Book, J2),
Cl MWJi!J, II, § 30, 133.9.
41 LJlm6/Nû. Php., IV, J, 116.3-6.
42 HII.,rJkil, II (a) 53.8-9 (p) § 9,89.2 (.AJd., 45; .!smJlU, 105).
43 H~, II (a) 53.5-7 (P) § 9,88.16-89.1 (An:-h., 45; .!smllJ/, IDS).
44 On the notion of the power of Light, see Corbin's note ta bis traD51ation in u .IJ-r-redr:s Temp/e-sde
Jumiin!, cf. Corbin, An::hil1{"e, 76 Q.. 16.

06 Hllyiikil, fi (a) 53.10 (p) § 9,89.2-3 (ALrh.. 45; .!smllU, 105).

 CHAPTER. THREE - 111

• "becomes tempenue is a means to cool the brain." thal the sages (.~) ca11ed the "spirit"' (C-'J).o#)
In the Tab/e1S .fJt!dLœœdro 'lmiIdnl-DfLl. he identifies it as the psychic spirit or pneumll:

[The animal vital spirit] originales in the left side [of the heart]. The part of it w hich
flows upward 111to the brain becomes temperate U;::":') due to the coldness (~;.-)
of the brain [neither hot nor cold) and it accepts ligbt from the rational soul, and that
is what is called the psychic spirit V~) And with this spirit. perception (~I J.j!)
and movement (~.,ra:.) become complete.
d7

In faet. both perception and motion. Ils was already mentioned Ln the prevlOus disœssion,
belong to the animal soul. This mises the question of the respective dominions of the animal and
human or psychic spirits. Suhrawardi. however, does mention that it is from the brain that the animal
4B
aetivities originate. This alludes ta the principLe that imparts direction and guidance ta the body It
is, in fact, the human spirit which provides the input - i.e., light - or the impetus that initiates the
aetivities of the animal spirit which, in tum, is at the origin of the upward Dow of the animal spirit
heading towards the braïn. None of these two spirits can be conceived independently from the
existence of the other, whereby the psychic spirit serves as the principle for the activities of the
a nim • 1 spirit. The psydtic spirit receives ilS own principle from the ration&! - light - principle. Il is
as if the animal spirit and the more active psychic spirit corresponded to sorne more generic notion
of vital spiriL

Avicenn8, on the other band, does not dwell at any lengtb on the question of the spirits.
Although he does not provide any detailed discussions on the three different Peripatetic spirits
identified in the works of Suhrawardi, in sorne pœsages, Avicenna alludes ta the existence of similar
activities associated with the different spirits and be10nging to the different souls.<8 AJthough the
spirit possess as a mixture «(S. f ~ ) which is particular to il, tbis mixture varies according to the

various faculties in which it participates, so as to become the bearer of the various faculties. A vicenna
argues that the "visual n spirit cannot correspond ta the spirits associated with motion. anger, or the
f&CUlty of growth, because if these different spirits were one, their activities would aIso have ta be
one. This is obviously not the case.5'.l The vital spirit then is associated with different functions, such

46 It becomes temperaœ because the vi&a1 spirit is considel'ed a wa-m ( "..1 6..) subd.e body, cf. K4IkmlU
1

, IV, § U, 96.16 (Airh., 163).

-n AJwii/J, D, § 30, 133.6-9; cf. PJIrtÜ, IV, § 36, 31.7-9 (Book, 32).
4B Liœl/Jk, PA,P'S.. IV, J 116.5-6; cf. Al~, II, § 30, 133.7.
1

09 Jacqua't and Michea\a, "La médecine arabe," 59; cf. Avicenna, Shi/ii.l. NJI's, V, 8,268.7-8 (Psy:.
190).
5(J Avic:enna, SJtdiïI, Nids, V, 8, 263.15-20 (P~, 187).
 CHAPTER THREE - 112

•
as motion. anger. or the faculty of growth. etc.,51 as weil œi the different faculties associated with
representa1Ïon. such as a "cogitative" (~~) spirit.~

The different physiological explanations provided by Suhrawardi regarding the origination

of the vital spirit. its division and twofold direction of flow thl"Oughout the body. associated with the
three different spirits. are all found in Avicenna's works. despite the faet that the)" are not associated
with distinct spirits.53 A vicenna' s discussion is restrieted ta the physiological account of the different
activities ta which spirits are associated. whereas. in Suhrawardï. different spirits are ldentified and
associated with each of these activities. More important. however. is the fact that Aviœnna did
associ.ate spirits with the different faculties of representations. Hence. even representation cannot be
explained without the notion of spirit.

SuhnIWardi distinguishes between different spirits to be associated with the activities ascribed
to the different seuls. But on the whoJe, in Subrawardi. the process by which the h'Uman spirit
becomes complete, travelling through the whole body and providing support for the different faculties
of the soul associated with the body, corresponds ta similar - albeit slightly modified - Peripatetic
positions found in a. somewhat more sketeby fashion in Avicenn.a.

FUNeTION Of THE VITAL SPIRIT

One of the funcrions of the vital spirit is to animate the body. It cllTies the different forces
which are st the origin of the body' s activities and thus maintains life in il. In the works of
Suhrawardï, this corresponds ta the natural spirit. Hence, when the natural (vital) spirit is prevented
from entering a particular body part or organ, i.e., when the blood (the vehicle of the spirit) ceases to
flow inca it, chen, that particular organ "dies, and life disappear5 from it."S<l The vital spirit stops to
flow and ta exist in it.

In addition ta be the life-giving force ta the body. the vital spirit (pneuml/) serves as the first
instrument of the soul and thus bridges the gap tbat exists between soul and body. 55 This patticular
idea predates Avicenna's discussions, e.g., Abü Sulaymin al-SijistiiJü (d. aftel" 1000) distinguished
between the soul and the spirit by writing that "the spirit (ru./!) ... is the intermediary between the
body and the soul," and adding that, "by it [i.e., the spirit] the 50ul spreads its powers over the body;

SI Avic:enna, S1Jr/ii'. Hm, V, 8, 267.8; cf. Ibid., V. B, 267.5-8 (P.f1; 266 and 189).
52 Aviœnna, SInd, MIlS, v, 8,268.7 (P.vr., 190).
53 Avicenna, SJnIii~, Mûs, V, 8,263.15-264.5 (P.f1; 188).
54 A!".m., n, § 30, 133.11-2.
5S Avic:enna, SJ.nfiF', Hm, v, 8, 264.1-2 (P.!r=, IB7); cf. Golcl1on, Oùn:tin:s, 321 n.7.
 CHAPTf.R THREE - 113

•
it can [then. i.e.. the body] percelve and move, rejoiœ or suffer."56
Avicenna, whose concept of the soul is defined in terms of the immateriality of its sub stance,
simi1arly ascribes ta the spirits a similar raIe. The vital spirit can provide the particularized link
aeated betWeen itself and the physiall body. The spirit can, tben, constitute the unique point of
connection between the immaterial saul and the corporeality associated W1th the body. It is in the
following terms that Avicenna discusses the function of the pDt:'umo as an intennediary: "the soul
is essentially one [br essence]; therefare, it must possess an initial dependence <J'-; J."Î ) on the

body. from whicb it govems it (;;~) and mates it develop (~ ). [and] this takes place br the
intermediary of this vital spirit (c.-'~ 1 1,i.A.J.:...;~ ).•SI It 1S rnraugh the aeation of such an organ
(as Avicenna cal1s it), 1.e., the vital spirit, that the different Ïaculties of the soul can then be derived
(~- :·.ï) in the rest of the organs of the body:e

Likewise, for Suhrawardï, the vital spirit becomes an intermediary between the body and the
All the extemal and internai faculties of the body possess organs (..::,., ~T) - i.e., vital spirits,
59
sou1.
olby which they are distio.guished" from one another.60 The function of the vital spirit as an intermediary
is more specifica11y ascrib ed ta the psychic spirit.

In Suhrawardï's light ontology, the spirit is defined in term.s of ilS opacity (4.:j.::.l.=. ). The

opacity Suhrawardi ascribes ta this entity simultaneously provides it with the ability to receive light
from the rational soul. the latter being light by essence. and ta serve as a mediator (..1..-..1,,) for the
activities of the rational soul (~ i,hL:, ~ ...:(~ )61 that take place in the human body.

The vital psychic spirit is not itself an independent substance capable of acting on its own. It
is only a mediator once il has adomed itself with the light of the rational soul (.û.Ja.~ ~ .J~ ) and
62
is. thus, only the receptacle for the light provided by the rational 50Ul. The rational soul is by
essence the Isfahbad-light which exercises its goveming activities over the body through the Mediation
of the psychic vital spirit. And through this subde body, the Isfahbsd-light provides the body with
light ( J.,,:a.J' 41...b-: :).63

56 al-Tawl,idi, ;d-Imd", m. 111 CCaito: (942); C(uoted Ln the inuo. of Badawi's ed., cf. Abû
SuJaymm SijistaDi, oÛ""... JII-/frbDIl/', 26.
57 Aviceœa, SbrfiI, NIIEs, V, 8, 263.20-21 (Rs~ 187).
58 AviCClUla, Slnfil, NIIEs, V, 8,263.20-264.2 (~~ 187).
59 Killrm.rr. IV, §§ 2 L-2, 95.11-97.4 (A.rrn, 162-3).
60 L6mJl/hïr, Phy:r:, IV, 3.116.1-2.
61 M!yJkiJ , II (p) § 9,89.5-6.
62 H~, n (p) § 9,89.3.
 CHAPTER THREE - 114

•
Suhrawardï catks about the spirit as the mounc (4.:,L ft ) for the rational souI. responsible for
maintaining the ongoing and governing activities (~li"~ ) of the soul over the body.04 The Saale

metaphor was employed by Avicenna to describe the relationship of the faculties of the body with
os
the soul, i.e., in [enns of a riding animal, a metaphor used by Plato. The spirit which was the
intercesscr of the rational soul ove!" the body in Avicenna's works remai.n.s 8J1 mtennedimy in
Suhrawardï's. Here is yet another instance where Avicenna's and Suhrawardï's positions are quite
simi1ar. The following diagram may help illustrate how they understand the vital spirit' 5 function as
a mediatol" - a bodily, yet subtle subst8J1ce - lying on the boundaries of the physical and the
immaterial W odds.

LIGHT AND THE RATIONAL SOUL

The relationships betWeen the soul and the vital spirit must be preserved if life is ta be
maintained. This is achieved by the aetivities of the rational soul - the govenling Isfahbad-light - a
point Suhrawardï gl"eatly emphasizes and which has already beeo alluded to. The maintenance of the
activities of the rational soul over the body is guaranteed by the non-disnuilance 01" non-disruption.
as well as the health, of tbe animal vital spirit. In the TemplesofkgAr, Suhrawardï notes that:

If this animal spirit possessed no such subtlety, it would not ciradate in aU the areas
where it penelrates. (f an obstacle were te prevent ie from penetrating into a certain
limb, that limb would die... So long as [the animal spirit is in a hea1tby condition],
the rational soul exerts its control and power over the body. But once the former is
broken up, the latter's control of the body ceases. 66

It has aiready been mentioned that in the Onenra/-Ulu.mm~livt? J,JTjsdom , the vital spirit -

63 Hrbnae, § 219. 207.1-8 (S~. 195). The sOlll maintains a ndesiringb reJClon with the spirit. d.
AI~, IV, § 75,168.14-5.
604 HII,YiikiI, n (a) 54.2-3 (Ann, 45; fsmJlD, lOS).
6S Avicenna. Mlflir, Plip., XI, 374.8-10 (AI'7~, 56).
66 HIly;ikiJ 1 n (a)53,10-54.3 (p) § 9,89.3-7 (AJ'W't., 45; fsmlJJ. 105).
 CHAPTER THREE - LIS

being of ft corporea1 nature - serves as an. obstacie whose funetion is ta become ureceptacle for
irradiating light" and to "preserve" this light.67 Moreover. Suhrawardf 5 interpretation establishes
agsin a correspondence (~L:a:. ) between both characteristics of the vital spirit - its subtlet).. and us

he. - and light. i.e.. more precisely. with the "ftccidental" light (~J~
68
) which they receive.

Suhrawardï t'Sises the issue of the close similarity that exists between the vital spirit and ligbt. such
that the spirit - especially the psychic poeumu - is a substance through which light can pass. The
vital spirit also shares with light its heat and the quickness of its response ta motion.69 As an obstacle
- a subtle body - of a corporeal natUre, the vital spirit is thus a substance that can reflect light and
become the support of the luminous faculty. and through which the Isfahbad-light cao govern the
body and provide it with light.70 In another passage, he mentions that .. aU the illuminations
(..:"lil~Dthat the rational soul itse1freceives are ref1eeted ~) on the corporeal temple - i.e.,

on the body- as weU as onthehumanorpsychic vital spirit (~~).',71

It is notewonhy chat even in Suhraw8l"dï's intrieate system. of light there is ft concet'n for
integrating physiological elements that physicians and AVlcenna lOot as the foundation of theil"
philosophical speculations about the vital spirits. the pneuml/hl. These speculations are integrated in
Suhrawardi's philosophica1 anthropology alongside bis ontology of light and its terminalogy. For
instance, he notes that the animal vital spirit" proœeds ('7 r.~/';:. ) from the left ventricle of the beart
throughout the body &fter it has reœived the luminous ruler (':F.J~ ,,~ ) from the rational soul
(:i ë, b~ ~)."72 In one of bis Persian texts, the spirit rec:eives the sacred cloth of light (.J~ ~~)

with which it is covered.73 ln another WOrK, he writes that uthe relation between the soul and the
body is [established] by a [subtle] body thst is the vital spirit. And the [psychic] vital spirit is a
luminous body (~I ~ ) in the brain...74 It is interesting ta note that in the latter passage Suhrawardî
integrates both scheme - Peripatetic and illu.m.inative which he rejects in other wodcs (especially the
localizBtion of spirit or representatïon in the brain). This is aJso exemplified by the explanation he
provides for sorne of the soul's aiJments. He adds that:

67 .{5kmw, § 218,207.3-5 (~ 195).

68 Ifrkmllt, § 218, 206.11~ (SJfl", 194-5).
69 ffjkm;rr, § 218,206.15-207.2 (5..lw:. 195).
70 Hikm., § 219, 207.7-9 (5.tf:, 195).
71 HJkmJu. § 273, 254.6-7 (5.t~1229).
72 HI!JIiïkiI, II (a) 53.9-10 (p) § 9,89.2-3 (Afrh., 45; fsm8i1,105).
73 HII,1'iïkiJ. n (P) § 9,89.2-3.
74 A/wiiIJ, X, § 90, 182.3-4 (~.. 108).
 CHAPTFR THREE - 116

•
If there is a reduction of the intensity of the light it possesses (~.)~)' il causes a
disruption of its lite {"I ~~ j). and such illnesses as melancholy and ether [sickness
of the soull occur. 7S - -

It is mus clear that Suhrawardi, whiJe not reject1Jlg the Peripatetic philosophical and
physiological basis of the soul's siclcness (e.g., their theory of humers). discusses these issues with
bis usual emphœis on light. He makes the intensity of light responsible for the regulstion of the
health of the soul His explanation in terms of a variation in intensity of Light reformulates the
tradition al tbeories of the changes of humors. keeping in lille with bis own ontology of light.

HUMAN PSYCHIC SPIRIT AND FûRMS

There is yet another function ascribed to the vital spirits to whieh Avicenna alludes. and
whichmight offeryetanother e1ementof comparisonb~eenthethougbtsof Avieennaand Suh1'awardï.
This is the raie played by the psychic spirit in the process of representation. This function has not
bem disC1Issed st any length by the commentators. The animal vital spirit which has made its way to
the brain becomes a psychic (hum an) spirit. Once it has transfonned itse1f into a human spirit, this
psychic pDellmll finds itself involved in the activities of intellection specifie to human beings. The
human psychic spirit, which results of the ascension of the animal spirit to the braïn, then serves as
an indispensable malerial, albeit subtle and refined infrastructure, for the functioning of the internal
senses. As the substratum for the forms abstraeted from the senses, the psychic spirit becomes the
substratum for thoughts. This is specifically mentioned br A vicenna. 76

In Avicenna, Many facuJties are involved in the process of representation. The first two

faculties are the common Rose and the passive imagination (or what Avicenna calIs POlUllllSrO -
l:--~ ), whose "organ" is the - psychic - spirit. This spirit perm.eaces the base of the nerve of
sensibility C~, ~ ~t;.. ), espeàally in the anterior part of the brain. ï7 These faculties work
together, with the help of the psychic pneumo, such mat the latter preserves the abjects abstraeted
by the former. ";tj

The next faculty is the pas si ve imagination (J ~ ) or the formative faculty (i.)~ ).79 [ts
organ is in the (psychic) spirit sœttered throughout the anterior cavity of the brain. especially the
BCl
posterior side.

ï5 Alri!5', X, § 90,182.4-5 (Arrh" 108).

76 AviceJUla, SIJUiï", NlÛS, m, 8,151.14-3 (Psy., 107).
77 Avi cenna, IslJiïriir, vol. 2, m, 9,355.4-5 (.oü:.. 317, and 320 n.5, 322).
78 Avïœnlla, SJnB: N44IS, m, 8, 151.12-14 (~. 106); d. [bid., Dl, 8 , 158.21-159.1 (Po9'=. 111).
 CfiAPTER. THREE - 117

•
Another facult}'" is estimation, whose organ is the whole brain. but more specifically the
middJe cavity.61 The estimaive faculty is assisted by a faculty which composes and separates the
forms. It is called either the cogitative faculty (o~ ), or the active imagÎJl8lÎon f-i(z'.:,'-,'. ) (see
section on division of the soul).52 The power of the estimative faculty is situated in the anœrior part
of the middle cavity. where the spirit is seattered.

The last faealty is memory. whose power is located in the area of the posterior section of the
brain where the spirit - irs organ - is agaïn scattered 6J Avicenna affers a physiologtca.1 explanation
to corroborate the thesis that the spirits are the organs of these faculties.8~ ln short. the psychic spirit
becomes an organ for the different internaI faculties on which the process of representation (and
memory) depends.

One of Suhrawardf s aiticisms of Peripatetic philosophical anthropology focuses on

Avicenna's physiological explanations of the process of thought. Suhrawardï rejects the materialist
implications underlying sucb physiological explanations. He is adamant that forms ClU1Jlot be impressed
on a physical organ, i.e., a place~;" ) in the brain.as He. therefore. rejects the localizaion of
forms in any physicaJ organ.

But beyond such an explicit rejeetion of a Peripatetic thesis, lies an implicit adoption of tbat
particular thesis. Suhrawardfs statement that forms cannot be impressed in a physical organ does
not, however, preclude the possibility for the psychic spirit to become the locus for these forms,
espeàally in light of the role of the vital psychic spirit as a substnnlm to the ab51nlCted forms in
Avicenna's works. This cao offer new perspective on Suhrawardi's obscure "suspended" fonns
(~ J~) (see section on a sep.-ale world of imagination).

One is surprised st seeiJlg how. in bis Onenim-U/umionrif-'e &f:~dam. Suhrawardï considers

that elememary realities - such as the vital psychic spirit - cano in faet, become a place of inherence
or manifestation (~) for imaginai fonns or similes (J ~ ). The vital psychic spirit - as ft subtle
body - can become a place of manifestation for these fonns. because there is a certain equilibrium
(J ,-+, ) in it and a certain distancïng from opposition (J Wa:; ) which resembJes the nature of
ce1estial bodies (~,,1& t,J 1~). themselves etherical bodies. Furthennore, tbere is in the vital spirit a

i9 III another text, A vicen.na ca.l.ks of a formative faculty (i.J~ G"";), in.stead of a passive Lmagination
(J~), although both would seem. ta c:orrespond ta a single faculty, cf. AVlcenna, Sbffii~ N411S, V. 8,268.3-4

•
(~, 190). ln fact, the (;.)~) would desigllate a sensible memory, ~ opposed lo the (i~l:S ) ",hic:b would
destgilae an inleUeQUal memory, cf. Goicbon. Lc!D'lue. no. 238, § 2, 118; cf. Ibid., no. 3n, 193.
80 Avic:enna, IshJÏr'id, vol. 2, m, 9.356.1-2 (Oir., 322, and 322 n.l).
81 Avicenna, fsbibr?, vol. 2, m, 9,357.1-2 (Oir.. 322).
 CHAPTER. THREE - 118

certain economy (,,)1 c:ï-.,' ) (i e., no excesses) that mates it possible for the imaginary exemplars or
similes (J~) to manifest themselves in chIS ps)""chic spirit.st!

It sbould be remembered, Suhrawa-di writes, that in the vital psychic spint "there is somet1ung
of an opacity which accepts light [and] preserves it;" moreover, it "presErVes figures U~; ) and
forms (J.,.... ):087 For him. the nature of the vital spirit. as mentioned earlier. presents great analogy
with the pnnciple of human souls, i.e., light (the rational principle). whether it be through ies
subtlety. heat. or movem.ent, aU analogous to accidentallight. 68 The role of the vital spirit is. thus, to
be a receptacle for light. inasmuch as the thing whidt serves as an obstacle accepts the irradiating
ligbt (~~ J~)' and preserves it. 89 The spirit. as an .. intermediate ( " ;-,'" ft ) preserves light rays.
and becomes a place of manifestation (~ ) for the similes [or the images] of tha which gives
light and that which receives light (.J.!}--: ;1'", J";" Il J~)."~

From the ahove statement. it appears tbat Suhrawardi is willing to recognize that the vital
psychic spirit plays a raIe in the reception of forms. More importantly. the psycbic spirit plays a role
ÏJl the preservation of forms or sïmi1es. This is, in faet, quite consistent witb bis clBims that the spirit
is a receptac1e for ligbt. an intermediary between the soul and the body, the olle througb wbose
aetivities the rational soul- the Isfahbad-light - can exercise its dominion over the body.
Therefore, Suhrawardi's vital psychic spirit, as the receptaele for forms or similes, is not
very different structurally from Avicenna's conception of the psychic spirit as the organ of
represelltation. The following diagram illustrates some of the sim.iJarities between Suhrawardi' 5 and
Avicenaa's funC1ion of the vital spirit as the substratum offorms.

112 Avic:enna, Is/iiïik, vol. 2, ID, 9, 357.2-6 (Dû:, 322).

83 Avicenn8, Ish6riit, vol. 2., In, 9,358.1-359.1 (Où:, 323).
84 Avicenna, fs/irJe, voL 2, ru, 9,360.1-362.1 (OÛ:, 323).
es HfkmJu, § 225,211.12-3 (5.1J';, 199).
86 .(fzkntar, § 218,206.10-12 (S~. 194).
~ HJ~, § 218,206.12-13 (5.t41'~ 194-5).
88 .(frbDll/. § 218,2.06.13-207.1 ( SifI:, 195).
89 Hikm6. § 218, 207.3 (5.t~, 195).
90 .{fibnur, § 218,206.4-5 (SJ{tr, 194).
 CHAPTER THREE - 119

ügJu:

subdElY - darkness and üglu

fepresen18t1OJ1S - fcrms
suspe.'1ded forms

daitness

A9iœJIda Sutn• •di

EXISTENCE AFTER DEATH

A lsst aspect that pertains ta the concept of the vital spirit deserves some attention. This is
the fate of the spirit &fter the soul' s departUre from the body. Aviœnna. with bis rejection of Thibit
b. Qurrah' s (d. 90 1) theory of subtle bodies,'iH and bis refusaI to accept the subsistence of a vital spirit
separate from the body. rejeets the idea of the survivaI of an immaterial subtle body - the psyche or
psychic pneumo. 92
Likewise. Suhrawardi rejects the thesis of a survival of this subtle body arter deatb. One of
bis arguments is that the separated psychic spirit - as an unstable subtle body - would suffer from
intense heat or cold if it were tao close ta the ce1estial spheres or tao far from them.93 The vital spirit.
which is said to share with light such charaeterislÏ~ as beat and rapidity of transmission of motion.
differs from light br me coldness associated witb it.94 something which Qu~ al-Dm al-Shïrizï
interprets to mean its density.~ Suhrawardï adds that its stability can ooly be achieved tbrough the
help of something (;.sJ~ ~~ L-/.:";j ) coming from without. bec::ause the nature of me vital spirit
does nat allow it to remtÙn stable. lt is quick ta dissolve (~:ic.~ ) due ta its subtlety. but aIso

91 An astrologer-ph1.losopher based in I:i-nn and responslble for the propagation of Greek sciences

amongst the Arabs. cf. Fakhry. A Hismt;rofIslJU1ZTr:PhL/osoP'!Y. 3, 15,17.

92 And tltis ·whether it be the remains of the psychic pOt!llJDI or of a type of }Mn/mil of
1

substitution, no malter what tbeir dimensions might be," e.g .• infin:ite particJes. cf. Mlchot, Ot:!S/inI!Y!. 177;
cf. lbid., l75-7.
93 TJtlwiltiU. § 61.89.8-15; cf. trans. in Mlchot. Oesrint!e, 1780.123.
94 ffrbDlU, § 218.207.4-5 (Sit47=. 195).
'i6 Q. D. Shîrâzï. S1Nlr.1J, (ed. Corbin) 207 n. for IiAe 5 (5.t{47=. 384 n.?).
 CHAPTER. THREE - 120

•
due to the predominance of heat (0..) 1~) in it.9fj The problem of the immortality of the psychic !ipirit
will, however. re-emerge with the problem of the surviva! of imagination or. at least. of imaginative

representation (see chapter on imagiJlation).

The most impoltaJlt charaeteristic of Suhrawardî 5 discussions of the topie is. in facto the
ligbt terminology be employs. Nevertheless. the c1assical A vicennm Peripatetic structure underlying
the theoty of the vital spirits remai1lS. however. unmodified. The previou5 discussions have highlighted
Suhnwardi' s concept of the vital spirits - the p.neumlif/I.

96 PLkmnr. § 2 J 8. 206.15 (5irf:. 195).

 CHAP'fFR. FOUR - 121

• FOUR •

DIVISION OF THE SOUL

VEGETATIVE. ANIMAL. AND HUMAN SOULS

Philosophica1 diseourses on the nature of the sout and its funerions have led to systematization
of its different components. The Islamie Peripmetie tradition eventually adopted the stance proposed
in. Aviœnna's synthesis of ear1ier philosophieal traditions. Classical discussions about the human
soul were usuaUy articulated with the use of suitably modified Greet philosophiœl, natural. and
medicaJ conceptions that served as taols for investigations ÏJlto the sours nature.
The vanoas functions charaaerizî.ng living crganisms are believed ta be ruled by different
types of souls. Subrawardï and Aviœnna posit the existence of three types of soul eharaeterizing the
different reigns: the vegetative, the animal. and the human. For Avicenna, all of these - vegetative,
animal, and human - souls are defined 85 perfections or entelecby of a narural body which possesses
different specialized organs. 1 Likewise, Suhrawardï adopts these disti.n.etions which are, however.
merelyauempts st ideJltifyiJ1g the principles responsible for different identifiable aetivities. But, on
the whole, human beings possess a single soul capable of all of these aetivities. The distinaion is,
therefore, more formai and logical chan faetua1.
For Avicenna and Suhrawardï (as for Aristotle), the huma.n sou! encompasses the two 10wer
vegetative snd anjmal souls. The vegetative part of the soul is the principle al me hein of the
fune:tions of nutrition, of growth and of reproduction. The faculty of reproduction. however, only
comei about through the intermediary of the facu1ties of nu1rition and grcwth. These are al1 reproduced
in Suhrawardf s works.z

Avicenna posits a tripartition of the vegetative sou! which finds its way into Suhrawardi' s
warks. Its various functions ..e ail elaborated in Avicenna's works. The nu1ritive (~.iL& ) faculty

precedes the faculties of growth (~w ) and reproduction (i..J~ ). It is the nutritive faculty that
provides and guarantees the life of any organism. Tbis facu1ty proeesses ail the intake of nutrients

1 Avicel1DR,.MyN,.MUS, 1,320.1-14 (A ~~, 25).

2 LamJl/Jk, Phy:, IV. 1, 113.8-18; cf. Parr;;. 4, § 33, 27.10-L (Book, 28). On the three natuea1
bnBdoms and cnnUlritlon (absorpaon, retelltion, digestion, expulsion), d, rr6jJlt:l, § 10,269.1-9 (.AJd., 21);
cf. P.w, IV, § 33,26.16-27.15 (Bt»x, 29-30).
 CHAPTER FOUR - III

(i.e.., through digestion) and makes them available ta the body, 50 that it May replace what bas been
10st. It is al50 responsible for the growth of the pbysical body 50 tJtat it May reach a state of complete

development (~ ). dellDed in tenns of "perfection in growth... 3 Finally. the f&..~ty of reproduction

is responsible for the propagation of the species through the recreation of a similar type of being by
separating parts of mattet' in order ta rombine two parts of that being into one.4

The second and most important part of the human soul is the animal soul. As A vicenna
writes, .. the second, is the animal soul (~I~) which is the perfection of a natural body possessing
organs enabling it ta perceive particulars (~~~I .!J.;-l.:: ) and it is moved by volition (..J~
i,) 1.; ~ 4):,5 One of ils faculties is the facultyof motion whicb is of two types, .. motive insofar as it
gives an. impulse" or "insofar as it is active.,6 The other faculty is the perceptive pitt of the animal
sou! whicb includes the five external senses and the five interna! faculties (or .. senses"). 7

The same division of the animal soul finds its way ioto the works of Suhrawardi. The souls
of allliving things possess an appetitive faculty (4.: i~ ), itself divided into the concupiscent

Ç"l ',I~ ) and the irascible (:.il;' 'ë ). They also possess a locomotive faeatty (~~ ). For
8
Suhrawardî, the motive part is also related ta the desiring aspect of the soul On the wbole. Suhraw8l'di
does not depart from these traditional divisions of the vegetative and animal souls adopted by
AvicellIla.

FIVEFOLD DIVISION AND LOCALISATION OF FACULTIES

The internaI senses of the animalsouls, st the heart of the philosophieal anthropology of our
t'Ro autbors, are similarly divided into a number of faculties, all ruling over specifie aetivities and
paraUeling the five enernaI. senses. In the Fl/lSbes of.lJghr, the LJgllr/l,!rs ,the One.ou!-U/uHIIOatir---e
IJ'isdom, and other works, Suhrawardï introduces the fivefold division of the inner faculties of the
9
soul in accordance with the standard division of the internaI senses found in Avicenna's works. The
five inner faculties are the a::unmoosense <d;-:";· ~ ; Latin, seosuscommums), the faeultyof

3 Avi cenna, Mlp"6, N4IFs. r. 320.7-14 (A~, 25); cf. Idem, SJmiïI, NiÛS, [, S, ..w.L4-41.3 (~.
28).
" Aviœnna, J'mp, NIÛS, 1,319.1-3 (AP.7c.,2S)
5 Avicenna, SIn.fiI, .i'WIb ,1,5, 39.18-40.13 (P~, 17-8).
6 Avicenna, Nl!PU, ~ ,1,321.5-10 (A r-7ç.. 26).
? Avicenna, SItifii~ NaIS, 1,5, 4L.16-45.16 (.Ps,y:. 29-31). The tem1. Itself is Aot Aristote1lan; while

•
the facuLties are to be found in Anstotle its ongin could be Stoïc, d. Rahman, A fJ1Ï:mDiI S, 77-8 It. for p. 30, 2.
1

8 The desmng motion of the sout i.s auributed to the perceiving plUt of the :soul in Ari5totle, d .
• Usbida, EilIrIescompnUiJ'l!, 75-8; cf. Hily:ikil, II (a) 53.5-7 (p) § 8, 88.16-19 (An:'h.. 45; Ism8J/, 105).
9 For. presentation of the iDner senses, d. Wo1fson, "The lntema1 Senses," 69-133.
 CHAPTBl FOUR - 123

passive imagination (J ~ ) that has a retentive cspacity~ the estimative (rA.,,> f8culty~ the faculty of
active imagination (;;; i.:.;" <
n ) that has a compositive capacity: and the faculty of memory (4 (.;,. 6. )
that bas a preservative or recollective (i.,sl:' or i;S;~ ) capacity.IO This particu1ar classification

originates in Avicenn.a's works. However, although the enumeration of the different facunes appears
to be similar ta the one found in Avicenna, in some places, Suhrawardî reverses the order of some
faculties, e.g., that of the imaginative and the estimatlve faculties (see chapter on the faculty of
imagination).l1 This, as will become more apparent laler. indicates the greater importance tllat
Suhrawardï attributes ta the faculty of active imagination and its distinc:tive aetivities withi.n his own
reiJlterpretation of Avicennan philosophica1 anthropology.

In addition to the fivefold division of the facuJties of the soul, the Avicennan tradition
ascribed ta lhese different faculties specifie physiologica1 locations in the brain. 12 Suhrawardï is weil
awace of this faet. F or instance, in some of bis works, S uhrawardi describes (1) the COn:tA'HJLl sœse
as ft facuJty that is linked witb the front part of the anterior cavity of the brain; (2) the passive
imagination as a faculty associated with the back part of the 8I1terior cavity of the brain; (3) the
estimative facu1ty and (4) the active imaginative as the facu1ties lodged in the middle cavity of the
brain; and, fiJlal.1y. (5) memoty as the facu1ty associated with the posterioc cavity of the brain.o
Furthermore, Suhrawardï adds that should the particular location of any of the inremal senses be
damaged, the function of the particular internai sense associsted with that part of the brain would

become itself deficient.l~ His apparent adoption of the Avicennan position in these warks represents
only one tacet of bis division of the inner faculties.

REJECTION Of DIFFERENT FAa.JLTIES IN A BODILY ORGAN

Suhrawardï adopts a second position. He now criticizes Avicenna's fivefold division of the
ÏJuler senses, cbaraeteristic of the PeripstEtic tradition. In 50 doing ,he atternpts to go beyond A vicenna' s

la H4!r.Jbl, fi (a)S2.1-53.2; cf. Lm1J1/hït, 115.7-116.11; cf. P..rnv, § 35,29.9-31 3 (Book, 30-2).
11 More generally, however. J~ is the passive (rdentive) imagiDalion, i.e., ollly • representative
f aculty, w hile .. Jo! .;, -, • js the active (compositi.ve) imagination at tbe service of estimatiOll.

12 This is the Galen.ic tradition; for Aristode it is the heal't, cf. RahmaIl, A J'i7~ S, 79 n. for p. 31,

3; d. Avicenna, J\.1Ifii", N..&, 3, 328.13-329.17 (Ar:7~, 31); d. Idem, SJn/ii~ NRIS,44.04-4S.16 (~,J':', 30-l).
13 HIIfikiJ, II (a) S3.2-3; cf. L;un;t.fJ., 115.7-116.11; cC. PJirtij. § 35,29.9-31.3 ( Book,30-2).
_4

.
pœ'JInor
S
@ 2

1
.
IIJ1Ur»t"

104 HlIYJki/, fi (a) 53.2-4 (p) § 8, 88.12-4 (AJrh., +4; fsm8ll, 104).
 CffAPTER FOUR - 124

system. and to pursue whst he perceived ta be the "oriental-illuminative" tradition. alluded ta by

Avicenna, especially in his Lo...lfrcof EOt! ElSrerntrs and {f~f:r Ibn Ydf~/ln.15 Suhrawaroï's critique
of some Peripateticpositions i5 fou.ndinhis f01Jrmajordoctrinal WOl"ks, especially OnenEJlI-U/uDUÂlKif--e
~Vistlom. In the 1.ter work. he sets out to elaborate bis own theory of ··oriental-ûlumination.'·16 To
achieve hlS goal, he must first reject some of the principles of Avicenna' s Peripatetici.sm. including'
the localization of the different faculties of the soul in particuh.. parts of the body (its organs) and the
fivefold division of the sou1.

Suhrawardi directs bis cn.ticism first st the localization of the different facu1ties of the soul
in the brain. a. bodily organ. In bis presentation of the Peripatetic theses. Suhrawa-dï genenilly

foUows Avicenn8. The presentation of the Avicennan tbeses, however, provides him with the
philosophica1 principles from which bis own reinterpretation. t.

Suhrawardi bolds thllt the different faculties of the soul cannot inbere in any m.erial body.
In faet, he states expücitly in a number of passages mat it is impossible for forms tbat are perceived
ta be imp-essed in either the eye or the brain,l7 His refutation of this position may be divided into
four arguments: fim, two facuIties witb [WO different funaions cannot inhere in the same part of the
brai.n; second, two functions can be operaed byone and the same facutty; third the active imagination.
1

cannat be said to aa, but unable ta perceive; and finally, the nature of recollection cannot involve a

physical crgan.

TWO DISTlNCf FACULTIES AND FUNCIlONS

Suhrawardi's fint criticism against the 10ca1ization of the inner facu1ties in. a physical organ
is that the PeripatetiΠhave identified two different faculties with two different functions and located
them in the sante part of the brain. Both the estimative and the a.ctive imaginative facuhies are said to
IB
exist side br side in the middle pan of the brain. Furthermore, according to Suhrawardi, others -
accordiJJ.g to Qu~b al-DiD al-Shïriizï (d. L311), the Peripatetic~9 - bave argued that human beings
POSSESS an estimative facuity that judges over partieular represeJltations (AM .:~ ), whereas they

IS For a debate between two differeat iJlterpn=tations - allegcric:al and mystical - of this particular

work. cf. Goic:hon, Lf! nf'Q'r de H#!J'Y.ibD Yav~ and Corbin, A rz'a!nru-er: le n!'Qr "m~; cf. Anawati,
"GJ1Ose et philosophie," 291-305.
115 It is more c:ommonly known as the philosopby of "ilhmullation," e.g., by Ziai, Walbridge. and

Amin Razavi.
17 ffikm.lr, § 220,208.6 (5.t[,.v:. 196); cf. esp. Idem, § 225. 211.12-3 (.siw:. 199).
18 AvîœJUla, S1nfi~,NaFs. J,5,45.3-7(.P.v'~31);cf. l:.JlmR/JiU, 115.15-8.
19 Q. D. al-Shnzï, Sltam (ed. Corbin), 209, n. fOt" lille 7 (.${~~ 386n.4).
 CfIAPTER. FOUR - 125

passes a facully of active imagination whose funet10n is to analyse ~ ) and ta compose or

synthesize (~~ ).20 He argues that the estimative is itse1f the facuJey of active imagination which
passes judgments. analyses and makes synthesises. since both judge particolars. L1

Suhrawardi argues by reducrio tJd ohsurdum against an)' distinaion betWeen these [wo
faculties. established by the Peripatetics. He tries to show that these faculties œnnot be distinguished
from one anotber, since they are localed in the same part of the brain. He rejeets the Peripatetics'
distinction br objecting ta the independent funetioning of each of the two faculties, observing that if
the facu1ty of active imagination is sound, tben. there is alsa something which passes judgments -
what the Peripatetics call the estimative faculty. Moreover. it is known that the faculties are necessarily
affected by the alteration that affects their se~. Sinoe bath facu1ties are sud to inhere in the same
part of the brain.. both sbould be affected br any type of alteration of their com..mon sesto These [wo
faculties should. according to tbeir claims. be locsted in different places, which is not the case.22 But
for Subrawardi, different seats sbouJd be 8ltnbuted to different faculties. because if the se8lS were to
be disturbed, the (wo faculties would be disturbed. Since bath shlre the same se&t. il would be
absurd to tbink that only one of the two would be aJtered, if the sest itself were to be subjected to

some a1terstion.
Another argument provided br Suhrawardi ta reject such a 10calization of the inner faculties
in a physical organ is based on the idea tbat two funetions may be operated by one and the same
facuIty. Hence. it is not because there are more tha.n one operation or function that there sbould
neœssarily be more tban one facuJty.23 He suggests that the same faculty - but viewed according to
24
its (two) differeJlt aspects - muId be responsible for two different operations. Ta demonstnlte tbis
proposition, he invokes the activities of the faculty of the common stYlSe which, according ta the
same people (i.e.. the Peripatetics), is a faculty whicb has the ability to know the totality of the
abjects ofthefive externat senses (~L....~ ; the Latin sensibikil). butwhich remains one and

unadulterated by the reception of the different absteaeted forms th~ originate in the senses.
25
ln the
same manner. Suhrawardï argues, it is possible to conceive of the operations or activities of the
estimative faculty as not being opposed to thase of the faculty of active imagin&tion.~ In faet, he

ZO (Ubnnr. § 222, 209.7-9 (S.,-. 197); cf. ~. Pl!PS.. rv, 3,115.17-9.

21 PLkmur. § 22L, 209.9-10 (..si,,:. 197).
zz IYbnur. § 222,209. LO-14 (~ 197).
ZJ Q. D. al-Shirizi, Shllr.h 467.1 (st4'=. 386 n. 6); cf. ffrbnar, § 222, 209. L3-14 (Sl{q;, 197).
Z<l ,ffrbrt/I/:, § 222, 209.14-16 (.5i{Ir.. 197).
Z!l Hd:n:tN, § 222, 209.16-210.1 (~. 197).
 CHAPTFR FOUR - 126

•
considers the distiJlct activities of these two different faculties as two different functions of one and
the same faculty..27 He concludes this passage b}9 smting that the estimative judgments are not
opposed ta the actions of the facuJty of active imagination.Z6

Suhrawardï proposes yet &Dother argument against mis A vicennan thesis. There are some -
perhaps. again according to Qu~b al-Dm aJ-Shïriizi. the Peripatetics""~ - who say that the fsculty of
active imagination sets but cannot perceive (~.J~). In the A vicennan system, abstraeted forms are
the objec~ (Avïcenna's intentions - ~lA.. ) of the facu1ty of estimation. Moreover, wben a form is
present, a perception must occur and, a fortiori, so must sorne kind of knowledge. For Suhrawardï, if
the faculty of active imagination were to aet, without perceiving, it wouJd be different from the
f&CUlty of passive 1Œagination, which receives forms, but which is not responsible for analysing and
synthes izing.
For the Peripatetics, Suhrawardï notes, perception (.!JI ,J.J!) only occurs through a form, i.e.,
in the presence or the actualisation of the form of the object known br the knowing subjeet.:D If there
were no forms present to the faculty of active imagination for it to pereeive, he .-gues, men this
faculty could not perceive. What could it then analyse and compose?l Furthermore, if me forms
32
were in another f&culty - e.g., the retentive or passive imagination - then bow could the facu1ty of
active imagination malyse and CDmpose the different forms? Cons equ ently, since the facu1ty of
active imagination cannot funetion and pass judgments without forms, one eannot say that the
faculty of passive imagination, the recipientofthe forms, maybe disturbed while the active imaginative
remains sound. 3J In other words: the [Wo faculties - the passive and active imaginations - must
necessarily be the same and not distinct faculties.

PROBLEM OF RECOLLECTION
SuhraWEll"dï proposes still another argument against the localization of the inner faculti.es in a

as Hibmu, § 222,210.4-6 (S..,.. 198).

Z7 ln the Temples of LJ.~br, the aJmmOR seDSe is the reci.pient of fcxm.s caming from the five
senses; it Wltllesses (,).A~ ), in die stale of sleep, dreams but DOt through the imaginative facu1.ty (~ i
~I ~ ), cf. HilTJkU, Il <a) 52.1-2 (P) § 8,87.15-8 (Arrh. +4; fsmJlLl, L03); cf. PJtmï §§ 90-1,
1

n.16-79.12 (Book, 81-3).

28 PLkmM, § 222,210.6 (5...., 198).
2'9 Q. D. al-5bîrâzi, S6ri, 210 D. fOl" hne 7 (S~. 386 note 8).
30 ffjkmllr,§ 223,210.7-8(SJw:, 198).
31 H1bDJU, § 223,210.9 (-%r., 198).
32 This would be the imagination, cf. Q. D. al-Shïrazï, Sh.-.IJ. 468.13 (5.t.v:, 386 n.9).
33 IfrkotM, § 223, 210.10-11 (5.t~. 198).
 CHAP'fER FOUR - 121

bodily organ with an. interesting discussion on the faculty of recollection. His position is ciea-: he
rejeets the position of the Peripatetics who held that the "forms apprehended by the faculty of
passive imagination (~l;:" ;;.-) are preserved (~..s~) in the faeulty of passive im.agination."~
This lalter faculty was traditionally considered as the storehouse for the forms abstraeted from the
senses by the inner f aculty of common sel.1Se.:fi

On the contrary. Suhrawardï holds that what is retneved and rem.embered is not something
deposited in any corporeaJ faculty. His notion of recollec:tion is dependent on his ides of the rational
soul as the ruling faculty. and is deftned in terms of a goveming ruling light (;;~.,;y ).36 Since.
notb.i.Jlg can escape the reach of the ruling light (the rational soul), then, if what is retrieved were to
be preserved in any corporeal faculey, nothing cou1d prevent the ruling Jight to have access to it by
exerting sorne effort. 37 Nothing cm remain an obstacle for the manifestation of light, such that it is
thus absurd to argue that it is the existence of an obstacle that accounts for forgetting, i.e.. for the
mability to have access to something leamed and preserved in one of the corporea1 facu1ties. ~

The goveming light (...J""~ J~ ) - the rational soul - always has acœss te these fOrlns.
the rational 50ul being the priaciple at the heart of the proœss of recoUection. The rational soul is the
nJli..ng light wh1cb searcbes and ha access to everything there is to remember. because the ratio1l81
soul is Bot. Ut itse1f. something corporeal ~5~ ~ ), and neither are the fonns it perceives.
39

Suhrawardï states. against the Peripatetic position, that

If these [imaginative] fonns existed in [the passive imagination). tbey would be

present to [the l"U1.ing light]. and it would perceive (~..,;~ ) them. [This is not the
case.] The human being finds absolutely nothing in ~self that CIi11 imagine (~)
Zayd when [Zayd] is absent. It is omy when the human bang fee1s that something
presents an analogy with Zayd. or [wben] he ref1ects on th. which provides him
wilh a certain cotTespondence that bis thought trave1s towards [the idea of] Zayd.
[Then] a disposition (~I~I ) occurs to him ta [be able] te recall (o~Lü...",,1 ) the

)li Hlbnil/'. § 221, 209.1 (.5iI§:. (96). It is the stDrehouse of the comman sense according to the
Peripat«ics. cf. Q. D. al-Sbïrizi, Sh-....h (ed. CorbÏJl). 209 ft. for line l (.sig(:, 386 n. 3).
3S L#mJl.(liir. PAys. IV. 3 , 115.13-5 and 115.21-116.1; cf. Avicenna, SiuN. NlIFs, J. 5. 44.7-9 (P~
30).
36
Cf. with Aviœnna's use of the COJlCept of a "conrrolling faculty," (gr. H~amkon) of the
ÏJldlvidual, cf. Hall. "A Decisi.ve Example." 74. 78; c:f. Walbridge. "Suhrawardï," 528.
n (fIbDIU. § 220. 208.5-7 (5if!r:, 196).
]3 (fIkmM. § 220.208.7-8 (Sftv:, 196).
39 {5bnM. § 220, 20S.8-lO (S4Y-, 196). [f the fcx-gouen t.1ung was inside of it or in anolher faculty of
the body. thlCtIllng wouJd have in itself a Jftsenœ and [the ruling Light) would be COmiClOUS of it (ù lS.J
~ ~l1àr"a~ o~ , ........ ~). d. Q. D. al-5birizi. Shar/1 (ed. Corbin). 208 A. for lme 9 (.5iW".. 385 n. 2).
 CHAPTER FOUR - 128

form [of Zayd]from the world of memorial (.;S.iJJ ~~). And chat which experiences
[chis recoilection] from the world of memorial is the ruling light (~,J-A.)~ ) [ie.,
the rational 50ul].4:1

For Subrawardi, thanles ta the incorporea1ity of the goveming light (~-~ .)~ ), no
ob~acle p-events tbis tigbt from having acce5S to something which is said to have been slOred in one
of the faculties of the body. Remembering (~ ) 1S no longer linked witb an ability ta reaccess
deposited forms in any particular physica1 organ. since tbese fonns do not, in faet, exist Ul anyof
them. Rather, recollect1on is a disposition that makes possible the ability ta retrieve (o,JlL:w.,.,1 ) forms
that originale in non-sensible realms. Renee, fonns are received from the world of" memorial" (~l&
,;S.iJ 1) (Corbin' 5 teml):21

Suhrawardi writes chat remembering cm anly come from the "memarial" worM, where "the
spheres of the power of the guiding celestial Isfahbad-Iights [oœur] (.J'~~I olb1- ~I;' lJ-'4
~J 4.: ':·d"· :111 ), because they do net forget 8I1ythi.Jlg.w42 The one who perceives has, thereupon,
a disposition that makes it possible to receive the forms. e.g., the fonn of a pS'ticuJar (e.g.. of Zayd)
as a gift coming from the celestial souls of that world of" memorial" (~lJ 1 rJ ~ ). Moreover, the
medilltor between that world of" mem.oriaI" and the human faculties is the ruling light (;;.:- ..J~ ) -
,.-.
the rational soul. co Foc Suhrawardi, then., the aet of remembering consists essentially in bringing back
(t. ~...f'--'J ) or reaccesSÏJ1g what originates at the level of the world of the "memorial," the world of
the celestial spheres (o!J)li ~ J ~ ~). 44

Suhrawardi's scheme i5 here definitely Platonic in spirit. Recollection is, ta a h..ge degree,
the recollection of sorne objective e1ltities existing in the reaIm of pure abstraction.<5 In some respect,
reminïsce1lce is, thus, akin ta the process of lU18DmesLS (Gr., "to recall ta mem.ory") round in Plato

(and associated with the Platonic world of Ideas).

In &nother' respect. it differs somewhat from the Phltonic position, because Plato' 5 theory of
IlDJ/mnes:is rested on the belief of the pre-existence of a 50ul which previously knew [deas, but whicb

has forgoŒea them upon re-entering the body.46 The affinities of Subrawardï's position with Plato's

4) prkmnr, § 221, 209.2-6 (5:t.v:. 196-7).

41
The world of .. Memorial" is not in lcself a Qur'inic expression, cf. Kassis, A Coocord#nce af~1te
(Jura.
42
HJkmlu, § 220,208.10-12 (S..,., 196).
4J HibnJlr, § 221, 209.3-6 (~, 197). ln Corbin's transLlItioll, "The World of Memorial is the
Ruling Light."
44
Pikmld, § 224, 211.6-7 (SJI..~.. 199).
4!i Hibnnr, f§ 94-8. 92.3-96.16.
 CffAPTER FOUR - 129

theory of recollection are ben exemplified by a comment of Ou~b al-Dïn Shïriizï (d. 1311) on a
passage of the On"eoml-IUu.nuO/lfÙ--e Jr/'isdom. where he notes t1181:

It is necessary to show first tbat the recoUection (~ ) of forgotten things does Itot
consist in the fact that the ruling light makes them come back (t ~.,;:w....1 ) from the
facu1ty of memory (~6.) which would be the storehouse (~Ijâ) of the judgments
of the estimative f&culty (~.3 \~i ). while its substrate (J-- ) would be the
posterior lobe of the brain. following the doctrine of the Peripatetics (~~ ).
Rather, it CansiSlS in making it come back (t ~,;:w...../) from the power of the immaterial
lights of the spheres (d .:Slà Il ii;~1 )".:,~I "lJ-L..w ) that forget nothing st aU,
following the doctrine of the I1luminationists (().:.: i/~! ). according to what their
leader or, nuber. as Plata (~~I ), the divine lœder of all ( ~~I-JS.I/~.J ),
has explained: the act of remembering (~ ) is something that cames from the
ce1estial worlds (~ ~/~ ) andfrom the Sacred Souls (~1i (JM~ )which
know the totality of the thiogs. eternal (~tj), past and te come.
cT7

Suhrawardi's commentators were not wrong to regard him as having adopœd more a Ph~onic

conception of reminiscence than an Aristotelian A vicennan position. In his discussions on recollection,

Suhrawardï actuaUy argues against the A vicennan theory, in order to introduœ bis more Pl810nic
theory of reminiscen.ce. Although Suhrawardi, in somê of bis warks, mentions views similsr te those
of the Peripatetics (i.e., recollection understood as the retrieval of the judgments of the estimative
facu1ty stored in the facu1ty of memory), nonethe1ess, he rejeets this position in the metaphysics of
bis OrieRhU-D.!uOlinldir--e J~~dom.

In this more persona! wark, recol1ection is defined in distinttively Platonic terms. RecoUection
is now a process of retrieving data from the world of the ce1estial spheres (~.hl"~1 ~~ VA). He adds
thal "it is conœivable that there is a faculty on whicb depends a certain aptitude (,)/~I) belongïng
ta this reminiscence (~)... 46 W ould titis impJyan intrinsic aptitude linked ta a psrticular function '1
Perhaps not, E Suhrawardï seeks ta depart from the Peripatetic theory. It might, on the other hand,
Cl9
explain why some individuals cm "remem.ber" more powerfully than others.

REJECI10N OF THE FIVEfOLD DNISJON Ol? THE SOUL

Suhrawardï, having sought to show the absurdity of the localization of the different faculties

45 A position aIse assocïated Wltb Pythagoras, cf. Plata, Repubbc, lO.6JOe-6L1a; d. Idem, Pbnl!do,

70c-Tle; cf. Idem, AFeno.

47 Q. D. al-Shïrizï, SÔ;U;fJ (ecl. Corbin), 208 n. for li.ne .. ( ~ 385 n. 1).
.., Hà:mar, § 224, 211.&7 (5.t~ J99).
49 This was suggested by Prof. H. LaDdolt; but how wouJd thlS aptitude have been undenrood by
Subraw-m'
 CHAPTFR. FOUR - 130

of the soul in a bodily organ - especially the esti.m-.ive and the imagmative - given that one and the
same faculty can be responsible for different operations, s-gues that the Peripatetics' division of the
internai senses into Cive is untenable and must be rejeaed.'SfJ

On a more general note. Suhrawardï believes that a11 the inner activities are reducible to thei..
luminous principle - the rational souL In bis Orie.or8l-U/unzLoOD·r·'l! "IMom, Suhnrwardï writes:

Just like aU the senses go back. (~J:> ta a single sense (i:......6. ). i e., the conunon
seASt? aU these [internai faculties] go back to a single poWEr (o,."i ) in the ruling
light (~J.A .)~ ) [i.e., the rational soul] which [i.e.. its power] is [the ruling light' s]
luminous essence which emanates by itself (~f.i.J ..... ~.)~).Sl e:.-
Suhrawardi' s staement makes it elear that aU the internal senses are part of the soul. The
distinction that he establishes between the internai senses and the rational soul is one of inclusion.
Indeed, the rational soul mes over aI.1 inner faculties. The distinction he establisbes between the
single faculty of representalion and the rational soul is, however, not as c1ear. On the one hand. this
single faeully of representation is, aiong witb the othe!' faculties of COrrutlon SeASe and memory, a
part of the immateriai soul.
This is, in faa, a misleading equation precisely beeause the sou1's luminous and emanating
,'- ..
substance - st the raliona1leve1- is immllterial. There ..e, ÏJl fact, (wo kinds of reduetions. The first
type of red\1etion is thlit of the faeuJties responsible for representation. They are reduœd to li single
faculty of representation. The latter faculty of representation preserves its mlterïa1 charaeter.
The second type of reduction is that of aU perception to a single "power," i.e., the soul
S2
itself. As such, the single faculry of representstion is but a "shadow" of the rational principle - i.e.,
the sou!. This is best exempJified with Suhrawardï' s statement that aIl these faculties are but shadows

of the ruling lightofthe soul, i.e., the Isfahbad-light (::·.'ë· :~I ..J~I ~ L. JJ.;).5J

Suhrawardï's singlefaculty ineorporatesthevarious activities that wereidentified by Avieenna

as the activities of specifie inner faculties. Suhrawa-dI asserts tbat "the truth is that these three
[facuJties] are one and the same thing, and one and the same faculty thm we interpret according ta

three different meanings."S=! Aecording to Quçb al-Dîn al-Shïrazï, these faculties are the faculties of
passive imagiDation. estimatioll, and active imaginative. 55

50 /fikm11/", § 220-24, 208.1-211.8 (..5itr. 1 196-9).

51 /frbn11/", §226, 213.3--4 (s.,.. 200).
52 This lS perbaps net without some relation with Abü al-Barakat aI.-Baghdidï's UJUty of the soul's
actions, cf. An al-Barakit, aI-Mu'/alvr5Jl1-Hzkm.u, 317.24-319:l0: d. al-Khelaifi, -Psychologie," 60-4.
53 /fr"bDnr, § 221, 214.3 (5.t~, 200).
54 lfikmlU, § 224,210.12-3 (Sofr:, 199).
 CtfA.PTFR FOUR - 131

Thus, Suhrawardï reduces the three Avicennan faculties a5sociated with the imaglnative
p-acess - the (retentive) passive. estimation. and the (oompositive) aetive - to one facu1ty. Ta this
single faeulty of representation, he asai.bes the three distinct functlons that were traditionally auribu:cd
co these faculties. Suhrawardï unifies the varions functions responsible for and involved in the
manipulation of sensible and abstraet images and fonns and proposes a single and unique aeative
im.agin~onwith various funetions.$

Suhrawardï proposes a coneeptlon of the soul in term.s of ils intrinsie unit}'. Sneh a nnity
must be aaributed to the soul on aecount of the ruling power whtch the rational souJ possesses over
aU the aetivlties of representation. His rejeetion of the Avicennan division of the soul ioto a number

of inner faculties (now the three inner faculties related to representation are one), bowever, does not
do away witb the different ac:tivities traditionally attributed to the Avicennan inner faculties. The
specialisalion of the soul's different activities implicidy maintains the previous division of the inner
faculties, even if only in terms of their activities. The human soul is now constituted of the commoo
se.nse. a triparrite facu1ty, and the facolty of memory.
It is, however. notewot1hy that the faculty of memory, the sta-ehouse of the judgments of the
estimative facu1ty in Avicenna. and of the facu1ty of active imagination in Suhrawardï (see section
on the faculty of imagination) is treBted separateJy. las function, according ta tbe Peripaœties, is no
less important chan th. of the faculty of passive imagination. the storehouse of the sensible forms
S7
œ,straeted by the common se4fe. In the works of Avicenna, the facuJty of memory certain1y
occupied a centrall"ole, along with the estimative facuJty.S8

For Suhrawardi. since recoUection no longer consists in retrieving deposited forms in the
facuJties of passive and active imagination, the whole purpose for the existence of the faadty of
memory is undermined. This bea>mes particulady crue of knowledge acquired from non-sensible
realms. Witb regards to what has just previousJy been mentioned about the problem of recollection,
il may be argued th 111, in bis Iater o<illuminative" works, name1y the OnèDlllI-UJUA'LÜ1Œif'e JfTisdom.
Suhrawardi rejects the specifie characteristiat - in its Peripatetic sense - of the faeuity of memory
and mat. in fact, he elimîn81es it as a faculty wmch preserves forms in a bodily organ.

55 Q. D. al-Shirizi considers tbem te be the passive (representattve) imagination, the estimative and
the aCllve (oompositive) imagination, d. Q. D. al-Sbirazï, ShJlr/J (ed. Corbin), 210 n. line 12 (%,386 n. 10);
cf. Goichon. DueaiFeS, 322 n.2.
56 It is differentfrom thereasonning capability of Descartes, d. Jambet's miro. in, ~e~, 27.
S7 LtmJt/lsïr, PJJp, IV 13, 115.21-116.1.
58 Hall," A Decisive Example ," 47-84.
 CHAPTER fOUR - 132

•
The Isse faculty that remains to be discussed is the common st::'OSe. It may be argued that
Suhrawardi sttempted ta eliminste this faculey, especially in the (Peripatetic) sense of inhering in a

puticuJar physical organ. For Suhrawardï. the function of the common se.l1se is ta manipulate the
distinct and varied forms that il reœives from the senses. In sorne passages of his Oneoro/-U.luDI./nlHir·1!
~Jrsdom. he is adamant chat fonns - whether visual (l:I;.L1 ;;.-) or imaginative (4..:-J~';;- )-
tre not imprinted (; .. : b', • ) anywhere. e.g .. in the common sense or any other faculty. S9 These

sensible fonns are bodily (i.e., citade1s. just like the bodies are for saufs) wh1ch are Jinked or
suspended - in the soul- without possessing a plaœ of inherenœ (~ ~ ~ ;.1.' ft. u--4;- ).
Therefore, these forms have distinguishable manifestations without being in. those places of

manifestation ( ~ ~ ~..j J!6~ ~ ~,J

60
'+J ). They could not. therefore. be located in an
organ. as the Peripatetics hold. This May even be tnJer with respect te such passages as mentioned
abave where he ststes th. all the inner facu1ties are derived from the luminous substance of the soul.

For Suhraw8l'dï. the common se.nse am become some kind of recipient of these immaterial
forms, similar to a mirror that ref1ects images.51 To receive these immaterial forms. it therefore
somehow needs te be complEtely dissociated from any type of m81eriality. The problems sssociated

with the sensible representâions of the forms themselves th. are to be contained in this faaJlty, e.g.,
visua1 represe1ltâÏons, are, however, not really dealt with. Furtbermore, the commonsense becomes

the receptaele of both the sensible fOnlls and the imaginative forms that the soul receives from the
metaphysica1 world, i.e., at the level of the werld of "memorial," the world of the œlestiaJ spheres.
Likewise. the ability of the conzmon St;?DSt? to become such a receptac1e.

A TENEBROUS FACULTY AND THE RU LING LIGHT

Suhrawardï's single facuJty responsible for representation is, in fact, "other" than the ruling
lig.bt - the rational soul. Its eristence is concomitant (~~jJ) to the existen~ of the lsfahbad-light
(;:-i è- :1 ~), the rational soul that ruJes and govems the body. 52

Suhrawardï descri.bes this faculty possessed by human beings as being "tenebrous" (:;.1 ,,~).
It is, therefore, characterized by its deficiency or lact of light. Moreover. its "tenebrous" nature is
quite oddly explained by the fsct that it is imprinted (:i .... ! b', • ) in a barza/dJ (t j-~). 6J In the works

!:9 .{Ubn.ttr, § 225, 211.13-212.1 (S~4T., 199).

60 .{Ubn.ttr. § 215, 212. 1-2 (Sat.v:. 199).
61 /fikmlU, § 226,213.1-2 (5i{f:. 200); cf. Idem, § 227,234.1-3 (5..y:,21S).
62 HibDar, § 224, 211.3~ (~ 199).
63 .ffLknttlr. § 224, 211.4-5 (5.t4T.. 199).
 CHAPTER. FOUR - 133

•
of Suhrawardï. the tenn borzakh expresses either matter or the intennediary wodd. ln the particular
contex:t of the above statement, borz~ corresponds ta sorne sort of corporeality or matter, 1.e., the
physical body.

Tenebrous faculti.es are opposed to the luminosity of immaterial substances. e.g., the human
rational souJ. In facto for Suhrawardi, tbis "tenebrous" faculty denies the eXistence of the immaterial
lights (o;~ .,;lyi) and recognizes (..... ~) only sensible rea1ities ( ..:.JL......~ ).64 He goes so far
as ta say tbat sometimes it even deDies ltse1f. The affinities this faculty shares with matter a-e thus
ronsiderable and, due ta its utenebrous" nature, it is denied access ta these loftier reaJms. This
faculty must, therefore, be quite distinct from the nï1ional soul - although part of it. It somehow lies
beeween a 5We of materiality and one of immateria1ity.

Understood in suclt manner, employing the concept of blirZLiklJ or matter ta describe this
faeulty of the sou! ontY complicate matters. It may ecl10 the original Peripatetic stand from which
In say case, titis is not how he is interpreted by ~b al-Dm
65
Suhrawardï tries ta dissociate himse1f.
a1.-Shïrizï who comments on Suhrawardï's exposition of the Pecipatetic theses. Quçb al-Dm aI-ShïrBzï

acknowLedges that the aetivities of the three different facuJties of the soul have thar sest in the brain.
- thU5, inadvertentiyreverting ta the Avicennan scheme. 66
The question that ulti.mate1y needs to be answered is, Where does Suhrawardi actuaLly locate
the forms at the hesrt of representation and the basis of human knowledge? The experience of forms
defUled as separated from any corporeal nature would somehow r81uïre an independent universe
capable of lodging them.

Qu~b al-Dïn al-Shïriizï, still commenting on the passage about the forms not being in the eye
cr the brain. notes that the imaginative forms do net exist in the brain. do not exist in empirical
reality (04-&-1) and yet are not pure non-existence r~ L...u:. ). This is because if they WEr'e pure
non-existence, an individual representation (i;~) of the forms would not be possible, the forInS
could not be distinguished (i~ ) from one another, and they could not be the subject of differenc
judgmenl5 (, lS.=.1). 61

Imaginative fonns have a real existence (O.,)~.,... ). but not in the braiJ:l, ncr in the external
reality. They Cl11lJ1ot be in the world of the intelligences (J.,iaJ 1 rJ l& ) - because they remain

6'" !5kmztr, § 224, 211.5-6 (Sifr.. 199).

6S The context suggests that tbis material t.m.aginarion is the rebelhous and erro-prone imagi.nmon,
specifiçally identified as beiJIg the estimative faculty (see section on the faculty of Imagination).
6f> Q. D. al-Shïrizi, SharfJ (ed. Corbin), 21111. foc lines 5 and 13 (Sot4'=. 386 n. Il and 13).
~ Q. D. al-Shirizi, ShJlr.A (ed. Corbin), 211 n. for 1. J3-212.20 (5.!"., 387 n.I).
 CH.'\PTER fOUR - 134

•
corporeaJ and non-intelligible fonns ~ )l ~ ~ '"1;;'- ~",s.J ). It is, therefore, necessary
that they should subsist somewhere else. In bis commentary, Qu~ al-Dm aI-Shïriizï cLearly identifies
this intermediary world as the place where aIl these forms have an existence (see section on
escbathoLogy).

This is what Suhrawardï caUs the "imaginai" world (~~I.J ~l:J.1 rJW1 ). It is an
intermediary world tbat ex.ists between the sensible worJd and the wodd of intelligences ( .J.-..,~

~t.J j.iAJ 1.~ ~ ~ ).6IJ In the conte..xt of Suhrawardî' s discussions about the inner senses, this
intetmediary world corresponds ta an intermediBIY level of abstraction (.>.: ~ ), iJlferior to the Level
of pure abstraction charaeteristic of the worLd of intelligences but above the worId of the senses. It is
in this intermediary world that the totality of figures (J~i), fonns tJ~ ), extensions (J':.)li.o ).

bodies (r~j), and aIl that is associated with them (such as motions (~~~) and reposes (~w.s.....,)
positions (t. ~."j ) and configurations (~~ ), etc) will take place. In this imaginai world of
representation. all things subsist by themselves (4-:i 1.3~ 4....: li ) without having any 1ink ta such
thïngs as Il place or a substrate (~).69
Vet how is such a fsculty of representstion to be defined? The nature of the relationship mal
exists between the different functions of this facu1ty and the rational sou1 - i.e., the Isfahbad-light -
complicates matters. The Isfsbbad-light is not spatial and does Qat possess any dimensions. These _
become, however, charaeteristics of the forms manipulated by this sole facolry of represent~on.

Furthermore. the existence of these forms in anotber wor1d seems te prec1ude their access by human
beings.

The Isfahbad-light. however, aIso rules OVe!" the body and is obeyed by the "tenebrous"
elements (~L.ÏL;) of which the body is constituted.~ The different fonctions of this single facuJty of
representation, tberefore, somehow participate in m.eriality through their "ten.ebrous" nlltUre. As
such, they may even oppose the "roling light. "11
A few problems have so far been raised: the number of the faculties, the localization in a
panicular organ of the inner faculties, and the "ten.ebrous" nature of these inner senses. AIl these
p'oblems originate wim Suhrawardi' s attempt ta redefine the nature and the retaionships of the five
Avicennan internai faculties. Suhrawardï' s stance regarding the natUre of the faculties of the soul are

68 Q. D. al-Sbïrizi, S~ (00. Corbin), 212.20-21 (st""" 387 n.l).

69 Q. D. al-Sbïrizi, ShadJ (ed. Corbin), 212.21-5 (Sot.v:, 387 n.l).
;u .lûbuJlt, § 219, 207.14 (S~, 196).
71 .lûbnJlr, f 224, 2l0.12-211.8 (SW:. 198-9).
 CfiAPTER FOUR - 135

-. Avicennan. internai facuJties. Suhrawardi' s stance regarding the nab.1re of the fac:ulties of the soul are
explicable in the light of bis own conception of knowledge.

The classica1 Peripatetic theory of knowledge, based on the hylomorphism of dassical Greek
physics (Aristotle), consisted essentially in an abstraeting process - by way of the forots. Suhrawacdï,
however, departs from this traditional hylomorphic conception of the world. genera1ly adopted by
the Peripatetics (see section on the ruling light - the Isfahbad-light).7Z

For Suhrawardï, since the fundamental principle of al! things is light, forms no longer need
ta be imprinted in. a bodily organ..7.3 On the contrary, they are now ettached tD bodies, somehow

suspended, on account of their existence in the imaginal worLd. They have places of i1Lherence or
74
manifestations. but chey are not in these places of manifestation, having absolutely no substnKe.
The knowledge of immaterial forms can, therefore, ooly be achieved throlJgh a düecr contact with
non-sensible realms. This is the "presential" type of knowledge so charactEristic of Suhrawardi's
uilluminative" philosophy. Knowledgethathsd previousfy been conceived in terms ofboth abstraction
and perception, in the Peripatetic system, is now conceived in Suhrawardï's system in terms of direct
perception (see section of intellection 8Ild prophetology). Abstraction offorms is not rejected outright,
but it definitively no longer guanmtees the acquisition of true knowledge.

The emp.hasis on the sctivities of direct perception becomes essential for Suhrawardï and
aUows bim. to offer an account of individual.and persona! knowledge of metaphysica1 principles,
truths, and realities. Furtbermore, this redefinition of the relation of the different facu1ties of the soul
with the body he1ps him. to refonnuJate bis theory of mystical perception, a more immediate type of
knowJedge that does not operate with rorms. He defines this pllrticu1ar conception of knowledge œ a
J<knowledge by presence" ~-J~ ~). 75

Suhrawardï's stance on the nature of the faculties responsible for represematïon may aIso be
explained in the light of Avicenna's works. 76 The faculties of the soul are often distinguished from
one another on.ly insofar as these distinctions can help him. identify the different functions - according
to their respective objects - of the soul. Moreover, some bave argved chat Avicenns's conception of

72 Hibnltr, §§ n-90, 74.13-90.4.

73 Hi.bnltr, § 220 ,208.6(S-t.v:, 196).
74 HJbnJtr, § 225,211.13-212.3 (5.t.v:, 199).
'15 TllIwf/Jik, § 61, 90.8-9 and [dan. § 55, 74.3-6; does Ilot seem te be mentloned in the HrbnJl;
howewr, it is mentioned exp1ir:itcly by Q. D. al-5birizi. Sbu;fJ (eci. Corbin), ISO n. for line 9 V
1~I ~
l.SJ~ ) and 215 D. for JiJle 4 (u-i l,rotl r.S ~ ~ ) (SJ{f/".. 32"~_3 and 38%.11, respectively). Cf. Ha' ici
Yazdi, 71Je Pnnciples ofEp~olCf(Y-
7tl Verbeke, • Science de l'âme et perception sel1S1ble," 34-48.
 CHAPTER. FOUR - 136

knowledge is flot as Aristotelian as it appesrs at first glance. On the contrary. in some important parts
of bis works, e.g. , in the logical works. the thrust of his philosophical discussions is more Neoplatonic.
10 the enent that an "illuminative" conception of knowledge is detectsble (see section on intellection).

For instance, Hall discusses Avicenna's doctrine of the soul by focusÏ1lg on some specific
issues like the ensouJment of the human embryo and the question of the empirical basis of knowledge
- both closely linked with A vicenna' s tbeory of individual unmorality"Tl He shows how AviceJ1J1a.
while intending to preserve an Anstotelian epistemology, aetually proposes bis own version of Wh81
rnay be labeUed an "illuminative" theory.76 It is "illuminative" inasmuch as the aitenOQ of true
knowledge originates from non-sensible realms or "from without," the Aristotelian (nous d!urdifeo),
i.e.. mediated through the emanation from the separate active intelligence (the last intelligence). The
active intelligence is responsible for the introduction of a rational soul in the human embtyo in the
form of a potential intellect (which informs the human nature with a potential to think) and responsible
for the attainment of an aoquireé intellect br human beings (which makes the rational soul thi.nk).~
In short, Avicenna' 5 theoty of knowledge aIready exhibited festUres that indicate a shift
awayfrom Aristotelian empiricism and towards a new persona! conception of k..nowiedge. Avicenna' s
non-AristoteJian account of the aOCiuisition of knowiedge presents 811 "illuminative" knowledge
mecliated by complex mental entities (~lA..). abjects of the estimative faculty, ratber tban knowledge
resulting from. the abstnletion of the sensibIes. BO This reading of Avicenna's epistemology &Scribes a
reality ta intellection resulting from illumination which proceeds downward from the separate active
intelligence (the last intelligence) anta the leve1 of the human acquired intellect. BI Suhrawardi' 5
efforts must be Ullderstood 85 a genuine aaempt CO elaborate an "i11uminstive" system that was.
however, present in. Avicet'l1la's epistemology.
Suhrawardï has criticized A vicenna' s conceptiofl of the faculties of the soul with the intention
to underline the sours fundamental unity. The faculties of the soul. inasmuch as they are loeated in a
bodily organ, or are distiflguished from one another. are seen as jeopardi7ing tbis fundamental uJ1Îty,
which is necessary for the perception of abstrae:t entities originating from the metaphysica1 realm.
Furthermore, Subrawardï' s rejection of the loca1ization of the sour 5 facuJties in a bodily organ is

Tl Hall, "A DeCISive EIampJe,· 47-84.

18 Hall, ,. A Decisive Example," 77, 81,82. But nat of the ~üfi or PlotiJlian type, cf. [dem, 81.
79 Hall, UA Deci.sive ExampJe." 72.
8J Avicenna "produœd a nOIl-Aristotelian aa:ount of the acquiSltion of lœowledge," c:f. Hall. •A
Decisive Example," 82-3.
81 Verbeke, -Le «De Anima» d'Avicenne," 1-73.
 CHAPTER FOUR - 137

required by bis own theory of knowledge (ta which we will return). lt might even be suggested that
Suhrawardï aetuaUy perceived the Neoplatonic fahric of Avicenna's thought and pursued his analysis
slang those lines, beyond bis mastel'" s positions.
 CfIAPTER. Flvr: - 138

• FlVE •

PERCEPTION

VISUAL (SENSIBLE) PERCEPTION

ln the works of Suhrawardï. the most important sense is sight and ilS corollary. vision.
Whether sensible, inteUective or mystical, vision is st the heart of bis philosophy. SuhrawS"dï's
discussions regarding visual (sensible) perception (~) ace interesting Ïor severa.l reasons. First, it
allows us ta evaluate (by comparîsoll) bis degree of faithfulness to the Peripatetïc positions. especially
those of Avicenna. Second. it Bllows us to assess Subr&wardî' 5 effort ta go beyond the c1assica1
theories of vision in order ta e1aborate bis own mystically compatible theory. especially iJl view of
the fact that bis tbeoty of vision has ramifications in the metaphysical spbere.

The following discussion will highligbt the positions which Suhrawardï adopts or rejeets
regarding the Peripatetic theories of visual perception in. bis effort to introduce sorne "illuminative"
principles. These principles constitute the found8lÎons of bis new phiJosophy of orienta1-illuminative
wisdom. More importantly, however, is the fact that many of Subrawardï's discussions regarding
vision, e.g., in the F.lIiSDeS' of .liçbr and in the first part of the Orieoml-lUumLnl/ri~ W'istlom 1

reproduce Avicenna's objections (from bis SllIr-WJon and the Book of xl'œce) to the teaditionaJ
theses. Most of the theories of vision refuted by Avicenna ace, tberefore, refuted by Suhrawardî.

THE .. EXTRAMISSlVE" THEOR y OF THE LIGHT RAYS

The fll"5t tbeory of visual perception Suhrawardï rejeas is the .. extramissive" theory, which
holds that luminous rars served as an illtennediary between the observer and the observed object.
The luminous rays Emerge from the eye and then procœd ta join or unite with the sensible ob jeets,
the object of visual sense. Altbough Suhrawardï does not mention anyone who held this position, in
A vicenna' 5 BOOK of ~ , we leam that dUs theory was atlributed to the Ancients who preœded
Aristotle. 1 AJ-Firiibï in bis book on the HtnDtH!.Y IJ«wt!teA die OpÛlions of Plaro NOd Ari.srode,
1

2
attributes it 10 Plato.

1 Avicenna, Oiïnish. P~..v, 87.3-5 (LiJ-R-, II, 58); d. Janssens, "Le OJÎnesfJ-J11Îmeh d'[bn Sînâ: un

texte à revoIt?" 163-177. He discussed vision in a number of oeber waca such as iII-.MIjiïI" (a summary of the
;u-S./Ji/iï'), MIlijDJI/J ff a/-NJIh (an ea-lier work), and the nJ-<?ÏDiin li n/-TilJb .
2 al-Firibi, L 1NIt:monre in al-Farabi, Oeurlnlill!s p1JiJasopAiqUI:'S, 73-n on viSlon [57-97, trans. of
 CHAPTER FrvE - 139

This was the .. extramisslve" theory adopted by mathematicians and geometers. essentially
Euclid (450-374 B.C.) and Ptolemy (fi. ca 150 A.D.). who believed chat the eye emitted a ray or a

force, in. the shape of a cane. directed toward the object, and that chis ray seized the image of =1e
objea and communicated it ta the visual sense. 3

A Vlcenna had already provided arguments ta refute the .. exteamissive" theses and trgUed, on

the one hand, against the mathematicians and the geometers that "these remarks [about the
"extramissive" theory) are absurd; what eye cauld cantain sa Many ligbt rays [which can) extel1d ta
half the world. from the sky ta the etnh?,,4

A viceMa argued, on the other hand, against the physi ci ans . probably Galen (13Q.-200 A. D.),

that "if air were ta become endowed with vision by uniting with this ray [coming out of the eye] ,
then, when people gather in crawds, they would give air a much greater ahility of vision: therefore,
someone witb a weak vision, would see much better in the company of his friends than if he were
alane." Avicenna adds, "but, if air doesn't possess a seeing capability, and only transmÎls ta the ray
[from the eye) the image of the seen object, tben, what would be the role of the ray coming out [of
the eye)?"s

Physicians like Galen had adopted an "extramissive" theory of the light rays. They conceived
of a "visua! spirit" originating in the brain whicb traVelled through the optic nerve and emerged from

the eye for a shott distance, 10 transfoml the surraunding air. ln the process, the SUlTounding air
became itse1f an extension of the optic nerve and an instrument of the human sou1 6 The sult"ounding
air now became a perceiving medium, perceiving the object with whicb it is in contact. It men
retransmits its perception ta the eye through the intermediary of the transformed air, 8l1d retraces its
steps bact ta the soul. Renee, for Galen. the medium - air - becomes somehow the instrument of

Hilrmooy; 98-115, the not~]. The translation is based on Dletel"ÏCl'S edition orthe KIfJïhJl/-./iun" ~R8:pay
;l/-fflb"m'fPD AD;ïfün lf1-U.uu- Jlf71 Ansrd.Di5s, pp. 1-33 of the 1890 editi.OD. (and it is compared with Fawzi
Najjâr's yet unpublished edition, i.e.• in 1989). esp. 13-16; cf. Placo, Timevs. 45b-d and 67c:-68e. OnPJato and
Euc:lid against Ga1en and AristorJ.e, cf. Rosenthal, "On. the KnowJedge of Plato's Philosophy ," .... 12~16.
3 Euc:Jid belIeved that the visual cone consisted of a discrete ray, sepanted by spac:e, while Ptolemy
coasidcred it to be a sort of continuum, cf. Lindberg, "The SCIence of Optics," 338-68 (repnnlled in Idem,
Stwies.i8dJeMsrmyofA-fedie?.uOpaa, 340, 363 n.5].
4 OiiizrSfJ. P.h,y;. 87.6-7 (Lir-Te, n,58).
5 OiïmSfJ, P.b~ 88.3-7 (LÙTe, Il, 58).
6 Cf. Eastwood, 1O~E1emeJJ1sofJ.WOD.· The Mraocosmalogyoftnllenrc HSvlf178e~Acam:fDw
10 HllDItp./bd fsINItJ. In the medicaJ Il"adition. the c:oncept whicb is pl'evalen.t i.s tbe idea of a luminous soul, cf.
the tat of f:[unayn b. Isbiq ll1 the translation of M. Meyerhof, 77J~ BOM cff die Te4 TrezIliS1!5 0.0 c1Je lf.w
(Cairo, (938), 98sq.; quoted in Rasbed, "Le "Discours de la Lumière" d'Ibn al-Haydtam," 197-224; reprinted
in Idem, OpI:iqu~l!rm1lÙJé.lD4ll1Ï1ul:"S,V, 214 n.2.
 CHAPTER FrvE - 140

bath the eye and the soul, in such a way that the observer becomes active.7

Subrawardï. setting out to refute the "extramissive" theory. does not mention the physicians.
However, tbis does not prevent him from using some of Avicenna's arguments in bis own refutation
of the emission of a lig.ht ray conceived as a body. His refulatioa of the "extramissive" theory is
twofold. First, he sets out to dem.onsteate thet the light bœm or ray (t. ~ ) cannot be an accident,
and second, that it cannat be a body. First, Subrawardi asks how could a luminous beam tr8vel and
be moved from one place ta anather if it were an accident (~~ ).8 Moreover, an accident could aoe
be emitted from the eye, nor could lt meet the abject.' Suhl"8.wardîs refutâion reproduces a series of
arguments aiready put forward by Avicenna.
Neither Suhrawardi nor Avicenna, however, e1aborate further on the reasons why it could
not be 50. It was probably considered self-evidem. A ccrporeal accident cannat move independently
of the body. Suhrawardi might bave had in mind a passage in the works of Aviœnna where the latter
mentions that the beam of light could onJy be conceived as an accident figuratively, i.e., in tenns of a
œrtain quality (~) emitted from the eye and not a real accident,lO adding that the luminous beam
ll
sbould be steonger in the case of someone whose vision is stronger. This first aspect pertaini.ng ta
the light ray as an accident is not, on the whole, adequaœly discussed by Suhrawardï.

Suhrawardï gives more attention to the second llSpect thu pertains ta the corporea1ity of the
luminous beam.. If one supposes that the lum.i.nous beam. is a body (~), then its movement has to
be either natura! cr not. Fint, in the former case, the movement of the luminous beam would onIy
take place in one direction 12 If it were not natural, but voluntay, then one would have to be able to

recall it in arder ta direct it in the direction of another abjeet.13 It would, therefore, be impossible to
look st two things simuJtaneously. Second, the penetration of the Juminous beam - as a body -
through a coJored liquid would be better than througb a transparent glassy substance, while its
penetration tbrough porcelain wouJd be better than through glass, since the former has greater

7 Lindberg, "The Scienœ of Optics," 3-40-1; d. Idem, 7'1Jeonesofl'isian, chap. l, 3,8; cf. also the
work of SiegeJ (a pbysietan) on Galen's tbeory of vision, d. Siegel, CiulI!D QJI ~ P~t:1D.
8 Hibnll, § 101,99.16; d. PJun], [V. § 34,28.16 (Book, 30); d. AvicenJla, 0iïnis1J. Phy, 89.1
(I.iJn-, II, 59).
9 LJumr/Nir, Phy.. IV, 2, 114.17.
10 Avic:enna, MlJ1ïr, Nm, l, 324.3-6 (A moc.. 28).
11 Avicenna, Mlfiii', NaFs,l, 326.7-8 CA~. 29).

•• 12

(A "7&:,28).
13
L6rDIl/nïI", P.JJy:, IV, 2, 114.18; cf. f5bnw-, § 101,99.18; dAvicenna., N~Ir, .MIfs, 2,325.8-12

LJ/mJI/JI, Pny:,
325.6-12 {Am'4::, 28).
[V, 2,114.18-9; cf. Hibn4lr, § 101,99.15-5; cf. Avicenna, N4IJiïr, Nm, 2,
 CHAPTER FIVE - 141

porosity.14 Third, the vision of abjects would vary according to theic p-oximity or their rem.oteness;
remote and closer celestial bodies could not be observed at the same time;15 moreover, seeing them
would vary according to the existence or absence of winds responsible for the deviation of th·s body
from the course of tbis luminaus beam. 16 Faurth, the canopy of heaven, where the different œlestial
spheres are situated, would have ta be somehow tom asunder in arder to let this luminous beam
17
through. And finaily. mis luminous body would have to disperse itself a11 over the world and up ta
the celestial spheres. 16

Suhrawardï's arguments refuting the corporeality of the luminous beam are quite similar to
Avicenns's that are found in his Del.ifl:nU2Ce. L9 The argument based on the porosity of objects
mentioned by Suhrawardi is, however, absent from Avicen.na' 5 SHlFlIfion and his Book ofSCLénce
; whereas Suhrawardï omits another part of the argument against the physicians' thesis on physical
20
grounds.

THE" INTROMISSIVE" TH EORY OF THE FORMS OF OBJEcrS

The "inrromissive" theory of vision is the second theory that was usually held by Atomists
like Epicurus (ca. 342-271 B.e.) and Lucretius (ca. 99-55 B.C), for whom the image (w{/oJOfJ) was
conceived as a coherent assembly, or a convoy, of atoms capable of communicati..ng ta the observer
al1 the qualities of the abject from which they originated. Hence, the reception of these images was
responsible for the visual impression of the abject itself in the eye of the vîewer.21 Al-Firihï
sttributed the "intromissive" theory to Aristode ("an affection of the eye").22
This is also the Avieennan position, e.g., ÎJI. the l)ek'n:'hlOCe where Avicenna states that
"[vision] must, tberefore, be due ta something coming towards us from the sensed objea; since this

14 HibnJu, § 101,99.16-100.2; cf. PJI1fj § 34,29.4-6 (BDOX, 30); but absent from the Lm1Jl/JJü.
1

1S HitmM, § 101,100.2-3.
!fi hlmJf/Jiù, P1Iy.. IV. 2, 114.20; d. AVlœJUla, Oiimsh. PI!,y:, 89.6-8 (Lù·n-. II, 59).
17 hlmll/dr, P.by:, IV, 2, 114.21-115.2; cf. !fd:nMt, § 101,100.3-5; cf. P6rrii, IV, § 34,29.2-3 (Book

,JO). For Aviceana's tint argumeDt, cf. AVlceDna, Nifiiit", .1\4ItS. 2,324.7-11 (An&-., 28).
~ . -
Ulmll/1iil, P.by:, 1V,2, 114.21-1I5.1; cf. flrbnar, § lOI, 100.3--4; cf. PJIr11I, IV, § J.4, 29.1-2 (Book
, JO).
1'9 For Avicenna.'s second argument, d. AVlœnna, .Mijrü, Ml/S, 2, 324.12-5 (A l'7c. 28).
zo Amangst other tbings, it would be absurd co think of wbat emerges, a sometlting whicb WlÏte5
witb the air and with the heavens, because tbey would then possess sensation .having become, tbemsel.ves, the
cqall of sight, cf. Aviœnna, ~, Nafs, 2, 324.16-325.2 (A 1'7c., 28).
11 Lindberg, "The Science of Optics," 340.
22 al-Firibi, L 'Mmomé' , 73; cf. Aristotle. 01:' ADimJl, n, 1, 418a25ff. and Idem, De se.osu «"
scwsil1ib·, D, 436b 18ir ÏJl the .Pltrw./1i11lTrJ/ril.
 CHAPIER FIVE - 142

is not the body of the abject, it must be its fonn."2:3

In bis Ilo,rs oI'.L{irnr. Suhrawardï. too. allribuœs this "intromissive" theory ta Aristotle. In
faa. he appears to accept the theory of the receptton of the image and its imprint in the vitt'eous
substance.24 In bis Oneoro/-U/u.otll:Iorir--e 1.J~sdom . however. Suhrawsrdï seems to rejeet the
"intromissive" theory he discussed in such works as the R~!ps of4"e".br.

In the Onènro/-U/umiirll.;ve WiSe/am, Suhrawardi diSC\lsses the counterarguments levelled

against the "intromissive" thecry. i.e.. "the imprintiog <t. ~I ) of the form of the object in the
vitreous substance (:i:~ ~".bJ )... 25 Against this Aristotelian position, some have .-gued th8t the
size (J l,J.À..a ) of the fonn of that which is perceived cannat find El place in. the organ of VIsion. Some
have replied to this objecrion that the virreous substance.1.ike other bodies. can be divided indefinite1y.
e.g. the foml. of the perceived abject. penniuing the occurrence of the latter in the former. However.
t

th:is is uosound, because no matter how they are divided, the proportionitself of the size of the abject
and of that in which it is im~essed does not change - the big (i.e., me fonn of the mountain) having
to be impressed in the small (i.e., the eye).as

Otber thinkers have stated that the soul itself infers from the objects of pel'Ception fonns thal
are sma11er tban the aetUa1 size of what is perceived. Suhrawardï notes that this is &gain unsound,
--..
because the vision (4:,j J) of somet1ting large occurs as direct contemplation (o,),A~ ) of the fom15
of abjects and not tbrough ioference (J~~I).

Otbers still allow that the [Wo different sizes (J I..\.&.. ) inhere in one malter. i.e., the vitreous
substance. These 8l"e the smalt size of the fonn found in the virreous substance and another bigger
fotm. the replica of a redllced size of the perceived object - its image (J~). 27

The countemrgument thal Suhrawardi proposes appeals ta the iUogical conclusions to which
the understanding of size may lead in a material sense. Absent from A vicenna. it may well be bis
own qumenL The different parts that constitute the extension (~I ~ 1) of the form cannat be mi1ced
ÎJl one place, otherwise the vision of proportions (~~ 1 6.i.A ~ ) would not be possible, i.e., we
would not be able ta distinguish big from smaU. Hence, if aU the parts of the form found in the
vitreous substance equal the size of ail the parIS of the extended fonn (~~I~I oJ""- ) (e.g..

23 Avicen.na, MlJiU, Hm, 2, 326.16-327.2 (A rie.. 29); d. Rahman, Aa~s, 76 n. fOl" p. 27.line
23.
20t P8rtü, § 34,29.6-8 ( BOOK, 30).
25 .{5bmIr. § 102,100,6-7.
2I!i ./fikmw, § 102, 100.1-15.
27 .{Ukmll/', § 103, 100.16-101.1
 CHAPTER FIVE - 143

belonging to a mount8Ïn), one could not concave of its real size. Moreover. lf the size of the

extended fotm (of the mountain) were to be greater in size man the size of the vilreous substance, the
increased pans of the fonner would 50 exceed the limilS of the Jatter, that il could not be seen as il
really is and it could not be in a substratum ('J.-... ) Suhrawardï states that it would be impossible

thal the true extension of the abject be round in the e)'e. If the eye could possess it. in. addition to the
Z8
parts - the atoms - of the object, then the organ of vision could not contain aU these pSl'ts. He
concludes chat he who analyses this issue with objectivity will have ta recognize the difficulty of

holding the ''intromissive'' themy, i.e., the "imprinting" of a fotm {~I t. ~I) in the eye. Z9
The important point of Subrawsrcfi's argument against the notion of "imprinting" (t. ~I )

that the .. intromissive,. theory implies is that vision cannot be material at all. The refutation in the

On"eDrJl/-lDummocir-e ~f~stlom mayindeed amount to a refutation of Avicenna's Aristotelianism. In

chis work, Su.hrawardï reduces Avicenna' s theory ta a kind of materialism - essentially what he is
confronting. It is noteworthy that Suhrawardï' 5 depiction of the Aristotelian theory of vision as
materialist had aJready been presented by al-Firaoï as a Platonist counterargument - i.e. . that Aristode' s
notion of .. affection" implied an impression, a change and an alteration. either of the organ of sight
or in the air, the transparent body.3D

Suhrawardi's argument is based on the rejection of another theoty, one which conceives the
31
luminous beam as color. Wbat is at stake is the nltUre of light. This development is found again in.
the OnéDraJ-Ufu.miAolr"r·PIJ'i"sdo.l11.whereSuhrawardidepartsfromAvicenna'spositions.InAviceana's

Salf'6r.ioo, vision of objects does not amount sole1y to light faUing on a colored object. Vision is, in

faet. the result of the reflection of ligbt on the object, accounting for the transmission of color. The
latter gives its colOl" ta another body - air.32

Il is difficult 10 identify the individuals to whom Suhrawardî refers wben he mentions the

group of people who conceived of light in terms of color. In the Harmon,r between iDt! Opinions of
PJ60 nod Anxode, al-Fiiriibi for one mentions an tUgument of the partisans of AristotJe who held

chat it is air (the diaphanous body) in aâ that cames the color of the object seen ta the eye. Colors

must be transmitted ta the eye in order that they may be perceived. Otberwise everything far would
be perceived only after the neBrer abjects have been perœived, but, in fact, both are perceived

Z8 HJbrJRr. § 103, 101.2-101.11

29 /5bDar, § 103,101.11-12
i ....~ al-Ficibï, L 74-75.
~
30 81ln/100Zt!,

31 ffrbnll/', § 100.98.1-99.11.
32 Avicenna, Nlfiiii. Hm. 2,323.17-324.1 CA f.7C. 27).
 CHAPTER. FIVE - 144

•
simultan.eously.3J

It is the notion of coler defined in tenns of light that Suhrawardï attempts to refute. Quçb
al-Dm al-Shïrizi. however. is here of little help He only mentions th. this latter opinion be10nged to
the Peripstetics or the Ancients).: lt has been suggested that the people to whom Suhrawardî refers
might be some of the Sages of Ancient Persia that Suhrawardi mentions in the OrieA12l1-U/umiolllir--e
3s
&Yisdom. e.g.. Jammf (.....i-,Lo~ ). Frœhiüshtar (~-,~.,.i ), Büzurjmihr (~.Jj-,"= ). This.

however. is difficu1t to corroborate with Suhrawardfs own statem.ents. ln any case. Suhrawardï adds
st the end of the section on vision that were the theses of chis group of people true, i.e., regarding

light beams identical witb color. this would not affect in any way the discussions regarding vision
which he in.troduces in. the metaphysics of bis Orit;Y/r~l/-UlunzirkilÙ'?!Jf:;'soom 36

NATURE OF HIS REFUTATIONS

The refutations against particuls- theories of vision are of vaious natures. e.g., geometrica1,
physiological. or physical. Suhrawardi' s refutation of the ., extramissive" and the .. intromissive"
theses is not mathematical, but rathEr of physica1 nature. His generalline of argumentation is, again,
bOlTowed from Aviœ.nna, e.g., in the [wo works aIready mentioned, although a few of the latter's
.-guments are absent. Suhrawardi appes-s to adopt 811 Avicennan. position which defmes vision as
the reception of the form of the object. In the Sa!r-7Xioo, A vicenna states tbat:

Sight is oot the result of something which emanates from us and goes toward the
sensible object ( ~ ~ ). It must, therefore. depend on something else which
comes toward us from the sensible object. Sïnce titis cannot be the body (~ ) of
the object, it must, men, be its form (é;
"1).37

Hence, the extema1 fonn of the colored abject which the light bits is transmitted to the pupil
of the eye when a truly transparent body - e.g., ft body which has absolutely no color such as air or
water - accors between the eye and the objett of vision.:E The vi su ai impression coming from the
objett is identified with the form (oJ~) of the object. Altbough Avicenna does not provide many
detaiJs about this theory of vision, he attriblJtes it ta Aristotle.39 In fact, he is ooly trying to refute the

33 al-FnOi, L, 'JhIr.m08R:', 75.

34 Q. D. al-Sbïrin, S1JIU:f2, 264.3-4 (the § 100 of 1fikm4ll' corresponds to Q. O. al-Shirizi's SIIJJrlJ,
263.J5-266.19).
35 For example, by Prof. Landolt; cf. H.rbmr.r, § 4, 11.1 (S-tq:, 89).
36 Ifrbnnr, § 100,99.1l.

.~. 37 Avicenna, .MIp, Hm, 2, 326.15-327.2 (Ar-74::, 29); cf. Avice'".:la, Sér/ii' (section IV, book 6).
:El Avicenna. N1!/iïr. HIÛS, 2.322.1-3 CA J'7è" 27); cf. Ib1d., 2, 323.14-7 (A r-7C:, 28).
39 ln Iris EpSrle 0/2 tlJe Soul, A vicenna be1d a simiJar positton; the pa'Jsage is traDslated in English in
 CHAPTER. FrvE - 145

"extramissive" theones of vision, e.g., the theses of Euclid and of Gal en. .:(l

Furthermore, altJtough Avicenna' s refutations are basically of a physical nature, this does not
prevent hi.m from aôopting the mathematical expJanations of vision attributed to Aristotle ta exr laln
how a form with reduced dimensions couJd be reproduced in the eye. The geometric proof offered by
Avicenna is based on angles branching out from the cenœr of a sphere tawards an object. The further
the object is, the more the angles that delimit the contours of the abject diminish, just like an image
ref1eeted on the surface of the sphere from wluch the angles origïn81ed. e.g., the pupiJ. This is how
an image in the eye can be small while the real object is quite larger. Likewise, the c10ser the object
is, the wider- the angles which derme the limits of the abject will be. Consequently, the image of the
object on the pupil becomes greater. Avicenna, in bis Book ofScieAce, explains that:

The eye is like the mïrror, and the visible object (~~.» is like the abject which is
refleaed in the mÏ1Tor, through the mediation ~l:- ) of air or another transparent
(....i r• 10.) body, because light (l:.2:.,;,J) faUs on the visible object, it projects the image
(;; -J""-) on the eye. The humid body which resem.bles ice and a seed of flu reœives
this image and deposits il in [the field] of vision [in the eye] where pErlect vision -
pet"Ceives aIl objects - occurs, i.e., that it receives in itse1f the image of the object, in
such a way that if the object were to be destroyed or ta disappear, [the eye] would
oontinue to see me image. Therefore, the image of the objects occurs in the eye, and
this image anives to [the place] of vision, and then, the soul perceives it. If the
mitTor .had a soul, tben it would see an image when it would occur in il.
And the resson wby [the eye] sees a distant objeet smaUer is thst this humid
body whicb serves as the mirror is circular, and a circle is Equidistant from the
center. Therefore, the more an object is rem.ote, the more it becomes small, while its
image is reproduced in the eye. This is what can be seen in a circu1ar mirror. There
is here a geometric reason.41

Suhrawardï owes mucb to discussions similar to this passage from Avicenna' s Book of
ScieAce. For example, st the end of the section on vision in bis F.lllSiJes ofLJght (a compendium of

Avicennall phiJosophical theses), he ends his presentation of the theses of the Perip81etïcs by
reproduCÎJlg, quite fsithfully, the geometric proof found st the end of Avicenna's So/r-w.ron and
Book 01' S~ACe.42 More important, however, is the faet that in his Onenhl/-Ulum.D1l1iR! JP'ist/om,

Suhrawardï appears to refute the possibility of the impression of the form of the abject in the

Lindberg's article, cf. Lindberg, "The lJ1tromilssion-Ex1ram:ission Comraversy," IV. 142. Lindberg's artlcle is
maiJlly ÇQŒerDed witb Avicenna's refUlations of the Euclidian and GaliJliç theories of vision, d. Avicen.na,
AfJlllMIIIJ Dm-Nars [Epsde 08 die' SouJ), ed. and Oennan 1I'ans. in Landauer, "Die Psychologie des Ibn Si.Dâ, ft

336-9.
4J Lindberg, -The IntromisSlon-Extnmission Controveny," 152.
41 Avicenna, OiiiziTh. PlIy:. 90.9-92.5 (LiJn.a, n, 60).
42 Lllmll/Jk, Phy:, IV, 2, lIS.2ft; cf. Avic:enna, N~. N.tlIS 1 2, 325.1-5 (A J·;ù::. 29); d. Idem,
Oiülr~. PlIy.. 92.6-95.11 (LiJ'n!, II,50-1).
 CHAPTER FrvE - 146

virreous substance of the eye. 43

The del::lates sulTOunding these different theones of vision were centered acound the nature of
the facu1ty of sight and the nature of the various demonstratioftS for vision - the "extramissive" and
the "introatissive" tbeories. The [wo theories were, in facto competing traditions. a cboice between
the mathematical explanstion of Ptolemy and the physical expJanatioll of Aristotle.44

Al-Fiiriibï had a1ready tried to find 8 third way or a reconciJiation between the Phltonic and

Aristotelian. positions.as This he did by arguing thst the detraetors of both positions misrepresented
the positions of their opponents i.e.. the Platonic notion of .. emission" and the Aristotelian notion of
1

"affection" for polemical reasons, leading to misunderstanding and misinterpretation.'ll5 Avicenne. on

the other hand, proposed a geometric demonstraion for the "intromissive" theory.

Suhrawardï will. simillr1y. misrepresent the Peripatetic positions ta reject what he perceives
is their underlying maerialism. It is tnJe that Galen complicated matters with bis physiologica1
theory, but the problems raised by these competing and incompatible theories were resolved only in
the Middle of the 1 Jth cen.tury by Ibn al-Haytham. (d. ea. 1039), a mathem8tician and astronomer who
lived 1ess than a century before Suhrawardi and st about the same time EIS A vicenna, who proposed a
synthesis of the diffa-ent mathematical., physical, and physiological factors by USÏJlg the ideas of the

'-_.6 visus1 COJle (Euclid and Ptolemy), the "intromission" themy, and e1ements bOLTowed from Ga1en.~
Perhaps, Aviœnna was, in fact, well aware of Ibn Haytham's theory. This would aa:ount for the
inclusion of a geometric proof that A vicenna proposed. A vicenna does Ilot mention him in his major
WOl"ks (e.g., Cuœ and Deh·venm~).

THEORY OF VISION AOOPTED BY SUHRAWARDÏ

It is thus apparent that Suhrawardi bolTOWS much from the Avicennan tradition. It seems

43 .{fibDJIr, § 103, 100.16-101.2.

401 Euclid's tbeory was mathematical, while Prolemy's and al-Ki.ndï's theones were mathemanca1
with some comidermons of pbysical elemen.ts.
~s al-Fïribï. L 'innztO.Dre, 73-79, esp. 76, and notes ~ and 49.
46 (n exp1aining how the vision of repr-escntaioœ of th. which is perceived from the metaphysica1

world such as real VISions, e.g., dreams, he states, "from suc:h impressions (r~.J ) within. the faculty of sight
.ua lBlpressions of man in the sbini.ng air whic:h C:Olll1ects the sight whic:h p-oceeds frem the eye with the ray
of vision. Onœ tbese unpressions bave appe..ed in the air, [the image] of the aIr is in turn agaiA unpressed on
the f.:ulty of sigbt whic:h resides in d'Je eye. and tbat [impression] is reflected back to the commOLf seJZS'e and
to d'Je facu1ty of representatlOJl Vi Co!;' -, ft;"'; ). And sinœ aU these [states] are c:ontmuous. the abjects of that

:•.
'.
tind which the active intellect (JGù Jk) has suppJied become visible ta tbat penon," c:f. al-FiraOï. iII-Madfmth
,222 (hd"crr~,223.

of7 Iindberg, "The InCl"odlÏ.'5S1on-Extramission Controversy," 1S4.

 CHAPTER FIVE - 147

that. in the first place. he advances arguments used by Avicenna without proposing any novel
a-guments. Hegenerally appears to adopt the geometric demonsrration used br Avicenna. paraphrasing
it st lengtb. In bis more Peripatetic Rd,Y-Y ofL{ehr . he explains that:

Seeing objects (LA~ 0"'"::" ) is produced thraugh the intennediay of a form

(~..)".,.-..: ) which is impressed (Lib'" 0 in the crystalline substance (~.,J:J
)

~~) of the eye. according to the opinion of Aristode. the Sage..An.d its condition
[of vision) is the presence of luminosity V~".). the fac~to-faœ (~l&... ) and
the mediation of a transparent body (..... i i "'. r ~ Ja:.....".:;). de

Ostensibly. in this passage. Suhrawardi appea1s explicitly ta the Aristotelian thesis with
whose position he seems ta agree. One should Qot. however. conclude that he adopts an Aristote1ian
theory. He is more like1y ooly reitenning A vicenna' s rendering of the Aristote1ian position. Suhrawardi
aetDally demonstnltes bis familiarity with titis partïcular philosophical school in this. and simiJar
works greatly influenced br Peripatetic themes and tbeses. The last senten.ce of the above passage
aet1Ially alludes to bis own interpretation of the Peripatetic theory of vision. The Penpatetïc thesis
appesrs to be complememed and reinterpreted by Suhrawardi' s own understanding of vision.

In bis (Jrieol:lll-U.luminlllir--e J.Visdom. whiJe insistiJlg that the beam of light is oat a body.
Suhrawardï states that the cause of the luminous beam is "the luminous source (.~ ) [which
occurs) through the intermediary of a transparent body (..... ï e "', ) such as air.'0<5 This statement is
reminiscent of the previous pœsage from the R~yS of~hr. First, a principle of luminosity should
exist, Second, two objects should face one another. And fÏ!lally. a transparent body should be present
to explain the transmission of the light of the object to the one who perœives. Vision. in this second
sense, does not seem to l'equite the reception of the fonn of the object. something that was typically
Peripatetic.

More importandy. Suhrawa-di proposes a shift of emphasis and tries to indicate that vision
results from something totally different. This leads him to propose the more persona! interpretation
of vision found in the metaphysïcs of his On'eorm-ULu.mùltl/ir--e &~'isd(Jm, where he writes that:

You have aJready leamed that vision (..J~[ ) does not consist in the faet that the
fomt of the object is ïmpnssed iJl the eye. nor in the fad that sometbing wouJd be
emitted from the eye. Therefore. [vision] cao. only occur wben the luminous abject
(J'::'~-: : .) meets faee-to-face (~LL) a bealthy eye. and notbiJlg eise.
9J

Suhrawardï not only distances himse1f from the Peripatetic thesis of Avicenna. he actually

48 PJlt1'Ü. IV. § 34. 29.6-8 ( Book. 30).

49 IfrkmllJ", § 99. 97.11-2.
50 !fzA:omr, §145, 134.12-3 CS..,.,:. 129). On perception. cf, ~faslW1·~. § 209, 484.6-487.5.
 CHAPTERFrvE - L48

rejeclS it. He is eategonca1: vision is not the resuJt of some sort of impression (ë, ~~I ) of the form
(i .;.,.-)51 of the obJect in the eye, nor is it the result of the emission of something comiog out of the

ere.52 Suhrawardï. therefore, rejects the" e.xtramissive'· theory (the emission of light beam) as .." eU as
the .. intronUsslve" theexy (the impression of the fonn of the object in the eye). Suhrawardï argues
that aU Ûlese theories are in.capable of providing an account of the trUe nature of vision. His rejection
of the Aristotelian position is, by extension. a rejection of Avicenna's own them'Y of vision, i.e., the
"imprinting" of a fonn. ln Suhrawardïs Neoplatonic theory of illumination. there is no room for
imprinting and its required forms.

Qutb al-Dïn aI-Shiriizi commenIs that vision envisioned by Suhrawardï corresponds to the
perception of the soul, "sinee by this [the face-to-face] a presential illumination ~J~ ~I~!
on the lighted object (J.!~';-; .; ft ) occurs in. the soul. such that it sees it."53 Mulla $adri. on the other
hand. daims tbat Subrawardi actually adopted al-Fiiribi's (intermediate) positions (e.g., from the
Htrmony). 5~

CONomONS OF VISION
In the short passage mentioned above, a11 the elements of the Suhrawardian theory of vision

---.
....
are present. These are the three conditions which he considers essential for the phenomenon of vision
to oœur. Intel'estiJlgly enough, it is in the physics of the Onenrol-.IHu.mmNÙ·P &l75do01 that the
classica1 tbeories of vision are rejeaed, and only in the metaphysics of the same work that bis own
theory is developed. Nowhere is this concem present in the works of Avicen.na, for whom vision,
like the soul, remamed a subjeet for physics. Suhrawardî, on the other' hand, tries ta develop 8 theory
of vision that will, in some way, spiritualize vision and associate it with the sou! and the metaphysica1
55
entities it can co ntemplate.
The first condition set by Suhrawardï for the oCCUlTence of vision is the necessity of a
face-ro-face encounter (~li... ). Heace, vision occurs ontY when t'Wo objects are brought into each

51 In sorne places, he uses the term ~ ) or indistinct form, cf. ff.tl::m., § 160, 150.8 (.sis:. 145).
The same term is present in. Avicenaa's work, d. Avicenna, NJljiïr, Hm, 2,323.16 (A P7C, 28); cf. Ibid., 2,
327.2 (A fiX:, 29); cf. Ibld., 2,322.2 (A l'ic:, 27).
52 ffLkmil, § 145, 134.1L-2 (S-tr:, 129); cf. Ibid., § 160, 150.8-9 (5.{,f:. 145); cf. Ibid., § 225,2L1.12
(.siw=, 199).

••
53 Q. D. al-Shirazï, S1JlJr!; (ed. Corbin), 13411. for Lâne L3 (SIfT-. 305 n. 22).
S4 Mulla Sadti, iI/-{fibmt/J M.I-~fuhlJiUJIMli III-As5raJ- 'Al;tlfy;t/J Jf!-ArlJJI~dt. vol. 8, 1 n.L8-21 and
L82.1 -183.5 [Lstpartofthe4th voyage]. Chapters 6-10 dea1 with differentlssuesreLated with viSlon(178.7-200.18).
~ Thel'e exists the JII'Oblem. of the period in whicb he wrote lus different worb and &he fact that many
of the works Wer'e 'WnUen at the same tinte (see seetlon on the problem of the natUre of hlS writings).
 CHAPTER. FlVE - 149

otber's presence. 56 The direct encounter between the one who perceives and the perceived object is.
tberefore, a "presential" encounterU1g mat requires &l number of conditions: the presence of an organ
capable of visi..;n, i.e.. the eye 1.D. the case of sensible viSlon, the presence of an illuminateô object
illuminated by sorne sort of source of light and a face-to-face encounter. The face-ta-face encounter
is a condition for VIsion that is not found in the works of Avicenna. It is. however. central to
Suhrawardï's own theory. inasmuch as titis notion of unmediated encounter can then be applied to

the metaphysicaJ reaJm. Consequendy. Suhrawardï's redefinition of vision can now serve ta explain
the possibility of yet another type of vision. i.e.. the vision of non-sensible metaphysica1 rea1ities.

The second condition of Suhrawardi' s theory of vision is the absence of any sort of obstacle
or veil (y~) betWeen the perœiviJlg subject and the perceived object. 57 This condition is found in
the works of Avicenna. The notion of obstacle or of veil, howevet'. becomes an essential aspect of
Suhrawardï' 5 notion of vision and central to the epistemological aspetts of his philosophical
anthropology as a whole. 58

Since perfect vision only occors st the metaphysical level. the vision of intelligible realities
will become possible only when all obstacles that exist between the 50ul and these intelligible
realities are elimiosted. At such a cime, a1.1 materiality is transcended and only pure Jight subsists. In
the sensory rea1m, obstacles co.nsist mostly of the usual natural phenomena - the remoteness of the
abject, the presence of a physica1 obstacle between the one who sees and what is seen. In the
meœphysica1 realm, obstacles consist of the degree of materiality (understood in renns of darkness)
belonging to hum an beings which prevent the.occurrence of 8 tn11y clesr mystica1 vision.5!j

Another condition is perhaps more important than the (Wo preceding ones. This condition
pertains to the presence of light and luminosity which become the conditions without which vision
cannot occur. When 1îght is present, then vision cao take place in the sensible realm.. But, in the
metaphysicsJ. realm, the most perfect vision œn occur, beœuse the only thing that now subsists is the
constituting and constitutive light of ail things. This emphasis on light and luminosity models
Suhrawardi' s theory of vision.

56 .{frbRw, 1145, 134.12-3 (S'.1J':, 129). Fer example, he states that the size of an abject is evaluated
based on direct witnessing or mystic:aJ. contemplation (i;a~ >, and not as the result of an inference. d.
/fLkmlle, 01,3, ix, f 103.2.
.ffrbnlll, § 160, 150.9 (SJIY.. 145). Vision is linted to a "preseJJlial" mowledge of the abject - there

_o.
57
c:an nat e%ist a veil, because the Lisht of lights - a pure .Iight - cannat be vei1ed ta icself by anything, cf. Q. D.
:al-5birizi, Shri (ed. Corbin), 150 n. for lme 9 (SJfY. 326 n.3).
58 aJ-Ghazilî, A-fishk-Jr a/-Anw;r, 3rd part.
59 .ffikmllt § 145, 135.4--5 (.5iw:, 129).
1
 CHAPTER FlVE - 150

•
SuhrawlU"dï' 5 reinterpretatïon of earlier theories of vision is interesting, inasmuch as it is no
longer sufficient for the objeâ to be illuminaœd in arder to be perceived. In order to grasp what is at
stake in Suhrawardï' 5 conception of vision, it is important to understand that !ight 15 the fundamental
reality of an things. The distinction tha Suhrawardï establishes is lWofold. Light is conceived as
active and passive. This distinâion applies to both the metaphysical and the materiai leve1s. One
couId speak of active aJld passive luminosity. But light is also conceived as physical, i.e.. "accidentai"
lights. In bath cases, however, ligbt is the essential principle. 60

For Suhrawardï, the subject and the object of vision must be tuminous. The physical world is
the locus of accidenta1light. Renee, wben the act of vision occurs, it is ultim~ely the seeing light of
the soul which befalls the illuminated essence of the observed object. itself conceived as a corrupted
principle of light (immersed in materiality). First, the object either reflects light or transmits it when
it is illuminated. This is, however. insufficient, because this hgbting - or this illuminatlon - is for
Suhrawardï essentially of another type: it is ontological.

SuhrawlU"dï's ontology of light makes light the essence of everything. Everything becomes a
luminous being, albei.t of varying degrees of lum.iJlosity. Consequently, the enstenœ and the presence
of a sourœ of physica.1light are insufficient conditions for a complete explanation of vision. In faet,

this light - whose nature is ontologiœ1 - is an integraJ. part of the set of seeing. just as it is an
essential part of the &ct of being seen.

The abject of vision itself is the subjea of tbese two kinds of light (physical and ontological).
SuhrawBI'dï mentions that "a condition for the object of this vision is to receive light [in the case of
physical vision]. or to be itself a light [in the case of metaphysiœ1 vîsion].,,61 He develops here 8

dynamic conception of the abject. The object is now an integral part of the process of vision. since it
is both El physical and an ontologica1light te he seen. Mulla ~adrii williater criticize Subrawardï for
the overemphasis on the active principle he attributes ta the object.62 This is where Suhmwardï
departs in an original manner from the Ptripatetic theory of vision.
Suhrawardï~s thesis - that objects receive ligbt and are constituted of light - has some
affinity with positions found in the works of Ibn al-Haytham. In bis f)jscours~ on I4!hr. Ibn
al-Haytham mentions that he has demoJlStnlted that "opaque bodies. as well as transparent bodies
have a receptive power ta Jigbt," and. moreover, that the fixity of light in physical bodies is due to

(0 HJb1IlIr, § 145.134.15-135.1 (5i{t:. 129).

61
ffrbmU. § 145,135.4-5 (S.t(4T., 129).
Si! See the IlOte of Jambet in. ~s:J'e, 129 n.h.
 CHAPTER BVE - 151

the opacity of bodies.6 :3 He explains tbst aU physical bodies - opaque or transparent - have the power

• to transmit Jight and. consequently, ta receive light from luminous bodies, such that ..the appearance
of Jight OJl the surface of opaque bodies is an evident proof that there is in them a force of reception
of light.,,64 Suhrawardï was perhaps ware of [bJl al-Haytham's treatises. Subrawardï's works do echo
the idea chat abjects are capable of receiving physical light.

Suhrawardï. however, goes beyond the simple notion of physical recepttvity of light. He
in.vests this notion of receptivity (of light) with an ontological determinatioJl. Übjects are now
themse1ves constituted of a degree of light. This is obviously absent tram Ibn al-Haytham's physical
themy of Jight. Suhrawardï. in faet, construes bis tbeOlyof VlSion in such a way as te account for
perception which goes beyond the mere phenomena of visual and sensible perception taking place in
the physica.l realm.

RULING LIGHT - ISFAHBAD-LIGHT

The Isfahbad-light is st the heart of Suhrawardï' s theory of vision. 65 It is the buman rational
soul as the light principle that can, in fact, perceive the intrinsic - light - Jlawre of ail things.
Subrawardï states that:

Although visionhas as a condition the faee-to-face (~LL) [of the seen object] with
the facuJty of sight, nevertheless. in the aet of vision, tbe [real] ageDt of vision
(~4) is the Isfahbad-light ( :.: il :' ~) [i.e.• tberational SOvI].66
6Î
The Isfahbad-light present in each hum an being is the rational ruling sou1. The intellective
pert of aU hum811. souls is simultaneously the divine and luminous aspett whose origin is the Light of
tïghts, or Gad. Suhrawardï's philosophica1 anthropology. œntered on such a concept of light. is.
therefore. greatly dependent on a metaphysics of light. This is exemplified by bis novel und8'Standing
of vision.
Suhrawardï' 5 metaphysics of tïght aiso inrroduces the concept of darkness (~~ ) as the
necessSlY counterpart of tbe concept of light. For instance. in the pl1ysics of bis Orieohll-Ulumintllir·-e
JJ~Sdom , bodies result from what remains once light has depaned. Pure darkness. therefore, exists
only in mauer.CB What is important. however. is the definition ofthe ratiOJlaJ as a radiant self-emanating

6J Rashed," Le • DisooUl"S de la Lumière" d' Ibn al-Haytham., .. 210, 217.

64 Rashed ... Le "Discours de la Lumière" d'Ibn aJ-Haytham." 208-9, 210.
ES FUbmu, § 156, 141.5-8 (~.142).
616 .(fLbnar § 226,213.4-5 (~200).
67 Cf. Appendîx E. in Walbridge• .samce-. 195; d. Corbin, EilfsliUllinlrben, n, 123.
68 Ccx1nJl. az fsilUll inuJJd7, vol. 2, 108-9.
 CHAPTERFrVE - 152

light (~'.iJ ~~ ).64J In another passage, he writes that, "an these faculties which are in the body
are a shadow of wbat is in the Isfahbad-light. And the temple [i.e., the body] is its talisman (~)
[or. if one likes. its theurgy]."'70 Human bodies are aiso defined in terms of their lack of luminosi~y.
They are but shadows which, nevertheless. become the conditions for the possible activity of the
Isfahbad-Iight. As with A vicenna, the bodily is a condition of the existentiation of the soul and its
activities pennitti.ng it to rule over the body (see chapter on nature of the soul).
The introduction of a theory of light te account for physical phenomena. e.g., bodies as
shadows of light or deprived of light and vision, also illustrales Suhrawardi' s desire ta go beyond the
71
dassical hylomorphic conception of the world. Hylomorphism distinguishes betWeen matter ( krle)
and fatm ( eLOOS / maphè) - [wo indispensable and indissociable elements of any abject in Aristotehan
physics, and which was adopted by Avicenna.

According to Qu~ al-DÜ1 al-Shïriizï, the being of light present in the individual participates
12
in the rule of the lights, whereby other more sublime lights a-e revea1ed. Suhrawardi states that the
luminous princi.ple which erists in a11 human beings - tbis Isfahbad-Light - .. illuminates the vision
which 1S [then.] in no need of fonn."n The structure of the sours perception is thus radicaJ1y
differem. It appears to paralle1 Suhrawardi's re.Jeetïon of the definition of the sou! as the fonn of the
body. Suhrawa-di states that:

The Isfahbad-ligbt encompasses (~ ) [the body and its faculties] and judges
(~6.) that it possesses these particular facuJties (=4.: ., ~~,:; ), ~erefore. il judges
by itse1f since ... it is the sense of an of the senses (-(,,)A"I~I ~ V - ). And that
which is dispersed in the totality of the body, ilS essence, amounts to one thing in the
Isfahbad-light (~'", ~~ u-I' 4..1....-6.).1cl
Once more, Suhrawardi alludes ta the primacy of the rational soul - the Isfahbad-light - as
the tnJe perceiver (see section of the faculties of the soul). Suhrawardi, tbus, affinns that the rational
7S
soul is that which ultimately perceives. As such. there is. therefore, no need for the reœption of the

69 HJbnar, § 216,204.8 (st47=. 193).

70 .fVbnJ6, § 221, 214.3-4 (~, 200). From the Gr. rbt!rJuIFril, i.e., the divine operation or magic

whic:h appeals CO the œ1esllal divinil:i.es and to the supematural spirits whose powers are used by man. From the
Gr. te/esmil, i.e., the obJeet to which .-e aunbuted magicaJ virtues cf protection, cr power.
71 Light, ~ a "materiaJ light [wJnch] is adi!positlan (~ ) (exlriJlsiç aspect] in a body," cf. A/wJi/J,
§ 90,182.9 (AJ'rh.. 108).
Q. D. al-Shïrazï, SIt....D, 474.14-8 (SIJr-, 389 n.ll).

'.
72

73 fUbniU, § 227,215.2 (st47=. 201).

74 !frkmIU, § 227, 214.8-215.1 (~.201).
i5 Itresults from lus theoryof tnowledge, cr. !f1km~, § 227. 2J4.2 (5.tw:, 200). As opposed to the

Aris1Dtehan traditlan for wbiclt a1l tnowJedge 15 me result of the abstraction of forms, knowledge will J/or
 CfiAPTER FIVE - 153

form of the objeas. The theory of the impression of the fonn. via the eye is reinterpreted by
Suhrawardï. as when he states that:

You &1ready know tbat me impression of fomts in. the eye is impossible. LiJcewise, it
is impossible that fonns be impressed in a particular place in the brain. The truth
regarding the refleeted forms in the mitrors and the imaginai forms (~, ;;, .j.,,-) is
that the)" are not impressed. but that they are "citadels" [i.e.. bodies. even subtJe] in
suspension (::ië....L:ft which have no substratum. [Althougb] they have places of
)

76
manifestation. they are not in tbose places.
Suhrawardïs nove! conception of vision allows him te account for the visual perception of
melaphysical Jights, the latter cOlTesponding to Peripatetic intelligences. The principles Suhrawardi
seeks to apply in arder ta explain visual perception have their justification in bis quest for a
conception of vision whicb can account for the vision of non-sensible entities.

At this metaphysica1leve1. vision operates with similar principles. There is a need fOl" the
existence of light. the activity of vision (ô.iA ~ or ..J ~f ). and the activity of illumination. 7ï This
type of mystical vision requires a notion of .. unveiling:' i.e.. the total absence of obslacle (mtUer).

Subrawardï thus writes that:

And since sight consists in its perception (~I.j.JD by means of ilS luminous sense
,.-..... (~J~ i-k. ) 8I1d the absence of veil [or obstacle] (y 4-=-- ) betWeen it and the
illuminated thing (J.! ';-, , therefore. luminescence (~~~) and the absence of
ft ).

veil are more perfect in the ïmm.8terial realities (~I,,)"';;" ), as [tbese immaterial
realities] are manifest by their' essence. That is why chey are at the sante ti..m.e seeing
(i~~) and visible (i;-:";") to the lights.
78

la Suhrawardï's works, tbere appear te be two different, seemingly incompatible theories of

vision. There is bis apparent adoption of the Peripatetic theory of vision, e.g.. at the end of the
physical part of the Ckienhl/-mumioIiLir---e mSdom, but mostly in his other more Peripatetic works.
Furtherm01'e, his efforts al reiterating the arguments and refutations of Avîcenna. may signal bis aim
te insert bis own endeavor into the Peripatetic rradition. This wms out not to he acceptable for mm.
These effons are concluded with his own rebuuaJ. of this position in the metaphysics cf the Orieol"JU-
fUumÙJllIi"f"e ~'sdom. one w bicb Mulla $adri mer bigblighted.
But passages like the one quoted abave illustrate quite weil the purpose of Suhrawsrdi' s

need the mediation of a fonn. The best example of titis patticular procas is self-blowledge discussed br bocb
Avicenna (bis suspen.ded man) and Suhrawa'di and Whlch is never mechated through the form. of the indivlCtual.
but, radier, il is perœived directly, d. Corbin, HrSt'aire. 291-2. However,in Sullrawardfs phil 0 sophy, it

••
beçomes the yardstic:.k of allknowledge.
~ pdmllr. §225.211.13-212.3 (.5i{47=,199).
TT Ziai., KnowJqe. 151.
78 .{5kmll/', § 228.216.1-3 (.siQr, 201).
 CHAPTER FrVE - 154

theory of vision. It serves to ex:plain more lban vision at the level of the physicaJ and sensible world.
In the second pact of his OnenEJl!-UlumLoœ'r--e J.fJ'Sdom. the principles at the heart of his theory of
vision are meant tCl apply ta bath realm.s - the metaphysical as weil as the physical. It appears that
Suhrawardï is trying to apply to the physical rea1m the same theory of Vtsion he e1aboMes ta account
far the vision of metaphysical teutbs. 79 It is ooly under these conditions that these metaphysical truths
cao become perceptible for mystics. the050phers and the lîke.
Suhrawardï' s concept of vision begins with the Avicennan position whose philosophical
premises are chen rejected. He e1aborates conditions for bis theory of vision that will appJy to
specific metaphysical realities. A problem arises, however, when these pltticular conditions of
vision are reapplied at the level of sensible visual perception. e.g., bis concept of a light principle
thal belongs ta abjects. There does not seem 10 be. on SuhrawEU'di's part, a systematic attem.pt ta
provide a rigarous theory of vision that oould offer a physicaJ. geomelrical. mathematicaI. or
physiological explanation of sensible vision (in the Peripatetic sense).

Suhrawardï's main concem is witb the metaphysical and the conditions under which vision
becomes possible st that level. What is at stake is of another rea1m. Suhrawardï needs to expJain
vision in a way th. renders it compatible with the principles of hislight onlology and its coroUary -
illumination. He can. therefore, rejeet the two main traditional theories of vision. It is only after
rejec1ing them that he C8l'l establish the foundations for bis own theory of visual perception. Vision
œn now occur without the mediation of a fonn. We have se en. , however, that he does argue
philosophicaUy. from the traditional theories to bis own more personal theory of vision that appeals
te notions like rite "presential" face-to-face of the illuminated object and the seeing subject, but,

more importantly. ta the cenlra1ity of the notion of light.

The apparent tum-about that Suhrawardï maltes regarding vision does not provide us with
any reason for bis Peripatetic positions in the sections on physics of a number of bis works. Could it
be that he neveI" really adopted the positions he expounded in these works? One shouJd not forget
that be hœ imroduced one or two elemems tha were absent in the works of Avicenna (e.g., Jight is
different from coJor) in the body of bis argumentation in the physical part of bis Oneol'81-ULll",intlf:ir--e
WiSdom, and which he considered ta be impOlUnt for the development of his metaphysicat theses.
In the Orienr6/-UJummariF"e IJ7iSdOOl , he himself informs the reader of the "revelational"
aspett of whllt he has come to reg..d iii the trutb of things and of the efforts that he has exerted to try

.~.
79 !fzbnar, § 146, 135.7-10 (S{4".. 129-30).
 CHAPTER FrvE - 155

to describe and present the fruits of these persona! experiences so He writes that he had startecl by
being a st8Unch defender of the doctrines of the Peripatetics regarding the negation of the mysticaJ
vision beyond the material world. His adherence ta this philosophical tradition was so profound that
he confesses tbat he would have continued ta follow this tradition had he not seen fer himself a
decisi ve proof given to him by God.
Furthermore. Suhrawardï invites thase who cannot be convin.œd rationally of what he now
exposes in bis Or.ienr8/-UJum.iooo·r-p JVi"sdom te engage in the practice of spiritual exercises. or to
enter into the services of those who have had this visionary experience and who have gone back to
81
the tradition of the Anàents. i.e.. of the Ancient Sages of Persia - Jümisf. Frashiüshtar. Büzurjmihr.
Zoroasœr (or Zarahustra). and Kay K.husraw. 82 Tbe tradition of the Ancients also includes other
individuals such as Empedocles (ca. 490-430 B.C.) and Aristotle as weU as Hennes. or Plato.
"Imam" of the Sages.6J

80 .{fLbmlr, § 6, 13.5-7 ( S...,. 92).

81 ~. . . § 4. 10.15-11.2 (~, 89).
82 IGri wu a Sassanid king; by extension, a name ofœn used to desigIJate. in general, Sassallid
tings. â. {5bDRr, § 166.157.1-3 (SJB".. 151).
83 Hikmar, § 166, 156-8 C5.w:, 151).
 CHAPTfR. S lX - 156

• SIX •

THE FACULTY OF IMAGINATION

In the preceding chapter, we saw how Suhrawarcfi has insisted on reduci.ng A vicenna' s
internai faculties of representation [0 a single faculty capable of represent8t1oll. name1y the imaginative
faculty. The distance that separates him from the position of Avicenna is. however, proportionate to
the new e1ements he sougbt to inrroduce. The purpose of this chapter is [0 identify the Avicennan
them.es taken up by Suhrawardï regarding the role of imagination and ta indicate the similarities. but,
more importantly. the discrepancies between bis and Avicenna's account. For a fuller appreciation of
Suhrawardï' 5 concept of active imagination (:i '.:':' -, .). a comparaive approach is particularly important,
especially in view of the faet that Suhrawardï positions himself viS-à-vis the Avicennan corpus he
seeks ta reUlterp'et. ldentifyî.ng bow Suhrawardï depllrtS from the Aviœn..nan notion of imagination
belps identifying some of the l'essons that incited Suhrawardi te em.phasize the pre-eminence and
importance of the imaginative facuJty.

The whole discussion SUlTounding the faculty of imagination i~ more complex than could be
ex:pected at first glance. However, lacer developments - whether introduced by Subrawardi or by
Mulla $adri - find their ongin in sorne of Avicenna' s positions. In addition, a number of issues are
associsted with the COd.cept of imaginatiOd. such as the role of imagination in propbecy and in the
afterlife, a consequed.ce of philosophical discussions about the Islamic concept of retribution in the
aftedife.

We have already discussed how the Peripatetic tradition of A vicenna elaborated a compJex
scheme of the internal faculties. 1 lt was in the wntings of al-~aram before hlm, however, that ft

faculty of imagination began to evolve mto ft distinct and novel facu1ty with new activities and
funCtÎons. Amongst its most novel features is its capacity to account for revelation, inspiration,
divination and the like.2 Most philosophers adopted chis Islamic reatticulation of the faculey of
imagination, e.g., Ibn Miskawayh (d. 1030), a contemporary of Avicenna, who alsa provides a
3
philosophical anatysis of the faculty of imsgiaation and its role in prophethood.

'. 1

Z
For the Peripatetic -school-psychology," d. Wolfson, -The Internai Senses," 69-133.
Walzer. "Al-Firibfs Theexy of Prophecy and Divination," 206-19.
 CfIAPTER. SIX 157

•
Avicenna. on the other hand, proposed a new classification. having analysed the different
functions involved in perception - sensible and intelJective. Il will suffice here ta mention that. in
Aristotle's 01.L dJeSoul. imagination 15 different from perceiving or discursive thin.king th~ugh it is
not found without sensation, and judgement is not found without it~ As a capacity to interpret
percepts and thereby perceive an object Ils an abject of some sort. the facuJtyof imagination is
possessed by all animais. As a "deliberaive" phl1OlllS.is, only animaJs with intellect - i.e., human
beings - possess it.5 On the w hole ....-\ristotle' 5 concept of imagination (pOtlDtL1SJO. which receÏ'ves
6
what "appears") denotes a comprehensive faculty. ruling over all interna! activities of representation.
Hence, Aristatle's imagiJJ.ation (phlUX./JS.I~) actually encompasses the faculties that will be diVlded by
A vicenna ioto the Cive distinct faculties so charaeteristic of Avicenna' s Peripateticisrn..

NATIJRE OF THE FACULTY OF IMAGINATION

A number of studies have focused on the notion of imagination (in a broad sense) and
estimation (rA.,) in [slamic philosophy, particularly the thought of Avicenna and, ta a lesser extent,
tbat of Suhrawardï. But most studie5 usuaJIy conceotrate on Avicenna who, with AvetToes, bad the
greatest impact on. the West in the Middle Ages. 7 In addition, nobody needs to be reminded of
Corbin's contribution to the study of the "imaginal" as "a mode of the specifically religious
imagination... 6 In the broadest religious and philosophical sense, the facuJty of imaginaion
encompesses, as Durand has shawn, more than Mere faney and goes well beyond the familiar
9
framework of modern psychological analyses. ln the works of medieval thinkers. imagination was
part of a general philosophica1 anthropology which linked this human faculty ta the cosmologicaJ
and theological dimensions of religious experience. This is the dimension that i5 developed by both

Avicenna and Suhrawardï.

The following discussion will not propose a genem.l theoretiœl framework for the concept of

3 Marc:otte, "Ibn Miskawayb," 1-13; cf. [dem, "rmaginatioJl et révélation," 45-55; cf. [dem, "The
Role of Ima,iJ1ation," 37-72.
" Aristotle, ODdJeSouJ, DI,3,427b14-18; cf. [bid., 427a19-21.
5 Arisrotle, On lite SoaI, m. 11, 434a5-6; cf. Ibid., Dl, 3, 427b28-29. For the three roles of
p/lillZlJISrll, d. Byoum. "A New Look atAristotle's Thec:xy of Pen:eption." 101-2.
6 Ari5totle, OD ml!' SouJ, m, 3, 428a 1-428b 1.
7 Jambet, L.iI 10000ue c:k!s OnmUlJ.r; cf. Rahman, "Dreams"; cf. Black, .. F.5timation ( fJ'8m) in
Avic:enna,n 219-58; cf. Druart, "Imagination:' 327-42.
.~. 8 Durand, "The ImagLDaI," 10Sib; cf. Corbin, ED EslJfD1 infDien. S.v. mundus imRpJl1rs and jyJlm
III-DIdha/ (huriicme dimar ).
9 Durand, L 'imZWÙU'tion ..vrmbo1x,ue.
 CHAPTER srx - 158

10
imagin8tion specific ta !stamic phitosophy. Others have tried ta propose such frameworks. Our
goal is more modest. We will attempt to expound Subrawardï's concept of imagination Ils it was

shaped. te a certain extent. by the PeripstelÎc tbeses, namely Avicenns's coucept of imagination. As
with otheraspeas ofSuhrawardi'sphilosophicaJ anthropology, itis necessaryto analyse the Avicennan
context which Suhrawardï fint adopted. but tarer rejeeted or, more precise1y moclified. The question
of imagination is far more complex chan its rote within the division of the ÏJ1temal facu1ties. We will

cx>me back to the probtem of imagination ÏJ1 our discussion about prophetotogy and eschaology.

In. the foJ1owing pages, we will arguethatSuhraws-di' srejection of Avicenna's differentiation

among~ the internai facutties is a modified version of Avicenna's theory. Moreover, Suhraws-di's

discussions about the concept of imagination, once again, refiect the twofold 5trUcwre of bis
presentation: first, discussions typical of the Avicennan tradition and, second, passages in which his

more persona! approach prevails. Subrawardi sttempts to solve some of the problems raised br the
Avicenaan tradition by proposing a solution - his singJe facuJty.

THE AVICENNANSTRUCfURE
The first position that is found in most of Suhrawardï's warks is the Avicennan theory of
interna! facultîes. For instance. in F./ashes of Lighl" (an abridged version of Peripatetic theses) ,
Suhrawardï enumerates the five extemal senses and live internai lacuJti.es, expJaining their various
functïoas. The latter senses include the vanoas fsculties responsible for representstion. 1I For each of
these interna! senses or faculties. a specific part of the brain is identified as their place of i!1herence,
in. a manner identical with what is found in Avicenna's works on the soult e.g., in. the Deh'f't:Y1l/'LC'e

orthe Cu.œ. 12

In a number of works, inctuding the F14SÂes of 4trh~, Suhrawardï is, however, not very
fairbful to the Avicennan divisions of the inner senses. In fact, he present an abridged version of the
Peripatetic tbeses. and deviates slightly from the canonical Avicennan position. In the Temp/es of
.ligé~, a concise philosophical compendium which ïntegrates "illuminative" elem.ents, there is a
discussion (typicalJy Peripatetic) similar ta what is found in the F./llS1Jes of 4tré~. The classification
of the iJltema1 senses presented in the Temp/es ofLfr.IJ1" f oUows the generai A vicennan scheme and

10 fOl" a philosophie. discusSlon on the na11Jre of what should œQStl.tute a gelleraI concept of

•
iJDaginatlOD. specif:U; ta Islanuc thought. cf. Morewedge. "Epistemology," 123-59.
11 LJImJl/J., PlIy:s:, IV, 3, 115.7-116.11.
12 AVlcenna, N~, NIIfs, 3,328.13-330.5 (Ar:7C:. 30-1); cf. Idem, SJnliï'. NlÛS. r, 5. 443~S.J6
(Psy:. 30-l).
 CH~ 5lX - 159

•
even adopts Avicenna's physiologica1 explanation of the differenr bodily locations aaributed ta these
facuJties. IJ This was pointed out by Dawwam (d. 1501), a commentator on the work, who did Ilot
ftnd the same classification in the metaphysics of Suhrawardï' 5 OIienall-UlumÙItI/i'fi! &Visdom. 14

Suffice it to say that in the Temp/es 0/ Lr..LrlJr the passive imagination remains the
storehouse of the common seos~ in which forms are preserved after their disappearance from the
15
senses. The active unagination, whose funttion is ta combine and to seperate, is identified with the
oogitative faculty <:i: ~). the latter being cbm-acterized byan ability ta gatber meaning {~~I).Ui
Suhrawardi goes on to describe the estimalive facuJt}'·, which .. challenges the (jlldgments passed by)
reason., i.e., intellett, (o~Lw.i ~ Ji.-JI t.j~ ):.17 and whose aetivities. it should not be forgotten.
are those it possesses when it tums toward the active imaginatiOn. 18

Suhrawardi's classification is not quite identica1 ta the cano1lÎcal Avicennan order. The
estimative faculty is not associated any more with the cogitative facu1ty, while the functions of the
active imagination (whicb is not ex:plicitly identified), i.e.. combinaion and sepa-alion, are attributed
to the cogitative faculey. Suhrawardi gives to the active imagin-.ion - i.e., in its cogitative mode -
the positive function of A vicenna' 5 estimative faculty, and gives to the estimative faculty the negative
functions of Avicenna' 5 active imagination. 19 Paradoxically, in this passage wbich purpOltS ta present
the Peripltetie thesis, a major faculty of Aviceana' 5 inner senses, the active imagination, i.e., it
appears as cogitative in the Arabie text, is totally omirted in the Persian. This faculty is, nonetheless,
at the beart of his reinterpreution.

Suhrawardi's account of the place and functions of the active imagination found in the
Temples- ofLJiflJr dîffers slighdy from that of Avicenna, not in the elements it introduces or omits,
but ÏJI. the rearticul.ai.on of the different funetions of the ÏJ1ner faculty. Subrawarclï reinterprets

13 He writes that "should the location of a particu!ar sense be clamaged, lts function would b«ome
deficient, while the funeti.ons of aU ather senses would remaJ.J1 intact. From this one May condude that ail the
fa.cultles differ- from one anotber and tbal each possesses its own proper localion," cf. Hl!rJkiJ, Il (a) 53.3-4 Cp)
§ 8, 88,12-14 (ALm., 44; fSD1J1U, 1(4).
14 H~], JI Ca) 51.8-53.4 (p) § 8, 87.13-88.15 (.Arm., 44; fsmlllJ, 103--4). The same also holds
ne for many of Jns tRatisel, cf. KIIIiJmit, 95.13-96.13; cf. Oawwam. SIIi1W'likiJil1-Hür, 65.
IS HllftIkiJ, fi (a) 52.3-4 (p) § 8. 87.18-20 (AJrh., 44; fsJrlllL!, 1(4).
16 HJ1yMkiJ, n (a) 52.4-5 (An:-b:, 44; fsmJlu 1(4). Absent from the Persian text.
1

17 Hllyiikil, fi (a) 52.5-6 (p) § .8,87.20-88.1 (An:-h., +4; .ISmtru, 1(4).

18 It is responsible for overpowering the rational eJemeats of the soul, e.g., a dead body in a room at

night, cf. HIIftIb1, II (a) 52.6-8 (p) § 8, 88.2--4 (AJ'd'~ +4; krmiLl, J 04).
19 The empbasis OA the creative aspect of the estimative fac:uJty is an eJement of AVloenna's psycbology.
cf. Black, "EstimatlOJl ( W6IJm) in Avïçenna," 227-8.
 CfIAPTER SlX - 160

Avicenna's classification and gives grester pre-eminence ta the active imagin~on by providing it
with functions previously attnbuted to the estimative facuJty.

UNITY OF FUNcrIONS OF THE ANIMAL SOUL

In orderto grasp the sims of Suhrawardï' s interpretation of the Avicennan view on imagination,
itisnecessaryto torn ta his aitiqueof Avicenna's classification of the inner senses and bis understanding
of their nature. Suhrawardï' s aitique is scaltered througbout his works. It is even present in such
work as the TempJes ofLigor, where he discusses the issue of the substratum required for representation
and distances himself from the traditionaJ position.

Suhrawardï's depatturefrom Avicenaa's classificaion of the inner senses is first and foremost
ch.-acterized by a rejection of the latter' s fivefold division. There are indicftions that allude ta or
oorroborate bis rejectian of the fivefold division in a number of bis works, but the main arguments
are found in the metapbysics of the Orienhll-UJuminllFir--e J~~Sdom.2O
In tbis work. Suhrawardï discards Avicenna's partition of the inner facuJties, which he
reduœs to one main representative or imaginative faculty.21 AJthough Suhrawardï's concena. is, first,
about the unity of the fac:ulty of representation, gre8t simiJarities do exist between bis unique faculty
of representation and the different functions it encompasses.
Suhrawardï later further reduces this unity ta that of the rational (see section on the rejeaion
of the fivefold division of the soul). How, tben. does Suhrawardï define tbis single faculty of
rept"esenution that encompasses Avicenna's - tbree - facu1ties responsible for representatïon? In his
Oneohll-mumiJJmir·~IfJSdom, he writes:

And tbat which proves that this [imagin~ve faculty] is not the nlling light (~
;,~) [i.e., the rational soul], is that if we tried to establish sometbing (1-:-.,",; ), we
flJ1d in our self (~j ) something which moves away from it (~ AndJ/-:-:.: ).
we learn from aurselves that that which struggles ta establish Il confirmation
('.'': :Io,; ) is not that whicb wishes «("J~) to move and [we leam.) that that which
estabJishes [the existence] of some things is other tban chat which denies them..
Hence. since we find in our bodies something which would be Likewise opposed ta
it, then. it is something other than that [which constitutes) our individuality
(,·,-;.:·,t.:,l ). It is, therefore, a faculty wbich W8S derived ~ ~j.J ) in the citadel
(:.i.: ' ) [i.e., the body] out of the Isfabbad-ligbt [i.e., the rational soul]. And il is
becallse [this faculty] is tenebrous (:.i.: ',L...LID ) [i.e., in some sense, corporeal] and

•• 20 Interestingly enough, the f"ltSt part - i.e., physic:s (not transliced) - does not discuss these faculties.
21 This is Q.D. Shirizi's interpretatioJl; another commeDtalDr, suggests '"estimation," '"imagination,"

and "œmmQD~,"-cf.~ ~ Yazdï, ilI-A-fiIIdJI,/M-.FJdid (Qum: Mu'assasatal-Nasbral-lslâmï, 140711986),

369; mentioDed in Zarean, "5emory and lmaginal Pen;eption," 22 Jl.55.
 CHAPTfR srx - 161

impressed in the body (tj~) that it denies the immatEriallights (6;~ )~j )
[i.e.. the intelligibles] and that it does Qat recognize anything but the abjects of the
senses (..:,.,L...~). And, perhaps. it denies [even] its [own] self.•-'\nd it helps with
the premises. But. if il reached the conclusion. it reverts [to a position of] denia1.
Thus. il denies that which was required from what it had [previously] conceded.
And. although the aet of reminiscence (;S.ï.=i) [originates) from the celestial spheres.
nevertheless. it is possible [to concave] chat it is ft faculty on w hich a certain.
disposition for reminiscence depends.22
Suhrawardï introduces a single faculty of representatioJJ tbat incorporates a11 of the A vicennan
functions responsible for representation - i.e.. the representative or passive imagiJuuion. the faculty
of estimation. and the active or compositive imagination.

Suhrawardï dees. however. distinguish betWeen this single faculty of representation and the
roting light (,;,~ J~ ), n i.e.. the rational soul. In this work. Suhrawardi implies that the estimative
facuJty actually contradiets the intellect. It functions in such a way as ta oppose reasO!1. As mentioned
in bis Temp/es of LJgor. the imaginative facu1ty can occasionally help with the premises (i.e., sense
perception) for syllogistic reasoning, but the estimative cao. deny its logical conclusion (i.e., resson).Z4

Cogitation - the use of the inteUeetive - as an en-ing facu1ty, on the other hand. can aise
p-event the soul' 5 true communion with the divine. Suhrawardï beJieves that the intellect (JA,&) cao
p-eventthe active imagination from communicating information ta the commoo sense because the
intellect busies the active imagination with thougbt in a similar way as the external senses œn
25
distraet the active imagination. with data originating !rom enemal sensations. These activities ..e
those 85S0ciated with the cogitative faculty. They prevent the imprint or the fotm ta be reflected
down unti1 it reaches the common SëY5e. although it results from samething acquired br the soul -
the rstiona11uminous substance. The inte11ective - perhaps more appropriaœly the cogitative - must
be by-passed. For this purpose, Suhr'aw..dï appea1s to the receptive - or mimetic - funetion of the
active imagination.26

Tbat the inner senses a-e reduced ta their functio!lS exc1udes any identification of this
particular f8CUlty witb individuality (=t:.:ae:i ),27 with which self-knowledge is associ.ed (see section

Z2 Ribmtr, § 224, 210.13-2L1.8 (&w:' 198-9).

23 It is me rul:ing Isfahbadic-Jigbt or the comroling abstraeted Isfabbadic-light (- 4S~1 ~~ .J~
c;;"".. ie.,,1 u"';-:u. ;~I .J~)' d. ShabrazVri. Sh..,.p, 504.15 and 504.18.

.,.. !5kmIlr, § 224,211.5-6 (~ 199).

25 AfllFlriïri;, § 216, 495.5-9; cf. PJtdü, X, § 91. 78.15-79.1 (~.. 144; Book, 82); -Ï. A/w~, IV.

7, § 87, 178.13-179,16 (An::h. 105).

26 !fjkmN, § 224, 211.5-6 ( 5.t~ 199).
 CHAPTER S[X - 162

on self-knowledge). One could make a case for the similarity betWee1l Suhrawardï's sole and unique
(aculty and Avicenna's concept of estimative faeulty understood as an opponeJlt of resson when il
CUnlS ta the active lmagination (;4'.:'; ~, c ), or as an aUy of resson when it becomes the cogirative
faculty (i~ ). He, therefore. adopts a position in which bis single faculty of represent8tÎoJl is not
only a facu1ty whose substratum is the rational soul, but is slmu.ltaneously a fsculty whicb is distinct
from it,

MATERIALITY OR IMMATERIALITY
The issue of the materiality of the fs.culty of imagination or representation does nct seem to
present a problem for AviCenJl8, Ùl many instances. he associates this faaJlty with its material

substratum and ) QI' that of its abjects, For him. any immateriality that migbt be 85sociated with the
faculty of imagination would mainly apply ta the rational part of the soul - i.e., tbe cogitative - and
its objeas - intelligibles.

Understanding the facuJty of imaginaion as a matErial facultybecomes somewhat problematic

for the religious escharologica1 fste of the soul. Dow 15 retribution of souls in the hereafter to be
understood? In order ta guarantee the alJotment of punish.m.ent or rewards ta the souls after thar
separation from their body upon deatb the immatel"iality of the faeuIty responsible for representation
1

- imagination - or p8l"t of it would somehow have to be postulated (see the section on eschatology),
Ù1 Suhrawardi, as already discussed, this single imaginative facu1ty is st the heart of the
representative activities of the sou1. Reacting ta a percei.ved Avicennan materialism, Suhrawardï
divorces chis facu1ty from the rest of the material aspects of human. beiJlgs and thus distinguishes it
from the body and its funC%ions. As a result, the issue of the possible independence of the imaginative
faculty from the body srises and, with this. of iu possible degree of immateriality.
Suhrawardi'5 commentators such as Qu~ aI-DiJl al-Shïrirzi (to a le5set" degree) , but especially
Mulla ~adri believed tbat Suhrawardi had introduced the immateriality of the imaginative faculty
and its relative independence from the body. The faculty of imagÏJlalion 15 viewed as an immaterial
substance whose being is aetuaUy and essentially separated from the sensible body.Zfl Mulla $adrii,
nonetheless, aiticized Suhrawardi for Aot having fully undEl"Stood the consequences of bis own
tbeory,29

How different is Suhraward1's vis-à-vis Avicenna's position regarding the materiality or

27 Some mss. bave ~ül and ~f, cf. HJ:bnJU. 211 f1. for l1ne 3.
;l8 Zareaa., ·Sensory and Imagina! Perception," 68.
 CHAPTER. SIX - 163

immateriality of the facult)"" of imagination? According to Suhrawardï, tbis discussion is a fairly

straightforward ISsue in the works of Avicenna. AlI the internai senses of the Peripatetï.c tradition
must be materiaI. because tbey depend on the various parts of the bnun for Lheir aetivities. The

matter is, however, more complex man Suhrawardï depicts it.

Avieenna's position is difficult to assess. because he divides the faculty responsible for
representation into a number of faculties. These inelude the faculty of passive (or representaive)
imagination, which sets as the recipient of fonns originating st the leveL of the common se.4S"e; and
the passive imagination. which is a storebouse for the images that remain at the disposai of the next
faeulty, i.e., the active (or compositive) imagination. whieh funaions as a center of anaIysis and
synthesis of the various fonns.
Mster becomes more complex once one turns ta the nature and funttions of the estimative
faeulty which possesses. in Avicenna's work. the capability cf scœssing both realms - that of the
active imagination and mat of the intellect. The absolute materiaLity or immateriality of the imaginative
faeulty cannot adequately be detennined. on aocount of its association with representations that
incorporate some degree of materiality (as particular representations). 30

Given that he mares much with the Peripatetie tradition. Suhrawardi in Many pEsages
explicitl.y upholds the materiality of the imaginative facuJties, whether the passive imagination, the
estimative. or the active imagination. This position occurs in his more Peripatetie works, e.g.. in his
F.lI1s1Jes of4hr, where be discusses the materiality of the passive imagination. 31

Suhrawardï's position must. however. be nuanced with bis other more personal position that
..-gues for some sort of immateriality for the faculty of imagination (in a broad sense). white being
unable to cid it of the maceriality that is associated with its various functions of representa1Ïon. This
claim appears to be in contradiction with the fonner. As was pointed out, Suhrawardï proposes a
number of arguments ta reject Avieenna' s particularization of the inner faculties in specifie parts of
the body.

In his Orienrm-UJvmmob'F-e J~~d(]m, Suhrawardi uses the metaphor of the mirror to explain
the process of representation. Representation occors w ben self-subsisting fonns are reflected in
min"ors or polished surfaces. Hence, a conception more compatible with his aeeeptance of the
Platonic forms replaces the tnditional conception of fonns inhering in the brain. Altbough useful to
explain the existence of self-subsisting fonns outside the mind and their reception by the human

29 Mulli ~adrii, TJt~9'IU, 477 (5.It~ 608-9).

30 Avic:enna, SIum', .1'hIFs, IV, 2, 169.10-5 (P~, 119).
 CEfAPTER srx - 164

soul, tbis meraphor has the inconvenience of rei.ntroducing a certain degree of materiality into
Suhrawardî's single faculey of representation. ~ Suhrawardî writes:

You have leamed that the imprinting ~ ~ 1 ) of fonns in the eye is unpossible,
and. similarly, that it cannot be in. a [pS"ticular] place 1.ll the brain. The truth about
the fonns [refleaed in] milTors (~'.,.ll J~) and imagina! fonns (~~ J"'- ) is
that they are not imprinted (4 b', 0); rather, they are suspended citadels [i.e.. fonns]
ft .'

(~ ~l:- ) chat have no place of inherence (-j- ). Perhaps, they have places
of manifestation C.... ~), while they are not in them. Therefore. the milTor where
forms S"e ref1ected~ is their [i.e., the suspended fonns] place of manifestation. They
are suspended, nelther in a place nor in. a substratum. And the active imagination
(~ ) where the imaginative forms U~l J.:T- ) are reflected and attached
(4.iL-...) is their place of manifestation. 3:3

Moreover. the long passage previouslyquoted from the Orlenr4U-UJULtlLono'f--e l~'istlom would
aetually reaffirm the intrinsic materiality of chis facu1ty. Although derived from the nding light - the
rationa1soul - and necessitated by this light, this faculty nevertheless exists in the body - the citadel

les nature is, in faet, different from the light nature of the ruling light - this faculty is tenebrous and
"impressed in the body... 34 The distinction rests !.fi the fact that the imaginative faculty can. affect

one' s judgement and lead it co error. It can be an overpoweri.og for'œ within the human sou1.3S
.-. ConsequentJy, it is complete1y distinct form the rational soul, altbough it is still, more or less, a
funetioR of the soul, a1beit inferior to what is properly considered the rational within the human soul,
but derived from il.

The materiality characteristic of this faculty does not prevent Suhraw8l'di from
transcendentalising the abjects of ies perception (based on the passage &bave). His redefinition of the
inner senses in term.s of their intrinsic unity, at cimes alluding to the rational soul, and bis insistence

on their non-localisation in a material faculey necessarily imply the possession of a certain degree of
imm.eriatity by this faculey. This latter position aise favors a deiulition of this faculty by analogy
witb the nature of its object, the latter being immaterial., especially the intentions ~L...). Therefore,
the faculty tb. bas the power to grasp tbem must itse1f somehow share in some of the characteristics
of ils objects.

It is possible to find some similitudes betWeen Suhrawa-dï' s position and Plotin\Js' articulation

32 .f5kmw, §§ 225-8,211.10-216.3 <.sïw=. 199-201).

33 .ffrk.m~, § 225,211.12- 212.3 (.stw:. 199).
JoI .{Wfmar, § 224,212.4-5 (5.1[tr. 199).
35 HikmIN, § 224.210.13-211.1 (SIls:, (98). For exampJe, fright which pushes man to fJee while
there is no danger, or the one provided by Qu~ al-Dm SIürizï of someone who stays alone al. night with the
body of a dead man, and fears, d. Q. D. Sbïrizï. Sbar;fJ, 468.19-469.3 (5:t~, 386 n. 12).
 CHAPTfR srx ~ 165

of the immateriality of representaion.:36 F"or Plotinus, the imaginative faculty (pIlIUK~/Sli/) does not
depend on the body for its operation, although it is linked with the funetions of sense-perception
which depend ,JO it. Objects occur to this faculty through the perception that generates extc!lSÎonless
entities in the soul- ~i.ntelligible representations," "forms ," QI" "images." .~ Emi1sson states,

Their lack of extension is in tum linked with the unity of perception. F"or lt 15 clear
from Plotinus' argumeAt against the Stoics in IV. 7. 6-7 ... tbat the non-extension of
the perci.pient goes together with the non-extension of that whicb the percipient
receives (cf. IV. 7. 8) ... the abjects of phlUX8Sin are tbese uneJrtended entities ...
the most important funetîon of ponnœsiil is to be the "locus" of these unextended
entities that are involved in memory and reasoning.37

Suhrawardï is usua1ly considered to have introdueed an independent imagina! realm.. The

previous discussion has, however, highlighted the anthropological notion of imagination as the
faeulty responsible for representation. _.o\t the anthropologieal level here discussed, the imaginative
facu1ty is, therefore, distinct from the notion of an independent imagi.Jla1 world (see chaptEl" on
eschatology).

In bis reinterpretation of the vsrious i.nn.er senses, Suhrawardï redefines the facu1ty of
imagin&tion by shifting emphasis away from its total paticu1arization in the body, and transforms it
mto ft partir immaterial faculty. Suhrawardï assumes that the mental representations a the disposai
of the rational sou! cannat be material in any way, because the rational soul - the ruling Isfahbad-Iight

- itseJf lies beyond any such materiality and, therefore. 50 would the representations QI" images it
manipulates. Therefore, by extension, he implies some sort of immateria1.ity for the faculty of
representation.

From the ongoing discussion, it becomes clearthat Subrawardï adopts a seeminglyparadoxical

notion of represent8tÏon. On the one band, he stresses some sort of ineorporeality eharacteristic of bis
single faculty of representation capable of interaa.iJlg with the raional part of the soul. On the other
band, the same faculty is distinct from the rstiona! p8l't of the human soul, and incorporates most of
thetraditional functions attributed ta the internaJsenses responsible forrepresentatï.on bythe Avicennan

36 Emilsson, PlOl1!8us OH Sense-.;\'H:~pt)Î2I1, 109-9. As for AviœJUUl, he writes "en fait, il Jl'y a pas
d'empêchement à ce que l'intellect ait L'aperception d'un particulier dont J'individuation. ne tiendrait pas à ses
mesures ni à sa positionloc:aJe ni. à [d'a1JIl"eS aceidents] de ce genre; nlle p.-t ta preuve Jl'. été falte que c;'est là
chose unpossib1e," cf. Avice.ana, ~fulJJÜJJldliïr,208.ë-7 (PIJleS, "CoJlÇeption," 194-5).

.•
~
The MulJli/illthlie are noces from A'Vlc:eDJla's leacbing - simiI.- to the U1as:œs (different fro!U bis
Commt!8~ on Aristotle's On me Soul> - mat were probably wnaen by Babman.yir, cf. Janssem, "Les
7it~iiI d'Ibn Sina," 118; d. Miclux, "Tables de CorreSPOIldanCes," 231-50. It appears lo Ç()nstitute the
Arabie text on which depends a part of the Dliizish-DlÏDNIIJ, cf. Janssens, "Le Oiinesll-Nmne.1J d'Ibn Sï.Da,"
164-5; cf. Michot, -La réponse d" AVlC:enne à Bahmanyir et al-lCinnâni." 143-221.
3? Emilson, Ploanus on Sit!!rJsc--PI!r&&'pIiOD, 108-9.
 CffAPTER SIX - 166

tradition.
The presence of [wo seemingly opposing positions is perbaps best understood in tenns of
Suhrawardt s adoption of a Peripatetie framework from whieh he rries ttJ depart. His use of the
metaphor of the miITor helps ta account for the reception of Îonns that preexist and be10ng to the
PI atonie nature (i.e.. his adoption of atheory of Idees) of bis reinterpretation of A vicenna' s philosophical
anthropology. As for the immateriality of the imaginative faculry. it has Plotinian. anteœdents.

While A vieenna genera11y .tributed immateriaJity onlr to the rational part of the soul and to
intelligibles, Suhrawardï appœrs ta have ascribed some sort of im..materiality to aU the representative
functions of the soul. inasmuch as representation is reduci.ble ta the perception of the rational sou1.
This is not to say that Avicenna' s position regarding the materiaJity of the inner senses is the
def'lnitive interpretation wbieh Suhrawardï - or al-Ghazali. for that matter - would Jike ta make. This
is perhaps an oversimpJified account of Avieenna's position, especially in view of the eschatologies!
raie he attributes to the faculty of imagination (see section on eschatology).

SUHRAWARDÏ'S MODIFIED AND SIMPLIFIED VERSIONS

Having reviewed a few passages where Subrawardï discusses the faculty of imagination. one
needs to ask what ean be made of these different stances? By postulating the existence of a single
"- -
facuJty of represeJJt8lÏ.on. SUDrawardï rejeets only the existence of distinctive internai faeulties. There
is no outright rejeetion of the different functions proposed by Avicenna ta accoum for representation.
In fatt, all the funetions found inAviœnna' 5 works attually find tbeïr wayinto the OneJd.d-UluLtJimJliF-~

IPisdom as components of this new single faculty of the animal soul

The retentive function of the passive imagination, the estimative function and the compositive
funetion of the active imagination beeome three facets of one and the same faculty. Admittedly, the
emphasis is on the active imagination, especially witb respect ta issues pertaining ta the revelation of
hidden matters which occur through the Mediation of a stl"ong imaginative facuJty.3e

Moreover, the process by which sensibles are perceived by the soul does not depart from the
uaditional p-ocess of abstraeting the forms from the sensibles. This quintessentiaUy Peripatetic mode
of knowledge accounts for knowledge derived from the sensible world. Although Suhrawardï sdvocates
a reconsideration of the notion of knowledge by appea1ing to bis notions of personal or presentiaJ
knowledge, he must aceawtt for the existence of an external reality and the meus ta pel"ceive it. If
we look st a tree or hear the running water of a brook, these are objective reaJities in the worJd to be

38 .f5kmIlr, § 251,236.15-237." (5.w:. 217).

 CHAPTER SIX - 167

perceived.
In line with the Avicennan tradition, the tripartite division of the faculties respoJlSible for
representation is mainrained. ln tenns of their respective functioos. Moreover, the aclive imagination
is still. per se, unable to attain the univers al , because it is essentially bodily, But more importently.
the main func:tion of the active imagination is ta account for the reception of forms, images. or icons
from above, the perfect example being prophetic knowledge - which is aiso the case for A vicenna.

It is possible to illustrste the sunilarities and differenœs that exist betWeen. Suhrawardi' s
classification of the inner senses (in the Rlisbes of Lrg-.hr and the ()l'ienrJl1-D.lunuRon'r-C' f.f'fsdomr 9
and the Avice1lJ1an division. of the internaI senses in the following manner:

Avicenna

_ _..... i~ c:ogirsive
~=-
estimsive ~J - -_ _... ~ active
imsgi.naion

Suhnnvardi
Suhrawardi
three funcbons of
Um6/nir a sole fa.culty
~

-
active
imsgUlSLion
- - ~
~II"""
.....

..
i~

~
oogirative
.
acnve
imagin2aÏOIl
~
active
im.insion
- •
.. i~

~~
c:ogiraive

~ve

The position of the passive (retentive) imagination (J~) remains idenrica1. i.e., the facu1ty
Den to the C0QZIZ10A Sf!L1Se. Variations in. Suhrawardi's interpretati.on oecur at the higher level of
represe.ntstion- with the functions attributed to the different faculties of estimation, active imagination,
and cogitation, The most notable difference is the sbirt tbat Suhrawardï makes: the estimative facu1ty
is replaced by the active imagination. The latter takes on the former' 5 place and functioos. Suhrawardï
DOW attributes more importaJlce to the aclive imagination. He can, therefore, be seen as adopting
quite freely Avicen.na's c1assificalion, perhaps less out of inconsistency than out of Il concern with
attributing a greater rote the faculLy responsible for the representation of metaphysical entities.

•• CONTENTS OF IMAGINATION AND OF THE RATIONAL SOUL

39 5îmiJar disp.-ities are found in his other works.

.•
'
CtfAPTER SIX

Suhrawardî noœs chat the single faculty of represenration he inacoduces and which en.oompasses
the representstive faculties of Avicenna is derived from the ruling Isfahbad-light. i.e.. the rat10naJ
soul. Avicenna. however. separated the representative faculties from the rational realm and tileir
- 168

relation to the rational soul - i.e.. their localisation l.Q a bodily organ. Suhrawardt s rejection of their
Gsociation with partïcular organs or loci and of any type of materiality of the perceived forms
suggests a kind of participation in the immaleriality traditionally œcribed to the rational part of the
soul as mentioned e8l"lier.

One of the consequences of chis position is that the single f8C\l1ty should share some of the
ch8l"8Cteristics of thatfrom which it is originaœd. However. how could this facuJtyshare charaeteristics
with what is essentia11y rational, while being associated with the capacity ta "phantasize?" This
function of the soul is responsible for erring and rejecting rational conclusions. Second. as already
mentioned, ibis faculty is associated with some sort of materiality. expressed in terms of a .. tenebrosity"
(4.: ',~ ), having a necessary existence in the body derived from the existence or presence of the
rational principJe, i.e., the Isfahbad-light.4J While. the faculty of imagination is responsible for
judgments that can go against the conclusions reached by reason, the light and d8l"kness symbolïsm
reintroduces mat.eriality to this generic faculty of representation. 41

There are problems with the A viœnnan theory of imagination or estimation. These have ta
do mainly witb the faet that the fWlCtiOns of estimation aecount fer the explanation of knowledge of

universals in a psnicular way thraugh the perception of intentions (~lA.. ). The dual nature of this
faeulty is illustrated by the presence of its funetions, in both the animal and rational soul~ The
estimative faculty is, on the one hand, sh8l"ed byaIl animal souls also present in animaJs. It corresponds
to the active imagination wbich possesses the ability ta sense such simple abstraet intentions as
danger and which, in more modem. terms, may be called a sort of conditioned behaviour. On the
other hand, the same estimative facuIty characterizes human beings and corresponds to the cagitative
faeulty (i~ ) at the heart of the perception of similar mental en.tities as intentions, i.e.. the
perception of such tbings as horseness, friendliness, etc.. but of a resolutely more comple" nature. In
this respect, it is associated with partic:ular (the particuJar imtances), although it goes well beyond it.

In Aviœnna's works, the estimltive faculty enjoys a comptex relation with the body. First,

4J HibnJtr, § 224, 211.3 -211.7 (..sigr., 199).

41 This facul.t.y impressed in a banakh would. tberefore, ae:tually be in a body 1Jl wmch it is
impressed, cf. 5bahrazüri, Sb.lr/J. 511.3.
42 Pines, "NouveUes Etudes," 135-6. ThIs faculty would aIsa be aflil.1ated to the Greek plrranesis <r
p:'Udence. d.lbid., 136-7.
 CHAPTfR srx - 169

the estimlllive is a function of the animal soul cequiring 811 organ. Second. this faculty enjoys a
certain ["elatio~ with particu1ars - chat is. in its manipulation of pan.icu1ar cepresentation (e.g., not
devoid of sucb accidents as size, extension, and 50 on), but a1sa in. its perception of intenti('ln~ of
particulars (e.g., humanity as a concept in which individuals share). Finally. the estimation hinders.
by its activities, the higher fU.Iletions of the soul, i.e_, the rational sou1.43

For A vicenna. imagination is an essential stage in the process leading to acquisition of

knowledge at the rat1onalleve1. However, and this is wbere the Avicennan system. departs from the
Aristotelian scheme of evoJutive process responsible for knowledge. imagination must be discsrded
once it has served its purpose, Le., to initiate the process thal leads to the rational. At the level of the
rational soul, me active principle is then able, arter its education in the use of the cogitative faculty of
representstion. to receive. !rom non-sensible reaJms. the input originating st the level of the active
intelligence. In. what follows we would like to argue that some difficulties with which Avicenna was
CDnfronted remained unsolved for Suhœwardï.
One of the issues raised by Avicenna' s and Suhrawardï' s notion of imagination is the nature
of representatioll that is made possible by this faculty in both animal and rational souls. Ooes the

.~,
content of representation occur ill the msterial sphere or Ilot? Avicenna' 5 process of intellection
grounded in the Arisote1ian tradition conœives of the sours acquisition of knowledge as a process
dependent on the senses, experienee. and abstraction of fonIlS !rom particulars. AU tbese steps
represeJlt preliminaries that enable the soul rD grasp universals - intelligibles or divine revel&tion -
whicb origin8te at the level of the meœphysical realm of intelligences.

In fact, the faculty of imagination - Avicenna's estimative faculty and Suhrawardïs faculty
of active imagination - constitutes a function of me human soul. It sets as a recipient of matten thal
originaœ st the level of the rational soult Hence, imagination as a faculty manipulating forms and
intentions, especially in its Avicennan cogitative mode. serves as &.Il indispensable instrument for the
human rational souL

Another difficulty resides in the fact that the human rational souJ shauld nat requ1l"e say
bodily funaions sueh as the f&cully of imagination, or, for that matter. the body itself fOt" its
functioning. For Avïcenns. intelligibles - objects of intellection - are not abstraeted from particular
forms Ot" images.~ Intelligibles .-e received from the active intelligence. Their representation by the

'. 43 In Suhrawanlî, che example of the dead body in the room at mght, cf. HayJkü, II <a) 52.6-8 (P) §
8. 87.20-88.4 (AJrh., 44; fsma-n, 1(4).
44 Druart, "Imaginllti.OD.," 332.
 CHAPTER. 5 IX - 170

bum8l1 soul requires the presence of an imaginative facu1ty capable of giving a sensitive-like form. to
ÏJ1telligibles ConsequentJy. a paradoxical situation occurs in wbich the facuJty of imagination and its
objeexs are simultaneousJy needed and not needed for the occurrence of knowledge. ln fact, il bas
generaUy been he1d that the former process leads ta the latter one. ie., the potential rnaterial intellect
must be actualized sucb thal the psrticu1ars the soul can perceive will help it ta achieve its attualit)".

In Suhrawardï. the question really boils down to the apparent contradiction between the
foUowiJlg [Wo points: first, the fact that the unified faculty of imagination is bodily - even thougb il
is "derived" from the human rational soulas - and, second. the fonns perceived by titis single faculty
of imagination are not 'ïmprinted" in it. but o.nly refleaed in it, as in a min'or.46

The faœ1ty of imagination, as a part of the human soul. becomes the mitTor reflecting these
ultimate realities. This faculty is exemplified by the knowledge of prophets (see section on
prophetology). Theoretically, tbere is no limitstion to the degree of abstraetness that the objeexs of
this imaginative faculty ca.n grasp.47 Suhrawardï rejects the tbesis of an acquisition of knowledge
through the imprinting of a form. in a (bodily) faculty of imagination. Even bis conception of
knowledge in tenns of a prese.ntial knowJedge - i.e., knowledge by p-esence - requires the presence
of a represeJlt8tÎonal faculty. Such a faculty is required œ the recipient (the mirror) of chis knowledge
(reflectiOJlS),48

The imaginative faculty is more central ta Suhrawardï' 5 conception of knowJedge than to

Avicenna's whose conception of knowledge provides some room for the empiricaL Both, however,
do agree on the extrinsicality of knowledge originating st the leveJ of the intelligible world and,
mOl'e specifically, at the level of the active intelligence. For Suhrawardï, knowledge of the type of
"visionary" experiences that descends upon the faculty of memory (~ ) enends to the faculty of
represeatation or the passive imagmation, which. ÎJl tum, overpowers the COJDmOD se.l.ZS"e on which
it projeets an image orfonn (6.)".-) and is ofultimaebesuty and perfection in its bodily manifestation
(:.i~;;.),~

UltimateJy, according to a passage from the On"enu/-UJUA1.Ù1olir.re &Vis-dom, the commOA

45 bS'bnw, § 224,210.12-211.8 (..sïw=. 198-9).

46 !fikmllr § 22S, 211.12-213.1 (s..s:, J99-200).
1

47 TIns is wbat just1.fies statements that what has been pcojected Ul the conrmQQ ~ is not an
"aJJe,o:y;" it is sometlnng chat needs to be interpreted as somedung hiding the "Other:' of whidt it would be
the form; radier, it 1S a manifestation of the tl'Uth il anJlOUI1CleS, cf. Corbin, .. L'~ l'empli," 289-90.
48 Shahrazül"Ï, 1Jl his commentary, adds that the active imagination i5 a percei.VI..ag facuJty, judging
both over wbat is i1Itel1ee:tual as weU as what is sensible, cf.5hahrazüri. SIJ;rh. 511.19-20.
49 TJIIJVf/NU, § 74, 103.13-15; cf. Davidson, Affllnl!Ji, 168f.
 CHAPTfR SlX - 171

sense is the receptac1e of images and similes thal originate aI the level of the world of intelligences.
Everything whicb the sou! perceives originates at the level of the rational soul (~.)..A JY ) and from
the single power its luminous and emanating essence possesses.so These perc«:-ived fonns are now
given an ontologically different st8tUs man the perceived forms abstraeted from the sensibles. The
former forms are real and partake af the other world. In ft sense. bath types of forms are real - in
their own way.

The reflettion of these images and similes in the common seASe can express vanous types
of mystical and prophetie visions. These fonns represenling perceived metaphysical rea1ities are.
bowever. first, reflected in the soul that beeomes mitror-like (see section on mystieal vision).

Moreover. all these faculries are in the body only a sbadow of what exists in the rational soul
- the Isfahbad-light. The rational soul can aet through the body (the body being its temple or its
theurgy, ~ ) such that the active imagination is an icon (~) that belongs ta the faculty of
judgement of the rational soul.S ! For Suhrawardï, seme of the fonns are responsible for appa'itions or
phantoms <é; .., ) which, according te Dawwinî. are shadows of the immateriallight. and aU the
sttributes included in tbose apparitions are equally the shadows of the spiritual attributei of chat
S2
light.
.~
The lumping together of aU the funetions of representation into one generic faculty allows
Suhrawardï to identify a particular facu1ty of represemation as the receptacle of what originates from
the non-sensible realm. The single faeulty of imagination bemmes the place of its unmediated
manifestation. In bis endeavcr, however. Suhrawardï does not propose another term to identify this
new faculty, although, as we have seen, he aIso reduces an the faculties to the rational soul (i.e., the
luminous essence emanating by itse1f). S:3lt becomes the active imagination.

He uses. however. the traditiooal names sttributed to the different faculries responsible of
representation to identify the vsrious aetivities of this facu1ty. Here, Suhrawardï is unsble to discard
the philosophical framework from which he sought ta depart. The distinctive feaeure of this process
is that the initial impetus needed to initiale it is no longer grounded in the physical wodd. Nonetheless,
the various funetions of the faculties identified by Avicen.na are still required ta receive and. more
împortalltly. ta process what originates in the world of intelligences. In faet. it is the Avicennan

50 .ffzkmar, § 226.213.1-2 (..5igr., 200); cf. Ccrbin, "L'imlp œmpli:' 289-90.

51 lUbDlIe, § 227.21<4.3-4 (.si{t; 200); cf. [bid., § 227.214.5-215.2 (S-trr. 200-1).
Si! Kuspinar. Ism~LIArzbInIr;f, 236.
S3 !5kmzu. § 226. 2l3.3-04 (.5ift:, 200).
 CfiAPTER SIX - 172

philosophical framework which provides him with this compJex scheme whose functions he tntegrates
within bis own reinterpretalion of A vicelUla' 5 philosophical anthropology.

Furt.herm.ore. there is sorne ambivalence in 1115 apparent indisaiminare use of such L~S as
54
the active imagination.. the retentive or pasStve imagination.55 or the faculty of the commoo se.nse .5ri
in passages wbere he discusses the funclions chat are lDvolved in the activities of representation (see
earlier diagram). The above mentioned faculties are genera.1.1y all identified as reœptacles. For
example, when accessing intellectual matters or intelligibles. the rational soul utilizes the internai
faculties responsible for representation to grasp and access them, whether one is asleep or awake.
Here is how Suhrawardï describes tbis process:

The imaginative faculty (=4 il':' ", imitates [ÏJltelleaual matter'5] (~6::. ) through
c )

the use of a form [or an image] (i..).,.-) which is in some way app'0priate to it. And
this form is ref1ected in. the sensitive world [i.e., by the intennediary of the commoo
seti'eand the passive imagination]. in the same manner as [a Conn] is retlected from
[the sensitive world through the ÏJlterm.ediary of the COL11OJOO ~.IJS'e J in the treasure-
trove (,,~)
,
of the active imagination (~).S7 -
Thereupon, the soul contemplates (..tAL...:.Y:i ) marvellous fonns, hears things or sees spiritual
entities. The termi.Ilology of this passage is not mystieal, but the content May weil be. Suhrawardï is
simply ttying ta give an Avicennan explanation of visionary-spiritual experiences. The process is the
sBJDe, except that the direction is revened, Mce the data onginstes from non-sensible realms. In
fact, Suhrawardî resorts ta a process of representation that is not 50 differeJlt from that of Avicenna
and which requires the OCCUITenee of some material.-like form or image. Just as ordÏJlary vision
OCCUl'S tbrough the projection of sensible physical forms to the imagination, so intellectual and
non-sensible mattel"5 are projected to the facutty of imagination which cm then be represen.ted.

Suhrawardï explains how abstract intellectual matters (~ jA i ) can be visualized by

resorting to a notion of "imitation" V~). The idea of an "imitation" is not an Avicennan invention.
It is already found in al-Fiiribi's work. Amongst the activities of the imaginative faculty, al-Fiïribï
introduces an imitating (olSl.::-. ) or mimetie function. The Arabie term is, in fact, an equivalent ta
m.imèsis as it had been used in. the Arabie translation of Aristotle' s Poe/les. This new function
alJows the imaginative facuity ta represent objects with images of other objects, either bodily

54 HikmRr, § 225,212.3 (541(4'=,199).

55 :z
.{:5kmIlr, § 22 7 , 10.1-2 ( S'!tr. 20 1).
56 Hl1J"iïki1, Il <a> 52.1-2 (p) § 8,87.15-18 (Ail:'h., 44; fsmiiu, (04): cf. Afwif/1, § 87,178.19-179.4
(AIrh., lOS).
57 HJ!riïkZJ, VIl <a) 85.9-12 (p) § 37, 107.16-18 (ALm, 64; fsmau. 229-30).
 CHAPrER. 5 IX - 173

temperameJ1t5, emations and desires. and even immaterial reaiities. S8

One might tum to Avicenna's On ["oeSIl/Ees ofdJeSoul for insight. ln this work. he states
chat the fonJl!. apprehended by intuition ((J&'~) are then stabilised (·-/t·;j) in the faculty c! memory

(0 ~Ij), while the faculty of imagination tums to flUdOSLiJ and imitates ~~ ) or reproduces in
other forms what it bas received. S9 The underlying srructure highlighted by Suhrawardï for such fi.

reception is most certainly compatible with the &bave Avicennan Peripatetic view.
For Suhrawardi. the facuJty of the active imagination (~) cornes into play in this process.
whereupon lt has the ability to oVel'power (.>~ L~, -.• ) the COOUJ'100 st:'L!Se in. order to materialize
- in sensible visua! or auditive representations - wh. it has received from the rational soul. Reception,
therefore, certainly appears to Decur through the higher faculties of the human soul. Wben lt reaches
the COozmOD seASe, a number of things can become manifested: what is remote (~I.J ~ jJIi li.;, .).3.J ):

mythical forms Vi;:' (,.$l+iJYO-), e.g., confused dreams (r~~llll o~i); forms which are images
im1rat1ng (~~l.:.... ) divine mattets. In the latter case. it cm amount to a dream that is true or to a
revelation (or divine inspiraion) that is unadulterated (c=>-).6IJ
In the Templt5 ofLJg.br. the imaginative faculty re-presents or imitates ~~) the inte1lecm al

-. matter tbrough a form oc an image (0.).".- ) which is appropriate to it. And this form is reflecœd in
the semitive world. It is onJy then. tbat:

The soul contemplates (..lA 1.,;;; ) marvel10us fonns with which it has a private
conversation (~t::i ), or spoken words are heard [without tbere being any body
present], orhiddenmau:ers (~ ...J-"Î) manifestthemselves~' and apparitions (';';"':;'f
appesr as if they ascended and descended.63
The second problem with whicb Suhrawsrdi is confromed is the nature of the seul-body
relation (see section on the nature of the soul). Avice.ana adopted a notion of the soul and the self in
tenns of substantiality. Such a notion of substantiality limits Avicenna' 5 need for a faculty of
imagination as a preparatory instrument in the acquisition of knowledge. Avicenna's "suspended
person" example again precJudes the Aeed for any faculty of estimation (or imagination). The

93 al-Fitibï, Akdii1.lrh. 211-19 (PtYf4'"rShM'e, 21l-9); cf. Black, "Al-FbDï," 185.

59 A'vicemta, AfJWJïl. 119.9-10 ("Prophétle," 520).
60 A/w;ï/}, IV, § 87, 179.6-16 (Atr.h.. 105).
Abii Rayyan in bis Ar. ed. reads, along witb the four mss. he uses ~I ., "'hile Corbin r-eads

••
61

~I. cf. HllyHiJ, vn Ca) 8S.1 1• 8S ft. 8 (AJrh~ 64)•

50! ID. the Persian. translation, il is a hidden form (~ ~ ..)~). cf. H1I,rJki/, VII (p) § 37. 107.20.
63 HRyiikiJ, VII <a> 85.9-12 (p) § 37,107.16-20 (AJ'rh, 64; fsmïl-il,l29-30).
 CHAPTER SIX - 174

immediacy of the sours knowledge of its essence does not require the Mediation of any other objea
or facu.lty. Imagination is of no aVRil al the ontologicallevel.~

At the anthropologica1 Leve!. the estimative faculty intervenes in Avicenna' s epistemological

process This faculty be10ngs to both the animal and rational souLs. It is the most complex of the
sour s inner facu1ties. It is. on the one band, shared by aU animals and cOlTesponds te the active
imagination and, on the other hand, present in human bangs and cOlTesponds to the cogitative
faculty w hen the intellect mteracts with il.ti5 Wben this interaction occurs. after its education in the
use of the cogitative faculty, estimation is able to receive non-sensible inputs whose origin is st the
level of the active intelligence. Paradoxically, the soul does need the body to instantiate its existence
66
and for ies individuation, but not to reach self-intellection or grasp intelligibles.
ln the works of Suhrawardi, on the one hand, the appesl to a notion of substantiality aJso
limits the need for a faculty of imagination as a preparatory instrUment in the episœmologicaL
process leading ta the knowledge of the self. Like Avicenna's example of the "suspended person,"
Suhrawardï's conception of self-knowJedge precludes any of the intemaL faculries (see section on the
nature of the saul). These discussions are distinct from any type of imaginative perception, let alone
intellectual perception subsumed under any sort of discursive account. For Suhrawardï, the facuJty of
representation does not constitute the self (the :.i! ". ~ j) or the soul' s self-consciousness. The knowing
subject is presumably the soul understood in its totality. sometbing other than the faculty of
representation (tbat includes the various Avicennan. fUJ1aïons responsibJe for representation), because
the self, or moreprecisely self-knowledge of one's self, oœurs without theneed of a body.

This is not new and, in many plaœs, Suhrawatdï maltes use of the typically Avicennan
hypotheticaJ ex:ample of the "suspended person," slong with that of the drunken person, to est8blish
67
the existence of the sou! as a separate substance. The appeaJ to a notion of self-consciousness is
intended to demonstrate the complete separation of the soul from the body. However, the argument
he proposes presupposes, at lesst in the case of self-knowledge, the possibility of a non-conceptual
knowledge precluding the mediation of the body or of any faeulty associated with it (see section on

601 Druart, "Imagination," 334-5.

6S Druart, "Imagination," 331-4.
66 Druart, "lmaginaion," 334.
(i1 LJtrztll/liu, Ph.J'3:, IV, 4, 116.12-20; d. PJldü, §§ 27-30, 23.3-25.1 (BooÉ 204-6); cf. Avicenna,
1

Ish6iir, vol. 2,319.5-321.8 (Oir., 303-4) and Idem, SJn/ii", V, 7, 255.1-11 (P~, 255-6). In. adchtioQ, ÎJ1 many
imtanc:es, Avicenna identIfIes the soul with a se1f-consc:iousness of the self, cf. Pines, "Conception," 189-91.
The i.ateUed.tve faculty, i.e., the ratlonal soul, is neither a faeuJty nor a fonn subsisting ln the body (e.g., in the
SIliIii' ), cf. Pines, • Conceptlon.," 194-6.
 CfIAPI'ER 5 lX - 175

self-knowledge). The imagmation wouJd. tberefore. become an obsolete faculty.

The srrong Neoplatanic navor of Suhrawardï's w·ork. whether in the InLimnrioos. or the
Temp/es of LighE. provides the philosophical framework which makes greater aUowance for the
ttanscendental ongin of knowledge - in line with an emanationist scheme. Ulti.mate1y, it aceounts for
the reception of knowledge by mystica1 means - i.e.. the gnostic path (~Li ~ ) An illustration of

the adoption of such an emanationist scheme where knowledge is received !rom non-sensible realms
is found in the following passage from the Temp.les of 4i:bl" . where Suhrawardï discusses rational
soll1s:

Once the 50ul has become strengthened with [the aid of] spiritual virtues ~ Lw..i
:4 .: .~ 6..", J ). and once the dominance of the physical (4.: .,~ ) facu1ties has grown
weaker accordingly, and that the diminution of the l1ourishmen.t and the prolongation
of insomnia has overcome [the body]. (the soul] becomes free and Even occasionally
bastens to joïn the saaed world «(J"'~I rJ~ ) Then it conjoins (~ ) with its
saaed father <U:....u 1 ~'-:a J..-"i:i )6lJ and sCXf.uïres wough le lcnowledge [i.e.. a
type of gnostic knowledge] (..... J La.....), and it conjoins with the celestial souls cognizant
(U l& ~ ("J"~ ) of tbeir movement and of the necessities of their movements.
Tbereby, regardless of whether it is asleep or awate, it 8cquires ~ ) from [the

.-. œleslialsou1s] knowledge of unseen [realities] in the same way that a mirrorrecei.ves
the image of the object facing it.6~

Suhrawardï highlights the need to strive to aoquire such aknowledge as weB as the ïmpolUJlce
of its reception from the metaphysical re&1m. In addition, dispensing with all bodily impediments
becomes one of tbe conditioJlS for the acquisition of knowledge tha originales st the Jevel of the
ce1estial sauls. In this q\1est, the internaI facuJties are use1ess. At tbis stage, this also includes the
imaginative facu1ty. Suhrawardï thus oscillstes betWeen [WO modes of 8CXiuisition of knowledge
related ta the respective realms the sau! seeks ta know - the sensible and non-sensible worlds. These
two modes are a1so present in the works of A vicenna. Indeed. it would be interestïng ta study in. a
more detailled fashion a11 of Avicenna's texts, especially the llemarks (last chapters), ta in.vestigate
the presence of similar concerns.

The difficulties Suhrawardï faces originale precise1y in bis adoption of an ambiguous staIld.
First, he adopts • complete and total rejection of the world of the senses and the philosophicaJ, white
not rejecting the natural requirements imposed by the more tradition& accounts of perception -

68 It is the Holy Spirit, the active intelligence, the lord of the human species, cf. H~, VI (a),
~.9-83.2 (p) § 36, J 06.l~-17 (ALd., 62-3; fsmaJJ, 215-6).
(B HIIYJiki1. VU (a> 85.3-8 (p) § 31, 107.10-15 (An:b., 63-4; fsmaJJ, 229-30). For various fonns of
revelations (Q, 16:102-3; 26: 192-9; ~2: 51-2, and 50 on); cf. T8/wf/JIU, § 74, 103.13-15.
 CffAPTER 5[X - 176

sensible and intellectual. On the whole, bowever, the tnJe reality is not grasped by the senses nor lies
within the sensible realm. His pOSItion weigbs on a seemingly greater dualism. a consequence of his
more spiritualist inlerpretation.

The junctioll between the two - sensible and non-sensible - rea1.ms occurs with the reception
of an input from the active intelligence. This is rrue of Avicenna' 5 and Suhl"awardï' 5 philosophical
antbropology. In this respect, bowever, Suhrawardï appears to opt fol" a greater ln1DScendentalism,
espeàa11y in bis more illuminative p-esentation. Knowledge is received from non-sensible rea1ms (as
it was wilh Avicenna with the input of the active intelligence) and can bypass the inner faculties
identified as necessary preliminanes in the works of Avicenna (i.e., onginstiJlg with the senses and
leading ta the estimative faœ1ty). Nonetheless, Subrawardi' 5 adoption of the light and darkness
motifs does not prevent him from reproducing - in melaphorical ~e - e1ements found in Avicenna' s
Peripateticism. Neither the problem of the means by which knowledge of this world is acquired, nor
the perennial question of die relation between the soul and the body, have been solved. 70

70 Corbin. AJ'rh., JO n.46; cf. [dem, "L' imswo~empLi," 288.

 CHAPTER 5EVEN - 177

• SEVEN •

EPISTEMOLOGY

SELF-KNOWLEDGE

The question of self-knowledge in the thought of Suhrawardï is aI the heart of his conception
of presential knowledge (~J~ rU ), bis contribution to Islamic philosophy. It has been argued
that tbis Ù1.O.ovative doctrine of knowledge is possible, in part. because of bis elaboration of s theory

of seJf-knowledge consisting essentially of any individual's immediate and unmediated knowledge

of what or who that ÏJl.dividual is.

The discussions about the sou! found in the P.lJllë'do, the P1Jedrus and the Timaeus imply
1
some sort of self-knowledge. However, Plato did not sctually propose an explicit theory of self-
knowledge.

SeJf-knowledge was neither taken up by Aristotle as a psrticular issue. It was not until the
advent of Neoplaronism that genuine enquiries into the issue of se1f-knowledge began in eamest.
Some discussions of Plotin.us' ideas with respect to the ides of seH-knowledge found Ebeir way into
warks such as the pseudo- TIJeoJOjfy of An:srode which then greatly iofluenœd Islamic thought.
Plotinus with bis asœnt motif inttoduces a conception of the self that can be equated with a kind of
personal mowledge.2 The se1f's upward drive, characteristic of every soul. guarantees st least the
possibility that eac:h soul will achieve an inteJleetUal knowledge of itse1f. Hence, the PlotWan system
dermes intelleetllal and etbical dimensions of the soul' s quest, in its attempt CO return to the One.:3
Suhrawlltdï shows that direetand unmediated knowledge constitutes a possible and a legitimate
method of knowing, using the analogy of self-knowledge. Not rurprisingly, bis discussions on this
subjeet are elmonte, beœuse of the importance self-knowledge pJays in the e1sboration of bis own
epistemology. His discussions of r.his point.-e much more extensive tban tbose found in Avicenna.
For Suhrawardï, discussions on se1f-knowledge arise in two c10sely related contexts: the metaphysical
and the psycbologica1.

ln the metaphysical context (which will not be deaJt with here at length), self-knowledge is

1 Wesrra, "SeJf-Knowing," 89-92.

2 Crystal, "PlotulUs," 264-86.
3 Westra, "SeJf-Knowing," 93-102; cf. Rappe, "SeIf-tnowJedge and SubJectivity," 253-70.
 CHAPTER 5EVEN - 178

an essential mode of knowledge or cognition ascribed to intelligible substances and œlestia1 souls. In
the psychologicat context. Suhrawsrdï lays the conditions tha hetp deJineate and defme the nature of
an initial percepti"n of the self in tenns of a seJf-consciousness. The experience of seJf-consciousness

is a primay experience and the oruy real experience leading to true knowJedge. A good introduction
to the whote discussion on seLf-knowledge in the psychologiœ1 context is found in the fnumlJLrOns
where Suhrawardï writes that the problem of knowledge had been the most preoccupying problem
which he encountered. What he had read in books. he informs the reader. failed to satisfy mm. But.
one night, aCter spendiJlg long hours thinking and practising spiritual exercises (4.w.l:.J >, he fell in a
state of somnolence (r.,.:;.J1 é.; Io.):
1 was overcome with a pleasure, a g1ittering flash of Light. and a radiant glow [Lit
ligbt] which was [takiJlg the shape of] a representation (~) of li human form
(~~I é; I.e Then. 1 saw it. It was the succaur [i.e., the aid] of the souls. the
).

Imam of [perenniaJ] wisdom, the ftrSt teacher [Aristotle] possessiog a distinguishing

quality (~.;;. ) which pleasecl me and a splendor which astonished me ... 1 then
ex>mplained ta him abaut tbe difficulties of this problem. He said to me "Go back to
your self (~ ~! ~~I), then, [this difficulty] will be solved for yoU.,,4

This pœsage introduces some of the Most important discussions of the Io4imIlIÙHJS. What
---, follows is a long dialogue betWeen Suhrawardï and the farst mast« - Aristotle - who ansWer.i bis
queries about the nature of knawledge. It is in. the course of his dream-vision of Aristotle that he is
instrueted about the nature of knowledge - true knowledge is achieved wough the subject' s perception
of her Ol" bis own essence or self (~'j), her or bis soo1. 5

Such discussions are not entire1y novet Plotinus' idea of the self as knowledge found its way
ÏJlto some passages of Avicenna' s works where simi1ar preoccupations and issues are discussed. In
fact, Aviœnna appe&rS ta be the first Islamic pbîJosopher to have anempted an analysis of self-
knowledge in the context of philosophica1 anthropology. e.g., in bis ClHP, Discussions.6 and
RemnrJa. For instance, in. the Ilemorrs, Avice.n.na begins a discussion on the nature of the human
soul and self-lmowledge with a stâement that it is identical with the one pronounced by Suhrawardï's
Aristotle: "Go back to your se.lf.,,7

4 TJllwf!Jk. § 55, 70.3-7.

5 Foc:liai,"n is the Peripatetic master of philosophy, l.e., the rea1 Aristode, and net uy one else,"

cf. Ziai, KJ!o,,'eq,e. 145 n.5. The lnJth lies more in.liDe wim Fakhry's assessment, i.e., il would repœsent the
Aristol1e of me pseutlo-77JedCf[Y, cr. Fathry. HiseOlY'. 299 n.IO. It is net, here, the place to discuss the nature
of and the dectriJles a:fopleCl by tbis Iagyre Suhrawardï idemifie:s as Aristotle. For LandoJt, it is a personalisation
of the Adive Intellect, d. Landolt, • 5uhrawacdï' s," 478b.
6 Pines•• Conc:eptlon.." 204. 244-16.
7 Avicenna, fslrJÏr"iU, vol. 2, m, 1.319.5 (.où:, 303).
 CHAPTER. SEVEN - 179

In what follows. we will show. first. bow Suhrawardï aticulates bis notion of self-knowJedge
and, second, how the discussions ÏJ1 Aviœnns's works about se1f-knowledge are the prelude and
perbaps the origin of Suhrawa-dï's enquiries on ·this particuJar issue. Suhr:lwardrs analyses on
self-knowJedge are more complex than those round in Avicenna. Subrawardï discusses the knowledge
of the soul itself, a knowledge totaUy different from that of other chings. Self-knowledge shares ft

particular re1ationship with ils object. i.e., the experience of the self, not as it cogitates, but as it
exists. Ta explain self-perception and self-consciousness. Suhrawardi makes use of philosophica.l
quments and this, notwithstanding the faet that these experiences ocou' ft[ a leve1 often thought to
lie beyond any rationaJ or intelleaive experience.

It is in the context of discussions about the establishment of the existence of an immaterial

soul th. Suhrawardï is to discuss seLf-knowledge B A parallel may be drawn oEtWeen Suhrawardï's
ooncept of se1f-knowledge in view of its immediacy,9 and the more mystical position of the N eoplatonic
tradition and its concept of se1f-knowledge or self-cognition (PlotinuS).10 The latter aspect remains to
be explored.

SELF-CONS ClOU SNESS

The first issue of importance regarding self-knowledge pertains ta the unceasing nature of
tbis particular type of immediate awareness of the self. 11 Self-awareness rests upon the immediacy of
the personai knowledge of one's self. But as Jamalpur bas argued, while Descartes moves from
thought to existence (the CV§"L~O tYg0 sum), AvicenJla tries to show that it is impossible for the seH
(i.e., the soul) to be unaware of ils existeace. Therefore, self-knowJedge in Avicenna does not
amount te a tautology of the type" 1 am myself," since this is aot a 10gical proposition (like A is A).
It COlTesponds to an. "existential" proposition, i.e., a direct self-awareness of the self. This "existenrial
proposition" constitutes "the a priori condition of human intelligence," i.e., a kind of "pre-conscious

e HiknuIr, § 1l4-117, 110.15-116.15 (5.tv., 102-8). One exception 15 the unedited physic:s of the
TJllwi:/1iïf: (B~Jin ms. 5062, menl10ned by Ziai) wbich contains a book Cb Ute Soul (lV) and wbose fourtb
cbapter is dedicated ta se1f-knowledge,1c.Dowledge one', essenœ, and seJf-c:onsciousness; furthennore, simil..
discussions OCCll[' in the physic:s of the PldIs (Leiden ms. Or. 365, mentioned by Ziai), cf. Zlai, Knowlet:(fre,
147, 147 D.4, 148n. 4 and n.s.
9 Fer Ziai, Suhrawardi's tnowledge by presenc;e is "the subject's immediate eKpet1enœ of the
"presence" of the abject [which] determines the validity of lcnowledge itself. Thus experien.œ of sucb mings as
Gad, the self, sepante entities, ete., is the same as know1edge of tltem," cf. Zia!. KDowledjre, 143. ln this
respect, this type of knowledge can he said to c:orrespond 10 the mystical aspect of Suhrawardi' 5 thought in
.~. whicb he tries to pcovide rational exp1anatioDS fer the occurrence of suœ persoJUll and intuitive experie.nces.
10 Rappe," Self-Perœptïon," 433 -51.
Il Kobayashi, -Ibn5ïna and Suhrawardi," 62-77.
 CHAPTER 5EVEN - 180

stage...12 These conclusions, however, are required by Jamalpur' s essentialist interpretation,

p-esupposing the existence of a substance prior ta its existence - i.e., the distinction beeween the
existence of a conception of the self as a primitive ego along with a created ego.

Such immediacy is linked to the primacy of the fundamental awareness that one has of one' 5
self. Self-knowledge , in this perspective, corresponds to a primary apperception of one' s own existence,
a sort of primary awareness of one' 5 individu al self. Suhrawardï write5 that:

In general, you can be unaware (~~ ) of evay body ~ ) and accident

(~~ ) that exists, white you cannat be unaware of your seJf (.),à ), since you
know your self (.) ~) without having to ponder ( ~ ~) over ail of these [things ].13

The ftrst characteristic of self-knowJedge is tha it need not proceed from the acquisition of
any type of knowledge of what constitutes human beings, i.e., bodies and accidents. The latter is by
no means a cnndition for self-awarenes5~ rather, seJf-awareness is essentially pre-conceptual and
piorto anyintellettual considentt.ionofone's own nature. Itis impossible roreduceone's self-awareness
ta the perception of the physical body, such that neither the knowledge nor the awareness of bodily
parts or, for that matter, of the whole human body would amount to se1f-knowledge.

This is established by appeaJing to our genenallack of knowJedge of our internai organs,

some of which cao oaly be known by means of a comparison with other living beings or by
dissection. If awareness of one's self was somehow dependent on the knowledge of ail our bodily
parts, tben ignor&J1ce or unawareness of the existence of the heart, the brain, and other internai
crgans wouJd amount to an ignorance or unaw.-eness of one's self. Suhrawardï wriœs that, indeed
"you know yourown self [i.e., your essence] (.)~ ~J.i), although you are unsware of aU the organs.
You consist, therefore, [of somethiog which is] beyond all [these bodily] organs."I<l SeJf-knowledge
is, Ibus, not associated with the knowledge of the bodily. Rather, it is prior ta any type of intellectl1a1
oonsiderali.ons about what ooostitutes the nature of human bei.ngs or their con5tÏtuents.

Avicenna aIready made the same point byarguing that the soul (or the self) is not identical
with, e.g., the skin which the eye sees, for if somebody else were to wear that skin, the individual
would still remain the same. The sout is neither the bodily parts Dor the org30S that constitute the
body, since internaI organs such as the heart or brain are only known artel" dissection (e= ~ ).

Avicenna adds duit "what you perceive is aIse not a totality (~ ), as a totality ." is something

12 Jamalpur-, rr::xl JUJd Af~, 170-1.

IJ P.1Imï. m, § 27, 23.5- 7 ( Boat" 24).
1

14 AfJr.m, n, § 27, 129.9-12: cf. PJII'tü, Dl § 27, 23.3~ (BOOK. 24).

 CHAPTER 5EVEN - 181

e1se."IS He then goes on ta show that the soul is samething other than a living being's corporeality
(~.: ft ? ), and other than the mixture (G,..I j...G ) that constituleS its body.16

AviC'~Jl1la states that no one cao be unawace af who she or he is Someone who sleeps or a
drunken person, altbough not in. a nonnaI state of awareness, is nonetheJess se1f-llware, even if the
self-representation is not canstantly present in memory. Avicenna aIso uses the hypatheticaJ example
of the "suspended person" ta prove th~ the soul is immaleriaJ and that it has an experientill1 or
intuitive knowledge of its self (~! ) as an immaterial entity.17 Moreover, if it were p05sibl~ for
someone ta be suspended and not recei.ve any type of information from the outside world througb
perception or mediated by any bodily parts or organs (_~i ), this person. wauld still be llware. he
asSel'tS, ,. of the certitude of its being ('a-,...:·.... i ..::-~):,16

Suhrawardï pursues the matter in a similar fashion and says that if one investigates further:

You da net find that which is really you (~j '4 ~j L. ) other than something
which perceives itse1f (oLil~ lS,J~ ) and it is that which is your individuaI being
(A-,.: ., ~ i). And everything whicb can perœive itself (~I ~) and its individu al being
(~wi) bas this in common with yoU.
19

Knowledge of one's self occurs, furthermore, because of the existence of an unceasing

phenomenoll or, as Suhraw..dï notes, "the knowledge of yourself (~ ~ Ü 1,) ) is unintetTUpted
(G.-I~ ) and permanent (r=IJ)."20 Fïrst, it is the individu al existence that is the subjeet of this

unintenupted knowledge, inasmuch as no one can stop ta apprebend her or bis existence. And,
second, this knowledge is permanent, in the sense that its permanence refers eithee to the knowledge
chat persists throughout one' s lifetime, or al every moment of one' s life; or ta the knowledge tbat
persists as an abstraeted-like knowledge, independeotly of any material (earthly) substratum, in the
afterlife, in the sense of being etemal (r-: 1,). This is an important aspect of Suhrawardi' 5 esch.ology,
inasmuch as the abjects of the imaginative faculty will be able ta survive the disappearance of the
body and be responsible for the Cate of the soul, in the afterlife. 00 the whole, the first charaeteristic
of self-Jmowledge is its definition in tenns of a notion of self-awareness.

15 AviceJUla, IslJMriû, vol. 2, Ill, 3, 322.8-323.2 (OU:, 308).

16 Avicenlla, I.dJiiiir, vol. 2, Ill, 5,325.1-330.1 (Dû:, 309-10).

'.
17 Mannura, "AvicelUla's -Flying Man" in Context," 386-7; d. GOic::hcll, OrSt:r:rJaiOD, 13-5.
18 Avicenna, Ishiiriû, vol. 2 ,[[l,4, 323.6-324.7 (Orr., 3Il); cf. Ibid., 7,320.7 (Oir:, 304).
19
.ffrbmlr, ":!~ 116,1l2.11-13 (5i{4r.. 1(4).
20 HllyfikiJ, n (a) 49.8-9 (p) § S, 86.1 (AJ'rh.. 43; FsmaLl, 101).
 CfiAPTER SE\/EN - 182

SELF-ID ENTITY
Suhrawardï' 5 concept of se1f-knowledge introduces a notion of self-identity. Thefitst argument
that Suhrawardi provides to establish self-identity is t&ken trom observations of bodily changes. In
genera1. because of the deficiencies 10 which their bodies are subjected, aH living things undergo
Datura! transformations. The expJanation of such a deficiency is the existence of the natural heat
(...:,.,..)1;' ) that bodies possess and which is responsible for their natUral depletion. Such a state

requires, in turn, a replenishment by way of an intake of nutrients. The body, thErefore, replaces
contiauously, complete1y, and n8turally. what it loses.L i

The same physiological phenomenon applies to all other bodily parts. such mat the whole
body constantJy changes throughout life: everything which constitutes the bodysuffe1"5 transformation.
e.g., the sJcin, muscles. and alJ other organs. AU these bodily parts become dissolved (jL.:;{. ) ud.
then, rebalanced uJ-::.) by a process of replenishment,22 since they are subject to aJteration (J.=~)
and transformation (~ ).Z3 Avicenna avails himself of a simi1ar argument based on a ronstant
bodily transformation.24

In spite of all these physiological changes that affect the narural body, the human being' s

~.
apperception of itself is not subject 10 similar changes. Suhrawardï writes that "if you were that body
or a part of it, then your individual being [i.e.. your ipseity) (;;-:·,~i ) would be changing all the
time. ..zs FOl' Suhrawardï, as for Avicenna, tbat which remains unaltered is a person's individuality. It
is that which constitutes tbe essence of each and every individual. Suhrawardï adds that:

If your own individu al body were te be understood as one of tbe parts of the body,
il would lilœwise [like these parts] be constantly changing. Your own individual
being [i.e., your ipseityJ of Jast year (~..)~ ~) would no Jonger be [identical toJ
Y0Ul" individual being of this ye..; indeed, your own individual being (,:i (,$~ )
Z6
would amount to something diffeœnt every day; and this is not the case.

The abave argument reslS on the assomption that if individuality were somehow identicaJ

21 HllyJkiJ. II (a) 49.6-8 (p) § S, 85.11-S (Arrh.. 42; f.mrau. 101). This is a natural procas by which

the body regeneraœs itself. k wa argued tha if die body did net ehminare some of the food it ingested, lt
would gcow indefiDitely somerhiJIg ilS natural developmenr refutes.
1

22 A/wJi!J, n, § 27,129.7-8.
Z3 HI!Y.ibJ, II Cp) § S. 8S .1S-16 CAJ'rh. 43; fsmlJ/, 10 1).
204 Aviœnna, ~f~. 128.24-129.14 (Mamull"a. "Ghazali," 201-2).
2S HII.,.nifzl. II (a) 49.7-8 (Arat., 42; fsmaL/, 101); cf. AJwJi!J. II, § 27, 129.8.
~.
. 26 HIIfikil, II (p) § S, 8S.Hi-LS (ALd.43; fsmRIl.IOL). He wntes in the Arabic version, -however,

as Ions as the perceiving subâ.JJce (~J~ .;lb ~ ) ÏJl you persists, chen you are [U1l1y] yourself (~l ~ 1) and
Jlot [lJCI'cei~1 through you body," cf. [bid., JI (a) 49. 8-9 (fsml~, 101).
 CHAPTER. 5EVEN - 183

•
with the body or part of the body. then. how could the OCCUlTeJlce of change take place withfn the
body without the individuality associated with il aIso changing? Experience proves otherwise.
Tberefore, there must be a definite permanence of one's own perœptlOJl of one's existence. If
self-knowledge depended on the bodily, the person's individuality would also be subject to change.
But, in faet. there is a permanence of one's identity throughout life. The underlying assumption of
such an argument is the intuitive knowledge t.nherent in the experience of one's self-identity itself.

The second argument for self-identity which Suhrawardï provides is based on the Loss of
sorne bodily parts or the Loss of their perception. In such cases, the ïndividua1's knowleclge of one's
self does not cease with the loss of sorne bodily Iimbs. This type of bodily deficiency - whether
natura! or accidentai - in no way affects a person' s self-identity as a whoJe. Suhrawardï provides the
examples of human beings who live without a band, a foot., or some ether bodily part and who do not
loose the knowledge of who chey are or part of the knowledge of themselves.27 In faet, Suhraw8l"dï is
explicit: thase who suffer a loss of sensation in any part of tbeir bodies do not lose sigbt of who they
are. He Wl"Ïtes, "DOW that if you forget any psrticuls- part of YOUf body, [Of if] you see some parts
without aay life or perception [e.g.. a paratysed limb] , it does not make a human being deficient. tt2B

The self is, therefore, not reducible lo the perception of its bodily parts, although tbese can,
st limes, be forgotten. 29 In sum, Suhrawardi advances these arguments to estabJish the notion of
self-identity. Once the notion of self-identity is accepted, he can tben proceed ta establish the
existence of an individu al being or of m ipseity, i.e., the individual rational sou1. This argument can,
in fact, betraced back ta Avicenna's hypothetical "suspended person" example. 30

UNMEDIATED NATURE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE

The third aspect of self-knowledge which Suhrawardï discusses st length is its unmediaœd
nature. It occupies the bulk of the arguments on which he builds bis own conception of presentiaJ
knowledge. Self-knowledge, primarily because it is intimalely associsted with self-conscious.ness,
constitutes a dirett type of knowledge which precludes the positing of any type of intermediary.
Self-tnowledge is an immediate and unmedila:ed knowledge chat does away with the distinction
between the object and the subject of knowledge as both are embodied in one and the S801e individual

AlwJÏ/J, n, § 27, 129.7-9.

••
27

28 .PIrtiï, nI (p) § 27,23.3-4 (BoOK, 24).

2'9 HiI,riïkiI, il (a) 049.2-4 (p) § 4, 85.4-6 (.ALrh., 42; .IsmllJJ, 101).
JO PiJles, "Conception," 185-7; cf. Marmuca, "Gbaza1i and the Avicennall," 195-205; cf. Ibid.,
.. Avicenna' 5 Flying Man"
Il 1Jl Context," 383-95.
 CHAPTal 5EVEN - L84

being - the self. the soul

In bis llenuuKs. Avicenna ventures answers to such queries as "do you perceive [yourself]
through an intennediary?" He answers ta this question negative1y. writing that "you pereeive you~1f
without having a need for another faculty or for an intennediary. "3L

It is not surprising, therefore. ta discover tha Suh~wardï echoes Avicenna' s position with
statements Wce "to perceive yourself, you do not need anyt.hing ether than your own self [or essence)
(~I.J)... 32 The self is. here, the individual eristence that manifests itself. in. a sense. intuitively to the
one who experiences his own existence and not through the knowledge of what the self constitutes.
One might say that the being of the self, i.e.. that which constitutes the individuality. cannot be
occulted. as it constitutes the essence of the self. Nothing stands betWeen the self and the knowledge
it bas of itself.

To establish the veracity of a notion of unmediated knowJedge. Suhrawardi goes on ta

provide, aleast, four c10sely rel81ed wguments ta show that it is impossible ta obtain knowledge of
the selfthrough sucb tbings as image, form, notion of self (~I~), or attribute of the self.

la. bis first version of the argument for the unmediated nature of self-knowledge, Suhrawardi

states that self-kn.owJedge cannot be the result of a representation and tha it does not occur through
an image. simile, or representation of the self. He writes:

A thing [i.e., a bei.ng] thatis se1f-5\1bsisting (..:il~ ~l.i) [and] which perceives itself
(~'.iJ ~..J~ ) [i.e.. ils essence] does not know itself (~I.i) tbrough an image
(J ~ ) of itself which would be in it5elf. because if its knowledge [of itself] were
by means of an image, which image of the individu al being would be ether than
[the individual being] itself (~~ :i .(,c,~, J~ ) ... it would follow nece5sarily
that the perception of the reality of the individual being (~ü~ 1 ~'.).J!) is by itseJf
the perception of 8.11 impersanal object (,A ~ L..), ... which is absurd.
33

The unst8ted premise of this argument is. once more, that the self hE an unmediated
knowledge of what it is. Images or similes which bave to be postulated as mediating agents in sucb a
œse become the abjects of self-knowledge. Perception of the individuaJ self would. then, essentially

amount ta the perception of that ether entity, posited as an abject of the self.

Subrawanlî appears ta distinguish between Ibis particular type of knowledge of one' s self
and the sensitive perception of the extenlaJ world. In the latter case, the perception of extemal

31 Avicenna. fslJMiir, vol. 2, III, 2, 321.2-8 (Où:, 308); cf. AmaJdez, "Un Jricédent avicennieJl,"

341-49; cf. Druart. -The SauL and Body Problem," 27-49.

32 !5A:mRe, § 116. 112.2-3 (5.tf:, 103).
J3 Hikm.JI/", § 115, 111.5-8 (~4T.. 102).
 CflAPTER. 5EVEN - 185

•• abjects occurs through representations which are usually constituted of images (J ~ ) of the objects
found in the world. In the case of perception thcough the senses. for instance. the objea of perception
- i.e., the perceptibles - and the real. objea in the world both become objective entities
one who peeceives and both at"e essentially reducible to one and the same thing.
3a
c.,.> fc:- th~

Knowledge mediated br such representations cannot. however, apply to sel.f-knowledge. The

OCCUlTence of self-knowledge that would require represenrations or images of the self would not be
possible. because tbese representations or images would become obstacles for the perception of the
true self. Perception of the self would and could ooly be achieved thcough its represent8tÎon and not
through what it reaUy is. ConsequentJy, Suhrawardi concludei mit knowledge of the self through
any ki..nd of representatïon of images or similes U ~) is, therefore, unsustai.Jlable.
The difficuJty raised by this first version of the argument fer the unmediated nature of
se1f-knowledge js, in faa, the problem of the "objectification" of that which constitutes the subjeet
of self-knowledge. The subject of se1f-knowJedge would simultaneously be construed as some kind
of objective reality through which the self, out of which is constituted the individual being, would
have ta know itseJf. In chis case, knowledge of the seJf would have ta be equated witb the knowJedge
of the image, the simile, or any othee kind of representation tbat stands for the self and, thus, Lie
outside the self. Such a cepresentation wou1d. therefcre, mways prevent the self from having direct
aeeess to its reaJ essence.

The argument is 5uch that if self-knowledge occulTed through an image or a representation

(J~), then, one of t'Wo situations would follow: either the subject would not know that it is its own
image, because the knowledge this person would have of the image presupposes the existence of
another image, cesulting in an infinite regress: or the subjea would be aW81"e of the faet that it is a
self-image, in which case, the subjec:t would aJready have self-knowledge without having uy need
for such a self-image.:'5 Suhrawardï shows how such a conception of se1f-knowledge leads to two
absurd conclusions and, thet"efore, demonstrates the impossibility of a concept of sel.f-knowledge
which requites the intervention of a represeotatioD, as an intermediary term in this partieular epistemic
process.
The second version of Suhrawardï' s argument for the unmediated nature of se1f-knowledge
is lb. self-tnowledge does not occur tbrough a fonn of the self. With this second version of the
argument, Suhrawardï implicitly alludes to the absurdity of anr conception of the soul in terms of a

304 IfLbn#/', § 115, 111.9 (S8g:. 102).

35 PLbn., § 115,111.9-11 (SJw:, 102-3).
 CHAPTER. 5EVEN - 186

•• form. thus rejecting the immanence unplied in the adoption of any type of hylomorphic theory of the
soul-body compound. More importantly. however. Suhl"awardï tries to do away with a Peripatetic
conception of knnwle:cJge based on a theory of abstraction of fonns. For mm. this c1assical mode of
knowledge cannot sufficiently explain se1f-knowledge. It is nat difficult for him to reject this theol"}'
of absuaction. because he discusses a type of knowledge (as opposed to the perception of the
extenlaJ reality) which offers no p05sibility of being grasped thmugh any sort of lnteUectual
representslÎon. al least, in its more primitive and primary mode of self-perception (e.g., self-awareness).
Contrary to uy type of sense perception. self-perception is not the result of 811 abstraction of the
fenil which constituleS the objective and external reality of the self which could then fmd its way
into the COO1A1OD se.ese. The self. or the individu al being. is itself. and knows itse1f without having
to resort to any kind of abstraction of f orms of ilS own reality.

The argument Subrawardï provides is very similar to the previous one. It is. therefore. not
surprising that the occurrence of such forms witbiA the process of se1f-knowledge should amount,
again. to an "objectification" of the self and its reality. Suhrawardï offers two reasons; the first is as
follows:
_o. Therefore. we say tbat our souls, wben tbey perceive their essence ('+il:' ), their
perception cf [their essence) is. for severaJ ressons. net by means of a form.. One of
these [reasons] is that the form. which would be in the soul would not be by itself
identical with [the souJ] ~ vA ~ ~ ). And that which Ferceives its own
essence perceives the very essence (~)36by which its iJldividual being (~~i )
exists and not an [other] entity (jA i) wbich would correspond ta it. And every form
in the one who perceives would be added to [the perœiver' 5] essence such as to be
in relation ta [the one who perceives], an abject [Le., an lOit" C".,.) other than the
subject itseJf]: [the Conn] wouJd Qot be an "1" (t,;) [i.e., an individu al entity] for
[the one who percei.ves]. Tberefore. perception is not througb a form. ri
The second reason is the following:

If self-perception ('+=aI,j.J ~I •.:.H,J.J! ) [i.e.. the soul's perception of its essence]

were by means of Il fonn. (but, this is impossible, because] every fotm acquired by
the soul is a univers al , wbich [by defiJlition] nothi.ng stops from being appJied to a
multitude (i~ ); even if tateJl 8S a totality of universals. ail of which together
would be specific to a single individual (~ ) [i.e., our persans]. it still would
not leave its universalness [i.e., it still would be applicable to a multiplicity rather
chan ta one only]. But every human being percei.ves its essence (~I~) in a way
which prevents it from being applied to others (4S~ ). Tberefore. the tbinking of

35 It is abo the fact of betag the same, i.e., same.ness (~).

77 MJIS/WZ#', § 208,4&4.6-10.
 CHAPTER. 5EVEN - 187

one' 5 parlicular essence (~~I ~ l.iJ ~ ) cannot possibly take place by means
'~ of a fotm. 3B

In short, seJf-perception is neithec through a universal form - in which case me perœived

abject wouJd not be the particuJar subject it rea1ly is - nor through the ordinary percepüon of
particulars - i.e., the senses. Therefore, self-perception must be through the soul itse1f. He aIso adds
that:

Furthermore. the sou1 perceives its body and perceives its [faculties of) estimative
and of passive imagÎJlation (4J I..:à", 4-aA" ). So, if it were to perceive these things
through a fonn that [would be] in its essence (~f,j ), white this form would be a
universaI, then. the soul would be a mover (4S..>-=-" ) of a universal body. and would
be a usee of a universaI faculty. Hence. [the soul] would possess neitherthe perception
of its own body oar bave perception of the facu1ties of ilS own body and this wovld
not be correct. How could tbis be when the estimative [facuJty] (rA.J) denies its
[own) self and aIso deDies the internai faculties. a1though, iJ1deed. [the estimative]
does not deny its effects {lAJ~;} So. if the estimative [faculty] does not perceive
these [inner] facu1ties [of the soul], and bodily faculties do not pecceive anything of
these [bodily facu1ties] themselves, then the soul would not perœive anything, but
universa1s. Tberefol"e, it would follow that a hUmaJl being would not perceive bis
body, bis estimstive [faculty], and bis [faculty] of passive imagination by which
particulars are dislinguished (~ ~ ~ ...~ ); and this is oot the cœe. And there
is no human being who does not perceive bis present (~La. ) particular body and
facuJties, and make use of a particular facuJty. Therefore. a human being does not
pereeive himself br meao.s of a form, dOe5 not [perceive] bis lacuJties in a certain.
general way by means of a form, and does not [perceive] bis body in a certain
~
general way through a (orm.
The third version of Subrawardï' 5 argument for the u11.dlediated nature of se1f-knowledge is
found in anotber passage whEl"e he eKplains how the self cannot perceive itself through the particu1sr
notion whicb defmes ils own nature, i.e., the notion of self or the notioA of essence (~I.i) itse1f.
4J

Once more, Suhtawardi uses a similar argument - it is impossible to know the self through someûling
ether than the self. Henœ, it is impossible to know the self, if one tries to conceive of the self as
having knowledge of itself througb an entity tha would cOITespond to its self or its essence (~f .ï).

For Suhraw..di. such a notion of self or the essence of the self would. once again, become intermediate
tenus or entities, posited between the self and the knowledge of what constitutes iL Any notion of
the self would, merefore, set like a representation or a form. and become an objective reality of the

Je A,fJlSlJlïà', § 208. 4&4, 10-14.

.•. .
39 MlISJnn", § 208,484.14-485.6.
'.--.
40 There are some quidditles which CaJ1JlOt possess an. ex:is1ence in aetuality and in concrete enemal
essences. s1lCh as Dlany geometncal figures, cf. Aviœana, IslllÏrik, vol. 2, HI, 5,334.3-340.1 (Où:, 312).
 CHAPTER. 5EVEN - 188

•
-- self. which would. men. predude an access to the crue self. It would amount to the knowledge of
something ether man its true reality. Suhrawardï writes:

You perceive your self. Your perception of yourself is either t.."trough your [owr ~
self (~I ~) or through somEthing other man the self which would [in the laaer
case] then be - besides your self - another faculty or [another] self (~I~) which
would perceive your essence (..:,blj) This argument les.ds to an infinite regress. and
this is impossible:~l

Subrawardï offers yel anether example of what he has in mind, t.hts Ume using the concept of
substantiality (~;"~). Hewrites:

And if substantiality (4:;"~ ) were [taken as] [il the entelechy of [the se1f's]
quiddity (~La J t...s ) or [ü] were an expression of the negation [of inberence
iJl) a subjeet or a substratum (~I.Ji t.."...:..."ll ~ ). then, [substantiality] would
[in any case] not exist as an Ùldependent entity which would be identical with your
essence (~ ~ d::ilj). If substantiality is me8Jlt to possess an unknown meaning
[or concept], and sinee you constantly perceive your self (d:31.ï .:!SJ.Jl ) not by
means of an added entity, therefore, the substantiality that is concealed from you is
42
not the totality of your self (.:,blj) and not a part of rour self.
Suhrawardï maltes it clear that even an understanding of one' s ipseity or of one' s the self in.
.~ ..... terms of one's substantiality - i.e., the soul's substance - faUs prey te similar objections of
"objeetification" of the essence of the self. Such a logical distinction in terms of substantiality
œnnot, in fact, tender the tr'Ue nature - as it exists - of the self.

The fourth version of Su.hrawardï' 5 argument amounts to what bas been implicitly heJd in all
three previou5 versions. The different arguments he presents seem te be reducible te a genera1
pinciple that emphasizes the impossibility of self-knowLedge through any sort of entity added ta the
self. If anything were added to the seJf, e.g., arepresentation, afonn. or anotherself for self-knowledge
ta be achieved, this particular additional entity would, men, have te be considered an attribute
(4à..-), and it would have ta belong to the self.

ln titis particular case, in which the self would be an attribute, if the self were to judge mat
any type of attribuœ had been added ta irse1f, tbis would p'esuppose tbat the self had known its own
essence beforehand in order to know tbat the attribute was superadded ta its essence - without
having the self to resort te a notion of the self or any added attribute just to kn.ow ïtself. In short. for
A ta know that B belongs to it, A bas to tnow A in the first place. The ErgOment, although seemingJy
more compJex, is essentially simiJar to the one used in the previous three venions. Suhrawardï

41 TJtfwf!2iû, § 55, 70.7-9 (free traDS. in Amin Razavi, Su1Jnl",JIn:5.59).

42 Jn:l:mIrr, 1116, 112.8-11 (S4':, 103~).
 CfIAPTER 5EVEN - 189

wriles:

Il is inconceivable that a thing (.~) [ie.. an existing and knowing being] knows
ilS self b)" means of an enrity added (~I j ,)-'8i) to its self. because [the added entit)"]
would be an attribute (:u...- ) belonging to [the existing and knowing being]. And if
[the knowing being] juciges that any attribute added to ilS essence. whether it be
knowiedge (~) or something else [i.e.. another attribute]. belongs to its essence
(...:il~). then. it would have already known its essence before aU the atlributes and
without them. Therefore. it did not know its self by means of [any] added attribute.~
More generally. aU tbese different versions of the argument for the unmediated nature of
self-knowledge highlight the importance of the issue for Suhrawardi ln numerous passages, he
rejecL'i a notion of se1f-knowledge that would require or depend on the mediation of any type of
mental representation of the self, whetber it be a representation. an image, a simile, a form. any type
of attribute, or even a concept The impossibility of seJf-knowledge tbrough any sort of representation
is essentially argued on the assumption that sucb a knowledge is inherent. unquestionable. perpetua!
and. somehow, akin te a pre-conceptual perception QI" awareness. Suhrawardï .wriœs:

And Mce perception [of the self] cannot be tbrough a fonn (0,J"- ) or something
added (~I j). you do net need for the perception of your self (~I.iJ .:!SI.).)! )
anything other tban your self (d:;I,j) which is manifest ta itself (1. .à·,1 i."AU; ) or
not absent from its self (~ VA- ~ W, ~ 1 ). Consequent1y, it is necessary
thal the perception of its self [i.e., its essence (~,~)] is due 10 [or caused by] itself
as il is, and [in fact] you do not become absent st all !rom your self cr part of your
self.4=!

Suhrawardi makes an analogy as a tool for understanding what he conceives to be the mode
of perception of self-knowledge that occurs without resorting ta any sort of representation. The
ex8l11ple he provides is the ex:perience of pain. an anaiogy orten used to illustrae the evanescent
chanlCteristic of this particu1ar type of personal knowledge. Suhrawardï writes:

And amongst that which establishes thBt we possess perceptions (..::,., loSJ .).)! ) which
8I'e in no need of another form other than the presence (.)..,.:-;- ) of the essence
(~I~) of what is peroeived (~J":" ) is: that a human. being suffers pain because of
the separation of a bodily part whicb is attached [to ber or bis body] and feels il
(4.:' ~ ). not because the separation of [a bodily part] 8ttached [ta the body]
causes for [this] person another Corm in that bodily part or in (any] other [part].
Rather, the object of perception (~J.w ) [i.e.. pain] is identica1 to thal separation
«(j"'~ ) which is sensed (uu",........- ); by itself, pain does net arise through a form
which would occur from [the sep8l'8.tion]. Therefore. il bas been shown that what is
sufficient for the perception (..:.11.).)1) of what cao. be perceived is the OCCUlTence of

43 /fibnRe. § 115, 111.11-1<4 (5..tf; 103).

44 .ffrbDRe, § 116, 112.1-3 (5ttr.. 103).
 CflAPTER. 5EVEN - 190

the essence of [these abjects of perception. e.g .. pain] [0 the soul or ta an entitya5
which has a particular and presential attachment to the soul (u-l:.. -~.J"":--' ~I. ï
~l.:!)..:16

The analogy of pain. apdy illu!U8tes the manner in which self-knowledge must be understood.
These different aspects of the nature of self-knowledge aUlead to discussions about the individuality
which cbaracterizes each and every soul. On.ce the condiuons ofself-knowledge have beenestablished.
Suhrawardï can. then. seek to demonstrate the existence of an individual soul.

INDIVIDUATION AND PERSONAL INDIVIDUALITY

SeJf-knowledge. witb its various facets posits the existence of an individuality - of an
Ùldividual self - as the subject of aU personal experienœs. Such individuality is constitutive of each
and every individu" b eing , human or celestial (e.g., celestial souls or angels).d7 The previous discussions
about the nature of seJf-knowledge aU revolve around a notion of individuality. More general1y, in
the Peripatetic system, individuation occurs to human and celestial souls as a consequen.ce of their
existentiation. This kind of individu81ion requires the presence of some faim of bodily matter ta
whieh the souls will attach themselves: œlestial souls will attach tbemse1ves to celestial and ethereal
bodies. i.e., the œlestial spheres; white human souls will attaeh themselves ta elementa1 bodies, i.e.,
the human physiœ1 body (see section on the nature of the soul).41 In fBet, Suhrawardï' 5 aim in
establishiJlg the above type of immediate self-knowledge is rather. ta by-pœs such bodily anachments.
The same may be said about Avicenna' s "suspended person" hypothetical example (see earlier
discussion). The tenns used by Avicenna [0 discuss individuality are the Arabie ~i or ;; .:....,1 .
Suhrawardï uses the Arabic alongside the Persian ~.J 1 .~~ .~ etc. This notion of individuality
1

- one' 5 ipseity - con-esponds, for the maS[ part. ta the Latin JtlAiras (see section on the nature of the
soul).~

There are 1 st least, [WO types ofpreoccupatiOJ1S underlying the firse few pages of the metaphysics
of the On'eDhlI-/Dummntiw If1LSdom. Suhrawardi' s first preocœpation is ta establish a notion of
being. i.e., light, which can provide the metaphysica1 basis for bis notion of souls (human and

45 Perhaps, Suhrawlr'di is bere thinting of the spirit - the pneumll.

4I!i Masha7·', § 208,485.7-13.
tt7 al-GbaLUlOuelri. ...La problématique de l'haeccéité," 175-88.
48 Corbin. A r:7a'm2e. 91 (A rda:wnll, 80-1).
<S HIIJI'iib/. J) (a) 49.7-8 (P) § 5, 85.16-8 (ALd., 43; fsma"b, 101). For discussions on this tenu, cf.
Goicbon, OirR:Iins, 304 0..3; cf. D' Alvemy. "Annïyya-AlUtas," 59-91; cf. Frank, "The 0riglJ1 of the Arabie
Philosophieal Term ~1," 181-201.
 CHAPTER 5EVEN - 191

ce1estial) as substance. His second preoccupation is ta demonstnlte the existence of a self-subsisting

substance, i.e., of a self-subsisting soul (see section on the natuce of the soul).
These two preoccupations are simihr ta chose of A vicenna, especia.lly in the ./lemlurs
whece a notion of being and of indlvidual. existence - i.e., an individual essence in the sense of a
realised essence - of th st being l1l"e pursued. so For Avicenna. individuation occurs onlY!lt the time the
soul attaches itself [() the body. And the influence of the soul over the body is possible because it is
51
linked ta the individuaJ. .ntixture of each body which. in tum, has an influence on the SOUI. Vet. in
bis Im.mol~/tions. Avicenna emphasizes the fact chal the word "1" (~i), which refers to one's self.
indicltes somethï.ng beyond mere individual body or BOY of its parts. In fact, it refers to the human
soul.52
Suhrawardï' 5 investigations into the nature of the self constitute an addendum ta the classi cal.
Avicenne hypotheticaJ. example of the "suspended person."SJ Avicen.na had set out to illustrate
(rather than ta demonstrate) the existence of the soul. His illustration rested on the fundamenral
intuition that tbere is an intimate perception of the self, i.e., the human (rational) souJ. ForAvicenna.
someone who perœives her or bis own quiddity or ber or bis own essential reality (:; ë.:ë=' ) perceives

-- a quiddity as something not sep8l'1lted from that individual.S4 As such. aoybody who is Ittentive can
realize tbat, altbough she can, in certain. situations, be inattentive to her body, in no case is she
unaware of who she is and that she eri5tS.5S The hypothetical example of the .. suspended persan"
illustrates the fact that we are always aware "of the œnicude of [our own] individu al being {~~

~;)."56Thisis a crucial element of Avicenna's text which, it seems, Suhrawardï has in. mind.

In the works of Suhrawardï, similar discussions are proposed to establish the immaterial
nature of the self, as alteady alluded ta in conneetion with discussions about seif-consci.ousness,
se1f-awareness and self-identity. Having rejeaed arguments that make self-kaowledge a type of
apprehension through representation, form, or any added element like an (ac:àdenta1) saribute or

50 Goicboll, OUecIiJ''l!S, 306 a-

51 Avicenna, /shihïJ', vol. 2, III,S, 325.2-331.1 (OU:, 310); d. Goicbon, OistrJk:IiOD,45S-6.
52 Avicenna, A~~ (ed. Dunya), 127.1-131.7; cf. D'Alvemy, "Anniyya-Annitas," X,59-61.
53 Fat AvJeenna's "suspended person" hypo&betical aample (in the C'ùœ and the Rem..a), c:f.
Marmura, "Avicenna's "Flyusg Man" in Conte'Xt," 383-95; cf. Avicenna, .Is1J1iir, vol. 2, III, L. 320.4-7 (Ori;
302); (ulthe Adh.6.6wi".J"Û, French and Latin translations), cf. D'AJvemy, .. Anniyya - AJUtas," X, 86-90; cf. (in.
the ;d-SIJi/iï~ Latin translation), cf. Gilson, "Sources gréco-arabes," 40-41.
~ Avicenna, /shJÏnTe, vol. 2, 1[[,7,339.1-340.1 (Oir., 312); cf. wic.b Avicenna's statements round in.
the book On rJJe Sovl of the C~, cf. Pines, "Conception," 185ff..
!5 Avicenna, /sIJJïnïr vol 2, ID, 1,320,2-3 (Ori:, 302).
1

95 Avicenna, /shJÏnÏt, vol. 2, [H, 1,320.7 (Où:, 304); cf. Ibid., 4, 322.6-324.7 (Où:., 311).
 CHAPTER. 5EVEN - 192

•
concept. Subrawardï chen taekles the issue of the nature of the individu al self.
The notion of individuaJit}t, once more. rests on an original and primary intuition of the self.
an everla.sti.ng and perpetual experience of self-awareness: "you are [never] absent from your self
(~',j) and from the perception [i.e., the knowledge] (~, J-'D of yourself.'.57 In his Temples-of LJgnl,
Suhrawardï writes, chat:

You are never unaware of yourseJf (d:; ':'), and there is no part of your body of
which you are occasionally forgetfuJ. But if you yourseJf were chat aggregation [of
ail of }tour bodily parts}. then you would not be consrantly aware of yourseH, while
forgelting them [i.e.. the parts]. TherefoL"e. you a-e [something] beyond this body
· parts. 58
and lts
A notion of individuality emerges from such statements and from 8 number of ether similar
passages. Suhrawardi taeldes the subject of self-mowledge trom a va'iety of perspectives. Likewise,
he explores the relationship that the notion of personal (or celestial) being entertains with the notion
of perception - self-perception being radical1y differ'ent from other' types of perception.
How is one's awareness of one' s self, however, ta be understood~ The conditions th. are
requited for perception (4.: C:J~ ), i.e., the capacity te perceive reality, cannot apply ta self-perception.
becallse the perception of one's individuality (~L:,i ) can.o.ot be achieved through the intermediary
of anything other than itself. The self cannot know itseJf through something else, whether it be 8

representation. a fonn, or even the œpaàty to perceive - ie., as a perceiving faculty. This particular
.-gument shares some charaeteristics witb thase br which Suhrawardi demonstrated the natUre of
self-perception. Consequenrly. the œpaàty to perceive is intrinsic ta the self and cannat be distiJJ.et
from it as Iljkld of il. Suhrawardï writes:

[The capacity to perœive (:;.: e,;';" )]

is not a psrt of your individual being
(""-.!.,L:a~ )
such that other- parts [of yourself] wouJd r-emain unknown at that time
[i.e., when it perœives; otherwise, your individual being] would he beyond the
capacity to perceive (~;~ ) and the capacity of being aware (~~~ ) aJld.
therefore, would be unknown [te you] and would not be a part of your self. whose
awareness of itself is not something whicb is added to [itself].59
Once again, Suhrawardï appeals to bis genera1 principle of the unity of the self - essentially
of the (light) soul - to argue against the additional existence of such a fseulty. To be aware (~~ )
of one's seH does net admit any kind of mediating facuJty. This is the case for the knowledge of the
essence of what constitutes the individual being and of wbat constitutes the reality of a thing

57 HJkmN, f 116,112.1-3 (~q:, 103).

58 H/!rJkiJ • fi (a) 49.2-4 (P) § 4,85.4-10 (ALrh., 42; fsm/lu, 101).
59 ffikmllt, f 116, 112.14-16 (~ 1(4).
 CfIAYfER 5EVEN - 193

For Suhrawardi, the ahility ta perceive other things besides one's self is dependent on one's
essence. and not on an accidentai facu1ty of perception. The same type of argumentation is Utili7~ i,l.>
show that the aptitude to perceive is accidentaJ. Sïnce the capaetty to perceive is only accidentaI, if
perception were to be constitutive of the self, the seH would not be able ta perceive itseH, because it
would have ta exist somehow prior ta the aet of perception. Suhrawardï notes that:

Your capacity to be able to perceive (~.,;~ ) other things [chan yourself] is

dependent on your essence [i.e., YoUl" seJ!]. And the aptitude of being able to
perœive (~.)J-11 .JJ~I ) is accidenta! to your essence. And if you suppose that
your essence [i.e., your self] (~J~) is an individu al being (:4.! " j ) which perceives
its self. and that its self is prior ta the aet of perception (~I J.J!). then, [this anterior
60
existence of the self] would be unknown [10 ic]; and this is impossible.

Suhrawardï proposes an Equivalence between the raet tbat one is an individual being and the
faa chat one has knowledge of this faet. The perception of one' 5 self becomes akin ta a self-awareness
of one's self. Self-knowledge can now be defined in terms of the degree of awareness one bas of
one' s self. This is expressed in the definition Suhrawardï provides for this state in. terms of the
degree of manifestation of tbe self ta the self. The formula he uses is .. that which is manifest by itself
to itself (.. .è " : ~ ..J!à lJ.iJ f .,A);" hence, there is no psrticu1ar charaeteristic ( u-~) associated
"---
with it such that the fact of bei.ng maoifest would be an accident inhering in it (..J -"i~ ), but it is
identica1 with that which is manifest and nothing else.51

Since wh8t becomes manifest is the sours nature, Suhr&wardï am apply to this state of
manifestation (i.e., aw..eness) bis light terminology and hold that tbis notion of self-manifestation (a
oorollary of se1f-awll'eness) is the manifestation of the ligbt belonging to itseJf ( ~ .)~."...à ), a
light which is pure light (~) and which cOlTe5ponds to the immaterial substance of the soul. 52

Suhrawardï implicitly introduces elem.ents that pertain to the essence of individual beings,
i.e., which are constitutive of the soul's nature. As such, the essence of each individuality capable of
perceiving ïtself, in faet, lies beyond the physical. body, sinœ the bodily and the m8terial do not
perceive themselves. For ex:ample. the internai organs - the hem, the liver, the brain, or anr body
defa..ned as dart and luminous material forms ~ .)~I" ~ WJ.à.J 1 ~~ 1 ..J tJ 1~ 1 ~ ) - do
not perceive (~-,.w ) themselves. That which is capable of perception in someone is neitber a

• 60 .{ükmw, § 116, 113.2-5 (

61 .{frknlllr., § 116,112.16-113.2
62 .{Dbnlle, § 116,113. 2 (S~ HM).
S.-.. HM).
(SIB:. 104).
 CHAPTER. 5EVEN - 194

(physical) organ nor oorporeal matter ~ j.>-: .)Ai); otberwise. the individual (self) which is constantly
aware of its self (~I~ J~ ) would not be absent from the parts of which it is. at times,
forgetful.ôJThe individuality behilld the perception of every individual (self) is, in faet, the soul, i e.,
the rational and immoterial part of hum an souls. But. SuhrawardL as was shawn earlier. needs the
body for the 10gical demanstration of individuation. Thus the dichotomy (or self-contradiction)
remains. as in Avicenna

EPISTEMIC PROCESS
As a prelude to our discussion about intellection. let us just mention a few additional things
regarding se1f-knowledge and the affinities it sha-es with a certain conception of intellection. Cu a
paralIel be established betWeen se1f-knowledge and Suhrawardi' s presential knowledge? In arder to
bring togetber tbese [wo notions. it must be mentioned that illnmioatioJl. and light have aIready been.
associated with the process of intelleaion in the works of Avicen.na.6 O: This notion of illumination
and light is. naturally. at the heart of Suhrawardï's ontology. and by extension of bis episœmology.
Furthermore. the uilluminative" tradition seems to have subsaibed to the idea of self-knowledge or

_. se1f-ooDsci.ousness as a distintt epistemic process (Mun a $adrii).6S

Suhrawsrdi's conception of seJf-knowledge. it might be argued. is distinct from a conception

of knowledge br presence (':F..J~). Self-knowledge is not the principle st the heatt of a knowledge
by presence. sinee tbe latter would be the knowledge that the sou! possesses of entities that. in some
sense. would be extrinsic to it. On the one hand. self-tnowledge cotTesponds to a more primai or
p-e-cognitive perception of the self. Hence. could such a primary awareness of the self be the
..chEtype of Suhrawardi' s "illu mi native" presential knowledge? The issue raised by su ch intelTOgatioJl.
is, in fact, the natUre of self-knowledge. i.e.. Suhrawa-dï's theory of consciousness: 15 knowledge of
the self an aetivity of intellectionf'6
On the other band. Suhrawardfs extensive discussions about self-knowledge - whether in
terms of self-consciousness or self-identity - provide different arguments for the demonstration of a
type of knowledge that is c1early unmediated - wbether through an image. a fonn, a notion or an

attribute of the self. Suhrawardi's notion of se1f-knowJedge provides the means by wbich to conceive

63 HibnRr. § 116. 112.4-7 {S~ 103).

l
604Aviceana, Alnd/IlI-NiIfs (ed. al-AhwamJ. 11 1.1-113-11; cl. Idem. JII-Jt.fJ/bdiï , 98.20-3. 99.9-12
and 103.18-9.
n
65 Moris. "Revelation, IntelIectUa1 Intuition. aIld Reason. 69-70.
66 For bis thecry of coœcioume5S. cl. Ha\ri Yazdï. flinc:iples o fEpi.srl!!lllofqgy 121-82.
1
 CHAPTER. 5EVEN - 195

--. of knowledge as unmediaœd through any type of abstraaion. e.g.. his analogy with pain. It is.
therefore, not the produet of self-knowledge that constitutes a mode of knowing akin to Suhrawardïs
presential knowledge. Rather. it is the process by which seff-knowledge is achieved - an unmediated,
i.e.. non-ooJ1ceptual and no.n-propositional (e.g .. 1 know x, x being my self) - that constitutes a mode
of knowing akin ta presential knowledge, as opposed to a knowledge by colTespondence (~~ ).

The substitution of a type of aon-predicative relationship as the guarantor of knowlecJge rests on the
relation established between the knowing subject and the "present" object.
It is byarguments such as tbose offered for self-knowledge and, more precisely, the particular
epistemic process which they illustrate that Suhrawardï's epistemic presential knowledge can be
understood. This epistemic process al the heart of bis notioJl of self-knowledge becomes the model
forthe presentialknowledgeso charaeteristic ofthe"iUuminative" tradition, i.e., withoutintennediary.67
This process is, in fact, a criticism of Peripatetic epistemology. Moreover, it cOlTesponds to an
epistemic process that is in line with a more mystica1 mode of knowing, already inaroduced in
Plotinus' worts.68 It is not se1f-knowledge, but, more precise1y, the epistemic process underlyjng
self-knowledge that becomes the guarantor, along with mystical contemplation (o~ l.1&- ). of the

presel1ce (J~) of the object of perception ÏJl the perœiving subject.69 Not only is it a process that

-- guBnU1tees the 1œowledge of the self, the unmediated character of this process becomes characteristic
of the sours knowledge of supernal entities and, ultimately, of the possible glimpse of the Light of
lights, i.e., God.7{]

67 Zia, KAo",.leq,e, 150.

118 Ziai. KDoJIFIel:!fçI!', 136-45. The mystlcaJ a10ng with the pbilosophicaJ aspect, together wi~ bis
c:ritià.sm of Peripateeism cœstitutes the vxious faœts of bis philosopbical system, cf. Walbridge, .5Qewa",

••
33-9.
69 To tbis presential or "illuminaive" knowJedge, i..e., seJf-consciousness, Zia assocïates the "special
mode ofpen:eptionreferred to as "Slght" or "vision" (mushJïJhk:la)," cf. Zlai., KAo",.Jeq,e, 149-50; cf. AfJlS1J;,n"~
, § 208,485.7-18 and § 210, 488.3-12.
"Xl Ziai, KAo"Je~. 136-43.
 CHAPTBl 5EVEN - 196

INTELLECTION
Most commeotators of Suhrawardf 5 philosophy have ceJ1tered their ana...,-ses and
interpretations on the faculty of imagination - the faculty of representatioQ at the center of bis
philosophical anthrop01ogy. Less attention, however, has been paid ta the role of Ultelleet. except
perhaps to highlight the faet that Suhrawardi' s conception of knowledge goes beyond the rational
level. On the whole, both Suhrawardïs and AVlcenna's conception of knowledge are undeniably
more Neoplatonic - in their intuitive aspect - than Aristotelian. For instance. in Suhrawardi' s works.
numerous passages that discuss the acquisition of "tl"Ue" knowledge do 50 by appea1ing ta a notion of
a personal experience ta which i5 often associated an intuitive type of perception. I.n spite of the
appeal to an intuitive-like mode of knowing, especially with regards ta self-knowledge, Suhrawardï
does not, in faet, completely evac:uate notions like the rational soul or the intellect (Jà,& ) from ms
phil050phica1 system. Such notions play a role here no different from that in Avicennan floetics.

The phil050phicaJ. tradition contains count1ess ïnterpretations on the nature and the roLe of
the rational soul and the intellect. Knowledge depends on the intellect. This is true of lacer Hellenistic
traditions as weU as the Arabie, lewish, and Medieval Scholastic traditions.· Less grounded in an
empirical conception of knowledge, Phllo's notion of intellection, for instance, impLied a notion of
contemplation and opened the way for a theory of Ideas and irs ~b1iged counterpart. a theory of
recolleetion: hence, the existence of a pure intellectual rea1m is postulated at the mecaphysicallevel.
In Islamic tl"lldition, the whole debate OVEI" the modes of rational processes stems from the combinatiofl
of the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions, especially Aristotelian noetics as it was understood by
subsequent Hellen.istic com..mentators.2
The emphasis placed on an intuitive, non-discursive type of knowledge became more dominant.
howevEr, in Plotinus' works and in the pseudepigraphical worlcs of Neoplatonic origin sttributed to
Aristode. These Jaœraocretions were heavilyintluenc:ed byPlotinian and, later. by generaJ Neoplatonic
ideas about the contact of the inte1Ject with the One, the downward procession (i.e.. emanationist
cosmology. divine providence, and celestial influences), and the upward progression (i.e., prayer",

"_ .• 1 For a discussion of the Aristotel.ian sources of AvicelUla's noetics (ln Ins Latin worb) , see Gilson.
"Les sources gréco-arabes," 5-129. For a sketch of the Greek and Arabie tbeories of the active intel1ec;t, see
Walzer... Aristade':5 Active Intellect," 423-36; cf. Marcotte... Ibn MlSkawayh' 5 concept of the Intellect ( *Atj/
)." 10-63; cf. 81wnentbal, AnSt'odeJll1dNe!OpIJltDmSm.
z HameliJl, L1I œéon"e de" J rnrd/«t; d. Medan, A-fonop.sydJiszlt. A(pYQt:in:r2, JJ.fema:mscioameJ:S.
 CHAPTER. 5EVEN - 197

purification, and theurgy).J ln these later traditions. the rational faculty becomes more independent of
the body and of the lower human soul and its facuJties - imagination and memory.

The notion of intellect is not only central to the Peripatetic phiJosophicaJ tradition. it aIso
OCCUpiES a central place within Islamic tradition, e.g.. ies conception of creation. Like al-Ghazali
before him,a Suhrawardï quotes ml ofœn mentioned hadith which states chat the Ultelleet was the first
tbing that God aeated (t...l-:'i ).5 With appeals to such a well known tradition. Suhrawardï might
attempt to deny any possibility of confliet betWeen the demands of phiJosophy and of religion or
c
dogma, whereut dogma becomes an essential complement [0 the limited human intellect, like al_ Amin
5
and al-Kindi had done befOl"e him. Suhrawardï' 5 intention is, however, more complex: he attempts a
rational formulaion of the fruits of bis own personal experiences, i.e., the type of knowledge
acquired through inner experiences and wmch is radically distinct from any other type of knowledge
acquired empirically. Such EXperiences are, perhaps. more akin to mystiœ1 expenences. More
important, however, is Suhrawardî's own "presential" conception of knowledge which implies a
negation of any role auributed to the inteHective faculties. Therefore, the questions that have to be
answered are the following: How does Suhrawardï's conception of knowledge resolve chis apparent
paradox, and how is bis "presential" conception of knowledge different from, or at odds with
Avicenna's own theory of knowledge!

PRACTICAL AND THEDRETICAL INTELLEcrs

With bis definition of the nature of the human soult Avicenna laid the foundations for bis
conception of intellection - the hwnan soul "is the one w hich is rational (:.tU ~ )." The rational part
of the human soul is the locus of the conscious principle of h\lman life on which se1f-consciousness
and the soul' s iAdividuality aU rests. But the rational part of the human soul is also the intellective
principJe at the heart of any possibility of intellection.
Moreover. Aviœnna divides reason inco the practical facuJty and the theoretical facuJty
(found in Plato. Aristotle and their commeatcOl"S). The former faculty is responsible for the practical

J Gutas, A~, 254-61, esp. 260. Tbeurgy. from the Greek dJt!OS = Gad and d'Fos = wormg.
a magical science of the NeopJatOlllSts.
" al-Ghazali, /Crac rI/- :4tfJ in.bis I/J,ni-l 'lIlvm li/-PEn 83. For a crans1ation, cf. al-Ghazili 77J~
1 1

Bookol"K40wlqe, 222. The hadlth is reported by al-Tabarinïfrom Abii Umamah and Abû Nu"aym from
eÂalshah, d. Ibld.• 8J n.J; cf. Craw. "The RfJ1e of ;1/- 'A'l1 in Eatly [stamic Wisdom. ft

5 rlJijïd. § 4,264 12-1" (Aid., (6).

6 Rowson. A if.fu:slu11 Philosopher; 20; cf. Jolivet. L 'intl:"Ut!&r, 94-6.
 CHAPTER 5EVEN - 198

•
lire of the human souJ. white the latter is responsible for its theoretical and speculative life? For
Corbin.tbese two intellective faculties typify the twoterrestrial ange1s that a-e mentionedin Avicenna'5
ff~1Y Ibn Ytlfj!ÎÜJ, whose union forms the total self 6 Such a (gnostic) interpretation, however. has

the inconveoienœ of reviving the spectres of the pre-existence of the soul lJ1 the celestial and
metaphysieal real.m (see section on pre-eltistence of the soul).

More generally. for Avieenna. the praetical faculty moves the body and imparts it with an
impetus in arder that it May achieve particular actions. In faet. the pntetica1 faculty can impart
motion to the lower faculties of the soul such as the faculties of active imagination and of estimation
and to the body with which il has a relation. It is. therefore, active. although it is ultimate1y guided
by the theoretiœ1 faculty ta which it is subjected. And with the help of the praetical faeulty.
especially when the saul resot1S to imagination and e~ation. the raional soul is able ta impart
moral habits ta the soul.9

The loftier side of the rational soul is the tbeoretica1 facutty. It is responsible for the production
of knowledge and science. For Avicenna. this Caculty is the locus of inte11ective perception (..:JI J.J!

~ ). And on account of the faet that intelleaive perceptions are by definition immateriaJ and
requite an immaterial. substance. the rational soul of human beings cannot. therefore. be found nor
aIn its aetivities be exercised in a bodily organ. 1O The loftier theocerical faculty of the rational soul
maintains a relationsbip with the intelligible rea1m. as opposed ta the practica1 faculty.ll The fonner
faculty cotTesponds to the rational soul's ability to grasp the fonus of intelligibles. cither througb
i.nstructio.n or tbrough some sort of intellectua1 intuition. lt remains. however. ta be established
whetber this intellectual intuition must he restricted to an intellectual intuition (O"~) or be understood
a5 a mystica1 perception - in the sense of a personal experiencing (~.,,~) ,12 or. more representative of
AviœJUUl's thought. the philosophical equivalent of experiential knowledge (~~ ). In the latter
case. one would still have to ask w hat would then be the specifie distinguishing criteria if there be
any. thst oouldprovidegrounds forcomparisonbecweea thetwo experiences (inœlleetual and mystical).

7 Avicenna. SlnTii', N;d"s, V. 6, 240.16 (~, (71); cf. Aristotle. On me Scul, 111,10, 43Ja13-20,
26-30.
8 CorbiA, A 'f7Cenne, 98 (A 'f7CenHll. 87).
9 Avicenna. SJnfiï~ NIIÛ, 1.5.45.17-47.18 (P~ 31-32).
10 Avicemta, SInd. Nms. l, 2. 26.17-27.12 (P~ 19-20).
11 Aviœnna, SInff. NJÛS. II,3,48.1-6 (P-!J':, 33).
12 Avicenaa, fslürJr vol. 3-4, IX, 816.6-9 (Dir., 489-90; A(Y-E, 84); cf. Mannura. "Plocting the
1

C01JCSe," 340a-342b; d. o.det. -La connaissance suprême," 387-94. Moris opts foc personal experi.encing
(~:t), d. Moris. "Revelation, .. 58.
 CHAPTfR. SEVEN - 199

Suhrawardï adopts a number of consecrated distinctions sucb as the one made between the
pnctical. and theoretica1 faculties. He distinguishes clearly betWeen the theoretical (speculative)
ÏJltellect and the practical intellect. For example. in bis No,rs o[ Ltehr where he writes that.
"regarding the practica1 intellect, its perfection is ta be the superior qualities [tbat rule] over (...:,.,~
~~I ) the body, not the qUalities affected (~~I ~~ ) br the body, and [the praetical

intellect] provides [tbe soul] with a disposition (~) for justice: justice being temperance (+-)i~c ).
bravery, and wisdom." 13 The practical faculty - here, the practical intellect - nlles over the body as
its perfection.

Moreover, the practica1 faculty is responsible for the development of moral habits, something
alreadydiscussed by Avicenna. Likewise, Suhrawardï's own ethical principles depend on the practical
14
intellect for establishing the foundation of proper actions that lead to justice and to a virtuous life.
One of the ethica1 principles put forward in Suhrawardï' s Il~ys of Lighr is the Aristotelian idea of a

just balance or of the mean between [wo undesirable extremes - e.g., lust and torpor, impetuosity
and cowardice, shrewdness and foolishness. His understanding of this p-actical "wisdom" is chat it is
"net [the same as] that [ether] wisdom which is the reception [lit., the imprinting] of the realities and
of the intelligibles (~~."a........ .J c3-=~ ~~I ) of which the more there is, the beuer it will be. "IS
The reception of intelligibles refers to the activities of the theoreticaJ intellect.

Following Peripaœtic tradition. Avicenn.a identifies a number of intellects defined with

respect ta their respective states of potentiality or actuality: a state of pure pote.ntiaJity occupies one
end of the speetrum. of intellectual aetiviries, while a pure state of aetuality occupies the other end of

the speetrum, with the existence of an intennediary intellective disposition. These different states
forat El hienrchy: tIrst, an absolute aptitude or disposition (ü..lU 1.) I..u:a.......~ i".i ) represented (by
analogy) as the aptitude of primai mater (~ 'J~ i~) for receiving fonns, e.g.. tbe potentiality of
the child to be able ta write which cOlTesponds ta the maaerial intellect; second, there is a possible
aptitude or disposition (~i~ ), e.g., the adult who possesses the ability to write, which ability
colTesponds to the intellect in potentiatity. And finally. there is the perfection of the aptitude (Jla.S
i~ 1) or tbeperfeetion of the disposition (.)I..uü.-'JI Jla.S ), which need nat be acquired, but rather,
which is associated with an habituai potentiality, e.g., the scribe who possesses the abiJity ta write
and who actualizes it when he chooses, which ability corresponds ta the state of the aCXluired

tJ PNtii, lX, § 77,68.9-10 (Book, 71); not lnl11SJated in A~~. The distiJ1ction 15 found in
cbapter (IX).
14 Studies on Suhrawarcfi's etbical eonœptions have yet to be wriŒen.
15 PIuni, IX, § 77,68.9 - 69.3 (BOOK, 71-2); cf. Landolt, "Suhrawardï's," 479b.
 CfIAPTFR 5EVEN - 200

.-. 16
inte11ect. The potential intellect first created in human beings is aetiValed with the coming together
of soul and body. As for the intellects ptr se. Avicenna identifies four different types according to
their ststes of potentiality or actuality: a material intellect (~~~ ). an habituaI intellect (~~).
an intellect in actuality U---àJ 4). and finally. an acquired intellect (.)ü.::-.- ).1Î Goicbon' s analysis is
bere relevant. She identifiES three intellects. The fourth intellect. the aCXiu1l"ed intellect. appears te

colTespond to an intelligible or a concept recei.ved from the active intelligence and grasped by the
intellect. As s'Ucb. the acquired intellect represents an intennedÎ1U'y stage becween the human intellects
and the active intel.ligence.1B

Are the different intellects identified by Avicenna and the Peripatetic tradition found in
Suhrawardï's works? In the general sense. the answer m'Ust be yeso Altbough Suhrawardi does not
<!weIl on this Avicennan division of intellects. it does coJl.Stitute the underlying structure of bis
epistem.ology. Moreover. nowhere does he state that it should be rejected. replaced. or transfonned.
In the POy:»Cs of the Eodmations. Suhrawardï discusses the sour s ability te grasp intentions in
potentiality and in. aetuality. ascribiJlg a hierarchy to the facuJties of the rational soul - in terms of
potentiality. The soult therefore. possesses potentialities for tho'Ught tbat are similar to the tripartite
division a1ready defined by AvïCeJUlL Suhrawardï writes:

The soul is receptive to ideas potentiaUy md actually. Potentially [in this sense] has
different [i.e.. tbree] levels. One ofthese is [il the first disposition C",I..u:......I) possessed
by the newbom (~~L...r) infant and calJed the matErial intellect (~~~ ~ ). [iiJ
Another disposition occurs sita- the aoquisition of the first intelligibles in oroer to
perceive the secondary [intelligibles) ~ I~ ). either through cogitation (~ ) or
intuition (O"'~); it is called the habituai intellect (~4). Thereupon. a potentiality
(6"'; ) and a perfection (JL..S ) occor to the soule Potentiality belongs ta [the soult
once] it has finished to aequite the intelligibles whenever it wills it by an [aoquired]
babit (~) and without requiring to seek [them]. This is the closest disposition [te
perfection] and it is ca11ed an intellect in aetuality (J.a.iJl:t Ji& ). And the perlection
is [when] intelligibles occur in aetuality tbrough contemplation ( jA.&.J~ 4.L-~
-i.).AL.:-). It is called the acquired (.)~ ) intellect. The genus of animality and its
buman SpeciES (""':'~ll ~~ ) become ped"ect by it. And • this stage. the sou!
becomes simil.. (, ,Co: ..,) to the [first] principles (ts.J4--a). bea>ming an [intellectual]
w,

werld (U l&).1'9

16 Avicenna. S/nl'iï'. Hm, 1.5. 48.6-18 (~, 33); cf. B Ahwani, "La théorie de la connaissance:'
36-7.
17Goichon. LeniJ'ui;W, no. 435, 225-33 (§§ 2. 6. 9, 11); cf. Avic:enna. SJnliï~ NJÛs, 1.5, 48,18-50.12
(~. 33-4); cr. Idem. fÜ6M", 43.3-44.1 (Proof. 113~); cf. Idem. Jd-hfll/lda-' 99.1-8.

le Goic:hOJl. DrSti~a:ion. 98.314-9; cf. AVlcenna. Ishiïriïl", vol. 3. m. 363.1-367.4 (OÛ:, 324-6).
19 rJllWÜJJïr, Phy., (ms). 132..14-20; cf. Davidson. A/f61lili 166 (based on the V.C.LA. ms.
t
 CHAPTER 5EVEN - 201

•
In. the latter passage. Suhrawardi alludes to the process by which the potential intellect is
transformed into an active intellect as part of the deve10pment of the rational part of the human soul.
whose ultimate end is to become a perfeet intellect, i.e.. an aoquired intellect in actuality. Th~

horizon of the passage may be escbaological, alludmg to a stage beyond the merely intellectual
perfection in mis world. But the context of the passage seems to situate the discussion within
traditional Peripatetic theses.

THEPROCESSOF~LLECTION

The acquisition of knowledge may be e:xplai.ned in t'Wo ways. On the one hand, knowledge
can be acquired empirically: this the raDula rosH theory whereby knowledge is entirely acquired
throughout one' 5 life. The JllÎJld or the intellect is like a tablet on which nothing has yet been writtett,
e.g.. Aristotle or the Ikhwin al-$a.fiC.zo On the other hand. knowledge can aIso be conceived as
originating from the non-sensible and having i15 source in the metaphysical realm. This may be
ca11ed the a priori theory. 21 In the latter case. knowledge pre-erists the eKperience of sensory perception.
As sucb, it or part of it exists in the soul or is accessible only br the (rational) seul, independentlyof
8I1Y bodily or material consideration (plata and a number of Neoplatonists).22 Avicenna appears to

._. have adopted an unusual combination of these two modes of thougbt. In bis Book ofScieAŒ, he
writes that:

At its first stage, the soul is a /"UbUNI niSH (6.,) L.,.,) and no intelligible f orm is present
in it, but [the rational part of the sou!] is capable of receiving [intelligibles]. This is
the degree which is ca1.led the material intellett (~"JI~ Jü ) or the potential
Îlltellect (d~ J.A.c.). Z3

In. Avicenna, therefore, the idea of a /"I1Du/a nlSO, e.g., in such passages. The soul. like an
blank tablet, awaits ta receive the imprints of intelligibles.

Notwithstanding the soul' 5 innate capacity to know some a priori principles by its own.

(MinaSlan Collection, Anlne MS 845) of the Tll/wi/lik.- ~wra 153). Fer Avicenna's argument from the
1

phenomenoA of iJJteJ1eetllal memory, cf. Davidson, AffJlnlbi. 89. For the mirrer analogy in Aviœnna, d.
Davidsoll. AU". .Jh~', 94.
3'J And Jater, Locke.
21 An ofteA mennoned a. priori principle is that the whole 1$ bIger than i15 parts. A case eou1d.
however, be made. baed on Piaget's studies and bis genetie episœmology, tbat nmilar a priori. principles c:an
Drigi.nale from the nawral development of the child's capacty for graspu1g cooœpts with the deveJopmeJlt Qf
ms Q[' ber capacity of abstraction; whiJe Evolutionists er Cbomsltian theOl'ÏSlS wouJd consider them· to be
somehaw innate.
Z2 El Ahwanï, • La théorie de Ja connaissance;' 27-9.
23 Avicenn.a, O1ïiIish, Phys., 108.6-8 (Sama-. 69).
 CHAPTF.R 5EVEN - 202

nature,Zot for Avïcenn8, knowledge remains something acquired. Hence, the source of knowledge or
ilS active principle is extemal to the soult and knowledge can be acquired only once its potential
25
p-inciple has been activated.

There are, therefore. two types of apprehension (from the sensible and non-sensible worlds).
Perbsps, it is not totally correct te conclude. lite Garda, that an abstraction does not reaJly exist as
the result of an abstraction of intelligible fOnIls from the material world. In Gardet's interpretation,
the active intelligence provides the soul with fonns that pre-exist in il; it is in the milTor of itself that
the rational soul sees the luminous intelligibles; in faet. the origin of knowledge is not found in the
sensible world al all; the sensible world is but mat which incites the SOUllO mm loward the light that
originates with the provider of forms - the active intelligence.2é The soul perpetuaIly needs illuminatlon
from the active intelligence.

Altbough Avicenna's epistemology is highJy idea1ist, tbere is, nonetbeless, a suong

oommitment to the woddly constraints imposed on human beings and their souls. It should not be
forgotten that the philosopher is simultaneously the physi ci an. Avicenna does, in faet, hold that
knowledge based on the extraction of simple concepts from particular images ocœrs by me8l1s of a
p-ocess of tmstraetion, i.e., wbat might be concei.ved as a version of the œlluJo msn theory. The sou!
acquires, by experience. premises that it will use in its reasoning, assisted by the functions of all the
perceptive faculties - extenlaJ and intema1.lJldeed. the human soul is devoid of any knowledge; and.
conarary to Plato's a priori conception of knowledge, Avicenna does not appear ta subsaibe ta a
Platonic theory of recollection, because such a beJief could imply the pre-existence of the soul before
its existentiation in its body or the existence of an explicit world of Ideas.

It is true, however, that Avicenna's version of the a priori theory of knowledge r-ests on the
postul8le of an .. extrinsiœl.itY' of knowledge. In the OIosses on Aristode' s OA dJe Soul, A vicenna
writes that the soul must receive intelligibles from the supreme active and intellective principle, such
thal "when we want ta know something and [when] the soul is prepared to receive knowledge
(ü jI&-A ) of this from the active intelligence by lelting whatever acts as an obstacle for its quest

24 Avic:en.na writes in. bis poem. Gb.f.olic. "Some [ide.] are prier to [or premisses for] the iDœllect
(J.i.aJ1 oL.~ ), suc:b as the part is smaller than the whoJe. Our intellect possesses them by its nature
(i~~) and regarding dus matter, no daubt ispossibJe (afii-ll ~ ,~I.:tC.";,·. Il ~ 'Jf ),B cf. Aw:enna,
M ~ JlI-hfJlSDri9{J!Zrl.
B
14.3-4; d. El Ahwani, -La théone de la coJU1ai.ssance. 38-40.
25 Avicenna. ~f~. 227.23-228. li; cf. El Ahwani, -La théorie dela connaissanc:e: 29.
26 Avicenna• .M!jiïr, .N1ûs. 394.9-10 (A ~&:, 68); cf. Ganiet, L3cmmllissltrJcem.n:t1Î/ue. 13-6,39-42.
 CfiAPTER 5EVEN - 203

cease. its preparation becomes appropriate (lA"I~J ..,)0- n';' -,.! ).'.27 In tbis particular formulation.
intellection is reduced to the receptive charaeter of the soul - its i.n.tuitive ability - a characteristic of
which Suhrawardi will malte great use. Avicenna emphasizes the receptive ability of the soul which.
like ft mitror. cm receive the flux of intelligible fonns that are emanated onto lt from the active
intelligence.
Some interesting observations are found in Avicenna's Tœrllise on AtZions ondPassions,
where he writes that there is, in some cases, no need for any of the internat facuJties of the buman
soul - the intellect atone suffices - te acquïre knowledge. because the human soul accesses the
intelligible realm directly: ..... the Middle term [of any syllogism] arrives all al once to the one who is
helped with a penetrating intuition. without requiring any inquiry br the cogitative [faculty], without
requiring another facuJty except in the intellect. uze Avicenna's conception of knowledge wouJd.
therefore, appear to rely almost exclusive1y on the huma.n. souls' capacity to contact the active
intelligence with the help of the intuitive capacity of human souls and not simply through cogitation.
A vicenna describes the process of intuitive appreheJlSion, at times, by resorting ta the use of
the anaJogy of light, an analogy that is often used, e.g., in bis symboüc presentation. of the Queinic
light verse (Q., 24:35).29 This p-acess is frequently associated with the &CXluisition or, rather, the
reception of knowledge by me8DS of an emanation or lUl illumination of ligbt. Sucb a conception of
knowledge in terms of intuitive app-ehension is compatible with Avicenna's conception of the soul
in terms of ilS substanti o l1ty. As El Ahwani has pointed out, it is the soul' s immateriality that
gulll'1U1tees the possibility of accessing metaphysical truths that exist only as pure intelligibles. The
saul cu thus accept these truths without having ta acquire them.:IJ Moreover, Avicenna's conception
of intuition is associBted with the divine:

Intuition is a divine flux and an. intel1ectual junttion that occurs absolutely without
[requiring] any acquisition. Certain individuals attain [in it] such a stage that they

27 Aviœnna, T4IFI/6 Jrg .(t'.1IJr.ÏSIIr.i1, 83.14-6.

28 Avic:enaa, Il.rdlJl 6 R/-AriiJ WII 61-IrdiIU [WZl AqsiimùmrJM li-/-.571l!1'b'J III-NI6), Ist ed., ed.
Badawi (Hauleribid: Ma~a~a Dairat al-Macirifal-·Uthm.anïya. 135311934),227-8 and 23 J -2; partlal.lnU1SJati.on.
of the RisiïJ/I ff III-Af'JÜ WJI III-/Afi°Ju in Jean Mic:hOl. "CuJtes, magie et intellection," [discusSIons 457 and
467] in Idem, ·Culte, n Appendice n, § 4,231. F'Urther, he adds mat ·Si cela est vrai, qu'on ne se tourne pas
vers ce à q'GOÏ elle est eonErainte du fait d' ob51ac:les et d' oppositlOJlS. Si ce n' est pas vrai, que la chose reste en
suspens, qu'eUe ne dépende pas de ce par q,uoi l'âme est affligée d'U faït de l' assoClat'iOJl de L'imagination. Au
coDlnire, qu'elle repose seulement sur une démOJ1SU'alion péremptoire (prouvant) qu'il est faux q'Ue l'âme ait
un lIIJir propre, n quoted in Mic:hot, "Cuhr:s," Appendice Il, § 12,233; cf. Ibid., 22.0 n.3 .

.=tt L16-8).
29 Avicenna, fshmTr, vol. 2, III. 10,363.1-367.4 (Où:, 324-5); cf. Idem., /lbhlÏr. 49.1-52.12 (A'PaF,

30 El. Ahwani, "La théorie de Ja connaissance," 27-29

 CRAPTER5EVEN - 2~

cao do witbout cogitation regarding much of what they have leamed, and that the
power of the divine soul belongs to them Thea. when the soul has become noble,
has aoquired [this] distinguished power and separates from the body. [the soul] when
lits) preoccupations vanish obtains what it obtains here. [more] rapldly than the
intuition obtains il. The intellective world presents itse1f to [the soul] br foUowing
the order of the terms of the jucJgments and of the intelligibles - essential ordination.
not temporal - this occurring aU st once. The need to cognize is only due to the
sour s impurity or its lack of exercise. ta its incapacity to obtaïn the divine flux. or to
its preoccupations If this did not ex.ist. the soul would bum of desire ra emigrate
[far] from everything to the term of reality.31

Avicenna also uses the notion of intuition to explain the spiritual quest of Sufis. e.g., in the
last three sections of the /leDNlrK:s (where the idea of the soul as a mirrar is presented). In. tbis work,
he offets an intelligible accoum of the different stages through which the mystica1 seeker passes:
from the world of the senses ra the world of the intelligence, culminating in the soul' s enjoyment of
the p!easures of a pure intellective life through the reception of the imldiation. This itTadiaion of
light ultimalely comes from the supreme subsisting ügbt, the first Being. God. Avicenna's account
of the mystical path is more contemplative in nature. altbough it greatly depends on the inteUective
cbaraeter of the underlying emanative process. Knowledge thus becomes proportionaœ to differences
in the inteosity of the illumination the soul receives from the aŒive intelligence, whereas the different
stages of mystical knowledge correspond ta the progress achieved in this capacity of reœiving such
illumination. But even the moral purificstionnecessayfor the atteinmem ofthis intuitive apprehension
of knowledge is achieved thraugh what seems ta be intel1ectual purification. 32

The importance of intellection in Suhrawardï's thought is best illustl'8ted br the identification

he himse1f maltes between the world of "pure light" and the "worJd of the iJltellectlintelligence"
(J&..J 1 ~ l& ~ ~I J~ 1), which identification he attributes to Plata and bis disciples. D Suhrawa-dï' 5
ligbt ontology and bis srticlilaion of intellection in terms of an apprehension of light is most
cha-acteristic of the process of intellection thal the N eoplatonism of Ploti11us develops. The substitution
of ligbt for the intelligible principles or the rational maintains Suhrawardi' 5 concept of intellection in
the Avicennan Jinesge and bis use of light in the Plotinian linesge. Subrawardî is, indeed, quite
explicit in 8 number of passages about the natUre of the human rational souls' relationsbip ta the

metaphysica1 world of lights, even. in more Peripltetic wcrks as bis Deliefs where he writes:

Spirituailights (~6."'J J'~' ) occur ta [the sauis), until tbis [lbility ta access

••• 31

32

J3
AviceJJJla, RJSiïlllhffJll-ArIiJ "1;t/-.lrJLiil/ :quoted in Michot, "Cultes," Appendu:e
Gardee. • L'expérience mystu:tve," 57-9.
prbnar, § 171,162.6 (Art"h., 155).
n, § 8, 231-2.
.•
'

to tbem. And the soul conjoÙls with them by means of a spiritual conjunction
~ 6.
(L:_~.) .~ l-:i' 1.,
~
r. _-.. ).:fi
v--::
CtIAPTFR SEVEN

these lights] becomes a habit (~), and ft repose (:;" _e;; )34 [i.e.. a state in which
the lights persist]. Tbereupon, supra-sensible rea1ities (:;.: :.: è J~ Î) become manifest
- 205

The Plotinian parallel is undeniable. For Plotinus, the human intellect receives an
"illumination" from the intelligence (./1ous). while the process by which the human intellect grasps
its abject (of intellection) or accesses unalterable trutbs is by a process of "assimilation" which
BlumenIhal desaibes as follows:

We then thin.k the intelligibles themselves: we no longer have impressions or images

of them but aetually are the intelligibles, and instead of just receiving them in us we
take a place among them (VI.57.1-6, cf.lOAO-2). We tbus participate in an activity
that is a1ways in progress (V.8.3.9f.), but is only ours when we are aware of it
(rv.3.30.7-1S). We possess LlDUS when we use it (cf. V.3.326-9. 1.2.4.25-7) ...
There is mus no need for demonstnltÎon and persuasion, for nOlis need not seek its
abjects: truth resides in the real existents (ovrex) that are bath its object and itself. 36

ln. 8lumentbal's analysis, theinteUect( nou~inthesoulisable 10 grasp both those metaphysical

realities and extemal abjects. Reason worlts from premises, and moves gradually towards its
conclusions. The self, however, becomes the real meeting place of the sensible and intelligible
world, where the soul ultimately no longer uses a dialectic method (platonic method of division ta
separate the Ideas), but seeks contemplation (an idea of unity). ~ Similarities are, therefore. here great
with Suhrawardi' s concept of a non-abstraetive proœss of intellection - bis presential-type of
knowledge. The difference, however, lies with Suhrawardï's rejection of the ides of a union of
subject and object in the process of thought - at the lime that il is exercised (see furtber on).

Suhrawardï' 5 conception of the existence of some ft. priori knowledge, as exemplified by bis
claim tbat knowledge does not rest on an 8bstraetive process, departs from PlaID' 5 theory of recollection
(1101lmOt:?sis). Although bis theory of recollection shares some affinities witb Plato's, it has features

tbat distinguish it from the latter. The most important difference is Suhrawardï's rejection of what

Plato's theory implies: the pre-existence of human souls. Nowhere does Suhniwardï state that the
souls recover knowledge tbat tbeir existentiation in material bodies made them forget. On the
contrary, the souls altain - not recOVel" - a knowledge tbat exists in ilS own metaphysica1 plane, i.e.,

301 Pourjavady, 4,irllr ofSl/kiAn .

:5 rLitJJÏd, § 15,271.7-9 (Arrh,24).
36 BJumenthal, Plodnus'P:Jyrbofqur, 107-8; cf. PJOtulU5, EmJeJIds, V, 3,3.6-10; cf. Idem, Eimt!'1lt/s,
l, 1,9.12-13.
37 Plotinus, EoAmt/s, V, 3,4.14-16.; d. Blumenthal, P.loddus'PsydJoICflY, Ill.
 CHAPTER SEVEN - 206

in what he ca.lls the horimntai arder of Platonic fdess.

Plotinus' theory of memory is interesting for the similarity il shares with Suhrawardf s own
departure from Avicenna's traditional conception of m.emory. For Avîcenna, memory is ftJ1 internai
and bodily faculty - situaced in the brain. In Plot1nus' complex theory of memolY, there are, perhaps
(Wo types of memory 85soc1ated with the two existing types of imagination. esse.ntial fer the soul's
fate in the afterlife. AJthough PJotinus does not explain bow the soul retains and recalls information,
he does elaborate on what occurs with intelligible abjects and direct intuition. Far him, memory is
the persistence of intelligibles apprehended by the faeulty of imagination. Plotinus who believed in
reincarnation did not, however, adopl anything like a Platonic theory of recollection. Rather, he
substituted bis own doctrine of the undescended intelligence. 33
MOl"eover, there exists an interesting paralleJ between. Plotinus' conception of forms - the
mntent of intelligence (oous) is forms 3 <i - and Suhrawardï's idea of Platonic Ideas. For Plotinus, the
p-oblem of individuation is, therefore, the problem of the primacy of eitber form or matter. But
matter is devoid of form; ÏJl faet, it is mere privation.4J Forms are merely reflected ento matter from
above::l 1 81umenthal explains the iJ1tellective process in Plotinus in the following manner:

Wben the contemplationwhich takes plaœatvarious degrees ofintensity, proportionate

10 the levels of being, becomes 50 weak that the production of nBturaI abjects is i15
only resuJt (cf. UI.8.4.28-31), the entities in the intelligibJe world reflect tbemselves
on ta the receptaeJe below. Many sucb reflections may arise from a single existent
abave. Thus the Many sensible fires, which May be thought of as refleaions
(€ÀÀaJ.Hjlnç) of an archetypal fire, have one source which produœs them aU (cf.
VI5.8).~2

Plotinus' own Platonic idea of forms may have influenced Suhraw.dî' s concept of PlatoJlÏc
Ideas - as archetypal forms. Subnlw..dï' s criticism. of Peripateticism focuses on their adoption of a
single series of ten immaterial intelligences. Contrary to Avicenna, Suhrawa-dî adopts a modified
theory of Ideas charaeteristic of Platonism.<O Quçb al-Dia &1-Shirizi summarizes Suhrawardï's notion
of Pl8tonic Ideas by stating tbat:

Like Plata ... who he1d that each bodiJy species in the sensible world has a form

38 BlumeDtbal, Plotmus' ~qror, 83-98.

J9 Blumenthal, P.1oI:inus· Psfr/1o.1ogr 114. He did not, however, hold consistent views on the
1

e:nsten.ce of [deas of Uldividua1s.

4) Plotinus, EDnentls, n, 4,14,24.
41 BlumentbaJ., P10iZnus' P.Jyc-bolqur. 112-3, 129,132.; cf. Plotinu5, EoneRds. m, 6,14, 24ff.
4i! Blumentbal, PiOiZnus' P.Jyc-bo.llKY, 114.
43 Walbridge, Sama-. 61-73; fVbJJ;q, f§ 96-9,94.15-98.12
 CfiAPTER5EVEN - 207

e (J~ ) in the intelligible wodd - a simple.luminous. self-subsistent, non-spatial

form (0..)."...-) These. in truth. are the realities. sinee the}" are like spirits (C'",) for
the bodily fonns of species. The latter are like idols of them - i.e.. shadows and
droplets from them, because of the subtlety of the former and coarseness of the
latter.<l4

Suhrawardf s ontology of light multiplies the metaphysiœl entities or intermediaries existing

between the One and the sublunm- world. This is best exemplified by bis two orders of lights: the
longitudinal - the c1assical order of intelligences - and the latitudinal - the Platonic Idees - orders
lights (or of angels).45 This new lstitudinal crder of lights is derived from his light ontology. Light
can disperse itself without losing any of its essential qualities. From a single p-inciple - light -
originates a multitude of lïghrs which aU interaet with one anocher st the metaphysical. level.<lI:i Each
light in the latitudinal arder is the "lord of an idol" - the Platonic Ides or fonn of a particuhr speci.es.
e.g. of humanity. These Plltonic forms are luminous simple essences whose shadaws are the idol -
. , th e speCles.
1.e. . 47

In faet, Suhrawardï does not rejeet the notion of Platonic Ideas as the Peripaletics have done
on the groWlds that such a doctrine would imply the particu1arization of the rea.lity of tbese forms in
46
-.., the multiple individual substnlta ÏJl which these Ideas wouLd inhere. Suhrawardï' 5 counter-argument
is thst the form of Il substance (a substantial forat) only accurs in the mind and is 8J1 accident
(nominalist position). In faet, these exïstentiated forms are dependent on the external- self-subsisting
- quiddities for their own existence. ag The coLTesponding self-subsisting fotm of the acciden~al. forms
amounts preci.sely to aPlatonic notion of Idess.

Suhrawsrdï' 5 concept of intellection focuses on the process of illumination as an exp-ession

of the Avicennan emanative scheme. It is said, he wrïtes. that .. the soul which we possess has an
infinite faculty." To tbïs, Suhrawardï replies br desaibing the relationship thal exists betWeen our
sauls and their principle - i.e.. the active intelligence - in terms of illuminations:

If the famlties of celestial souls - stronger than ours - were ta cesse, then what
[wouJd occur ta] the st8te of our faculties whicb are also rational? But it is said
rhetorically tbat our seuls ..e œpable of infmite intellection. If you know that [our

44 Q. D. al-Sbïrâzi, Sh.-.IJ (ed. Corbin), 92 n for line 7.1-4; q'Uoted in Walbridge, .5Cma-. 62.
4S 1zuau, -1shriillï yah," E.R. 7 (1987), 299a-300a.

-·e 46

47

43
~. f§ 150-2, 138.6-1435 (S-!Il=. 133-9)
(fikmnr. f§ 157-9, 158.2-161.1
.{fiknIM, § 94, 92.6-10.
(.sïw=. 151-3).

49 (fdmJll', § 94,92.10-93.6.
 CHA.PTFR 5EVEN - 208

• souls) possessthis [œpability of intellection] from the active intelligen.ce {JW ~),50
then, [you know that] they ace recipients and receptive of infinite traces (JGI)
[coming from the active intelligence] and of the influence [Û1at occurs] by means of
the conceivable ÎJltermediacy of the body and its faculties [Le., the senses] ...
Furtbermore. if our souls were te possess infinite faculties, the primai. maaer of the
faculties (~~~I ~~I i".,tL. ) would not pr~ent them [to access) theirworld,
theirinfluence would not be limited ra a single body. and they would not be impcisoned
in [tbeir] relation with bodies ... It is • therefore. necessary that hgbts and illuminlCions
(~li.:~ ) not cease te emanate (~ ) from the in.tel1ective principle (1~
~ ) onto the œlestial soul helping it ( 4J T.i:..:. ) by meaJ1S of an infinite power,
light, longing (J""":" ). and inf'utite love (~ ), an emanation of [the intel1ective
principle] onto [the souls).'51

A histery of light as a metaphor for intellection within the different philosophical traditions
bas yet to be written; wbereas a study of its use br Islamic philosophers would certainly yield
ÎJlteresting results. It will be sufficient for our purpose to mention that the analogy found its way into
al-Firibï' s works as a way ta exp-ess the activities of the active intelligence and. more generally of

intellection. In bis OfJU1ioDS of me People of me ~DrUOlU w{Y, al-Firibï. using the metapbor of
light, writes th.

In the same way, chis intellect in actuality conveys ta the materîal intellea something
which it imprints on it, which is in relation to the material intellect, the saine as ligbt
in relation to sight.sz

Al-Firiibï adds:

The action of this separate intellect upon the materia1 intellect is similar to the action
of the SUJ1 upon the sigbt of the eye. It is, merefore, caUed the active intelligence,
ranking tentb amongst the separate entities ... When, then, tbat thing whicb cOtTesponds
to ligbt in. the case of sight arises in the rational facuJty from the active intelligence,
intelligibles arise It the same time in the rational faculty from the sensibles which
Ire presetVed in the faculty of represe.lltatïon.53
For Avicenna, intellection is simiJarly associated with a similar proœs5 of illumination (or
light). In the Oe.IL·fi:'rllDCe, he wntes that "the theoretical faculty in [human souls] also cames into
aetuaJity from potentiality, through the li.luollnstion of a substance (.jIb ~ 4;..) ~ H ) wbose nature is
te produce light." In fact, something potential can only be actualized through something tbat is

aIready in aetuality. Tbis is the role of the active intelligence. Avicenna - like aI-Fiiriibï - continues

50 TJdWi/Rïl'. § 57,76.7-8.
SI TlI1wi:fJ;û, § 47, 60.12-61.7.

52 aJ-Firibï, MAdiA6J, 13,200.13-15 (Pcd"ecrSr4e, 201).

53 aJ.-Firibi. ~MdïAJi6. 13,202.1-13 (PerferrSmFe, 203); d. Davidso.ll, AJfill7lbL', 48-63.
 CHAPTER 5EVEN - 209

with an analogy between the sun as the active provider of light and the eye as the patentia! recipient
to illustt'ale the reJationship that exists becween the active intelligence and human souls. The latter,
ex>nsisting essentially of rational sauls, are first potelltïal intellects th. receive an. emanation fro:n
the active intelligence. Light rays (t. ~) are responsible far vision, whereas, metapharical1y. emanstion
from the active intelligence is st the heatt of intellection.503

Suhrawardï employs the sam.e metaphor of 1tght [Q ascribe suggestive titles to some of bis
own works, e.g., the N~ps o f 4ir.IJr or the Temp.le ofE..itT.lJrs. This is not surprising as light is st the
heart of bis philosophical interpretation of Avicennan metaphysics and philosophica1 anthropology.
especially with regards to intellection.

A ma-ked difference does. however. exist betWeen al-Faribîs and Avicenna's noetics. The
former cames closer ta recognising the existe.l1ce of a human active intellea. The lalter, hawever.
divorces it from the rational soul. establishing the existence of an. active intelligence distinct from the
hum8ll soul. Although Avicenna seets a means ta separate the active principle. belonging to a
7

metaphysical realm and to spiritualize bis phi1osophical anthropology, the nature of the relatJ.onship
that is established between tbese two radica11y distinct real.m.s remains problemalic (see section on
the conjunetion with the divine realm).
The idea of an illumination - not just emBJUaÏon - is scattered throughout A vicenna' s own
works. illumination expresses bis own conception of the noetic process. As sucb, Avicenna May be
one of the sources chat couJd explain Suhrawardï' s emphasis on the illu.miJ1ative aspect of knowledge.
One might object tbat such an interpretation regarding Subrawardï's inte11ectual heritage (withi1l the
limited framework of our study) ignores such works as al-Ghaziili' s Nic.IJe ofLJgllrs or the light
motif presented in the pseudo-71JeaJO§Y of Ansrode. The structural resemblance that May exist
between al-Ghazalï' s work with the Avicen.l1a.11 philosophica1 system. however, still remains ta be
elucidated.55

For Aviceona, the theoretical part of the human soul requires an emanation or an illumination
from the active intelligence in order ta become aetualized. The sou1's ability ta attain this level.
however. is reduced and limited ta the sours receptive power and the divine Mercy ta whicb it is
subordinsted. In a sense, intellection can, in fact, do away with the Bctivities of the senses, because
only the active intelligence can lead the rational soul - Le., the m.erial intellect - out of a stage of
potentiality into a stage of aetuality.

••• 54

55
AviœJUla, Mviil", NlIfS, 395.9-15 (A T'7c., 68-9).
La.adelt, .. Ghazali and "Religionswissenscbaft," Seme Notes. "
 CHAPTER 5EVEN - 210

The "il1uminative" model that bas gained popuJarity over the years as the main interpretation
of Suhrawardi's original contribution ta IsJamic philosophy hast in a way. obscured the fact that the
epistem.ic process st the heart of bis system closely follows the A vicennan Madel. A case in point is
the theory of illumination or of emanatioo alluded ta earlierregardiog the role of the active intelligence.
Not only do we find a notion of illumination in the works of Avicenoa. but Subrawardï aetua1ly uses
ÏJl some places the notion of emanation that. st times. is readily interchangeable with the notion of

illumination. e.g.. in the folim~ILioos wbere he uses this notion of emanation or .. over-flowiog"
priaciple lO qualify the aetivities of the active intelligence UCù..J1 Jù..J1 ~).S6

THEFACULTY Of IMAGINATION
Imagination which is but one of the stages within the process of intellection for Avicenne.
becomes the pivotai faœlty of Suhraw8l'dï's epistemology. as well as of bis eschatology and
pt"ophetology (see nexttwo chapters). For Avicenna, tbere is ft hiersrchy of perceptions that onginates
witb the externs.l and then the intemal senses - the faculti.es of passive imagination, estimation.
active imaginarioJ1 and memory - 8fld which cu1mi.nates with resson. 57 Generally. however, the
ÏJltellect can aetually do without any of the i.nternal faculties. essentially because it does not know

through a physical. organ. SB

-...-."
Wilhin tbis Peripatetic system, A vicenna' s concepts and intentions - i.e.. particularized
universals - are, however, aetually perceived br the estimative faculty that, in the hierarchy of
faculti.es, possesses a greater abstraetive power chan the faculty of active imagination.5'SI It is the
estimative faculty which "receives the intentions VIA.. ) which in themselves are non-materia1,
although they sccidentally happen ta be in matter,"6O i.e., they share with matter attributes like shape,
color, location, etc.

The faculty of imagination wbich manipuJates materiai forms is thus grounded in the particular
and necessarily gives way to the primacy of intellection. As sucb. the facuJty of imaginstion cannot
diree::t1y access uoiversal truths which are accessed only by the intellect, whether one talks of
AviceD1la's intellect or Suhrawardî's Isfahbad-light - bis rational or, beuer. his intelleetive light

56 Tlllwi/JIU, § 57, 76.15.

57 Avicenna, Mp, NlÛS, VII, 344.1-349.8 (A rnoc:, 38-40); cf. Ralunaa, A rnoCd'UJU S, 95-7.
58 Avicenna, IlI-NlljJïr, MlJ.j-, X, 364.1......371.11 (A ~(:: ,50-4).
59 Gradation of abszraaion finds its origin. perhaps, in AJexuder, rath« than Aristod.e, cf. Rahman,
A~s, 96-1 nore for page 39,4. FOI' an evaluation of the Anstotelian tradition. cf. 0--, A~~.. ,
254-61.
60 Avicenna, MUn?,.Mûs, VII. 347.6-7 (AT-7C:, 39); cf. Ibid., 347.14-7 and 348.2-5 (Arno&., 0(0).
 CHAPTER 5E\lEN - 211

•• priJlciple. The main reason for the facultyof imagUl8tÏon' s inability ta access universals lies in its
oWnn~e.

For Avicenna. the faeully of imag1J1ation is unable ta perceive pure intelligibles, i.e., the
abjects of the in.tellect, because itis itself abodilyfacuJtywhich cm onlyprovide sellSÎble representations
- a particularization - of the abjects pereeived by the intellect.61 The faculty of active imagination
œ,n, therefore. ooly represent - or "reflecC 1O Suhrawardi' 5 language - the uaiversais thal the

intellect bas previously perceived. The role of the faculty of imagination is essentially to re-present
universal tnJths that were first reeeived by the substance of the sou1, i.e., the rational human soul

In A vieenna' 5 Gjosses, the role of passive imagination is ta initiate the inteJ1ective process,
inasmuch as the products of the imaginative facuJtybeeome necessary, first, to incite the soul to turo
to the active intelligence where the cOlTesponding and rea1 intelligibles exist and: second, to initiate
the reception of these intelligibles in the possible intellect - e.g., busying the imaginative raculty
52
with the figure of the particular shape we waat to trace in arder not to think of anytbing else. A
certain control over this iJUemal facuIty is, therefore, reqnired in arder ta attain a bigber degree of
knowledge, because although this faculty can be an instrument for the soul, it can aise prevent the
rational soul from tuming towards those intelligibles. Once the passive imagination and the senses
",-.
are propedy used, they aetually permit the intellect to function. properly. Avicenna writes that
"reflection (~"J) amounts ta the 50ul occupying its faculties with sometbing of the type of tbal
which it seeks; [and this]. in order lO prepare [itself) to receive the form which is sougbt from the
provider of forms (J."....-J' ~I"" ),,163 This provider of forms is the dotor l'onn4rllO/ of the Latin
translations.

Similar ideas are found in Avicenna' 5 Acrion ~U1dPllSSioo in which the imaginative faculty
on/y serves as the initilltÙlg stage for furtber întelleetual developments. For instance, the mind is
busied with images that he1p focus aŒention on the invisible or the intelligible, e.g., in geometry.
A vicenna emphasizes tbat:

Our intelleC% does not need the [faculty of) imagination in aJ1 the juJlctions with the

61 AviœJUla. Shdiï', NMD', V,S, 235.15-236.2 (P~ 167); d. [dem, My-N, NiIfs, Vue 3<49.11-350.3

and 356.5-6 (A J'I7~ -41 and 45).

62 Avice.I1Jla, TJI'U'lN, 83.14-16; cf. Michot, "Cultes," 224.224 n.12.
6J Avicenna. T.lI U,/M , 84.7-10. He also writes, "when. demonstraio.D5 (~, ~ ) are learned. geome1rical
figures (L.-.41 J~1 ) n.eecl ta be represented (aJ~) on a tablet in arder th_ the passive imagination. be
m,sied with tbem [these figures], in arder not ta disturb (..;.-:;.,;,-,,2 "i ) the 111tellec:t from [being able te]
ac:compJi3h the dem.onstntlOD. The pasSIve imagmation wltil':h is busied with a thing of the tiod we are seek1.ng
ils dem.oDStration. does not become an obstacle, nor does it pl'event it," cf. AviceJ1lla. TJlu'1Rr.84.4-6.
 CHAPTER. SEVEN - 212

•
separated [prinClple]. On the contrary. rit ooly requires it] ur me hegUuuo..e, when it
grasps the primary universal representations. Sometimes, the soul also bas recourse
to the imagination in sorne of its activities to distraet the [faculty) of imagination [ta
p-event it) from opposîng [the tntelleet], 50 that by sssociating itself to it, its [own J
disposition be more f~ [this]. just like we do when we examine sensitive shapes
while we think of [problems of) geometry.~

A vicenna adds chat:

Furthermore, yeu must know that the composition of universa! definitions is not
something that œn be accomp1ished br corporeal. facult1es and instruments, although
these fsculties are useful and that they imitate these things with particu1ar images.
55
like the geometer does with bis tablet and bis compass.
The role of imagination in the process of intellection is, th erefore, necessary, although not
frimordiaL A vi.œnna illustrates this process with the praetice of divination or magic by sootbsayers
and magicians. The images their minds create become particu1ar internai representations which.
although in a sense the products of the imaginative faculty, actually prevent their imaginative faculty
from distracting their intellect and opposing the faculey of lDtuition in its attempt ta become more
receptive.66

Suhrawardï alludes to a similar function of the imaginative faeu!ty when. for instance,
amougst the prw:tices of the mystic, he discusses the practice of rememorating the name of Gad
(~ ), a technique employed by the mystics that helps the human. soul to focus its attention on its

first cause. Moreover-, Suhrawardï ascribes a simiJar role to the faculty of imagination in children and
wome.n. Their faculty of imagination can be busied in a way conducive ta the production of visions
simi1ar ta those th. occur in sleep. when the Se1l5es are reJative1y subdued.

The importal1œ attributed tothefacu1ty ofimaginstionin the proœss of thoughtin. Suhrawardï' s

works can be compared ta the role played by tbis faculty in the worts of Plotinus and described by
Blumenthal in. the following manner:

The logos deploys the thought and shows it to the imaginative faculty as though in
a I1lÏ1Tor. The imagination is then able to apprehend it: the persistence of tbis image
is memory. It is tbis presenb.bo.n of thought ta the imaginative faeulty that makes
use of intellection (v01'1GlÇ) that is a1ways in progress (IV. 3.30.5-15). Plotinus often
repeats that it is only neœssary for us ta tum our attention to the BOl/S chat is ours

64 Aviœnna, RisiiJa JI JlI-Ariil W"JI Jl1-IJzli"aJ, 227-8; quoted in Michot•• Cultes." Appendice Il. § 2,

•• 213.
65 Avicenna, /àsiilJlffJl/-AfaJ Wl/llI-InfiUl, 231-2; quoted iD. Michot, ·Cultes," AppendIce, Il, § 13,
233; cf. AviœJUla, Diïmm, Php., 136.7-139.4 (.lir-n.-, D, 85-6).
66 Michot, "Culres," 225.
 CHAPTER. 5EVEN - 213

for intellection to take place (cf. e.g.1.2.4.25-7).67

In its PlotlnÏan illterpreration, intellection becomes the reeeption of the intelligence (nous) in
an u.nmediated process that is 10giœ1ly prior ta ilS re-presentation in any faculty responsible for
representation. The process that is proposed and upheld is the possibility of a direct intuition of the
intelligible (metaphysical) world.
For Suhrawardï, intellection is 10gica1ly prior, in a fashioJl tbat differs littie from Plotinas'
unmedisted process, but mis time in terms of the reception of light (the rational / the logos).
Consequently, the primary activities of Sahrawardï' 5 facalty of imagination are related to the different
func:tions associated with representation in a way not 50 different from AVlcennan Peripatetics (see
seaion on imagination). The purpose of Suhrawardi:' 5 philosophical arguments is ta propose an
analytical presentation of the manner in which the sou! - essentially the Isfabbad-light (~onal) soul

- receives intellective matters (~ .,.,... i ) that helong ta the world of pure intelligences and in which
the active intelligence has an important raIe ta play.

THE AeTIVE INTELLIGENCE

The epistemic process at the heart of Avîcenna's philosophica1 anthropology consists of the
reception of tbat which emanates from the iJUelligible realm onto the human rational sou1. In its
initiaJ stage, there is no need for the actiYities of any of the faculties of the sou! to receive what
emanates onta it from the intelligible rea1m. In the t?/o.s:s-es, Avicenna writes that:

If the vision of the one who sleeps is, in the firse place, an emanation (0":;- ) of the
active intelligence onta the sou! and, then. in the second place, an. emanation from
[the rational scul] o!1to the faculty of passive imagÙlation (~ ~ ) ... the soul is
p-epared to receive what emanates from [the active intelligence]. And [the soul]
does nat Jleed uy of the faculties of the body ta receive chis emanation, since what
it receives cames from the intellect without having a need for the mediation of any
intermediary.6B

The actual cause of universal forms that occur in the human soul is, in faet, an emanation
that originates st the level of the active intelligeJlce and whicb overflows onto the human material
intellect.59 Avicenna, however, ascri.bes three distinct functions ta the active intelligence. First, it is
the organizing principle of matter. Semnd, it is the cause of the origination of the rational soul. And

67 Blumenthal. P.l0tI4lTs· Psyrboft:f(Y. 88.

68 Aviœnna, TJil1ï'pïr, 81.28-88.4 (Oe.stmt!t!, l18 al28). ln what follows. Avicenna concludes that
in ilS posth'umous llfe, the soul does not require any of the c:œporeal faculties wbicb would. howe'Ver, c:ontradlet
otber pasages (see section on eschatology).
69 Avicenna, S1Jffiï1, NaIS, V, 5,235.2-5 (~ 167).
 CHAPTER 5EVEN - 214

r1J1al.ly. as the provider of forms. it is the cause of the intelligibles that possess an e2cistence in
actuality in itself and provides them to the rational sauls.7(l

The first functiol1 of the active intelligence is ta prepare bodies to receive the human souls
with which it will provide them. As the source or cause of the human rational souL the active
intelligence must. therefore. theoretically possess (ln potentiality) alJ these souls. But, as a rational
priAciple. i.e.. a metaphysical intelligence. it is itself simple. indivisible. and. therefore. one. As we
have mentioned. Fakhr a1-Dw al-Rizï (d. 1209). however, will object against the Avicennan position
that simultaneously holds mat the active intelligence is one and many (see section on the nature of
the soul).l1

The second function of the active intelligence is co be the principle at the heart of the
actualization of the human intelligence. Although evety human being possesses a maerial intellect -
as pure potentiality - capable of becoming an intellect in. actuality, nonetheless, its development into
an aoquired intellect is only possible with the help of an external factor. In facto in bis Proof of
Propoe&;Y, Avicenna notes that "[an acquired intellect] does not exist actually in the material
intellect and, tbus, does not exist in it essentially;" rather, he continues, its existence in the m81erïa1

.-- iJltellect co is due to something in which it exist5 esseJltially and that causes that w hich is in potentiality
to [exist] in aetuality." This is the "universal intellect" fvJS J.i.c.), the "universalsouJ," and the "soul
of the world.,,72 Sutements lite tbese that appeal ta notions of a univE!l'5al intelligence or soul May

readily be 8Ssociated with IsmâïU terms, Neoplatonic con.ceptions, or with Plotinus' undesceJlded or
universal soul (the third hypostasis). In fact, Aviceona reminds the reader that he aetually intends the
active Ùltelligence or the "universal active intelligence" ~ J Ca.i Jü. ), the principle responsible
7J
for the perfection of the potentiality of the human înteUect. He writes that:
If the intelleetive faculty comes ta know patticulars abat are in the passive imagination.
and [the intel1ective faculey] thst is in us is illuminated (4-=J.c. ~ ~1 ) by the light of
the active intelligence (J ~ 1 Ji.a.J 1 .)~ ) as we have mentioned, its separation
from and relations with matter would be impossible, and they would be imprinted in
the rational soul (ü.bc, ~) as ther acbJally are.74
The notion of an illumiJlarion of light to which this passage alludes cOlTesponds ta Avicenna' 5

1(1 Davidson, "Alï"aram and Avicenna on the Active lIltel1ect," 109-78; cf. Idem, A.ffur8bi.
71 F. D. al-Rm, ilI-MRbii!ni:IJ, vol. 1,447.15-447.20.
72 Aviœnna, IrnblÜ", 43.11-44.3 (ProoF, 114).
T.J Avieenna, Iœh.Rr, 44.5 (Proof., 114).
~ Avicenna, S1Jzfiï~ .MJfs, V,S, .235.2-5 (P~ 167).
 CfIAPTER SEVEN - 215

• emanationism - emanation (~) is the usual term employed. It is preci.selythis notion of illumination
75

that recurs in numerous works of Sufis - Ibn Sabin. al-Ghaziili's M"cbe of Liçhrs. Najm aJ-Din
Kubri. ete. Likewise. in Suhrawardi" 5 onOOlogy of light. the active intelligence defined in temlS of
76
light becomes a dominating light (i jA li) chat illumiJlates human sauIs.
FinaUy. the third function of the active intelligence is te provide our souls with knowledge.
i.e.. ta emanaœ universal forms 011.00 them. As such. the active intelligence is usually ideotified with
the provider of f orms. a tam Suhrawardî often uses (J ~, ~ '.,,) and alteady present in A vicenna' 5
works. 77

Avicenna's epistemology attributes a predominant role te the active intelligence. As such ,

78
bis epistemology becomes more spiritualized tban that of ArislOtle. The human sou! requires the
aetivities of an active priJlciple to initiate the process by which it will alXiuire knowledge. Therefore.
knowledge is not something ÏJlJ1ate. In. facto the soul receives its knowledge from a pure and separated
intelligence. an intelligence that is extrinsic and distinct from the soul. It is an efficient principle
responsibJe for the soul' 5 actual knowledge. The active intelligence is the source of intelligibles and
the o.a.1y gu8nll1tor of the continuation of me inte11eetive process of buman souls. Human intellects
79
can cognize only with the interVention of the active intelligence.

A vicenna' 5 idealist or spiritualisttendencies. are. however, counterbalanced with the exigencies

of the sensible world. The human soul must tom. to the active intelligence to receive the intelligible
(univers al) forms that will correspond to the sensitive fonns it visualizes. The senses, however. do
set the process in motion. Sensation, the first instrument of the soul in its relation with the world
constitutes the primary aetivity th. eventuallyand ultimately lems to future possibilities of conjonction
of the human 50ul with the active intelligence once the intellect has been developed. In. a sense,
110
sensitive perceptions become truly intelligible only through the action of the active intelligen.ce.
The active intelligence îs, therefore, a necessary but nct sufficient condition for accessing intelligibles
in their universality. Al! empirical experiences initiate the process - especially in view of the role
attributed by Avicenna ta the imaginative facu1ty.

7!5 Gaicboll, Or#:inaio8, 310-3.

76 Massignon, '·Ibn Sabcin et la altique psychologique," 123-30.
n Avicenna, TJI'lii[ik, 84.7-10; cf. Idem, SItffjï', "'fd"U., IX, S, 413.7-12 ("'fem. (47); cf. Corbin,
Arrh.Ttq"e, 2611.16.
78 Avicenna' 5 idea1i~ concepcion of tnowledge centers on the active intelligence, cf. Ushida. Bude,
177-8.
79 B AhwaDi, • La théorie de la connaissance," 31 , 33-5.
fi) Salib., Buc:lesorllmdJtpIJy:a,fkYd'Ar.'rœD8e, 194-5.
 CHAPTFR 5EVEN - 216

Knowledge should not tben be simply equated with the reception of intelligibles by passive
souls. Perhaps as a remnant of Aristotelian empiricism, Avicenna concelves of a prior, even primitive
apprebension of rea1îty that enables the soul to tum to the active intelligence which, in tum, renders
tbese sensitive perceptions - present to the imaginative faculty - perfectly intelligible. In the latter
phase of this process , the active intelligence illuminates the images found in the human souls or
p-ovides them with an intelligible form (science being something that is not innate to the human
saul) 61 The only exceptions Avieenna envisions ta this process of intellection are individuals such as
p-ophets and their likes (see section on prophetie knowledge).
The structure in which the aaive intelligence finds It5elf in Suhrawardï' 5 cosmology is
eisentially the Neoplatonic cosmology inberiœd from the A vicennan tradition. Each eelestial body is
associated with a heavenly soul and an intelligence. Suhrawa-di explains that the relationship that
exists between the heavenly sauls and the intelligences is "like the relation of the active intelligence
ta our souls. ,.82 The tenth intelligence, the emanated outoome of the math intelligence (responsible
for the sphere of the moon and its soul) is the aaive intelligence.fI) Although it is trUe that Subrawardi
is inclin.ed to disregsrd tb.is traditional tenfold division of intelligences and to conceive of a grellter
plurality of celeitial intelligences, he recognizes that ther cannat be in a leiser number than ten,
writiag:

The number [ten] is the least number of intelligences (J~ ) upon which [the
metaphysical realms] are constituted. However, it does not mean that their number
cannot bemore than this - and in much greatermultiplicity. However, [theîr number]
cannot be less than [ten]. Elsewhere in our books, we have mentioned that their
64
numbers ...e indeed very numerous.
Suhrawardï aUudes here ta discussions he has in his OrleAm/-U/umLoarir-'"e JfISdom ,fIS about
the D'Umber of immalerial lights.

The active intelligence originates from the emanative strUctUre already at work in Avicennan
Peripateticism. In the foUowing passage, Suhrawa-dï discusses the place occupied by the active
intelligence within this cosmology. He identifies it as the emansting principle that provides lire, the
human (rational) soul and intelligibles:

If you contemplate the rraces of God's mercy (Lui ~J .JCjj ) in this [conaete]

81 AvicelU1a,51nfiF', Nm, V, 6, 247.13-248.8 (Psy; 175-6).

82 TJII~iU, § 45,58.11-12.
83 .P8rrü, VU, § 60, 54.2-5 (Book, 56).
84 PJITtü, VII, § 61,55.1-4 ( Book, 57).
es HibnM, § 151,139.11-141.3 (5«:.134-5).
 CHAPTER 5EVEN - 217

world, you will he astonisbed [by the faet) that. owing ta the impossibility for divine
mercy not 10 be infinite, that primai matter was broug.ht into existence as an infinitely
receptive entity. Likewise, tbe first principles (t,s.l~) [i.e.. the intelligences] possess
811 infinite power to act: and inevitably, due to the [permanent) renewal of the
ernanation (~I;~ ), something had ta be renewed. As a result. you find that
the celestial per.so.oae ~ u-~i ) were brougbt into existence as somelhing
turning in etrcular motion. for elevated aïms. [but) in keeping with [meir respective)
infinite preparedness (.,)I~J ), joined with infinite aetivity [of the intelligences)
and infinite receptivity [of prima! matter). Thus, the door is eternally [post- and
p-e-etemityJ open for the descent of [God's) blessings (~~~J J",.,>:r ) and the
effusion (~ ) of the permanent Good. And emanation is aetualized in ever')'
receptacle with the latter's prep8l"edness. because the giving principJe (~J,JI i~ ~
[i.e.. the intelligences] is uncbanging. And if the ant were ta have the preparedness
to receive 8 noblE[" soul, like hu.m.an bei.ngs. chen, such would be aetualized in it
thanks ta the emanation of the intelligence which is by nature ovedlowing (~
ua4AJ 1 J.i.aJ 1).66
Likewise, Suhrawardî discusses the three major functions of the active intelligence. The
latter is responsible for the production of human rational souls in the fotm of potential intellects once
the detenninations that condition the receprion of a huma.11. soul by a natura! body occur. These
mnditions ..e re1ated ta the physica1 constituents required for the constitution of a human body and
the cosmologicaJ conjectures which determine the mixture of the portion of sublun.. matter' receiving
-' the fonn. The most ped'ect mixture is the one which receives the human soul (see cbapter on the
nature of the soul). Suhrawardï notes that .. since the rational soul is the noblest [thingl that ataches
[itseJf) ta prima! matter ~~~ j".-,.!), and that it is not possible that the production of an of [the
ntiona1souJ's) possibilities occur a1J at once without bodies (of",":,~1 ~ ')1" ôl",":,~J W.J), theref<X'e,
[human] souls accur out of the emanation of tbeir provider [of forms], œntury arter century, [and]
retum 10 dteir Lord if they have become perfect...87 The provider of forms cOlTesponds 10 the active
intelligence and is thus identical with A vicenna' 5 provider of forms.

The fint function of Suhrawardî' s active intelligence is similar to the one discussed by
A vicenna. The active intelligence is the lord of the elemental world (~~ rJ ~ l.SJ.Ja .JS ). of
prime matter and its fonns, and of our souls.818 As the cause of the sublunar wodd, the active
intelligence is aided (o~ La.. ) br the motions of ce1estial spheres, which are the SOUl"Cei of nstural
determ.inations a the level of the sublunar world. In this world. the active intelligence can produce

ll6 TJtlwi/Jiïl:, § 57,76.7-15 (Landolt, "Suhraw.-di's, 483b). For an almo~ identical text, cf. ÀJwii!t,
ft

(a> § 64,45.5-46.6 (P) § 61,155.19-156.8.

lr7 TJllwi"/Nït. § 57, 76.15-18.
88 P1Irrii, VU, § 60,54.4-6 ( Book, 56).
 CHAPTER 5EVEN - 218

'. various effects or actions. because it has at its disposa!

ft is

angel of revelation.
equally the bestower of souls (Persian. ~

91
ft number of recipients ~ 1"'; ).69
ùf; J ).';0 As the bestower - the source - of

human souls. (he active intelligence can easily be identilied with the holy spint (U""w 1 c.".J
Suhmwardï himself writes that it was the active intelligence which. following
) or the

the Qur'iin. dec1ared to Maryam (Mary): .. 1 am the messenger of your Lord in arder ta give you a
pure son" (Q.. L9: 19).92 more ooncemed than Avicenna with trying to harmonize philosophical
doctrines with the reLigious dogmas.
The aet1ve intelligence is the cause of human souls. As such, it provides the souls with their
own immateriality, because if the cause is immaterial. its effeets must aiso be immaterial. [f it were
not the case tbat the effect - the human rational soul- was immaterial, then. the materiality associared
with buman souJs would imply a cenain amount of materiality in their cause. Since the cause is the
immaterial aaive intelligence, mis is, in facto impossible, because it is the latter, as the cause of
human ralional souls, that gueranlees them the same immortality.9J

The second function of the active intelligence - once it has endowed the body with a
potential 1 materia1 intellect - is to be the principle for the aetualization of the passive or materia1
intellect Ulto an intellect in. aetuality. Suhrawardï states that "it is tbis [active] intelligence that brings
us from potentieljty to aetuality; its relation ta our souls is Jike tbat of the sun ta the eye," thus
9ol
alluding to the different stages through which the human intellect proceeds. As the aaive principle.
the active intelligence imparts the capabillties ta ascend ta its full stae of development ta the
potential intellect. The relation of the aaive intelligence ta our souls in terms of the relation of the
sun to the eye, is a now familiar metaphor.'i5

And finaUy, the third function of the active intelligence is ta be the source of knowledge. For
Suhrawardi, the human sou! obtains its abillty of infinite intellection ~ ) from the aaive
intelligence.Q6 The active intelligence provides the - intelligible - fOrIns that human souls will grasp

89 PlImï, VII, § 61,54.9-11 (Baox,56).

90 HIbmlr, § 210,2005-201.4, esp. 201.1 (S..,:, 90).
91 Davidson, AUilnrbi, 174-5. For Avi,œJlJla, celestial sovls. œlestial spberes, and intelligences (i.e.,
me cberubins [brrïb[pZiz] ) are all ange1s, d. Goic:bon, OistJÀaiOD, 296-9; cf. Jadaane, "La place des anges,"
23-61.
92 r6r;Ji::I, § 4,265.8-9 (AJ'rh, (7).
93 PJirtû. IX § 73, 65 .15-16 (Baok, 69).
1

:~'-.: PJimi, VU, § 60,54.7-8 (BooK, 56).

-.- 94

95 PIrt'ü VII, § 60,54.4-8 ( Book. 56).

1

'iIlS T"'wf!Nïr, § 47, 60.11-61.7.

 CHAPTFR SEVEN . 219

cr. more accurately. recei.ve from it. Like other intelligences. the active intelligen.ce is incolTUptible
(~~ ~) It owes its incotTUptibility ta its in.telleetive nature, but also "becsuse if (intelligences)

were to change," Suhrawardï writes. "the aecessary being (meir uJtimate cause] would have aIso to
change. which is impossible."';11 Such a statement presupposes a causality in the A Vlcennan sense -
i.e.. the intrinsic relationship betWeen cause a.ad effect at the meœphystcallevel.

The active intelligen.ce aaualizes poteatia1 intellect. because itself is always in. aetllality - as
a pure intelligence - and. therefore. not subject to colTUption. The souf s ability to access the
metaphysical realm is mus detennined by the existence and activities of the active intelligence.

CONJUNCTION WITH THE DIVINE REALM

Human rational souls aim st estabLishing a conneetion with the metaphysical realm. How is
then the relation that can be established between the sublunar and metaphysical reaJms to be understood?
In their explanatioJl5, both Avicenna and Subrawardï appeal ta a notion of cnnjunetion. But how is a
oonjunc:%ion of human. souls with the world of celestial souls ta explain the acquisition of knowledge
cr prophetic and mystica1 knowleege (see seaion on prophetology for the 181ter)9
The appeal ta a notion of "umon" (.)1,-;1 ) ta describe either the sours apprebemion of

reality or its relation to the metaphysical mises some problems in the worts of bath A viœnna and
Suhrawardï. On. the one hand, the notion of union implies some sort of identity of the subject and the
abject typically charac:teristic of self-tnowledge: white. on the other, the same notion of union is
employed to describe the reJationship of the soul with the active intelligence.

Avicenna upheld two positions in bis works. In bis earlier works, he appears to endorse the
idea of a union of the soul witb the intelleaive principle. This is a position he rejects in bis later
warD. Avi.œnna' s earlier adoption of the theory of a union of the soul with the intellective principle
was most probably derived from the works of later Peripatetics. e.g., in the pseudo-1À~logyof

An'.sTode.96 ln. bis com..mentary of the Nemorks. Tüsi notes chat Avicenna accepted such a union on.1y
in. the O~ nAd!l«lJnJ.9i

In bis Nem. .ks. Avicenna attributes this belief in the union of the mind and the object - lbat
"the intelligent substance [ie.. the rational soul]. when it knows an intelligible farm, it becomes that

97 Pwrii, VII, § 61.54.13-14 ( Bcok, 56).

'lB Goicbon. OrreaiJ'l!S, 443 R.1.
99 Avïœnna, JI.I-hf;lbdR'W'JI;d-A-fl/~~{ed. N1Iriünî. 97.13-100.2 and 106.13-5; cf. Goicbon. OrœaiJ''t'S
1 Dace fot' page 445.
 CHAPTER. 5EVEN - no

•
form." - to some of the forefathers of philosophy (00::;~ ).100 He asserts that the soul does not
becomethe object during intellection. He rejects the idea of a "union" (..)~I) of the nIliona1. intellect
with the active intelligence (or my other transœndent principle), a union some people understand as
the human soul becoming the active intelligence.
On the conrnuy. the human intellect only becomes an acquired intellect. 101 A vïœnna, therefore,
rejeets the idea of any type of mtellective union, a thesis which be attributes ta Porphyry referring to

a conrroversial work. 102 According ta Goichon, the work to which Avicenna is probably refetTing is
OA me ioœDtir~Aœ Ildd 1LJreU.f!!I~fé?S , a work mat presents Plotin.us' doclrine.
I03
For Finnegan,
"Porphyry" corresponds, rather, ta the translator responsible for the Arabic ten of Alexander's On
die /n/"eUecr (Pen'nou ).104 Avicenna migbt be thinking of al-Firibï, calling him Porphyry to
obscure matters. lOS

ln the Remorks, A vicenna upholds El notion of the intellective conjunction - rather than the
union - of the human rational sou! with the active intelligence in the act of intellection (~~ Jü:i
JLu..H Ji.a-l4 [~I ~] 4Jl.._:;L~ .~I ).1(16 Hence, once the human soul has reached the

most pedecl state of poteatiality - i.e., once il has become an 8CXJ.uired intellect - it is then capable of

.---. conjoining with the active intelligence.

Avicennagoes on te argue that the relation of the human. intellect and the aaive intelligence
understood as a union would imply the divisibility of the active intelligence - and consequently of
pure intelligence itself, because of the nature of the union of two things. On the contrary, the human
soul' s conjunction with the active intelligence only provides the soul with the nLenos to access the
plethora of separated intelligences. A vicenna believes thΠthe Porphyrian concept of union of [wo
different things must be understood poetically (~~ ) - or, according to N~ al-Dm Tusi,
metaphorically (j~). Il is notintel.ligihle otherwise.
107

100 Avicenna, fsh;nrr, vol. 3-4, VII, 697,1-698.10 (Où:, 443). It woald correspond to the fint group

in the M.-1Ilin·', § 20 l, 474.7-475.2 and in the TJII~, f 54, 68.16-69.6.

101 Avicenna, .lslnnït. vol. 3-4, vn, 701.6-8 (Où:, 447).
102 Avicenna, .lsAJ6iir, vol. 3-4, VIT, 702.8-12 (Dû:, 448).
103 Goicboll, D.r.œai,~, 448 n.2; cf. Avicenna, Aet:uwf~ {eci, c~ij, 132.1-142.13.
104
FîIUlelaD., -Texte arabe," 159-202.
105 5 uBBe5led by Prof. La.n.doJt.

-. 40-1;
106 Aviœnna. fskiinü, vol 3-4, VH. 701.3-5 ( Oir., 447); cf. El Ahwani., - La théorie de la CORn3.lSsaDCe,"
cr. Ga'det. LI COJ1IDl1s.uD&e LD.,J'Sb9ue, 13-6.
107 Avicel1J1a, ./s1Jii'iïe, vol. 3-4, vn, 703.7, 703 n.IIme 6
(Ok, 449, 449 11.3). Finnegan writes, "The
principal. argument thal Avicenna advances against the 'Porphyrians' (;omes te dus. If A is ta become B, you
must admit Olle of two possibilities. Ether A disappears in the process and leaves the stage entireJy to B, or
-.
CHAP'TER. 5EVEN - 221

Likewise. Suhrawardï is reluetant to use the tenn "union" (.J~I ) to desaibe the relation
beeween the soul and the aaive intellect. He reports that Avicenna criticized Porphyry (~~J~ ~ )

for beJieving in the idea of a union, even though A vicenna himself adopted this positlon in bis earlier
works. Suhrawardi mentions Avicenna's TheOttifinnnddJeReilIrO (.JWI" i~1 ) as evidence for
AviceJ11ls's earlier belief in such a union and criticizes him for ie as weil as Porph)'ry.lœ Suhrawardfs
aiticism is quite polemiœ1. since he must have been weil aware of the discussions that are found in
the Renmrks. where AvicefU1a is quite explicit abouc his rejeetion of say possibility of a union.
For Suhrawardï. the hum an soul does not unite with anytlung. Such a process can onlyalter
ilS nature. He first demonstrates the falsehood of the cJaim tbat "the perception of an entity which
becomes itself a form of that thing" by arguing that it is impossible for one thing to become -
COJlcretely (~) - something else. Ether the first entity rem.8Ï.JlS with the occurrence of the second
entlty. in which case there would now be two entities. or the first disappears and only the second
I09
remains or, lastly, the first remains and the second does not occur. But the original entity - the
human rational soul - does not become &nother entity. It always remains distinct. To expJain this,
Suhrawardï offers the example of the transformation of water into vapor in terms of principles of
mange of states and of substantial transformation. A transformation of forms occurs, but the substratum
(J.--) remains one (~I,,),ll0 i.e., the p-ime matter which receives the forms.

In the case of the human soult the self-pEl"ceiving substance remains unchanged. white the
forms of ils perœption (of other chings) Il"e accidentai. Suhrawardï wriœs:

Then, the subst81lce which perceives itse1f in you (~ ...:il~ ~~l .>A~I ) is
not sometbiJlg which is renewed ~ each moment. lt is. rather. a "monadic" (..s.-.I" )
entity (.~) unchanging (~lj) before. wiLIt. and afœr [the existence or the presence]
of the Corm. The form is an entity which occurs with the permanence of [the ipseity]
(~li..;a ). Indeed, you are yourself (~i ~i ~t.t ). with perception or without
perception. therefore, there is no meaning to the unification (.J~I ) [of the human
soul with forms].111

The rejection of intelleetuaJ perception, in terms of a unification of subject and object. reitS
on the substantial nature of the soul. The soul cannet unite with anotber entity - an object of

else, if yeu lDSist that bath should n:mai.n, you must alJow that by their combinatlon they give tise te a lert2um
Vœil. AB, w.bic:b, e'Vldently, cannot be identi.c:aUy either. Every becomiJJg 1J1Volves a duality of principles. As
soon as one tries ta substitute an ideatît:)" for this duality. one loses boJd of me 'becoming, which was to be
explaiJIed," cf. FinJlegan, .. Aviœnna's Refutatlon ofPorphyrius." 189.
IDB TlIIJlFf/Jiir, § 54, 69.8-11. Suhntwardî i.s probably commenting the IsllJÏrJr; he notes AVlcenna's
severe crilic:ism. towards Porphyry; then: is also a reference to "perspectives" (.1-:J), cf. Ibid.• § 203, 0476.
109 Afll.sl1JTn"r, § 201,4704.1-2; cC. TllIw"f.!nïr, § 504, 68.16-17.
110 Au.mm·', § 201.474.2-16; cf. AVlœnna, IslJihir, vol. 3-4. VU, 705.1-3 (.ori':,0449).
 CHAPTER 5EVEN - 222

perception - even if the ialler were a focm. Any type of union would imply a change in the soul' s
substance. This is not the case as Suhrawardï has demonstrated with his subjective notion of the self
- a consciousness independent of any physicai oc of bodily contact - that guarantees that the soul.
DOW the self, has knowledge of itself, in the sense of a logicaJ priority. without ultimaely requiring
any sort of perceptive sbility or perception chat relies on something other than itself.
The second position Suhrawardi rejeclS. agaïn faithful ta the Aviœnna of the Ilenuvks. is
the daim that a union of the soul with the active intelligence is a U"SJ1Sformation of the former inta
the latter. This type of union would entait. either. that the active intelligence is, in. some way. divided
into parts. The soul would then perceive some parts ta which it would unites without uniting with its
other parts (which it does not know), in which case it would perceive sorne things but not others. Or
it would entail thal the soul perceives a single thing, the whole of the active intelligence, unites with
it, and through it perceives aU other thingS.l1Z The rejection of the ides of ft transformation of the soul
into the active intelligence thus imposes itself.
A last difficulty raised with the adoption of any theOlY of union - even of a conjunction - of
the humaa soul with the metaphysical worfd is inberent in its similarity with mystica1 union with the
One. The possibility of uJlÏting with the active intelligence cm be interpreted as seaing the oonditions
for a possible union with the One. 1I3 The belief of a uniOll. of the buman 50u1 with the One followed
the identification of the active intelligence with God (Alexander of Aphrodisias) whicb Avicenna
discusses in the ProoF of~p.IJ«iY where be proposes a philosophical interprelation of the Ver.ie of
light (Q., 24:35).114 IJ1 Alexander' 5 Onl1Je IAref/ea, the active intelligence is compared ta light that
IIS
illuminates intelligibles for US and whidJ "t1Irns the materiaJ. intellect - whicb is in potentiality -
into an active intellect" and which "separates the intelligibles from prime mater ~~ ).,,116 When
the active intelligence actualizes the intelligibles, it imparts a disposition for intellectual con.ception
~ ;~ ) in the material intellect. 117 The active intelligence thal is "always an active principle"

lit AfasDJÏn"', § 201,474.6-4752.

112 AfllslJm°r, § 202,415.3-9; cf. TJlIwi!Jijr, § 54,68.16-69.7.
113 Morewedge, "Ibn Sma's Conœpt of the Se1f," 59-60 [section V - TheParadox].
1\4 Avicenaa, fd16k, 52.4-7 (PnJof, 117-8); cf. Idem, SIIi,ljj#, Nm, V, 7, 250.5-262.16 (~,
177-86).
C
us For an earher edil10n of the Arabie "Maqilah fi aI- Aql" of Alexander of Aphrodisias, d.
Finnegan. "Tene arabe," 181-202; d. Alexander, "Maqilah fi aI_cAql," 33,34,38. [Badawï's reeditIon of
Finnegan' 5 edition)
116 Alexander, "Maqilah ... fi al-'Aql," 34 and 37.
 CEiAPTER. SEVEN - 223

• is. however. alcin ta a divine intelligence <v+J! ~ ) H6 !vloreover, for Alexander, the active
iJltelligence is .. the cause of everything chat exists," besides being .. the cause of human thought and
of human being's tnteUeet."IICJ As such. it is akin
notion of creator.
ta Aristotle's First Cause,lZO but aisa akin te the

In the Temple of~1Jrs. in addition ta rejectmg identtfïcation of the active intelligence with
Gad. Suhrawa-di also reJects the daim. made by those who hold that the rational soul is a part of
God. God is not a body. therefore. how couJd it be divided and distributed into these parts. Moreover,
who would beresponsible for the division and the distribution~IZI

In the PLlcDs, Suhrawardi actually refers the reader ta bis Ohènr.n/-D/unuDOiive ~'jsdom for
a more detailed account of bis own position regardiJlg the rational sauf s - the Isfahbad-light' s -
desire ta conjoin with the immaterial lights. IZZ

Noteworthy is the Caet that in the Onenhll-Ulumm/llir-1:' Jf'j"sdam, he discusses this desire to
conjoin in terms of a "union" (,)6:':; 1). He specifies. however, that this union is merely an intellective
union ~ ,)~I ), not a physical or bodily (~~ ) union. 123 Suhrawardï, in fact, alludes ta the
im&ginary representation V ~i;"~ ) that the souls have, such that the ruling rational lights

.-- (O-H"w .)1,,=,;) imagine that tbey

or even the Light of lights - GOd.
IUP

lZ4
the dominating lights (~~ o.)Aü .) Iyi ), the intelligences,

Moreover, Suhrawardï cautions anyone about conceiving of a substantial union of lights

arter their separation. i.e., the rational soul's separation from the body. There is no union of two
things, otherwise their distinctive and respective cbaraeter would cesse to exist. He then states that
there can only be conjunetion (JWJ) and mixture <G.1,.>=-1) betWeen [Wo distinct things. 12S

His reluetance to employa tenu like "union" stems from the materialist implications its
usage raises - the fusion of two distinct entities Utto one or the division of one into two. The

118 Alexander, "Maqilah fi al_cAql,n 41.

!tg AJexander, "Maqilah fi aJ- "AqI," <40,42,43.
Davidson, "A1fa-abi and Avicenna on the Active Intellect," 125; cf. Hamelin, U
IZll UJeOl7e de
JÜUl!Uea, 35.
12:1 H~rJkil, JI (a) 55.3--4 (p) § 11,90.4-6 (AJ'rn., 46; fsmllLf, (06); cf. Hi!r.db/. IV <a) 61.7-11 (p) §
17,94.5-104 (Ard., 049; IsmaLl, 1504).

-. 122 ~fas1Nïn·~ § 207,483.104-15.

IZ3 Hikm~, § 242, 228.1-2 <
"Subraw.-di's," 481a.
12:4

1Z5
§
.{5.bnw, 2042,228.2·5 ( Slgr., 212).
s.v.
212); cf. Mulli ~dri, TJI'bÏfiK. SOS <S{4'=, 635-37}; cf. Landolt,

IU"bmtr, § 2043, 228.9-12 (Sol5'". 212); cf. Ibld.• § n-76 , 74.15-80.1.

 CfiAPTER 5EVEN - 224

-. distinction betWeen newly separated lights (in cheir posthumous liCe) - the rational souls - is preserved
through a differentlation that is "intelleetive" (~ j~1 ).126 The permanence of the perception or
awareness (J~ ) of their own selves in the afterl.ife (&fta- their association witb bodies) - I.e., the
awareness of their own (substantial) lights - guwantees a permanence ta their individuality.lZ7 His
adoption of a notion of conjunction is quite in agreement with AVlcenna's position in the lle.nuvla.
One of Suhrawardi's central epistemological th eses , according to Gardet's mysticaI
interpretation, is the beJief in "an onroJo...eû;61 unity of the knowing with the known," which, he
believes, can probably be traeed back te Plotinu 5 , retum of the soul ta the One. perhaps even ta
pre-Islamic Zoroastrian sources or to Vedantic Indian noetics. This is what he caUs Suhrawardf s as
we1l as Plotinus' .. natura! mysticism," where a persona! experience and a philosophical
col1ceptualization of this experience are almost indissociable. l26 For G..det, Suhrawardi criticizes
AviceJllUl for bis refusa! to postUlate an. "ontologicaJ identity in an intelleetual knowledge. and,
therefore, of mystical knowledge" as the true authentic Oriental philosophy.ln
For Suhrawardï. human souls have access to and can conjoin with the metaphysica1 realm. In
bis dream-vision, Aristotle informs bim that buman souls enjoy .. an inte11ective conjunction (J ~ 1
~)" witb the metapbysical world and that "there also exists between the souts in the loftier world

'- an intelleeti.ve conjunction... 130 Subrawardï mentions mat the direct access one has in the afterlife ta
knowledge is a kind of "ïntellective unioo" (4i J WI ~ tÙ~ ~ .)~I) and nota substantial
131
one. In light of such statement, Gardet May bave a point by emphasizing a type of ontologicaJ
unity. Noned1eless, as regards a notion of union in the sense of an identity of subject and object,
Suhraw..dï generally keeps the two spart. It is only in the case of self-knowledge that one could,
perbaps, conceive of an "onto1ogical unity." i.e.. oneness of subjeet and abject, but not fusion of the
o/Pe implied in the use of such tenns as "unity." Even the pure ligbts. which possess a knowledge
described in terms of an "intellective union" ~ J6:":ï 1), remain distinct.
The intellective union envisioned by Suhrawardi must be understaod only in the sense that a

I~ Corbin's U1UlS1ation - "dûférentiation spiritueUe" - is. tb«efore. misleading for non-Arabists. cf.
RikmM, § 242,228.12 (S.",.. 213).
12'1 /5bnllt, 1242.228.12-229.2 (5.t.v:, 213).
IZll Gardel, LlI c:onnm:s:sance mpoiIue, 59-61; cf. CocbUl, "Prolégomènes," in ~nI. l, xl-xliii; d.

Ml/!iïnl!IiU. § 223.502.13-504.2; COI'bm. Les motUs zOf"O;lS/J7ens (oeuvre de jeunesse).

lZ9 Gardet, LI Q;J.11DiII.sJ:lIn&e n.1,r:s:rR1ue• 20.
130 T""~. § 55, 73.14-15. For a traIlS•• cf. Walbridge. LeJ/R'D, 225-229 [Appendix U].
131 T6Ifri/Jiï!, §55. 73.15-16; cf. TJlIwf.Mr, 154.68.16-69.15.
 CHAPTER 5EVEN - 225

dl.Ïn"or cm exist st the same time as the milTOred lights that occur in it. lJ2 The soul must develop a
hnl1lfUs forconjoiniJlg with the world of pure light (~f J,,:-JI ~~ J~il ~) aJong with a

Suhrawardi generally defines perception in tenn:r: of l~

l33
love and a longing for the afterlife.
presential nature. As such, the notion of union, In the case of knowledge. becomes a fruitless
concept.a~ [n bis cornmentary, Mulla $adra quotes a passage from the PotIJs that aptly illustrates

Suhrawardï' s position:

Some [thinkers] believe mat we Mean mat there is fi conjunction of these lights with
the soul (~f JL..::i1 ) and [that] it unites with the principle (~~~ LA.J~I )
[i.e.. the active intelligence]. It has been proven that union is impossible, umess what
is meant br union is a spiritual state (~6..3J ~6. ) whicb befits the separated
substances (~li J l&..). [This union] should not be understood as a bodily conjunction
(cr ~ JW and a mixture (~I .J=-' ) [characteristic of maœria! bodies], as il is
J )

incontestable tbat there is no annihilation of one of the two identities k;;-'.!~ ).

Conceiving of the inberenœ (J"bJI rA;: ) [of the soul iota a material substratum]
is a mistake. Indeed, there is notbing that prevents me to say tbat the soul, although
il is not in the body, when there is, however, a strong relation [established]
betWeen [the soul] and the body, it indicates the body by [saying] .. l," such that MoSt
seuls focget themselves and believe that their identities (~l:""" ) are [redocibJe toI
the body. Likewise. tbere is nothing that prevents a desirous, luminous and divine
.---. (~.,.i ~J",:a ~~ ) relation with the [fi1'5t] principles (~~ ) to occur ta the
soul [andJ whicb establishes on [the scul] a permanent and aboJishing irradiation
(o--lL. r.r-~ t.. ~ ) that erases from it the attention lit can pay] te sometbing
e1se, such that it design.es its principle by [saying] 'T' with a spiniull/ des-W0lhon
(~6.,J.J iJL:ü! ). TherefOl"e, aU ipseities (~~i) become immersed in the infinite
and most regent light (~~, ~ 1 .J+Ï~f J.,,:a.J 1).135

DIVINE SPIRIT, LOGOS, AND LIGHT

A number of ether notions such as divine spirits.ligbts, or logos are introduced in discussions
that pertain to rational souls and associated with the latter. The 111"5t of tbese notions is the notion of

divine spirit. This concept belongs ro the Judaic, Christian, and [slamic traditions - the Holy Spirit
Islamic philosophers, on me other hand, will identit'y it as the active intelligence, the resu1t of a
sinœre concern ta bridge the gap that often seemed impossible to fill between two inte1lectual
uaditions - p-ophetic and phi1osophical.l315 [n Avicenna, the divine spirit is associated with the

1'2 Landolt, "Suhrawardï," 48Ja.

133
HLboJU, § 237,223.15-224.1 (.5:1t4'=, 208); cf. ~fasIJïD", §§ 201-2.474.7-476.9.
1304 M~', §474.7-475.2.
135 ~fMldri~ § 222,501.15-502.6; cf. Mulla ~adrii, u'liiJlir,506 (S~, 637).
136 Rahman, PnJp/MJçyin fsJJtm, J09-10.
 CfIAPTFR 5EVEN - 226

•• inte1Jective principle. The divine spirit (~~

the higher aetivities of the human soul
overfJows or ernanates (ù 1 • -.:-.;)
UpOll.
c." J

towacds the human

) -

sOUlS.
the Archangel Gabriel - commumcstes with
whicb its emanated light descends. The divine spirit
I37

Both a philosopher and a pious Muslim, Suhrawardï also endeavoured towards reconciliation.
He genera.l1y follows the religious uadition and distinguishes between a human and a divine spirit.
For instance. he writes that the animal spirit (~I ~ C,jJ )" is different from the divine spirit (C" J
l
~_' ) which was included in the sayings of the Prophets." and which originaleS from the non-sensible. 3:l

In another work. he writes chat the vital spirit flowing through the body and providing life to the
different organs it passes through is distinct from the .. spirit which is altributed [() Gad... ni J'j Generally
speaking. the divine spirit - the Hoiy Spirit - is the divine breath without which life would not be
possible and. in a way. is intimately associaed with the vital spirit - the psychic pneumo. The divine
spirit aIso corresponds to the principle at the hem of the rational pErt of human sauls. the provider of
souls, the aC%Ïve intelligence, the Archangel Gabriel.
Suhrawardi's philosophica1 ïnterpretation of the religious tradition is evident from slatements
like die following passage from the Temples of 4.lJrs. Uwhat is meant by (the divine spirit} is the
rational souL" The Persian version of this work is EVen more explicit and mentions that what is
-..- reported in the Qur'in refers to the rational sou1. Suhrawatdi then provides a verse ta support bis
interpretation. In the Qur'in, he writes, what is alluded to by the term spirit (C.J..J) is Ua light from
the lights of Gad - the most exalted - and it occupies no dimension (~ )...14J The last part of the
statement is, in faet, an allusion to the rational soul' 5 immateriality. In another work, he writes that

the divine spirit is nothing other than the human spirit (ô L...,,;, ~ 1 C.J J ), whose origin is not of this
world. He adds that as long as it remains attached (~i.ï ) to the body, the body remains alive.
141

Agaïn. Suhrawardï must be referring to the rational sou! itse1f.

COll.teary ta A vicenna. Suhrawardï associates the rational soul with two other concepts - chat

137 Avicenna, .MIfir. NIlI"S, VI, 339.1-341.9 (A~&:, 35-6); cf. the begutDiag of the cbapter VI whel"e

the ratlonal soul's ac:qllisition of knowJedge is dlScussed, cf. A'VÎœDI1a, MlJïït. ,A,fem, 710.14-5.
138 Hl/phI, II (a) 54.4 (b) § 9,89,7-8 (ALd., 45; fsma"7, 105). The vital soul he lS disçussing is
altributed to all living things (ù 1;~ ~).
139 KJlIims, IV, § 22. 97.3. Kuspimlr ha tried ta show that me three ooncepts - "divine spirit,"
-human spirit," and "rational souJ" (ù~1' c..J...J ) - are o.lle and the same tlwlg; it is somedtiJIg onJy human
beiJJBs possess a opposed to the animal spirit which is onJy particul. 10 animais [cf. Dawwiini (20bl)]. cf.
Kuspinac, fSlDJI-'i1, 131.
14] HJIfiïkiJ, fi (a) 54.5 (b) § 9, 89.10 (• .û'rh., 45; fsm8L/, 105-6); cf. Hl!rJkiJ ,n (p) § 9.89.9-13; cf.
A./w;Ï/}, n, § 30. 133.13-4.
141 rliVJKI, § 7.267.12-4; d. IbId., § 7,268.2-3.
 CflAPTER 5EVEN - 227

of the logos (:L...1S ) and of light (.J~ ) - wbich are bath intimateJy reJated to one anotber. The first
identification of the rational souJ with the logos is found in such works 85 his /lemod:s 00 SuliSm.
In this work. he UJlderstands the logos in a number of way. AJ1 point te its !'livine ongin. Hence. the
logos is the divine spirit or God's breath (or word) without which nature would not be animated. He
writes that it is "the logos about which Gad said. 'and when 1 have fashioned h.im ud breathed into
him of my Spirit (~.3J D-A ~ .-:bi', ): (Q.. 15: 29) and Gad most exalted [also] said. 'and bis

ward whicb he sent ta Mary. and a spirit from hint (~ C..,J.3 r="'" ~I lAlA.J1 ~-' r (Q., 4:
171)... 142 In addition. he writes tbat the logos of the mystics can be identified with the rational soul aï
the philosophers. as with the .. heart:' "secrec." and "spirit" of the mystics.I<O

More importantly. in the same work. Subrawardïidentifies the logos as the rational principle. 14:2
In the Cbnnr ofGtibn'ej:S I~~. he writes that "when from the divine spirit (~.;:. c..JJ ) [or the

boly spirit. i.e.. the right wing of Gabriel]. a ray of ligbt descends. its ray of light is the logos wbich
is called the minor logos ( :s~:.....as ),'.145 suppotting bis c1aim witb a verse form the Qur'iin (a

metbod he employs abundantly tbrougbout tbis particu1ar work) (Q.. 9:40).146 Hence, in the Remorks
OB Sub"sm . the rational soul - the logos - is. therefore. DOC the ·'lr8.nSJnÎtter" of ligbt ta the body. le

-. is itself essenrially light (;a~..J~ ). the tradsmitter being the vital spirit. The vital spirit, as the
philosophers have mentioned, is the bearer of a11 the faculties and "the intamediary betWeen the
logos and the body."I47

Suhrawardï pursues in the same work 8Jlother distinction. The buman rational soul cOrTesponds
to the minor logos. wbi1e the divine spirit corresponds. in a sense, ta the greater logos, i.e.. the active
intelligence or Archange! Gabriel (perhaps even aU intelligibles). bath of which are immaterial
substances. The minor logos is then in contact with the vital spirit. itself the intermediary between

14Z KwOmû, IV, § 22,97.3-4 (.An::"h., 163).

143 K.ilÔiZI., III, § 19, 93.9-11 (~.• 161). For Gardet and Aftawali, "the Stn~te emaaative schooJs
or [those with) Shï&-Jte inclin.ations readily IdeJllified ~J (lJue.11ee:t). tpl/h (heart), and nih (spirit) ta make it
the vital aatvity and. thereupon, even Ebe personality of human bei.ng," d. Gardet and Anawati.. IJ1Irodvr::hen;i
JldJéofo.pemusulmll8tf. 347. The same may, however, be said about Gbazili as weIl.
144 The fourdl dI.pl« of his WadsOllSIdiSm dea1s witb the vital spirit as the link between the logos
(L.A..lS ) and the body. along witb the different intenJal senses, cf. KMfrm-Jr. IV, § 21-2,95.11-97.4 (An:D,
162-3).
145 A-Jt7ÏZ, § 19. 221.1-2 (An:'h. 236).
146 k would be intere5tiJJg tG analyse Suhrawa-dï's use of the various Qur'in quoutions to convey,

molt probably for the con.sumption of a more retigioU5 audience, a greater sense of orthodoxy te bis own
views. thereupon corrobŒated by the religious text.
147 K.mAt, IV, § 22, 96.1~7 (~, 163); cf. KJdimnr, IV, § 21,95.11 (AJm. 162).
 CHAPTER SEVEN - 228

•• the rational part of t11e soul and the body. In another passage, Suhrawardï writes that .. the logos does
not exist prior to the body.~ hence, alluding to his rejection of a doctrine of the pre-existence of the
rational soul.
l4B

The second notion œsociated witb the rational part of the soul is light. In. the Temple 0/
ke-:blS, light constitutes the rational principle tbat originales l'rom the Light of ligbts - God - and to
whom it ultimately return5. Suhrawardi writes that what is meant by the sayings found in the
reve1ation is that "this [divine spirit] is the rational soul (~w ~ ), whicJt is Ofle ofdie ~i{llIs of

God most exaJted, [a light] which does not subsist in a place, springs from Gad (4-i,~ 4..1J1 r:.r-
and returns (~,;..:. .uJ J ~ !.,,) to [God]. .. 149

Such an identification of the rational and the intelliglble with light appears to introduce a
rationalistic perspective thus underlies Suhrawardi's own ontology of light. The rationaJ part of the
soul is DOW associated with a concept of light. It becomes one of God's lights. Moreover. the
emanative scheme of intelligences found in Avicenna finds its parallel in Suhrawardï 5 light ontology,
where light becomes explicitly identified with the rational and the intellective.

In the 0ppoSLiions. where he lries to answer a query reg8l"ding the nature of the soult

.-- Suhrawardï explains how souls are "luminous, separsted, divine" (~.J.i i;~ 4..:~ ), and
lSO
self-subsistent. By contrast. the luminosity of bodies is acquired through the intennedisry of
something else. Thei.r lum.inosity amoWlts to the very appearance of anotber. This is their cause.
Hence, he writes chat" the bodily light (~.~ J~) is an image U ~) be10nging to the self-subsistent
light <r=li ..)~ ), i.e.. a shadow (~) be10nging ta [that light), just like the templic [i.e., bodily] life
(:;,: IC.:. i~ ) is [but] a trace of the self-subsisteat Life (~li o~ ) and its shadow."l51 The

quiddity of the im.mllterial entity (~,J ~ ) - the souls (celestial and buman) - is thus reducible to

pure light.

Vital spirits possessed by human beings. on the contnuy. are only the receptac1es of accidenta!
light. The function of vital spirits is, again, to serve as an intermediary. Suhrawardï illustrates this by
writing that:

The living which is self-subsisting (r:ü:;:' ) is the self-subsisting light <r=û J~ ),

148 KlllrÀbU, DI, § 20. 93.l2-17 (Aa"h, 16l).

149 HlIY'JA:ij, II (a) 545-6 (~., 45; fsmiÏÙ, lOS). III the Persian version, he writes "it originates
from Gad, and lt returm Wlth God," adding dlat "as it is said in the Qur'in. '0 appeased soul, retum to your
Lord,' [Q., 89:27-8]," cf. Hl!rJkil, n (b) § 9,89.11-3.
ISO ~fuyiïwJ1miÏ/", § 56, 188.4.
ISI ~fllf1;ïfl1"JUDiïl", § 56, 188.5-7.
 CffAPTER 5EVEN - 229

• and Jife is pure luminosity itself (6.)~f 4.:J~1 ~ ). Hence. the essence of the
separated [abstraet] essences (~J lU f ~ L. ) amounts [0 pure light (~! •.. ~ ~
;~I ~I). And a soul CM onI}" attach itse1fto a body in which there isluminosity
<=-:: J~)' i.e.. a p.o~umll [or a vital spU"it] (C.3J ).152
The spirit to which titis passage alludes is naturally the human psychic spirit. the highest of
the vital spirits. Suhrawardï adds that "if [the vital spirit or the body] beoomes troubled <;..).~':i) and
tenebrous (~I). then from it originates melancholy and other [sickness of the sool]. If it ceased
altogether. then the rule [or power] of the soul (~I ülb.J-) would be severed [from the body] ... ISJ

In summa-y. Suhrawardi incorporates the concept of divine spirit as the religious equivslent
of the emanatioll of the intelligence - or the nnional principle (or the Archange! Gabriel) - onto
human bei.ngs. By way of correspondences. it is the logos and light. Suhrawsrdi's usage of such
notions as divine spirit. logos and Jight te discuss the rational part of souls (œlestial and human)
highlights the importance of intellection. Consequently. Subrawardï' s interpretation of Peripatetic
philosophy does not evacuate the rationalistic perspective and the importance attributed to the
rational part of souls or to intellection.

152 lf,fllflJÏW'JID1iû, § 56, 188.6-9.

153 MUf/ÏWJID1iU, § 56, 188.9-10.
 CHAP'fER 5EVEN - 230

• PHILOSOPHY VERSUS MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE

Let us eum co the rel4ionship tbat reason. the object of philosopnical enquiries. and intuition.
typically ftSSOciŒed with the mystica1 or gnostic experience, enjoy in the works of Suhrawardi. Some
have mentioned that the sbirt made by Suhrawardï from tesson to mystical or direct intuitIon is not
one of substance but rather of emphasis, i.e. what is realJy called for in bis works is the predominance
of a "philosophical intuition... 1

Intuition is usually understood as a type of immediate knowledge or faculty responsible for

2
tbis type of intuitive knowledge. This philo50phical. intuition hœ a role, in its first stage, in the
perception (i.e., 1J1tUiting) of patticulars El5sociated with the senses, a perception thΠoccurs following
the direct contact of the senses witb the experienced wodd. At a second stage, intuition plays a role
in the perception (i.e., intuition) of universals or generaJizations and abstractions that can be made
from the particulars (of senses).

In the Arabic tradition of the Aristotelian corpus, it is ofte.D. considered to be the funetion of
intuition (U"'~ ), in the seJlSe of .. bitting COlTect1y upon the mark" and related to a notion of
nacumen."J This Aristotelian notion was taken up b}" Avicenna, ÎJl whose works ie plays a similar
raIe i.n. the acquisition of knowledge through demonstrations.4

The notion of intuition ('-""~) generally used by Avicenna. however, appears to be slightly
different in its nature and funetion from Aristotle' 5 notion of intuition. ln the works of A vicenna,
intuition appears ta be integrated into a broader philosophical system considerably influenced by
religiousconsiderationsand,moreimportandy,tbewholeNeoplatonictradition.Forexample,Avicen.na
a1s0 maltes use of the terni. ri."rm6 (on the anthropologicallevel) as a means of acquiri.n.g knowledge
witbin the broader Islamic theological COJltext. i.e., "the concept of natUral intelligence providing
ïnnate, 1/ paon knowledge, El5 expressed in the Qur'inic li.inJ .." and /i,b'o is precisely the term

Avicenna uses to desaibe lntuition in theological tenninology" ta whic.h oolTespond such tenns as

1 A" !JIds-J. f..œtfllh," cf. Ziai, "Mushihadab. Ravish-l lshriiq,," 83-4; cf. Marcotte, -Phiosophlca1

Reasan," 109-26.
2 IntultiOn. is derived from the Latin "looting ar' (ùKuitio). cr "to gaze upon" (inl'Uen"), cr "to look
." (l'Ua7').
3 ln the POSk!nOr ArIIllylics and the Md1om~Edlics. see Gutas, A f.7C:em1i1. L66-8, esp. 166;
â. ldem, -Avicenna V. Mysticism," 79b-8Ob.
4 Gutas somebow acri.ves at the oonclusion rhat - A Vlcenna ... is J10C interested in. the etbiœJ but the

ep1Stemological fuDCtion of the concept /NIds (errsroc:IJia >,"

cf. Gutas, A r;iQ!D./11l, 169; cf. Idem, .. Avicen.na
V. Mysti.cism." 80a; cf. Mamlura. -PLottïng the Course," 336a-331b.
 CffAPTER 5 EVEN - 231

•
.. w.t~.Y (revelation). ilbiün (inspiration). and particularly bddibu (self-evident. sponuneous. or P
pnon" knowledge.'·s The latter influences have left their traces in Avicenna's conception of an
6
ÎIltuitive type of knowledge and coostitute the foundation of bis philosophicaJ mysticism. A vicenna
uses the notion of inwition te account for the knowledge of the divine.
In Suhrawacdfs works. the Aristote1ian or. more preciseJy, the Avicennan notion of intuition
does, of CDUl5e, remain patt of bis general Peripatetic outlook. For instance, he often appeals te the
judgements of intuition (O"'~I r~i or u-uJ.::.lI ~ or ~~I ~).7 In bis O,.ieohl/-U/u.m.inIlD·r--e
Jf'isdom. there is a whole discussion in the section on logic whicb pertains ta .. intuitive premises"

(~l:-u.b.).eThe whole discussion is about demonstration (c LA ~) (it is also fOllnd in the Enlim.tlliODS

) in which intuitive premises play a raIe Ùl 8CXiuiring rea! knowledge. Tbese are either empirical or
traditional and are not obtained by Ùlduetion: and proofs "based on intuition are shared by thase with
the seme intuitive capabilities only."~ In the PlJysic:s of bis fillSAes ofL{q-Ar. he mentions that. ··the
semnd [disposition] is [the soul's] st8te wben it acquites the first intelligibles (~':Il~ ): and when
it acquîtes the secondaty (~I~) [intelligibles] - either by mea.ns of thought [the cogitative process]
(~~) orby intuition (O"'~~)- [then] itis called thehabitualinte11ect (~4 J.".):'IO Suhrawardï

goes on ta mention that uthought (..,s.i) is a motion (4S~ ) belonging ta the soul. by wbicb it can

acquire principJes (,::,.)4-- ) ... intuition (U"'~) being the excellence (i.)~) of this movement which
does net requite any efforts (~).',11Passages like this one are typica! of Avicenna inhis philosophica1
and mystlc. al perspecllves.
. 1:2

The main tbrust of Suhrawardï's own pel50nal interpretation of the Avicennan corpus.

5 Gvtas, Af'7cd'UbI, 170; cf. Walbridge. SQ'ézrœ, 34-5.

6 In his mere natrOW philosophical interpretaion, Gutas mentions. regarding the notion of ïntuitlon.
chat, "it [~s] is a mencaJ aet wheœby the human intellect comes into contact (err~JÏI) Wltb the Kti:ve
intellect ( iJvl hi'iiI) and reœives what Avic:enna frequently desaibes as "divine effluences" {fgpel.6/JL1, ie.,
tnowledge of the intelligibles tbraugh the IICClUlSition of the middle tenns. ffllds cCDStitutes the ~y point
of epistemologlC:a1 contact, in A vic;enna' s thought, betWeen the sublunar and the supralunar realm.s, Cl" betWeen
the mWldme and the cranscendeJ1tal, and it mers ta a strict and pœase syUogistic process. Avicenaa adm.its no
odlcr way ta a k.nowledge of the in&elligibJe worJd and ultIJDately of the Nec:essary Existent ( w.t)ib llI-wo';üd'j,"
cf. Gutas, "Avic:enna. v. Mystlc:ïsm," 79b-80a.
7 Suhrawlrdï, TJÛwQdr, § 45,57.8-9; c:f. Idem, JJfJlSAih", § 174,440.4-6; cf. Mbrr6, § 111,
109.17-110.1 (~, 100-101).
8 pLkmar, § 30,40.12-42.6.
9 Ziai., Kno"'J~t!' 71-2.
1

la f.JImJt{nU, 119.13-5.
Il LJtmJI.{nU, 120.5-6.
12 Avicenna, .MIjiir, .MIlS V, 333.1-336.10 (A flic::, 34-6); d. IbId., Pltys.. 204,206.
1
 CHAPTER 5EVEN - 232

however, rests on the existence of a notion of intuition that might be better characterized or defined
as a "contemplative" intuition. The contemplative aspect, at the heart of his conception of a "direct
intuition," is sucb th8t vision or mystica1 contemplation (O.)A ~ ) becomes the basis for judgE'ments
that now acquire a status similar to that of d emonstrations. In the introduction of bis OritYll'oI-
D./um.lnotir-p ~fISdoD1 , Suhrawardi a11udes ta titis fact when he states that ttaditional logica1

demonstrations become, st the stage of mystical contemplation, quite superfluoUS. 13 In the Eolimnlions
. he mentions that "thevalid intuition (Cl" ='1 (,.)6I~I) judges withoutany appeal to a proof~)
[required in] a logical dem.onstration (ùLA~ ).,,14 Hence, it seems that conceptual knowledge with
which philosophiœ1 intuition is usually associaed is relegaœd ta a secondary position. ln this
scheme, pre-eminence is attributed ta the funetion of receptivity. which is seen as transcending any
type of human rational funetion.

Althougb direct intuition has now been given a novel inferential character. it is essentially
aticulated ta account for knowledge aOluired througb illumination (~I~! ) and, moreover, te
ultimEitely account for reve1ation. For Suhrawardi, direct intuition is intrinsically linked to a personal
experience. Accordingly, such tenns as "tastïng" (~.",), mystical perception, "uncoverlng" (.....a..:..5),
mystical vision and the "objects of uncovering" (~lA...:,~), and mystical revelations ail cOtTe5pond
to different aspects of a more genera1 notion of iJltuitiOll implied in the experience of direct knowledg e,

mystical cr other. 15 In Suhrawardi' 5 works, tbis more general notion of mystiœ1 intuition is, perhaps,
best defin.ed br his own use of the expression witnessing, or mystica1 .. contemplation" (i.),A ~).
Suhrawardï's mystical contemplation seems to rely on a notion of direct intuition in the
sense of a direct awareness simiJar ta the knowledge one has of one' 5 self. A similar process is
posited, but directed upwards, ready ta reœive data from metaphysica1 realms. The problem. resides
perbaps less with the term "mystïcal" than with the expression "contemplation," whicb can, al times,
mean a sort of spiritual meditation as part of religious praetices, e.g., concentration of the mind and

lJ IfLkm~ § 6, 13.2-8 (5.t~, 92).

1... TJlfwf/Nü, § 45,51.8-9.
IS In one of Jambel's notes to the French InIlSlatioJl of the Ot?emw-/lJllAt.imlr:ù~WJSl/om, he wriœs

tbat "Q.D. [~ al-Vin ShïriZll es:plique le rapport entre la mobiduif;J et la moshiUJJldll : œ1Je-ci serait ici
URe (oC visualisation» plus qu'une «vision mentale :P. En. effet. la mosblU1.ld6 est plus pa1iculière, plus
spéciale que la mobîsfutlil. La différalce eJJ1l'e les deux est celle du ~ et du pro~. CepeodaDt dans Le
.l.i~ du .~ du SouFirme (c.hap.m: « De l'âme pensante comme Verbe »), Sohravardi disait: (oC La
m~.iJlIflI, c'est l'aaualisation d'UJle connaissance par l'âme, soit par une déduc:lion, SOIt par inférence, soit
par me intuÎtlon secrète se rallac:hant à une chose particulière échéant dans le passé ou daos l'aveDl.f'. » [...] En
bref, la .mobisJJ1IIiI , au sens le plus général, est révélldioQ.-intérievre. iJIIuitioo. vision-mentale, inspiratioJl
imaginative. La moslJiilJ.rtd1t est visualisation, perception-visionnaire, organe des appantions," cf. Jambet,
~ , 86 IlOlle d.
 CfIAPTER. 5EVEN - 233

•
the soul upan the nature of God. The term conlemp18lion can aIso Mean the process of a thaughtful.
or long consideration. or observation of a partiœlar object. The latter corresponds more appropriately
to che more spiritual elemellts at the heatt of Subrawa-dï's philosophy. but direct intuition - pnrhap.i
philosophica1ly more neutnll - can be used as an equivalellt to Suhrawardï's mystica1 a:>ntemplation.
the central notion in his conception of direct knowledge which was previously alluded ta (see
se<.tion on vision).

ONTOLOGY OF LIGHT
The shift of emphasis from a purely pbilosophical ta a more mystically inclined approach is
Most certain1y the result of the attribution of a new status ta direct intuition or mystical a>ntemplatiaD-

This May best he undE!l"Stood witbin the general metaphysical framework of Suhrawardï's system
and, in particular, bis distinct ontalogy of light alluded te throughout this study.

Suhrawardi' 5 philosophy of light introduces new realm of discourse , i.e.. the language of
ft

16
the Theosophists (~'b.... ~ l-S.:.. ) engrossed in the pursuit of God, the Light of lights. It might not
be far-fetehed to st8le that, with the inttodut%ion of bis new terminology, he signais bis depa"tUre
from purely philosophical disoourse. This would then pave the way for bis more mystiœl and

_
.. '
gnostic-oriented redefiaition of metaphysics. Most of his oriental-illuminstive term.iJlology makes
use of symbols (j"'J ) and metaphors which apply more specifically to the notion of light, as an
equivalent ta the essence of everytbing.17

On the whole, bis symbolism of light, especially in bis Persian mystical tre&lises, but aIso in
bis OrieJd8l-mu.mûNltif-~ JJ7j"sdom, often overshadows the similarities that its undedying philosophica1
staIlds share with Peripatetic phiJosophy. UI The extent to which il departs from the latter owes much
ta the symbolism that he introduces to reinterpret ud re-articulate the Peripatetic system, in line
19
with bis own persona! (mystical) experiences, but witbin a more general emanative system.

16 These "1ights" are not mereJy the ones mentioned in the (Juru ( SilnU nf-Hür ) but they are also
1

made to correspoJld to those existing in lranian pl'e-Islamic; traditions. His terminology shoulet be compared
with the exi.s1ing cnes developed by the philosopbers, the mealogians and the Sufis. e.g., the lnpartite clzssificali.oJl
of K.hwirizmï, M6IiitùJ m- Wiim 1 (Cairo, 192.1). The use, here, of terms such as "Theosop1uSC$" bas no modem
md popul.. connotaions; rather, this term. 'l'as coined by Cortin as a translation of terms sueb as c L...S-
iiJ1:u·
17 These "secrets" cr "symbols" (~.) ) are discussed in the fNUnJII.fons, cf. Zlai, Kno"letIJr~,23
n.3.
18 Fakhry," Al-Subrawardi's Critlque," 279-84 [do Idem, "aJ-Suhrawardï wa Ma·ik.hidhilu cala
a1-M.hsham al_CArab ," 151-68].
19 Regarding the symbo1ism of his work, cf. Bylet:Jy, "The Wisdom of lliununation;" d. Tehrini,

-Mystical Symbolism." On the "ora1ity" of the philosophy of Subrawardï, d. Zia. Kno",.Jqe, 19.
 CHAPTfR SEVEN - 2J4

Suhrawardï with h1s pbi1osophyof hght attempts ta do away with concepts in genera1, such
as exisœnce, unity. m.ter. fonn. etc.. as the sources of our knawledge of reality,ZO tnssmuch as his
antology of light - a aiticism of the Peripatetic epistemology - substitutes to most of these Lerms ies
own orieotal-illuminative terminalogy. He substitutes te these concepts a whole new series of tenns
chat simultaneously become the new structure of reality and the object of knowledge. 21 Light. as 8

symbol, becomes more than the concept of existence, it becomes the substntnJOJ of reality."

His ontology of light incorparates a not 50 unfamiliar emanationist scheme. To begin with,
there is a First light, the Closest light (yi ~j .J~) which corresponds ta the first intelligence of the
24
Peripatetics system ,23 or ta Bahman. It exislS as a separate light - l.e.. separated from matter. As
such, this abstract light (6.J"'~ ) is endowed with a twofold impetus. On the one hand. it loves (

-.:. '_./.:) and contemplates (~l.:i.a:) the Ught of ligbts (God), the SO\l1"ce of aU lights. situated &bove it.
On the other hand. it contraIs (;f (:) and illuminstes (J ~ 1) what lies below it.25 The only difference
between the FU'St ligbt and the Light of lights lies in their relative degree of intensity ( i"'fû ) such
that the perfection of the Light of lights rests precisely in its utmost perfection of ilS inœnsity of
ligbt.
Suhrawardi defines bis ontological hierarchy of lights in similar tenns of perfection, intensity.
or abundance (~) ad of impoverishment (~ ) with regards to the different lights' relation to

the Ligllt of lights and ta all other superior and inferior ligbts. As in the classica1 Peripatetic scbeme,
a first œlestial saul and a ftnt ce1estial sphere come into existence from the first intelligence, along
widt the ensuing emanation of the subsequent intelligences, souls and spberes.~ For Suhrawardî. the
First light, motivaœd by lave, conœmp.lates the Light of lights, and from the relation it maintsins
witb it another light - another intelligence - is originated. ThereupoJl, a procession of lights ensues
that is the result of bath mystical contemplation of the superior leve1s of light and the illumination of

~ VV_bridge, ~ea~.44.
21 Subrawardi Ilotes that the immaenal llght - as a symbol - caJ1 only he analogous to physica1ligbt,
cf. .{5kmllr. § 112,110.9-13 (5.§r.. 101).
22 Walbridge mentions tha some have equated the Suhrawardïan concept of light witb the concepc of
existence, e.g. Na,rand lzutsu, d. Wabridge, Sad1~, 048-9; cf. N~, 71Jrr:'f!Mus5AtSJJxes. 15l-52n. 27; cf.
Izutsu, C~lII1dRt!'4IÔ!y.144-5.
23 .{5bnIU, §§ 135-8, 125.1-129.04 (SIr. lI7-(21); cf. TIlIwL/hie, § ~8, 61.14-62.12; cf. AfUYÏWltmik

,'.
1 § 36. 165.15-166.5. For Suhrawnï's commentator, Qutb al-DiD Sbiriizï. the Fint Jigbt corresponds ta the
fint e1ement 0'J 'i1 ~) and the universal 50111 {~I Jù.}. cf. Walbridge, SaeAa!, 6011. 79.
2<4 .{fikmIU, § 138, 128.8 (5.Iff:. 120).
2S lflkm#, f§ 1~7-8, 135.12-137.8 (~.v:. 130-132); cf. Ibid., § 151,139.11-1041.3 (5.t~ 134-7).
26 !DkmIU, § 129,121.6-122.11 (~.v:, 117-8); cf. Ibid.• §§ 182-9, ln.l0-183.6 (S~ 169-173).
 CHAPTER 5EVEN - 235

•
the lower levels by the superior - direet.ly œ; weil as indirectly - through the intermediary of the First
ligbt and ail the other sepantte ligbts.Z'7 EVelY light entertains the same type of ontological relation as
regards the lighrs above and below il. a relation which is responsible for the origination of everything
th 81 lies below each individualligbt. When the First light sees its own impoverishment. then. its own
matter and shape 81"e obtained.ze As this process unfoJds, the celestial spheres and the elemental
world of which the light partakes aIl come into existence.Z9

It is clear from the above that Suhrawardi articuJates bis ontology of light aocording to an
emanationist scheme al.m.oSl identical to Peripatetic philosophers. The difference lies in the structure
of the emanationist process. The emanationist scheme of the latter is basica1ly line8l": from the first
intelligence emanates the second, from the second intelligence the third and 50 on. Suhrawardi. on
the other hand, introduces a two-dimensionality into the emanative scheme, i.e., the longitudinal and
18tÏtudinaJ orders of lights (see es-lier discussion). It should be noted, however, that the a-aditional
and linear procession of intelligences is nat wholly rejeeted, e.g., in such works as OA me Bt!Jiefof
JJlse A-fen, albeit the fact that he does subscribe to the possibility of an infU1ite multiplication of

intelligences (more than ten), i.e., of intelligible lights.:D Suhr&w8l"di argues that if the traditional
Neoplato.nic scheme WE!I'e adopted, a limitation of the number of the intelligences would result. For
him, mis is not the case, In faet, light is distribuled almost exponentially to the rest of rea1ity, both
horizontallyand vertically?l

The expansion, even the explosion of the Neopl8tonic emanationist schem.e iota an almost
infiniteseries of relations transforms thetraditional ontology of emanationinto a theory of participation
of light. Suhrawardï sets up a metaphysiai where light is now the central principle of the whole;
whereas, previously, this principJe had been the intelligence (nous), i.e., of the Neoplatonists.
However, the hiena-chy of intelligences that gives way to bis more encompassing re-articulation of
Avieennan ontoJogy actually equites the inteUeaive with the luminous. For the Neoplstonists, the
32
original source - the One - patta.tes in everything while losing nothing of itself. Suhrawardï

27 H.tlmM', f§ 135-8, 125.8-129.4 (s.w:, 117-121); cf. rbid., f§ 142--4, 132.11-134.10 (st47=. 126-129);
cC. Ibid., § 155, 145.8-147.4 (S...... 141-2).
28 (frkmw, f§ 142-4, 132.11-134.10 (..si{t:. 126-9); cf. Ibid., 150-2,138.9-1435 (st~ 133-139).
29 HJbrJar, § 149,138.1--4 (~, 131).
30 ffLkmnF, § 151, 140.2-141.1 (~, 125).

•• 3 l lzutsu,· IsIuaj.J,.ÏI1I," 299a-300a. The honzoncaJ level of lights corresponds co the Platonic Ideas, cf.
Walbridge, .së:rmœ, 58, 61,ln-9.
32 Plot1nus, fOl" example, alDCeiVed
Hamelin, udJ/tJ!oriede.lmreDea, c;bap. on Themisti:u5.
of the intelligence as "giving of iœelf without losing ïtself," cf.
 CHAfFTER 5EVEN - 236

adheres to a similar notion of uaity of the wbole. a kin.d of ontologica.l monism (of iatelleaive light)
rendered necessary b}"' bis ontotogy of tight. 3J
Ligbt is used symbolically ta designate bolh Gad - the Light of lights - and the n~~ure of the
soul. Moreover. and more relevantly te the purpose at band. Jigbt desaibes symbolically the knowing
"agent" in human beings. i.e.. the rational part of tbe soul. In. mis respect and by extension. light.
iadeed. can be partiy equated with the traditional notion of intelligence. 3.:
Suhrawardf 5 ontology of light redefines the relatioaships which reason has with the source
of its knowledge. the üght of lights via the active intelligence that rotes over the sublun.. world and
human souls. The tight-soul (the rational soul) is now able ta know everything directiy and without
any type of Mediation. i.e.. without the mediation of concepts. It knows through the Mediation of its
individuaJ. experience of the metaphysica1 world, i.e., ilS conjunetioll with ils cause. the active
intelligence.
Heace. direct intuition. which presupposes the immediate graspillg of a certain knowledge.
i.e.. the ability to grasp the manifestation of light. must be considered as the MOst perfeet mode of
cognition. These lights. the product of illumination. are simultaneously the principle of both being

- and Jutowing. Renee. as the pinciple of knewledge. light ultimately finds itself al the core of
revelation and becomes the principle of divine inspiration that prophets and sages necessarily experience
when tbey grasp ultimate truths.35 In this p81'1Ïcular context. Suhrawardi achieves a certain
COtTespondence betWeen direct experiencing (not so different ftom bis conception of self-knowledge)
and a notion of intellection.

ESSENCE OF PRESENTIAL KNOWLEDGE

Sbams al-Dm MuJ,ammad al-Shahrazüri (d. &fter 1288) summBrizes the types of knowledge
he found expressed in Suhrawardi's worts. In the preface he wrote to the OrieAt:I1/-H./omLnlllir-7:'
IVisdom, he makes a fundamental epistemological distinction to establisb the means by which true
knowledge C&JI. be ac:quired. On the one hand. there is a discursive or dem.onstralive (~ ) and a
theoretical (~~) type of knowledge. On the other band. there is an "experientiaJ" (~~j) knowledge

based on mystica1 PErCeptiOn or "t8Sting" (~~:t). sometimes identified as m.ystico-theosophical

perception (~~j ~ ) or a mystical vision (=4.: ; • s ).3ci These two essential. yet different types of

33 FOi an 1J]terpr'eUtiOIl of a bint of ·Manic:hean dualism" iD. Suhrawardï's thought, cf. Landolt.
·Mystique iranienne." 32, 37 .n. 60.
J" Cf. the Appmdàin Walbridge • .5amet>, 194-5; cf. Amin Razavi, "Suhrawardi's," 157.
JS .{5bztIIr.. § 5. 11.12-12.14 (5,.:. 90-1).
 CHAPTER. 5EVEN - 237

knowledge will n~raI.1y caU for different epistemic processes. The former requires a philosopbical
method. the latter consists of Il mystica.l or gnostic method emphasizing the persona! experiencing of
ultimate rt"a1ities.

Bath methods are quite different. Fint. the method of the phiJosophers. essentiallyconceptual.
resorts ta an .. observation of the sensibles" in arder ta produce knowledge (in the Aristotelian sense).
It eonstitutes the main. method by which human beings produce the different scienœs 37 Discursive
knowledge relies basieally on the faeulty of reason (J.i.a:. ) and, in a broad sense. on demonstrative
methods. Essen.tially discursive in nature. the process of thought or of cogitation (.,s.; ) relies on
36
mental concepts and their representations. i.e.. fonnS. In Suhrawardi's terminology. it became
known as an acquired knowledge (~~ ~ ) which. according to him. is a valid. yet limited.
Merbod that is useful for explaining what can be Imown through the other superior pro cess - direct
intuition.J9 Presumably. resson or intellect raa.ks high in the realm of discursive knowledge. However.
the aiterion for truth in the realm. of intuitive knowledge. which gives access ta the realm of the
divine and of the experientia!. cannat rest on reason. or intellect atone. if at aU.
Besides the method of the Peripetetics. there are spiritual mean.s more adapted to the divine
realm. These spiritual means ..e oriental-illuminative notions like vision (J~! ). mystical vision
(~ ). 8I1d mystical contemplation (o.,)"AL.:A.. ). Moreovel". these are the sole gllarantors of true

knowledge. The spiritual method, sbaring much with the metbod of the mystics and the Gnos ti cs ,
rests on. the oDSé'rfJNIion of some of the spiritual rea1ities from which true knowledge can be
derived. Suhrawardi notes that. "we comemplate (~~ ) things !rom the spiritual realities
(~~l-",.J): thereafter. we built upon these observations... 4J A glimpse of wbat Suhrawardï alludes

to is indicated when he notes that what he bas written in bis book, noewithstanding bis allegorical
warks. wss net the result of "discursive thought" (~); ratber. it was obtained by "another means"
(;=..' .,...l.:a). cocresponding ta the fruits of bis own experience: ll
In fact, he mentions that he addresses

36 Shabrazür1 5 edited introduction is added 10 the .{frkmll/" III-IsDniIJ •cf. ~dF,R9, 5.7-11 and 79 1l. a.
3'1 Suhrawardï's major criticism of PeripatetIc principles takes the form of a critic:ism of their notion
of defiDitian which mates 1t tmpassible te maw anytbing because kIlowledge is acquired by COJlCept5. He
substitutes to it. as a consequence of bis o.,.-n onto1ogy, a tbeory of definition based on di.rec:c kJlowledge of
diVl.D.emallers.This.1J1tum.becomesthemode1forbisepïstemologyand.ÏJlfae:t.forbiswholecosmo.1ogy.cf.
Walbridge. SQm~, 101.
Jt is conœpcual (S~) and assertor.ica1 (J;.u-:i). cf. .{fikAIrIr, § 8. 15.1-11.

••
38

39 /Ulmllr, § 6. 13.1-2 (SIs:. 192). Seme prinaples of illuminatlve pInlosophy are sound Peripatetic
principles. i.e.• cheir methods and conclusions wbicb he h~ not rejec:ted and whlcb Suhrawardï considers
generallyvalid. cf. Walbridge, SQezr~. 33.
<Il Ffibmlr, § 6, 13.6-8 (.5iW=. 92).
 CHAPTfR 5EVEN - 238

thase who, like him, are already "accomplished spiritual seekers (.-Jb.... ~ ) or who aspire to
[this stage]. ".:2

Mystical pet"ception is, therefore, st the heart of a more "direct" !nethod of knowing. adapted
for the divine real.m.. This particuJar type of immediale knowledge is achieved through a process of
mystical and direa intuition by wluch the unveïling presence of.the known occurs to the knower,
and 0« when the imprinting of a fonn occurs, as was the case with the Peripatetics' adoption of an
Aristote1ian epistemological model. Direct intuition guarantees a direct access ta crue knowledge.
Suhrawardï's conception of mystical knowledge has come to be known as a present1al
knowledge ('r1.J~ F ) whose principle is essentially illuminatlon and an oriental-illuminative
re1~on (:4 oZ ; l,.,..:u! ;U L.:.a! ),<0 capable of explai.ni.ng the immediate and a-temporal charaCler of this

type of knowledge. Suhrawardï insists on the possibility of an unmedialed knowledge of the type
made possible by bis own discussions about self-knowledge, in spile of the difficulties of founding a
presential kn.owledge on self-awareness (see section on seJf-knowledge). lbis type of a direct ÏJltuitive
knowledge - as the term "presential" itself ('r1.J~ ) implies - precludes the use of any logical or
demOl15tl"8tive method in grasping the esseace of objects without resorting ta such things as concepts
or forms. Indeed. there is no place for the mediation of concepts or forms.

Direct intuition lies st the aossroads of one' s personal experience or mystical contemplation
and illumination of which it partates. AJthough Suhrawardï estabJishes the legitimacy of direct
intuition alongside reason. he argues, nonetheless. that certainty only lies witbin the reach of the
.. expErientiaJ" <:i.:-i.",j). i.e., of the direct persona! aperience, a characteristic of mystica1 perception.
The personal experience of the true see.ker ( 'f·'? c ), conceived as a direct intuition-like
process, is st the heart of Subrawardfs mystica1 contemplation. Acrordingly. this persona! experience
possesses a distinctive and unique cbaracter tbat maltes it impossible to conceive of any type of
mediation. It would. tberefore, seem improbable simply ta equate direct intuition with any type of
ft
"philosophical intuition," or with the Aristotelian notion of "acumen involved at the conceptuaJ
level of the tb'ok' ng process. even st irs most abstraet Jeve1.

As was briefly meatione.d earJier, these mystical implications do not seem te find an echo in

41 HJbn., § 3, 10.9 (..5:t4T.. 88).

42 Ifibzlnr, § 6, 12.16-17 ( ..5:t4T.. 92).
43 Itresultsof a.tJtowl~ge based on "iUWIU.J1alÏon" Vl~!> and "presence" (~J~)" establisbed
by che existence of an "oriental-iUuminmve relation" <L:i'~! ü~! )," d . .f5bnur, § 162, 152.7-153.8
(.5.t.4'=. 147-8); d. Ziai, Kno"..It!J:11e.14O-3.
 CfIAPTER. 5EVEN - 239

•
Avicenna's Aristotelian use of the notion of intuition. They fmd an echo in Avicenna's use of the
notion of intuition, in the sense of intellectual astuteness - even acumen - which is linked to the
intellect LA hlJÔ.im and whicb ultimately occurs as a result of the divine intelligence. The latter
aspett seems [0 have exerted an influence on SuhrawfI"di. foc intuition in Avicenna's work is
responsible for grasping the intelligibles without temporal extension and does not require the he1p of
instruction al the hand of a teacher (see ear1ier discussion on bis philosophical use of intuition).

Il is important to notice that Suhrawardï introduces mystical knowledge. alongside a more

discursive type of knowledge. essentially because light is the essence of everythiog.4a Mystical
ex>otemplation and illumination become like two epistemological principles. at the heart of the "true"
knowing process, a COl"ollary of bis ontology of light and the Neoplatonic melaphysics he adopts.
There is no doubt that for Suhrawardï the spiritual level is the realm of pure existence. On that
metaphysica1 horizon. relations that are established between the differentlevels of ligbt are conceîved
either in term.s of contemplation or of illumination such that a contemplation of the superior lights is
complementary to an illumination of the JOWEr ligbts by the higher ones. KnowJedge at this level
combines the light's self-conscioumess of its divine essence. ie., the nature of its .light, and the
reaJiZlltion of being itself an ilium; nation of the first principJe, me Light of lights. It is inœrestiJlg to
note that these lights - the rational sauls - conceived as self-conscious are able ta know in similar
ways as Neoplaronic intelligences.
The same type of relationship that prevails between the lights at the m.etaphY$ical leveJ also
45
prevails st the physical level. Lights which manifest tbemselves te OthErS are also manifest by
themselves and to themse1ves. Having defined the essence of existence as light, Suhrawardï can then
p-oceed to make this type of mysticaJ. knowledge an immediate knowledge rooted in the spirituaJ
ex:perience of the ligbts, i.e., those thst become apparent. or manifested te the human soul. 45 On the
wbole, the ontologica1 underpinning of the spirituaJ experience is his oriental-illuminative ontology
of light

We have a1ready noted th., although Suhrawardï' s philosophica1 anthropology shores

similarities witb Avicenna' s, Suhrawardï rejects some of ilS prin.ciples on account of bis introduction
of an olltology of light.<f7 Suhrawardï' s classification of the different functions of the rational soul

•• 44

45

46

<f7
Webb, "The Humanl AngeJicRelation," 6O-9L.
.fUbnUl". f§ 114.ti, 110.15-1135 (Sat~. 102-1(4); cf. Walbridge. Saena!, 109.
~f,rsfnfn"~ 194. J -5.3
Thactston, ~/j'5rJQd, 18 n. 19; cf. Laodolt, "Subrawardi.'s," 48~; cf. Ihkmllr.207ff.
 CHAPTfR SEVEN - 240

has heen shown to depart little from the cl 85 si cal distinctions between the different intellects (see
earlier discussion).~ NonetheJess, the distinctiveaess of each of the functions of the rational soul
gives way to the soul's ability ta receive light. Avicen.na's noetics serves as one of the oomer:toaes
of Suhrawardi's own epistemology for which he cao then substitute his own light term.inology. His
ontalogy of lights introduces the notion of the commanding Isfahbad-light (~I ..;,,:., ) which

COtTeSponds to the managiJlg rational soul; or again., it introduces the notion of the triumphal light
(J!tliJ, J~)' corresponding ta metaphysical ïntelligences. 49 lt is. it seems. the new emphasis on the
process of a direct intuition as a means of acquiring knowJedge tha serves ta bridge the gap that
exists between two types of perception - both physical and spiritual. Hence. knowledge now consists

in the perception of manifestations of light.

In Suhrawardî's works. direct intuition does not occupY a place as a faculty. Rather. it
cotTeSponds to a funetion of the soul. operating in. a fashion that is not 50 different from the function
of vision on which Suhrawa-dï dwells al length and from which he draws manyanalogies (see
section on vision). Direct intuition. defined in tet"ms of a vision of abstract lights through mysticaJ
oontemplation (ô~ ~), aoquires a novel and important epistemological function. Vision of abstnlet
lights through contemplation guaranœes the knowledge of the spiritual world - the perception of the
pure and abstraet lights - and the rea1 goal sought by aU genuine seekers of rruth.
Where certainty had a rational foundation, in the Aristotelian and Perip81etic philosophicaJ
tradition. Suhrawardï now adds an experiential and essentially mystical foundation. Now certainty
consists of divine knowledge obtained by the divine inspiration that befalls hume beings. Mystical
perception like direct in.tuition - a combioafion of inspiration and revelation - becomes necessa-y as
the ollly process capabJe of providing true knowledge. Light reveals itself al the individual Jevel and.
oonseql1ently, oJl1y direct intuition or the immediate perception of light can become the ultimate
source of truth.

It is interesting to note mat one of Suhr'awardi' s commentators. Mu~ammadSharif b. al-Harawï

(fi. llth c.), commenting on the former' 5 philosophy, believes that wh. is acquired by prophets and

those who might be JabeUed Theosophists (~f '-.$~ ) is a combination of mystica1 revelation
(;;i r..~), presential experience or mystical contemplation (ô,,),A~), revelation (~"") and, finally,

~ ~,113-21 and. iII. the same wcrk, cf. ~fM:e, XÏl-xiv. Anodter edition of the ten exist. but
it omy comprises the metaphysic:s, d. Suhrawaroï. .sm /üsJiliIh; cf. with the iJltcoduction of Th~D,
JY,(nirCal, 11-3.
49 .{5bnIlr, § 156, 147.5-148.5 (Sr~ 142-3); cf. Ibid., § 164, 154.1-155.2 (.5".yf:, (49) respectivel.y;
cf. Walbridge, .5è:7ioDçe'. 194-5. Walbndge identifies die immateriaJ. tight with the iDœllee:t and the accidentai
ligbt witb iJUle1leet1OJ1., cf. Ibid., 60.
 CHAPTER SEVEN - 241

•
inspiration (, ~! ).50 These four states would seem to constînlte varying degrees of a combination of
divine manifestation and experiential perceptions.

Furthermore. this divine knowledge. in a way ineffable. cao only find its expression thlough
symbols which Suhrawardï says cannot be refuted through Jogical demonstrations and thus. obviously.
cx>ntain. their own intrinsic croth criteria.

And finaUy. the religious implications of Suhrawardï's position for the traditional. Islamic
tbeory of revelation should not be underestimated. As a matter of fact, it shouJd not be forgotlen that
he was put to death for aUegedJy claiming the possibility of the advent of Mother prophet. i.e.. the
possibility of new revel ati ons. Sl

By appeaIing ta bath reason. and direct intuition, Suhrawardï hopes ta tntegrate both the
demonstrabJe and the experiential aspects of two differeat epistemic experiences: the inteUec01al and
the mystical. The fact that he estmlishes the pre-eminence of the experien.œ of direct intuition, i.e.,
mysticaJ. contemplation, witb bis phiJosophico-mystical explanation should net be underestimated. It
is clear that knowledge acquired through philosophy and knowledge acquired through mystical
experience are intrinsically different.

The shift from. reaon to direct intuition is indicative of the new mysticaI orientation imparted

'- by bis oriental-illuminative phiIosophy and its ascetic aspects, as mentioned by Quçb al-Dïn Shïrizî
(d. 1311) who writes that this method rests primarilyon "mystical perception, internaI revelations,

due ta contiauous prac:tice of spiri01al exercises...52 Suhraw..di: himself states that knowledge
corresponds, fltSt and foremost, to the aetual mystical perception or per.;onaI. experience of the teuth.
Onlythen eam knowledge acquired by means of this priviJeged means be colToborated by philosophieal
p-oofs.53

9J Quoted by Ziai, -Musbahadah, Ravish-i Ishrâq, va Zabin-i Sbi"!"." 94 n. 15; cf. Ibn al-Harawï.
ADW'Ji7ya.
51 Beside bis clai.m.s to an absolute omnipotence of God, SulIraw..oi, nonetheless, openes the door- ta

the possibility of p-ophecic daims on tbis very experiential buis. It is interesti.ng 10 note that Ibn • Arabi' 5
concept of "unicity of enstenœ," "'~.,JI ë~.J ) with aU its religious and theologiQ! implicâÏ.ons, was aIso
vebemeDdyopposed and aaacked by the uJamas.
~ For Q. D. Shïriizi's commentay on the Hibnz 1lI-b:hnirI. cf. Corbin, .$Fresse, 2041 n. 23; cf.
Ibid. , 241 n. 24 on certainty.
53 Walbridge mentions that "Subraw.-di states that the tratbs of the Science of Lights are denved in
the f"ant inJtaIlœ from mystical intuition," d. Walbridge, Sama-, 42; cf. HLbn;tr, §§ 171-3. 162.1-167.4
(..sïw:, 154-7). Walbridge also adds that .. 11w PmJ4:Ul?P'tv of Ujum;a"rion il phiJosophy, not mysticism;
Suhnnnrdi COJ1SUUas raioaaI proofs of bis intuitions both for che sake of bis own continued certa.iDty and
correct interpretation of those intUllions and for the guidance of rh05e witbout the experience," cf. Walbridge,
Samœ,42.
 CHAPTER. SEVEN - 242

The primacy of Suhrawardï' s experi.entiaJ knowledge auJ best be illustrated by bis description
of the knowledge of the sages. Suhrawardï 5 classification of leamed men according to their respective
meriu in phiJo~::>phy and myst1cal experience is revealing. SUlce it is direct intuition or mystical
contemplation as opposed to reason that is ascribed the predominant role.
In some passages. however, he proposes some sort of complementary relation between the
philosophica1 and the mystical. He writes that .. if the wayfarer (~L....,) bas no theoretical (:.i.:", a: )
power. he is defective: similarly. the philosopher (~~) who has not perceived (i,),A ~ ) signs

from the heaven (~."s.Lo) is defective. nS-l Most often, however. pre-eminence is given to experiential
knowLedge. A œse in point is Suhrawardï's statement tbat a group of individuals sucb as the
mystic5. like Sahl al-Tustari (d. 896). Abu Yazïd al-B8S1iimï (d. 874) and al-I:Ialliij (d. 912. a disciple
of al-Tustari and Junayd)55 "have gone beyond [knowledge ~~ ~ )] te attai.n a presential.
conjunctive [i.e., intellective] and witnessing knowledge (':P~ ~t..-::':il ~.J~ ~ ).,,56 Tbese

exceptional individuals have, with theirintellective conjunction with the intellective principle surpassed
discursive phiJosophy through tbeir persona! expEl"Îence of the principle.

Another reason for the pre-eminence of mis direct intuitive funetion appears to be essentially
religious in nature and linked to Suhnnvardi's prophetology, ÎJlasmuch as oaly the most perfect sage
,-.. ,
who witnesses tbese trutbs deserves God's viceregency, whether he is a living praof (~) or is in
occultation.

Whereas previous philosophees like fil-Fiiraoï and Avicenna had extolled primarily intel1ectual
faculties, SuhrawlU'dï brought direct intuition, in the sense of mystical contemplation (e.J,.A ~ ). to
the f«efront as an alternative - albeit more reliable - foundation of certainty. Moreover, he focmulated
the basis of what may be said to be an co esoteric phiJosophy. ,,57 His attitude towards the methods of
borh lhe philosophical and the mystical U'8ditions paved the way for bis own per.iOnaJ. expression of
mystical speculations embedded in philosophical tenniJlology and a posteriori demonstratÎons.
lnescapebly, bis "essentially" mystical thought (bis persona! experiences) cannot but emphasise
iJltuitive knowledge as the ultimate source and criterion of tcue knowledge.~

54 M.-JJih', § 111,361.10-2; Cluoted in E. Maa1ouf's intro. tG bis ed. of AfAlJ/nuïr uI-$ü4Y1lb, cf.

KIllimIIl1-TIf.!WlJ'wuf, 3.
55 For a good UltrOduetion to the bis corical backgound of the early SUf1 tradition, cf. 5cbim.meJ,
M,Y3IialOimeuzans QffsJJlm , 42- n.
56 rMwf/1iiI', § 55, 73.2-6; cf. bai, Kno"lqe, 21,21 D. 3; cf. Ibid., 21-2,21 D.2; cf. Corbin, Les
.~ m«Ifs ZDrOIISD7ÏS1S, 28-9.
~
57 Izutsu, .. fshnip).'11 ," 296b.
!Il Landolt. -MystIque iranienne," 25.
 CffAPTER EIGlIT - 243

• • EIGHT·

PROPHETOLOGY

In Islamic societies, prophets are the law-givers that guarantee the preservation of the social
and moral order of the (reJigious) community as a whole. In fact, prophets are law-givers pur
e.:rcel./ence whose purpose is to bring people closer ta Gad and to guide them towards what is right.

Prophets acbieve this goal by persuading and leading the masses ta create religious institutions
whereby obedience to the religious law may continue mer their deaths. These are more properly the
1 2
ethical and social aspects of revelation. As law-givers. prophets are considered unique.
The occurrence of prophethood is often expressed in terms of a gift or a bestowment from
God through divine providence ta prophets, e.g., in Avieenna's De.!L·""Wl1OCt!.3 A similar idea of
divine bestowment recurs in the worts of Suhrawardï who beJieves that the guidance (4: I.,),A) of God
reaches those who await the heaven1y sustenanœ (cJj,J); these are those chosen (f"a.-t .L.",i )
individuals that are in quest for the Orient (v-=i J .';,-, ," ft ), Le., those who mm their faces towards
their "sacred fatber," seeking light and divine guidance.~ The ability to know hidden matters (~li=..)

occurs through the "guidance" of the wot"ld of ligbts and of intelligences (~.J~.3 J~ rJl.& ).5

Suhrawardï generally a11\1des to prophets, but as with Avicenna, it is net ft privilege of prophets. The
bestowment of divine guidance occurs through the intennediary of different metaphysical entities,
namely tbe active intelligence identified as the Archange! Gabriel in the works of A vicenna and
Suhrawardi

The basis of much of their discussions on prophets and prophetie knowledge with which the
imaginativefaculty is intimlltely retated had already been established by earlier philosophers , especislly

J aJ-FiraDi, AffilrJlbis, §§ 57-9, 43-44 (foUowing pagination of lst ed. in margiJl).

2 Niémab, .. tA1iqil aJ-Nubllwwab bl al-5iyisih cinda Ibn SÜI.i," 43-52.
3 Avicenna, NJlp. M6;l, 710.15; d. Walzer, "A1-FbOï's Theory of Prophec:y and DIvin_ion,"
206-219. For a reevaluation of Rahman's and Walzer's tbesis, cf. Daiber, "Prophetie und Etbik bei Firibï
(Gat. 339/950)," n9-S3: c:f. Daibec, "Ru"y&." 648a.
4 H4I,)'iïbl, VI[ (a) 87.1-6 (AJ'rh., 64-5; fsmifJ), 231) [absent }Com the Persum]; c:f. f5bn.u, § 263,

246,9-247.2 (5.ow:. 224).

5 PJIrrii, X, § 86, 75.6-7 (Book, 79).
 CHAPTER EIGlIT - 244
6
al-Fiftbï. For Aviœnna and Suhraw.dï, the lJDaginative faculty of prophets is equally responsible
~
"~. for the reception of traces of these divine truths and for their ahility ta communiœte these trutbs to
the masses in the form of images and primitive allegories. These elements are essential r Jl"tS of the
philosophieal anthropology of both auth01"5.
Suhrawardfs own epistemology of prophetie and theosophic knowledge sh~e5 a number of
similarities with that of A viœnna. lts terminology is indeed different. and one could perhaps suceessfully
que the same for his ontology. The proœss br whieh this prophetie knowledge occurs and the one
by whicb knowledge is attained by Suhrawardi's theosophers. however. •e not essentially different
because the faculty of imagination plays an equally important raIe in the acquisition of knowledge
by prophecs. theosophers. "friends of God" (.4J"i), sages, etc. This seem.ingly homogeaeous process.
whether one considers the acquisition of knowledge by prophets or tbeosophers. aetually raises the
problem of the uniqueness of prophetie knowledge as opposed to the occurrence of various persona!
experiences by wlueh metaphysica1lrUths ..e accessed by tbeosophers. sages. mysties, ete.
For both our authol"5, a number of experiences can lead to me OCCUlT'ence of a variety of
personal experiences of metaphysical entities or truths, e.g., the intuitive experiences of sages.
theosopbers and mystics. These persona! Experiences can. equaUy provide access ta truths that be10ng
to the divine rea.lms ta whieh prophets have access.
Su.brawardï highlights the religious aspect that distiJlguishes prophEts from omer iodividuals
and specifies that the funetion of prophets is to bring the message of God ta humankind: ontY
prophets are commissioned (..J~'L. ) br Gad "to reform. morals'· (~J c.~! )"ta transmit a

message," Le.• the divine reve1atiOll (;tlt....",.J1 .I",Î ), and "to refonn the human species" (c.~!
t..~ 1) as a whole; prophets are sent (()~.,;.;.... ) br God for the benet'it of the order of tbis world (
(J W 1 \~ :.i ,'j ~:' ). and ta belp humankind remember the other wodd, because it is forgetful and
7
unrig.bteous (ù.: è, \1«) in the affairs of t.bis wodd. It is precisely the commissioning aspect of their

mission that traditionally set prophets spart from other individuals and made tbem lawgivers (i.e., of
the divine law) and leaders of the religious community. This particu1ar notion of divine appointment
distinguishes lhem from aIl other individuals who ca.n have access to similar divine rea1ms, e.g.,
friends of Gad, etc.

6 al-Firibi, MJldinJlfJ, XXV ( Tr...ré, J 00-101 ).

7 TalJYf/Iiïr, § 65, 95.7-8; cf. rlirI6d, § 14,270.12-14 (AJr4, 2J}; cf. PJtrtiï, X, § 87, 7S.13~ ( Book
1 79). Not traas1aled ln Arr:h. Il is noterworthy that the l'U./ii'd does not include the Imans of the SbJî
cradi.tion.
 CtfAPTFR EIGHT - 245

PROPHETIe KNOWLEDGE VS THEOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE

The prophetology that Avieenna develops is. for the alost part. articu1ated on philosophieal
principles. whether one tums to bis phitosophieaJ. anthropology or even. to his metarllysies. For
instance, the metaphySlcs of the C~ concludes with a section on prophethood,e white simiJ8l". but
more extent discussions oecor in its section on physics.9 Three different arguments - theologieal
(revelatioJl), anthropological (faculty of imagination) afld ethical (institutions) - are ategrated into
Avicenna's philosophical conception of prophethood. 1o
In. general, Avieenna appears to have adopted an understaading of revelation , st least in the
broad sense, similar to the one upheld by reJigious traditions which makes revel.ion specific to
p-ophets. On the other hand, he subscribes to the view tbat eternal truths are attainable by other
individuaJs. There appear to be [WO distinct epistemic modes: one for prophets and one for mystics
or gnostics. But is it rea1ly the case? At stake is the nature of each p-ocess and their distinctiveness.
Both processes, however. provide a seem..ingly simil.. access to metaphysical truths. This
appears to be me case in both Avicen.na's and Suhl"ElW8l"dï's own understanding of prophetie and
mystica1 knowledge.
Avieenna' 5 philosophical explanation of prophetie knowledge appeals ta a number of
anthropological issues. He posits a hierwcby of intemaJ. faculties, al! leading to the rstionai part of
the human. soul. 1l At the rational level, a similar hierarchy of facu1ties is proposee ta explain. the
process by which knowledge is aClluired.
Avicenna' 5 rendition of this inteUectual p-ocess is net, however, limited 10 discursive
knowledge. He introduees a philosophically onented rendition of Il seemingly superior mystical
process by whicb the seekers of tNth 1ltt8ÏJl knowledge (the lsst section of the Rem.rs). Bath the
former. more inte1Jeetua1 epïstemic process (in terms of a hierarchy of intellects) and the latter, more
mystica1 epistemic process (an extension of the first) ultimate1y lead te sorne union of the soul with
its active principle.
Whether one speaks of inspiration. revellltion, dreams, or the knowledge attained by mystics
8I1d philosophen, the epïstemic process - eitber intellectua! or mysticaJ - appears to be the same.
Although the acquisition of divine or metaphysica1 knowJedge is greatly variable, the process itseJf

8 Avicenna, Sbrtiï~ ~feD1., X. 2, 4411.1-+43.12 ("",fd8~ 175-1).

9 Avic:enna, SJnfiT~ Nm, V, 6.249.18-250.4 (P.9'=. 177).
10 Ganlet, -Quelques apeccs," 531-75.
Il Avicenna, flbbN, 41-61 (ProaF, 112-121).
 CHAPTER E1GHr - 246

•• appea-s quite similar, thus varying only in degrees. A proof of this is the possibility for almost
anybody who develops bis or her intellectual facu1ties or 1 and praetiœs spiriWal exercises te aeeess
metaphysieal tnJtbs.
12

The ability ta aeeess hidden matters is, therefore, not re~eted to prophets. For SuhrawardI,
individuals like friends of Gad bave aceess'ta the same metaphysical realities that prophets do. The
difference only lies in the iJlnate ability of prophet'5 to reach this 10fty stage, having a greater
capability ta aeœss tbese realms tban the friends of God. Furtbermore, prophets possess, indeed. a
superior rank ~.J,J "'=~ ),
bang commissioned by God. Prophets have a "divine" mission of
whieh the friends of God are devoid. 13
Nonetheless, a number of individuals devoid of any "divine" mission will aIso become
recipiems of portions of divine inspiration. Amongst these individuals, Suhrawardï identifies those
versed in Sufism and aseetic practices, alse ealled the spiritual masters (~l:,>J1 y4.Ji ).14 Certain
states brougbt on by spiritual and intelleetual exercises ca lead to the unveiling of lofly realities. ln
fact, the spiritual masters - not identified as prophets - are ranted quite high amongst human. beings,

as they pessess the greatest share (,;..,,; ...~ ) and occupY the highest rank fuLi
rl&.. ) in chis world
ls
and in the next. Moreover, Suhrawardï refers ta them by stating the epitbet "blessed (u-:'.".La) be the
..-.0...

one who tnows himseJf (~ ) [i.e., bis soul] before death md who has reached in this wodd a
stage wha-e [the souL] can take pleasuee in the abode of [seJf] annihilation (_l:a.à.J' ..) l~) and in whieh
it cao rejoice in etemity (_~l ..)l~) [i.e., in bom worldS].,,16 Other statements round in Suhrawsrdi's
Deliefs, a more traditional philosopbical work, alJude to the possibility of acquiring tnowledge from

the divine rea1m by friends of God, sages, and theosophers, induding ua great number of truth
17
seekers (0 li&-)," such as - no doube - Suhrawsrdï himseLf.
For Suhrawardi, even some of the funetïons traditiol1aUy ascribed to prophets. such as being
the leader of the a>mmunity May be ascribed to other individuais if required by certain eonditiol1S.
i.e., in the absence of a Pr0phet. In such circumstaaces, ether individuals can pLay a 1egislative,
moral, and even politica1 rele. Suhrawsrdi's position. illustrates the necessity ta provide some sort of
politiœ1 and moral guidance for the community. Consequenl1y. the moral and political funetions

12 Michot, "Prophétie et divinalioJl," 509.

13 rllirpïd, § 14.271.3 (AmI, 23).
1" r~6d, § 15,271.4 (AJrh,2J).
IS rliV6d, § 15.271.12 (AJrh, 24).
16 rlir;Ji:I, § 15, 271.12-14 (A~.. 14).
17 P6tii, X. § W7. 76.1-8 (Book, 80). AbseDtfrom Ard.
 CHAPTER EIGlIT - 247

saributed to propbets may be extended to those who have 8ltained a certain degree of divine
knowledge in the absence of living prophets.

An illustration of chis is found in. the On"eom./-UlU.n:Unl/lir->e J~:rstlom. where Suhrawardï

p-oposes a clœsification of in.dividuals in terms of their respective degrees of discursive resson and
experiential knowlecJge or direct intuition. Such a classification has implications for the socio-political
crder of the community. For the purpose of clssstfication. Suhrawardi appeals to a. notion of reason.
the principle at the heart of tbe philosophicat tradition. This is wan-anted by the fact that some
Peripatetic principles. attainable only through a discursive process. do remain valid and essential for
the elaboration of bis own philosophical system.

The hierarchy he establishes ta differentiate the different stages attained by seeker.; of truth
and sages is. however. indicative of the relation reason and direa intuition enjoy in. bis philosophical
system. On the one hand, there are those who pursue discursive knowtedge. but who are ignorant of
gnostic or mystica1 knowledge. i.e.. the science of lights <'.1 I~ '"il ~); on the other hand. there are

those who possess intuition or illumination. but who are ignorant of discursive knowledge (~

4.:1." : ). e.g.. Sufis like al-E:Iallij and al-Bistiimï; and fina1ly. tbere are those who possess true
discursive and gnostïc knowledge (..Jb.... - ~ 1 ~). For Suhrawardî. the most perfeet sage is the
one who bas achieved the utmost level of perfection in both philosophical knowledge and mystica1
experience. e.g.. figures such as Buzurjmihr. Jiimisf. Farshiüshtra. Hermes. Empedocles. Pythagoras.
Plato. Ul It is upon the last group composed of sages who belong ta very different traditions - eastem
and western - tbat befalls the responsibility of supreme authority (Ll:.a..; ) over the community and
of the viceregencyof Gad (4:u1 Ü~).I"

The equal importance given to discursive - reason - and gnostic or mystica1 - direct intuition.
i.e., mysticai contemplation - knowledge attributes a very similar heuristic value ta both modes of
knowing. Suhrawardï. however. goes on to state chat in the absence of a perleet individus! capable of
simultaneously developing these two faculties ta their utmost perfection. tbe individual that will
deserve the responsibility of supreme authority and viceregen.cy of God over the community will
possess the greatest amount of mystical experienœ. whether he lacks great philosophical knowledge
or possesses none whatsoever.zo

Such claims are indicative of the great importance which Suhrawardi assigns to direct

• 18

19

20
.Mb1JJu. § 4.10.11-11.2 (Site:. 88-9).
Sec earlier discussion in the section on Suhrawardï' 5 intel.lectual allegiance.
.HJbmù, § 5. 11.2-12.14 ( 5.T!e:, 90- L).
 CHAPTFR E[GlIT - 248

•
intuitive knowledge. Orny individuals who receive this divine knowledge through a process of
illumination or perceive it through a process of direa experience are able to guide others. 2 ] In
addition. the office of God's viceregency requires a .. direct appointment."Z4: The guardiansbip of the
reJigious comm.unity. thus. presupposes. to sorne extent, the acquisition of some sort of divine
knowledge and guidance.

In a similar fasluon, mystical knowledge wbich results from illumination as weil as mystica1
contemplation requires the existence of a living proof or a "pole" (~) who can, for instance, be
someone who WltnesSes or who bas alreadl" witnessed these divine truths. Zl The authority rests with
the "pole." even. if the pole is completell" unknown te the people - i.e., in oc:cultation za Tberefore.
Suhrawardi acknowledges the existence of a non-temporal autbority.

In order to penetrale the secrets of bis philosophy of ligbt. Suhrawardi' 5 own followers must
have aJready received some sort of divine i11spit"Btion or illumination of ligbt ~_l r:;.~ >, white
others. he notes, will nat benefit at aU from wbat bis book offers. i.e.. the OrieAbil-1DU02Lndb·r··e

Wistlom, in which case they will bave to depend on someone else for ilS interpretatïon. 2S Suhrawardi
maintains that bis own. works are in. need of a .. maintainer of the book" (y ~ 1 ~ li ) to reveal - to
the seeker unable ta "troly" understand the esoteric meaning of bis works - the trutbs that lie beyond
the symbolism that is used in it and ta become the guardian (~) to whom is entrusted the science
of the book (y bS.J' ~ ).26

The iJ'lspirationai nature of Subrawardï' s works is, perbaps, best exemplified with the f oUowing
report. In the preface to bis commentary on the Or.ienml-UJu.mio~,..ive J.VLSdom. SbahraziJri reports
the following verses attributed to Suhrawardï: "The signs of the prophetbood of love became apparent
with me (~~ ~ <,$"""" 'f~ ~,,=i ); before me tbey were hidden; theywere, however, divulged
during my time (~~, ~'-j~,J ~ ~ ):.Z7 Interpretations as ta what Suhrawardi real1y

21 The unportaDce of the master-disciple reJationsbip is, in addition, an important feŒUre of Suhrawardï
worb, especially m "visionary recita.Js. "
12 15kmnr, § 5,11.12-12.14 (5",!4'=, 90-91).
23 5ubrawanfî mentions that these prooes (~) are essential, W hether they are ltving, or in occultation,
cC. ffLkm;tr, § 5.11.12-12.14 (SJIJT. 90-1).
24
.(frkm., § 5,12.9-12 (SJ{.v:,90);cf.Cornin.. EorslllmQ-JJU~~,vol. 2, 69-n.
2S Ff1bRN, § 6, 12.15-13.12 (5"/Y-. 91-2).
Z6 (5bn;lI", § 280,259.3-5 (5-!~ 232); cf. lbid., § 4, J 1.3-5 (Sag.• 89); cf. Ibid., § 260.244.7-8 (~(':,
223); cf. [bid.. § 276. 256,7-8 <5.§T., 230); cf. Corbin.. 8t isJam irame.n, vol. 2.21-3 and index of: r:~ : cf. Q.,
13:43 and 27:40.
Tl Sha.hrazüri. SOIlr!7, 6.14; cf. Idem, aI-iWCHJDdmznr;IL. .• fILbrriir, 7.7 <5.ïtf:, 82); cf. ed of Spies and
Kharak, 1lJrer:o T.tt:!JIlises, 109.4.
 CHAPTER EIGHr - 249

•
meam with sucb statements remaîn pure speculation (see section on Suhrawardi' 5 intelleetual
allegiance).

Suhrawardï' 5 prophetie epistemotogy thus beeomes more inclusive of other experiences -

m}~tica1 and/or personal - capable of providing acce5S te the divine. It aIso fiJ1ds another expression
in the filiation Su.hrawardî establishes between divine guidance and with Zoroastrianism. e.g .. in his
Tob/ers. and to which we will recurn.28 Nonethetess. the basie d1Stinction established between
commissioned and non-eommissioned individuals remai.n.s the essential difference that sets prophets
apltt from other individuals capable of aeœssÏJlg these divine realms.

ONE OR MANY EPfSTEMOLOGICAL PROCESSFS

The unique charaeterof prophetic experienees. as opposed to the multiple possible theosophical
cr mystica1 experiences of other individuals. actually raises sorne problem.s: How distinct ace these
two supposedly different processes by whieh metaphysieal truths are accessed? How ca.n the nature
of these processes be defiJled, if prophets and theosophers. sages. as weIl as mystics have access to
the same reslitiescf'
In spite of the differences mat distinguish prophets from theosophers. no passages in
Suhrawardï' s works appear to distinguish between the two categories of individuals with respect to
the aetual process br which ther &equite tbese metaphysical truths. It is not the process. but the
greater or lesser receptive ability that constitutes the main difference betWeen prophets. frien.ds of
God, sages, theosophers. mystics. etc. In fact, when Suhrawardï discusses how it is possible to know
tbese hidden trutbs, he makes no tnempt to restrict it ta prophets alone. He includes those who
experience prophetie inspirations (~r~1 ..)~j). thosewho Experience dreams (~L.ea:.). and the
soothsayers who makes divination (~~ l.is>. Xl

Prophets, as opposed ta i.nspired individuals. neitber need any instruction by msster5 to

acquire know1edge - e.g., MutJammad, Idris?l and Abraham 32 - nor do they need spiritual exercises
to receive inspiration.

But the number of individuaJs capable of acquiring sorne sort of divine knowledge extends

Z8 A/H';Ï/J. XI. § 93-5,1&4.13-188.6 (ALrh. 110-3).

29 IfrbnJU, § 256, 240.4-6 (st4'=. 220).

-e
Xl HJ.bmu, § 253,237.15-238.2 (S..,:. 218).
31 Q., 19:57 and Q .• 21:85; traditionally identified with Enoch and Hennes. cf. Corbin, AJr1J., 149
a12.
30! P6rrü, X, § 88, 76.9-11 (A.tr.tt., 143: Book, SO) and Ibid.• § 87. 7514-15.
 CHAPTFR ECGRT - 250

• well beyond the c~egory of prophets to mc1ude anybody whoever 15 aided by divine lights: prophets
(.. ~i ) as wellas friends of Gad (.. 4-1.,i ), theosophers (o4Jb...e ), learned and pious individua1s
(~ ) and anybodr (rA~ ) who becomes receptive ta these truths every time theu" souls -
essenrially their rational souls - have been fortified by spiritual virtues ud who have subdued their
bodily faculti es 3:l These individuals have acœss ta hidden matters (~~ ) when the)" are œleep

(yJ."aJ" - ("~J ~), but more importan.tly, when tbey are awake.
3oJ
In a wakeful state, the reception
of suprasensible matters occurs under a nwnber of circumstances. The [WO most impOl'tant œ-e, mat
cheu" souls po~ess this ability by nature <4: ~ ~ 0"'" ), or that their souls acquire chis ability
from the seuls of spheres (..:J)li J uu~ ),35 identified with the acquired (loftier) lighls (~ ;;.' ,-,e; c

~.,.J.aJJ ..)'~~I), i.e., the ability to receive chis divine light from the intelligences and ceJestial souls

(see section on probJem of recolleclion). And finally, access to these metaphysica.l trUths May also
accur because of a weak .nature (~ .............. >, as is the case for hypochondriacs (~.,~) and
epiJeptics (V=.J.j..JAR)' 315

Unlike other individuaJs, prophets possess particular qualities that account for their n~raJ
ability to access metaphysica1 realms. For Suhrawardi, pt"ophets possess a superior soul (---=~

~ 1), are highly knowJedgeable (rJ l&. ), and possess a power (Jlli ) u.nequalled byany of their
a>ntemporaries. lt is their superior souis chat partly account for their acœss ra the divine. Prophets
must not, however, be identified with tbose who OCYfu.u-e this ability, althougb they receive the

power of light (~I.J~ i.,.. >, tbrough conjunetion with the spirit of the divine (c..j~ ~
U""~J), i.e., the Holy Spirit. 37

Bath means - a natura! disposition and the acquisition of such an ability - are effective to
acœss that divine reaJ.m.. Suhrawardï adds tbat such an ability can be acxruired by means that only
certain individuals know and with sciences that they keep secret and concealed (;-,~-:, ; 0.j (' ~ )

and express onlysymbolicaJly (j",...~) in their works, this bang an implicit referenceto Suhrawardï's
own work. 31l This type of sratement alludes to the intrinsic ÏJ1Îtiatic aspect of the quest for truth. These
"individuais" ta which the passage alludes may very well be the tbeosopbers, tbe learned and pious

33 IfrkmlN, § 256, 240.4 (SrS;, 220): cf. M!riibl, VU (a) 85.2-3 (p) § 37, 107.10-11 ( k m.• 64:
fsm.llU, 229); cf. AJW';1/J, IV, 7, § 87,178.13-14; d. PJimï, X, § 93,80,9-81.2 (Atrh.. 146-7; Book,83-4),
J4 Hi!rJbJ, VII (a) 85.7(p) §37, 107.13-16 (AJrh~ 64; fsmJl-ri,229).
J5 HlI,rJbt, VII (P) § 37, 101.13 (~.' 64).
36 MJlslJiiri', § 215,493.16-494.4; cf. Avicenna, .fslJJinïl' , vol. 3-4, X, 12, 871.5-6 (A-.(~. 95; JJÛ:.
510).
37 rlitj4Ïd, § 14, 270.14-271.1 (~., 23); â. ~h.• 26 n.7, 4.11, 29 4.42.
38 .AJw;t!J, IV,1, § 87, 178.13-6 (An=h~ 105-6).
 CHAPTER ElGfIT - 251

men but. more impottantly. ail those who strive to know the truth and God.

Suhrawardï dwe.lls on mystical contemplation (o.iA~ ) as a privileged means of accessing

tbese metaphysicaJ realms - sometbing which draws bim closer to mystical tradition. His conception.
of mystical contemplation. a type of direct intuition. is already present in Avicenna's works. associated
with both prophetie knowledge and the knowledge attained br mystics k&,J ~ ) ~ ForAvîcenna.
knowledge is acquired either through the reœption of forms that originate from the sensible world or
the reception of forms that originates from non-seOSlble realms - i.e.. in the active intelligence.

The fonner process amounts to an acquisition of forms through the process of abslraetion
tbat originates in sensations as the primary reci.pients for this extemal data. This may be characterized
as the intellective aspect of Avicenna's epi stemology. The latter type of knowledge, more typically
associated with prophets and mystics. depends on the soul's ability to ascend and receive an mput
from non-sensibJe realms 40 No recourse to any eve1lt from the externat world is required; rather, it
depends primariJyon the faculty of intuition «JM.~).

In the DeliJ·-enmce. Avieen.na writes tbat ''it is possible tbat a human being may lLnd the
teUtb from non-sensible realms, and tbat the syllogism may be effected in bis mind without a

-. 41
teacher... This abillty to grasp the middle term of the syl10gism without a teacher charaeterizE!5 the
5trong intuitive ability of prophets. According ta Avicenna, intuition is, in faa, "the highest of
human facu1ties" and should be caUed a "divine faculty" (~~ o."i ) at which time the soul is
iaspired (~I J.:~ ).42

The fonner process. hawever, that proceeds by abstraction from the extemal world appears
ta be reducible to the buter. Knowledge - i.e., the forms of intelligibles that the sauls receive - is
received from the active intelligence with which the souls conjoin (J~! ). a::l Knowledge a(X{uired

:B Avicenna, Na/ru, NiIfs, 339.1-343.9 (A J:7C:. 35-8). It is preœded by a chapter on. the theoreticaJ

fac11lty and lts various degrees, d. Idem, Ni!f;ir. 333.1-336.10 (Al'7c, 33-5). This:is also described al length in
the Iast t'Wo seClicns of Avicenna' s .IshmN whicb cre precedeeS by a chapter on splntual pleasures.
1

<0 Avicenn.a. NiViû, Jlfelll., 697.9-12.

41 A vicen.na, ..MI,I., .Mûs VI, 340.10-11 (A 1'7&:, 37).
1

42 Avïcenn.a, MIjiir, Nus, vr, 341.3-9 (A 1'7~, 36-7).

43 He adds tbat "it is possible thal someone. whose soul is inspired (~, .J.:~ ) by the intensit}· of
its punty and die inrensity ofits conjunctiOJl with intellective principles ~ I ~l...;tll...;t JL.-:i"i' ), have tbeir
iJJtwtive [fcully] busied. i.e., tbat they recei.ve inspiration from the active intellect (Jl.a.LJ1 J.ü-ll r4J! )
ooncenring an maeters; 50 the forms of all tltiDgs contained ln the active UJtellect become inscribed ln his
[50111], eitber instantaneously or a1most instanraneously, net that he accepts them merely on autbority but on
account or tbeic logicaJ. order which encompasses all the middle terms," cf. Avicenna. Najru, 341.1-6 (A 1=7(;:.
36).
 CHAPTFR EIGHT - 252

•
from the non-sensible remains logicall)'" prior to any nltional perception.

Nonetheless, Avicenna emphasizes the need to develop one's intellective faculties. The
iJltelleetive process exercised by the theorEtica1 faculty of the soul leads ta the development of one' s
faculty of intuition.4<l Once developed, the theoretical faculty receives the impressions of uniVel"SaJ
fonns. lt is then that the hum an tntellect penet1"ates the metaphysica1 rea1m, the potential intellect
having become a perfect potentiality in .!Jabiru, i.e., an aCX{uired inte11ect,45 at which cime. it is, in.
effect, of the genus of the acquired intellect and must be ca1led a "divine intelligence" ('F'""',ü ~).'"

Actions attributed to the "divine intelligence," 1.e., the intellect in.!J80dU, can now overf1ow
(~) into the imaginative faculty (:.i i.:; -, c) wbich. in. turo. symbo1i2es them (4-=S~) in sensory-

imageries and words (\~I (,;A ~""""""',J .......".......- ~i ).dl Occasionally. this l"8tional facu1ty
needs not exert any effort. no!" require any instruction to achieve conraet with the active intelligence.
i.e.. the Archange! Gabriel. This phenomenonoccul"Sprimarilyto prophets, whoreœive all intelligibles
from the active intelligence. either instantaneously or almost instantaneously. And it is the highest of
prophec:ies, the loftiest part of the rational f&Culty that is caUed a .. divine faculLy. "

Prophetie knowledge, the purest fonn of knowledge appears, therefore, ta be reduàble to its
intelleetual aspect. Prophetie knowJedge amounts ta the reception of a flux of intelligible forms
originating at the leve1 of the active intelligence. The highest level of buman Întellea. the .. divine
facutty" which prophets possess becomes the locus of perfe<:t illuminalion received from the active
intelligence. Furthermore. prophets are in no need of rational demonstnllions ta attain these truths.
Prophets bave an intuitive perception of higher realities. Their souJs. which serve as a receptacle
will. like a min-or, refleet those metaphysicaJ traths, i.e.. the divine (intelligible) lights Ûlat the divine
flux c:onslantly emanstes. Aviceona ascribes this leve1 of total and perfect receptivity to the prophets:

Hence, it is possible that there exist amongst people an individual whose soul is
fottified by great purity and br the conjunction (J~I ) with the inœllectuai principles.
to the point where it occupies bis [f&CUlty of] intuition (UA'~), l mean the reception
of [intellectual principles] from the aaive intelligence U Jü c....
) reg8l"ding

44 Avicenna, MPl', 339.2-10 CA r-7C:, 35).

45 Avicenna. MlJiU', 333.1-336.10 {A F7~ 33-4).
46 Avic:ema writes that, "it belongs ta the genus of iAre.U~cnrsiD hi/inti' but 15 50 lofty that not all
1"

people share it," cf. Avic:enna, N.,pïI", 339.11-14 (Anc, 35-6). In the soul, tbese fcrms ..e tnlnSIIliu.ed tD the
quired ÏJIte1Jec:t, the inlellee:t Ln llav, che intellect Ln hillJJÎ"U, the material intellect, and then. ta the prae::tica1

---
i.nEellee:t served by the e.uttatlve (rA,.,> and the representative (. r,!.;. -, • ) facuJties, in turn, served by the
appetitive ~.J.P ) and the passive unaginalion, itself served by the comman sensr! (4.:-J~ ) or the r:JnUSDJ
(~lJ..:Li), c:f. Avicenna, Mifiir, 341.10-343.9 (Ar·l'Co, 37-8); d. Goic:hon, L~ritjve. 231.

i(1 A~eMa. Mfiir, 339.15-17 (A~, 36).

 CHAPTER ElGfIT - 253

everytbing. and the imprinting of (~ ~~ ) the forms which are in the active
intelligence. cither all at once, or almost al! at once, in sorne sort of imprint (
"L.l-&:i.)1 ). not imitatively ("l:~ ). but rather graduail}". [the soul] busying itseJI
with the middle tenn. The imitative elements (~l:~ ) regarding the matters
whicb a-e only known through char causes are not intellectually cel1a.Ïl1 (:i.:". ;ë.:
~ ). And chis is a sort of prophecy. better. it is the highest of the faculties of
prophecy and this faculcy is the most worthy ta be called a divine faculty (;i,.,..t
~J.i) which is the hïghest of the degrees of the human facultie5.~

Once illuminated. the divine faC1l1ty becomes a perfect mirrorcapable of recei.ving intelligible
forms. From the &bove passage it is clear that. first. it is essentially the rational sauls of prophets that
penetrate the metaphysica.1 realm. Otherwise. how could the statement "the conjunaion is with the
iatellective principles" be understood? The souls of these individuals can be conjoined with the
active and divine intelligence. transforming their poœntial intellect into an acquired intellect. because
of the immateriality of the nuiona! part of the sou1.49 Access ta this loftier epistemological stage is
not. however. restrieted ta prophets. Altbough essentially cbsracteristic of prophets. this ability ta
busy one's faculEy of intuition and to be conjoined with intelleetual principles is present in a Îew~

ether individuals, e.g., gl10stics (C"'" J l&) or sincere and pure individuals <ù.: ë.z J-). 50
-
..... .. Suhrawardï's awn prophetie and theosophic epistemology is best understood by viewing it
from two different perspectives. The f1l"5t is the metaphysical dimension with iCi cosmologica1
conceptions that under.1ie the possibility of propheticknowledge in terms of an intelleetual conjunction
of the human soul witb the intelligences. And the second perspective is the psychologieal dimension
that accounts fOl" the human sout' s reception of these truths. Moreover, Suhrawardî understands
Avicenna's notion of intellectual intuition - which oceupies the apex of the epistemalogical process
accx>unting for prophetie knowledge - in a more metaphorieal fashion. He 8ppea1S ta such notions as
the reception of light. already present ia Aviœnna's works, or to ft more typically Suhrawardian.
preseotial-type of knowledge.

METAPHYSICAL CONSIDERATIONS
At the metaphysical level, bath Suhrawardï's and Avicenna's prophetie and theosophic

epistemologies ..e dependent upon the prevailing Peripatetic cosmalogy. where the celestial spheres

e Avicenna, SJntiï~ Hm, V. 6,248.2- 250.4 (Psr:, 176-7).

<S Micbot, "Cultes, magie et intellection," 223; cf. Avicenna, JJ,f~, 227.22-228.11 and Ibid.,

231.3-232.1", ("Appendice." II, § 4, 8. 12 1Jl MichOl's trans., cf. Mic:boe, "Culees," 231-3); c:f. Idem.. .s:JJdiI'.
Mûs, V, 6, 249.18-250.4 (~ 177).
so Avcienna, l'sluïrJr, vol. 3-4, lX. 2-8,799.1-827.1 (Où:, 485-92; ""~, 81-6).
 CHA.PTER. E1GIIT - ~

•
51
are responsible for changes in the sublunar world. For Avîœnna. the course of events in chis world
is detennin.ed by the ceJestiai causes that rule over this world. Thereupon, prophetie knowledge
becomes possible only once human souls can be conjolJ1ed with their celestial causes, the celestiaJ
and angeJical souls - which in turn ÏJlfonn these human souls of the greater cosmic plan.52 Al-Ghazili
criticized titis parocular Peripatetic tbesis. SJ The ongin of reve1aticJ15. dream.s. premonitions. etc.. of
prophets - and the friends of Gad, sages, and other individuals - are. tberefore, partIy detennmed by
cosmological considerations.

The same holds crue for SuhrawardL Knowledge oftbe divine partlr depends on the Peripatetic
cosmology already in place by Avicenna' s time. The relationship betWeen the knowledge of
metaphysical planes and the cosmological arder may, perhaps, be illustrated by Subrawardi's explicit
indications tha prophetie and theosophic knowledge cOlTespond to the human soul' s ability to access
knowledge engraved in the rational souls possessed by the celestiaJ spheres (4J o~~ J'~i ) - i.e.,
the ce1estial souls. 54 Suhrawardi writes, ..these lights [i.e., the celestiaJ souls] know the partieulars of
[this world], as they know theeffects aftheirown movements (~lS;~ jl~-,4-=i~~ ~~).,,55r
Furthermore, Suhrawardï subscribes to a certain notion of causality attributed to celestial

.-... motions to accountfor EVents thatoceurin. this world. Hedoes not rejeet the eosmological deœrminism
implied in Avicenna's own cosmology - Le., the idea of celestial causes. In bis Temp/es ofL..tglJr,
human souls can eonjoin with the celestial souls, themse1ves cognizant (4J~ ~ ~~ ) of all

that aceurs in this world, on account of the intelligences with whicb each of tbem is sssociated. The
oogniz8l1ce of tbese celestial souls-intelligences encompasses the motion they impart to the spheres,
along with the âfeets tbat these motions p....oduee in this wodd. The human soul' 5 ability to access
the metaphysieal realm, i.e., its intellective eonjunction with the celestial souls, accounts for the
knowledge human sauls can. attain of the greater cosmologicai plan. 56

51 Lemer, Lem~Dde des sphères.

52 Avic:ellna, A{JwiÏ! n/-.Mlfj-, 115.2-117.3 C'Prophétie et divination," 516-7); cf. Mtchot, "Prophétie
et divuJation: 508-9; d. AVlcenna, .N.Ip, MtU., 100.3-104.9.
53 al-Ghazili. TJlluifur, 156.1- 163.10 (ma:W~~, 156-163).
Sol ffrkmll/', § 253,238.2-3 (st,4'=.218); cf. Ibid., § 208,198.15-199.5 (.sïrr., 189): cf. AJWii/J. IV, 7, §
83, 176.13-5.
5S HrbniN. § 251, 236.1-15 (.,ç,~ 217); d. HilTJbl. VU (a) 85.5-7 (P) § 37. 107.13-6 (~.. 64;
fsmJlÎ/, 229).
S6 He wrï.tes that "it conjoins ~ ) witb the œJestlal souls which ace knowJedgeable of their
monons add the çoftcomltants that depelld on cher motions," cf. H;l.J"iïkU. VU (a) 85.6-7 Cp) § 37, l07.13-14
(.kd.,64; fsmJÏ7J, 229); d . .{fLbn;u, § 190-3, 183.9-186.11 (S~~ 173-1n); cf. lbid., § 204,195.4-12 (Sot"'..
186).
 CHAPTFR. EIGHT - 255

•• Moreover. Suhrawacdï substitutes bis itTadiation or illumination (~J."..1ü!

aûJs the "divine in'adiation of rays of l1ghts" (~~ ,-, "Il cL.....:;.) ta ernanation (~ ) which is

central ta Avicenna's Neoplatonic cosmoJog)'.57 Consequently. the generaJ em.anatlve stnJaure of

Peripateticism is not rejeeted by Subrawardi. It is only modified and rendered more complex.
) motif. what he

Knowledge in its purest form colTesponds to the reception of this divine in'adiation. As a result. the
intellective becomes the luminous. IntelligibJe matter5 are now couched in bis Jight terminoJogy-
Suhrawardï writes. that upon reaching this stage. "the light of the first Truth mes upon [the human
souls] (~ ,j,Jo ..;.! )," adding that it is at this stage that ..the soul becomes illuminated (~~I).
enJightened (":"J~I) and imldis:ed (.,:.,.~I)by the light of Gad...56

The souls which reach this stage of receptivity are chen. capable of recei.ving intelligible
mattEl"5 - i.e., light - from the world of ceJeslial souls (~~ )S9 It is, thus. possible for human
rational souls (4.i..L.t.:a ). also identifie<! as theosophica1 souls (~b... ) to aclueve an intellective
conjunction with tbis world of ceJestial souls because of the similari1ies shared by the substance of
the latter with the substance of hum8ll rational sauls. 6O

Avicenna's definition of the soul in terms of ilS subscantiality was of great help to explain
_o. the possibility for ail human souls to access the metaphysica1 reaJ.m. AU souls cao partici.pate in the
61
metaphysical realm., because both human and ce1estial sauls share simiJar intelligible substances.
As such, chen, the access ta the metaphysical realm. is not a privilege reserved only for proph~.

Coosequently, the sou.ls of aU those who thread on the mystical path - the path of knowledge -
deve10p similar abilities to access the metaphysical reaJm.
For Avicenna, the relationship posited between the celestial souls and the intelligences is
similar to the one which exists between the human soul and the human intellect. Both the intelligences
and the celestial souJs are, in a sense, the source of the knowledge mat the human. soul can aoquire
"once the human potentiality becomes Jike (. -, .-: "; ) the fint principles of all eristence,'·62 the first
principles bein.g the active intelligence - the last of the metaphysicaJ intelligences - chat roles over

57 PJirtii, X, § 93, 8l.2-3 (.An:'.h., 147; Book. &4).

!iB HJlyJbl, VII <a> 86.6-87.1 (p) § 37,108.3-7 (AJ'rh., 64; fsmaD,231).
59 HI!Yiïbl, VII <a) 85.2-3 (p) § 37, 107.9-10 (AJrh. 63; /smlU.229).
60 Ms. B reads ~b....o 1 cf. HlITJkiJ, VII (a> 86 n.6. ln ms inlrodlJction co the edition of the HIJY'Jb:/,
Rayyin me1ltl.ODS thlt ms. 8 is the oldest ms, d. Rayyin, H~, 40; and tbat it is closer to SlJhrawardï' 5
orber Wot"ks in. whicb the theosophical soul wouJd correspond to tbeone possessed by the tbeosopher <~
,Jb.".). cf. Ibid., 39.
61 El Ahwani, .. Latbéorie de la connaissance," 26,40.
62 AviceJUla, Mljiir, V, 336.7-8 (A~, 35); cr. mati, fbnSmiï1lHdMy;m"aSm,44-S0.
 CHAPTER E(GIIT - 256

the subJunar world and the hurnan rational soul. In fact. once tbe human intellect becames Like its
pi.ncipJes and, thereupon. accesses the divine intelligence - i.e., tbe active intelligence with which
the humaa sauls of prophets. SamES, mystics and potentially ail human.kutd can acœs5 - il becomes a
prophetie intellect.
Ce1estial souls and celestial intelligences are, in fact, inœrmediaries in chis Neop!atonic
cosmology. In the religious tradition, they are the divine agents or angels - e.g.. Avicenna and
Suhrawardïequatethe Archange! Gabriel withthe aetiveintelligence. Theseangels aetas intermediaries.
like the ange1s in Jaeob's dream of the ladder in Judaism (Gen. 28: 12). Sïmi1ar views .-e found in
the Islamic tradition, wmch makes use of the ladder to express metaphorically the distance tbat
sepsrates our world from that of Gad (Q., 6.35; Q., 52:38: and 70:3 ).63 The coorse of events insaibed
in. the œlestia1 Book (of the religious tradition) is engraved on the intermediaries, intelligences and

souls. For ÎJlStance. alluding to these divine agents. Suhrawardï wrïtes, "[God's] name is abave the
world of intelligence; (~.,,~ ), and undemeath the beams of [Gad' 5] light there is a groop of
people beholding Him."64

Moreover, Subrawardï' s illumination or irradiation of light - essentially of an intelleetive

nature - is the resu1t of the divine assistance provided to hum an souls.65 Renee, the assistance
provided to the prophets is the guidance offered by the intermediary of the Archangel Gabrie1. 66 Fa-
Avicenna and SuhrawS"di, prophetie epistemologies occur once the human rational souls can conjoin
with the souls of the spheres, e.g., as stated in the Temples- of4§"or.ô1 ln their philosophical systems,
tbere is a transposition of t.bis role ta the intelligence. all of which are inlennediaries in the Peripatetic

cosm 01ogy, but more specifica1Jy to the Jast active intelligence.

ANfHROPOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In contnldistinetion te the downward emanative principle 50 charaeteristic of Peripatetic
oosmology - st tintes defined in tenns of divine guidance - there is an upward force. The latter
colTesponds to the human quest for the absoJute tbat drives the souls lowards their principle, in an
ascending mode. This mode is often modelJed on the ascent of the Prophet Mu~amm.ad (~I...J-'-).
AnthropoJogical elements S"e just as fundamental for Avicenna's and Su.hrawardï'5 account

63 WolfsOJl, P.hùo, vol 1,372.

64 HZ!Yiïkil. VI] (a) 87.5-6 (An::-b, 65; fsmJlJ1, 231). Absent in. the Persian trans.
65 f5kmJU, § 253, 238,9-12 (~, 219).
66 /5bnIlL', § 210, 200.9-201.2 (SlfI:, 189) (see our section oJl1Jlte11ection).
67 HlITJkll • Vll <a) 85.6-7 (p) § 37, 107.9-13 (An:-h., 64; fsm;ïY, 229).
 CHAPTER EIGHr - 257

•
of propbetoJogy as the physical and physiological elemenls required for the existentiation of human
souls (see chapte!" on the nature of the soul). For Avicenna. the human sours ascension is fuelled by
a necessary natural ~ ) desire (~ >. a wilful and inteUectl.ve ascension. sometbing lbat
Gardet has interpreted as an. undevel.oped OBturai. mysticism, a sort of reduction of mysticism 10 its
6B
philosophical plane. Evaluations of this sort. although debatable. do, however. highJightthe undedying
philosopbical strUcture of AviceJUls's explanation of mystica.l knowledge.

Suhrawardi' 5 own conception of mystical knowledge largely depends on similar philosophica1

expJan«ions. Mystic and sages can, with the help of spiritual exercises (..:;.J l..Q 1:: J) and the refinement
of their chsractel" (J ~i _~~ ), transfonn their souls into sauls that are similar to the celestial
souls (~~J ~~ '-:' .J.:4-:' ~ü..o Î~ ). Some activities prepsrethe human souls to schieve a

stale of receptivity. .A.mongst lhese activities. there are, first, intelleetual exercises chacacteristic of an
intellective substance - the soul - desirous of its intellective principle and, tbus stri ving to retum to

il. The development of the rational part of the 50\11 can lesd to visionary states and the acquisition of
knowledge through "that which causes (allj causes" (y~~J ' .....:. ; ft ) and the beings which it
brings into existence directly (~r.s;.;.;...).69

Suhrawardï's prized means to altain the level of receptivity tbat leads to visionary states S'e,
..... howeYer", ascetic and spiritual exercises. Greater receptivity is achieved essentially througb the
dulling of the senses, e.g., with the decrease of the intake of food in arder to bring about a state of
balance (~J~) betWeen the heart (~ ) and tbought (~). The graduai suppression (~~
,J~~ ) of everything bodily or physical. similarly ta what occurs nfnlnûly during sleep.
becomes another stage for the attainment of a state tbat enables the human soul ta access the
metaphysieaI realm. The internai and the extemal senses must be weakened because they are bath
sources of distraction for the soul. because they prevent the soul from receiving traces of suprasensible
70
matters. They are lite vei1s that obstruet the Isfahbad-light ( • .'. ë rJ) - the light of the rational soul

lB
Gardet. "L'expérience mystiq~e,W 61. G.-det describes Avicenna's ~ as "monïst and
detenniDïst," cf. Ibid., 61. 66; or, again, as an "eri5teJ1liaiistmonism," d.lbid.• 64. For Avicenna. it corresponds
CO a motlism of existence, sucb lbat geaing c:1oser ta Gad equares the perfec=ti.oD of the so~l' 5 nature, while for
Plotunls. there is a certain ideJltifleation (object-subjeet) winch Gardet does net find in. Aviceona where "a
duality remains. tbat of the coDtingent, prenecessary by ether, and of the necessary by itself, which is only
God," cf. Idem, 62-3.
69 rbijJÏd. § 15,271,4-6 (An:-b., 24-5). The tenn e.'~! is generally defi1led as .. direct" onginarion or
bringing ioto existence. Corbin compares it with the Isma'ïlï .. JulJlt1 tli-Amr" (lbe world of the creative
impenéve, the kÜA = bel as opposed to the ii/am itI-k1NfIq. It is essentially the pleroma of beings of pllre
light, the Jabarit and the Malaküt, it is the t/;ir JIf-ibdii' in. lsm~ili gnosis. cf. Corbin, Arrh., 30 n.44.
70 AhYA:{J, IV § 86, L78.4 (ALrh. 104).
 CHAPTER EIGHT - 258

•
- and prevent it (rom rising to the (ortier realms.
Even ÎJ1 a state of sleep. the faculty of imagination - in me sense of Avicenna's active,
ElTor-prone imagination - can creste interferences that become obstacles that prevent the rational
part of the soul (the Isfahbad-light) from penetrating the metaphysica1 realm. Hume souls must.
therefore, go througb a process of transfonnlCÎon, purification. spiritualization, and detachment from
evEl")'thing bodiJy and worldly. Once mer are tnmsformed and prepare d, human souls can then
"disjoin" themse1ves from the corporeal substratum ta which mey are attached. Suhrawa-dï notes
mat this is achievable by prophets, some of the friends of Gad, and Even those who possess il weak
natura! disposition ('-S".,.b.i ~ ) like some soothsayers ( 4'; i s ) 71 [n the latter case, however. the
ability to dEtach themselves from this world and access the other world is net the result of a wilful
action, but of a natural phenomenon over which complete control is not possible.7Z

THE NOTION OF INTELLECfIVE CONJUNCTION

Let us tum ta the issue of intellective conjunetion that is employed ta explain the possibility
of prophetie or tbeosophic/mysti.œ1 knowledge (see section on intellect). In the Beh"e/S. Suhrawardî
writes that the knowledge of prophets is unique. ,. because their souls conjoin with the divine spirit
(UMW 1 c,~~ ~ ), reœive knowledge (r.,J&) from it. and acquire a luminous power (ô.".i
4-:-d' ~) and a particubl" (ability] ta bave influence (~bJl ~l:. ) [over the elementaJ world]."73
This more Peripatetic work maintains the traditional Perip81etïc idea of conjunction witb the world of
intelligences. In the T8hlets. Suhrawardî explains that what the philosophers caU the active intelligence
is known as the Holy Spirit ((",)A'J-iJ 1 c,.3.J) by the religious tradition (i;':").74 The appeal he makes to
religious tradition is not nove! in itse1f. Rsther. the distinctive Suhrawardian haUmark is that of the
light tenninology, which he uses to desaibe the active intelligen.ce. the Archange! Gabriel.

The idea of a conjunction with the metaphysica1 worJd is central to Avicenna' 5 Peripateticism.
It is the condition that guarantees chat human souls can penàrae the knowledge possessed by the
œlestial spheres. In the .Remids", Avicenna states that .. celestial bodies have souls tbat possess

71 PJutii, IX, § 90, 78.4-5 (BDOk, 81; ALr'+., 144). Furtbennore, .-:;< lS simil.-to ùCis and the
plural of ~~
72 This is espeerally tnle of Ins group of the "bretbren of de~hment fonn the worJd" (y~l

-. ~~I ) who Slrive to detach themselves from the bodiJy

314-32 (An:h., 449-62;

7:l

701
~fpm"aJl, 88-99).

rlJiIld, § 14,270.16-211.1 (Arrb.• 23).

Aftf;-6/J, IV, 8. § 88, 180.3 (ALd., 106).
ta access the abslraeted metaphysical worJd; for
imtance. intbe SOUJZdofdJt"SimlfdJ. Subrawardï discusses the various states (J[~l ) ofthis group. cf. SR5r.
 CHAPTER. E[GlIT - 259

•
particu1ar knowledge (~~ ..::"LS'JJ!) [i.e.. perceptions] and particular wilLs (~ ~ ~IJI.;!) produced
by particulsr opinion."75 Human souls seek to access the knowledge possessed by the celestial souls.
The knowledge of celestia1 seuls amoUJl.ts to a particuJarization of the universaIs contained in the
intelligences. This knowledge is then particu1arized in a similar way br the human souls. Avicenna
writes that:

Particular things are imprinted in. the intelligible world in a. universa1 manner (:i~
~) and are imprintecl in the psychic world (~~ ~ l&. ) in a particular manner
(~~ i4.A ). perceptive of tinte. or are imprinted [in the psychic werld] in both
manners simultaneously.76

Prophets are the buman. beings who are the Most apt [0 reach this stage of oonjunction with
the metaphysical world. ln the BeLi«s, however, Suhrawardï adds that the friends of God can
sometim.es reach this rank (.4J..,,~ ~.;.1J1 oa ~..ü ).77 Prophets are, therefore, not the sole

depositors oftbis knowledge acquired through a conjunction with the metapbysicaJ lights, i.e., the
celestial. sauls (and their intelligences).

A similar spiritual or inteUective conjunction with the divine soul - the active intelligence or
the Ardumgel Gabriel- mayaIso be achieved by a number of other individuals. For ÏJlStanœ, the
sauls of mystics (~~,>II y 4 Ji) May be conjoiaed spiritually with suprase1lSible matters. 78 Simïlarly.
knowledge of hidden matters is possible for theosophers (" L;Jl:- ) when. these ïndividuals are
awake. as we1las for the Most virtuous of human beings (~ ). Suhrawardi. therefore, believes in
the possibility for all human souls to have potentiaJ access te these metaphYsicaJ realms. In the
Temp.les ofLiçbr, he writes that once the human souJ bas achieved a stage of detachment (~~ ),
"sometimes. it becomes free [ta rise] ta the world of the divine;" and then... it is conjoined (~ )
witb its saaed flUher «,)A'~I ~1 ) and receives ~)79 from it knowledge (...i~Jl.A... ):,00 The

saaed father May be an entity like the divine spirits «,)A'-Ü Cl.".;l ). e.g., as is mentioned in his
82
Persian. translation,61 or the Jast active intelligence which acts as the lord of the human species. An

75 Avicenna. fshJTriïe, vol. 3-4, X, 9,863.4-5 (Où:, 507; A-{]I3r,95).

76 A1IÏ.cenna. fshWiïe, vol. 3-4, X, 9, 865.2-866.2 (OJr., 508; .JI..(~t 96).
TI r~Jid, § 14, 27l.2-3 (An:"h~ 23).
78 He writes that, "spiritual lighes oa:ur to [the soul] such that i.t beçomes a habit and a SUIte of

repose; tbereupon bidden mauers manifest themselves ta [these indlviduals) and the [human) soul conjolDS
witb [these spiritual Jighu) in a sptritual manner." cf. fm;.ikf. § 15,271.7-9 (..4J'œ., 24).
79 Hewrites, "whatthepropbets (~l.:-:ùl). thefriea.ds ofGod (~L:J"I), and otberindividuals (~~)

-~-.
receive from hidden maners (0 1 .::, ... ;," cf. ffibnld, § 256,240.4 (.sigl:, 220).

80 Hl!rJb:J, VU (a> 85.2-3 (p) § 37,107.12-3 (An:'n.. 64; fsml~,229).

81 In. the Persian text, "sacred sptriu" (U&'"Ü ~'",.J 1); cf. u.~rJkil, VII (p) 107.12 ( .IsmJlL/,229).
 CffAPTER E[GfIT - 260

'. illustration of the process by which lights become manifest through the advent of a conjunction with
the spiritual wodd is provided br Suhrawardï' s own experience:

You have sent into our hearts (c. f .J.J i) the breeze of your compassion. upon our
souls descended (J j..:a i) the flashes of your blessings (~lS;.J-:' ), cnte our souls
emaoated the lights of rour bounty (~f ~ ), made easy for us the ascent (~",~ )
aJ

ta the divine heavens (UA'.J-iJ 1 • L....... ) and the conjunction (J ~ 1) with the spiritual
entities (~~"'-I) [i.e., angels or celestial souls] and the relationship of the zealous
venerators of Gad fü.:;'s-.. in the appeasing divine presence. in the chambers of
ft )

the spiritual city which is beyond the beyond (.1 ~ f .. f -I.J).8c1

THEFACULTY OF IMAGINATION

To grasp fully Suhrawardï' 5 conception of prophetie knowledge, one must tum. once more to
the MOst impaunt of the ÎJUler faculties - the f&CUlty of imagmation. The importance it oecupies in
Suhrawardî's worts is not entirely nove!. As expected. Avicenna articu1ates bis own prophetology
with the faculty of imagination. Although logically second to the intellect in the proœss of reception
of universal truths, the facu1ty of imagination, nonetheless, guarantees that the mEtaphysicaJ matters

perceived br strong souls are presented to the buman soul, as weIl as re-presented, and thus account
for sucb phenomena as reve1ation, miracles and prodigies. B5 In fsct, Avicenna gives credence to the
existence of a non-eog11itive and quasi-natural phenomenon that he classified œ; an additional kind of
p-ophecy, i.e., the possibility for human souls to effee:t changes in the pbysicaJ world by the sheer
power of their wiJls.f16 lit this1atœr process, the role of imagination is to aetualize extraordinary feats
and, in a way, ta extEn18lize revel«ion or inspiration.
In a similar fasbion. S\1brawsrdi notes that propbets and the like can accomplish extraordinary
deeds and miracles - e.g., produce earthquakes, eclipses, cure sick people (Jesus), or tame wild
animais and birds (Salomon). As for theosophers and the seekers of trUtb (and for a number of
87
mystics), they have the ability to have auditions or visioas. These extraordinay feats are possible
thanks ta a certain law of cOlTespondence. The matter of mis world (~~ 6,)L.. ) obeys the immaterial

B2 HVJA7/, VI <a) 80.1-&4.3 (P) f 34-6, 105.3-107.6 (.Nd, 61-3; I.muf'iJ,213-217).

83 Read ~l iastead of uai1, cf. TJI1wi/Jiù, § 62.94.3.
84 TllIwi.(Jlïr, § 62,94.1-5.
as AVlc:enna, fshiTnTr, vol. 3~, X, 853.1-901.5 (Orr.,S03-24; ~(J'3t"., 92-106); cf. Cim-det, u~œ
mpti'lw, 49-52.
8!S Michot, /kstmee, 118-133.
fS7 .f5kmllt', § 256,2040.4-241.4 (S.."., 220).
 CHAPTER ElGfIT - 261

•
essences (<.::.Jli.)l&... ~ ), just like the body cbeys the soulF.5 Hence. the pteas and prayers of these
individuals ca4 be heard b).. the highest heavens. on account of the divine light these souls receive89
and the encompassing knowledge of the souls of the celestia! spheres. When human souls a-e
oonjoined (J L-:i 1) with these celestial souls. they also become knowledgeable. 9CJ
In the epistemie proœss responsible for bath prophetie and thecsophieaL and mystica1
knowledge. the faculty of imaginsion plays a twofold function. In A vïcenna. the negative role of the
imaginative faculty is illustrated with the faet that the activities of tbis facu1ty must be deaeased in
arder to initiale the reception of dream.s. visions. or revelation. The imaginative faculty becomes an
obstacle. inasmuch as il is a faealty capable of error and of creating represe.ntstions that do not eX1St.
ft is these false representstions that are wrongly attributed to the divine realm. The faculty of
imagination must. lherefore, be stopped and rendered a passive faculey. The prerequisite for the
activation of the intellective principle is the suppression of what is most negative in mis facuJty.

It is ontY under these conditions that the prophetie intellect can be conjoined with the active
intelligence and, thereupon. canreceive traces of divine matters.91 inAvicenna' s noetics. the imaginative
faculty sa-ves onl}" as the receptade of what the hume rational soul - the prophetie or divine

.-.. intellect - has received. In bis G.losses, A vicenna writes:

When the souJ acquaints [itself] with something !rom the werJd of the celestial souls
(~.,SJ..>, il is noecessari1y separated from and does not require the faculty of the
passive imaginalion (~~), the estimative facu1ty (~",),-or other [faculties].92
In tbis particuJar passage, Avicenna notes that the faculey of imagination bas no role to play
i.n the reception of intelligible mlners from the active intelligence. Avicenna bas in mind a gentral
faculty of representation, something that encompasses the passive imagination, me estimative and
the active imagination. There is, in fact. here an indirect allusion to the role played by the rational
soul. It is the Jatter part of the human soul. i.e., the prophetie intellett, that becomes the recipient of
concepts that overflow onto it.
Likewise. imagination occupies a central place within Suhrawardï's own prophetie and
theosophic epistemology.and sbares simiJar rotes with Avicenna's imagination. Tbe fint role specifie

88 PlIdiJ, X. § 88, 76.15-n.3 (Ard.. 143; Book,80).

89 PlIdiJ, X, § 88,77.5-8 (AJrh, 144; Book,81).
90 PJIlTii, X. t 89. n.1O-15 (Arrh., 144; Book, 81). On the process itself and the association of lbbs

with the estimaive faeulty, cf. KillLmiû. XII, § 44, 109.5-110.7 (Arr.h, 167-8).
91 Micbot, lJe:sIiAl!e. 125-6.
92 Avicenna, u'lii,iir, 82.1-2 (DestiAée, 1270.102).
 CHAP'fFR E[GfIT - 262

•
ta the faculey of imagination is a negative one. inasmuch as it is a faculty responsible for errors. Like
the external senses and the internai senses. the active imagination can occupy the soul and cause
iaterference (.. i.:.; -, ft ~lA ~~) in the process of reception of metaphysical truths.

The active imagillation (j.:;, ï ) must. therefore. be put rD rest so that the human soul can be
informed ofsupnsensible matters. According ta Suhrawardi. the ascetic practices of sages. theosophers
and mystics which are conditions for God's guidance can suppress aU the bodily attachments. shut
the door of the senses and aIl incoming thoughts. and maintain the thought process in the remem.brance
of Gad (LUI ~).93

For ÎIlSlance. true dreams (:i.i,JL- oL.~ ) (during sleep) occur when human souls are no

longer preoccupied or busied by the senses. st which lime souls are conjoined (;.;:;;.;.;> with the pure
spiritual substances V~""..J .,.,...~) of the celestial souls. engraved (u"-ë ·.-,.) by hidden matters (4..:'
~ ~LA ~ ). and informed (~) of the metaphysical world (~ ~ ~ ).9:1 Once the human
soul is completely liberated from the dominance of the faculty of active imagination - i.e., of its
essentiaUy negative aspect - revelation Cl" tnJe dream.s can then occur. In this partic::ul.ar scheme. it is
&gain the rational part of the soul that is implicitly, as was the case with Avicenna. responsible for

- the reception of divine mstten. As su ch , it becomes apparent that the active imagination only has a
seconday, albeit essentia! role.

Avicen.na and Suhrawardï ascribe a second and more positive role to the imaginative facuJty.
This latter role expresses the relation that the imaginative facuJty enjoys witb the data grasped br the
tbeoretical intuition and the data gcasped by the praaica1 intellect. These are the two facets of
AviceJ1Jl8's prophetie knowledge bighlighted by Michot: the theoretical and the practica.1.95 The
theoretical aspect pet'taîns to the intelleetualism of Avicenna' s prophetology that makes it possible
for an intuition. of universaJs ta occur. The receptïon of universal fonns from the active intelligence
is possible by the development of this theoretical intuition.96 The f&CUlty of imagination is al the
service of the p-actical intellect by msterializing the data thcough its imitsting aspect. The data
received bythe praetical intellect is then.given a sensible representstion by thefaculty of imagination
which the human soul can grasp. Avicenna identified the praC%ica1 intellect as the primary recipient
of prophetie information (e.g.. in 0.1.1 iRe Shlfes ofrÂe Soul). cather man merely the generic hllman

•• 93

94

95

9IS
TJtlwZ!tid, § 84, LOS.S-I09.6.
PJ6Tii. X. § 90, 77.16-78.1 (AJr.h., 144; Book, 82); cf. AJwiUI, [V, 7. § 86, 178.1-7 (Arr:.h., 104).
Michot. OesI:ùzee, 132-3; cf. Ibid.. 13211.119.
Micbot, .Destint!'e, 120.
 CHAPTFR EIGlIT - 263

souls (e.g.. in the CUn').97 The imaginative faculty rcansforms the universal forrns and the immaterial
data received bythe practical inœ1Jea from the eelestial souls. 9El

For Avicenna. the imaginative faculty as the instrument of imitation is crucial to the reception
of prophetie knowledge. In the f)eü'f~, the faculty of imagination .. imilates" ("S~ ) and
reproduces - in the forol of images - the prophetic information. it has accessed and received (see the
section on the faculty of imagination).99

Suhrawardï. more than Avicenna. dwells on the positive role played by the faculty of
imagination The dulling of the senses through a number of ticetic means cbaracteristic of Sufi
practices sctiVBtes the positive capabilities of the imaginative faeulty. The state or condition brought
about by tbe spiritual exercises makes it possible for the human souls to access the rea1.m of
intel1ective Iights and, then. permit their manifestation into the sou1. IOO Moreover. the acquisition of
metaphysical truths aIso occurs during sJeep, when these individuals "recei.ve in tbemselves an
imprint of the imprints that these pure spiritual substances possess in themselves. "101

It is this particular raie of the imaginative faculty as existentiator of images and fomlS that is
highlighted by Suhrawardï, in the manner of objects that face a mirror wherein their images lIl"e
reflected.
102
Human souls similarly act as mùTors that reflect these hidden matters (~~ ) which.
chen. become imprinted (.Jo:,""':' ~) in the souls of prophets. theosopbers, most perfee:t individuals
I03
(~). and 50 On.

The ides of an imprinting is Jlot. here. Peripaœtic. Suhrawardï criticizes st len.gtb the Peripatetic
idea of imprinting. Although the tenninology is rather Peripatetic. it is to be understood as a
refleetion of the imagiJlative faculty that appeals ta a notion of imitation (4.:-J~ ~ lS~ ).l~ Like
AvicenJla, Suhrawardï conceives that forms are aeated in the imaginative faculty to imitate (~~

97 Aviœnna. A/JwiU.1l7.3-8 ("Prophétie." 517); cf. Mic:hot, "Propbétl.e," 509.510.

98 Michot, Oestmi!e, 131. 13111.116.133,133 n. 123.
99 Aviœnna. AfJ"Jl/. 117.3-118.1 ("Prophetie," 517-8); d. Michet, "Prophétie," 509, 510; cf.
AVlceJllla, Mlp, NHFs, 339.15-17 CA Jl7è::, 36).
100 rlitpd, § 15.271.4-9 (Arrh., 23--4).
101 AJwJi/J. IV. § 76, 178.1--4 (~.,104).
102 HIIftkiI. VII (a) 85.7-8 (p) § 37. 107.14-16 {Aid.,64; fsmllU, 229).
103 HrbnJJr. § 256, 240.4 (S..yv;, nO); cf. HlIfJÏkd, vu Ca) 85.2-3 (p) § 37, 107.10-11 (An:-.6., 64;
fS1JU~,229);d. AJWJiIJ. IV, 7. § 87.178.13--4; cf. P8rtlï, X, § 93.80.9-81.2 (ArrA., 146-7; Book,83-'4).
104 HllyiïI:iI. VI] (a) 85.9 (p) § 37,107.16-17 (Arœ., 64; fsm~ïJ/, 229); cf. Rahman, "Dream,"
167-80. On 5uhrawanJi's dodrine of i.mag1nation and its role Ul the visionary expenence of prophets and
divine sages as weil as mystlcs, Kuspinar mentions the process of contemplatioJl (DlusI1J1!JJrdJtIJ) of intelligibles
tG which tbe imagiJlat:ive faallty aEtributes a particulat fcon. cf. Kuspinac. fSD1l1~, 235-41.
 CHAPTER EIGlIT - 264

i J~ :i il;' -; 1 1 ) whst the rational - Isfshbad-light - 50ul has witnessed from the suprasensible
world. These forms are, then, "refleaed ~ ) in the sensory wodd, in the same way as [the
sensed image] is mitTored in the storehouse of the passive imagination ~ 1 ô,J,...A...a)." lOS Information
received !rom the metaphysiœl res1m, Suhrawardi notes, is a suprasensible imprint ( ~ ~ )
impriJlted (. -, ".ë-, ·,1 ) in the soul, which then illuminates the faculty of memol'Y (fi.lJ 1 ~ ~,J '';:2 )
leaving a trace (p i) in this facuILy.I06 Suhrawardï s allusion to the role of the facu1ty of memory in
the reception of those suprasensible matters is llere slightly obscure. but may be indicative of the role
played by the loftier faculties of the rational soul in the reception of divine matters.

Sometimes. bowever. the reœption of suprasensible matter occurs to epileptics and

melanchohacs ("l:",l,)~ ) because tbey s-e less preoccupied by the other faculties of the soul and

their bodies (Cl' organs) suffer certa.Î11 disturbances. By adopting this Jatter position, Suhrawardi does
not depart from Aviœnnan physio1ogy. He adopts what appears ta be ail empiricist perspective, MOst
cel1ainly as a consequence of bis refusai to reject a great number of Peripatetic priJlciples.
In addition to epileptics and me1ancholiacs, sometimes the imaginative faculty of chiJdren
and women can be busied with something which astoBisbes and fœcinates them, e.g., watel' in a
glass or a bright black surface, thus ocx:upying their active imagination. This creates a state in which
their senses are put to rest, and tbeir active imagination is appeased (~,J.".i ), thus allowing for
the reception. of traces of these divine truthS. I07

The sensitive representation or images of tbese hidden matters result from the projection of
this metaphysica1 data onto the facully of œm.LDOO sense, This latter faculty receives a fonn and
then produces an imprint - or an image - onta itself. The representations will actually mirror matters
that have their origÙl in the divine reaim (U""~ 1 ~ ); hence, if something is received by the sou!
that is !lot merely a fabrication of the imagination, it must be somethin.g true (~,)L.- rel ) that
I08
m1rr0l'S divine truthS. The human soul then resembles a perfeetly "polished mirror" (OJ."",j ~T)

once au obstacles or impediments are eliminated, and it caa become imprinted (~) with forms
that originate at the level of the loftier kingdom of ce1estia1 souls {~T ~.J..; ~~ ~~ ~.),J ).109

lOS HVJkil, VII (a) 85.8-10 (p) § 37,101.16-18 (ALrh.. 64; fsmaJJ.229).
106 TJllwf/JRr. § 74, 103.12-15.
107 AJwii!J. IV, § 81, 119.6-16 (Arch., J04-5). Prophetie messages were a1so said to have oa;wled ta
Mu~ammad while he wu steUck witb aeute malaise. As for the seat of melancholy, it wu tbought to be the
abdomen, white hypokhondria onginated in [ from 1Jupo.k1JonclnOs (Gr.) =) the upper abdomen; cf. A/W1lfJ, §
81, 178.17-9.
.,
•••••
108 Jr,fJlSlNïn"', § 216,495.14-16.
109 AJwMh, IV, 1, § 87, 178.18-20; cf. P8rrü, X, § 90,78.9-12 (.An:.-Jt.. 145; Book. 82); cf. Am-;i/J. §
 CHAP'fER EIGIIT - 265

•
Suhrawardï wntes mat:

These [supra-sensible realities} make their wayto the active imagination (:1;.:; -,. ),
in a manner which corresponds ta the condition [or mode of bet.n.g] of the active
imagination, such that the common sense has a vision [of these rea1ities] (\oS.>:)
[Spiritual masœrs] see the spiritual forms [i.e.. apparitions] (~ 6..".; C. ~i ) in the
most beautifuJ forms thal cao be imagined. and ther hear from tbem the most sweet
words, and they 8CXf.uire from them knowledge. and can see hidden matters (.~i
4-~).1l0

The ontoJogica1 status of these fonns will vary, however. according to thar ongins. The
imprint or image that is Dawa sensitive representation may result from something acquired from the
active imagination. In this case, Suhrawardï writes, the ensuing representation is the product of the
hum8l1 facuJty of imagination in its Most pejorative aspect, i.e.. as the faeulty producing imaginsry or
illusionary objects which are "evil and deceiâul" (y.ilS "'~ ). These .e the typically negative
effeets of the facult}" of imaginŒion as errer-prone that must be suppressed, because it creates
images that do not originale in the metaphysical rea1m. In fact, Suhrawardï 15 here alluding ta the
activities of the estimative faculty when it tums ta the active imagination instead of the rational
facuJty of the soul, as itis found in Avicenna' s Peripateticism.
The imprint or image that finds a sensitive representation can, however, originate in the
metaphysica1 world. It is only then thllt voiees are he.-d and images seen by the prophets - or even
by the friends of God, sages, theosophers, mystics, etc. - which can truly be said to originate in the
divine wOOd. lll The latter representations are no different from those tbat resuJt !rom the aetivities
A vieenna ascribed to the estimative faculty when it cums ta the rational- cogitative - part of the soul

instead of the active imagination.

For Suhrawardï, the COOUDon serJse is the fsculty tbat materializes in the human soul what
bas been. both perœived from hidden. rea1ities or aeated with the help of the (negative) imaginative

activities. His use of the COOllDon SéW.SP as the recipient of unseen matters, realities. or truths is not,
however, muc:b different from Aviœ.nna's own notion of the corrunon seASe. In faet, for Avicenna,
this faeully can be the locus of the representations of metaphysical mattet"S. This faculty can aJso
coJ15titute the condition for the occurrence of the corresponding sensible representation of these

matters. In bis Remarks, he writes:

The common sense is the tablet of imprints. When the imprints take hold of this

.~. "'1,178.17-9.
110 r';
oF ~;j;J,
§ 15,271.9-12 (Arrh.. 24).

III Hl!yiibJ, VII <a> 85.10-12 (p) § 37, 107,17-108.2 (AIrA., 64; .Ism8LI,229).
 CHAPTER EIGffr - 266

•
tablet, they enter the c1ass of observed things. A sensible thing that produced an
imprint may be removed from the externaJ sense, while its form rem.ains in the
common sense for a short time. Thus, it rem.ains in the class of observed things
and not of those imagined ... This is 50 whelher it is at the beginning of the state of
its representation in mis tablet due to the extemal object, whether it remains while
the sensible objett remains, whether it persïsts after the removal of the sensible
abject, or wherhtr Lr oecllrS .in lhis rAb.ler nar tlue ro me SE"0S7lJ.le ob.fècr - if this were
possible. 112

It is the Isst (italicized) aspect of Avicenna' s conception of the common sense that is most
impottantforSultrawardï. In fact,it occupes acenlral placeinSuhrawarcfi'spropbetic and theosophical.
epistemology. Althougb it is onlyan bypothesis for Avicenna in tbis particular passage, il beromes a
rem possibility for Suhrawa-di for whom the fonns imprinted in the common sense criginate al the
level of the active imagination, the receptive faculty of tbis suprasensible data. It is this process and
the central role played by the imaginative faculty that is at the hem of what Corbin caUs the
"visionary" perceptions mat cbarac:terîze a great number of mystical experiences. IlJ

The active imagination is the receptive faculty. only inasmuch as it refiects that which the
Isfahbad-Jight - the rational. soul - has recei.ved from the ceJe5tial souls and intelligences. For
Suhrawardï, the imaginative facuJty that Avicenna, and sJ.-FaraDÏ before him, had identified as the
locus of these manifestations is capable of "assigning a colTesponding form" to intelligible matters
ua
chat the sou! then contemplates (,)A ~).

DIVINE SIGNS AND INTERPRETATION

For A vicenna and Suhrawardi. the facuJty of imagination also provides a philosophical
explanation of the melBphoric and parabolic cbaracter of the messages of propbets. Traces of the
divine received by prophets, friends of God, sages, mystics. ete., resuJt from divine inspiration, such
as the communications of the Archangel Gabriel to the Prophet (Q., 2:97) in the forms of whispers,
caUs or written messages, or exact pictorial representation of hidden matters. Mter their reception,
these Inlces of divine truths, i.e., intel1ectual truths - the imprints and reflections - of the divine must
be interpreted, because, for A vicenna they are essentially of a metaphysicaJ nature. IIS Organization
and tnutsfonnation of what the imaginative faculty bas received from the rational soul (e.g., of an
iastantaneous universaJ) into an articuJated and ordained discourse is left to the imitative funetion of

112 Aviœnna, fsl1intr, vol. 3-4, X, 12,870.3-811.2 (Dû:, 510; A~r.sr., 97).

~. IIJ

114
Corbin, .An:-A~, 30 n.46.
H~rJbl, Vil (a) &5.8-12 (p) § 37,107.16-19 (AJrh.. 64; fsnl.l-rU, 229).
115 Rahman, A vil%'!D8" S, 94 note for page 36,4.
 CHAPTER ElGHT - 267

•
this imaginative faculty. Avicenna, in faet, alludes co the worldJy use of language. 116

It should be noted that A vicenna' 5 emphasis on the receptive faculty of the rational and, by
extension, of the f!"ophetic 50ul gives precedence to the intel1ective nature of the a<X{uired knowledge
from non sensitive realms. Moreover, the tI'aJlSmission of intelligibles taking place from the
mecaphysical te the worldly spheres requires an extemalizsion of revelation. This is achieved
mrough the use of the faculty of imagination after revelation has occurred ta the souls of prophets. 117
Witb the heJp of their rsculty of imagination, prophets creste individual sensible images that cao then
be presented lo me masses. As such. these indiVldual sensible images particuhrize universal truths
and present them in a somewhat allegorica1 fashion. 1 16 This can be highlighted with a passage from
A vicenna' s In1mojNLans:

As for the re1igious law, one genera1 principle is to he admitted, i.e., mat religion
(J.1..) and religious laws (t.~ ) promulgated through a prophet sim at addressing
the masses as a whole. Now, it is obvious that the deeper traths conceming Unity ...
cannot be commu1Ùcaœd to the multitude. For if this had been com.m.unicated in its
ErUe form to the Bedouin. Arabs or the Hebrews and the uncivilized, they would have
refused stnIight away to believe and would have unanimously proclaimed tbat the
belief to which they were bang invited was be1ief in an absolute .nonentity ... All
this shows dlat religions are intended to address the multitude in tenus intelligible to
tbent, seeking to bring home to them that which transcends their intelligence by
means of metaphor and symbol. Otherwise, religion would be of no use whatsoever. ll9

The striking feaNre of chis passage is the idea that metaphorica1 language is the required
structure for the p-oper reception and transmission of tbese metaphysica1 entîties. The faculty of
imagination is posterior ta the reception of these matters. This faculty of imagination then becomes
responsible fer the expression - verbal or audible - of reveJ.ati.on, dreams, ete. In his Gjosses,
A vicenna is more explicit as to the role of the f&culty of imagination:

The active intelligence emanates (~) those cona!Fts [i.e., mteJlbOnes] ~ la..... )
anto (the rational soul) as inartieulllte and disorganised universals; and this, aU at
once. Thea. [the concept] overf1ows from the [rational) soul onta the faculty of the
passive imaginfUion <~4-à ) [which] then imagines [the concept] <J.:';' -, ï ) as
something articulated and organised in an audible and struetured expression. And it
appears that revelation (~,,) occurs in chis "'ay: when revelation overflows (;L;..~!>
onto the soul [i.e., prophelic inteUect). the active intelligence is net in need of an

..•
_
117

lta
116 Michot, OestJA«-. 131 n.11S. Language is used by prophets and poets; bowever, it can be argued

that ..... the linguistic imagimwon gets presemed as a cognitive faculty," cf. Kenny, 71Te MI!!DIpÂJ'»"cs ofMind,
120.
Micbot, Oes/:iAee, 128-9.
Jamalpur, OotI;lIXfA-fRD, 190.
119 AviceJUla, A~FJ-j}'8IJ, 97.9-103.3.
 CffAPTER EIGHr - 268

imaginlltive faculty (.:il....:;.,; ii"i ) ta which it would have ta address itself in audible
or articu1aed tenns. lZO

The implication of such pœsages is that metaphysicel and divine matters can be humanly
expressed only aCter and throllgh a process of transformation br the individllal .. psyche" of prophets.
sages, theosophers, and 50 on. Ir is not clear ta what extent thought. presupposed by tbe presence of
language. becomes a requirement for divulging revelalion (let atone its advent).
Likewise. for Suhrawardï, the ability of prophets ta communicate the tnJths of revelation to
the multitude rests upon their Stl"ong faculty of imagination.1 Zl Prophets are able to transmit to the
masses, in allegorical fasbion and in term.s of partiaJlar exampLes, the universal truths that they have
pereeived through their personal experienœs. Nonetheless, the sensible representations of reve1l1tion
can take the forms of images that are either opposite (~~) or con"espond (~Ca-) ta the traces

received by the prophet' s imaginative faculty. In either cases, there is a need for an interpretation
(~) in order ta discover the original metaphysicel enlity the imaginative faculty has transformed
through chis p.-oœss of represetttstion. l22 Suhrawardï writes:

It is incomben.t upon the one endowed with the faculty of inner perception.
(..J :-... ) to be1ieve firmly in the verity of the messages of tbe prophets (~
~-'.
~I~ 1) as well as in the faet mat the parables (J ~ i ) of the prophets point ro the
realities (~~), as it is stated in the Qur-'in: "Such at"e the parables (J~1) We set
forth for humankind, but only those understand tbem who have knowledge. (~! ft

J~\J4 ""... ~, "i .l:..)i) [cf. Q., 29:43].123

For Suhrswardï, interpretation is incumbent upon the believers in order to unveil the true
meaning of revelation. In some cases. some of the traces of the suprasensible reaJities perceived by
prophets may colTespond perfectly ta wbat the p'ophets' rational soul has reaUy witnessed. In chis
case. tbere is no need for an. "herm.eneutic" interprelation (J=."b) and no need for the 'Use of some
sort of "dream" interpr-etatlon (~ ) for tbese visions be understood. If, however, the traces of
what has been contem.plated do not remain in the faculty of memory (~ ), but find meir way into
the facu1ty of active imagination (.:i ï.:.;., -,. ), these traces are transformed into "COlTesponding" or
similar represen.tations (~I ~;-,' ft). The faculty of aaive imagination is, tbus, responsible for assembling
and separating the forms it receives and provides similes (~ ) of that which it has received from

120 Avicenu., T~'6j'Jtr. 82.2-5 (Mic:bot. ~, 127 n.l02).

lZ1 HJJ:mJû, § 264,247.3-8 (s.rs:. 224-5).
IZ2 HJbnl6:, § 251,236.15-237.4 (S#s:, 217); also explained in A/wiï!J. rv, 7, § 86, 178.16-179.7
(An:lt., 104).
lZ3 H~, VII <a> 87.7-88.1 (b) § 38, 108.10-13 (Ait:II., 65; fsmJl-O, 231).
 CHAPTER. EIGHr - 269

••• suprasensible realms (and mediated by the rational part of the SOlll).lZd

The figure of the Paraclete is important as an eschstological figure. WhiJe reve1ation is

re51ricted to prophets who are entrusted with a literai. revelstion. interpretation and explar~on or

spiritual henneneutics of revelation is devolved on whom Suhrawardi identifies as Ûle Paraclete. In

his Té'mpJ~ of4.IJrs. this figure is meotioned [WO times in passages that Suhrawardi appears ta
quote from the Bible. The function of the Parac1ete is twofold and lin.ted with the unveiling of the
esoteric meaning of the revelation. as opposed te the apparent (exoteric).I25 The two funccions are the
interpretation. i.e.. a spiritual hermeneutics. and the explanation of the tnle meaning of reve1ati.on.
Subrawardi writes'

Therefore. prophets are entnJsted with revelatian U= ~ ), while the supreme

manife~ons (~i ~ ) [i.e.. the pure spiritual light) , the Paraclete
<uJ-:.li.) lAJ 1 ), is enlrUSted with the interpretation (J: ",b) and explanation ( r.:.s ~ ),
œ the Christ forewarned when he sai.d: "1 sh~ go te my Father and yout" Fsther in
arder that he send you the Paraclete wbo will iafonn you by virtue of interpretation"
[cf. John, 14:16: cf. Ibid.. 15:26; cf. Ibid., 20:17] and "the Paraclete whom my
Father will send to you in my name will instnJet you in aU thïngs" [cf. John,
14 :26].12èi

The Paradete 15, st limes. viewed as Mul;lammad, the Sea1 of the Prophets, e.g.. in Ankariivï' 5
a>m.mentary on the TempJe of 41Jts. At other times, he is viewed as a friend of Gad, e.g.. in
Dawwiini's interpretation ÏJ1 bis commentay on the same work, and may even inclllde the chain of
the Imams. l27 On aceount of the ligbt it receives, the Pamc1ete is also the second Christ who will
precede the coming of the Day of ReSUlTedÏon and, hence, he can he associated with the Imam of the
ResulTection. l26 An in-depth analysis of what can be described as Suhrawardi' 5 philosophica1 exegesis
would certainly revea1 8Ilother aspect of bis religious thought that has Ilot yet beeo thoroughly
studied.
For Suhraw8l"di. the need for interpretation (of the content of reve1ation) extends to the bulk
of the manifestations of the divine, e.g., that which is contemplated may take on a number of forms,

124 Forms of ghouJs (J~ ) and jlJUl$ ( w~) are also provided by the comman S'l!~, cf. J.fllSbJïn", §
216,495.16-18.
125 For an allusion te exoteric and esoteric meani.ng of revelation, cf. Q. 15: 19.
126 HlI.nïkiJ, VU (a) 88.2-5 (Arrb.. 65; .Ism1!1, 232). Abseœ from the PersÙUl tra.ns14llion; cf.
ALrhJII'.We, 39, 69.
Kuspin.., fsm8~. 246; cf. Corbm, AJ'rh.. 81 n.114.
:~
127

. lZ8 Corbin, •• L'idée du Paraclet en philosophie iraJJienne," 329-31 (5ubrawardi is discussed in 321-331];
cf. Idem, EJ1alllJ11inuzit.-D. vol. 4,430-53; cf. PJImï. VI, §§ 41-9,40.8-44.3 (Book. 43-6). Absentfrom Atrh.;
cf. Lan.dolt, "WaJaya," 3168.-323a..
 CtfAPTER ElGHT - 270

whetber it be in. written form (e.g.. Moses and the Tablets. but. more specifically. Mut,ammad and
the Book); through bearing pleasant or unpleasant sounds:l~ or by contemplating living fOrnls

(v.= ~ 1 J""'- "",..\A ~ ) chat take the shape of human beings and wbo talk about the hidden
13
world. 0The forms contem.plated oecur in a number of individuals, e.g .. the "brethren of detachment
from the worid" (~~. ûf.,,:.! ).131 who possess Il certain. mysticaJ station of their own ( ,li...
-u-là) which Suhrawardi defmes as the station of the creative imperative {° 05 ,li... ).132 in the sense
that they caa aea.te self-subsisting forms or images (~li ~ .J~I ) of any type they wish.l~

Accot"ding ta Suhrawardï. it is to these individuals and mystics (..::,.,Lw.L:,;J1 ~~Ji ) mat true vision
l3a
(4i.Jl- ":.3J ). cIear revelation (c= >-~.j ) or tNe dreams may be given. These individuals
I35
strive for a total suppression of the physica1 and the bodily ta eJevate their souls to lortier real.ms.

But who are these individuals? They are. in facto a mixed crowd. They may or may not be
identical witb the "bt"ethren of detachment of the world." ln faet. Subrawardi writes that tbis group
includes people lite Plaro. l:Ialliij, but also Abü Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthman, 'Ali, J:ludbayfah,l36 l:Iasan
al-Ba.,ri, Dhü al-NüJl al-Mi~, Sahl al-Tustsri, Abü Yazïd al-BastiJrü, Ibrihîm Ibn Adham,l37 and
even Junayd and Shibli. l3a Suhrawardï adds. however, that those who couJd penetrate tbese loftier

.'-.
rea1ms did not iJlctude Peripatetic philosophers. He most probably inteads people like al-Fiiraoï and
A vicenna. l39

But what is more striking is the inclusion amongst the group of tbese chosen individuals able

1Z9 .{5bnw, § 258, 2....2.1-3 (~ 221); the passage mentions the imaginai. fcxm of sounds heard by
mystics (ù.,u~).
130
HJb»Jtr, § 256,240.4-7 (5.t4':. 220).
131 CorbiJJ. proposes .. anachorète spirituel."
132 For the notion of creation (v:~), cf. Najm aJ.-Oïn Kubrii (d. 1221), Fmvamul-.kmD ~uFnJVJialJ
.u-JJJlJi/.

133 .(fikmnr, § 259, 242.10-11. On. the rea1iLy of titis otber world, cr. HLbnnr, § 259. 242.10-243.8
(5.t4':.222).
134 TJllwt:{JJU. § 74, 103.11-15 and Ibid., § 74, 1042.
TllIwï/JJU, § 74,103.12-5. They bave diff«entnames: perfect souls. ascetics, wayfarers, visionaries.
135

possessors of the command, people of insight, those with pure souls. and brethrens of teuth, ef. Zlai, "The
Sourœ and Nature of Authorily." 333.
136 6udhayfah b. al- Yamiin. (d. 556), one of the companions of the Prophet wbo took part in the
coa"uests, aam.ely of Perna.
137 Ibrahim b. Adbam Baltbi, an aeetic (",ra·j) who was killed in 776 or 782. during the Win of
coDCluests agaiDstthe Byzantlnes.
138 PJIrttï X, § 87, 76.2-4 (Book, 19-80). Absent in Atm.
1

139 MJ1SJIiiri', § 216.496.1-5. Calya few were true seekers of the cruth and, even then their spiritual

qllests (.:.J~) w«e weak, since the latter was not a part of their rational investigatlons.
 CHAPTER ElGfff - 271

to penerrate metaphysieal realms and receive divine assistance of a number of (m}-'thical) Persian
.~.
kings (Afridün 8I1d Kay-Khusraw). In his rob/ers. Suhrawsrdï draws a para11el betWeen the divine
spirit of the re1igieus tradition and the light bestowed upen the kings of Ancient Persia, understood
as divine glJidanee: the Avestic fdJJJ-1U71nD or the Persian klJunzlD, eharacteristie of Zoroastrianism.
As sueb, tbese kings were œpable of conjunction with the Holy Spirit. 140 [t was with the help of chis

light - as divine assistance - th. they ruLed over bumankind.

Suhrawardî. then associates the reception of this ancient divine hght with the notion of
s//kimi8, a station reached within the mystica1 quest. These are hanUy historical figures, Mee
Suhrawardî, in faet, discusses spiritual aseendency, at times, mythologieal ascendency (e.g., the
vierory of Afridün over Zu~iik or Kay-Khus-aw over Afrisyab), ratber than politieal ones. The
appeal to Persian figures is typical. of Suhmwardi' s mysticaJ tbought, something totally absent from
classica1 S urism.

Recently, Pourjavady bas shown, however, chat Suhrawardî' s notion of s/lkimUJ should not
be taken for the Zoroas1rian idea of light. He notes that most comm.entators of the C"Nie6fm-ULuminorir--e
lJ7"sdom do not identify the s.tikûmn-light witb the b,Yiü.I KillNTlfIJ of Zoroastrianism. 141 Pourjavady

points out tbat chis notion is simply tbe Qur'iinie concept of sllkimlb. The latter is tbus a properly
religious notion (e.g.. Q., 9:40; Q., 48:4; Q., 48:18: Q.. 48:26) - e.g., as a light in the hesrt (Q.,
13:28) and &ssociated with the power of clairvoyance of sorne souls. 1ctZ The notion of s:oxiB4IJ stands
for a particu1ar ÎJJJ1er light that a philosopher-mystic experiences on the path leading ta the knowledge
(4.i~ ) of God (e.g.. in Suhrawardi's SOl/AdofrneSÜJu{fiJ·) and was, in. faa, already discussed by
earlier Sufis (e.g., l;Iakïm Tinnïdhî, d. ca. 905, Abd Alliib An~iri, d. 1089, SabJ Abd AJliih al-Tustiri.
C C

d. 896. [bJl cAÇii al-Adami, d. 922, Abü SaC id al-KhaTiz, d. 899), upon which Suhrawardï draws. The
slléüJlliJ is a light that shines in the heart of the philosopher-mystic who has reached the ïntermediary
stage in the spiritual quest and thal remains. l43

More importantly for the understanding of his relation ta Peripatetic phiJosophy, however,

1«1 Afwiï/l, § 95, 186.11-187.5 (~., 111-2); cf. CorbU1, ArDt., 126057, 126n.S9, 127n. 64,
128n.73; cf. !5bnJlr., § 261,250.1 (%,226); cf. rmpïd. § 15.271.4-14 (Arch.• 23-4); cf. Jl,fllS"lJïn·'. § 222,
502.7-12.
141 Exœpt Wadüd-i Tabnzï (e.g., hi.s commentay on the A/wziR. Damely bis Jl,fisbrill III-ArwiiII5

KasJû{UtJ.lÎÏlJll-AbrJ/J ) and cAbd al-Razzilt Kishinï's Sufi commentary Ti/;".iliïrJl1-t;JlIrmz. cf. Corbin,
PbilosophieinrDiemle dcomp1l1'ft!, 95-9; cf. PoufJavady, L..t;hrofSJikinJl, 4-5 and 14-5.

•• 142 Pourjavady. 4~lJrofS_ina.3~; fOI:' the references to the warts of Goldziher. Joel, Jeifery and
Fahd. cf. Ibid .• 18n.6.
143 SaJr, m, § 8,321.15-323.8 (AJrh., 454-5; -"'.(J-3t:. 92-3); A1~'R!J. § 85, 187.4-12 (Alrh. 112); cl.

Pouljavady, LiKhrofSâina, 1,4-5, 13.

 CHAPTFR ElGIIT - 272

•
Suhrawardï also draws upon A vicenna's analysis of the various stages of the mystica1 quest, especislly
from the latter' 5 llemtJrks .1a.J ln the latter parts of tbis work, A vicenna desaibes the different
stations of inner spiritual enlighlenIDeI1t in œrms of flashes of light. Suhrawardï s commentary on the
ideas found in the Remmks is done with quotation of Qur8.nic verses, prophetie traditions, but
more specifically with the language of Sufism (and sayings of the grest Sufi shaykhs), e.g., desaibing
the experience of momentary lights of the first stage with Sufi terms..<t5 In the Remnrks. Avicenna
actually uses the term. sllhOnb ta desaibe the second stage, where momentary flashes of light
(ideotified as "instants") become more stable 1J1 their dul"8tÏon and experience. l4i Suhrawardi innovates
and identifies s~lbi:t,lb with light, rather than with a stflte of duratioll and stability of light Because
of this identification, the term. also implies certain supematural powers with which chis remaining
light is assoclated.1a7 Studies such as Pourjavadï' 5 aetually indicate the extent te whicb even Avicenna' 5
more mystical writings influenœd Suhrawardïs own mystical thought. besides the more ttaditio.o.al
mystical writel"S which Suhraw..di mentions throughout bis worlts.

144 FOl" analysis of the relarionship becween Avicenna's fstJrJr and Subrawarcfi's SJlfir-iSfnll!!rb,
d. Pourjavady, Lillir ofSJlbim ,5-10.
145 SNü, n, § 319.2-12 (An:-h~ 452-3; Ar.(P3T.. 91).
146 Avicel1Da, Isbli7ir. vol. 3-4, IX, lI, 868.3.869.1L (OJ'r.. -494; lf,ffl:tt.96).
147 Pourjavady, L.{,,:lIrofSM:iml, 6-9; cf. tbree lights in TJllwZfJJfr, § 88, 113.10-11-4.10.
 CHAPTER NINE - 273

•
-NlNE-

ESCHATOLOGY

A number of elements within re1igious traditions define the parameters of the future life
leading to the Day of ResulTection. For instance, the Qur1iin mentions the existence of an interrnediary
world (t,j~) for the souls; that every individual soul will be justly requited with what il has earned
in. tbis world; and a number of verses describe the pleasures that await the pious souls in Paradise
and the eternal torments inflieted upon the impious in Hell.·

Early Islamic tradition elaborated little about the afterlife and the intennediary world where
souls would abide until the final judgement. The earliest author in IsI&m1c literature, if not the first
who wrote specifically on the tapic of the afterlife, appears ta be Ibn Abï al-Dunya (d. 281/894).2
White a rompafison of bis writings with chose of earlier philosophers might prove instructive for a
historica1 account of the development of philosopbical eschatology, what follows centers on
Suhrawardi's interpretation of Aviœnna' s Peripatetic eschatological system, where the idea of an
intermediary wodd and iQi significant nature are intimately linked ta the notion of resUlTection.

BODILY RESURREcrION (,Jla...)

Resurrection is an important therne of Avicenna's eschatology for which he bas written
specific warks like the lmm018/iODS. This is the Avicennan work on resulTection pu erce11eACe,
where a number of possible views on resulTeetioJl are investigated: a resurreClion of the body alone,
the body and the soul together, and the soul atone. His investigations on the issue of the aftedife or
resurrection are incorporated with his phiJosophical inquiries into the metaphysics of separated
entities?

1 Barzakh (t,j~) is the intermediary world and the 5ltate of limbo where human souls remain.
between the tune of mett dearh and resurrectioJ1 as mentloned Ln the Quran (Q., 23. LOO). A wade. unavailabe to
us but of tmportance is El-SaJeh, Hè furure: III J7e fuLlIn! selon le Canm.
2 De Vaux, "Barzakh," l071b-10?2a; cf. Kinberg, "lDteraeti.oJ1 Between This World," 285-308.
r • • 3 Gutas, A Piamna, 254. Aviœnna writes, "the subJeet of DestlDation (DIO Id) of the soul ought not

-- to be discussed in the context of Physics but onJy in the context of the phiJosophical discipline (ils-;szniIJl
JII-~) wbere the tbiJlgs tha are separable [from matter] are investigated," cf. Avic:enna, i1i-ShO~,
1II-.MIfs, 238.5-7 (Gutas, Af07Ca:t.tm, 258).
 CHAPTER NrNE - 274

AVlcenna's eschatologica1 position, especially regarding tbe SUrvlval and fate of the rational
part of the soul. departs from the Aristotelian tradition. He articulates bis conception of resurTection
from a Neoplatonic emftllationist perspective. where a natural hierarchy e..X15tS for the nrional :~ul,

whereby it seeks ta return to its (mtellective) principle. How, then, does Avicenna conceive of
resulTection? Wbich part of buman beings is to resulTeet? The body or the soul. or both 9 Does
Avice1lJlahave a bodily cr spiritual resulTection in mind 9

In bis treatise On die LJir-ision of SCIences. A vicenna mentions that even if the physical
bodydoes not reSUrTect, rEtribution - promised in the Qur1in - is, nonetheless , possible. A non-corporesJ.
recompense or punishment will be provided for human beings in the afterlife for their souls, naturally
4
in accordance with the state of each sout Avicenna, in fact, daims that the soul only undergoes a
spiritual reSUlTectïon. But this position taises further difficulties rega-ding the naNre of and the
conditions for the survival of each individu al soul. Which part of the human soul survives: all the
internaI faculties, some of them, or only the intellect?
The traditional interpretation was that Avicen.na believed that only the rational faculty was
able to survive the death of the body. More recently, however. in LII t1esliLJét! de /nomme se/on

A f'2CeDoe, Micbot has shown that,like the rational part of the soul, the facu1ty of imagination must,
in part or Ù1 totality. be immaterial in order ta fulf'l1 the Qur~c promises of punishments and
reward of retribution. Consequently, it too would survive the disappesranœ of the body.s

Avicenna rejeets the possibility of a pure1y bodily and physica1 resun-eetion. He prefers te
interpret the relevant Qur~inic verses on resulTection metaphoricaUy. He &dopts a position st odds
with the religious tradition for which bodily resulTection is one of its tenets, a position that al-Ghaziilï
in bis fDcoberœce of~be PlJilosoplltrS (against the positions al-Firibï and Avicen.na) and by Mulli
$adri (especiaUy of Aviœnna's immoloDodS) denounced.6 Avicenna indeed does not offer any
praof for bodily resurrect1on. Instead, he only states that the praof of bodily resurrection relies on
revelation. In the IOlO101llhOdS, ms c1aim is that only spiritual resulTection can be investigated
7
through rational demonstration.

Similarly, in the CUn' and the DeUfi!nUlCe. AviceJllUl explains that there are [wo different

4 AlIawati. "Un cas typlque," 73-5 [bis study is based on Avicenna's A~"'''fp.;rh and the fsIJJÏriir).
5 Michot. OClSlinée, 140-218.
6 al-Ghazili, TJI&ïFur. 212.1-229.16 (fDco1lcreot:e, 212-29); cf. AnawatÎ, "Un cas typique,· 86-90;

cf. Muna ~.Jra·s criticism. of both Avicenna's and al-Ghuali's idea, cf. Mulli~, TJI~~, 512 (~
654); cf. MuUi Sadra, r.,?f9N,478 (SJ{~ 612).
7 Avicenna, Ad{111WiJ'uh (ed. ·~1. 143.1-144.15; cf. Gard et, "Quelques aspects," 707; cf. Michot,
Oemn~, 200-6.
 CHAPTER NlNE - 275

ways to address the issue: foUowiJlg the religious law for bodily resurrection or following me rule of
reason (orrational demonstration) for the spirirual resulTection.a Agam. Avicenna rejecrs the possibility
of AnY type of b0dily resurrection - whether bodily malter or bodily entity - on philosopbica1 and
9
physicaJ grounds.

The negation of any t}1'e of bodiJy resurrection would then apply to aU the ilU1er faculties
since these faculties are aU assocütted with parts of the body (e.g.. the brain) or elements associated
with the bodiJy (e.g., the pneUmlJ). In the latter case where all the inner faculties would not survive
the death of the body, bodily and physical pleasures and pains. as pramised by religious traditions,
would natbe possible in the afterlife. since these sensible pains and pleasures could not b~ experienœd.

Avicenna, however, lUempts to l"eooncile [slamic tenets - as the possibility of divine retribut1an
- with bis philasophical conception af the soul. He interprets the verses referring 10 retribution in
sum a way Ils ta malte it possible for these promised plessures and pains to be perceived through the
imaginative facuJt}... IQ

Suhrawardi' s philosophy has been the subjeet of different interpretations, while genera1izations
about the Suhraw..dian corpus are often made. One example is the c1aim dlat he challenged the
Peripatetic argument for the immottality of the soul as bang too weak,ll or the claim th. only an
illuminationist method, as opposed to ft philosophical analysis, can adequately explain Suhrawardfs
tnJe intentions. 12

The structure that Most commentators identify as typically Suhrawardian - bis iUuminationist
philosophy - and as being at the heart of bis redefinition of the philosophical quest for truth - the
tnJe reaJity and Gad - bas been shown ta be substantially derived from the Neoplatonic epistemology
developed by Avicenna, especially in bis more mature works and, in particular, the last two d.1apters
of the Remorks.

Suhrawardï, like Avicenna, beJieved in the survival of the human soul in the afterlife. In bis
Pd0S, he writes that the immortality of the soul results from the permanence of its =ause, the

emanating (~r.!ë '1 ci& .~ ~ ) principle. 13 He makes sîmil81" statements in ft numbE!l" of bis
works. For instance, in the R~pSof4"e"ba, he wriles:

8 Anawati, ·Un cas typIque," 75-7.

9 Michot, Oe.stint!e, 8 n.42; cf. Ibid., 140..58.
10 See Marmura, "Avicenna's Psycbological Praof," 49.56.
11
Nasr, ~MvslrmS"es,68.
12 Amin Raza"i.. SulmlJJ'lU'r:Ü,41-4.
13 .A-f~",§§217-9,496.6-"499.1S; cf. nUJJi:fJN. §59, 79.16.
 CHAPTER NlNE - 276

•• Know tbatthesoul ~)remains(~l.:a) and itsaonihilation (~)is not conceivable

because its cause. which is elem.al (r-:'J), is the active intelligence Therefore. the
effeet will remain eternally (r'..,J) because of the eternal nature of the cause. 14

The immortality of the soul is dependent on the immortality (~I J) of its cause - thl:: active
intelligence. Hence. since from the etemal. only the «ernal em.anates. much like the principle that
from the one only the one originates. what is csused by something which lS. by essence. etemal must
itself be eternal. In facto this argument for the immortality of the soul rests 00. a traditional conception
of causality. as

Moreover. the death of the body can in no way entail the destruction of the soul. Death
consists only in the severi.ng of the attachment between the body and the sou1. What survives is the
intelleetive principle of human beings. their rational souls. theit'" intellects. which aJso constituees part
of their individuality. The latter aspect is. in faet. problematic because of the necessity of the body
for uy type of individuation (see section on individuation). S\1hrawardï can, therefore. write that
"when the soult after [its] separation from the body. is imprio.ted with the intelligibles. it will partake
in the intelleetual rea1m. and become actualized as an intellect in. every way" (see section on the
nature of the soul ).16

Another argument Suhraw..di provided ta justify the soul' s immortality rests on the nature
of the attachment between the soul and the body. Sïnce the soul' 5 attach.ment to the body is added to
its existence and is accidentai, a change in the relation or in the attachment between the two
substances - soul and body - does not necessarily produce a change in the soul. The severa.nce of the
soul from its body does not nullify (J...Ia....:'.= ) the substance of the sou1. Suhrawardï argues 11 çOOFnuio

that if eternal entities were by their own e~enœ capable of being nullified (4:i 1.i..J ~ ). tben their
i.nfJuence would not be changed br the attachment te bodies or the absence of attachment. 17

Another qument of Suhrawardï is that the human soul cannot possess charaeteristics chat
would account for its destruet:i.on. In fatt, the soul is an etemal existent, whereas everythin.g which
can be o.ullified (or destroyed) must combine the capacity to be annihilated (.Ct.â.U o~) to its power

14 P.rmï,§73.65.15-16(Aa"h.,139; BDOk,69);d.AfW"JP,IV,§61.1SS.19-157.6.
15 Amin Razavi criticizes such a conception and writes that .. Suhrawardi rails to adequardy demon.strate

that if a given cause is immortal. the effec:t CO become immucabJ.e and munexta1, a rdalionship which he seems
CO cake fer granted. It is trUe that dlere bas CO be an affiJIity between a. cause and its effect, but to establish a
neœssary œlatiOJUhip between a cause and its effee:t and ta ascribe the existel1tial atributes of the cause to is
efTeet is U.Dfounded," c:f. Amin Razavi. S1I1JnIwJlFt5••3-4.
16 P.nï,IX, § 76, 68.~ (Book, 71).
17 TaI",zpiil, § 59,80.10-13.
 CHAPTFRNrNE - 2n

of permanence (..::J~I o"i). But the soul is tl u.nity (~ oZ ·.I~-,) and in aetUa1ity, such tbat pennanence
(.~) of being and cessation ( • L,:;,j) of being in ae:tuality a-e [wo facu1ties that cannat exist in it, or in
any one thing. 18 Avicenne used a simiJar argument ta demonstrate the in.corTUptibility of sC'lls and 8
fonim- of the:ir immol"tal.ity and wbich al-Ghazali aiticized (see section on the nature of the soul).
Suhrawardrs concept of resulTection is greatly Avicennan. It purports ta recognize an
essentially spiritual res\UTection, as tbe ultimate end of human. souls. In Suhrawardï' s Oneohl/-
U/unumli"ir--e "''jsdom. resun-ection in the religious sense of the Day of Judgement (:L.l:-i) is defined

as that lime when it will be possible for human souls to contemplaœ (.)A ~ ) the lights or, as he

mentions, the "heavens of light" P.o: ',' J~ lS:~j ) that Plate and those who have witnessed those

lights (~I,),A~I ~l:..-i) bave perœived in thei!" mystical quest.

l9

Suhrawardï needs ta account for the sensible experience of pain and pleasure associated with
divine retribution. Like Avicenna, he proposes that these "sensible" other worldly perceptions take
place through the activities of the facuJty of active imagination. Bodily resurrection is, therefore.
associ81ed with the metaphysical only inasmuch as a bodily faculty is required for the perception of
the pains and pleasures of retribution.

,-- But, like Avicenna's, Suhrawardï's eschatology views underdeveloped souls that have
seperated fmm tbeir bodies as experiencing the sensible pains and pleasures imposed by divine
retribution. In the Oneol:ll/-EDum,ioatir.r;> lVisûom , aftel" a long p~age about the human souls'
sepetation from the body (to which we will return) ,20 Suhrawardï alludes to some kind of bodily
resurrection:

This wodd [aiready] mentioned we call the world of the im.msterial fOnIlS (rJ l&
o;~1 C. ~~I ). It is through it that the resulTection of bodies (.J~'i' ~ ), the
divine apparitions (~4..) c.~j). and al! the promises ofprophecy (~l",... ~
i~l) become realized.
21

According ta Mullii ~edra, Suhrawarcfj' s efforts must by lauded for trying to demonstrate
bodily resulTection, although bis proofs faU short of their inœnded purpose: i.e., a rea1 bodily
resurrection in acoord with re1igious tradition. Suhraw8I'dï, Iilte Avicenna, does not really establish
an eanhly bodily resurrection.

18 TJIJ~-z{NU, § 59. 80.14-81.2.

19 .(Ubnlll', § 171. 162.1-5 <5.t4'=. (54). Suhrawardî then ({votes Q., 104:49. He 1$ aetually refering to

PlotulUS and not Piao, cf. Jambet's note to S;vnse 154b. A simi1ar dream-vision 15 found in the Arabie
1

version of Plotinus' EïMl!'dds. cf. pseudo-71k!o/aryofAnSrr:Jde. 22.2-23.3.

20 {Vkmnr. §§ 244-7, 229.7-234.3 (s.w:, 213-5).
21 ffrbnlll', § 2048, 2:M.4-5 (.5i~ 215).
 CHAPTER. NINE - 278

•
Suhrawardï is oflen interpreted as having posited an independentworld of"suspended images"
and, in so doing, te have developed an eschatology that differs from th. of A vicenna, inssmuch as it
paves the wl'y for the possibility of the reSUfTection of bodies.zz According to mis eschatology. in the
imaginaJ. world "imagin-.ion takes the place of sense perception," and it is in that imaginai world
chat "the resurrection of the bodr takes place. the divine figllres (such as angels) become real and ail
the prophetie eschatological statements come true.·,2J Mulli ~adra notes that Suhrawardï understands
the fonns that are promised in the other world in a number of ways: as fonus attached to a. œlestial
24
body: forms attached to some matena! place of manifestatton: or agam, fonns as pure intelligibles.

The real issue. however. remains unanswered: What exaetly does Suhrawardi mean by
bodily resulTection? Indeed, Suhrawardï maltes statements in which it is obvious that the world of
immacerial fonns is where such phenomena oecur, rather than occurring in the sublunar world. Is the
existence of an "imaginai" world really postulated as an in.dependent world? The existence of an
iJldependent imsginal world was, in fact, one of Ibn Arabi' s novel theses. 25 As Mulla $adri himself
C

bas noted, Suhraw..dï' 5 idea of a bodily resulTection remains unsuccessful.

In. order to provide some answers ta these que5tions, one cao propose that Suhrawardï relies

_. on and expands Avicenna's escbatology. We will show how Suhrawardi, foUowing Avicenna's
intuition, secs the conditions for the survival of an individual imaginative faculey, ratber chan the
existence of an imaginative and truly independent imsginal world, as it was later understood and
fOmlulated in the warks of Quçb al-Dm a1-Sbirizï,~ Mulla ~adra and others. Z"7

METEMPSYCHOSIS

Discussions on the nature of the soul not oruy revolve around the issue of the soul' s pre-
existence, but tbey come to include issues conceming ils post-existence. Both problems are intimately
re1ated te the problem of meœmpsychosis or transmigœtion of the soul beœ.use they raise the issue
of the existence of the soul before its existentiation in a body (see chapter' on the nature of the soul)
and ait« its sep..-ation througb death.

2'2 KuspiJ1ar, fsmILl,225 n.46.

Z3 Rahman, "Dream," 170.
Z4 MlI1Ja Sadra, TJ1Blpir, 513 C5.t,f:, 652).
2S Partial U'aJWation of Ibn •Arabi's ;u-FunJ!JJÏr aI-A-fllkk(r;1h (Beirut: Dar aI-Sidïr. ad.), vol. l,
126-31; quot.ed in Corbin, Corps spinrud, 164-7 L CSpnnul BodIes, 135-43).
as Q.O. aJ-Sbirizi, Shllr./J, 352.1-13 (5.Iw=, 319-20); cf. ibId., 5L 7.LO-9 (5.gr;, 408-9); d. Walbridge,
SaenR-, 149-59.
Z7 MuJJa~adra, TJlbi:{iiI, 348 (5.t{,f:, 544-5); cf. Ibid., 518 (5.t4'=. 664-5).
 CffAPTER NlNE - 279

The tnulSmigration of the soul is. however. in disagreement with orthodolC Islam 2a and absent
from the Qur'iin. 29 Such authors as al-Farabi and aJ_cAmirï (d. 992) rejeeted mis doctrine. Xl LiKewise,
Avicenna offers at least CiVO quments for the rejeetion of any transmigration of the soul.:31

In the Cln'. Avicenna argues that the soul can have only one particular body,32 as each body
requires and calls te itself its own sou1. 33 Each soui attaches itself to a single body' whose constitution
(as its acci.den.ts1 cause) has been made ta receive a soul which. in tum. allows the latter to rule over
34
the former.

The same argument is made in the Remorks where Avicenna wntes that "transmigration
into bodies of the [same] genus ~) that the soul had inhabited is impossible; otherwise, every

body (Go'.,;.. ) would require that a soul emanate to it and be joined by the transmigrated soul. Thus,
there would be two souls for one animal."~ A soul only has a natura! inclination ta the natural body
th. requires il, whereas the body requires a soul that constitutes its own pEl'fection. Therefore, both

the sou! 8I1d the body coexist, as a total1y new entity. whereas the attachment of soul and body is
f/lhlSi muural. The gist of the argument is th. if transmigration lOok place, the body wouid receive
the soul th. constitutes its perfection and. in addition, me new transmigrating soul - something

-.
.
which is impossible.
In the 1lenNU'k:S", A vicenna aIso appea1s to the cotTespondeJlce th. may exist betweeJl the
number of bodies and the number of sauls. He writes: "furtherm.ore, it is Dot neœssary tbat aU
annihilation be linked to generation, nor that the number of bodies be the same as that of the separate
souls thllt are joined to them, DOl" that a number of separate souls deserve one body to which they are

2S EarJi« studies indude Monnot.. "La transmlgration. et l'immortalité," 1<49-52; d. Walker, "The
DoetrineofMerempsyc;hosisinIslam," 219-38. StudieswluchwewcreunabletoconsuJt,butofsomeimportance,
cr. Keller, "Le mon.de islamique et les doe:trines de réincarnation," 181-203: cf. TIili, "Sur la transn.Ugration et
l'immortalité en terre d'Islam," lI1-M~~Mu.DhlblJJ 3 (1987): 85-98; cr. Frei.tag, Sl!f!lenwJI8deruJW.lÀ
derwmmsdJe.rzHNl'Sie [cf. Landol1, "RevJ.ew," 58-61].
29 Gïmacel, "Tanisuth," 182a.
30 Walker, "DoetnJle of MetempsychOSIS," 222-4; cf. Monnet, -La rransmigration et l'immortalité,"

154-5. al-'Amirï, AmMi Wiï8l-AbMI.

31 Avicen.na, Nn.Jik, Nilfs 14, 385.12-387.17 (A J:7~ 63-4). For simi.Jar passages, cf. Idem, A/JW1i/
1

1I1-~ (ed. al-Ahwaml, ch. 10, 106f (cf. ed. Ulken, 1380: cf. Idem, OiimSb. P1Jys.. 1295-8 (L'~'n?, II, 81);
cf. Idem, A(i/JJlwf1'8/J (ed. '~): 11-158, esp. 81-93.
:2 An. Aristotelian ide.. cf. Arisotle, Oe Anima, I :3, 407b 15r.: cf. Ibid.,
t n, 2, 414a20f.
n Avicenna, SJnlii~, Nm, V,4, 234.2-11 (~r:, 166).
Jo4 Avicenna, SJnIii~ Hm, v, 3, 223.11-225.11 (Rv;, 158-9).
J5 Aviœnna, fshJTFiir, vol. 3-4, 779.1-780.1 (IJir;. 478; .Jt...(J3T., 78): cf. Idem, .M1pr, AWS, 14,
386.12-387.3 (AP.7C:,63-4).
 CHAPTf.R NrNE - 280
36
then joined. and from which they are repelled due to mutual resistance... Moreover. his rejeetion of
ttansmigration applies both witbin the same species - human bodies - and aaoss different species -
humant animaJ or vegetative (both ascending and d~scending).37

A second argument against the idea of transmigration. is found in A vicen.na' s De.ô·J--enmce.

where he appeal.s ta a notion of self-consciousness whicb itself presupposes [he idea of an ego.
something deïu1itely not Aristotelian in spirit. 36 AviceJ1na writes:

The soul 15 conscious (~) of thst body and the body is influenced br [the action]
of mat soul. And every living being lS conscious that he has a unique soul which
goveras (0)--,,, ) and controls (~.).A ) [the body]. If there were another soul of
which the living being is not conscious. neither would it be [conscious of) itself, nor
would it occupy itse1f with [its] body. then [such a soul] would have no relationship
with the body. for the re1ationship only subsists in tItis wa.y.3'il

Suhrawardi does not use the later argument in the various sections where he rejects
transmigration, altbough it accords with bis own emphasis on se1f-knowledge on which he general1y
dwells st length.
Suhrawardi does, nonetheless, rejeet explicitly in most of bis works the possibility of
transmigraion, in spite of the fact that, in the Q-7t!DIJl/-/DumUJrHiw IPistlom, he presents a more
40
ambiguous position. In faet, he offers a number of p-oofs similar to thase used by Avieenna ta
.-gue for the impossibilio/ of transmigration of the human soul upon the separation from the body,
even menticning, in bis RlI,yS ofI..{i;nr, that it is in agreement with the position of the Peripatetics. dl

Suhrawardi presents st least three arguments for the impossibility of transmigration. A first
.-gument is found in the Inl:imaIJDns. When the body's physical constituents are ready to receive a
soul from the giver of forms, the body tben receives a soul. But if ft traJlSJIligrating sout were to joïn
the body, a single animal would have [wo souls. somethiag that is impossible:~2 This position is
reminiscent of Avicenna' s argument.
In. bis Pndls, Suhrawardi is again G.uite explicit. He states that he will later explain the

36 Avicenna, IshJiriir, vol 3-'4, 780.2-781.2 (Orr., 478-9; il.(~3T., 78).

37 Monnet,"La IraJl5migration et l'immortalité," 155, 156-8; cf. Marmura, .. Aviœnna and the
ProbJem ortbe lDfiDire Number of 501115," 233~; cr. AVlcenna., N~, NJIS, 14,386.12-387.17 (Am'&:, 63-4,
109); d. Idem. A~~ (ed. C~),l1•. 10-1215.
38 Rahman, A fi7f:eADJ1 S, 109 [.bis commentary].
39 Avicenna. .Mfli". NJÜS, 14,387.10-17 (A fi7C::, 64).
40 Monnot, "La transmigration et l' immonalité: 156 4.28.

~.
.
41 PIrTU, § 85, 74.1 (BOOK, 78).
42 TJdwüuïr, § 60, 81.11; d. A/wii/1, § 76, 170.6-10; cf. P:.vrû, § 85. 74.9-12 (Boaé, 78); cf.
Davidson, AUJnIlIi. 166.
 CHAPTER. NINE - 281

falsehood of metempsychosis.a:3 He. then. offers two otherarguments to reject and show the impossibility
of such a betief. One of these arguments is mathem~cai He notes that if transmigration is conceived
as the transfer of souls that descend ta lower levels. and since the number of animais is greater than
the number of human beings, whiJe the number of plants is even greater than the number of animais,
the required amount of souJs wouJd exceed that of the number of existing souJs. because the number
of generated and colTUptible souls do not correspond. It is, therefore. numerical1y impossible ta

account for the tra1lsmigration of aIl the souls that would take place.
The third argument. which he then proposes in his Poths, supposes that transmigration i5
concei.ved as the transfer of souls from the lower reigns to the reigns of human beings. In this
particular case, the number of migrating souls would exceed the number of human bodies. because
the species of sma11er animals exceed in number the larger species, and the same holds tnJe for plants
in relation to animaIs. 4a With the last two arguments, Suhrawardt, like A vicen.na, therefore rejeets the
possibility of trarlSmigration across species, both ascending and descending.
In the Oneow-/DummluÎfp IJ'lstlom . howeYer his position on transmigration is most
ambivaleJlt. First, he reviews the different theses about transm.ignttion: those of the Buddbists
41
(....L-I';..)o:' ),45 the PeripateticS,<t6 ancient Greek philosophers and Plato. lsJam.ic thinkers<tfl IU1d the
I11umjoatioaists (ù.:.: ;;.~ ).<8 He concludes this long discussion br stating that most sages (.~)
have adhered to a beJief in. transmigration, including the Illuminationists. More importantly, however,
he adds tbat there is a general consensus on the fact that the rational souls, i.e., the pure ruling lights
(oJA lb O,.H,)."a J I~i ), will be liberaœd and ascend to the wodd of light (the intelligible world)
without the possibility of any transmigration (~ """J ).50 Such statements are ÏJl accordance with
Avicen.na's own eschatology where the perfeet souJs can dwell in the afœrlife. But Suhrawardî also

43 AfJU~·~ f 214,493.12.
<W AfJUnki~ f 220, 499. 19-500.8; cf. AIJYJi:P. f 76,170.10-12; cf. P6fÜ, f &5,74.13-15 (Book, 78).
45The word is a ccrruptform of Boddbisatva. Suhrawardï'srefEr'enœ 1$ vague. For genera.l considerations
on the hiscory of tcaasmigraien ÏJl the Hindu conten, cf. Monnet, "La tranSJtUg1'3tion et l'immortalité,"
149-52; d. Gimaret, .. Bouddha et les bouddhistes dans la tradition musulmane," 273-316; cf. Melitian-Clurvani.
- Buddhisme. Il. In lslamic Times," 496a- 499a.
46 /fibrille. § 2JS, 221.4-5 (S6y.. 206).
47 PllKO, P.heIdo, 70c-72e; d. Hrbn;r, § 235,221.5-7 (S8s:. 206); cf. WaJbridge, .5Omcc-, 130,
14S-9.
<e Hd:mN, § 235, 221.8-222.1 {stlT-, 206-7). He quetes 9.,40:1 l, (:J., 4:S9, Q., 22:22, Q .. 32:55, Q.,
6:38, and a few haditbsontransfonnationinto animais (~), d. PeUal, "Maskh:' 736b-738b.

49 /UbD., §§ 229-35, 216.10-222 .... (SJfY.. 203-7).

SG f/ïbDIIt, § 2JS, 222.2-3 (~ 207).
 CEiAPTER. NINE - 282

•
bas statements like "whetber transmignuion is true or l'aise, because the praofs for or against it are
weak" wbich render more problematic uy interpretation about his lnIe position. The latter statemem
cao readily be interpreted as an explicit ambiguous stance that opens the daor for the possibil~.y of
transmigration. Sl

Man}' ancients and contempor81j'" commentators have aaributed to Suhrawardi sorne sort of
belief in the transmigration of souls. mosdy on aecount of sorne ambiguous stances found in bis
Onèor4l-U./um.r11IHir-p ff'isuom. Although $uhrawardï does not openly advocate a doctrine of
transmigration, Mut,ammad b. Ma.t,mûd al-Shat,razüri (d. after 1288) is perhaps the first follower of
Suhrawardïs thought who believes chat Suhrawardï adopted sueh a position. 52 His endorsement of
transmigration does nct, however, cake inco consideration the reservations of Subrawardi, and the
lauer's numerous explicit rejeetion of the doClrÏl1e (see section on the nature of the soul).5J

Likewise, Qu~ al-Dia al-Shiriizï (d. 13 JI) believes that Suhrawaroï adopted this position.
Like Suhrawardï, he argues that arguments for or against transmigration are inconclusive.S<l although
he himse1f believes in the pre-existence of lhe soul, but without elaboratîng fuMer. 55 Qu~ al-Dïn

al-Shiriizi wrïtes tbat the souls of the moderately happy (_I~I tJ-A~.,,:a..... ) are transfetTed to
the cele5tiaJ bodiei (~ rl~1 ) and that those of the misenble (_I.:i 10.1) are transferred to animal
bodies, be:ing transferred from one body to another, except minerais and plants.56 Such statements,
howevel", are notfound in the fifth book (on escbatologica1issues) of Suhrawardï' s Orit!Jlm/-U./umLmuir-i!
IPisdom, the work on which he is commenting.
Mulla ~adri' s assessment of Suhrawardi' 5 position regarding meœmpsychosis is similar to
Qu~ al-Dm a!-Shïrizï' s. ACter stating thathe rejeclS transmigration and, using Avic:enna's Immonuions
as an example, Mulla ~adrii, nonetheless, notes that Avicenna was unable to grasp the true meaning
S7
of resun'eetion. Such an assessmen.t, however. would seem co go sgainst claims that Avicenne was
58
totally consistent and steadfest in denying any possibility of metempsychosis. Mullii $adri, then,

51 .{frbnlU, § 245, 230.7-8 (~, 214); d. the views of Smith, -TnulSJI1lgration and the Sufis," 354

(on Subrawardï) and SJI1lth and Haddad. 005., 71Je fsllllnic UAd6Sbt4dûyofOewdJ aDd lleslJl7'ft:'l'rOA 199 n. 1

15.
52 Shahruüri, SllIIdJ r 518.10-2; cf. Ibid., 520.6-8 and 528.7-10.
S:l Schmidtke, • The Doctrine of the Transmigration," 2"'3-8.
54 Schmidtke, -The DoctnJ1e of the Transmigration," 249-50.
55 Q. D. aJ-Shüiizi, S1JiII:(I, 447.12-451.16 (~, 378-82); cf. Walbridge, Science ofMy:mc L.rYAa,

•
138-41.
SIS Q.D. al-51L..âzi, Shri, 477.1..... (.5igr-, 393); cr. ldem, R.is"31;tb 1 257 (Walbridge, SaenQ!, 219).
Si Mulli ~adra, T;/'lftfJü,"'79 (SJ{If:, 612). FŒ' a study of Mulla Sadra own concept of transmigration,

â. Kamada... Metem-psycllosis (l1IDbfJkh) in Mulla SacJra' 5 Thought," 122-6.

 CHAPTER NlNE - 283

•
expresses bis surprise at finding Suhrawardî unable to understand the meamng of resurrection in the
doctrine of the ancients sages. "in the way that we understand it." He accuses him of having written
on the doctrines .:>r the partisans of transmigrati.on and to have "understood it in a way which could
make [somec>ne] think that he aetually believes it to be true ... 5~

Suhrawardï's ambiguous statement in the Oriœu./-UJummoa·ve ~fLsdom and the legacy of

bis earlier commentator5. especially Qutb al-Dm al-Shïriizî. have led modern rom..mentators like
Schmidkte to affarm thet with his "review of the various notions of and arguments for metempsychosis
witb onlya very brief allusion to the opposing views of the Peripatetics seems to indicste bis support
for the ides of metempsychosis," noting chat Suhrawardî "refraias. hawever, from expliClt1y profE5sîng
the doctrine of transmigration of souls." Suhrawardi. however, did .-gue against transmigration.
namely. in. bis other works. not only in. the Peripatetic works. but also in bis dogmatic works. To be
sure, st8tements to the effeet that bumansouls - once freed of the corporeal body (~"j..>-:' ~4-)

- will receive .. shadaws (J~) of suspended forms (;;iL.... JY- ) correspondiag ta their marais
(J ~i )"60 may be interpreted as indications of a belief, perhaps hidden. in the transmigration of
souls, or st least as an indication of an u.Ildecided stance.61 Suhrawardï mentions that it is .. only once ft

tbey bave "freed themselves" from the bodily thst th~ will aocess the world of lights. thus, perhaps
implies a possible process of transmigration. Such an. interpretaion must, however, be understood
only in terms of the eschatological rate of souls - in the metaphysical afterlife - and not a physical
and worldly life.
It is not de.. how one can. ae:tua11y argue, by taking into account Suhrawardï's ontology of
light. that "adhering to basic Ibn Süùan doctrine of the gradations of beings. Suhl'awardï goes on ta
argue for the tnmsmigration of the human. soulan the basis of the inner quaJ.ities that he attribuœs ta
various oJltologieal statues ...62 Indeed, an omology of light would be st the hein of any entity's quest
ta ascend to higher ontological states according to the sour s ability to ascend on the Il ontological
bierarchy" before death. But to conclude that a notion of tnmsmigration is implied in sueh a context
seems inadequate. perhaps even misleading.

In the On'eDhl/-D./ummlJ·ve "Yisdmn, Suhrawardi writes that the soul throws off its ties to
ilS body, grows in its desire for the higher realms, and aCXluires "a habitus for conjunetion with the

se MOJlJlClt. "La a-ansmigntlon et l'immortalité," 156.

93 Mulla Sadrii, T.it2r9'N, 0477 (S~ 609).
60 .{5kmJu. § 245.230.8-9 (!Nfr., 214).
61 Schmidtke, "The Doctrine of the Transmigration," 242.
62 Amin Razavi., SlHJrJJJTNt:5, 41-2. esp. 4 t.
 CHAPTER NlNE - 284

•
world of pure light" in accordance ta its ability to "increase in light." i.e., in intellectual perfection.fi:]
Upon leavïng its lifeless body, a soul which bas developed a habitus fOl" conjunction with the world
of pure light becomes an "adjUDet of the [supemal] lights." Likewise, Avice.lna had descri~ed the
happiness (eudnemomiJ) enjoyed by perfeet rational souls in similar language, although without the
64
imagery of Jight.

AVICENNA AND THE SURv'NAL Of 1RE INDIVIDUAL SELF

These different eschatological issues - bodily resurrection and transmigration of souls -
depend on the following postulate: souls will recei.ve retribution in the afterlife and, in some œses,
will be able, in mis life, ta pErfeet themselves in an attempt to a1talJl felicity. Foc this purpose, souls
must retain their individuahty that which only their bodily 8llachment was able ta define. Moreover,
to be accountable in the bereafter for their worldly deeds, human souls must in addition be able ta
ex:perience or perceive the promised otber-woddly rewards and punishments.6S Both are intrinsically
related issues.

Moreover, if materiaJity - the five external (and inIemal) senses - is posited as a precondition
for perceiving tbat which is sensible in tbis world, then, how c:an the perception of the sensible
pleasures and pains associated with retribution take place once the organic life of the body has
œased to exist? A1-~aribï was faced with such a difficulty which resulted in bis inability to establish
the survival of the individual soul after death, much less provide a metaphysical basis for the de1ights
of Paradise and the tormeats of Hell 50 graphica11y described in the Qur'an..6fi

How tben will Avicenna and Suhrawardï resolve this difficuIty? Being a pure immaterial
substance, the sou! cao oniy experience posthumous pleasures and pains (i.e., sensible perceptions),
somehow. by preserving in. the afterlife the faculty responsible for sensible representation in this
world. Consequent1y. the soul will need the he1p of a part or al1 of the imaginative faculty (in its
broadest sense) ta experience these pleasures and pains associated with religious retribution.

Sucb a solution poses the whole question of the survival of an imaginative faculty slong with
or as part of the immaterial rational sou!. This solution also raises the subsidiary question of the
conditions under which the imaginative facu1ty would chen still be able to funetion for the human

63 HJbDJU. § 237,223.15-2242.
64 Davidson, A.HiIr.Ir6i. 110.
65 The theologica1 c:onsll"alnts seems ta have been absent of Aristotle's wa-k and might account fO[' a

seeming I.:k of • persona! immortal1ty.

66 Walbridge, Science, 156.
 CHAPTER NINE - 285

soul now separated from its corporeal body.

In this life. human souls perceive by virtue of a connection between an imaginai facu(ty - as
a faculty of the human soul - and the body. by means of the mediation of a semi -corpore~ entity -
the spirit or the pn~uml/. The human 50ul then maltes use of the imaginative faculties with the
Mediation of the pneumo.

Mcreover. the state of the soul in the afterlife is detennin.ed by the degree of attac:hmem that
il entelUÙls with the bodily. In his Commenrmy on the pseudo- 71Jeolog;,r ofAnSrode . Avicenna
writes that:

Il is what is provided for an effort. good (~ ) or bad (~ ), i.e., the effort that the
soul maltes to tum away from its immediate object of pleasure which is the body, ta
tom its aaention to the object of true love ( ~ ~ ) ... the happiness in [the
afterlife will be the retribution] cOlTesponding to mal effort.67
The individuation of the soul has prepared it to be in some way affeeted by the material
world such as the different passions of concupiscence, anger. ete. it EXperiences while in this world.
But when the soul separates from ilS body, some of its previous attachments ta the bodily May not
dïsappear, tbereby preventing the soul to acœ~ the superior world cf intelligences. The disposition
.--.. of the soul te be affee:ted by the material becomes one of the conditions that determines the extent of
its ascent and its possible conjunction with the superior worid.66

Once the individu al sou! has severed its attachment with the body, the imaginative facu1ty.
postulated as a condition for the spiritual experience of tbese sensible pleasures and pains, needs
sorne sort of corporeal entity to serve as its substratum in the afterlife. One of the problems mat the
survival cf an imaginai facuJty poses is the nature of the material substrabJm still required for the
po5thumous funetioning of this faculty. What might be, in these circumstances. the type of bodily
eotity that could serve as the necessary substratUm for these sensitive-like imaginative perceptions in
the works of Aviœnna, but MOst impOrtaJ1tly, in those of Suhrawardïf9
To set the stage for Suhtawardï's eschatoJogy, let us tum agein ta bis Bekefs, where he
discusses the state of the souls once they have separated from their bodies. He first highlights the
importance of religious knowledge for the postmortem fae of humsn souls. Suhrawardï notes that

67 Avicenn.a. Shri, ~.17-45.3 C'Notes," J. 1.... 361~2).

68 Avicenna. Shri, 041.9-42.6 C'Notes," l, 10.357).
69 Perœpcion of a partlcuJar req1Jires some sort of IJWter. The di.ffu::ulty hes lJ1 the fact tbat a
nonJm&enal entity such as an unmaterial intellect 01" such as the rat10nal seul cannot know partlcuJars cr
malerial accidents 1'il.11out the 1..DteI'œssioll of some sort of mater. Prcm.ding an explananon of the objects
(forms) of mem.ory which origuJate Ln the metaphysica1 werld is another reJaled problem.
 CHAPTER NlNE - 286

accordiAg ta the philosophers, souls must be knowledgesble of God (Lu 4 "ü J~ ) ud his angels,
and must have received the imprints of the spiritual realities (~lLJ4 • "-e', = ) once they have
reached a le ,,'el of aptitude for receptivity in order to be promised happiness in the aftedif~. It is only
when the souJ possesses a knowledge of the spiritual rea.lities, i.e.. that it knows God and God's
ange1s. that it will be able to perceive, in the other world, most sublime images and pleasant sounds_
On the CODtraty. if the soul Wl1S unable to know God and the angels. it will, according to the
QurJin (Q .. 17:72). be blind and remain in darmess (Q., 24:40). The absence of knowledge is what
sepanttes and wbat veils tbem from God (Q., 83: 14), whereas the result of the soul's ignonmce is
suffering. Moreover. the soul' s suffering occurs because it is separaœd from the worldly pleasures
that it still desires (Q., 34:54). Suhrawardï' s philosophical. rendering of retigious eschatoLogica1
conceptions in the Reliefs provides hi.m with ample opportUnÎties to make abundant use of QurJiinic
verses, more so than A vicenna in bis philosophica1 works.70

A VICENNA AND THE SURVIVAL OF THE IMAGINATIVE F ACULTY

Reg.ding the possible survival of the imaginative faculty afeer death, Avicenna proposes
two seemingly oontradietoay positions. The first is bis overt deniaL of the possibility of the survivaJ
of the imaginative facu1ty. For example, in the PIJ"Y-S'ics of the Book of Saœce, a condensed
version of the ClftI, he writes, "indeed, [the soufs] organic faculties ~Î ~~.,.i ) such as
sensation, active imagination ~ ), desire (~~ ), anger and other similar faculties will be
separated from [the soul] and will be destroyed following the destnJetion of the organ (...::-JI) [ie., the
body or the brain for the faculty of imagination] ...71
The deniaL of the survival of the imaginative faculty rests on the naWre of the sou! itse1f. The
substance of the soul is essentially defined in tennS of its rational or inœllec:tive nàUre. The destructiOll
of all the bodily faculties does not entail the destnJaion of the soul's substance. Avicenna writes that
"when the organ is destroyed and since it does not subsist by this organ, nor in mat organ, [the soul]
is not [itself] destroyed. ,,72 Similarly. in the founofarJOns, arter a long discussion in which he refutes
the arguments of the proponents of the theory of cransmigration of the souls, Avicenna states that "it
is not possible st aU that the sout return to the body sfter death," followed by bis proofs. This is
taken up by Mulla $adrii who aiticizes AviceJ1J1a for bis lack of understanding of the whole question

70 rliil6t/, § 13,270.3-11 (AJ'rh.. 22).

71 OiûlisIJ. PlJp, 123.4-6 (LJ-Jn! ,II, n).
72 Aviœnna, Diillish, PAp, 123.3~ (LiJn!, II, 77).
 CfIAPTFR. NINE - 287

of transmigration (~~).'7.3 Rence. it sppesrs that only the rational part of the soul survives. while
ail the rest - the body as well as the animal facuJties like imagination - perishes. The immateriality

of the soul - as an intellective substance - enables il "ta receive impressic.ns of the univers al forms:"
moreover. it becomes necessary chat" no traces whatsoever of material attachments remain in them ...74
In his CommenJ:ti/f- on the pseudo- 77JeoIos;rof.~srode.AYicenna spectfically notes that:

Similarly. if [the soul] preserves a souvenir of the body after [its separation tram it.
thisJ will not be an imaginative souvenir (~.J ~ ). but intellective and non
specified (u': ;. ft ~ ~ ). Such a perception. if it were called an intellettual
imagination (~ ~~). would be ignomnœ of the particuJar as partïcular.
7S

Moreover, the human soul can rapidly separate itself from this world only "if it is pure." on
account of the perfection tbat it has attained. Avicen.na adds that only then can "its nature (~) be
associated (~.) li) with the intelligible principles ... devoid of the impurities which aiter the dissolution
1

of the corporeaI compound. prevent one from reaching the intelligible world...7f!J
On the basis of simil.- statements, Mullii ~adri criticizes whathe understands te be Avicenna' 5
refusaI to pl'Ofess the existence of another corporeaJ world. distinct from the physical world. and for
which he will ascribe (in the tradition of Ibn Arabi) an independent imagina! rea1m.. distinct from
C

.-
- t.bis physical world. He criticizes Avicenna. despite quotï.og hint (from bis /mmOÔ'rJoAS ) as having
written that the vicious qualities of the souls would survive as if tbey were, lifter death. in material
bodies to serve as the Instruments of their punishment. TT
For Mulla $adrii. the posthumous survivaI of some sort of materiality requires the existence
of an independent world. But did Avicenna have in mind the existence of an independent imagina!
wor1d? It would be more appropriate CO 5t8te tha Avicenna alluded to a number of conditions that
implicitly conveyed the possibiJity of the survival of the imaginative faculty, e.g.. in the D.iscuSSfOns
and the CommeBtmy on the pseudo- 7Deology ofAnsrode.
Some scholars have rigbdy noted that Aviœnna attempted to use the imaginative faculty to
solve the problems associated with justifying the religious theory of reward and punishment in the
afterlife. 78 For Avicenna, souls do not becomethe elements of an undifferentiated universalsoul after

73 Avicenna, A~"f'" (ed. ·~).121.15-126.17.

Avicenna• .Mijiir,NRfs,5, 333.2-5 (AJ'iZ&:, 33).

-
74

"IS Avic:enna, S/J4IfJ, 53.3-4 ("Notes:' n. 6,3704).

76 Aviœnna, SIr.-/J, 66.8-1 L ("Noces," vn, 2,394).
.. 77 Mulli Sadd, 7ÏlnViïr. 477 (~608).
78 Walbridge, S::rm~, 149; cf. Midtot, .Desrinl!e, 140-218.
.'
"
,
• CHAPTfR NINE

their sepsration of the body.19 They retain their particular indivtduality. Different conditions - like
"the different matters in which they bad been. and owing to the times of their birth and their different
dispositions due to their bodies whtcb necesssily differ because of their pecuJia- conditions"oo -
- 288

gu8l'8l.1tee that human $Ouls acquire their individuality throughout their existence in this life and will
keep it in their future life.
for Avïcenna, the most noble of pJeasures and the highest perfection is intellective (rational).
In other wards, the highest pleasure and perfection are associated witb the world of pure intelligence
which guarantees their fulfilmen.t in the bereafter.B1 Sensible pleasures, on the other hand. are such
that they prevent the soul from attaining its true felicity. They are impedimen.ts ta the soul' s grasp of
intelligibles and to its inte1lectual deve1opment. 82 After a definition of pleasure and its relation ta

perfection. Aviœnna concludes that the plessure of the rational soul is the loftiest of pleasures and
that it is consummated upon its "Retum" (.Jl.a.... ).BJ
The eschatological fate of the soul is determined by the sub jeet' s consciousness of 115

essence or proper perfection. This is reflected in Avicenna's classification of souls. In the /lenNU'ks.
Avicenna identifies tbree different stages in the afœrlife. A more elaborate scheme is preseoted in bis
64
Unmofarions. In this latter work. the souls EIre eitber perfee:t or imperfec:t. aware of their perfection
or unaware of it, able to achieve their perfection or unable to achieve il. BS
In the lmmo18LioL/S, perfeet $OuIs are of two types. There are, first. the perlect souls aware
of their prop« end and who achieve perfection and absolute happiness. But there are aIso the perfea
souls that are aware of their proper end but who fail to acbieve perfection. The latter group of souls
will grearJy suffer in the hereafter, because of meir awareness of what constitutes their bappiness and
their inability ta attain absolute happiness. Theil" preoccupation witb the bodily and their inability to
~perience their worldly pleasures causes tbem. great pain. These souls will dweU in an interm.ediary
wodd (tJJ-!) that comes between the sensible or physical and the intelligible worJds. These are the
souls which seem to have been given the jXJ5'Sl1iôi;y ta eventually attain absolute happiness.
The second eategory coosists of the imperfee:t (~c, ) souls. Some imperfect souls become.

19 Goic:bOJl, ~.trr.Qa.ûm, -453, 460-94.

80 AviceJUla, J\.7Ifli', Nafs, 12, 3n.lO-378.2 (A '"'7&:,58).
81 D'Alvemy, • ADn:iyya - ADitas," 59-6l; d. Avicenna. A~Jffp.vh (ed. CAsï) , 149.
82 Michot, .De.st:inl!'e, 154.62.
83 Avicenna, A4slJn.1'uIt (ed. CAsi). 145-149.
8<l Inati, .Ibn Smli Ildd MystJ&ism 18-22.
1

as Cf. tbe chat 1J1 Mlcbot, De.sJ:inèe ,52 n. 87.

 CHAP'fFR NlNE - 289

•• st some point during their terrestrial life. aware of their poœntia1 perfeaion. They have, however,

wiJlingly refused to achieve it and held wrong beliefs. These souls will suffer eternal pain and never
atta:i.n absolutehappiness. ÛtherimperfeClsouls ,however, neverbecome aware oftheîr own perfection.
Consequently. they neither seek nor recognize their perfection. Still orber imperfect souls ace unaware
of the fact thal they possess a perfection: these are the souts of the simple-minded (~) and children
(ù~ ). They do not achieve absolute happïness nOl" do the}T experience obsolute misery (a pain
similar to the one who experiences hunger), because they are unaware of their perfection, although
they incline towards it substantially (jA~4).

FinaUy. there are the deficient souls which fail te achieve their perfection and are miserable
(o.Jli,;, ). On the one hand. if these souls are aware that mey possess some kind of perfection, titis
awareness will not disappear. while, on the other hand, if they are unaware of tbeir perfection, they
will experieo.ce pain according to their destrUctive qualities (~.,)..,.JI ..::,.,~). which they have inherited
6lS
from. the natural world.
In the Oelif'"trllOCe, the individvals who can achieve absolute pleasure and perfection are
67
those who have achieved the hîghest of pleasures. namely. intel1ectual pleasures. These souls can
tbus enjoy tbeirposmottemhappïness and perfectioninfeJicity, having completely detached themse1ves
from matter and their bodiJy attachment. For tbese souls. uJtimaœ happiness lies in the intellectual
realm devoid of an need for sensible represenrations. Ultimate happiness, thus, pt"ecludes anytype of
56
sttaehment te a bodily substance for these souls. These perfect seuls are, however, but a very small
fraction of au human sou15. The majority of souls, on the other hand. will Experience sensible
plessures and pains in proportion ta their attaehment te the world they have left behiJJ.d.

But how does Avicenna explain the pains and torments which imperfect and miserable souls
will experience in the afterlife depending on the type of life they enjoyed in this worJd'? Fmt.
Avicenna adopts an "indeterministic" conception of the state of seuls in the aftetlife which means
that it is always possible. st least theoretically. for human souls - imped'ect seuls - ta attempt te
achieve their own perfection (i.e., redemption). EVen in the afta-life. e-;1

Avicenna rejeets classica1 conceptions of metempsychosis. but he al10ws for the possibility

816 Aviœnna, Aç/.fhIwi)7t1J (ed. r~), 152.6-153.14. The clasSlflC:ation can be red1Jced to four, cf.
Heath. AUqI'DIYJII1dPMamptvlA A f.7CdmIl, 68-9.

87 Avic:eana, NIfiM, AfeJ:R., 699.10-700.1 . .

88 Souls preserve the q1JaJitites associated to tbeir boclily qualities <il.:-& ), cf. Avicenna, Nu'pû,
MtNlI., 695.13-696.5.
89 Aviœnn•• .MIfiir. J1.feu., 695.5-11.
 CHAPTER NlNE - 290

•
of some perfectibility t.n the afterlife without the existence of an earth1y body. ln bis G/osses. he
writes that "in facto the body is not a condition of the perfecting of the soul as it is a condition of its
existence;,,90 or agaïn that ..there is no demonstration proving that when unperfeaed souls separate
from the body. there is for them soœethiog which would perfect them." and that "there is no
demonstration that ... there is not something which would perfect them after their separation.'·91

AVlcenna deems it possible for souls to be perfected L'1 the aftedife without their woddly bodies,
paving the way (or an other-worldly perception of pains and pJeasures. In facto the soul' s experience
of pleasure is determined br the extent of the soul' s detachment from the corporeal and the sensible
as weil as its awareness of its perfection.
The conditions that gus-anteed the soul' s possibility of perfection in this wodd must similarly
exist in the afterlife in order that it May attain ilS other-world1y perfection. In. tbis world. the soul can
achieve its perfectio.n with the help of imaginative facu1ties associated with the sensible faeultyof
represe.nt8tion. Retribution in the afterlife can, therefore, occur only if sauls still possess imaginative
faculties. Their souls will. therefore, need ta possess an attacbment to some corporea1.ity, which can
tben act G a bodily subsrrawm for their imagiJlative faeully.92 ln faet, the presence of the faculty of
active imaginstion becomes an essential condition for the souls ta expErience the promised joys and

--
.. peins of divine retribution ud ta attain their perfection, especially the imperfeet souls of the majority.9J
The SUMval of the active imagination, or part of it is required following Avicenna's own
priJlciple that .. ail perception of the particular is through a bodily organ...9<1 The sour s ability ra make
represe.ntations in this world depends on the dsœ. collected by the eXtern.al senses wbich are then
impressed i.n the different internai facuJties. This organ responsible for sensible representation indudes
the faculties of passive imagination and estimation. as weU as of the active imagination.9S

In one of bis works, however, Aviœnna suggests that the worlds could be three: "the se.nsory
[imaginary]. the imaginative and estimative. and the Ù1tel1ective.,,9115 Such a suggestion aetUally sets
thestagefortheexistenceofanotherpossibleimaginativerea1m.AndalthoughAvicennaaclcnowledges

9J A viœon.a, Toil ~9'.iÜ, 81.26 (M1chot, OesIinl!r!, 178 n. 128).

91 A vicenna, nt 7J9'lu. 87.25-7 (Michot, OesriLIée, J78 n. 128).
92 Pain is asSœtated with the bodily. d. Avu::enna, IshJÏt7Ïr, vol. 3 ..... VU!. 11. 169.3-nO.6 (LJrr:, 47";
My:sr. 15).
93 He writes that "there is no ether way, but through the corporeal facuJti.es te attain inteUectual

••• beJeifs...... cf. Avicenna, RrSiilAhffJll-SJlJTdJlb rJ"Il1-6ujafJlf-~'- (ed. al-Müsavï. 1934), 16-7; quoted in
Michot. Or!.sIi6ée 179 n. J28.
904

95
1

AviceJUla, Mljiû, Mûs, 8, 349.11-350.1 CA Ji7C:,"I).

Avicenna, N1{jIïr, NJfs JI, J 72.4-5 CA OC, 55).
1
 CHAPTER NINE - 291

•
that "the substratUm of the intelligibles. i.e.. the rational soul. is neither a body nor a faculty in 8

body... 97 the substratum of the representl€ions chal occurs in the hereafter must be some sort of bodily

entit}? in order chat souls ms}"' experience pleasures and pains - albeit in 115 imagi11ative form.

AvicenJla develops [wo imponant aspects. On the one band, the surviva! of the internai
senses responsible for representatîon becomes necessary. On the other hand. the soul requires some
form of assistance from the celestial bodies, as a corporeal substratum.. First. Avicenna emphasizes

the eschatologica1 role of representation and establishes the need for the survival of the unaginative
faculty or part of it in the afterlife. In bis Commt!oDu;Y on lhe pseudo- Theo/ogy of..4n:srode .
Avicenna writes that:

The soul can only preserve the memory of what cao be represented by the unaginatlve
representalÏan ~,;~ ) attributed to the representative facvley (i';,,- ),96
and chis is oniy possible if it is the object of a passion (J ~ ) [mediated] br the
intermedi.y of a corporal organ, and if il receives the proper impressions (.J~T)
from the corporeal world. [lf chis were] ta happen after the separation, it would be as
if il were [still] linked [to the body]. 99

The possible survival of the imaginative faculty is, thus. posited as a condition for any type
of posthumous rep-ese.nt8tÏon. The survival of this imaginai f&culty, bowever, requires some kind of
bodily subs1nltUm. Its survivai appears 10 rest on the existence of a subtle body or entity that could
1OO
enable it ta funetion. This, however, is not t!xpût::ir!,r mentioned anywhere in Avicenna's works.

Anotber important aspect related ta the survival of the imaginative facuJty is the issue of the

nature of such a bodily entity required for the functioning of the soul' s representative faculties in the
afterlife. Amongst the different possibilities envisioned, A vicenJ1a refuses the thesis th. posits the
survival of any type of "pneumatïc substratum" in the afœrlife, an opinion he ascribes to Thibit b.
Qurra, e.g., in me fmmonlfJans. IOI His rejection rests essentia11y on a refutation of Gaien's concept
1al
of the pneumo.

Moreover. although Avicenna eategorically rejeclS the possibility of using another physical

915 He continues, "it i5 the ill.tellectual world that 15 the place of dwelling. This is paradise. The
imaginative and estimative, as has beeJl shown, is the world of corruption.. The world of the senses lS the 'Wcdd
of the graves." cf. AVlcenna, fdl6k, 57.6-8 (PmoEs, 119-20).
97 A VlœJUUl, .Mijiïr, Hm, Il, 374.11-12 (A ~.. 56).
9El GoicboJl, ~ue, no. 610,329-338, esp. § 14,334.
99 Aviœnn.a, SIJ.-.IJ, 54.2~ ("Notes," n. 7, 376).
100 Michae, Oe.sriDee, 175.
101 Avicenna, A4dWJ.,YJiJ (ed. c~ï), 118-9, 158.
102 Avicenna, A4t1wi)7lJJ (ed. Asi), 118.13-119.5, 155.8-12, 158.1-3 (Michot, Oestinl!r!, 175).
C
 CHAPTERNINE - 292

body like the one possessed in this lire, in the DiscussJon. he adds mat the possibility for a "œ1estial
body" V"L.-... ~ ) to become a possible corporeal entity for the perfecting of the souJs .. is
something 1 do nat affirm or refule; perhaps. this is realisabJe when one acquires from thi:i body
somethin.g which mates us able ta use the celestial body: perhaps, is it also not realisable... 10'3

In another passage of the same work where he discusses the possibilities of a purification of
the soul in the afœrlife, he alludes once more ta the fBet that the soul can establish sorne sort of
attachment with the celestial souls. He writes tbat "it is I/t'X impossible mat ... separated beings

(~Jla..) make use, in this process , of one of the ceJestial bodies (~",L.....J1 V-- ~) ... Furth erm ore,
it ispossible chat there exists, [in. the celestia! realm] some assistance (w IA..) which is hidden from
us: spiritual entities (~6.,",J ,)."....i ) or celestial psychic faculties (4:-,l-;;.: ,ë·. c..>.".i )."I~ In this
particular passage, not only is the possibilio/ of the assistance of the celestiaJ spheres affinned. but sa
15 the recognition of the use of celestial bodies by the sepanlted souls. In bis Commenlmy on the
pseudo- 71JeolO§Y of Ansode , A vicen.na &gain notes mat the human souJ cao attaeh itself to the
œlestial spheres. 105 Since the rational soul is in no need of any physical substratum, therefore, it can
only be the imaginative faculty that makes use of the celest:i.al bodies and receive assistance from the
106
œlesti&1 501115.

Avicenna has a few more similar passages where bis belief in li possible survival of the
internai senses - i.e.. essentially the imaginative faculty - and the use of a celestial body as the
ma.leriaJ substratum - required for the experience of posthumous pains and pleasures and the perfection
of one' 5 soul - Cali. clearly be identifïed. 107 In me !mmOllDOns, he states that it is Dot impossible for
the human. soul to tatacb itself ta something simiJar ta the mixture from which it has separated.

oonnecting ta tbis other substance by virtue of it being a cause ~ ) of the body from which it
separated.,œ The affinity the celestial spheres share with the physical body is illustrated br the fact
that these celestial spheres already serve as the sub~ for the psychic faeulties of the celestial
109
souls or of such entities as angels. An interpretation to the effeâ that the depaned souls can Most

la! Avicenna. MubJ1lJJldNü, 198.3..... no. 352 (Mlchot, .f)5lin~, 180).

104 Avicenna, MufJlÏIJIIr1hir, 203.24-204.2. no. 365 (Mlchot. IJesrin~, 181 n. 130).
l
lOS For ÎIl.SIaJ1Ce in the KJ'tiD JI/-If,FJI6dJ1 "iI JI1-MRld; Cluoted in Micbot• .lJe.stmc't!, 18 D. 70; cf. Idem•
.fshïiïl', vol. 3-41, VIII, 17, n7.5-n8.3 (00";,478; A.(.P.Jt:, 78); cf. Idem, Shnr/7, n.3-9 rNotes," VITI. i, 403
ud Ibid., 4,4(4).
1[Jl!i On the eelestlal spheres. cf. Michot, Oe.n:inee, 29 n.23 , 18 n.70; cf. Avicenna, Sh;r;fl, n.12
rNotes," VIII, 4. 4(4).
107 Michot• .f)~I!r!, 182~; cf. Davidson. AUinlbi, 167.
108 Aviœnna. A~~ (ecl. cA.sï). 155; d.lbid.• 156-7.
0. CHAPTER NINE

p-obably attach themselves ta celestial matters is certain1y justified if one coJlSiders that these
œlestiaJ spheres can become substitutes for the psychic pneudrl/
-

(the subtle body) found in the

brai.n and provide the imaginative faculty with a new bodily substnltUm, the subtle body ot whidl the
293

IIO
spheres are constiwted.
In Aviœnns's classification of human sauls in the hereafter, the survival of the unaginative
faculty becomes ft necessity for simple or imperfeet souls, sin.ee these souls were p-eoccupied during
their worldly life with their bodies and failed to realize their proper perfections. As a consequence.
their existence in the hereafter will mirror that of their esrthly existences.1l1 The survival of dIe
imaginative faculty becomes possible br the association of tbis faculty witb some sort of bodily
matter that will guarantee the production of sensible representations. Each individual and i.m..mortal
soul th. has not achieved perfection thus attaches itself - accide.ntally and tem.porality, not essentially
- to these celestial bodies. ln fact, human souls can. only attach themselves partially to the œlestiaJ
bodies, i.e., only to some part or particle of these ceJestial bodies, because celestial bodies already
possess cheir own celestial souls. Individual souls wouJd, then, only use an infUlitely small part of
these celestial bodies as the subSU"8tUJll for their imaginative facu1ties in tbe seme manner th. the
soul uses the psychic pneuma as the substratUm for the fac:uJties of represeJ1l8tion when attaehed to
the original body.

Such a subtle, yet material, celestial infrastructure becomes. the condition of the posthumous
functioning of the inner senses responsible for represenlation. A negation of the surviva.l of the
faculty of imagination can only amou nt ta the deprivation of human sauls of their individuality
(which is due to their initial anac:hment to the body) and the negation of any possible retnbution. The
corporeality required by the soul in the afterlife is, in fact, ftSsociated with an imaginai state that
allows it ta bave sensible experiences; although tbese sensible experiences are, in a sense, imaginai,
they are in no way imaginary like illusions. The imaginative faeulty becomes the instrument that
permits the OCCUlTence of these postbumous pleasures and pains and allows the soul to perfect itself
even after the 8onjbilEition of the physical body and pneuJOll.

These different elements taken from Avicenna's works indicate that he did deem possible
the eIistence of sorne sort of imaginaI perception in the aftedife, just as rea1 for the simple sauls as
the intelligible world contemplsted by the pure souls (that retain their iJl.dividuality).1l2 The

1D9 Aviceana, RisiilJlb 5" III-Sn~dJl!J WH 1I1-.{fup.i iII-'AS'.IJ6r (ecl. al-M'ÜSaVi, (934), 15: Cluoted ln
Michot, OestiAée, 184 n. 138.
110 Mi cbot, OesliAée, IBS-1.
III AviceDlla, A(!.fNIwfflÛl (ed. C~), 151,155-6.
 CHA.PTFR NINE - 294

•• contemplation of the intelligible world represents the ultimate stage ta acbieve (that of the sages).lIJ
while the condition of simple and imperfect souls still a110ws these in.dividual souls to eventoally
achieve the~ perfec:tion.l1<:l An imaginai. pa-adise modelled on the sensible world is. therefore. but a
stage in the soul's quest for p erfeaion, but situated ontologica11y below the intelligible world. 1l5
Imaginai perceptions represent a spiritual stage that enables the soul ta progress. although such
imaginai perceptions are but a means. These imaginai realities constitute. in the end, an illusionary
and temporary stage te overcome. as simple sauls are given the means to proceed beyond this
imaginal realm. 116

On a final note, let us add that for Avicenna. the survival of the faculty of imagination could
perbaps be oonceived as a "pseudo-transmigrationism" (pseudo- ~l:l..:i)." This particulac view depends.
howevEl", on the definition one gives to transmigration. More generally. transmigrstion may Mean
the migration or transfer of an individu al sou! (or of the spirit - c.,..;) from one material body into
8I10ther, but in chis world. as Mulla $adrii defÏJles it in bis oom.mentary of the Onenhl/-IUummllfi~"e

IJJSdom .117 ln tbis traditional understanding, transmigration refers to the physical world and Ilot a
retum (.)lA..) UJlderstood as the transfer (J~I) of the spirit from the sensible world (o.)~1 rJl.& )
to the suprasensible world (~, ~ 1.&). 118 In the latter sense, the survival of the faculty of imaginatiOJl
does not, tbrougb its association with some sort of materiality, constitute transmigration. For Mulli
~adri, however, itis the "wrong" kind of transmigratiOJl, of wbich he accuses Avicenna. In faet, the
soul only maintaiJI.s some sort of celestial material attachmen.t in order to fulfil the promises of
reve1ation, te allow a possible perfecting of the sou! in the afterlife, and to provide the conditions for
the survival of the sours individuality necessary for reribution. Perbaps a more interesting and
appropriate expression might be that of a .. spiritual transmigraionism." But tbis would be more
propedy a retum or an ascent (.)lA...).

In short. Avicenna' s discussions regarding an imaginal rea1m. are important for the insight

112 The question of the sours immortality raised certain. problems for AVerToes, cf. AnIaldez, "La

penséereJiginsed' Averroès, JIl," 23-41.

113 Michot, OesriDf!e, 207.
114 Michot, OeSlinl!t!,210.
us A rea1m which Mlcbot, following Corbin, defines as "Wl monde épipbanique. d. Mlct1ot. Or!srinl!'e
n

,202~.

116 Michot, Oeslintie,203.

117 Mulli Sadra, TJI'ff(flÏI', 476 (SIf8:, 603). In this introduetory commentary, Mulla ~adra dlstuJguishes
.~ betweP'l the nOlioll of transmignaion ~ l:ü ) and retum (.J ~ ).
:.~
118 He defines the sensible world as being what is perceived by the extemal senses and the supra

sensible world te be what is perceived by the iJlterna1 senses.

 CHAPTER NINE - 295

iato his own conceptioJlS of the fate of souls in the afœrlife. but, more importantly. on the fate of the
imaginative facuJty.

SUHRAWARDI'S ESCHATOLOGY AND THEACfIV"E IMAGINATION

The previous discussion on A vicenna' s eschatology is important ta identify parallels that
exist between bis positions sad those deve10ped by Suhrawardi It is only by juxtaposing the two
systems that the affinity - or possible filiation - of Suhrawardï's system with r.h81 of Avicenna's ca.n
be highlighted. And akhough Avicen1la did not develop an explicit theory for the existence of an
imm.erial imaginative realm.. the bulk of his remarIa on the eschatological fate of the soul may be
used [() reconstnlet a coherent metaphysical conception of an im.material. imaginative facuJty.119

For Suhrawardï, souls continue to exist until the advent of the Day of Judgment in an
intennediary ("imaginai") world. But how does Suhrawardï understand the role of the imaginative
facu1ty in the aftedife? How are the images brought inm existence ta be used by the individual
souls? How do the ceJestial spheres enable images ta manifest themselves? And how do unages
adapt tbemselves to the states of the souls spending an etemal afterlife in. their presence~

For Davidson. Suhrawardï provided no explanation. Davidson suggests that perhaps oelestial
bodies still serve as the imaginative faculty' 5 posthumous organ.l2J Yet Suhrawardï did provide an
explmation ta a number of these questions. Let us rry ta shed some üght on the role th. a oelestial
or some kind of celestial body plays in the posthumous fate of the imaginative facuJty.

Like A vicenna, Suhrawardï was compeUed to admit the survival of the imaginative faculty
in arder ta account for divine retribution describ ad in the Qur'iin. This was not a far-fetched extrapolation
of Avicenna's Peripstetic eschatoJogy. A contemporary of Suhrawardï. the theologisn. Fakhr al-Dm
al-Rizï did not rejeet the idea that the imaginative facuky may survive the death of the body and its
separation from corporeality.IZI Divine retribution depends on the survival of the imaginative faculty.
This is highlighted with bis classification of souls in the afterlife. particularly in. term.s of tbeir fate.
White the perfect 50ul will. in a sense. be iJl the presence of their light principles, the majority of
souts. like Avicenna's imperfeet souls. will occupY lower levels.

Suhrawardï establishes a classification of souls. just as A vicenna had done. accordiag to

119 Al-Kindï's mategy is ta distingwsb a (meta·physical) world in which laws of nature do net apply.

cf. Walzer. "New Studies 011 al-Kindi." L75-205.

lZO Davidson. AUintbi, J76.
tZl F. D. al-Rizï. aJ-hlabii/Udt (ed. Müsawi). H. 431; quoted in Micbot. Dest'n1t!'e. 169 n.l04}. For
Che cOJld:iti.ons of human 50Ws .rtel' separation. cf. Q.D. al-Shïrizï. RiS'iÏ1J#. 252-68 (Sama!, 216-30).
 CHAPTER NlNE - 296

'. their leveJ of attachment or deœchment from the materiaJ. The classification of souls in the afterlife
is slightJy different, depending on which of Suhrawardf 5 works one is studying. In the /ln,rs of4ir.hr
. there are four kinds of souls in the afterlife. First. tbere are the souls of fools (Avicenna' 5 ~) and
the righteous who will not suffer any pain, because tbey have neither false disobedienœ nor nonous
ignorance. However, because these souls have inclined. before their separation. towards bodies and
neglected the world of intellects, after their separation, they will be atteaeted to the celestiaJ bodies -
the emphasÎS here being on bodies - and most of them wilJ be inhabitants of paradise. lZ2
Second. there are the oompleted sauls (who Lose a11 their love for the material world) who
are separated from the body and who will experience endless pleasures that cannot be desaibed.
These pleasures persist witl1 the souls (Q .. 54:55) of those who bave tasted tbis pJeasure. i.e .. the
en1igbtened mind and the persons with power of insight. And, by observing the glory of Gad and the
world of light. they will remain constantJy in tbis state of pleasure and will become a luminous
lZ3
intellect - they will be like angels. These souls COlTespond ta Aviœnna' 5 perfect sauls.
Third. there are those who are leamed. but, because they have not purified tbeir moraIs
(J~i ), they will suffer great pains. Theil- knowJedge e1evates them to the superior worlds of light,

while their impure morals (~ ) attr8Cts the inferior world of darkness. Their sou15. after
them ta

,_.' their sepllnltiOQ (rom their bodies, will suffer temporary pains , but. in the end, they will be freed. 12<l

And finaUy. the souls of those who are in a st8te of compounded ignorance (~.jA ~ ),

tbose who not onIy ignore the trutb, but believe its opposite: tbese souls will, after the separation
from tbeir bodies. surfer the Most painful punishment from which tbey will never be freed. They will
be separated forever from the necessary being, because correct senses and tbin.Iting are taken away
from tbem. They will remain. in a state of darkness. because tbey have no familiarity with the world
of light - i.e.. the world of inteUigences. l2S

The fourfold division presented by Subrawardï in the Jatter work seems to be a variant of the
one established by A viœnna' 5 lmmolnrioAs. In the Temples of u.,irBis, however, a simplified
version of tbis classification presents the souls of individuals and distinguishes amongst miserable
souls, wbich are chastised because of their ignorance and miserable states in d..kness, and virtuous
and ecœllent souls which are proximate to God. l :z6

122 P8rt:ii, § 83, 72.14-73.6 (B~, 76).

123 P6rtû, § 80. 70.1-12 (Ard'~ 141-2: Book,73-4).
124 PJIrrii. § 82, 72.10-13 ( Book, 76).
Ils PItü, § 82. 71.15-n.l0 (Book, 75-6).
126 Hlly2bl, Vl (a) 80.8-10 (p) § 35, lOS. 11-4 (ALd'., 61; 1".fZrl8LJ,214-5).
 CfIAPTER NINE - 297

•
ln the OnenlN/-'/DumiOlltive lVisdom, as in Avicenns' 5 works, a simiIar idea of perfection
slang with an awareness of the sout' s ability or inabilit}.. to attain its perfec1ion is introduced which
detennines the sou1's fate in the afterlife. The human sours a.wareness oftheir perfection determines
its posthumous suffering sueh that ultimate pleasure consists in the perception of what is more
appropriate for the soul. AlI perceptions are, however. from the imma.teria! light. Light being the
principle, oruy the perception of it and the sou1's awareness of its principle will guarantee its
absolute pleasure and felicity.127

In the RL!rs of4ir.1J~. Suhrawardi mentions that the most e1evated pleasures are the intelleetual
pleasures, such th. the most perfected souls are thase which have attained their perfeeti.on and are in
no need of an imaginative fa cu Ity, having accessed these intellective lights 128 SiJJ.ee the immaterial
light cOlTesponds. in a sense, to Aviceona's intelligible world, the ulti.mate pleasure Suhrawardi's
souls experience correspond te the one experienced by A vicenna' s perfeet souls.

More importantly for the purpose of this discussion, Suhrawardï,lilce Avicenna, empbasizes
the importance of the imagiJJ.ative faculty for the eschatological fate of souls other than that of
perfect souls. He writes that "infinite illuminations" from the .. Ligbt of lights" and from the other
supemal lights "ref1eet" UpOJl the fortunare souls conjoined with them,l29 sueh that a soul may
"suppose" thatithss become "idemica1 witbthose ligbts, altbougb.infact,itretains its individuality... 130
The human soul' s attachment to the body and the preoccupation it has with the corpOl"eaI. prevent it -
i.e., the rational (Isfahbad-light) - to find pleasure in its perfection - its light principle - or to suffer
from its malady.131

The classification of souls in the afterlife round in the Oneoral-Dlumim/rir--e If~Sdom(chspter

l32
V) does not mitTor the classification of individuals found in the preface of the same work. First,
tbere are the souls of the very few who have perfeeted tbeir sauls, bath in praeti.cal and theoretical
knowledge. These are the sauls that will experience absolute happiness.

Second. there are the souls of those who have reached an intermediary stage of happiness

127 .(5brm,r. § 238,224.7-225.4 (5.01(4'=. 209); cf. Ibid., § 239, 225.8-226.1 (~. 210); cf. Ibid., §240,
226.3-12 (s.,,;. 210-11).
128 P8rrii, § 83,73.6-13 (.An;h.• 142; Book,77).
lZ9 HibNIlr, § 240,226.3-12 (~.v:. 210-1 1); d. Ibld., § 274,255.1-10 (.5:{.v:. 229-30).
130 ,f5kmIle, § 242,228.1-8 (SJfl".. 212).
l:Jl M'bD•• § 238, 224.L3-225.2 (Sifr.. 209).
132 .ffLkmnr, §§ 244-5, 229.6-230.9 <5.t4'=. 213-14); cf. Ibld. § S, 11 .12-12.14 (.5i{Ir-. 90). Amin RazavI

meJlÙoDS a third caregory, i.e., Chose who purified tbemse1ves to same extent (sudJtd) which i.s Ilot fovnd (?) in
the passages quClted 1J1 the IfrkmlM IlI-IsIJdiI, d. Amin. Razavi, Subn1WMtfi; 49.
 CHAPTFR NINE - 298

••• (~,.,.:a.1f ù-- .,~, ) and the ascetics (~~, ü-- .>lAjJl) Although this group couJd be an

example of the sauls that have reached an intennediary stage, chis is nat how Qu~b

interprets the text. Rather. he distinguis.hes between thesouls of those who have reached an intel mediarr
al-Dm al-Shïrâzï

stage of happi.ness, having achieved relative perfeaion in theoret.ica1 knowledge and in practice;ID
and the souls of tbose who have achieved perfection in praaice, but not 111 theoretica1 knowledge.l.Ja

In any case, however. the souls of those who belong to chis group - as a whoLe - do not
ascend to the pure intelligible realm. tbe world of pure Light. Rather. these souls ascend 10 the world
of suspended forms (~, ~, ~~ ~! 0.3 Li" -. 1 ). the place of manifestation of which are
someofthe celestial bodies (~~, tjl~1 ~ ~~). Those who havereachedanintermediary
stage in their happiness and the ascetics can, Suhrawardï writes. "existeltti«e images (~I .>4---=! ),
and they ha-ve the power (i",.i ) te do 50; foUowÏJlg their passions ( ~ L. ~ ). they make

present to themselves deJectable food, beautiful fonns, exquisite sound. and 50 011.',135 Quçb al-Dm
al-Sbïrizï interprets the suspended fonns . which Suhrawardi is here evidently discussing. as spiritual
imaginstive forms tbat exist iJldependentJy of any SUb~.I36

For Subrawardî, these forms. in fact, correspond to the imaginative pleasures expenenced by
the souls. Suhrawardï' s Jight lenDÎJ101ogy defines these imaginai represeotations or suspended fomts
(~ J:,:.. ) in tenus of cheir degl"ee of light sucb that the luminous fomlS (0 J': .;~; :.) are possessed

by the sauls of tbose who have acbieved a certain degree of perfection (. f ~) - whiJe the tenebl"ous
forms (~~) are possessed by the miserable souls (. 1.! ë "1 ).137

And finally, there are the miserable souls (i~J y~j ). Suhrawardi writes that when
"[the miserable souls] exit {rom the corporeal atadel (:.::;,~3~ ~ ~ ) [i.e., the body], they
possess certain shadows of the suspended forms (:. fi':' ;;-), in proportion ta theil" moral charaaer
(~~1).,,136

For Suhrawardï. souls other than the ones of the perfect individuals can experience ÏJl the
afterlife - in the sense of seeing. feeling, smelling or hearing - the promised pleasures and pains of
divine retribution. The nobler the habit (~ ) of experiencing true happiness of the soul is in this
life, the greatEl" its happiness will be in the heresfter. The opposite is true for the miserable souls who

133 Q.D. al-Shirizi. T.ilJfVN,S08.14-8 (~. 403 n.l).

134 Q.D. al-5bïrizï:, T.ilDvM. S08.19 (s.w:, 403 n.2).
135 Hikmllr, § 2~. 229.10-230.3 (~, 213).
1)6 Q.D. al-Sbirizï, SDn. 511.4-7 (-S:t4'=, 404 n.6).
137 Mbmtr, § 246.231.1-2 (SIfY~ 214).
138
Prkmw, ..~ 245,230.8-9 (..siw:. 214).
-.
CHAPTER NINE - 299

will suffer in proportion to their moral character.

In the EnlimllfioDS. Suhrawardï noces that those who experience the greatest happiness.
"especiaUy on the assumption of the existence of imaginative images (j::.. ,J~.3 .>=~ ~
:4.: i.:;. i)." are the souJs that "possess a station (U(,) in the celestial world with images." adding that
..the pious souls (J'.Jo:' i) experience [in a similar fashion] these pleasures witb the help of the
celestial and imaginative forms (~ di.: ï.!.;,; t. 4-aÎ )" The pious (J1.HÎ) are the ascetics of the

OnenhiL-/Huminnlir-t? ~Vistlom .139 Whatever is experienced by these souls - birds, houris, gold.
silver, etc. - is more beautifu1 ~i) and nobJer (..... ~i) than what is perceived in mis world.

For these intermediary sou15. happiness is aIso defined by appea1i11g ta the reJigious tradition.
Hence. the happiness of these sou1s is not of one kînd. There is the happiness of the ·<those brought
near" ~'Ji,..) who attain a grest happiness: there are the Companion of the right (~I yl.:....-i)
(the ones blessed in the Quein) who have Jess happiness. but who do not 8tt8i.n the "predeœssors"
(,,~L...u). i.e., those who ace "brought near" (Q. 56: 10-11; d. Q.. 83:25; Q., 83:25,27-8).1«1

Suhrawardfs solution to the probJem of retribution is, tberefore. similar 10 Avicenna's. He

posits the survival of the imaginai faculty capable of establishing some kind of re1arionship with

-', œlestial bodies. thereupon. enabling the non-perfeaed souls ta experieJlce posthumous pleasure and
pain. The same conditioJ1S discussed by Avicenna for the functioJling of the imaginative faculty -
i.e., the requirement of a bodily substratum - whether in. this world or in. the afterJife, recurs in
SuhrawEIl"dï's works. For Suhrawlll"dï, the function of the faculty of imagination permi~ sorne souls -
those of the innocent or the simple-min.ded (il.:) - ta attain an imaginative happiness (0,) La......
~'" ). In a similar fashion, it accoun~ for the imaginative nature of misery (~.3 o."t..i...:;. )

experienced by some of the miserable sou1s (.'.:ë .. i ) the anacbment witb a subtle body guS'8l1tees
the proper posthumous funetioning of this faculLy. Only a metaphysical subtle body can allow the
soul ta make use of ies imaginative facu1ty and experïence imaginai sensibilia. 141
Suhrawardï, then, discusses st least two possible solutions ta explain the existence of a

139 Suhrawardï writes that .. Les bienheureux ci' entre les « moyennement avancés » et Jes ascètes

d'eIltr'e ceux qui ont acquis la pureté morale s'évadent vers le monde des Images « en suspens » (;d-modJoI
llI-molllRltjJl) qui ont pour lieu d'apparition certalm bRrz1lkhs supéneurs. Leurs âme ont à faire exister les
Images et eUes ont le pourvoir.... El ces formes sont plus parfaites que celles 'lui existent en nOIre monde, car
les lieux d'apparition et les suppons de ces dernières sont imparfaits, tandis que [les heux d'apparitions] de
ceUes-là SO!lt pafaits. Et (les cmoyennemeat avancés»] sont pour l'éœnlité dans ces l16rzltrhs [supérieurs].
puisqu'est à jamais durable leur attache avec eux et u.ne certaiJle ténèbre et que les lJJrrzltkhs supéneurs sont
ÏJlc:CXTUptibles," cf. {5kmlU, § 2044, 229.10-230 ~ (~.213-4).
141
TlI!W71JN, § 64,94.12-95.2.
141 TlI1wifnü, § 61,89.15-90.1.
 CHAPTER NINE - 300

bodily substratum that aHows the imaginative faculty ta funet10n in. the afterlife. One solution is to
posit a pneumatic body mat exists in the air as a kind of compounded body (~.,,- \ ~ )-
consisting of vapor ( J ~ ) and smoke (ù~.) ) - that could aet z the subsU8wm for the pro(:uets of
the active imagination. This is a solution which he rejects as being devoid of foundation. He argues
thal whatever is found in the air cannat maintain a state of equilibrium (J'~! ). thus. becomîng
hotter or calder according ta its proximity ta the sources of heat or cold. l42 lnterestingly enough.
these are objections that echo Avicenna's objections agsï.nst Thibit b. QulTi and the Galenic notion
of pneumo.

Another solution proposed by scbolars whom Suhrawardi does not mention by name is
viewed more positively (~\~ ) br bïm.. This solution c10sely resem.b1es the one Avicenna
p-oposed. It consists in positing the existence of a celestial body (~."t....:..... i ~ u."S ) tbat can serve
as a substratum for the produas of the imaginative faculty (t.:.J~;' -, 1.~~"... ) of those who have
attained a degree of bappiness (_,~ ) and those who suifer misery (_~i ). Tbese souJs are
unab1e to apprehend (;~ rJ ) by themselves the intelleetual world - that of the intelligences and
the intelligibles or light - and who bave not severed their attachment (4.i~ ) with bodies and the
bodily.

-" For Suhrawardï, this attaehment ta a celestial body constitutes the condition that guarantees
the soul the abiJity ta experienœ imagina! pleasures and pains. l43 Again, in the U.trimohOA, be writes,
"as for [the souls of] those who have attained [a relative] happiness (.I~). they perceive by means
of thar faculty of active imagination wondrous and pl~asant images and forms (-~ Ct'" il ;.. -,.!
~ ë:: '. j -4 :.: 7" c -, .,;".-,,) with which they experience pleasure... 14'1 These are the souls of the ïntennediary
group and of the ascetics. It is not the rea1 happiness experienced by tbose who are able to access the
realm of pure Ù1telligence and the superior happiness of those who are in the proximity of Gad
(ù~l.- - ~r-..Ji-).

The imaginative perceptions - e.g.. the suspended fonns - experienced by the souls of the
Ùltermediary group and of the ascetics aŒ{uire. in the afterlife, a quality and an intensity tbey did Ilot
have in this warld. These imaginal (orms acquire qualities that are associated only with the ceJestial
realm, and as such "are nobler than what can be perceived br tbese [worldly] bodies since these
impurities [associ.ed witb worJdly bodies) do net adulten1te [the fonns which take ceJe~ia1 spheres

142 TI1wL{Jlû, § 61.89.8-15.

140 .ffrbnllr, § 142, 133.8-10 (S6S;, (27): cf. Ibid., f ISO, 138.9-139.10 (S6S;. 133); cf Ibid., § 194,
187.14-188.2 (&w:, IBO).
144 TllfJVi'.fJk. § 61,90.1-2.
 CEfAPTER NINE - 301

as bodily support]." The perfection of these suspended forms is due ta the nlOlre of the ce1estiaJ
~.
bodies themselves. Their nsture is such that they do not suCfer COtTUption ("W "i) and, thus. they do
notaffectthenatureofthesesuspendedforms.lolSSimilarideasaredeveloped in the Oneotol-J.tIu.mLoarù,~
&~'isdo.m.l46

The possibiJity of an attschment of the souls wîth celestial bodies in the afterlife. however.
raises some difficulties: What type of correspondence should exist betWeen the number of souls and
the number of celestl.a1 bodies? How could there be a presence of more man one soul attached to a
single œlestial body wbere. on the one hand. each celestiaJ body is ruled over by a ce1estial soul and.
on the other hand, more than one hum an soul attach themselves ta the same œlestial body. in
addition to the ce1estial soul it already possesses?
To such objections. Suhrawardi offers bis more personal reformulation of the Peripatetic
position. He writes that although there is a celestial body (r ~ ) that serves as the substratum for
every faculty of imagination ~), he adds that .. il is not far-fetched that there should be, for Many
sauls, a single body (~I", r~) in which each one of [the human seuls] would contempLate (,i,A~)

the fonns, "147

A passage in Avicenna's Comme.nr-:r on the pseudo- TlJeolD,!!Y ofAn'Srorle resonates

witb a similar idea: "If what we tbink about our souls is true, i.e., that they have an IIttaChment with
the celestial souls such that they would be for example like mitTors for them - a single mirror that
would be common ta Many that look at it - then it is possible..... l~ Avicenna here al1udes to the
pombility for Many souls ta be associated with a single celestial body.

This seems ta be precisely the position Suhrawardï actopts. Futthermore. Suhrawardï

acknowledges tbat human souls do not possess the ability to move th8l particuJar celestiaJ body.
CeJe5tial bodies are moved br tbeir own celestiaJ sauts, which impart on them their wills. Tbere is.
therefore, no possibility for human souls to stop each other, because of the difference of tbeir
wiJls. 14SI

But how does Suhrawardï concave of this ceJestia! body or bodies and its or their place
witbin the traditional Peripatetic cosmological system? He does conceive of a Fossible hierarchy of

145 TllIJri!nû, § 61.90.1-5.

146 Hrbn•• § 2+1, 230.2-5 (.siw, 213-4); cf. HrbDI. § 141, 132.6-10 (st~, 1204); d. Q.D.
al-Sbirizi. Til '1R?1Û. 509 (.s:v.:v:, 0403 D.2 and n.3).
147 TJllwL{Jk. § 61,90.9-10 (Dc'SITAt!e, 1860.144).
148 Avicenna. SJntr;fJ, 12.7-8 ("Notes." VIII, 4, 04(4).
149 TJlfwi/hir, § 61. 9O.10-lL.
 CHAPTER NlNE - 302

• celestial bodies in terms of nobility (....i ~) This wauld account for the various types of auachment
according to thedegreereached by eacb humansou1. 15(J In the following passage. however. Suhrawa-di
seems to ldentify a particular sphere as being that particuLar receptive ce1estial body. r-.loreover. he
does not identify it with one of the aJready existing spheres. He writes:

As for the miserable souls (.I.:i 10.; ). they do not have a relation with these noble
bodies [i.e., the celestial spheres] which possess luminous souls (...,...~I ~I".J
:;j.::a '-1,.,.:a..J 1), and the faculty [of representatioo.] makes them require a bodily imagination
(V""" ~ ~ ) ft 15 not impossible that below the Sphere (~) of the Moon and
a,ove the Sphere (o,.,s ) of Fire.151 there exists a spherical body which would not be
pierced through (l3 ~ ~ ) [and] which wouLd be of the species of its soul ( ~
~ t..~ ). It would be a body (~j~) [loœted] between the etbencal (~~I ) and
e1emental (~~ ) worlds. becoming a substratum for the produet5 of their
imaginative faculty (~:i.:.;. -, 1 ~~,.. ). [The miserable souls] would imagine, by
means of [this body] (~ w ï,;';" -,,! ) their bad deeds as images (J=:a... ) of fll"e and
152
snakes (<.:oJ l:--
w
" ,,1 ~ e.:"..).

Miserable souls cano therefore, perceive imaginatively the pains and tonnents they have been
p-omised in the QurBn -like the buming of scorpions or the pains experienced by drinking from the
Zaqqüm <r~j ).153 The problem.. however. 1s that Suhrawardi does nat identify in this work this
particular sphere whose existence he postul81es. In tbis passage, in. faet. he appears to allude to the
. --~~.

existence of only one new sphet"e.

In A O'!y widJ LI Gn:wp ofSufJ5, however. Suhrawardï proposes a hierarchicaJ cosmological

schem.e that appears ta introduce [Wo new spheres. His aim is ta propose a correspondence between
the existing t'Wo higher spheres - the Sphere of Spheres and the Sphere of the fixed st8l"S - and the
two spheres he ÏJltroduces. He places these new spheres below the Sphere of the Moon. the Jast of the
œlestial spheres - below Saturn. Jupiter, Mars, the Sun, Venus. Mercury.l~ To the question, "Why
is the body of the Sun. bigger and brighter than the ether stars?" The Sufi master replies:

Because it is in the middJe ... If you couat the seven planets. the Sun is in the

spheres below them.. Ether and Zamharir (J: j).155 *

middle. And just as there are two spheres above the seven. there are two other

ISO He also considers plausible some of the indications found in the Qur'in that all'Ude ta sudl
dqrees, e.g., Ibat the paradise is 10cated lJ1 the faunb heaven or thatit 1$ the widrh of the heavens and the earth.
çf, Q.,57: 21.
151 This is one cf the C01ll" spheres th. contalDS the elemenIs.
152 T.llfrri/nU, § 61,90.15-9.
153 The iJlCerœ1 tree with exœediJJgJy bitter fruits, mentioned in the Q'Ur'iD., d. TJlIwf.ltl, § 61,
90.19-91.1.
154 .fliizf. § 4, 244.10-245.3 (ALrh.. 370-1; Jf..(Y-Jt:, 45-6); cC. .{fikmar. § 150. 138.9-139.1 (SJlÇ. 133).
 CfiAPTER NINE - 303

'. The spheres he explicitly introduces are aber and Zamharir, both situated beJow the Moon
and are associated with the world of e1ements. This is, indeed, abSe1lt from Avicenna's works who
only mentions Zamharir as beûlg something extremeLy cold. The term itse1f appears in the Quran
(Q., 76: 13) 156 This term. was aIso used br the Ikhwân al-$afii' in their meteoroLogy. They divided
the air of the !iUblunar region into three Layers flCSt, the higher layer of Ether (~I ). heated by

contact with the lunar circle: second, the middle layer of Zambarir, extl"em.ely cold: and finally, the
lower layer of Nasim, the moderate temperature.lS7 For Avicenna. Zamharir does not constitute ft

sphere per se, but omy one of the layers (~~ ) of the elements wluch are locus of he81 and
ISB
coldness.

The difference between the Spheres of aber and Zambarir may be re1ated to the fate of the
differem souls. e.g., Ether for the (rel~vely) happy and Zamblrir for the miserable souls. The
relationship between the fate of the different souls and these spheres is, however, never discussed by
Suhrawardi. These spheres are, nonethe1ess. important. For instance, to the question, "Wby does the
Moon bave no light?" The Sufi master replies:

Every star that exists is becween two spheres ... and the light of the stars is reinforced
by the sphere. A star on a spbere is like the vital force in the human body, i.e., the
vital force is reinforced by the bodily strength, and vice versa. However, the side of
the Moon that is toward the esrth is void of a sphere. The IWo splJeres mat are
there are conneeted ta the e1emental world. Just as subtlety dominates in the first and
the second spberes [i.e., the Sphere of spheres and the Sphere of the flXed stars],
gravity is dominallt in these two, after the example of tbe ce1estia1 semicircles we
have just given: in descending order these [wo spberes have a greater rel~on to blue
than. white, while the fll'5t and second spheres have greater relation ta white than to
blue. By white and blue we mean subdety and gravity. Sace the sphere of the Sun is
in the middle, which is the position ofequilibrium betWeen subtlety and gravity, the
Sun received a full measure of light and the Moon was deprived altogetber. l59

Suhrawardi makes Ether and Zambarir Ùldependent spheres below the Sphere of the Moon.
Throughout bis works, however, he defined the etherical spheres with the spheres located above the
Sphere of the Moon. In the Paœs, he mentions that "there is a cetUin perfection and a desire for this
petfection that is possessed by each of the species of the separated entities (4.,; J là.) - etherical- and

ISS RiiZL-, § S, 245.5-7 (Ald.• 371; M,)'3T.. 46).

156 Aviœnna, NIfI;U, Jlfea., 686.2; d.lbid., 689.15; cf. Corbin, An:IJmwe, 379 n. 14.
157 N.... AI1 fAIrrxIlTaM6 ra IsJMDic Cosm~i:WIJrxtrint:'S, 85-6 (based on lkhwin aJ-Safâ, RJiS8JJ
,4 vols. (ClIÏro: cArabiyah Press, (928), vol. 2,57-9, 66,67-9,70-3).
158 AvicemuL, N1Ijiïr, PAp, 5, 30S.15-307.12.
159 RiiZL-, § 8, 2~6.18-247.11 (An:-h. 373).
 CHAPTER NlNE - 304

elemental [entities)."l60 Nonetheless. celestial bodies nIe over the elemenlS (~-,l....-..&JI \'~~' ùli
~l:.) ',,11 o.,.>Ali ).161 because like the intellective substaJ1ce wbich is noblerthan the soul, the
etherical entities (~l:~i [sic]) arenoblerthan. theelemental (~l:~) entities. This information.
Suhrawardï writes. is ta be found in Aristotle's work On LIre He~/F"eIZS (.L.......J i ).1b2 In the Temp/esof
4~1Jr.. like the passage from InnmoLions quoted earlier. Suhrawardï posits the existence of another
sphere. a body betWeen the ethereal (which constituEeS œlestial bodies) and the eJemental wodds
(which constitutes this wodd).115.J

Suhrawardï is. tberefore. not atwuys consistent in bis identification of the etherical. At times.
he rejeets the Peripatetic tbesis chat the etherea1 belongs (exclusiveJy) to the œlestial spheres. He
estabJisbes instead the existence of an independent ethereal sphere. adjacent la bis new celestial
sphere. Zambaric. At othee times. he 85sociates the etherical of the Spbere of Ether with al! the
celestial sauls.

1.. CelesJi81 spheres Aviceana

Spllere of che mooo 5
Edlerea1 sphere l. Suhrawardî
ZsmhM S
Sphere of rll'e
Sphere or war.er 16<:1
Elemem.al ~eres - four elemems
Sphere of air
Sphere of esrth

In any case. Suhrawardï posits an additional reaJm by which imaginai representations cao
occuc. This rea1.m identifies a medium that allows for certain sensitive perceptions. It also p-ovides a
decisive solution intended ta do away with whatever might be left of a similitude of transmigration.
This sphere would have to be loeated betWeen the sphere of the Moon and the highest level of the
elemental world. adjoining the lowest ce1estial sphere of Peripatetic cosmology.
The souls of the misersble do not enjoy any relation with the .. noble spheres" and are.
indeed. of the lowest rank. The q~estion remains unanswered as to the fate of the souls of ascetics

160 MltSIdn"'. § 169.433.14-5.

1&1 ilfashJÏri'. § 134.389.9-10.
1&2 if,fAYnm"'. § 170,435.11-2.
1&3 H~nïkiJ, V (a) 78.3-5 (p) § 32, 104.4-5 (~h.. 60; fsmlO.I92).
1604 ln Avicenna. the different e1.emeJltS occupy dIfferent leveJs - higher and Jower (o~ ) - rather
than. being deïl1ted as spheres, cf. Avu:enna• .MI.;iïr. P.lJys..306.11-307.12.
 CHAPTFR NINE - 305

and the interm.ediate souls: Do mey attach tbemselves ta these particulac spheres of Ether and
Zambarir or to more noble spheres. in proportion co their detachment !rom ail that is corporeal and
bodily? Vlith the p05sibility of experiettcing these imaginai pleasures and pains with the heJp of
these two celestial bodies. it is the requirement for a lrll{r physical - i.e.. tetTestriai - body. either
for experiencing or the perfecting ofme human soul. that seems te be elimiJJ.ated. This solution is. in
facto what he has himse1f experienced and cano therefore, be .. experientially" corroborated. 165

Avicenna had given great importance tD the faculty of imagination and set the conditions for
the elaboration of imaginai perceptions iJl the aftedife and. thus. indieated the path for the elaboration
of an imaginai world. The solution Subrawa-di proposes builds on Avicenna' s allusions. He posits
the existence of two other celestial spberes whi.ch find their place in cheir own independent cosmic
rea1m. Thesolutionheproposes.therefore,goeswel.1beyondAvicenna's scantindicatioQS.Suhraw8l"dï's
remarks that there must exist new independent spheres which, however, introduces the issue of the
ontological. statUs of tbat these psrticu1ar spheres (or unique sphere) are to have within traditional
Peripstetic cosmologies. It is Su.brawardï' 5 indications concem.i.ng the existence of an independent
ÎJnliginal world which guided Jater philosophers to posit the existence of a real..m of autonomous
• 166
1ll'lages.

...... -
A SEPARATE WORLD OF IMAGINATION
In his On"en/lll-IDUmmllJ'f-e ~YLsdom, Suhrawardï c1aims that bis own mystical experiences
have disclosed to him the existence of four distinct worlds, helping him refute the tbesis Qf the
167
philosophers that oaly three worlds exist. Tbere is, first of all, the world of intelligences, i.e., the
dominating lights (ojAli JI~j ); second, the world of souls (celestial and human), i.e.. the ruling
lights (o';'~ JI~l );I6B third , the world of bodies (~) divided into [wo bodily rea1ms (o4à_LH)'
one for tbe ce1estiaJ. spberes and one for sublunar elements;169 and finally, there is the "imaginai"
world (a term. coined br Corbin), a world of luminous and tenebrous suspended forms (4iI...... J""-
_
6
• ~
J.1 ••
-. 1
I.."" .
I l ' ) 170
«.3 4.:-u .....

165 r6wf.fJ.k. § 61,91.1-4; cf. Mlchot. LJerlinée , 200 n. 36.

166 E.g., Diwlid Qa~, Ibn ~Arabï, Lahïji, Shaylth ~ad AJ:JSiÎï, Q.O. al-Shirazi, Mulli Sadri, cf.

Walbridge, Sama", 159.

167 .{UJ::mlÛ, § 247.232.2-4 (SJ!t{"., 215). These are the world of intelligences or JalJinU(<:;.J,j~),the
world of souts or A-fllllkrH (c.:.J~), and the viSlble worJd of material bodi.es <ri ~1 ) or lf,fu./k (.:1L), cf.
rdqii:f, § 12,270.1-2 (..4n:lt., 22); cf. P6tii, VIII, § n, 65.3-11 (BDak, 68).
168 Tbese would be attaehed te tbe ce1estiaJ spbel"es and the human bodies. cf. Q.O. al-5hïrizï, IùSiilnr

,241 (Saena", 206).

 CHAPTfR NlNE - 306

The fourth world. introduced by Suhrawardï ÏJl the On"enllL1-/DumLoldL·ve ~vistlom 1S often
thought to consist of independent images and disembodies spectres. This is the reslm where souls
can experience their imagined posthumous happiness or misery.171 Fol" Outb al-Dio al-S~tirazi (d.
1311). this wodd of images faUs between the worlds of bodies and of souls, beœuse it is more
immaerial than the former and less than the lalter. In An Episde .4sceTmmog me llezw{Y ofrbe
"'Onu of fOll-{g-e • an expansion on discussions aIready broached in bis COHlD1t:'nbUY on the
Onenr.IJI-UJuAlllJrliVe ~Vistlom, Qu!b al-Dio al-Shïriizï mes to work out sorne of the philosophicaJ
implications of this concept.l72 Fol" him. the ontologica1 nature of this fourth imagma! world is
unambiguous; al times, the imaginaI wodd is coextensive witb OUl" world (as when we see its
manifestations ÏJl miracles or the Like), at others the souls of the dead are manifested in one of the
spheres of the planets. Hence. fOl" him... the World of Image seems to be wrapped &round OUl" world.
with ils ground being OUl" haven. ,,173

For MuUi $adrii. the imsgiJlaJ power of the sou! "is a substance whose being is aetually and
essentially separate from this sensible body."174 Mulli $adrii believes in the existence of such an
immaterial world, but disagrees witb Suhrawardi regarding lite nature of imaginai forms which "are
p."esent in the soul, as saon as the soul using imagination, pro du ces imagiJlal forms. Those [forms]
-. are not in a world outside the soul by the effect of something orber than the soul. "175

In accordance with Corbin' s interpretatïon of Su1u'awardi' s warks, each res1m. distinguished

by Suhrawardi has a cotTeSponding organ ofperception, i.e.. inteUee::tive iJltuition, imaginative intuition,
and sensible perception. Corbin himself explains that the imaginative al" imagination of the world of
souls (mlllllblr) "is an authentic organ of knowledge. It has its own noetie function, and the world
thal corresponds ta it hast on its own accol"d, its ontologica1 reality. "176 The imaginai world. therefore,

t69 The bodies of the spheres and of the eJemems, d. Q.D. al-SJürizï, RJr.ilJÜ1, 241 (Sam~, 206).

M~bah Yazdi mentions that the IlluminatioDÎ5tS pcoved the existence of another worJd called the wood of
imma&erieal phantoms (i;~ L 4-1d' ) or of suspended fonns ~ .j~ ), an intermediary wood becween
die inteUec:tuaJ wodd and the oorporeal.. This was called the world of bwz;Ikb, or imaginal wodd (J~ rJk).
He adds tbal, -the Shayth aJ-Ishriq does net use the teml "barzath .. for the Imaginai world of forms, but
applies this tcrm ta the maenal worJd," cf. Yazdi, • An.lmroduaion to Muslim PbiJosophy. Part 6," 104-5.
170 HibDIIr, § 2<47, 232.2-3 (&w:' 21S); Ibid., § 259, 242.10-243.8 (~, 222).
171 Subrawardï "envisicns an eDlire, objectively exîsting "other world," a world of "images" (.!DUrnal)

and "disembodied specters" (JlShlJ8!J mujarnld;/), where certain souIs reœive tbeir "unagined eudaemonia" in
die hereafter," cf. Davidson, AlfJlnlb.i, 175,175 n. 225; cf. Rahman, "Oream," 168-71.
m Q.D. al-Shïrizi, RJ:dIJIh, 206-9; cf. Ibid., 208-11; cf. Ibid, 154-59.
I?J Walbridge, .sQ-m~, 150.
174 Mulli Sadri al-Shïrizi, il/-~.,.p.ath,248 ( H-'iSdom, 159).
175 brean., -Sauory and imaginai Perœption." 79-BO.
 CHAPTER NlNE - 307

•
possesses ilS own reality.
Yet the miner is much more complicated. Imagina! forrns that partake in the world of
imagination iietUa1ly possess al lesst mo types of status. The first status of imaginaI fonns is more or
less similar to the traditional Peripatelic notion of the forms that are grasped by individuai human
souls as objects of their faculties of representation (see section on the Cacult)' of imagination). In the
afterlife. the luminous and tenebrous imaginai or suspended Conns provide the means by which the
miserable souls experience pain and the souls of those who have achieved a certain degree of
perfection experience imaginative happiness (~." ~I"L.....,., ). 177 These imaginai forms permit the
fulfilment of the promises of prophecy as weil as the .. imaginative" resurrectlon of bodies. l78 It is in
the latter sense that Suhrawardï cm daim that bodily resulTection is conœivable. As such. bis
position does notgreatly diverge from Avicenna's own behef in amereJ.y spiritual resulTeetion.

The position Suhrawardï adopts is bighly philosophica1. Indeed. it is the imaginal faculty's
association with sorne sort of "ethereal" corporeality. simila-Iy responsibLe fer the representation of
imaginai forms, which guarantees the sours spiritual and tberefore. imaginai resulTec:tion. Mareover.
Suhrawardï introduœs the imaginative facuLty within bis philosophicat explanalion for the
manifesations of the divine that cao occur in the chosen ones. as seen in the example of the
prophets. For instance. the ruling celestiaI üghts (~ o.>:'oW J,~i ) - the celestial souls - can
aeste imaginai fonns in these chosen individuals in order that the manifestations of tbese forms
The manifestation of tbese imaginai. - "suspended" - forms (~
l79
become accessible to tbem..
Ula....) can be produced an.ew and disappear,resembling what bappens in milTors orin the imaginative
facu1ties (~~).l80

Suhrawardï attributes a second, more meœphysical status ta .. suspended" forms ( ~ .,)~)

and "suspended" bodies (Ula.... <.r-~ ). Tbese are distinct from Aviœnna's notion of mental
forms as objects of absUlletïon. These "suspended" forms are part of wh. he caUs the "wodd of
immaterial apparitions" (o;~f C. ~\JI rJ~ ).l81 Moreover, in a number of passages from bis

176 Corbin contuJues, .. Il semble q,ve Sohrawartli ait été le premier" fonder systématiq,uement l' onrologle

«régionale» prop-e de cet univers intermédia.1l'e [...) ce mu.Ddus.im~ (iiIIm ;I/-midJiü) [ ... ) le jrSm
JIIlihJilf, P" exemple. le corps subtil, est un corps im,.m11l, mais non pas un cOlJls «imaginall'e»," cf. Corbin.
EH /siNIl inmim, n. 60; cf. Idem. HJ:smire, 92.
rn H.ibrJJIr. § 247. 232.3-5 ( %' 2(5).
178
HJbDJû, § 248, 234.4-5 (~.v:, 2(5); cf. Corbin, ffJ"sroirr!. 297-8, see also 261,475.
179 HJbmtr, § 247. 232.6-233.1 (S.i(f:. 215); cf. ldenL. § 2046,231.1-2 (.siw=. 214).
IEIO HJkmJu. § 247. 232.5-6 ( SJ{.v:. 215).
181
FUbDar, § 248,234.4-5 (s.r~, 215).
 CffAPTER NlNE - 308

•
CbenDl./-IDumLoID-r.-e JVisdom, he distinguishes becween these "suspended" fonns and Plato's self-

subsisting Ideas. Some of the "5Uspended" forms. he infonns us, are "tenebrous (~.: '.~ ) and
ethers a-e luminous (0.)_ ',-, t!. ):,l~ The mode of these tonns' luminescence pereains, foremost, ta
the human seuls' capacity to perceive these fonDS. This is especially teUe of the soul' s experience in
the afœrlife, e.g., the perception of the prom.îsed punishments or rewlIl"ds_ Hence, those who have
reached a certain Leve! of purification (.1 ~ ) - whet.her inteJlectuaJ or spiritual - can. perceive the
luminous forms, whiJe those whose souls have remained miserabJe (.~i ) can only perceive the
tenebrous fonns. l63
The capacity ta perceive these fonns is. therefore. variable. The more the sou! has progressed
in term.s of its detachment from everything which is bodily and has asœnded to me Luminous or the
intellective. the more it is able to receive these fonns whose most perfee:t manifestation is defined
again in terms of their luminosity. lGa The reception of these fonns aIso depends on the extent of the
soul' 5 moral cbaracter <4;i ~i ~ ),185 because the deve10pment and the acquisition of soch a
receptive capacity will determ.in.e the eschatological fate of souJs. The deveJopment of one' s moral
character will aIso become one of the conditions fer the perception of suprasensible realities by
certain human beings in this world.
The "suspended" fonns can aIso have places of manifestation in the extern.al world. In the
(HieJlr4l-b./llmjntnir--e IflSdom, Suhraw..dï notes mat:
Sïnce these "suspended" forms (~ ~L:--) are not in the mitTors or iD something
else and do nat possess a substratum. therefore, it is possible mat they may have a place
of manifestation in this world. Perhaps, they can even. move from thei.. [different] pLaces
of m&JJifestation. l86
Suhrawardi aIso believes that .. and amongst tbese [fonIls] ace a variety of jinns and demons
(~~ ) ... 187 The lalter' are p-oduced by the suspeJl.ded fonns and souls (most probabLy, aCter
death).I88 The reality of the material. manifestation of these forms is furtber corroborated by the
physical, worldly manifestations of some of these "suspended" bodies. A number of individuals have
attested te the existence of tbese manifestations. These forms may sometimes be out of human reach,

182
ffLbnllt, § 246,230.10-231.1 (5iW=,214).
183
HJkm6r, § 246,231.1-2 (~.214).
H....
ffrkmlU. § 244, 229.10-230.5 (~4T.,213.4) and § 245.230.6-9 C.siw:. 214).
las
HiJ:mN, § 2+1, 229.10-230.1 (S~.213) and § 245.230.8-9 (.5:9'=, 214).

.. ~. 186

187
ffrkm., § 246,231.2-4 (~4T., 214).
~, § 246,231.4 (S"!4T.. 214).
188
HJbDJIr, § 247,232 (Stfy., 215).
 CHAPTER NrNE - 309

while al other tintes. they are felt as corporeal entities. For instance. il is possible ta suuggle with
these sensible representations. For Suhrawacdi. th1S corroborates the fact that they ace not Mere
mental representations that occur onJy in the faC1Jlty of commoo sense .169 By offering such an
explanation. Suhrawardï is able to account for a number of divine mamfestations - e.g .. jinn and
demons - by appealing to the existence of this fourth wodd. l90

More generally. however, these forms ac:quire places of manifestation in the soul. Suhrawarrlï' 5
"suspended" fonns. the imaginative forms of hidden. reaJities (~~ ), require the existence of
some sort of corporeal1ty - albei.t subtle - and of some type of association with particuJar forms in
arder ta be existentiated in the sout. Suhrawardï is. however. caœgorical. These "suspended" forms
or ideas (~ J::..) that are "seen" in dreams are"aU [self] subsisting fOrnls" (:t..:li ~ 4JS):.I"jIl
They are such things as "true" visions witnessed during dreams or ÏJl an awake state. In chis
partîcular context, the imaginaI forms - as .. suspended" forms - a<X{uire a certain type of independent
existence. Their real essence somehow lies outside the human mind or the human soul whose
faculties onJy aa as the receptacle. i.e., the "place of manifestation of the "suspended" forms" (-ü
~tJCùlla~ ~).192

.~.
But how is one ta experience those "suspended n forms, consideriag the fact that the mode of
perceiving these fonns seems rD differ from the traditional Peripatetic perception of forms? According
to A vicenna, imaginative and ïntellective forms are perceived as ft result of a process of abstraction
in wbich the different sctivities of the rational soul are introduœd.
Suhrawardï's explanatïon for the perception of these "suspended tt forms. in faet. emphasizes
the sours passivity and capacity of receiviag these imagina! forms without any resort ta such a
process of abstraction. at least in the initial stage of their perception.
The seJf-subsisting "5Uspended" forms are, nonetbeless. integrated into. and made a part of
the process of representation (itself within a more generaJ process of intellection) by which the
hum8l1 soul perceives universals and patticuJar.;. The perception of the "suspended" forms - which
..e not intelligible forms - occurs through the perception of particuJars. These are percei.ved ei.ther
n
through the "presence" (..J~ ) of these particulars to the sou! or through the "presence of these

perticulars ta a matter or an entio/ which is .. present" (~L:. ) to the soul, such as the imaginative

189
fflkm., § 246, 231.8-232.L (5i{r:. 214-5).
t-1Ia. 190 Hibmtr, § 2048.2304.4-5 (SJf!T., 215).
~ 191 /fikmllr. § 256, ~O.8-10 (S.." 220).
192
/frb11i#, § 260. 2+4.5 (St4'=, 222).
 CHAPTFR NINE - 310

forms (4:-J4à.J"'- ):.l~ Althougb Suhrawardï departs from the traditional Aviœnnan position by
postulating the existence of suspended forms. he explains that the perception of "suspended" forms
is analogous ta the perception of imaginai forms. Both are integrated into representation. The
perception of "suspended" forms is. however. no longer the produet of a process of imprinting or of
abstraction. Perception thus results from the "presence" of forms ta the soul. forms that. in facto exist
• the metaphysica11evel.

How should we therefore understand the metaphysicaJ existence of suspended forms? These
forms .-e usually associated with a world of tbeir own - an "imaginai" realm - in which they can
oost. The p'oblem. bowever, is the particular ontological nature one should asaibe ta this fourth
world. The introduction of yet anotha- realm. is perhaps justified in order to guarantee the retribution
p'0mised by the re1igious tradition ta aU souls in tbe aftedife. Since these are described in sensitive
terms, it must be possible for some part of. or. in faet, aU of the interna! faculties responsible for
representaion, i.e., the imaginative facuJty in general, to survive in the afterlife. It is onIy with such
a stipuJation. tbat the philosophica1 antbropology of our authon can then conform ta religious
eschatology.

-" We bave mentioned how Avicenna himseli aUuded

souls to imagine orto witness (~I ...:; ) imagiJlative forms (~~.).,..
ta the possibilit;y for sorne individuaI
) in the afterlife witb the
l94
help of the celeltial bodies which could chen, in mm, become the instrument (;Ui) of these SOuls.

One can UJlderstan.d how A vïcenn.8 could aetuaUy concede sorne credence ta such a position. considerin.g
the faet that witbin Peripatetic cosmology each celestial sphere possesses a soul upon which it

imparts motion. Eacb ce1estial soul aIso possesses a facu1ty of active imagination chat renders it
cap8ble of the representatioJl (;",-.:; ) of particul81'S. Similarly, it is also the source of prophetie
l95
knowledge.

The novel solution Suhrawardï envisions is positing the existence of a particuJar celestiaJ
bodies, Ether and Zamblllir - at cimes one, only E:..her - that can selVe as the substratum for the
produe:ts of the imaginative facully in the afterlife. [.n mis way. tbe imaginative faculty imagines the
forms and images of pleasam or unpleasant tbin.gs, respectively. from Heaven and Hell.l96
It is net clœr, however, if Suhrawardï limits the existence of "suspended Il forms only ta

193 AfJlSIhn", § 210,487.15-16.

194 AvicellJ1a, SJnliï~, Afel./l., IX, 7,431.17-432.8 (Afdl., 164).
195 Avicenna, SAiN', ,A,ftU., IX, 3, 401.1-5 (,A,f~, 135).
196 TJtlwï{Jk, § 61, 90.1-2.
 CtfAPTFR NlNE - 311

these particular spheres of Zamharir and Ether. especially in view of bis amblguous use of the term
Etherical and the realm it is said ta co ver. If. however. the existence of "suspended" forros were
limited to tbese [wo spheres, each one could cOlTespond to the state of perfection of the souls - e.g..
Etberfor the intennediste souls and Zambsrir for the miserable souls. The spheres would then be the
substratum of the soul's posthumous imaginative faculty. Zambarir, whose Qur'inic occurrence does
not leave any doubt as ta its meaning, partakes in the realm of the cold and the tenebrous (could this
be HeU described in the Qur'an?)

Suhrawardï aIso alludes [0 the faa that celestiai spheres possess facuJties. similar in fashion
to those of the human body. Likewise, tbey a-e associated wlth "5Uspended" fonns. CeJestial spheres
do not become the substratum of mese forms, because these "suspended" fonns do not iJlhere Ln a
body. On the contnry. ce1estial spberes are only the "place of manifestations" for the world of
"suspended" forms (:i.:#' tjl.r:Jf ~ tA ~ ~ 14iL..LI j::J. 1 rl L.:.). 197 Therefore, "suspended"
forms should n.ot be associaœd solely with the Spheres of Ether and Zamharir, but with aU celestial
spl1eres.

This latter conclusion appea-s ta be quite consistent with the traditional Peripatetic cosmology
Suhrawardï c10sely follows. [f "suspended" fonns are associated with the totality of the celestiaJ
spheres and souls, then, this position could account for the different degrees of luminosity œsociated
wil:b some of these .. suspen.ded" forms, some being loftier and others Jower, and their correspondence
tG the hierarchy of the different celestial spheres. 19B
Moreover, this position would be consistent with the fact tbat celestial spheres would become
the (subtle) material substance that ceJestial souls require for the aetualization of imaginative forms
in a simi1ar way as the psychic pneumo serves as the (subtle) materiaI substratum for the internai
facu1ties, one of the conditions of the human. sour s representation. Celestial souls receive knowJedge
from tbe Necessaty Existent, e.g., the (imaginai) fonns of past and future events, which a-e firmly
estabJisbed in these celestial managers (:i.:.JL........, ~f .H~), bea-ers of these (psrticuhr and imaginative)
fornu as wEIl liS carriers of the (universal) intellective principles (~t.s~4--).I9i

Suhrawardï introduces the possible existence of a number of otber celestiaJ sphere or spheres
in order to locale bis imaginaJ world of "suspended" forms. This imaginai world of "suspended"

197 HfkmJl/', § 244.230.1 (5it.,:, 213); d. in the "lofty citadels." i.e., the celestiaJ bodies (tjl~
~..,u.), cf. .{Id:md, § 252,237.5-6 (~ 217-8).
19l1 FfJkmJU, § 259,243.5-8 (S41JY.. 222).
199 MISJnïri', § 210,487.19-488.1; â. lbid., § 210,488.10-1 l.
 CHAPTFRNlNE - 312

forms serves a variety of functioftS. Soteriologica.lly. it guarantees the futUre salvation of souls. an
idea also present in such works as A vicenna' s Immolohon. Cosmologically. it is dependent on
traditional Peripatetic cosmolog}" Episœmologically. it guaranlees the possibility of posthumous
perceptions and prophetie knowledge And finally. ontologica1Jy. it can be seen as an altempt to
provide an explanation for such things as the jinn and ghouls for it is in this imaginal world chat
imm.eria! phantoms occur. Suhrawardïs originality lies in bis attempt te elabotate ft more complex
cosmology with the introduction of additiona1 spheres - or sphere - to tbe traditional cosmological
arder. His attempts at redefining Peripatetic conceptions a-e, nonetheless. great1y influenced and
shaped by A vicenna' s legacy.
 CONCLUSION - 313

CONCLUSION

Scholars adopœd seemingly opposed views about the Suhrawardian corpus. Ziai bas pointed
out that there is an "oider Onentalist tradition" which asserts that Suhl1lwardf 5 "illuminationist"
philosophy is not essentially new. Tbese scholars consider Avicenna's brier remarks conceming
Oriental philosophy te constitute the real source of this new philosophy. But what exactly constitutes
Avicenna' 5 Oriental philosophy?

Suhrawardï argued that prior to bis own reconstruction of philosophy no Oriental philosophy
based on intuitive, inspirational, and immediate modes of cognition existed. and th. Aviœnna's
elaim ta have presenœd Oriental principles mere1y used reworded Peripatetic methods, whereas
Suhrawardï's own reformu1ation "reflect[s] the ea-lier "wisdom" of Persian Khusrawinï sages and
mmy ether figures. " 1
Most followers of the "illuminationist" tradition. namely Shams al-Dm Shahrazüri. Ibn

_. KammiiJlah. Q~ a1-Dïn Shïriizi. Isma'il Ankariïvï. Jalil. al-Dm Dawwiinï. Sharif Ibn Harawï, and
MuUi $adri al-Shïri7i, were of the opinion mat Suhraw.-dî's work is resolutely different from

--" Avicennan Perip.eticism.2 Modem Suhrawardian scholars similarly lll"g\1e in faver of Suhrawardî's
original departure from Avicennan tradition, .. designed to avoid the logical, epistemologica1 and
metaphysica1 inconsistencies which Suhrawardï perceived in the Peripaœtic philosophy of bis day.":'l
Many of Suhrawardî' s original positions resuJt from bis adoption of a number of non-Peripatetic
doctrines taken from Aristotelianism, Neoplatonism. Neopythagorian Platoai sm, Steicism and from
bis aiticism of Avicennan positions (e.g., the theory of definitioJ1 in logic).4 More importantly, bis

original iaterpretations result from the formulation of wh. he caUs a science of lights (..;1 ~~ 1 r-1&).s

It WŒ therefore legitimaœ ta ask: How and to what extent does Suhrawardi: depart from
dassical AvicenJlan Peripetetic philosophica1 anthropology? Suhrawardï' s philosophical anthropology
is, in fact, greatJy influenced by me one developed by Avicenna. A comparison of their respective
philosophica1 anthropologies has brought ta light a number of parallels.

1 Ziai., ·Sbihib a1.-Oin Svbrawardi:' 437-9. 460 Il. 30. n.31, n.32, Jl.33, 11.34.; cf. COl'bin,
·Prolégomènes," ta ~,II, 24-6.
2 Ziai, "The IUuminatlomst Tradition," 465~96.
3 Uai. "Slu1Iib al-Din 5uhrawardi," 43~9; cf. Idem. Know1er!le"JlDdfUumilJllkOD , 20-39.
4 Ziai, Keo"lqe J1Dd .DIuminllJl:m, 41-128; d. Walbridge. ,Uwvew; cf. Idid., "Suhrawardl:'
515-33.
5 .f5kmllt, § 4, 10.11 (..§iw:. 88).
 CONCLUSION - 314

Suhrawardî does not, however, offer a mere allegorical restatement of Peripatetic psychology.
His "illuminarionist" intention guides his interpretation of Avicenna's works. He aims st expJaining.
defming, and analrsing philosophically the nature of the sou! in tenns of bis light ontology ~:,)re

importandy, he pursues the thrust of Avicenna's more mystical discussions. e.g.. in the lœt [Wo
sections of the Nemnrks
Suhrawardî adopts a complex notion of the sou1. Like Avicenna, he dermes it as a perfection.
an entelecby. The soul' 5 perfectibility is defmed in terms of its possession cr deprivation of luminosity.
Such notions of luminosity or intensity of light describe the perfection of light. i.e.. the human soul as
a whole, itself subjea to perfection. A marked difference may be observed in the case of Avicenna's
distinction betWeen a farst and a secondary perfection, a distinct10n Suhrawardî does not adopt. His
deftnition of perfectibility of the luaUnous p-ovides no room for two distinct perfecting light principles.
Yet the human soul - as light - remains the principle 81 the heart of bath activities identified with
each Avicennan perfection.
Suhrawardî, like Avicenna. defmes the soul as an immaterial substance not 50 different from
Avicenna's, i.e., it is self-subsisting, not inhering in a lOals, living, knowing, and ruling over the
body. Avicenna and Suhrawardï both p-ovide a number of arguments to subsrantillte the chüm that the
soul's distinct substance guaramees its incorporea1ity, i.e., the n8tUre of the abjects of thoughts, the
perduranœ of one' 5 identity. or die sou1' s abilityto ascend ta loftier metaphysica1 realms. Suhrawardi's

reinterpretation of the sou! in terms of its luminosity defmes it as a lu.mi.nous substance, while the
body becames Il tenebrous substance.

Peripllteticism had already questioned the AristoteJian hylomorphic UJlderstanding of the

soul-body relation and thus introduced a grelter dualism. Similarly, Suhrawardî divorces the soul
from the body. This separation of soul and body becomes a condition for the sours aa:ess to the
divine, something he aIso corroborates by appea1ing to the Quru and hadiths. Suhrawardï steers
away from the naturalist position that Avicenna sometimes adopts. The Peripatetic ïnterdependence of
sou! and bodytbrough their complementary funttions (one existing only by the existence of the other)
i5, however, upheld by both audtors.
Suhrawardï's light intelJll"etation inllOduces a relation of dominion and desire between these
two distinct - soul and body - substances. He emphasizes the desirous element - the body desires its
perfection, die soul, and the soul desires the body. A simils- re1ationship is proposed by Avicenna.
e.g., in bis Ilemarks. Suhrawardi's ligbt ontology introduces a "participationist" - i.e., Jight is present

.~.
in everything - perspective differentfrom Avicenna' 5 conception of soul-body. The Perip.eticstructure,
howevEl", is absolute1y not discarded. Deprivlltion of light or corporeal darmess define matter and
buman bodies. Their possession of some portion of light is only accidentai, w.hile light itself defmes,
 CONCLUSION - 315

•• amongst other thiogs, both intelligibles and the rational soul. The re1ationship between body and soul
thus amounts to an accidentai. atrachment.
For the reiigious tradition, souls are created out of nothing by Gad. For phïlosophers like
Avicenna, human souls originate from and in the active intelligence. Suhrawardï, who has a number
of sym.bolic tales that appear to contradict bis deDiai of the soul' s coming iDto existence prior ta the
body.offers numerous arguments for the negation of sucb a pre-existence - som.e more theologica.l in
nature, but the majority of them. philosophical. Ta demonstrate the negation of the soul' s pre-existence,
he appea1s to a notion of unicity (similar ta the position of the philosophers). first. from a psychologicaI
perspective. i.e., the unity of the sours individuality. and then from a Jogica1 perspective, i.e.. from
the notion of unicity itse1f. He also appea1s to the ro1ing abilities and activities of the soul and the
ratio that exisl5 betWeen the number of souls and bodies.
He uses a light tem1inology 10 describe the sour s nature. But he is sure ta reduce the
argument bssed on luminosity ta bath psychologica1 and logica.l perspectives. Suhrawardî, in facto
uses Inldirional Avicennan pbilosophica1 arguments, reintel'pl"eted in terms of bis light termïnology.
The most powerful argument. however. remains bis appea1 to the tenets of the religious tradition, for
which bis philosophical arguments are but the expression.

Interpretïng Subraw..dï's position lE an affirmatioJl of the pre-existence of souls amounts to

anributing some inconsistency to his stance. One can appea1 ta possible Gnostic influences ta account
for the presence of some ambiguous passages. But had Suhrawardi adopted the latter position, bis
philosophical qumentation should ref1ect or, et least allude ta such a position which bis arguments,
in fact, do not. They aetually prec1ude it.
The Avicennan tradition identified a number of conditions responsible for the coming ÏJ1to
existence of human souls, in particu1ar the Neoplatonic articulacion of cosmology and the role played
by the active intelligence. These conditions remain the undedying strUcture of Suhrawardï' s
understandiJIg of the sours existentiation - the organisation of clements, mixtures, and humors so as
to prod'Uce receptive matter. This process of existentiation is again distinct owing to bis light tenninology.
IIlthough the underlyiJlg cosmological framework remains Avicennan, no matter bow bodies ..e
. defined. 6

Suhrawardï explores aven'Ues already discussed by the Perip81etic tradition ta account for the
nature of the relation of soul and body by means of an intermediary entity - the vital spirits or

.•
,
pneUDIIlr8 , i.e., the natura!, animal, and psychic spirits. He adopes a philosophicat notion of spirit or

pAelHllll, as a subtle and vapory body that originated in the Hellenic medical tradition and which

6 As prime matter (Aristotehm hylomcxpbism.) or magnitude-accidents (Subrawardi).

 CONCLUSION - 316

'. deplKtS from any purely Qur'in.ic or mystical notion of spirit. Most of Suhrawardï' s discussions about
its nature. division and funetions originate in the Peripatetic tradition.
The importance of the loftier psychic spirit lies in its function as an intermediary betWee!1 the
soul and the body. Suhraw.dï defines the spirit as a receptacle for the light of the rational soul. As a
recipient of light. the psychic pot;7umn uansmits the ligbt it receives te the body. Like a mirror. the
spirit reflects lights and becomes the support for the luminous faeulty - the rational sou1.

In Avicenna. the psychic pneumo becomes the vehicle for thoughts. It guarantees
a>mmunication between the different facuJties of the brain. Suhrawardï responds ta a perceived
malerialization of the process of thought, i.e.. forms manipulated by the mind. and criticizes this
particuJar Peripatetic idea. In spite of bis reservations about the materialism implied in Avicen.na' s
notion of iJltelleetual forms, Suhrawardï still maintains that the pnellLl1d remains the plftce of
inherence or manifestation for representations. i.e.. imaginai. forms or similes, because tbt: spirit is. in
fact, material as it does not survive the death of the body.

Suhrawardfs discus5Îons about the division of the soul nei.ther depart from the Peripatetic
division. of the souls inca vegEEative, animal and human souls. nor do they eliminate the different

-. faeulties and related af%ivities of the lower vegetative and animal souls. Subrawardï does. bowever.
set out to aiticize the Avicenne Cive-fold classification of the inner senses which localizes each
Ù1ner sense in a different part of the brain and, in 50 doing. naturalizes the process of representation.
His aiticism centers mainly on the facu1ties responsible for representation and of memory.
Suhrawardï replaces Avicenna's notion of reooUection, consisting of the relrieval. of forms
from the physical faculty of memory. with a more Platonic definition. The soul grasps lhe objects of
its representation that al.ready exist in a metaphysical realm of cheir own. Sïnce nothing can stand
betweea the human soul and what it perceives. what the so,,! grasps must similarly be immaterial.
Recollection, therefore, amounts to recalling the Conn of a thing from the "world of memorial," ta
which only the rational soul has access.

Suhrawardï interptets the internai. senses as shadows of the soul. Wbile al1 the activities
responsibJe for representation are incorporated within the realm of the rational soul in an attempt to
preserve the sou!'s unity, p8l1icu1srization takes place through the different aaivities associated with
the inner senses and is exp1aiJled in terms of their tenebrous nature. As such, Suhrawardï's sole
faculty is distinct from the ruling rational light and aetuaJ1y accounts for the perception of sensible
realities. Again, bis light interpretation preserves the activities a5sociated with the inner senses in the

:~. realm of the particulsr - i.e., tbeir teaebrosity - whiJe ascribiJlg to the light principle - i.e., the human
-- -
rational soul - the ruling power capable of perœiving universal and immaerial entities.
Suhrawardï also discusses visual perception. engaging in a debllte thal was part of a school
 CONCLUSION • 317

uaditioll., e.g., similar discussions .-e found in al-Firibi's and Avicenna's works. Suhrawardï rejects
the first theory, the .. extramissive" meor)" of vision, restatiJlg arguments found in A vicenna' 5 Snlr-Uliofl
and Book of ScJeL1~. The second tbeory, the "intromissive" theory of the imprinting of the ..lbject's
form is Avicenna' s position. e.g., in the Delif"trlU1Ce. Although this position appears to be 11l1plicitly
adopted by Subrawardï in SlIch warks as the No.FS ofLr...irhr. he does rejeet it in bis Orieohl1-/UUmfndD'f--e

lVr"Stfom. He uneartbs the materialist implicaions of such a notion of the imprinting of forms onto a

malena! and bodily substratum. He condudes that vision, although mediated by a pbysical organ, is
in reality an activity of the soul
Suhrawardï' s rejection of the traditional theories purports to introduce bis awn theary of
vision - a theory that can account for the human soul' s direct access ta metaphysica1 realms. His
theory of vision requires, first, a face-to-face encounter betWeen mat which perceives (the physica!
organ or the rational sou!) aad an illuminated objeet; second, the absence of obstacles betweeJl the
two, often described in a more mystical fashioJl in terms af an absence af veiLs;7 and finally, the
presence of light. These three conditions are simultaneously required for visuaL and mYStical visioQS.
Light that befalls existing things is of physical as well as ontalogical nature such thst the process of
vision wûalds on both. physica! and metaphysica1 leve1s. Physical vision is explained in terms of its
expJanatory capacity of omologicaJ. vision - i.e., the soul perceives the essentia11ight of its objeâS,
This process is especially true of visions of metaphysical entities.
The probJem arises, however, with varying applications of bis tbeory of vision ta actual
(instances of) visual perception. ln the latter case, vision ultimately becomes reducible to the soul' s
perception of the inlrinsic Light of the object. For Suhraw.-dï, physics and metaphysics merge as
abjects have the ability to reœive and em.it light, though only in a accidenta! way. The latter is
precise1y what the light-souJ, the Isfahbad-Jight, is able ta perceive E the real agent. Suhrawardï' s
conception of vision agaù1 attempts ta do awsy with any of the materialist interpretatïons proposed by
oider theories of vision. He is cIear: vision does not require the presence of forms. This particular
interpretation can more adequately explain the phenomena that oceur in mystical contemplation and
the visua1 perception of metaphysica!1ights.

Suhrawardï reduces A vicenna' 5 five-foid division of inner senses to a single faculty responsible
for l"eptesent&tioJl, i.e., the faculty of imagination. in the broadest sense. He presents, once m<re, two
different positions regarding the facuJty of imagination. ln bis PB'ipatetic-Jite discussions about the
inn.er facu1lies, Suhrawardi depsrts from the Peripatetic-Avicennan stnleture and disregards the

distinctions est8blished betWeen the facu1ties of estimative and active imagination, He attributes

7 For the seventy, the seven bWldred, or the seventy dlousand veils of light and darkœss of God,

cf. aL-Ghazili, ulJl!nUIde ~ Lumièn!s, 8S-96.

 CONCLUSION - 318

•• aetivities - e.g.. the ahility ta make particulsr judgements - ta the faculty of active imagination.
which Avicen.n.a bad ascribed to estimation.
The ty., o-faœted functions of estimation analysed by Avicenna - i.e., to become the cogitative
faCl.11ty when directed towards the intellect or ta become the active imagination when it judges
particu1ars - are not subject to the same attention in Suhrawardr 5 discussions. In keep:ing with bis
:interpretation. the active imagination, the mecliating faculty between intellect and the human. soul. is
associated with the activities of the cogitative faculty instead of those of the faculty of estimation. The
estimative faculty. on the other hand. is in othE!" i.nstances given the negative role traditionally
ascribed ta the active imagination.

Suhrawardï's rejection of Avicenna's differentiation amongst the internai faculties represents

a simplifiee!. slightly modified version of the latter' s position. AH the funetions attributed te the
faCl.1lties responsible for representation - Avicenna' 5 estimation, passive and active imagination - are
incorponued inta his single f&culty. He rejeets the latter's attempt ta identify distintt facuJties ta
acex>unt for different aetivities.

Suhrawanlï' s1mllgi native faculty responsiblefor representation does not exist as an independent

.-. metaphysical world. Rather, it must be understood as a distinct aetivity of the human soul - as
opposeeS to the intellee:tive and rational. On the antbropologica1level. the imaginative facultyresponsible
for reptesentation differs from the imaginal wodd with wbich it is often wrongly 85sociated. On the
oontnll'y. the various funetions of the imaginative faculty are simi1ar to those present in Avicenna's

philosophica1 anthropology.
Suhrawardï insÎ5ts tbat the aetivities responsible for repre5entafion cannot occur in a m81eriaJ.
organ. He emphasizes the non-m.erial localization of the objects of representation. Suhrawardï
transcendentaJizes these objects. The imaginative facu1ty shouJd thus partake, by anatogy with the
nature of its objects, in sorne sort of immateriality. It least in part. As such. it should be able ta grasp
:intelligibles wmch, according to Suhrawardï' S own claims. it does not. His discussions, therefore.
present a p. .doxica1 view of the nature. whether materiai or immaterial, of the faculty of imagination
- priaurily the active imagination.
The active imagination, however, remains a faCl1lty responsible for sensible representations.
As such. it cannot perceive intelligibles. The objects of representation. i.e., the imaginai forms are
deÏuted u suspended citadels - in some way. bodily entities. The 5Uspended forms imagination
manipullites mus aiso be understeod lm partaking in some form of materia1ity ratber than eKÏsting in
another realm. The manner in which they come into existence has been shown to be. in one of its
aspects. quite similar ta A vicenna' s theory.
These forms are only manifESted in the soul, reflected br means of a medium which is. in
 CONCLUSION - 319

-. fset, the psychic pneumo. The imaginative faculty thus remains associated with the bodiLy and is
unsble to auain the universal. Defined as the faculty capable of receiving images, fonns or icons of
metaphysica1 realities, its ultimate perfection cOlTesponds la the powerful and deve10ped fsculty of
imlgination possessed br prophets. The existence of the suspended fonns in human beings (their
minds) W85 shown ta be (partly) linked to the existence of the psychic pneuma Πthe substrata for
the forms abstraeted from matter.
Suhrawardï replaces Avicenna's proximity of the facu1ty of estimation and the rational part of
the soul with the proximity mat the aaive imagination shares with the Isfahbad-light - the intellect
Suhrawardï's active imagination becomes the depository of bath sensible images and intentions, i.e..
the receptacle for what originates from the inteUective level. as well as wh. is perceived by the means
of more experiential-like types of knowledge.
Suhrawardi's use of the Avicennan epistemologica1 structure, albeit somehow reversed as
imm..erial data origin.es from non-sensible realms. cannot overshadow the importance of intellect
The latter i5. by Suhrawardi s own avowal, the lsfahbad-light tbat accesses the Jights that rule over it.
His phiJosophical anthropology addresses a number of epistemological i5sues. such as self-knowledge
diSCU5Sed in a number of bis worts _ Although these discussions are often identified as typically
Suhrawardian. this Sb1dy has shown how they can be traeed back to Avicenna's discussion about the
nature of the human 50ulsuch as the hypothetical example of the "suspended" person. Iike Avicenna,
Suhrawardï uses self-knowledge to establish the immateriality of the soul and te discuS5 related
issues, such as self-consciousness. self-identity, and personal identity which Avicenna did not di5CUSS
st 1ength. Suhrawardï i5 primariJy con.cemed with the anaIysis of persona! and incommunicable types
of knowledge (like the experience of pain). The soul' s knowledge is not reducible to mere interactions
of the body with the external and matErial world. AJthough he does not equate self-knowledge with a
presentiaJ-type of knowJedge. he does make the former the mode! with whicb the latter can be
conceptua1ized. His philosopltical arguments sim st establishing the grounds for a presential-type of
knowleclge. in some way analogous to the perception one has of one' 5 self.
Suhrawardï establishes the enstel1ce of an independent consciousness as the foundation of
one's individuality. Although distinct from the intellective-light principle, individuality, nonetheless,
perticu1arizes the human soul and, in a sense, grounds it in this world. Suhrawardï' s discussions about
self-knowledge allude to the soul's pre-logical mode of perception. As such, it is divorced from the
ÎDtellective, siJl.c:e se1f-knowledge is bere understood as a pre-conceptuaJ app-ebension of one's being
or existence. The notion of the self uncovered refers to the immateria! substance of the souJ. itself
reducible. for both authors, to i15 inte1Jective nature. For Suhrawardï. the intellective is the luminous
substance of tbe soul.
 CONCLUSION - 320

Suhrawardi adopts a number of the traditional distinctions found in Avicenna: the division of
mtellects ÏJ1to praetical and theoretical or their division inlO materia1, habituai. active and aCXiuired
intellects. Nowhere are these basic distinctions rejected, although less impottant. For Suhrawardi,
knowledge consists of the receptlOll of light - an intellective princi.ple - an idea not very different
from the older Platonic llotion of knowledge as light (e.g.. allegory of the cave) or the Neoplatonic
notioll of eman.ation of light. Suhrawardï replaces the Avicennan em.anative proœss with a notion of
illumination. The similarities between. the [WO concepts, however, s-e important and illumination
becomes a metaphor for the inteUective process. establishing an illunu.native relation between the
active intellective principle and the human souls.

Suhrawardï's intellection departs from a more empiricist (Aristotelian) stance and introduces
a more Plotinian conception. with its emphasis on the extri.nsic ongin. of lœowledge. For Avicenna.
this was expressed in the role attributed to the active intelligence. In. a similar fashioll, Suhrawardî
identifies the active principle - i.e., light - responsible for human knowIedge as being the active
intelligence.

In Avicenna' s PeripatEtic noetics, imagination aets as the initiator of intellection, although it

is grounded in the psrticu1ar and as such , is ooly a step in the epistemic process. The roIe of
,'-
imaginstionis,nonetheJess,importantforrepresentingtothesoulthatwhichoriginaesfromnon-se1lSible
realms. Theprocess reaches its Apogee in Avicenna's prophetie imagination.

In Suhrawardi's interpretation. the imaginative faeulLy is presented as the mediating facuJry.

seemingly replacing the intellect. The active imagination is - eontrary te the estimative faculty of
Avïcenaa - the facu1ty in contact with the intellect. The imaginative faeulty re-p'esents and gives
fonns to the intelligible (light) that the Isfahbad-light - the intellect - receives from ils principle.

The active intelligence has simi1ar functions in the works of Avicenna and Suhrawardi. First.
as the Provider of forms, it prepares bodies ta reœive human sauls: second, as an active principle, il is
responsible for the existence of human souls and the aetualization of buman intelligence; and finally,
it provides our sauts with knowledge by emanating universal fonns onto them. Suhrawardi' s
interpretation of the funetions of the active intelligence onty differs from Avicenna's with regards to
bis Jight ontology - the active intelligence becomes the light principle. Suhrawardï's ïnterpretation
briags tagelber such concepts as logos, the divine spirit and a metaphor of light ta illustrate the
relationship that the human rational soul enjoys with its intelleetive principle. In S uhrawardï intellection
1

strueturally paraJlels Peripllletïe noetics. There is, chus, a requirement for an inlellective intennediary.
This is the role played by the intellect which ruJes OVe!" the imaginative facuIty.

Divergences between Avicenna and Suhrawardï are more evident in the 18lter' 5 polemical
treUment of the relation the sout enjoys with its immediate principJe. Suhrawardï provides a llumber
 CONCLUSION - 32J

of arguments lo rejeet what he polemically œlJs Avicenna's thesis of the union of the soul with the
active intelligence. His rejeetion of the union thesis aims al preserving the human soul's individuality
and avoiding an adulteration of the light-intelleetive principle. He proposes an intelleaive conjunction
which is, however. not mucb different from Avicenna's conjunction (in his later works) of the human
rational soul with the active intelligence. The ontologica1 unity of subject and object - more in
accoroance with the mystiœ1 tradition - is avoided. He keeps both term.s (subject and objects) st a
distance. This is crucial in order to preserve the uniqueness of the first principle - the Light of lights
to which everything seeks to retum. No rational soul can berome itseJf the diV1J1ity.
Avicenna's intellection culminates with intuition. Seing more philosophical in character,
intuition represents the highest inte11ectual activity. a stage beyond mere conscious intelleaual activity.
At this stage, no imaginative activity cornes into play. save a limited negalive and prep~oryrole.

Suhrawardi' s process of intellection gives way to a direct experience or witnessing of hidden

truths which is. in fact, the only process that guarantees the a<XIuisition of true knowledge. He
introduces a contemplative intuition., while philosophica1 intuition appears to be relegated ta a secondary
position. Suhrawardi appeals to bath reason - the demon..strable - and direC% intuition. or contempJation
- the experiential - 85 complementary means. But, in the end, his classification of sages extols
,.-....
mystical contemplation and gives it a more reliable foundlCion - e.g., in the politico-religious sphere.

In Suhrawardï' s light on.tology, illumination defÏ1les the reiation between aU existents in

tenns of dominance and poverty of light. The intellective at the hem of Avicenna's Peripateticism is
reduœd to the luminou5 and accounts for spiritual illumination. An immediate, mystical-like experie.nce
- the experienœ of Jigbt tbrough a presential expErience - constitutes a more adapted means to access
the divine realm of metaphysical lights, via mystical visions and myslical contemplation. Ultimate
certainty results from diviJle inspiration. The process itself is reminisce.n.t of Aviœnna's intellection
through mere intuition.
Davidson charaeterized Suhrawardï's notion of intellection as an. "inverted" Avioennan scbeme
in which knowledge no longer originates in sense perception, but which results in the reception -
from non-sensible rea1ms - of intelligibles which are then translated into images by the faculty of
imagi.naion.a A simil.. 85sessment can, bowever, be made of AviceJ1Jl8's concept of intellection.
Knowledge origïnates from the metaphysica1 Level as is exemplified by the various functions of active
i.n.telligence shared br AYicenna and Suhrawardi. Although Avicenna's epistemology makes greater
allowanœ for the empirical realm, sensible perception constitutes only the prelude for the aetualization.
of tnowledge through the actions of the active intelligence.

8 Davidson, A1Jirnrbj, 161-8.

 CONCLUSION - 322

Suhrawardï's epistemology appears to be more readily transcendental, a more spiritualized

version of Peripatetic epistemology. He does not do away with the Peripatetie epistemie strUcture, but
he emphasizes a presential type of knowledge as the paradigm of mystical or gno5t1e knowledge ~l he

latter process is explained in a fœhion quite similar ta Avicenna's discussions about prophetie
knowledge and mystical knowledge found. e.g., in his lle.nJIuks. Suhrawa-di' s concept of knowledge
does not, however, propose a solution to the seem.ing paradox raised br the existence of [wo distinct-
intellective and intuitive - types of knowledge.

From the perspective of the religious tradition. discussions about the nature of prophetie
knowledge introduce a number of equally important issues. Privileged access to the divine can only
occur once divine providence is bestowed upon certain individuals who are either commissioned or
uncommissioned ta recei.ve and transmit God's message. Prophets are those privileged individuals.
A study of the process by whieh prophets aCX{uire divine knowledge reveals mat it is not
radically different from the one by which otber individuals can access similar realms. Differences lie
ÏJ1 the extent of the preparation required by different human saws, prophets possessing an inherent

natural disposition. It is the latter process that now acquires a new heuristic value for SuhrawardL On
the ethicaJ level, the individu al who possesses mystical or gnostie knowledge should be invested with
the viceregency of God, because this individual has witnessed divine trutbs and bas received divine
iJlspiration - i.e.. divine lights.

Other individu ais possess varying receptive capacities. Some musttread the mysticaJ path and
purify their souts, as these aetivities lead to the achievement of mystical contemplation. On the whole.
howeYel", the epistemic process by which mystics {f;lallij or Bistim.tl. sages (Suhrawardï) or even
philosophers (plato) accElSS metaphysical ntbs reveals S1riking similarities witb the one by whicb
prophets access divine realms. Once mey have liberated themselves !rom the enslamg materiai
wodd, the souJs - the Isfahbad-ligbts - of a number of individuais can more readily receive illumination
and perceive truths similar ta those perceived by prophelS. The poweduJ intuitive ability possessed or
developed by some individuaJs in Suhraws-dî' s works are strikingly similar to the powetfuJ intuitive
abilities discussed by Avicenna.

Prophetie and theosopbicaJ knowledge ontY occur once the human soul conjoiJlS with the
metaphysical world. For Avicenna, e.g., the Rtm~,inprophetie knowledge consists in the possession
of a suong Îmllginative faculty capable of receiving emanation from a divine intellect, itseJf receiving
emanation from the active intelligence. Prophetie knowledge amounts ta an iAtelleClive conjunction
of the buman rational soul witb the divine intelligence.
Likewise, for Suhrawardï, once the human soul conjoins with the active Ïl1telligence knowledge
1

am be received from the divine spirit. The souJ tben aCXluires a luminous and theurgic power.
 CONCLUSION - 323

Prophets ..e, therefore, not the sole depositors of divine knowledge acquired through the conjunction
of the soul with the divine realm.

Suhrawardi s explanation of prophetie and mystieal knowledge more readily focuses on the
faculty of active imagiJlation. This faculty does. however, remain subordinate ta the light principle -
the Isfahbad-light, or the rational part of the soul. The aetive imagination existentiates images and
forms that have been reflec:ted onto it in a miJTor-like manner. The imaginative faculty imitates and
reproduees fonns that it has recei.ved from non-sensible rea1ms, and short-circuits aU enerna1 incolD.111g
data. This faeu1o/ then projects these matters onto the commoo sense and provides them with ft
sensible reality they did not originaUy possess. Lïtewise, Avicenna bad alluded ta this process.
Suhrawardï, however, provides a more elaborate aecount of the role of the imaginative fsculty in the
epistemie proœss responsible for prophetie and, more importantJ.y, theosophica1 knowledge. Moreover,
some individuals are able to ftetual.i2e visuaUyand in some corporea1 manner sorne of the forms
which exist at the meœphysieallevel. This is something absent from Aviceona's wade.

Transmission of revelation is facilitated by the presence of a strong faculty of imagination in

prophets. Avieen.na mentions the role of imagination in the transmission of revelation, but this
pertic:ular aspect is more extensively and originslly developed by Suhrawardï. Once prophets are no
longer living, interpretatïon or spiritual herm.eneutiœ is required to provide the means of deciphering
the hidden meanings of the revealed texts. As Subrawardï points out, the Christian 1nIdition alludes ta
this funetion with the figure of the Paradete which Suhrawartfi: develops at length. This may or may
Dot indude the chain of Imams. but certain1y ineludes the .. Brethren of detaehment from the world"
and sueb individuals as the Rishidün, mystics and most probably Suhrawardi himself. 9

Davidson interprets Suhrawardï' 5 conception of prophecy as a .. revision of A vicenna' S seheme

of prophecy,lt where the higbest fonn of prophecy - the intellectual - is replaeed with "a direct
experience of the world of lights." a substitution that had been suggested by at-Ghazili and Ibn
Tufayt
lO
Such an interpretation mu~, however. be nuanced. Noteworthy is the faet that the underlyin.g
structure of the direct experience of the lighlS can be reducible to the A vieenJlan episœmologîcal.

P'OCess of intuition. A vicenna' s intuitive process, althougb intel1ective (as pert of syllogistie reasoning).
appears to be the mode! of Suhrawardï's presentiai-tyPe of knowledge.

Contnuy to the religious tradition, bath Avicenna and Suhrawardï reject an earthly pbysü:aI
resurrection on purely philosophieal grounds. Suhrawardï does not, however. eompJetely rejeet the

9 PllrtiJ § 87 ~ B~k, 79-80).

1

10 Davidson, .AUilntf1J'. 140, 148; cf. Davidson, Aff#1lbi. 121-2 and 151-2. al-Ghazilï's own
epistemolcgical prooess U1 h1s Mme ofLf1*s remains ta be propedy analysed and compareeS with Aviçenna' s
owaepistallological system. d. al-GbaZilï. LelJlfJl!r11i1dedr!sIIlDU~,traIlS. DeJadriere; cf. Idem, AI-ûtJJIZIIb''s
Mi.,..,.6I-ADrrr, tr'IIDS. 8uchmaD; cf. Landolt. .. al-Ghazilï and Rebgionwisseascbaft...
 CONCLUSION - 324

possibility of sorne kind of bodily resurrection. although he did not adequately eKplain how he
understood il ta be. Nonetheless. the human soul does survives the death of the body. as it wailS for
the Day of Judgment. Avicenna and Suhraw8l"dï explain ilS immortality br appealing to such srgurr:~ts

as the immortality of its cause. its accidentai attachment co the body. or the absence of something that
would account for its destruction. The immortality of the soul mises the issue of ils transmigration. or
meœmpsychosis.l.naccordanœ with Islamictraditionalbeliefs. both Avicennaand SuhrawardïexpJicitly
denied II"ansmigration. Suhrawaroï, however, has been interpreted as having conceived of the possibility
of transmigration for miserable 50uls. The preponderance of passages that do negate meœmpsychosis
and the absence of the explicit affirmation of the transmigration of sauts suggest that, in most
likelihood, Suhrawardi rejected this thesis.

As for diVÎJle retribution, it can only take place if the individual existence of human souls
possesses a posthumous life, and if oonditions for its experience, or for the perception of the pl'Omised
other-worldly rewards and punishments exist. The soul' 5 Ittachment co the ~ody provides it with an
individuality and determ.ines the soul's posthumous fate - souls engrossed in matter in mis liCe will
bave partially determined their fate in the afrerlife. In this respect, Suhrawa-di does not depart from
Peripatetic escbatology.

AvicenJla's most fruitfu! insights are bis allusions to a possible posthumous life for the
imaginative faculty of some souls, the survivai of the im&ginative faculty is required for souls to
experience the pleasures and pains of divine retribution through sensitive representations. Moreover,
Avicenna alludes to the possibility for some souls to perfeet tbemse1ves in the afterlife, thus implicidy
positing the survival of this faculty necessary for any imaginative purification.

Suhrawardï skilfully makes the Avicennan eschatological system more inlricate 50 as co

explsin more adequately the posthumous rate of hum&1l souls. He erplicray posits the possible
survival of the imagiJlative faculty of souls tbat have not acbieved perfection, along with the existence
of an independent imaginai escbatologicat realm that functions as the metaphysica1 locus for the
surviving (human) imaginative facu1ty and the folUls it manipulates.

The subde celestial bodies to which the imaginative facu1ty attaches itse1f in the afterlife
p-ovides thm faculty with substnU. that is similar in nature to its previOU5 worldly and subtle body,
namely, the pneumo. Suhrawsrdï develops in an original fashion A vicenna' s aUusions co a possib/e
survival of the imaginative faculty with bis postulation of otber ce1estial spheres - Ether and Zamharir
- as the celestial substrata of chis faculty. Suhrawardï, bowever, is still unable ta depart radically from
the Peripatetic system. Instead, he expands the Peripatetïc cosmologicaJ scbeme w1th iJldependent
rea1ms or spheres ta which the imaginative faculties of the souls are able co attadt themselves and
wbich 8llows them to perfeet themselves or surfer me pains and expErience the pleasures of retribution.
 CONCLUSION - 325

The role of the vital spint - the pneUD/6 - is merefore quite important. At the anthropologieal level.

il serves as the Mlssiog link between the spiritual and materiaJ worlds. At the eschatologica! level,
celestiaJ spberes become the pnt!UmJltll required for the eschatological funetioning of the f&... ulty of

active imagination.

A clearer picture chus emerges of Avicenna' s Penpatetic heritage mat bas survived - although
modified - in Suhrawardi' s philosophical anthropology. Suhrawardi offers a more persona! interpretation
of Many phiLosophieal argumenlS, theories , and doctrines on the soul proposed by Avieenna. We have
fOOlsed almost exclusive1y on the Avicennan structure of Suhrawardi' s philosophical anthropology,
which is indeed philosophicaLly sound, espeeially in light of its Peripatetic underlying structw"e. and
in spite of the different elements from which it does depart. Further studies need, however, ta be
undeltaken. to eKplore the debt Suhrawardï owes ta al-Ghazili's attacks on Avicennan philosophical.
anthropology and to such thinkers as Abü al-Baratiit al-Bsghdidl, whom he eonsidered to have
established the methodology of Pista. Il

-.

'---
Il Ziai, Kno,,-Jt!tlTe 113, LJ3 n.2, 116, 1164.1, 185.
1
 BfBUOGRAPHY - 326

• BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

SUHRAWARDfS WORKS

1 - CORBINS AND NASR'S EDmONS

Ope71, 1 = Shihâboddîn Yahyâ Sohravardî. OeUfRS pbUosopbLqUes « O1,PShfues. tome 1. textes

édités avec prolégomènes en français par Henry Corbin (reprint. 2 lX! anastatic ed., Tébéran-
Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1976; Tehran: Mu'assasah-yi MuÇilic it wa TaJ,1qïqat-i Fa"hangï,
13n/1993).
[First 00. = O~ .JDebJphysiCli « mysriQ/. tome [, edidit et prolegomenis instruxit Henricus
Corbin, volumen primum (Istanbul: Masrif Mabassi, 1945»)
Ope71, fi =Shihâboddîn YahyâSohravardî. OeuJ-resp.!n7osopmqut!Set"A!1'SbVWS ( Opernm«8p~psiQi
et" LIl,nbCa). tome II. édition critique avec prolégomènes en français par Henry Corbin
(reprint,2a1 ed. 1976; Tehran: Mu'sssasab-yi Mu~cit wa TaJ.tqïClit-i Farhangï, 13n/1993).
[First ed. = Oeur-1'eSpAilosoplufllt5«nJ..nrH/ues ( Opem.JDemphysicli «m,~), tome II.
édition critique avec prolégomènes en français par Henri Corbin (Téhéran-Paris: Adrien-
Maisonneuve, 1952»)
0pe71, In = Shihâboddîn YahyâSohravardi, OeUF-resp.!n7osopAitJues«Ol,PS'hvws{ Ope71A1ebJp~PSrCIi
er ~Y-5"lJè8), tome III, Oeuvres en. persan, éditées avec inuo. et prolégoménes en persan par
Seyyed Hossein Nasr; prolégoménes. analyses et commentaires en français par Henry Corbin
(reprint.2Œ ed. 1977; Tehran: Mu'assasah-yi MuÇilicit wa TaJ.tqïClit-i Farhangï. 137211993).
[First ed. = Oeur-respMosoplufues«4!,J'Sllitues ( 0pe71 mer8physica et" 81,J'5TiQi), tome [IT.
Oeuvres en persan, éditées avec inIro. et prolégomènes en persan par Seyyed Hossetl1 Nasr;
prolégomènes, analyses et commentaires en français par Henry Corbin (l'éhéran-Paris: Adrien-
Maisonneuve, 1970»)

n - OORBIN AND THAClCSTON'S TRANSLATIONS

AfrDllOÇe = Sohravardï, L ~e empouqJrli. Quinze ~mirés e réai"s D1,nrifjws, traduction du

persan et de l' lnibe p8l" Henry Corbin (Pais: Fayard 1976). 1

~fpS'bèll/
, = Suhrawardï, TAe M~lau lUlU Hso.l.1,tM'V
~-_. -or Trt!Il&St?'S 1ofSh.ilJllbuddiA YIÛlPo
... Su/urlwordi,
trans. W. M. ThackstoJl (London: Oetagon Press, 1982).

1 Cf. Landolt's revoie'" article, "Suhrawardï's "Tales of lnitiation." Revlew Article," 415-86.
 BlBLlOGRAPHY - 321

•
BI - TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS

Suhrawardi, a/-Alwii/J Ilf- 7miidi),lliJ in. Idem. Sm /&siilll1J HZ Snoykô-/ IslJnïj. 1l/-.4..If*-ap 0/- 'lmiïd[YIID.
Kllün81" o/-T~WJf-vf. lÛ-lAmtJ/Jtil". ed. with Penian intra. Najaf-Ghuli J:labïbï, English
preface Sayyed Hossein Nasr (Tebran: Intishiitit-i Anjuman-i Sbihanshiihï-i Falsafsh-yi
Iran. 1397/1977). 1-78.
[tnms. in Persian) , cf. Idem, Alwii/J-i ïmiidi;YoIJ. in Ope7l, III. 110-95.
[partial tranS,) Idem, "Le Livre des tablettes:' in .4rcl1nnge, 99-116. [extracts; from Arabic
and Persian]
_ _ . :Af/-i Surk/J , in Opnr, Ill. 226-39.
_ _ .00. Mahdi Bayinï, presented br MuJ;tsïn Saba, (reprint ed. of Isfahan 1319/1940
(Chip-i Surbi) ) (Tehran: Anjuman-l Düstdiriin-i Kitiil, no date).
[trans.) Idem, "The Red Intellect," in A-fYSI:Ù:oI,35-43.
[trans.) Idem, "Le récit de f Archange empourpré," in Arc/Nlnge, 201-13.
[tnms.) Te1u'ani, "Mystieal SymboJism," 244-59.
_ _ , A-w/iz-iPar-L'JilJnitI, in O.JMll. Ill, 208-23.
_ _ . in Comin and Kraus, "Sullrawardi d'Alep," 1-82.
[traos.] Idem, "The Sound of Gabriefs Wing," in A-(p.saclil,26-34.
[trans.] Tehrani, .. Mystieal SymboJism," 207-30.
[trans.] Idem, "Le bruissement des ailes de Gabriel," in ALrAtu[e"e, 227-56.
_ _ , BiisllTLlaJ-(JuIDIJ, in Opnr, III, 334-401. [attributed to Suhrawardi)
_ _ , "Raw4atal-Qulüb," in CAllIJNrIaA1à'siilaIJ. ed. Mul;lammad Biqir Sabzav8ri (Tehran:
Intishiiriit-i DiI1ishgih-yi Tehriin, 1340),273-310.
_ _ . HJIYIikH 6/-Nür li /Û-SuônlwwrJf ItI-lsIJnif{f, ed.• intro. and comm, Mu~ammad cAli Abü
Rayyin (Cairo: al-Maktabah al-Tijiri al-Kubra, (957).
H,!Y/Ibl IlI-Nür, ed. Mu~y al-Dia $abri al-Kurdi (Cairo: [n.s.), (333/1914).
[trans. in Persian) , cf. Idem. Ho.P6ki/-iNür, in Opnr. III, 84-108.
[trans.) Kuspinar, /sma-o A11kr6f-'Î , 53-250. [comm. Ankaravi and Dawwinï)
[partial trans.) Idem, .. Le livre des temples de la lumière." in ArcollO{fe, 41-66. [ch. 1, II, N.
VI. VII, from Arabie and Persian with partial commentaries of Gbiyitb al-Din)
_ _ , .fUkmat ol-lmhNj, Ut ~. II. 1-260. [complete)
[Partiallr8llS.] Sohtavardi, LaSIIÇe5"seon'entale. KiliilJ .fUkmarll1-lsIu7itJ(witb) Commentaires
de QoJ.boddin Shirâzi et MolJâ $adrâ, trad. and notes Henry Corbin. ed. and Utlro. Christian
Jambet (paris: Verdier. 1986). [secoad part: mecaphisics)
[complete crans.] Soluawanh' s A-leI8p1J'psicsofD/UmIAlihOn{KthïIJ HikmN 8/-lsltriirJ/. tnulS.,
and ed. by John Walbridge and Hossein Ziai (provo: Brigbam Young University),
[forthcoming]
_ _ , I~lfd1Û-.(fuktl6lIT~. in. ~. l, 262-272.
[trans.] Idem. " Le symbole de foi des philosophes," in An:mU{e"e. 14-24.
, K8lim1l/" 1lI-Tl/:Fl1wwufor A-/llfJhniir nI-$ü/[yu. 00.. inlro., and notes Emile Maalouf
(Beint: Dar al-Mashriq, 1993).
 B[BL[OGRAPHY - 328

_ _ •in. Idem, Sib llisO/UHZSh~kD-iEshriïJ.a/-Alfi'-a:{lnI- 'lm17d[yaD. Knlùn~ull1- T~8wwUf.

llI-L8nm/Jiir. 00. with Pers. intro. Najaf-Ghuli I:Iabibï. Engl preface Sayyed Hossein Nasr
{Tehran: Intishir8t-i Anjuman-i Shiihanshihî-l Falsafah-yi Iran, 1397/1977).81-130.
[partial tram.] Idem. "Le livre du verbe du soufisme," in Arch/ldfft'. 161-72. [from Arabie;
extraets l'rom chapters III, IV. VI-IX. XIV. XIX-XXIII. XXV}
_ _ . llI-L4D1B./Jül" ff llI-!klljü}q, KirOb .u-LAm~i/J/Ï/". ed., infro. and notes Emile Mamou!. ,.œ ed
(Beirut: Dar al-Nahar. 1991). [meraphysics, physics.logie}
_ _ ,in Idem, SiDlbsmllbnzSbnykD-ilshnkj. a/-A1wO/JnI- 'lm8di;ylib.Kn5mOfl1l-T~8WWUf.
n/-LlLntll/tiïl, ed. Najaf-Ghuli lJabibi (Tehran: Intishiriit-i Anjuman-i Shfihanshi.hï-i Falsafab-yi
Iran. 1397/19n). 133-76. [metaphysies]
_ _ ' Lopïu in Shahrazüri' s NuzIJor ~i1-Anf.iE/J in Spies and Khatak. eds.. T1Jree TrtWhSes 00
JI.(rsbcism, 112-121.
_ _ . Luçllal"-iA-fiinio, in O~l. III. 294-311.
_ _ ,in Spies and Khatak, eds .. T~ TreNisf!son At(psâcis:m, 2-12. [Ar. numbEriag}
[trans.] Idem, "The Language of the Ants." in A-fysrJcm.76-87.
[trans.] Idem, "The Language of the Ants," in. T1Jree TreNises-on A(P5'/icism, ed. Otto Spies.
13-27.
[trans.] Idem, "La langue des founnis," in ~ e , 420-32.

_ _ ' MlUJfJf 81-T8Iw.f.{Jiïr, 00. and inrro. cAli Akb..

Tihrin, 1334/(955). [logic]
Fay." (Tebran: Intisbiriit-i DiJUshgih-yi

_ _ , td-Masllm' c wool-MU{iïnl!J., iJJ. O,Penl, 1,193-506. [metaphysics]

_ _ ' lf,fiAAsô~·IlI-~I, in Shahraziirl, Nuzbaral-ArJJ~,in Spies and KhIUk, eds., Tiree
Trealises OA .A(PYCicism. 103-112.
_ _ ' 1lI-lf,fIKJI7WllOJÜI, in {)pern, l, 123-92. [metaphysics}
_ _ , Paml-AiïmlilJ,iJl Opnl, Ill, 2-81.
Sohravardi, 71Je Book of./lofÛnoce (...... ~~..>; ). A PonlUel EngLisfJ-Persl40 Texr, ed. and
tnulS.with an intro. br Hossein Ziai (Costa Mesa. CA: Mazda PubJishers, 1998), 2-85.
[almost identical to N asr' sedition]
_ _ ' in C1J8IJlÜdlliJ ./li'slÜnb , ed. Mut;Jammad Biïqir Sabzaviri (Tehran: Inti sh irit-i
Dinishgiih-yi Tebriin, 1340/ [1960?] ),220-272.
[partial trans.] Idem, "Le livre du rayon de lumière," in ArcotlLf!!"e, 139-47 (from Persian;
extraets from two J~ chapter.; , IX, X).

[crans.] Sohravardi, 71JeBookofRl1ÔIilOce (...... ~~P).

__ , RismIllJ6/~H41-{fubumïJ, in Opnl, Il,261-72.
[trans.] Idem, "Le symbole de foi des philosophes," in ~B.tu.we, 14-24.

_ _ , ()L,'s!'li/' til-GIJurlJllIJ NI-OnlUfJtnUl, in 0JH2'l, II, 273 -297.

[lnUlS.] Ibid, in Ops7l, II, 273-293. [oontains Persian paraphrase witb brier commentary}
[trans.] Idem, .. A Tale of Occidental Exile," in. "'{PSfJ"œl, 100-108.
[rrans.] [dem, "Le récit de l'exil occidental... in ~~e, 273-9.

_ _ , RisiilmnJ-Abnij, in Opnl, UI,462-71. [al sI' tnownas KolimarllI-Ooawlf.i)7lh wom-Niko/

1l1-S111/wtJ.fYti11]
[rrans.] Idem, "L'épître des hautes tours:' in A~e, 349-55.
 BlBLlOGRAPHY - 329

_ _, /bsiUnIJ 5 fEimir m-TufUl{Yll1J ,ÏJ1 Openl, In, 252-66.

[trans. in Persian] M. Mahdi Bayam, j)iJ NisDnb-..FL· Fiir.FJ~ ~iS'Dl1f fi PiilN li/-TurvD.l'lib.
Risiilllr-illiizfbiïJlUzuïor-.i$iJflnü.J (Te.hran: [n.!.), 1317/1938)~
[tnlDs.] Idem, "On the Stste of Cildhood," ÏJ1 A-fJ-3ticii/, 51-61.
[trans.] Tehrani, "Mystical Symbolism," 156-188.
[trans.] Idem, "L'épître sur l'état d'enfance," in An:b/~e, 392-406.

_ _ ' /bsiïlaiJ IF fElIflBJI,r Ii/- 7s1Nj~YiïAfüms 111- VSOsnlïqJ in O~, III, 267-291.
_ _ ' Jt,fu~zisn1-I:Usbsoikf. TlleLofè'rY' Frieod, ed. Otto Spies (Delhi: Jamia Press, Jamia
Masjid, 1934).
[trans.] Idem, "On the ReaJity of Love," in A-fysbcnl, 62-75.
4
[trans.] Idem, "Le Vade-mecum des fide1es d'Amour," in ArclNuJge.302-18.
__ , RiS/Ï/IlbIl/-~pr,in ~,III, 198-205. [also knownas nlr.JiumU1~isDnlJlLI-T'!pr].

_ _ , Ibid., Spies and Khatak, eds., T~ Trelliis~son A{ysoo'sm. 39-46. [Ar. numberin.g)
[trans.] Idem, "The Treatise of the Bird," in A-!PHJ"cIl1,21-5.
[trans.] Idem, "The Treatise of the Bied," in Spies and Khatak, eds., T.hree Treobses on
A{YSliaSLlI, 45-5 1.
_ _ ' RÜzfb6.111D10~-i$iifi;nTn, Opnr. III, 242-250.
[trans.] Idem, "A Day with a Group ofSufis," A-fys&'col,44-50.
[trans.] TehraJIi, "Mystica1 SymboJism," 269-282.
(1l'anS.] Idem, "Un jour, avec un groupe de soufis... ," in ~ e , 368-77.

_ _ ' $IJIù-L·Sïmurr.IJ, in ~,I1I, 314-332.

_ _ ' SpiES and Khatak, eds., 71Jree Tre/lÛSesoD A(J'Ycia'sm, 13-38. [pers. numberiJlg]
[tram.] Idem, "The Sound of Gabriel's Wing," in A,!YSlicn/,88-99.
[trans.] Idem, "The Note of Simurgh," in Spies and Khatak, eds., T~ Tn!oLiseson A(PS'bcism
,28-44.
[trans.] Idem, "L'incantation de la Sîmorgh, in An:'Amwe, 449-62. 5
Tt

_ _ ' Il1-T6Iwi(lik, in Opnl, l, 1-121. [metapbysics]

_ _ ' Leiden ms., no. Or. 365. [contaios the physics and Ibn Kammunah' s SAor~]

_ _ ' 1l1- n~Ü7'diit wo 11/-TMIf6snr

_ _ ,Two invocations were published by M. Main iJl A-fo'p!ullh-,n'AmüZIsh WH PivwlU7sn
(Teran, 1924) and reprinted in. Suhrawardï, SilJlàSOllllJ, 18-9.6

2 Mentioned in ~,I, "Pro1éSomène:s ," iv.

3 AIso RrMIlI'JII-7sh9, cf. Sbahrazüri (O. Spies' edition), 10l.
4 An earher 1r'aD5. WIIS done in 1933, published in the anAual pllblic:ati.OIl, d. "Le familier
des Amants," RerI1crcbesphr/QSopitJ'ues n, (Paris, 1933),371-423. The later was done from a 'Uaïque
JIIS, before the edition of O. Spies (Delhi, 1934), ArdIange, 330 Jl. (a).

5 An earller tl"aDS... La modulatlon du Sîmocgb," H~rmcis, Ille série, n° 3 (Bruxelles-Pans,

novembre 1939),22-37; d. Arc:bange ,463 11. (a).

6 2ïai, "SbilIaD al-Dm Suhrawardï: Founder," 460 n.lS
 BIBLIOGRAPHY - 330

[crans.] Idem, "Strophes liturgiques et offices divins:' in .~e. 482-498.

[trans.] Idem, .. Psaumes à l' ..change du Soleil" and .. Psaumes a la Nature," in Cochin, En
EsllU» danien, vol. 2, 126-40..
__ , ~lZdiüJ ShiniïIdJr. in Open/, III. 404-59. [aaributed te Suhrawardï)
[partial trans.] Rem Nazemi, "An Analytical Study of the Persian Treatise on .. Gnosis of
Gad" ( y dZoiïo SoinliKnr ):' (M.A. Thesis: Institute of Is1amic Studies, McGill University,
1977), 15-58. [condensed selections)

AVICENNA'S WORKS
1 - BIBLIOGRAPHIES
Anawati, Georges C., o.p., Essoi de biblit{ifrop/lie or-icemlieAOe. A-fillenllÜe d:4 r-'Û:enoe [ Jl.fv ÎJUoIOr
EbB S.hui) , preface Ibriihïm Madkour. foreword ~ad Bek Amin (Cairo: Dar al-Macirif,
1950). [contains a synopsis of me S.IJilij"~ ]
JansSen5, Jules L., An ADnOl$edBilJôOgmphyon .IlJnSinô (/970-1989) (Leuven, BeJgium: Leuven
Univecsity Press, 1991).
Mahelavi, Y., Fi1Jrisr-i A-fu.SllDOIfir-L·Ihn Si'nii (Tehran.: 1Jltishariit-i Diinishgih-yi Tihriin, 1333/1954).

n - 1 EX IS AND TRANSLATIONS
Ibn Si.na(Avicenna), 1l/-A~Fi;r7l!J.ûJll-A-fdlTd,ed. ]Jœan c~ (Beirut: al-Mu'assasah al-Jiimicïyah
li &1-Drisiit wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzï~, 14(4/1984). [superior 10 the Dunyâ ed.)
_ _ ' RislÏ1/l/l A!1:haw[YItÔ.I1 Amr nI-Jl.fo~, ed. Sulayman Dunya (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr
a1-~Arabï, 1949).

[partial tnulS.] D'AJvemy, "Anniyya-Anitas," 59-61

_ _ ' A/JwiU m-NIlIS: RL"sD1I1J fi RI-NaIS WII Bllfjo)'JuT WII A-fa ~i1JI1. ed. and îmro. Alfmad Fu "ad
C
w-AhwEim.ï (Cairo: Dit Ittyil al-Kutub al_ Arabïyah, 1952),45-142.
_ _ ' RisiillllJ R 41-NIÛS, ed. Ulken in Avicenna, Ibo SÔlollisiilelen' 2. Les opuscules
dlb.l1 S.fAo ee le 5~re de la diffénYlCe emre l'espn"r « 1 ïime fNlI" (JOsr8 b. LlK{o, ed., studied
and annotated by Hill Ziaya Ulken (Istanbul: Ibrahim. Horoz 8asimevi, 1953),109-154.
[trans. in Persian) Risl11s1J-,ri NIlfs, ed., intro. and notes by Musa cAmïd (Tehran: Yiidgir-i
Jashn-i Hizinh-yi Abü cAli Sïnâ, 137111951).
[crans.] Michet, "Prophétie et divination," 5 12-22. [section 13)
[trans.] Michot, "Avicenne, LoLJéfinthondeIiÛDe," 239-56. [section 1)
_ _ ' O~4Nma1l:.n·~iÎt[TAeBookofSQ~].UlildffN/.ed .. intro.andnotesM.Mu"ïn.
(Tehran: An.juman.-i Athiir-i MiUï, 1371/1951-2). [Idem, PInisJJ-AiimaIJ-p' ~8r, eds. M.
Mu'ïn and M. Mishkavah, 3 vols. in 1 (reprint of 1952: Tehran.: Dihkbudi, 1975) )
[trans.] TneM~4,p.slaofA ~iœmto(7lJAS.ioO),trans. Parvïz Morewedge (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul; New York: Columbia University Press, 1973).
_ _ ' TahiLyat, ed., ïntro. and notes Mu~ammad Mashkuvah (Tehran: Anjuman-i Atbir-i
Milli. 137111951).
[tnu1S.] Le IJ~ de science [.o.inesA-nâma). 2nd ed., 1r8JlS. Mohammad Achena and Henri
Mœsé (1955 - log., meta.; 1958 - phy., math.; 2 vols in 1, UNFSCO: Les belles lettres,
 BlBLlOGRAPHY - 331

1986). vol. 2. 7-90.

_ _ . ff'!J:Y IbA Yllf~iio. in tvIehren, Tnures m,J-Yh;'ues. textes arabes par A. F Mehren (Leyden
E.J. Bril1, 1888-99). fasc. 1.
[trans.] Mehren. Tnuresm,J-'Yh'lues. Case. 1
[trans.] Corbin, A Joù:enne. 154-65. [cf. Idem, A Jo7Cenn~;, 137-50)
_ _ ' 1lI-/sb~ïnlr wo n/-TmJbihik 011il 8 Sh.-/J No.sfr ~1I-0fA m-TI1sÏ, 4 vols (in 3). 00. Sulayman
Dunyii(Cairo: Diral-Macarif. vol. 1. 1960: vol. 2, L957: vols. 3-4,1958).
[trans.] Le Iir-n! des (/upaù-'f5 el reAJlUr.fues, French tt'8JlS. Amélie-Msrie Goichon (Paris: J.
Vrin, 1951). 75-526.
[reans.] Michot... De la joie et du bonheur," 49-60.
[crans.] Rem/Ida dDd AumoA1hons [tlf-/sIJAnlr W'II nI-lil1h.ilJtir]. Pmr Four: IDA SÜJ~T lUlU
"-!1-Yfù:ism. trans.. Întro. and notes Shams C. Insti (London - New Vode: Kegan Paul
International. 1996).
_ _ . f(j'riib8l-MdOy/lLi /lInS7no. ed. M. cAbdub. 2nd ed. (Caïro: al-Qihirah al-Ejadithah. 1974)
[partial trans.] Michot, .. L'eschatologie," 138-52. [Iast section)
_ _ ' llI-Jl.f86diï~ WI/ 1lI-Jl,fliad. ed. tAbd Allah NüJiirü (Tehran: MuJassasah-yi Muf.il.icit-i Islimï
Diinisbgiih-yi McGill. Diioishgiih-yi Tihriin. 1363/1984).
(trans.] Mehren... La philosophie d' Avicenne." 389-409 and 506-522. [extraetsl
(partial rrans.] Michet. "Avicenne et la destinée humaine." 453-83. [extraets]
'--. _ _ , Jl.fNh/latIJ Mn 81-Ç)uwihu-NJlfstitr!YnIJ. ed. Landauer, "Die Psychologie des Ibn Sîna." 335-418.
_ _ • A-flUl{ij aI-A-faYkiqi;1'Ü1, in. A-fllDPf IlI-MaslJnlf[yfA WB oJ-(JapOlilJ 1lI-A-fuzdaW'ÏjÏlII fi 1lI-A-fllO.éliJ
Ta,s-off 1I1-&iJ"s AbI ~ h. SiON (2od reprint Qum: Maoshürit Maktabat-i Ayat Allih
al-C:U~iia1-MsrC:asbïal-Najafi, 1405/1984). [firsted. (Caire: al-Salafiyah. 1328/19(0), 1-83]
_ _ ' NasaL/ Sh~kIJ RI-NI1 :ÎS ... .Ibn SiDa (Qum: Intishiiriit-i Bidir, 1980). [ cf. Idem. A-flljmii ~
RASoL! dI-S.lJ1!J'kb al-Rots, ed. cAbd A11ih Ibn Abmad aI-cAJawï (l:Iaydar Abad: Di)irat
al-Maciirif al_cUthmiJl.ïyah. L354/1935)]
__ 1 n1-Jl.fnlJdiï~wl1Jff-A-fl1lït1. ed. A NüriJ1ï (Tehran: Tehran University and Institute of Istamic
Studies (McGi11), Tehran Branch, 1984) [cf. Idem. Jbs8l8tnJ-AfabdtT~wtlllI-"-fIl8tlin Idem,
c
Jl.fll/miiar IlI-RllS'oLf. 00. Kurd cAli (Caî.to: M~bac. Kurdistiin al_ I1miyah, 132811910),
250-6]
(trans.] Micbot. "L'épître surlageoèse," B.P.A-L 26 (1984): 104-118.
_ _ ,1l1-Mulm.{1tldJ1N in Badawi. ed., Ans,ü UMS a/- ~b. 122-239. [cf. Ibid., ed. and notes
M~sin Bïdirfar (Tehrao: Intishirit Bidar. 1371/1993)]
[partial trans.] Michot, "La réponse d'Avicenne à Bahmanyâr et al-Kirmâni," 143-221: cf.
Idem, OeshAœ ,passim; cf. Idem, "Cultes, Magie et intellection," 220-33.
[p.-tia1 traos.] Gutas, A J-7œnna, 56-60.
[partial tram.] Pines, "La conception de la conscience de soi."21-98.
_ _ , aI-NojlUmiD 1lI-GDlln/hBIl/JrIll-pall1lnr. ed. and miro. Mu~ammad Dinish-Pazhüh (Tebran:
fntishiirit-i Dinishgih-yi Tihran, 1364/19&S)?
[traos.] Rahman, A Jo7œnnll S P-!YdJoI~y, 24-69.
_ _ 1 (J4SfdaIJ ff IlI-NIlfs, ÎJl Idem, MI1D,/llf a/-Afnsbn'rjI,Wn. kb-kj; cf. Ibo Khallikin. JJ~û,!yii/"
voL 2, 160-1; cf. De Vaux. "La Kaçîdah." 159-65. (ed. and trans. with an anonymous
a>m.mentary)
 B[BL[OGRAP HY - 332

[1raIlS.] De Vaux, .. La Kaçîdah." 165-73: cf. Masse. "Le poême de l'âme," 7-9: cf. Ibn
KhliULkao 's. vol. 1. 443: cf. Browne. A uren'Y'HLsrayofPwsin, vol. 2,110-1.
_ _ . RisiUn; N- 7s1Kf in Mehren. Tnuies Ol,YShVues ,fasc. 3, 1-27.
[Erans.] Fackeaheim. "A Treatise on Love."20S-228.
[trans.] Mehren, ThHËt5m,YSbttl/es. fasc. 3. 1-5.
[trans.] Sabri. llisiDn 51- 'lI'!." 109-34.
Il

_ _ . IlisiUll1J li IdJbor II/-NubuwwiïE (Proof ofPropb«;Y). 00.. ÏJltro. and notes Michael Marmura
(Beirut: Dar al-Nahiir. (968),41-61.
[1raIlS.] Marmura. "On the Praof of Prophecies." L12-21.
_ _ . IU-JàSiUu ff n/-$lÏrIlb oI-MliflÏJ/d a/-A,fuKbiUffOÂ /i nI-PIKj~
[trans.] Michot. "Avicenna's 'L~ter," B.PA-L 27 (1985): 94-103.
(trans.] Michot. "«I,'Epitre S1lr ladisparitioJ1»." B.p.A-f. 29 (1987): 152-70.
_ _ ' Ris8JtU01- T~pr . in Mehren, Tmires OI,JlShtfues • fasc. 3.
[trans.] Mebren. "Loiseau: traité mystique d' Avicenne,"11 pages.
(trans.] Corbin. AJ-7Cd70e.203-9 [cf. Idem, Af7ŒADIi,186-192)
_ _ . aJ-SIUH: m-UiUJ[nr(I-.?) [A-feraphfS.rt:s). ed. Georges C. Anawati. Sacïd Zayd. et aJs., ("ev.
c
and intro. Ibriihïm Madlcür (reprint? Cairo: al-Hsy'ah al_cAmmab li-Shu'ün al-Ma;ibi
al-Amiriyah. J380/1960.2 vols.; [s.1. (Iran?): s.n., no date)).
[trans.] La mébyJô,rsijue du SHIFA-~ Lirn:!S"' Id V, traIlS., mua. notes and comm. Georges
C. Anawali (paris: J. Vrin, 1978).
[trans.) Lam~~YSiqueduSH.1FA-~Lifres J.-7ti.Y, tnulS.• intro. notes and comm. Georges
C. AnawaIÎ (paris: J. Vrin, 1985).
[trans.] Marmura. "Avicenna. Healing: Metaphysics." 98-111. [rrans. chaps. II-V of book X
of the Jl.f~.h,..p.»t:3']
z
_ _ 1 Ill-SbdiT , II, JU-TII!Ji"~)W, 6. Ill-Hm. 00. Bakos Jan. P.s;rdJoIoç.re d'Ibo SinN (.4r-7œmJe).

D ~ son oeur-re m_SfLiIijz, 2 vols., ed. and French trans.• vol. 1, Arabic text (prague:
Editions de l'Académie Tchécoslovaque des Sciences. 1956).
[trans.] Bakos. P.sycôolor.re d "/I1n Sind, 2 vols. [ed. and French trans.)
_ _ ' SINir.{I c1'JéJ"riKJ 'UdJOIOjr,Pa» • in cA. R. Badawi, 00., AnS.1ü UMIi Ilf- ~h, 2nd ed. (Kuwait:
Wakilat al-M~ücit. 1978).35-74.
[pS"tial trans.] Vajda, "Les notes d'Avicenne," 345-406.
__ ' Il1-Tll?i"~tU [Glo.s:s-es-]. ed. and Ï11tro, cAbd aJ-R~iIl Badawï (Cairo: G.E.B.O., 1973;
reprint. Tehran. Maktabat-i al-cAtam al-Islami. 1985). 13-192.
_ _ . IÛ-u'lfttk d/âlfllwMY1Ji"KibJolÛ-NlÛSb:'An"srû [GloSS"es onAristotle's OnueSou.l], ed.
Badawï, AnS.1Ü OJdall1- ~, 75-116.
_ _ • 7Is~RllSlïJ D 8I-f5km1l1J Fil a/- TIlÔi"r;P1lÔ wo ~NrSllIiinMn wa AbsDh"-I-Sô,!yldJ IlI-Hn ~s
IhA S7Aa, ed. IUtd intro. ijasan c~ï (Beirut-Dimashq: Dar Qiibis. 1986).

7 M. D. S. al-Kurdi, JlI-.M1prli-J-ShJ!1'"khJll-lblÎs... 51l1-Hrkmilrlll-MiV1PiJ!»lh w;I;d-TJIh~)r.lh W1i

III-Dii/u)'lrh. lsted. (Gairo: al-Sacidab. 1331/1913) and M. D.~. a1-Kurdi. 61-Nnjlr51l1-.{UbDJ//"lIf-A-fJID.l:itItPJÛJ
W# 6f- TlI6 ~ WII R/-DMoYu/l b"-J-SlJilyk}J lI/-RIl M... /hn Sü1TI, 2st ed. (0111'0: al-Saciidm, 1357J 1938)
 BIBLIOGRAPHY - 333

OTIIER. PRIMARY SOURCES

Abu al-Barakit al-Baghdidï (Ibn MalkiC). u.I-A-fu~luufi n1-ffLkmnIJ, 3 vols (l:Iaydsiibiid: Jam'ïyal
Di'irat al-Ma'irif al-'Uthmaniyah. 1357/1938).
&1-'Anuri, Abü al-l:fasan, o/-.4mml ~nnI-Abiïd in Rawson. A A-Iuslim Phi/osopÂer.
Aristot1e, FEal-NoIS[ OnœeSouJ]. ed. 'A. Badawï (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nabçah al-Mi!?liyah. 1954).
_ _ • 71Jt? JJ~ks ofAn'sror.le , 2 vols. (reprint of trans. under the editorship of W. D. Ross. Oxford
University Press; Chicago: Enc,yclopaedia 8rilannica. 1952)
. An'staeJes' /Je nnimll: eü.Je rw-loreJe spnDludke Alnipluflse ID nm6iscAëY und persicOw'
l7lJerJief~'ombisœer TexrnebsrKommenr... tjueUeogescnicIJt:lLchenSrudien uodOlossue
. ed. R. Arnze4 (Leiden: E.l. Brill. 1998).
• S/JuriJ/J ~iT An'sp7 Moftjiïdllh fi aI-Yiïnl1iJ(YMÔ WH NlISiïÎ./ U.éhriT. ed. 'Abd al-Ra~miin
Badawï (Beirut: Dar al-Mashriq, 1971).
Alexander of Aphrodisias... Maqiilat al-Iskandar al-Afrüdïsï fi al-' Aql 'aliRa1 ArisÇütiJïs:' in Aristotie.
ShuniP·
Badawï. 'Abd al-RaJ,miin. ed .. ARiJ.ri"n mtlH Hl- ~. 3rd ed. (Cairo: 1955; Kuwait: WakiJat
a1-M~ü'it. 1977).
,-. _ _ . ed.. ll.!-AOapïoIftlÔ ll.!-A-lu/JdaUmr mtla 111- ~b • 2ad ed. (Kuwait: W akilat al-M~ii'it.
1977).
_ _ . ed.. AnSpï WIlIl!-~h.2nded. (Caire. 1947; Kuwait: Wakaliïl a1-M~ü'it, 1978).
Bayhaqi. Zabïr. THtim.mllr$fwtiolll-!fUaD1Ih (Lahore. 135111932).
al-Bïriinï and Avicen.na, n/-AsL71lh w61l1-A/'wibM. .. Ç)ueShoos 8Ot/ ALls'w~' bJC~utlil.tg rée FurdJtr
Am'WtY5' ofa/-Bü'iÜJ[IlJ!Jd Id-M8~iimf's Pefence ofIbn S01I1. ed. with intro S.H. Nasr and
Mebdi Mohagbegh (Tehran. 1973).
Dawwiinï. JaW al-Oïn, SlJowdbllll-HürRSIJ/TIJIlI-HaYllblIll-Nür. ed. T. Chandrase.kharan, critica1
ed. M. Abdul Haq and Muhammad Yo~ Kok~(Madras:GovemmentOriental Manusaipts
Library, 1953).
al-Firiibï. Abü N~r, /J~vr lnUi'és pMosoplJ.Kjues: L '/mnDomè eDrre les opùuons des œar R{e"e"'• .le
dL'JoUI PlllroLl tr Anstrxe tr OeLI! reogi'on. trans .• ïntro. and notes Dominique Mallet (Damas:
Institut français de Damas, 1989).
_ _ , RLsiilnIJ Ji 6/- ~tjl. texte arabe ÏJltégral en partie inédit établi psr Maurice Bouyges (Beirut:
Imprimerie Catholique, (938).
[trans.] Arthur Hyman... A1farabi: The Letter Conceming the Intellect." in Hyman and Walsh,
eds.• Pôuosopl!riJI die A-fiddfe As"es • 215-6.
_ _ ' Il.!-MlltfümIJ HI-F.ilNé. ed. Richard Walzer. ~FlI7lhi60tI i:hePed"eerSare. Jl.fllb6"di An13
3
AA.lIlI-A-flltIüJH 1lI-fi.dull. revised ten witb i..ntro.• trans., and commenwy by Richard Walzer
(Oxford: Cl..endon Press 1985).
1

[trans.] Richard Walzer, AJ-FtnlhillDdl1IePerFt!a

~":~

~
[trans.] Tnuie des opinions des IJllhiranrs de la ciré .it:lelJ/e, intro. lnU1S. and oetes Tahani
Sabri (paris: J. Vrin. 1990).
_ _ . AUilTNb,i'sP11IlosopDyofPfnrolUldAn'st'oiIe. trans. and intro, Mubsin Mahdi, l'eV. ed. (1962;
 BIBLIOGRAPHY - 334

Ithaca. NY: Comell Paperbacks. 1969).

Galen.. T~ TrPlJ&ses 00 die .JVOEun! ofSaeoce. ed. M. Frede (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co..
1ge5).
al-Ghaziili, Mu1;lammad. TllbiVorNl-Fnlm-ffim, Ùl Idem. 77JeEncoôereoceoftOeP1Ji/osopDers(~frj
~.Jl&I/). A PomUe/ Eogns.IJ-_~LCTeri" Tmosliled. Introduced /lOd.4mxxnred b,r il-ILChlieL
E: A-fmmlK'O (provo. UT: Bringham Young University Press. 1997).
_ _ . I/J,P8 V/llmnl-LJ.in. 5 vols.
J
(~r: al-MaktabataJ-Tijiriyatal-Kubra. [n.d.]).
[trans.] The Book o fKAoFledge. lOe "Kir., 11/- 'lLm .. ofg/-GlnziilFS' ''Lf!.p"oJ ~U1üm a/-DLD ':"
2nd ed., tr. Nabib Amin fans (1962; Lahore: Sb. Mu1;lammad Ashraf. 1966).
_ _ . A-fis"iIkN IlI-AAwnr, ed. Abu al-cAli tAfîâï (Cairo: al-Diir al-Qawmïyah li al-Tibacah wa
al-Nashr,1964).
[trans.] .",y-Ohazllh·$ A-:lLS1zbrnJ-AnFOr(../&-;)I/ tits:..:w. ). A PIrllI1e1 EAçosh-ArabLc Texr.
trans. D. Buchman (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press. 1998).
[trans.] Gairdner(Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1924; London. 1924).
[trans.] Le TohemacÎt? deS' .lunuëres ( A-licltkiirIlI-Aow'). trans. and ïntro. Roger Deladrière
(paris: Seuil, 1981).
J:[allij, E:Iusayn Ibn Maœjür. AkDlllÜ nl-ffnlli!i, ed.. annotated and trans. Louis Massignon and Paul
Kraus. 3rd ed. reconstrueted and completed by L. Massignon (1936; Paris: J. Vrin. 1957).
Ibn Abi U~aybicah, Vyiio IlI-AoM fi Tnll/lfRr nI-A{iblJü~, ed. Ni~ Ri~i (Beirut: Dir Malttabah
3

,-. al-aayih. 1965).

Ibn cAdi. Abu Zaksriyi. TMdAïb al-Ak1LiJ Ùl Marie-Thérèse Urvoy, Tmiré d'ed1ifut? d'Allû
Zalainffï Yl1/Jyii III.o ~m. préface Gérard Troupeau. introductioJl, texte et traductiOJl par
J

M.-T. Urvoy (paris: Cariscript. 1991).

Ibn Bibi (N~ al-Dml:lusayn b. MuJJammad). Ik1Jbiïr-iSnlifilKJR1J-,yiRüm ofAbi BIhLal-A-fuDfmnaH.
JVtÜdJeCompit:Ye TerrofA-fu.kô~~iSaI/iiy-oliHJll1J;piIIJDBI"ï.ed. and lntro. Mu1;lammad
Javid Mushktür (Tehran: Kitib Furishï-yi Tilrio. 1350 h.s.l1971). (contains the text of the
TmLb AJ-iSilljiïq d..Aoa!üD and the A,fusamintr .tI-AkhhlÜ]
Ibn al-l:Iariiwi. Muf;lammad Sharif Ni?-iiJn al-Dïn ~ad, A6w~)wh, TIlIjomIiD WH S/Nlr/J-i.(likmat
IlI-Isiu'Wj-i Sulmlwnrd!. [ 1 ÎtIJ c. A.H PenLÏiJJ Tnnsl6rJOD 118d CommenrN;Y 00 SuOniwnrr5 's
IIIKMAT A.l-ISH/lA() /Phi/os-opiJ,rof DluouD6boo], 2nd ed., ed. and iJJ.tro. Hussayn Ziai
[Oiyi~]. (1357/1978; Tehran: Amïr Kabïr, 1363/1984).

Ibn Khallikin. JJ~y.. Il1-A:rLn WH

J J
A.oha Aboo IlI-ZomlÎO, a vols., ed. lJ;Jsin .J\bbiis (Beirut: Dar
t

$idir, 1997). vol. 6.

[trans.] /bJ1 KApIIié.fUl s BLog,.,mœ PJt&oo.y (JJ'tiIà,PlÏi" ti/-A iftlo), 4 vols.. trallS. Bn
Mac Guc1tin de Slane (paris: Oriental Translation Fund of Great Britain and Ireland 1843). 1

Ibn M.-zbin, Bahmanyir, IlI-T8/1.sU. new ed. Murta~i Mu{ahhari (Tehnm: Dinishgiih-yi Tihrin.
134911971). [earlier ed.. Caïro. 1229/1911]
[tnms. in Persian] Idem, JiïJIJ-i JllIJiïA Num'!p, eds. A. Nüriinï and Dinish Pazhûh (Tehran:
Intishiirit-i Dinimgib-yi Tihl'an. 1983).
Ibn Miskawayh. IlI-Fawz 1lI-A:s"rhr [Lept:rJ'r Iir-re du salU/]. ed. Silib CUdaymah, French tnulS. and
notes Roger Amaldez (Tunis: al-Mu~assasah al-W~yah li al-Tarjamah wa al-Ta1;lqiq wa
al-Di&-asit. Bayt aI-l:Iikmah, 1987).
_ _ ... lil-Fl/wZ 1lI-4wlJar : The Sborter Theology of Ibn Miskawaih," Eagl. tnms. J. W
Sweetman in Idem, IsitIDlllDd Ou7~ÏiD Theo/ogy, vol 1. pt. 1. 84-185.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY - 335
C
_ _ ' "MlCfilah li al-Ustidh Abï cAll Miskawayh fi al-Nafs wa al- Aql,'· in Mohammed ArkoWl.
ed., "Deux épîtres de Miskawayh; édition avec introduction et notes," B.Eo. 17 (1961-61):
20-65. [Arabie numbering, 10-55]
_ _ ' "Maqiilab li aJ-Ustidh Abu cAli Miskawayh," in 8adawï, ed., Duiïsiir ""0 N~~s fi
IlI-FIlkIlfIlb wu m- V/üm ÜXlIl 01- ~-4n/b, 57-97.
Ibn Qayyin al-Jawzïyah. Kiroh n/-/<ü!J, 3rd ed. (1906; Hayderibid: M~baCat Majlis Dayrac al-Macirif
al_cUthminiyah, 135711938); cf. Idem, Kihlb 1lI-/lü/J /:i IlI-KiJ/iim nl-Ar"-R/J 1lI-A.Pwiil wo
IlI-AI!YR bi m-LJn/6"L/ min 41-Kiroo wo n/-SUADIlÔ wu IlI-Ath.- "''8 A wlJD1lI- ~UlnmiïJ (Cairo:
Maktabat Subay, 1950).
Ibn al-Nadïm, The i"FiDnS/""of~i1-Nodim. A Tt:YKh-CenmrvSvn-eyofA-fuslLm Culrore. ed. and trans.
Bayard Dodge, 2 vols. (Columbia: Columbia Uni;ersity Press, 1970).
Ibn Shaddid (Babi' al-DÜl Yusjf b. Rifi') , Nowiïdu- nl-Su.fliül.[YIÛJ "'"9 n/-Afofliisi.o a/-YÜsu./i: Sin//"
$dlSIJ Ill-Dm (Cairo: al-Dar al-Mi~yah Ji al-Ta'lif wa al-Tarjumah. 1964).
[rrans.] ·Saladin·; or, What Befe1J Su.ltan YûSlÛ ($al~ ed-Dîn.). (1137-1193 A.D.)," tnu1S.
Sir Charles Williams Wilson, compared with the original Arabie and Annotated by Conder
(London: Committee of the Palestine Exploration Fund, 1897) [reprint Lahore: Isiamie Book
Service. 1976].
Ibn Rushd (AvetTOes), A J-H7t1eS' TllIJmurol-Tllhiifu/" [loconerenceofrIJe incoherence], Engl crans.
S. Van den Berg (2nd repriJlt of 1954; London: E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Trust. 1987).
tImid al-Dm al-Isfahiinï, BUsr8D 81-Jiïmi~ li-JH8lL-r Taw8rZkh n/-Znmü, ed. Claude Cah en, "Une
dlronique syrie1U1e du VlelXlle siècle: le "Bustin al-Jamic" ," B.E:o. 7-8 (19l7-38): 113-58.

.- cImid al-Dm al-Isfabiinï, CODlfuêr~ de./a Sfi7e «de /a PllIesdAe pu Sn/tNfin (a/-FN"./J a/-OudsiD
IlI-F~81-(}udSLI, tnu1S. Henri Massé (paris: Paul Geuthner, 1972).

[trans.] Gibb, H. A., 77Je Life of S41ndin.. bom rAe JJ'orb' of ?miït/IlI-DEn (Oxford:
Chrendon Press. 1973).
al-Jüzjiinï, Abu tUbayd, Sii7U n/-Sh,!Ykb Il/-NoLS: FiIJn'sr Kuruh./bD SOlo, ed. and trsns. Gohlman,
71Je Life ofIlJn SiDa, 16-42.
Kubri, Najm al-Dm, FHwlÏ~ 1i/-/IUD8/ Wil Fowiili/J81-Ja/ii1 (Kuwait: Die Sucid $abiil;l, 1993).
Lawkari. BiJ}'IiDIlI-(fMffIJL:,pin.1m$LOt;t. iiTheA-f~~.P-D'~ "ed. Ibriihïm Dïbiji (Tehran: International
Institute of Islamic Thought and Civiliz~on(ISTAC), 1995.
Lyons, M. C.. 00., An ArabLe TnuzslalÎan of 11Jemi'sriw' COD1Alenbll'yon An'srode S "Oe Animu"
(Columbia: U11ÏveI'Sity of South Carolins Press, 1973).
Mulla $adm, llI-piknJaIJ tU-Mu~o ~~ 0 a/-AsGr Il./- ~l[rU nl-Arho ~, 4th ed. in 9 vols (Beirut:
Dit !.byi' al-Turitb al-cAmbio 1410/1990).
_ _ • ~1WÂ1 ed. G. Ahanr (lsfahan. 1341/1962),218-88.
[trans.] Morris, 77Je UTisdom ofdJe T.lJrrJne, 89-258.
__ , TI1~-'. [with Q.D. Shïrazï' 5 SIIIlr/J ]. ed. Asad Allah l:Iaratï (facsimile, T ehran t 1313 -15/1895-
1).
[trans.] Corbin, "Commentaire de Mollâ $adrâ Sbirââ," in S~e.s:se, 437-669.
Platon, Oeurns COLDp./tYeS 12 vols.• trad. nouvelle et notes par Léon Robin (paris: Gallimard. coll.
Pléiade, 1950).
Plotinus. EmJellds, trans., Stephen Mackenn8, 2nd 00. rev. by B.S. Page, forward, E.R. Dodds, intro.
Psul Hemy (London: Faber and Fabert 1956).
Etvdus ~bus, Z,..,RIIZig" Ahsdmirre l/US der Institutio Theologies in ",biscktT llberzerzuAÇ •
 BlBLIOGRAPHY - 336

Einge1eitet, Herausgegeben und Erklart. Gerhard Endress (Beirut: Weisbaden: Franz Steiner
Verlag. 1973).
. Kim" Ii/-/diib .II n/-K.lJarr 1lI-A-kl1ld. in Badawï, ed .. Il1-AllikPmY8D flI-A-ful1dlidlur ÏDda
IU- :4mb. 1~3i .. .. ...

Pseudo-71JeoJqr,yof.~rode [plotinus] in Badawï, ed., AOii(UJ mm/Ill- :4nih. 3-164.

Proclus, "Liber de Causis," in cAbd al-Rahman Badawl. _-41liirümYlill a/-A-fuMndJah ~inda IJI- :4nJb
(Kuwalt: Wakalat al-Maçbutët. 1977). 1-33. ... .
[trans.] T.lJe Book ofÛluses [LLber de CauSLs]. trans. Dennis Brand (1981; Milwaukee:
Marquette University Press. 1984).
al-Rizi, Fakhr al-Oin, Kiriib IlI-Nafs WH ol-NU./J WH S/mrp ÇJuwiiIJumii, ed. Mu4ammad $aghir l:Jasan
al-Mac~ (Islamabad: Islamic Research Lnstitute, 1968).

[trans.] ImiTm Niizi's 'lûn m-oIdJ/lÏ/.· ERg/isb TmosJlloon a/Lus Kiroo III-NIIlI:s
WH oJ-Rü./1 WIl
S1NutJ ÇJUff--nlJumo, trans., ïntro. and commentaIy by M. ~aghïr l:Iasan Mac~ümï (Islamabad:
Islamic Research Institute, 1969).
, Lobilb m-/soihlr in Avicenna, a/-TanbiDiir wa 1l1-/sniirifi' WIl Lubib al-Ishiriit oz Fokhr
1l/-0f01l1lZL-, ed. Ma.l;unüdShabibi (Tehntn: Chipkbinab-yi DlU11shgih-yiTebran, 1339/1959),
171-282.
_ _ ' 1lI-A-fdbiT/UiO 1i/-A-fllS1n7if!nt1J D n/- 'li. III-U~YN W8 III-TIihI7;P1Ïi", 2 vols., ed. and noies
MuJ;lammad al-Mut~im. bi-Allah al-Baghdidi (Beirut: Diral-Kitib al-cArabi, 1410/1990).
_ _ . La pHfsiO,{!HDmonre ortJbe el" Je Kitiib al-Fitiisab de FllkIJr ii/-PiA m-/liizI, ed. and trans.
YOllssouf Mourad (paris: P. Geuthner, 1939).
_ _ ' Kir. 1lI-A-fUAiT..DI'IÏf. ed. and lnUlS. FatJ,;aallih Kholeif, A Sœt!YOA ENkIu 6/-Pm 1/J-1l6zI aod
ois COLlinJJ-BY.teSi.D Tnmso.NIUlili (Beint: Dar al- Mashriq, 1966), 4-63.
tU-A-fu/l~ A/K.r 1Û-Jl.fUbNjllddimiLl WI1 1/J-A-ful8 ~ 0lÜ11l1- ~Ulamli~ WH 1lI-.(fukamo
J
_ _ 1

WI1 aI-MumkllUimfn wriiJ Ta1khï~ al-Mu~~~al ofN~ 111-018 tU-1iisï, Ed. and intro Taba
C Abd al-Ru"üf Sacd (Beirut: Dar al-Kitib al-cArabi, L404/1984).
, SlkT1J 1lI-/".mtlnTr in Nasïr al-Dm al-Tüsi and Fakhr al-Dïn al-Riiti, SA.-oay 81-IsDin1r
(Qum:· Maktabat Ayit Alln al-tu~ah ~-Marcashi al-Najafi, 1404/1983). .,
al-Siiwi, KiINIJ iU-BII:S"0b- m-N~m:YMO R Il1-Moo.ritf (Cairo. 1897; Cairo: Maktab. MuJ;1am.mad cAli
$abïh, 19--).
Shahrastini, Abu al-Fatb Mul:lammad b. cAbd al-Karim [d.1153], Kimo4J-A-fLlaf wiud-Ni./Jal
[trans.] W-7t2 des reogioAS er des seaes [tU-A-fLlaf WH Il!-N~], vol. 1, tranS., muo. and
notes Daniel Gimaret and Guy Monnot (Leuven, BeJgium: Peeters, UNESCO, 1986)
[partial tnms.] A. K. Kazi and J. G. FJynn, A-fuslim S~ 4Ad dù·7sroL1S: Tne SecriOA on
A-fuSÜAJ.seas in Kitab al-Mital wa aI-Nihai by At: b. AbtlulllJ-Snnnmsmni (d. 1153)
(London: Kegan Paul, 1984).
[1nU1s.] w-re deY reJW'ioAS «des seaes [1l.I-A-.67af wa 81-N~l!], vot 2, trans., ïnlro. and
notes by Guy MOnJlot8l1d Jean JoJivet (Leuven. Beigium: Peeters, UNESCO, 1993).
_ _ 1 Mu.sw. ~ IJ-Fil/iFsifll8, ed. Muwaffaq Fawzi al-Jllbr (Damascus: Dar al-Numayr Dir Mid,
1997). [olber ed., Cairo: M~ac8t al-Jabalawï, 1916]
Shahrazuzi, Sbsms al-Dia, SkIfJ .{fikmnr 1lI-1SbdtJ, c:ritica1 ed., ÎJltro. and notes l:Iusayn J;)iyi~ï
Turbsri (Hossein Zim) (fehnul: MlI)assasab-yi Mutiilicât wa T~qïqit-i Farhangi, 137211993).

~. _ _ ' NvzIJdr IlI-ArwIi/J Wli Nn~lIHr n/-Afm/J. in Spies and Khatak, eds., 71Jn!e Trendses.
, 7iIi"kb III-(fukamiï~«' NlIZIuil w-Arw. Wil Rliw(l1It" lÛ-Afr4fJ» . ed. cAbd al-Karim Abü
 BIBLIOGRAPHY - 337

Shuwïrab ([no place]: JamCïyat al-Dacwah al-IsHimïyah. (397/1988).

J
[trans. into Persian] Nuzblllll1-ArH--M/7 wu RUHr/Jif a/-AfnT/J et" 78nkh llI-pukmniï » . tnlnS.
Maq~d cAli Tabrizi. intro. Muj;1ammad Taqï Danish-Pazhlih and Mu17ammad Suror M&nlii1
(Tehran: Intishiriit-i cIlmi wa Farhangï. 1366/1987).
l
al-ShIrizï. Qutb al-Oin. "Risilah fi Tal}qïq cAlam al-Mithil wa Ajwibat As'iJat bacç al-Fuçlali ," in
Walbridge. ed .. SaeOQ2 ofJI..(»1"I'C L{é'brs, 233-271.
[trans.]. Idem ... An Epistle of the •Allamah a1-Shïriizî Ascertaining the Rea1ity of the World
of Image and Answers to the Questions of a Certain Scholar:' in Walbridge. ed .. Scierzce of
A-(Y-5"IIC L{e-bts. 200-31.
_ _ . So~ !Ubmlr nI-IslJriNj [with Mulli $fl~ 7iJ 1Jrjiir ]. ed. Asad Allah I:Iarati (facsimili of
Tehran. 1313-15/1895-7); cf. the Corbin's ed. of (fikmnt. [footnoœs)
[trans.] Corbin. "Commentaire de Qo~oddÜ1Shirâzi." in SllÇesse.235-436.
al-Sijistiini. Abü SuJaymin al-Man~qï. $L'W60 al-(fLkmor wu TbRliidJ Rl6oL/. ed .. notes and intro.
Abd al-Ral;uniin Badawï (Tehran: Intishirit-i Buniyiid-i F arhang-i lriin. 1974).
C

al-Sijistiioï al-Bagbdidî. $iIYÔD iU-fIikmar. ed. cAbd al-Ra4miin Badawi (Tehran: Intïsbiiriit-i Bunyiid-i
Farbang-i Iran, 1974).
Spies, O. and S. K. Khatak. 71Jrr!e Trell.ises (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1935).
al-TUsï. N~ al-Oin and al-Rizï. Fakhr al-Dïn. S/NufJ .u-fs1J11nIt wolll-TllObÜJiif (Qüm: Manshürit-i
Maktabat-i Ayat-Allah al-c U?J1tâ sJ.-MarCasbï al-Najafi. 1404/1983).

_. _ _ and Fakhr sl-Din sl-Râzï. SlNlttl1yllJ-Fslliï'iïf(Qum: MaktabatAyaA1Jiibal-cU~ahal-Marcashî

al-Najafi. 14(4/1983).
Yiqüt. Ibn C Abd Allah al-Hamawï. MuJnm 1lI-l/doba 1i-/- YIlirjÜf, 20 vols., ed. ~ad Fand Rifi'ï
3

Bat (Mi~: Dar al-Ma'"mün. 1936-8). XIX. 314-20 [trans. Y~yi b. Khilid b. Barmsk].

SECONDARY SOURCES

PERSIAN AND ARABIe

Abü Rayyill.. MuJ,ammad cAli, l/.sü/ m-FnlS4fRb oI-fsAriitJ{YIlb Ux/o SDilJiïb Il1-Su.nnllYordf (Cairo:
Maktabat sl-Anj1u a1-Mi~yah. 1959).
Badawï. cAbd al-RÛ;UDin. 1lI-A-fudJul6/- ~ql!.PNh IlI-Abiï(üni}''IIO (Cairo: M~acah Diir al-Kutub
al-~yah. 1947).

_ _ . ed., Diriis"k wu Nu.sO.s R IiI-FIlIsafIllJ "'"1/ IlI- V/Dm md.. 1l1-~b (Beirut: al-Mu'assasab
a1- CArabiyab li 81-Diriïsit wa al-Nasbr. 1981)
Fakhri. Majïd, ua1-SubrawardïwaMa)iik.bidhuhu caJiai-Mashsha1naJ-cArsb." in Madkür, ed .. 1l1-/Cid/J
aI-TJJtIJIIlkIÏn-S0l!rkD 1l/-j'slJnTfJ. 151-68.
Nicmah. CI~i\ "cAliqital-Nubuwwah bi al-Siyisah cinda IbnSinii(al-l;JusaynAbü cAli)(980-1037)."
F.A. 19.3 (1998): 43-52.
clzzat. CAbd al-cAziz. A-liskl1wIlYA. FIlIS6fllnJhu II1-AklJliïtj{niIJ Fil Ahl!iidùubiT (Cairo: Ma~aCat
MW}tafid al-l;Ialabi wa Awliiduhu. 1947).
Madkür, [briihün. ed.. IlI-Kimb Il1-TodhLnn SA'!ykb Il1-Ishra, , inuo. 1. Madkür (Caire: al-Hay'ah
al- Mi~yab li al-Kitiib, 1393/1974).
 BIBLIcx::;RAPHY - 338

MuCin. M~am.mad. Fnrlmog-iFi8'sI, 6 vols.. 8th ed (Tehran: }\mîr Kabïr. 13711(992).

Nasr. Sayyid Hussayn. "Shaykh al-Ishraq." in Madkür. ed., td-.KJr~ïb IlI-TndHm. 17-36.
Pürjavidï. Nasr Allah. "Shaykh-i Ishriiq va Ta lif <<Alwiil.1-i clmidi»." in DivÜd. SS}l"id cAli .~-i,
J

ed.. NBmnIJ-,piEflJiU. r'iïdoiimnb:nI'Ib/u J'à mtlrzf (Tehran: IJ1tishirit-i Hirmand, 1377/1997):

1-11.
Sajjidï. Sayyid Jacfar. ForolU{lT-i ~riliïbir r-ll 7i/~fmr-,i 'lrhlt2r-. 2nd 00. (Tehœn: Kitibkhiinah-yi
Tuhüri.1373/(993).
~a1ibi. Jamil. A-IinAffiirüoilnIbnSÜ18, 4th ed. (Beirut: Dar al-AJldalus. 1951).
Ziai [J;)iyi1:). HusSIl)"n. ·'Mushiihidah. Rawish-i Ishraq. waZabin-i Shicr. BahtbïPayrii.mün-i Ni~-i
Falsafah-yi [shriq-i Shïhiib aJ-Dïn-i Suhrawardï," lN. 8 (1990),81-94.
 B1BL1OGRAPHY - 339

EUROPEAN LANGUAGES

Adams, Charl~ J .. ed.. fnuzNm CiVLLlnlfion liDO Culrure (MonErea1: lnstitute of Islamic Studies.
McGil1 University. 1972).
Affifi, A. E., "The Influence of Hermetic Literature on M05lem Thought:' o.s. O.A.S. 13 (1950):
840-55.
Al-Khe1aifi, "The Psychology of Abii al-Barakit al-Bagbdâdï' (ph.D Diss., Middle Eastern Studies,
University of Manchester. 1995).
Anlluè-EogLisn Le.rLcon. Lane, Edward William. 2 vols. (1877; Cambridge, UK: The [slamic Texts
Society, (984).
Amid. Moussa, EsyoiStlr/op.1;Ycoologieû:A f7Ct-nne (Genève. A. Kundig, 1940).
Amin Razavi, Mebdï, Sunmwtrdi IlOtI roe SclJool ofD/umiOorion (London: Curzon, 1996).
_ _ . "Suhrawardï's Metaphysics of illumination," H.L 15 (1992), 19-38.
_ _ ' .. Influence of Suhrawardï on the Istamic Philosophy," le 62 (l989), 1-31.
_ _ ,"Subrawardi's Theory of Knowledge" (Ph.D. Diss., Temple University, 1989).
Amine, Osmane, .. Le stotcisme et la pensée islamique," R.7: 59 (1959): 79-97.
Anawati, Georges C., "Un cas typique de l'ésotérisme avicenmen. Sa doarine de la résurrection des
corps," fl.C 141 (1951): 68-94 [repriJlted in Idem, Budes de pmlosopllie mUSllÛ.l1l1De •
263-89].
.- _ _ ' "Gnose et philosophie. A propos du Récit de
ElUdes deplb7osoplliemusuOrlaot!, 291-305.
I:Iayy ibn Yaq?in de A.-M. Goichon:' in Idem,

_ _ ' "Prolégomènes à une nouvelle édition du De CNusis .-&he (Kir. 1l1-1J'!j'T n/-dlR/Jd), in.
Idem, ElUdes depIJi1osoplliemusuk11aoe, 117-54.
_ _ , Erudesdep/JùosopmemusuLmaoe, préface de Louis Gardet (paris: J. Vrin, 1974).
_ _ ' "Les divisions des sciences intellettuelles d'Avicenne," A-f.lJ}.EO 13 (1977): 323-335.
_ _ ' "La tradition manuscrite orientale de l'oeuvre d'Avicenne," in Idem, Erudes d~pOi/asopAie
musuHnane.229-62. [reprint of Ibid., R.T: 2 (1951)]
_ _ ' "La classification des sciences et structure des Summoe chez les auteurs musulmans,"
R.,EL 44 (1976): 61-70.
_ _ ' "Le néoplatonisme dans la pensée musulmane: état actuel des recherches." in Idem, Budes
deplIuosopéie.I11usuhr/IIDt!, 155-221.
Armstrong, A. H .. ed., 71Je C4m1Jnqe RaNNy ofLu« ~ IlDÛ Eïr!,r AfeûLef-'Il1 PALloSOP~Y . rev.
ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
Amaldez, Roger, "L'histoire de la pensée grecque vue parles arabes," o.s.F:P. 72 (1978): 117-68.
_ _ ' "La pensée religieuse d'Averroès. III. L'immortalité de l'âme dans le TllIJiifur ," S,L 10
(1959): 23-41.
_ _ ' "Ibn Rusbd," EL··· vo1. 3 (1971): 909b-920a.
_ _ , .. Fsluiik," EL-" vol. 4 (1978): 119b-120b.
_ _ ,"(shrikiyyUn," E:I.~~ vol. 4 (1978): 120b-t2Lb.
~
. _ _ , "Unptécédent avicennien du 'Cogito' cartésien?" A.I. 2 (L972): 341-49.
Badawi, 'Abd a1-~in, LaI'nUlSnUSsIonde/oph.ilosqplJiegMayuellIlO1oAdellnlbe (Cairo: 1955;
 BIBLIOGRAPHY - 340

Paris, 1961: Paris: J. Vrin. 1968).

_ _ ' Hisro~deIHp1li1osopll.leeo.ls.lam. 2 vols. (Paris: 1. Vrin, 1972).
Bakos, J., Ps;ycho.logie d'Ibn Sind (.4 r-û:eAne). D ipres- SOD oeurre n1-S1zi1H , 2 vols., ed. ane! ~rench
J

trans., vol. n. trans. and notes (Pnglle: Académie Tchécoslovaque des Sciences. 1956).
Ballester, Garcia, "On the Origin of the SLi- Non-Naruntl 71Jings in Galen," in J. Kollesch and D.
Nickel. eds., Olllen u.I1d dilS oe/.IemStic1Je Ei-be( 1993: Stuttgart: F - Steiner. 1995).
Bernard, Marie, .. La notion de üm chez les premiers muCtazilites." S.L 36 (1971): 23-45 and [bid.,
37 (1973): 27-56.
Black, Deborah L., "Estimation ( 1~ilbm ) in Avicenna: The Logical and Psychological Dimensions,"
D. 32 (l993), 219-58.
_ _ ' "Avicenna on the Ontological and Epistemic Status of Fictional Beings," S. T:F.A-f. 8
(1997): 425-53.
_ _ ' ..Alfacabi," ÏJ1 Nasr and Leaman. eds., Hisr«;r of.Is.lllmicP1JUOSO~Y, vol. 1, 178-97.
Blumenthal, H. J., AnStoile ond Neoplmonism in Lore Mbfui{p: .lnr~l.1oM"of die Pe AnDoN
(Ithaca, NY: Comell University Press, 1996).
_ _ ' Plotinus' Psychology; bis Doetrin.es of the Embodied Mind (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970).
Bosworth, Clifford Edmund, 71Je ~w .Islllmic Dyonsries:- A Cluono.logiCIII and Geoetiloçiau A-fanue1
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996).
_ _ ' "Saldjükids," ELz vol. 8 (1995): 936a-978b.
Bremmer, Jan, TAe BarlY ~k Concep ofrhe SouJ (princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).
Broctelmann, Carl, GesclucNe der IIlIlJiscAen L.llrt:rlNUr. 2ad 00., 5 vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill,
193149).
Browne, E. G., A Lirenuy H.1sroryof PerYL6. FnJLII FerdllwS./· rD .sà~., 5 vols. in 4. 3rd ed. (1906:
Cambridge: Cambridge U~ersity Press, 1951).
Buttenvolth, CharJes E.. ed., TAe Poûi".1Ctl1 A~ 01' .Isldnuc PMas-0p4p: Esst!J75 in Hooar of
Mu.lJsLo S. A-fll1Jdi (Cambridge. Mass: Harvard University Press, 1992).
ByJebyl, Michael E.. "The Wisdom of illumination: A Study of the Prose Stories of Suhrawardï,"
(ph.D. Diss., University of Chicago, 1976).
Bynum, TetTe11 Ward, "A New Look st Aristotle's Theory of Perception," in Durrant, Ahst«/e's Pe
AmAt8ÜlFoœs.90-109.
Cahell, CJaude, "Le Diyir Bakr du temps des p-emiers U ruquides," ./.A. 227 (135): 219- 16.
_ _ , "Artukids," EL·" vol. 1 (1960): 662b-667b.
CaJverley. E. E., "Doctrines of the Soul (.t/mand niA) in Islam," A-f. U: 33 (1943): 254-264.
_ _ ' IINafs, EL·" vol. 7 (1993): 880a-884a.
Il

Canard. Marius. "Bamdinids," EL.? vol. 3 (1911), 125a-131a.

_ _ ' &",goJnt de 10 t!Yna.m"e des- H 'Nodiimoes de EHZÎnI er de ~n7e, 2 vols. (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1953).
Chamberlain. MichaeJ, KAow.ledgemldSoaiUPnlCbœinA-fediermDJlOlIlSClls, /1.90-1.1S0(Cambridge
- New York: Cambridge UniVE!l"Sity Press , 1999).
Corbin, Hemy, H.isro~ de.lapoüo.mpôLeislamit/ue (lst pt, 1964, 2nd pt, 1914: Paris: Gallimard.
1986).
_ _ , TmoçieisLIINé./ienne (Tebran: Institllt Franco-iranien 1 Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1961).
 BIBLIOGRAPHY - 341

. En k//lD1 Lnmien. 4 vols. - vol. 2 - Soonnfrnrdi er les plnron.iaens de Perse (paris:

Gallimlll"d. 1971): vol 4 - L ~/e d'/sf8IJdO. /'ecoJesoopkIJie. le dovxiemeÜluim (paris:
Gallima-d. 19n). ...
. A f·iœ.rme el" le rear r·7's1On.nmre: dlHIe sur le qJ-rle des reai's nFiœnoieos (Paris. Berg
International. 1979)
[rrans.] A FiœAOI/ ano IIJe f.'6LOnm;Y NecigiJ. trans. W. R. Trask (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul. 1960).
_ _ . ClNps spnru~t:V T~ ceJesl"e. De l '/nUl mozdeeo li lmlO sAI"Li'e (Paris: Suchet/Chastel.
1979).
[trans.] SpUitull1 Bod,r lIDd Ce/eshill Enrrô. trans. Nancy Pearson (Princeton: Princeton
Umversity Press, U~n).
_ _ . Les mod./S zorousrriens tlliOS ln philosophie de SOLlnIWIIrdL: Silo,rkh-ol-/sluiirj (Ob. 587/119.1)
. foreword M. Pouré-Davoud (Téhéran: Editions du Courrier. 1325/1946).
_ _ . SulJnlw.-di tI'.rVtp ( 1191), fOAoareur de 10 dOCllioe iIluminorive (ishnÎt/I) (Paris: G.-P.
Maisonneuve. 1939).
_ _ . "L' idée du Paraclet en philosophie iranienne." in Idem. NiCe de Dieu. 311-58.
_ _ . Face de Pieu. Focede.l'IJomme. Herm~eutirJuedsoufiSme (Pa-is: Flammarion. 1983).
_ _ • 71JeA-fllDofLJilorinInmianSuliSm.trans. N.PiersoJ1(Boulder-London: Shambhala.1978).
_ _ . "L' ùn"o lempli face aux normes profanes." in Idem. TempledcoAremplaiioLJ.285-322.

-. _ _ • TempledcoAremp.lll&on. liSsnissur.liSilU/linmie.n (paris: Flammarion. 1980).

_ _ . "La place de Mulla
81-113.
~adra (ob. 105011640) dans la philosophie iranienne." SL 18 (1963):

_ _ . PlJùosop1JieÛllnieoneepMas-opAiecomprée (paris: Buchet/Chastel. 198.5).

Corbin. Henry and Paul KraU5, "Suhrawardi d' Alep. Le Ixvissemenl" de L 'Aile de Gahriel. Traité
philosophique etmystique. publié et teaduit avec une inlrOCluctioa Et des notes." .lA. Jully-Sept.
(1935). 1-82.
Crow, Douglas S., "The Role of 1lI- 'Afjl in Early Islamic Wisdom with Reference ta Imam Jatfar
al-$idiq" (ph.D. Dîss.• Institute of Islamic Studies. McGill University. 1996).2 vols.
Crystal. lan. "Plotinus on the Structure of Self-Intellection." P. 43 (1998): 264-86.
Daftari. Farhad, 71JeIsmii7Ds (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
D'Ancona Costa. Christina. ·'Porphyry. Universal soul and the Arabie Plotinus." A.SA 9 (1999):
47-88.
Dhanani, A., TlJeP4psiail7JJe«;Y0fKo/mn (Leiden: E.J. Bril!, 1994).
Daiber, Hans. Bahmanyir, Kia." E/nuzial vol. 3 (1989), 501b-503a.
Il

_ _ , Bib.liogntpl!yofIs/amicPlJi.losoph"Y. 2 vols. (Leiden-Boston-Ko1m: E. J. Brill. 1999).

_ _ ,"Ru~yi,n EL-" vol. 8 (1995): 645a-649a.
_ _ ' "Prophetie und Ethik bei Fiiriïbï (Gest. 339/950)," in Wenin, ed., L nommeerson UOL'f"erS'IIU
A-f~YenAçe, vol. 2, 729-53.

D'Alverny. Marie-Thér'èse, .. Aniyya Aniras," in Idem.. Avicenne en Occident. X. 43·91

__ ' A~Cmne en Occident; Ilecuei.l d'trtLaes de M-TiJ. J)'AlJo'W71,.Y. intro. Danielle Jacquart
(paris: J. Vrin. 1993).
Davidson, Herbert A., AifllnllJ.I: A f:7~. IUId A J'~. OA InreUea. 71Jeir CosmoJOtfies. 71Jeodes
 BIBLIOGRAPHY - 342

ofr.1JeAaif-emreUecr. I/Ot! TlJeoriesofHumon/nreUea (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1992).
_ _ ,"A1fdrabi and Avicennaon the Active Intellect," E 3 (1972): 109-78.
De Boer, T. J., .. Soul (Muslim)," Ell.E, vol. Il. 744b-747a.
De Fouchéoour, Charles-Henry, A-fonzlLiJ. us notzons mfH7lles tbUJS LII Liuen/i"ureper.stme du J ~ /7"
I1U 7" /1.1" siècles (paris: Editions Recherche sur les Civilisations, A.D.P .F., 1986).

De Libera, Alain, Abde1ali Elaramrani-Jamal. Alain Galonnier, eds.. uU{lfl{lft5 « PlU/osophie.

HOO1OJl{lle 1i.k1lO JOLif'ei" (Paris: J. Vrin. 1997).
De Smet, Daniel, La fJu.rèrude de L mteUect: .LVeopfl/roniYme el ~I{oose isml/tdi(~mJt!dllBS j'oetJr-Te de
{Iamio d(/-J)ii1/Û-KinLllini" (.Ye-::Y7e 5:) (Leuven: Peeters. 1995).
De Vaux. Carra, "La Kaçîdah d'Avicenne sur l'âme," LA. 14.1 (1899): 159-73.
_ _ ' "La philosophie illuminative d'aprés Suhrawardi Maqtul." .t:A. 6 (1935).1-82.
, .. Ba-zakh," E/.··· vol. 1 (1960): 1071b-l0na.
Draye. J.. W.F. Ryand and C.V. Schmitt. eds., Pseudo-Ansrodt!in r:1JeA-fiddle-Açes. 7be "TL1eoIogr
"llBdOi1Jer Texa (London: The Warburg lnstitute University of London, 1986).
Druart, Thérèse-Anne, oc Imagination and the Soul-Body Problem in Arabie Phïlosophy," A.H 16
(1983): 327-42. [SoulllOd Bottyin HusserLitm PhenomeooJogp; Afno IUXI MtIlJre, ed. ADna-
Teresa Tymieniecba (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983) ]
_ _ ,"The Soul and Body Problem: Avicenna and Descartes." in AnlbicP1JiI0soplJ,PmlddLe JJ'ésr

-. : ComiAu.riy tmd UXs7Iœon. ed., Th.-A. Drum (Washington, DC: Georgetown University
Press, 1988), 27-49.
Durand, Gilbert, "The Imlginal. n
tnulS. Sally Gran, ER.. vol. 7, 109a-114b.
_ _ ' LÏHJ~ÛJtlrioA s;nl1l1oljtJue, 3rd 00. (1964; Paris: Quadrige " Presses Universitaires de
France, 1993).
DUlT8l1t, Michael, AnslOde's De A.rzimN iD Focus (London: Routledge, 1993).
EastWood, Bruce S., The ElemeD/"S of VàmA.S:· 71Je Microcosmoloçy of GR/mie 'Visull1 Theay
A ~1'0 HUAI!Y8 Ihn Is1Jay (philadelphia: American Philosophical Soc., 1982).

Eddé, Anne Marie, "Une grande famille de shafiites alépins. Les Banü al-CAgamî aux XIIe-XIIIe
siècles," N.M.M.AI. 62 (1991): 61-71.
El-Ahwani, Ahmed Fouad. "La théorie de la connaissance et la psychologie d'Aviceane," N.C 141
(1951): 23-43.
Elïsséeff, Nikita. "Les monuments de N'ur ad-DiJl. Inventaire, notes archéologiques et
bibliographiques." B.E: a
13 (1949-51): 5-43.
E1-Saleb, S .• Wefullue:Jo r:-iefU1U~seJoJJleConuJ (paris: J. Vrin. 1971).
Emilsson, Eyj61jur Kjalar. Plodnus OA ~P~Oo: A PlJUosopiNCIlI Srut!r (Cambridge:
Cambridge UniveI'Sity Press, 1988).
liDeydopediRlmniœ (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982).
liAcydopetlLil ofIs18HJ, 2ad ed. (Leiden: E. J. Brill; London: Luzac and Co., 1960-).
EscyclopedillofReo,ioD. ed. Mircea Eliade, 16 vols. (New York: MacmiUan, 1987).
EAo/'dopedil1 of.Re1IÇi04 andBd/ies. 13 vols., OOs. J. Hastins et al. (New York: Charles ScribnEr' 5
Sons, 1955).
Fackenheim, UA Treatise on Love," A-f.Sr. 7 (1945): 208-228.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY - 343

Fakhry, Majid, A Hisr~- of.IslORlLc PiJUosopn,r , 2nd ed. (1970: New York: Columbia U mvet"SÎty.
1983).
_ _ ' P1JiIosop1J,r. LJoçmo /lOd r1J~ Impucr of ~ 7ù0i!ll'br Ln IsJom (Lùndon Variorum, 1994).
_ _ . "A1-Subrawardi's Critique of the Muslim Peripatetics (a1-A-flJS1Js1In~D),"in Morewedge, 00.,
PMosopD,ies- ofEriS"l1:'nce, 279-84 [reprinted in Idem, P1JiIosopn,y. LJogmo /lAd rbe ImfMCl
of ~ T1JOl{e-br m .IsJam, section XVII ].
. "The Mu~ta:lilite View of Man," in /lecnerdJes d'/s1moolol[.ie. Recueil d"arciclesofferro G.
-- C Aoawllci er L. G.-der pm-leurcoUeyues er nOlis (Lou~aia: Peeters. Louvain-la-Neuve.
LSP.. 1977), 107-21.
_ _ , EUuau Tbeonesin Islam (Leiden: E.J. Brill, (991).
_ _ ' "The Platomsm of Miskawayh and its Implications for His Ethics," S.Is. 42 (1976): 40-57.
Finnegan, James. s.j., .. Avieenna's Refutation of Porphyrius," in A J-7œnna Commemonli"10Ll Volume
(Calœta: Iran Society, 1956),187-204.
_ _ ,"Texte arabe du Pen'Nolls d'Alexandre d'Apbrodise," Jl.f.USJ: 23 (1956): 159-202.
Frank. Richard M., "The Origin of the Arabie Philosophical Term 4.:·,j ," in CIlhBY de B.,fTSo
(Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1956): 181-201.
_ _ ' "Severa! Fundamental assumptions of the Basra Sehool of the Mu~tazila," S.L 33 (1971):
5-18.
Freitag, Rainer, Set:Yeow'"IlAdeTlLOÇ in derisfllOlisd.1en Htlresie (Berlin: Klaus Schwa'Z, 19&5).
Fuck. J. W., "Ibn Kbsllikan," EJ/ vol. 3 (1971): 832b-833a.
Gardet, Louis, L8 COLlDIU'".ssm1ce m,rsl1~ve cbez JbA Sü.Jo el" StS pnjSllpposes pMasopAr~Qe.s (Cairo:
Institut français d'archéologie orientale du Caire, 1952).
__ , L8peoséerP~ieQsed~ 5-7Œ.one (paris: J. Vrin, 1951).
_ _ ' "Quelques aspects de la pensée avicennienne dans ses rapports avec l'orthodoxie musulmane,"
/l.T. 45 (1939): 537-15.
_ _ . "L'expérience mystique selon Avicenne." R.C 141 (1951): 56-67.
_ _ ' "La connaissance suprême de Dieu (man/IN" AnNO) selon Avicenne," LB. LA. 4 (no. 55)
(1951): 387-94.
_ _ • Budesdep.lJiloso/.lJie«dem.J'Sl1~ueco.mpttrées. 2nd ed. (1970: Paris: J. Vrin, 1972).
Gardet, Louis and Georges Anawati, InIroduCI100 li ln riJéOfogie musuÔDIlDe. &SOI' de Iht!t:Jfogie
compuee (paris: J. Vrin, 1948).
Gatje. Helmut, SlUdien zur Uberiiefev6C dé!S" nnSl«eUsc1Jen Ps"rœoft:J!f.ie lm Es/am (Heidelberg:
Carl Winter UniversitatsVerlag. 1971).
al-Ghannouchi, A., "La problémalique de l'haeccéité et de l'aJtérité chez Avicenne et Averroès," in
MU/Ilp1e A ~ CoI/DtJlleÜ/terDlI1"JodtÛ8SO .Z1lir·~tIe/1l81l.tSSlUlce d'A r·~ (paris:
Les belles lettres, (978): 175-188.
Gianotti, Timothy J., "The Secrets of the Soul, Deah and the Afterlife in Al-Ghazali's ntyiC cUliim
al-DiA" (ph.D. diss., UaiversityofTorolltO, 1997).
Gibb, H.A.R., "Zengi and the FaU of Edessa," in. Setton and Baldwin, eds., A Hisrory of die
OuSlltles, vol. 1, 449-62.
~
. _ _ ' uThe C..eer of Nür al-Dm," ÏJ1 Seuon and Baldwin, eds., A HisrmyofÛ1f:' Crus/ides, vol. 1,
513-27.
Gilson, Etienne, "Les sources gréco-arabes de l' augllstinisme avicennisRnt," A.H.P.LMA. 4
 BIBLIOGRAPHY - 3+4

(1929): 5-127.
Gima-et, D.... Bouddha et les bouddhistes daas la tradition musulmane." .1:--4. 257 (1969): 273-316.
_ _ . "Tanisukh," E// vol. 10 (1998): 181b-183a
Goblman, W. E., Tlle Luè 0//l1n SiRo. A Cniicnl Emr.ion l/DdAnnlX8rœ TnlOs.ldDon [ SEnN o.I-Sh,!rkh
IZI-R8~s] (Albany.NY: Stale University of New York Press, 1974).

Goichon, Amélie-Marie, Le.nlfue de .I111iU{!fueph.llosophNjue d'Ibn SLÂH (A r·Ù;;eenoe) (Paris: Desclèe

de Brouwer, (938).
_ _ ' Le n?cir de .{ft'.JY ibn YllfJ~iin commenré por des rerres UA p/Œnoe, preface, explanaion.
and notes A-M. Goichon (Paris: Dec1èe de Brouwer. 1959).
_ _ , L8 dislmerlon de 1 e~nce er de l·e.risré'Rce d'opre'$/b8 Sùm ~ r-icenne) (Paris: Desc1ee de
Brouwer. 1937).
_ _ ' "La nouveauté de la logique d'Ibn Sînâ," in A-Men~ d:4 p/cwme. Congrès de Bagdad.
20-28 mars 1952 (Cairo: M~a'at Mi~, 1952),41-58.
_ _ ' "La place de la définition dans la logique d'avicenne," R.C vol. 27. no. 141 (1951):
95-106.
Goodman, Le11Jl E., "A Note on Avicenna's Theory of SubstaJltiality of the Soul," PE: 1 (1969):
547-54.
Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste, Les srou:reL/Serliime (paris: Presses UJ1lversitaires de France, 1996).
Guerrera, Rafael Ramon. Ls rt:"CeJXYon linllJe dei "Oe 1lJJim/l" de AnSlde/es.· IlI-Kind.t·,r Il1-Fitmbi
(Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 1992).
Gutas, Dimitri, A nCeDn8 IlOd rbe An"sroreullD Tmmiio8. /orroduœon ro Reading A f-iœmJH S
P.lJi.losoplliœl 1~'Orb' (Leiden: E. J. Drill, 1988). [pt. 3. integnuion of the Aristotelian
tradition)
_ _ ' "Ibn Tufayl on Ibn Sina's Eastern Philosophy," Os. 34 (1994): 222-58.
_ _ ,"Avicenna V. Mysticism," E/nmiaJ vol. 3 (1989), 79b-80b.
Ha~iri Yazdi, Mehdi, 71Je Prioaj.J.les ofEp.lSremoloç;yLB /s1IlDUC PhUosopô,P: K.ooJJ-1e(1Té' D,Y ~~.Da'
(Tebran, 1982; New York: Stste University of New York Press, 1992).
Hall, Robert E., oc A Decisive Example of the Influence of Psycho1ogicaJ Doctrines in Islamic Science
and Culture: Some Re18tionships between [ba Sïni' s Psychology, Othe.- Branches of His
Thougbt, and [stamic Tbought," ~H.A.S. 3.1 (1979): 46-84.
Halltq, W. B. and D.P. Little, eds., lS.ll/OUcSrodiesPresenretllo C1J.-.Ies.l Atlnms (Leiden: EJ.
Drill. 1991).
Hamelin, Octave, La meone de .l'iAreUea; d'après An"sr«e et" ses comoJeDUireurs (paris: J. Vrin,
1953).
Handaroh, S. et ms., eds., 77Je ()ur'iio llRd PlJLlosopluèd! IleOeaioAS (Yogyakarta. Indonisia:
Indonesi8ll Academie Society XXI. 1998),
Hill{, Mu~d Ab dul, "The Psychology of Mulla :;iadrii," lS. 9 (1970): 173-181.
!Jasan, Muttammad Saglür, "Notes on the Edition of the K.lio/J IlI-Nafs Ascribed ta Isbiq Ibn
!Junayn, .i.R.A.S. (1956): 57- n.
Il

Heath, Peter, Al/es-ory /lDdPJu7osoP'!rmA f-7CemJo (708 &6).' lJ~iiJJ 8 Tnmsllilioo ofthe Baok ofme
Pn:JpIJ~ A-fll/Jammods ASceDr rD Oœr-ew (philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1992).
Hodgson, Marshall G. S., The Qdtr ofAsSlls:WzS'. 71Je Struçgle ofdJe ~yNiziin~ /smii 1üs 4.1fllIAsr
 BIBLIOGRAP HY - 345

die /s/amlc IJ~/d(The Hague: Mouton, 1955).

_ _ , 71Je 1--œ1U~ of/s/am. 3 vols. (paperback, 1974; Chicago: Chicago University Press, 19n).
Horten, Max, Die Plu7osoplu"e der &.Ieuchruog oocD SuhmworrD (1.191!) (1912: Tubingen: Georg
Olms Verlag. 1981)
_ _ . Die speKu.ldrif-"e undposirir-"e 17JeoIogie des /s1402 OIIdJ /lI/EL' (/209) UM fOre Knu durc/J
Tusi (127.1): ollCA OdgmnlqueUen Obers«a und &tourer mir einem An1IIU{I{.- l~e!"ChmS
p1Ji.losopluèber Tsminiim IInlbischeo (Leipzig: O. Harrsssowitz. 1912).
Humphreys, R. Stephen, /sJtlOUC EliSTay: A Fmmeworsfor EnfuDy, rev. ed. (princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1991).
_ _ . From Stil~ldin rD die MOJ{l!o/s. TlJe 4J;'J"'l1'brds of Dom8Scus. 119:J-1'?(i() (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press. 19n).
Hyman. A. and Walsh. James J., eds., PMosoph,Y.in me A-fidd/e A§"es. 2nd ed. (lndianapolis:
Hackett Pub. Co., 1987).
Insti, Shams, "Ibn Sini," in Nasr and Leaman, eds.. HLsroryof/s'/iuDicP1Ji1osoplJ,Y, vol 1. 231--46.
Ivry, Alfred L., .. An Evaluation ofthe Neoplatonic Elements in al-Fârâbfs and IbnSinâ' s Metaphysics ,"
in Aca of me /nrtrrUiLroool S:rmposium on Ibo TurK, K1JwnZAZi. Fnmbl: Bt.;.pnjm; and /bo
Sioii, ADkom. 9-.12 Sept; 19&$ (Ankara: Ataturk Culture Center, 1990), 135-45.
Izutsu, Toshihiko, .. /.slJriïyiyl/ ," E/l., vol. 7, 296b-301a.
_ _ ' 71Je Co~ nod RatlLiy ofErisrœce (Tokyo: Keio Instinne of Cultural and Linguistic
Scudies. 1971).
Jaadane. Fahmi, L ÜJOueAœdusb.Ju::ismesurlapeosét!01usulmane (Beint: Diir at-Mashriq, 1968),
__ ' Il La place des anges dans la théologie cosmique musulmane," S.1 41 (1975): 23-61.
Jabre. Farid, Ul J1Ol10n de certirude stYoo GbazHf dllOS ses ongÜJesp5;yeOo/O§itJues d hisronitues,
2nd 00. (paris, 1959; Beirut: L'Université libanaise, 1986).
_ _ ' Ess4r' sur.le JeKiquede GbIlZ8b' (BeiNt: L'UDiversité libanaise, 1985).
_ _ ' "L'extase de Plotin et le fllLlfT de Ghazali," S.L 6 (1956): 101-24.
Jacqu8l't, Danielle, "Les choses non-naturelles," in LA mœecme HU rémps des œkpnes: A .l'ombre
d:4 1-7t:ume, Exposition présentée du 18 nov. 1996 au 2 mars 1997 (Paris: Institut du monde
arabe, 1996), 173-7.
_ _ and Fnmçoise Micheau, "La médecine arabe: une science dans le sillage de la philosophie." in
u01ér.fet:'ÙJel/urempsdescilUpnes. A J'ombre d:4 Plœnne, Exposition présentée du 18 nov.
1996 au 2 mars 1997 (paris: Institut du monde arabe, 1996),55-74.
Jamalpur, .. God and Man: A Historica1 and Critical Comparison of Ibn Sïni and Molavi within the
Esoteric Iranian Tradition of IsJamic Philosophy" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Notre-Dame.
1970).
Jambet. Christian, LA .IositJue des Ct7"eAhllJ..Y. Heay CodJin «.la saœœ des" fOOZ/es (paris: Seuil.
1983).
__ , Il L'âme humaine: d'Aristote à Mollâ Sadrâ Sltirâzî," S.L 26 (1997): 211-36.
Janssens ,JuJes, "Les TaJflj6 d'Ibn Sini. Essai. de structuration et de datation," De Libera, Elamrani-
JamaJ and Galonnier, eds., LdOtfl/f"es d Phi/asoplu'e, 109-22.
. "Le Dânes-n-NlimeIJ d'IbnSinâ: un texte à revoir?" O.P.A.f. 28 (1986): 163-77.
 BIBLloc:iRAPHY - 346

Jolivet. Jean. L ÏRleOea se/on Kindi (Leiden: E.J. Brill. 1971).

_ _ . "The Development of PbiJosophical Thought ln its Relationship with Islam op to Avicenna."
in /sJ/lL12. PMosopf!Y ~lOd Sa~~ Four Pubûc Lecrures ~mzàed ~r Unesco. JuPe' 1980
(Paris: Unesco Press. 1981),37-68.
Kamada. Shigeru. "Meœmpsycbosis (Imlm-u.kD)in Mulla ~adrii's Thought." Or. 30-31 (1995):119-32.
Kassis. Hanna E.. A ConçordlUZceo/d1et?ur~. forward F Rahman (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London:
University of Califormia Press, 1983).
Keller, C.-A., .. Le monde islamique el les doarines de rèincamation." in Keller. C.-A.. ed.. Ln
rèmcoroar.ion. lDeones. nzisonnemenls et" l/pprt!cùuio//S. l10 symposùJm (Bem. 1986),
181-203.
Kempfner. G .. "Rationalisme et mystique ai propos d' Al-GhazzaJi." LB.L.A. 82 (1958): 153-60.
Ke1lnY. Anthony, 70e A-fe.rLf'~J..3'LCS ofA-fmd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
Kinberg. Leah. "Interaction Beeween This World and the Mœnvorld in Barly Islamic Tradition," Os.
29-30 (1986): 285-308.
Kobaysshi. Haruo, .. Ibn Sïna and Suhrawardi on Self-Consciousness: Sorne Comparative Rem.arks."
Ck 26 (1990). 62-77.
Kl"II\Js, Paul, "Plotin. chez les arabes. Remarques sur un nouveau fragment de la paraphrase arabe des
EÀDétldes," B.I.E. 23 (1940-41): 263-295.
_ _ , "The Contt'oversies of Fakhral-Dïn Rizi," I.e 12 (1938): 13L-53.
_ _ , "Lei 'Comroverses' de Fakhral-Din Rizi," B.I.E 19 (1937-38): 187-219.
Kraye.ji11. W. F. Ryan and C. B. Schmitt. Pseudo-An'srodemtheAbtfdJeAges. The Theology .md
odJer Te.nJ' (London: The Warburg Institute: University of London, 1986).
Kuspinar. Bilai. ISAl8L1 Ankonn-7- on M/? Ulummofir-p PlJUosopiJ,r (Kuala Lumpur: International
Institue of Islamic Thought and Civilization. (ISTAC), 1996).
Landauer, S., Die psychologie des Ibn Sinâ," ZD.Jl.f.o. 2991878): 336-9. [reedited br Van Dyck
Il

(Cairo, 1907; reprinted, Beirut: Dar aI_clJm li al-Jamt, 1982) and in RasiiuSlIl!YidJ Il/-Rd~S
... /beSfDii (Qum: Intishiirit-i Bïd", 1980),143-219]
Landolt. Hermann, "Su1Jrawardfs "Tales of Initiation." Review Article," LA.O.S. 107 (1981),
475-86.
_ _ ' "Mystique iranienne: Suhrawardi Sk!pkb Ii/-I"sbnirf (549 1 1155 - 587 ) 1191) et CAyn
al-Qu?-iit-i Hamadinï (492 / 1098 - 525 / 1131)," in Adams. 00., unoitU1 CL'F'iIiz~i/û}n nnd
Cu/fUre. 187-204.
_ _ ' "Ghazilï and "Religionwissenschaft." Some Notes on the A-fis.lJkiir 6/-AnWHr for Professor
Charles J. Adams," A.S 45 (1991): 19- n.
_ _ ,"Waliya," E..R., vol. 15. 316a-23a.
_ _ , "Review" [of Freitag. Sœ/e7WIlOd'tnI~), B.CA.L 4 (1987):58-61.
Laoust. Les sclUsmes dllDS /ïslmn. bKnJduaion li llOe etUde de JII reorion DJusu1mDAe (paris: Payot,
1965).
Law. B. C., " Avicenna and His Theory of the Soul," in A J-7œAL18 CommemonlriOA J.'OJume (Calcuta:
Iran Society, 1956), 179-86.
Lerner, Michel-Pierre, .Le mORde des spÂtftaS, vol. 1 - Geoése N lnomp/Je d'une n:preseOI8hOn
COSOlLifue (paris: Société d'édition «Les Belles Lettres». 1997).
Lemer. R. and M. Mahdi, Mw.lieJ-'lI1 PolLh'aJl PÂffosop~y: A Sourceilook, eds. R. Lerner and M.
 B(BL(OGRAPHY - 347

Mahdi (collaboration of E.L. Fortin). ([oronto: Collier Macmillan. 1967).

Lewis. Bernard. "The Ismaîlis and the ."~ssassins." in Setton and BaldwÏJ1. eds., A HislOrY of the
CruSlldt-.:i. vol. 1.99-132. '
_ _ , "J:lashïshiyya," EL"" vol. 3 (1971): 267b-268b.
Lewisohn. Leonard, ed., 71Je Legnc,r of Afedidef-"d! PersÜlL1 SUJ1sm, foreword Javad Nurbakhsh.
intro. S.H. Nasr (London: Khaniqahi Nimarullahi, 1992).
Lindberg, David C.. "The ScieneeofOptics," in Idem, Sa"eoœmdJeMiddJeAges, 338-68 [reprinted
in Idem, SlUœes ÜJ die HiS"tZN;Y ofA-fedievlll OJXû::S . vol. 1, 33B-68].
_ _ , SaenœmtIJeMLtld1eAges (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978).
_ _ , 7Oeonesof 1-:iRon fn:Jmm-KLndira Kep.ltfr (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).
_ _ ' "The Intromission-Extnunission Conrroversy in Islamic Visual Theory: Alkindi versus
A vieenna, chapt IV in. Idem, Sruœes Ln me HisrtH;Y ofA-fediewu ~~. 137-59.
tt

__ , Snlœes ÜJ me HisrtNY ofA-ft!ÔievaJ Op/ics (London: Variorum, 1983).

Liok-SaLinger, Ruth. ed. in. chief, A S/rIljl"lIr p~: Srutlies fA A-fedLer-~PAi./osopôyIiDd Colrure, eds.
Jeremiab Haekett, Michael Samuel Hyman, R. James Long, Charles H. Manekin (Washington:
The Cstbolic University of Amenca, 1988).
Lyons, M. C., "An Arabie TtaJlS18tion of the Commentary of Themistius," o.s. O.A.S: 17 (1955):
426-35.
_ _ ' .. O.JJ die Nld"ure ofMIlD in. cAli Ibn Ri(lwin' 5 Epitome," An. 30 (1965): 181-71.
_ _ , "The IUrRJaI-Nafs of CAU Ibn Ri(lwin," lI). 6 (1961): 65-71.

-- MacdonaJd. Duncan, B., "The Development of the Idee of Spirit in IsJam," A.O
[reprinted in A-f. U~ 22 (1932): 2542 and 153-68].
9 (1931): 307-51

Macush, R., "Greek and Oriental Sources of Avicenna's and Sohrawardi's Theosophies," eF.A. 2
(1983),9-13.
Madelung, Wilfred, "Aspects of Ismii1U Theology: the Prophetic Chain and the God Beyond Being,"
in Nasr, 00., Ismii7ü Conln'bll&OAs co Is.IIlAYC Culture [reprinted ÏJl Idem, Reh§ious ScAoo.ls
IlOdSer:rsmA-fem"ef-ll.IEslam (London: Variorum, (985), XVII].
_ _ ' lle.ligÛ)US Scôoo/s IU1dS~.10 MedieVll.! EsI8m (London: Variorum., 1985).
Madko\1r, Ibribim., L 'OIyllDon d'AnShxe dlJlOS le monde nmbe: ses tnN!uClioLlS. son emde « ~s
'V'phQNiims, préface de Van den Bergh (1934; Paris: J. Vrin, 1969).
MaQmoud, N efti Bel-ijaj. Lap.syc1JofDgle des-llnimou.r cHez.les omoes-. nal"mnrDenc 0 1niT-'t:yyIt? KLiiih
Il.I-P,!1'W1D de 0JiifU.z (paris: KJincksieck. 19n).
Makdisi, Georges, TlJe Jàse o f CoIIe,{rtfS.: .l.DsDrlX.LOAS ofLeI1nHn{r Ù1 Isllld1lZDd me "~(Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1981).
_ _ ' "MusJim Instibltions of Le.-ning in Eleventh-Century Baghdad," o.s. o.A.S. 24 (1961):
1-50.
Marcotte. Roxanne D., Métaphysique Jléoplatonicieane orientale et anthropologie philosophique,"
Il

At.'res- du ~y;n'lEeCo~sde.l 'AssociatiOn des S'oa«-ès de PDiJosoplue de Uqrue Fnmpu"se:

Li AléilIpô,YSityue. mSroLre. cnr.rt;ue. eDJ"eur. Universi'ré LNf'R/. ()utJilec. /8-22I/oüt; /998) 2
vols. (Sainte-Foy, Québec: Presses de l'Université Laval, forthcoming Fall2000).

:ce __ ' Il An Attempt et Deconsrruction of IsJamie Thought. Ian Netton and His "Semiotic" Projeet,"
It;J. 43 (1999): 89-99.
_ _ ' "The "Semiotic" &terprise of Ian R. Netton: A Deonstructionist Approach of !slamic
 B(BLlOGRAPHY - 348

Tbought?" M1-JlUDi~ 60 (1997): 1-14.

_ _ ' "Subrawardïs Psycbology in the Pnysics of the Arabic Il/-LlUDoI/UL [TneF/J/SiJesof4ir.IJ/
]: Some Remarts," in 71Je ÇJur'ôn llDd P1J.i1osopIILCoI llelleclions, S. Handaroh. Q..A.J.
McGregor, E.R. Alexandrin., R. Marootte, S. Mulyati., A Alibayand D. Steigerwald, A.
Makin (Yogyakarta, Indonisia: Indone5ÏanAcadem.ic Society XXI. 1998),51-64.
_ _ . "Philosophical Resson Versus Mystiall Intuition - Shihab al-Din Suhrawardi (d. 1191),"
A.HA. 7 (1996): 109-126.
_ _ . "The Role of Imagination in Ibn Miskawayh's (d. 1030) Theory of Prophecies," A.CP.ÇJ.
73 (1999): 37-n.
_ _ , "Ibn Miskawayh' s Concept of the Intellect (~j )," (M.A. Thesis, Institute of Islamic
Studies, McGill University, 1992).
_ _ . "Ibn Miskawayh: Imagination and Prophecy (Nubuwwd)," I.e 71 (1997): 1-13.
_ _ , "Imagination et révélation chez Miskawayb," L. 13.1 (1996-1): 45-55.
al-Mac~ümï, Saghïr l;Iasan, .. A Treatise on the Sou1 Asaibed to Ibn SiDa," in Abdullah, S.M., ed.,
ProfessorMU/Jammlld SlNlff~ Pn5eorJUion VoJU.IJ1e (Lahore: Shafi Press, 1955), 131-44.
Mannura, Michael E., "On the Praof of Prophecies and the Interpretation of the Prophets' Symbols
and Meraphors," in Lemer and Mahdi, eds., A-fedieYlllPo/iaClllP1Ji/osophy, 112-21.
_ _ "Ploaing the Course of Avicenna' 5 Thought: A Review Article of Dimirri GUTAS, A l-7CeAnIi
lIDd r.IJe AtisroœJilUJ Tmdirion: IntnJduaion œ At:Wdq A 5-7Cenno S P1Ji/osopmCtJJ Terrs
(Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1988):' .l."A.QS 111 (1991), 333-42.

,--....
_ _ ,"Avicenna, Hea1ing: Metaphysics," in Lemer and Mahdi, eds., A-fedJer-71IPoûbQU P.lJilosoph,Y
,98-111.
_ _ , "Aviœoos's 'Flying Man' in Context," A-L 69 (1986): 383-95.
_ _ ' "Ghazali and the Avicennan Proof from Personal Identity for an Immaerial Self," in
Link-Salinger, ed., A S~brPIIdI, 195-205.
l "Avicenna on the Division of the Sciences in the fsaçogè of bis S1Jitii ," .lJlAs.s. 4
(1980),248-251. [trans. of part of this section]
_ _ ' "Aviœnna's Psychological Proof ofProphecy," .INES. 22 (1963),49-56.
_ _ ' "Some Aspects of Avicenna's Theory of God's Knowledge of PatticuJars," J.A.OS. 82
(1962), 299-312.
__ ' Il A vicenna and the Problem of the Infinite Number of Souls," A-LSr. 22 (1960), 232-9.
_ _ ' "Avicenn.a's"FlyingMan" ïnContext," A-f. 69(1986): 383-95.
Marquee, Yves, l.8p1JLlosoplnetlesllJwiüJn1-$llIiï~(Alger: Etudes et Documents,1973).
Massé, Henry "Le poême de l'ime attribué traditionnellement à Avicenne," in N.e 141 (1951): 1-9
[tr8DS. H. Massé]
MsssigJloJl, Louis, "Ibn SabcÛl et la aitique psychologique dans l'histoire de la philosophie
musulmane," in Mémonàl Hemi BIlSS«, vol. 2 (paris: Paul Geuthner, (928),123-30.
_ _ ' Recueil de rerres médûs conct:rn1UJl" / '1JisroiN de~" f»;.nhÏtfue en rerre d '/sI1lm (Paris: Paul
Geuthner, 1929).
_ _ t" La philosophie orientale d'Ibn Sînâ et son alphabet philosophique," in A-1iS"œJ/8AëW. A-fémonm

~.
A ~7i:emJe - IV(Cairo: Pub. de l'Institut français d'Archéologie Orientale du Caïre, 1954),
1-18.
Mebren, MA.f., "La philosophie d'Avicenne (Ibn-Sina) eKposé d'après des documents inédits,"
 BIBLIOGRAPHY - 349

A-fu. 1 (1882).389-409 and 506-522.

_ _ . Mebren. "Loiseau: traite mystique d' Avicenne. rendu littèralement en français et explique
selon le commenta1re persan de SawedJi." A-fu. (1887), II pages.
_ _ . Tnuies m,F5l".6!lJt:'S d'Aboli ALI n/-H05nin b. AbtltiUliR b. Smii ou A r-icemze. texte arabe
accompagné de l'explication en français par M.A.F. Mehren (Leyden: E.l. Brill. 1888-99).
[reprinted (4 fasc. in 1 vol.) Leiden: A.P.A., 1979]
MeliJcian-Chirvani. A.S.... Buddhisme. Il. In IsJamic Times." E/nimco vol. 4 (1990}: 4968.-499a.
Merlan. Philipp. A-fooop5;Yclu"sn. A-(y.s-ricism, MeœcoASciusof;!5.S: Pn:Jblem of die Soul in Neo-
AnsrOlehim andNeoplolomc Trot/ihon (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. (969).
___ ' "Greek Philosopby from Plata ta Plotinus," in Armstrong. ed.• Tne Cambridge/ksrmy-o/
Larer Gn:ek 4Dd EwL,Y Met/ier-v PlulosoplJ,Y. 14-132.
Michot. Jean, .. L' escb_ologie dans le «Livre de la guidance» d'Avicenne Présentation, tr'aduction et
index de la demiere section du Kihib oI-Hidnya ," B.P}"L 30 (1988): 138-52
, uAvicenna's 'Letter on the disappearance of me VaiJl lntelligible Forms After Death.'
Presentation and Translation," B.P.A-L 27 (1985): 94-103.
. u«L'Epitre sur la disparition des formes intelligibles vaines après la mort» d'Avicenne.
Edition aitÏC{ue, traduction et index," B.P'}"f. 29 (1987): 152-70.
_ _ ' "Cultes, magie et intellection: l'homme et sa corporéité selon Avicenne," in Wenin, ed..
L 'homme tIr soo /mi~1!rS, vol. l, 220-33.
_ _ ' "Avicenne et la destinée humaine. A propos de la résurrection des corps," R.P.L. 79
,,--.
(1981),453-83.
_ _ . "Tables de correspondances des Ta'lf'l81 d'a1-Firibî, des TocgfJ. d'Avicenne et du Liber
Aphon"smortUD d'Andrea Alpago," JI.~LD.EO. 15 (1982): 231-50.
_ _ , La destinée de /'homme seloo A ~lCerme. Le retour li OLeu (m~1 ad) et"1 Lml{eLnlllion (LovaJlii,
BeJgium.: Aedibus Peeters. 1986).
_ _ ,"L'eschatologie d'Avicenne selon F.n. al-Riizi," Il.P.L. 87 (1989): 235-63.
__ ' U Les sciences physiques et métaphysiques selon la làsiiMI 5 AfJsiïr1 0/- Vliim d'AvîceJUle,"
B.P.M 22 (1980): 64-71.
_ _ ' "Les questions sur les états de 1'esp'it. Problèmes d'attribution et essai de traduction critique,"
B.P.A-L 24 (1982): 44-53.
_ _ ' uProphétie et divination selon Avicenne. Présentation, essai de traduction critique et index
de l' «(Epitre de l'âme de la spbér~>." N.P.L 83 (1985): 507-35.
_ _ . "«L'épître sur la connsisslUlce de l'ime rationnelle et de ses états» attribuée à Avicenne,"
N.P.L. 82 (1984): 479-99.
_ _ ' "Avicenne, LB Oë.li(niaoo de Iiime. Section 1 de l'EpLw des érDrs de llime. Traduction
a"Ïtique et lexique," in De Libera, Elaramrani-Jamal and Galonnier, l:.ao§~es eL" Pm?as-opJu"e
.239-56.
, .. De la joie et du bonheur. Essai de Ir'aduction critique de la section II, 8. des Es1Janu
d'Avicenne," B.P.M 25 (1983),49-60.
_ _ ' "La réponse d'Avicenne à Bahmanyâr et aJ-Kïrmâni. Présentation, traduction critique et
lexique arabe-français de la A-Fuh~lIIiJoIII," A-Fu. 110 (1997): 143-221.
_ _ ' ilL' épître sur la genèse et le retour attribuée à Avicenne. Présentation et essai de traduciton
aitique," o.P..A.L 26 (1984): 104-118.
Mi~b'" Yazdï, MulJammad Taqï, "An Introduction to Muslim Philosophy. Part 6 (trans. Mu1}lUJlJDad
 BIBLKXjRAPHY - 350

LegeJlhausen and cA?ïm Sardalïr)," T 13.1 (1996): 83-112.

.~ Monnot, Guy, "Latransmigration et l'immortalité," M/./J.Eo. 14 (1980): 149-52.
_ _ ' .. La place de l' homme dans la philosophie islamique," N.T 80 (1980): 86-94.
Morewedge, Parviz, .. Ibn SUlii' s Concept of the Self," P.E. 4 (19n): 49-73.
_ _ ' ed., P.biIosoplties of Erisre.oœ. Anaenr ROd Afod67Z (New YOl"k. Fordham University
Press, 1982).
_ _ ,ed., Nt?Op/nroo.ism 'lOti /s/onuc ThOl{~nr (Albany, NY: Stme University of New York Press.
1992).
_ _ ' "EpistemoLogy: the Internai Sence of Prehension ( wlihm) in Islamic Philosophy," in Idem.
EsY~Ln /SNlDUC PlJUospD,Y, 123-59.

_ _ ' Ess-D,P'S Ln I.damicPlLLlosopiJ,p. 7Heo1o..lfY. IlOd A(J-Y/icism (Oneonta, NY: State Univer.iity of
New York atOneonta, Dept. of PhiJ 0 sophy, 1995),92-98.
_ _ ' "The Logic of Emanationism and $ûfism in Ibn SUli (Avicenna), part 1," LA.O.S. 91
(1971): 467-74.
Maris, Z., "Revelation, lntelleetual Intuition and Reason in the Philosophy of Mulla $adri: An
Analysis of the d1-.{JiKmIUNI-~mffaIJ,"(Ph.D. Diss., The American University, 1994).
MomlY, David, AA 4.J7'l1bid N«8hie nnd His "Ont /hA aI.- ~mm and A/~po os PortrM,PèVi in lJis
BiO§nlPhiœ OicrioAm;r ofPeop.le Assoaàred rnM rlJe Q9' (Leiden.: E. J. Brill, 1994).
MOITis, J. W., 77Je "~Sdom 01" rAe TAnwe An mbrXluetioA 10 die P1Ji.I0sopD,Y of A-fuUn Sudm
(princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).
Nader, Albert N., Le ~mepInlosop~ivuedes MU~8zi.1l1. preAUt!a peASeurs de 1'Es/1lnJ (Beirut:
Les Lettres Orientales, 1956).
N~, Sayyed Hossein, "Fakhr al-Dîn. al-Rizï," in Sharif, ed., A Hislmy ofA-fuslim PAiiosoph,y, vol.
1,642-56.
_ _ , "Post-Avicennan Islamie PbiJosophy and the SbJdy of Being ,tt in Morewedge, 00., Philosophies
ofEri'sreoœ, AAcienr BAd AfoderD. 337-44.
_ _ ' "!;)adr al-Dm Shïrizi (Mulli $adri)," in Sharif, 00., A Hi.srtH;Yof Jl..fuslim P.lJi.losoph,y, vol.
2,932-61.
_ _ ,"Mulli $adri as a Source for the History of Muslim Philosophy," LS. 3 (1964), 309-14.
_ _ ' ed., IsmiïÎlf CoDiriburioAS 10Islmnic Cu/l'ure (Tehnm: Imperial Academ.y of Philosophy,
1977).
_ _ ' An .InlFOdulDon 10 /s/Ilmic Cosmo.lo..eicàl DOChÜJes (Cambridge: Harva-d University Press,
1964).
__ 1 T~ Muslim %~ A P/et!AnIl - Su.lJnl~-artIf - ibn An/hI (Delmar, NY: Caravan Books,
1969),
_ _ ' An mtroduchoA 10 f.dIUmC Cosmo/08iCMI Oocrn.oes (Albany, NY: State University of New
York Press. 1993).
_ _ ' .. Ibn Sinii' 5 'Oriental philosophy' ," in Nasr and Leaman, eds., Hisr«y ofiS/llmic PhLlosoplJ,Y
, vol. 1,247-51.
__ l "Introduction to the Mystieal Tradition," in Nasr and Leaman, eds., Hisrmy of /s/nmrc
PAUosopD,Y, vol. 1, 367-73.
_ _ ' "The Persian Works of Shaykh al-Isbriq Shïhib al-Din Suhrawardï," LQ. 12 (1968): 3-8.
__ ' Il Shihib al-Dio Suhr&wanSï," in Nasr, 77Je IslllOUc mlel.lt!CIUIlI TnIdiaoA.fA Per.rio, 125-53 [a
 BIBLIOGRAPHY - 351

repiJlt of Ibid., "Shihib al-Din Suhrawardï Maqtül," in Sbsrif, ed.. A HisIOQ'- of MusLim
Pmlosop/!Y, vol. 1, 372-398].
_ _ . 7lJe /s/mnie Inlellt!CQNH Trotliiioo in Pt>nÙI. 00. Mehdi Amin Razavi (Ridtmond, Surrey:
Curzon Press, 1996).
_ _ ' "The Spread of the Illuminationist School of Subrawardi." in Idem, Tlte /SIam1C In~DecnmJ
Tnlt/rbon ILl Pen.IÏl, 160-71.
Nasr, Sayyed Hussayn and Lea.man. Oliver. eds., HisEOI';Y"of/sjamù:PAuosoph"r.2 vols. (London-New
York: Routledge, 1996).
Nazemi, Reza, "An. Analytical Study of the Persian Treatise 04 .. Gnosis of Gad" ( YezoiïO Shioiikhr
)" (M.A. Thesis: Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University. 19n).
Netton, IanRichard, Al-Eiüiibf~iL1t1HJsScOoo/(London and New York: Roudedge. 1992).
_ _ ' "More Recent Worts," appended to E. E. Calverley, "Nafs." El":" vol. 7 (1993): 880a-884a.
_ _ ' "1be Neoplatonic Substrate of Suhrawardï's Philosopby of Illumination: Fnls~i1ù as
Ta,llwWUf," in. Lewisohn., 00., TAeLegac;,yol'Af«/iuer--oJ PtrSLM Sufnm, 247-60
_ _ ' A-Iuslim Neop/Nonisrs.· AA EntrodUCl'Jon ID the TlIougDr al' me BredJreo OfPuniy ("IkPwlÏO
1lI-$llIIi') (Cambridge, 1962; London: Allen. and Unwin. 1982).
Nuseibeh, Sari, "Al- t Aql al-Qudsî: Avicenna's Subjective Theory of Knowtedge," s./. 69 (1989):
39-54.
Nunon, Vivian, ed., G81SJ'.' Prob/ems llOd Pro.5]JeŒS. A Co/Jeco'mJ ofPtyJerS Suhmiued 6E die /979
Citmhridçe Comt!n!Dœ (London: The Wencome Institute for the History of Medicine,
1981).
Pell., Charles. iCMaskh." .EL..f vol. 6 (1991): 736b-738b.
Peters, Francis E., Arisroœ/es-AmlJus. T1Je On€Ulr. Transln~OnsandCOmmeArLnes on dJe AhslOEeDilD
Cmpus (Leidea: EJ. Bril, 1960).
, AhstOf'le IlDd die AnD.5: TAe An'srorehim Tmmbon .in /slmn (N ew York: New York
University Press, 1968).
Pinès, Shlomo, "La 'Philosophie Orientale' d'Avicenne et sa polémique contre les Bagbdadiens,"
A.n.o.L.A-LA. 19 (1952): 5-37.
, "La conception de la connaissance de soi chez Avicenne et Abü-l-Barakiit al-Baghdidï,"
A.lJ.H.A-LA 21 (1954),21-98. [reprinted in Idem, Tlle CoUeatld fJ'OrksofShlomoPines.
vol 1. 181-2581
, TiJe CoU~ed fJ'Onts of S!JJ0010 Pio~s . 5 voIs. - vol. 1 - SlUt/res in Abü '/-Btnibir
IlI-BIf!f"1Jdiiih: PO,.p.s7cs and AfS"8p4.P.57t:5- (Jerusatem: Magnes Press, the Hebrew University,
1979).
_ _ ' "Quelques notes sur les rapports de l' fP,J7'Ii al-DÛl d'al-Gbazzâ1î avec la pensée d'Ibn Sinâ,"
in. Sîoaœur. ed. OIJnziik: u
nlisOA é€ /e miracle, 11-6.

_ _ ,"Note on Abû'l Ba-akit's Celestial Physics," in Idem, CoUeaed If~ofSn/omoPines,

vol. 1. 175-80.
_ _ ' "Nouvelles Etudes sur Aw~ad Ed-Zamân Abu'1-Baratât al-Baghdâdi," in Idem, CoUecœd
"«rs
ofSJUomo PVJes , vol. l, 96-113.
_ _ ' "Une version arabe de trois propositions de la 1:TOIXEI01:ΠeEOAOI1KH de Proclus,"
as: 8 (1955): 201.
Pourjavady, Nasrollah, l.irN ofS8/dnn Ù1 SUArtlff".rlPS PhilosopiJ,Y of /Uumineboo (Binghamton:
IGCS. Binghamton University, 1999).
 EHBLIOGRAPHY - 352

Rahman, FazJur, "Oream. Imagination and :4fmnli./-.t\-lidlnJ," lS. 3 (1964), L67-80.

__ . A J-7CennO S P.~rc1Jologf':- 110 Eùç1isn TntnS/iitùm of "KJ'riih Il1-Mi.lÎit: .. Book fi C7Japrer 1-'7,
notes and textualimprovements 00 me Cairo ed. by Fazlur Rahman (London: Oxford University
Press 1952).
1

_ _ ' "Avicenna and Ortbodox Islam: An Interpretative Note on the Composition of His System,"
in HI7;YA DStryo ~"roUson Jubilee ~'Olume OA me Occasion ofHis Ser--en{Y-Fdtb BUtlJdt!y. 2
vols. (Jerusalem: The Arnerican Academy for Jewish Research. 1965).
__ , Prr:Jpb~yin Es.lI/01.' p.nuosop~YlLAdCtr.hodo.ty'(Loodoo: George Allen & Unwin. 1958).
_ _ . TAeP.hilosopJ!.rofA-ful/n $IN/nJ ($odrlil-LJm IiI-Shii7JZLj (Albany. NY: State University of
New York Press, 1974).
Rahman, Mojibur, "Avicenna and HisContemporaries," Li: 34 (198L): 75-87.
Rappe. Sara. "Self-Perception in PLotinus and the Later NeopLatonicTradition," A.CP.ÇJ. 71 (1997):
433-51.
Rashed. Roshdi, "Le "Discours de la Lumière" d'Ibn al-Haytham (Alhazen)," /l.RS 21 (1968)'
197-224 [reprinted in Idem, 0J'dtlue«mtdt!ml/litfues. V, 197-224].
__ ' O~vue éY OlOJlJémnlrfJues. ./lecberclJes sur 1 'hisroire de Iii peA$ee scr'enr..ilLiJue en Ln/he
(London: Variorum. 1992).
Rescber, Nicholas. 77Je Der-wopmenr ofAnbic U:{qic (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
1964).
_ _ , A1-FiïriibL' A4 Anoomied BilJoO§nipé,Y (PittsblU'gh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962).
.--. Rescher, N. and M. Marmura, AJerllDder ofApérodù:ias.: ne ./ltY'ur4/"Jon of GzlJeA S Tn:wlJse on die
TIJetN;Y o fA-f«io.n (Islamabad: Istamic Research Institute, 1969).
Ritter, Helmut, "Philologika IX," IlL 24 (1937): 270-86 and D.!. 2S (1938): 35-6.
Rosenthal. Franz ... Al-Shaykh af- Yüninï and the Arabic PLotinus Source," ~ 24 (1955): 42-66.
_ _ ,"On the Knowledge of Plato's Philosophy," Le 14 (1940): 387-422.
Rowson, Everett K., A A-fuslim PbilosopiJer OB rôe Sou1lUld Ers Fore. tl/-:..fmm. s KimlJ dI-Amod ~ii
J-Al1l1d (New Heaven, Cf: American Oriental Society. 1988).
Sabra, Ali 1., "Avicenna 00 the Subjeet Matter of Logic," LP n (1980).746-64.
Sabri, Tahani, "Ià'salo 0 1- 'lI f. Le lmire surI 'amour d'A r"lcenoe. Traduction et étude," R.E.!. 53
(1990): 109-34.
Saliba, Djëmil, Emde sur 10 HlwopH.l75'rÎJue d'A v7"ceAoe (paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
1926).
Sauvaget, "l;Ialab," E.L'<~ vo1. 3 (1970): 85a-90a.
Schimmel, A., A-fys&"œI Oimem70D of Is.lnm (Chapet Hill: University of North Caroli1la Press,
1975).
Schmidtke, Sabine, "The Doctrine of the Transmigration of Soul According ta Shihab al-Dm al-
Suhrawardï(KiUed 587/1191) andhis Followers," s.Ir. 28 (1999): 237-254.
SettoJl, K.M. and M.W. Baldwin, eds., A MSlayofdle GuslJdes, 6 vols. (Madison, WI: University
of Wisconsin. Press, 1989) - vol. 1 - 71Je FUsr HUAdn!d y~.

-
ce
l"
l'
Sezgin, Fust, ed., BihhOgnipJtie der f)eulSœspmdnç-eo Anihish.k u.ndIsllunKunde. r-VJ'.I deo Anfooge.n
biS' J 986 LtelJsr L,irtnKur ulJw- die IIFJlJisdl~ L.tuJdtr der GtyeowNt" , 21 vols., with the
collaborations of G. Degener et al (Frankfurt am Main: Institut fur Gescbichte der srabish-
islemischen Wissenschaten, 1991- ).
 BIBLIOGRAPHY - 353

Sharif, Mubammad M.. ed.• A HisIO'J'- ofA,fus/.im PllilosoplJ.,v. 2 vols.. new ed. (1963-66; Karachi:
Royal Book, 1983).
Sherif. Mubammad ~mad. GlJoznli"s Tht!CN:Y 0/ l-~ue (Albany, NY: Stace University of ~;ew
y CX"k Press. 1975).
Siegel. Rudolph E., GII/en on P-!J''C'hology. PsycnofMdJolo...ll,y. ond FUDc&On nnd OLSt?'rlSt!S 0/ me
Nervous S;F5Tem. Parr .:J ofGUen 's S;P51"em ofPo,y.sio/f{I{.Y nod A-ft!dicine (lst part, 1968; 2nd
part. 1970; Base!; S. Ks-ger. 1973).
_ _ . GII/e'1 on SéY1Se Perctpaon EUs iJocuines. CJh.serf-71ioos ~lOd Erpen"meAls 00 ~LStOO. Hean1t~.
SOleil. TMœ. Touch tUJd p~n. IlDd 7DéYr HisloriaJ! Soun-es' (Base!: Karger. 1970).
Sinaceur. Mohammed Allal. ed.. GlJoziik: Lili mison «le nurode (Paris: Maisonneuve-Larose,
1987).
Smith. J81le 1. and Yvonne Y. Haddad, eds.. The /slonuc Undersloodio$ ofDez/rD ,LAd/lesurrecr.ioo
(Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1981).
Smith, Margaret, "Transmigration and the Sufis," J,f. n~ 30 (1940): 351-7.
Snell, Bruno, The DiscoJ--eL;Y 0/ t:lJe A-find: 7De ~ ~e-.tiJs of EuropeJ!lD 71JOl{~hl (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1953).
Soudavar, A., "The Concept of "aJ-Aqdamo A~aJ;Jb" and "Yaqin-e Sabeqi," and the Problem of
Semi-Fakes," s.u: 28 (1999): 255-73.
Sourde!. Dominique, .. Les professeurs de madrasa à Alep aux Xlr-X[II~ siècles d'après Ibn saddad,n
B.ED. 13 (1949-51): 85-115.
SPies, Otto and S. K. Khatak, eds., 77Jree Trea/lst?soD A(ps"liciun (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1935),
SteigerwaJd, Diane, LapeASée phnosoplnfue d 0è01OKNJue tleShlÛ1nlS"bÜU: m. S48/J.lS.:J (Lévis,
Québec: Presses de l'Université Laval, 1997).
Strohmaier. Gotthard, "Galen in Arabic: Prospects and Projeets," in. Nuuon, ed., Gtr1en: ProhJeOlS
andProspects, 187-96.
Sweetman, J. W., 1s/liOlllOti Côn"stJ80 71Jeo/qD'. 2 vols.· (London: LunerwOl"th Press, 1945).
Talbot Rice. Tamsra. 1ÀeSe'fllksÛlAsJÎlA-Wor(London: Thames and Hudson. 1961).
Tardieu, M., "Siibiens ooranique et «Sibiens» de I;Iarrin," .I.A. 274 (1986): 1-44.
Taylor. Rich..d, <OThe K8Iiim fi Mll/JfI n1-KA.t!f'r (uoe:Y" de ÛlUsis-) in the Islamic Philosophical
J,fiLieu," in Draye, Ryand and Schmitt, eds., Pseudo-AnSlodeùJ œeA-hatle-As"es, 31-52.
Tehriinï, K~em, "Mystica1 SymboJism in Fou.... Treatises of Suhrawardï" (Ph.D. Diss., Columbia
University, 1974).
Teichman, J., The J,find 0Dd die SouL AD /ntnx/uenoA 10 ÛIt! PMosopD,Y of Ahnû (New York:
Humanities Press. 1974).
Temkin, O., Oll/enism: RisedDdDecliAeofoA-fedLauP1U1osopD,Y (ltbaca, NY: Cornell University
Press 1973).
1

Tie1eman, Teun, Gll/en IUld Ch~ppus on de Soul ArgumeLlllldd Ne/ur~boD io rbe .De P/llCIiis
BDOU II-III (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996).
TJili, Abderrahman, Coolnourion IÎ l'émûe de .In p~yelJoloçie li !niFerY laplJUosopnie IIvicemzienoe
(Tunis: Université de Tunis l, 1995).
_ _ , "Sur la transmigration et l'immortalité en tetTe d'Islam," tU-A-~U.ni"oh"lh / m-A-fuolilbllJ 3
(1987): 85-98.
Trouillard, Jean, Llipurilia/hoopJodm"eDDe (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955).
 BlBLlC>CiRAPHY - 354

Ullmann, Manfred, Es/amie A-ft:YIieioe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1978).

___ ' .. Bucbbesprechungen [Review Article of Goblman' s Life of Ibo S.t.Î1a]:' DJ. 52 (1975),
148-51.
Urvoy, Dominique, IbD NusAd (A J'ëY7VeS"), trans. Olivia Stewart (London: Routledge, L991).
Ushida, Noriko, ElUde C'Ompm-tlCive dt? /0 psyC'oologû! d:-4nSrore. d'A r·ù:enoe et" ile.2: 7Doml/S
d'Atjuin (Tokyo: Keio Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies, 1968).
Vajda, G., "Les notes d'Avicenne sur la 'Théologie d'Aristote',ft /l.T. 51 (1951): 345-406.
Van Riet, S., ed., A f7CeAnl1 L.ormus. L.ibér de Anima seu Serrus de NaEunULoos. /-1/./, éd. critique de
la trad. latine médiévale par Van Riet. intro. G. Verbeke (Louvain: Peeœrs; Leiden: Brill,
1972).
_ _ ' 00.. A f7Cenno Lormus. LJber di! .Anima seu Sertus de Nd/1K'llIibus, t-.7- V·, éd. critique de la
trad. latine médiéVale par Van Riet, ïnteo. G. Verbete (Louvain: Peeters; Leiden: Brill,
1968).
Verbeke, Gerard, "Science de l'âme et perception sensible," in Van Riet, ed., A f7ŒIJOO Lorinus. /-f/I
,1-90.
_ _ ' "Le «De Anima» d'Avicenne. Une conception spiritualiste de l'homme:' in Van Riet, ed.,
A f7ŒL1OIl LoriDus, Iv:. V, 1-73.
Verdinkere, "L'âme ou nepesh el ruih," CL (1996): 59-69.
V oilquin, Jean, Lespeoseursgrecs IFl/OT Soawes de Thil/ès 8 ProdLeus (paris: Fiam.aurion, 1964).
W&lbridge, John, "Suhrawardi, a TweJfth-Cenwry Muslim Nec-Stoic?" LUP. 34 (1996): 515-33.
_ _ , TlJeLt!IlIven oftIJeA8aéAD: SuAmwlUYDlUJddJeHtn'r~eofdJe
O reeks (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 20(0).
_ _ ' TIJe Saetzce of A(Y-51'IC L.tgha. (Ju,iIJ Ill-Dm SlünTz.t- tlnd die U1u.m.i.nmioDisr Tn/di/ioB in
fsltmuc Pm10.st:1~Y(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
_ _ , "Review" [Amin Rszavi, Suh.mwlllrli] , f-J.A-LES 30 (1998): 615-7.
\Valker, Paul, "The Doctrine of Meœmpsychosis in Islam," in Hallaq and Little, eds., fs/llHUc
Shimes- Preser1red1'0 ChArles.J: AulUDs , 219-38.
_ _ , &idyPhilosop/ucIllSmism. ToeIsmoiliNeop/~onismofAbô YtI9-üb nI-S.tp"srœ[ (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993).
W &lzer, Richard, .. Aristode' 5 Active Iatellect VOVCi3l'Ol71nKO V in Greek and Farly IsJamic Philosophy,"
P/œno eLlAléoplmonismom lA7enleem Ocalk.l.1re (Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei) 371
(1974): 423-36.
_ _ ' "Furfuriyüs:' Ï1l EL 2 vol. 2 (1965): 948b-949b.
_ _ , "Bliruldus," in E.l. 2 vol. 1 (1960): 1339b-1340b.
_ _ ' "Al-Firaoï' s Theory of Prophecy and Divination," in Idem, ~ iAEo Aniluc 1 206-19.
_ _ , G1ft'klAID An.1b1~ h.Jir!YS 04 Islamic Philosopll,Y (Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, 1962; Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press, 1962).
_ _ , "New Studies on a1-Kindi," in Idem, ~ inl"oAra!Jic, 175-205.
_ _ ' "L'éveil de la philosophie islamique," R.E.I. 381 12 (1970): 207-42.
Watt, Montgomery, 71Je Fonndh'J-"e PenOt! of Islomic 7JJol{elJr (Edinburgh, 1973; Oxford, UK:
Oneworld Pub., 1998).
_ _ • IslllOlic PHilosoplJy liDO TDetoIogy, paperback ed. (Edinburgb: Edinburgh University Press,
 BrBLlOGRAPHY - 355

1987).
_ _ . 71Je Faidl /lOti Pn1clice O[IlI-Gb~lZZI"i. trans. by W.M. Watt (1953: 1963; Chicago: Kazi
Pub., 198~).
Webb, GiseJa Goodnch, "The Human 1 Angelic Relation in the Philosophies of Suhrawardi and Ibn
Arabi," (Ph.D. Diss., Temple University, 1989).
Wenin, Christian, ed.. L nommeerson UAà"èY'S nu fl.1'~1'PL14e Acres-du sl?plieme coAÇresrArt:rnHI:û:Jonl
liepluJosopDie mèdief111e (.JO OOÛi - 4 seprembre .1982),2 vols. (Louvain-la-Neuve: Editions
de l' InstiWt supérieur de philosophie, 1986) ,.
Wensinck, A. J., Lu Pensee de GlJuZZlili (PEris: Adrien-Maisonneuve. 1940)
Westra, Laura, "Self-Knowing in Plato, Plotinus and Avicenna," in Morewedge, ed. Neopl8i"omsm
undIsflUnic 71JOl{~hl. 89-109.
W oJfson, Hany Austrytt, rAe PlIilosopD;.1;+ ofme K a/iïm. Slruallre tUXI Growr.1J ofPhilosophe.s;psrems
fnJm PliO io Spio022l, 4 vols. (Cambridge, MA: HalVlIl"d University Press, 1976).
_ _ . PlIilo. FOllLldil&ons ofRehçious Philosop.l1yin Judo/sm, C./nShnm'ty. ~iRd Is./nm, 3rd 00., 2
vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962).
_ _ ' "The internai. Senses in Latin, Arabie, and Hebrew Philosophie Texts," H.TJl. 28 (1935):
69-133.
Yazdi, Mi~biih, "An Introduetionto Mus1im Philosophy. Part 6," 7: 13.1 (1996): 83-112.
Zarean, Moham..mad Javad, "Sensory and Imaginai. Perception According to $adr al-Dm al-5hïrizï
(MuUa $adrii) 1569-1640," (M.A. Thesis, Imtitute of Islamic Studies, McGill University.
1995).
Ziai, ijusayn, "Shihiib al-Dia Suhrawardi: FOWlder of the lliuminationist Scbool," in Nasr and
Leaman, 005., lhSrOl;YoI'IsllUnicP1Jiloso~Y. vol. 1, 434-64..
_ _ , "The Uluminationist Tradition." in N &Sr and Leaman, eds. H6hHy ofIslmn.ic Phrlosopll,Y,
1

voL l, 465-96.
_ _ ,"Ebn Sabliin Savaji," EImniQl vol. 8 (1997): 52a-53a.
_ _ . "The Source and Nature of Authority: A Study of al-Suhrawardi's muminatiooist Political
Doctrine," in Butterworth, ed., 71JePobiicalAspecisofIsllHJicPlIüoso~y,294-334.
_ _ ' KAowledçe and DJumin6hon. A Siut!yofSobn1w..m's .{IjKmortl.!-IslJnKj (Atlanta, Georgia:
Scholars Press 1990).
1

Zimmennan, F. W., "The Origins of the So-Called rAeology of Aristotle," in Kraye, Ryan and
Schmitt, eds., Pseudo-AnSrod~mdJeMiddk4.q-es, 110-240.