Senshi Sosho Index

Vol. # Title & Date Published

1 Advance into Malaya. (1966)

2 Occupation of Philippines. (1966)
3 Occupation of Dutch East Indies. (1967)
4 Ichi-go Operation (pt. 1): Campaign in Honan (China). (1968)
5 Occupation of.Burma. (1967)
6 Army Operations in Central Pacific (pt. 1): Before the Loss of the Mariana Islands. (1967)
7 Tobu Nyuginia homen rikugun koku sakusen: Army Air Operations on the Eastern New Guinea Front. (1967)
8 Conduct of Army Operations by Imperial HQ (pt. 1): To August 1942. (1967)
9 Industrial Mobilization of War Supply Production (1): Program. (1967)
10 Hawai sakusen: Hawaii Operation. (1967)
11 Army Operations in Okinawa Area. (1968)
12 Marianas oki kaisen: Sea Battles off the Marianas. (1968)
13 Army Operations in Central Pacific (pt. 2): Peleliu, Anguar and Iwo-Jima. (1967)
14 Minami Taiheiyo rikugun sakusen: Pooruto Moresubi - Ga shima shoki sakusen (pt. 1): Army Operations in
the South Pacific: Port Moresby to the First Phase of Guadalcanal (pt. 1). (1968)
15 Imphal Operation: Defense of Burma. (1968)
16 Ichi-go Operation (pt. 2): Campaign in Hunan (China). (1967)
17 Okinawa homen kaigun sakusen: Okinawa Area Naval Operations. (1968).
18 Ichi-go Operation (pt. 3): Campaign in Kwangsi (China). (1969)
(Note: vol. number in question; Princeton Library has this as: Hokushi no chiansen, the same title as Vol. 50).
19 Hondo boku sakusen: Homeland Air Defense Operations. (1969)
20 Conduct of Army Operations by Imperial HQ (pt. 2): To August 1942. (1969)
21 Army Operations in Northern Pacific Area (pt. 1): Loss of Attu. (1968)
22 Seibu Nyugineya homan rikugun koku sakusen: Army Air Force Operations on the Western New Guinea
Front. (1969)
23 Army Operations North of Australia. (1969)
24 Philippines-Marei hoomen kaigun shinkoo sakusen: Philippines-Malay Area Naval Attack Operations. (1969)

25 The Irrawaddy Campaign: Collapse of the Defense of Burma. (1969)

26 N.E.I.-Bengaru wan hoomen kaigun shinkoo sakusen: N.E.I.-Bengal Bay Area Naval Attack Operations.
(1969)
27 Kwantung Army (pt. 1): Military Disposition Against USSR and Nomonhan Incident. (1969)
28 Minami taiheiyoo rikugun sakusen: Gadarukanaru - Buna sakusen (pt. 2): Army Operations in the South
Pacific: Guadalcanal - Buna Operations (pt. 2). (1968)
29 Hokutoo hoomen kaigun sakusen: Northeast Area Naval Operations. (1969)
30 Kaigun Sho-Go sakusen: Fuirippin oki kaisen (pt. 2): Naval Sho-Go Operation: Battles off the Philippines (pt.
2). (1970)
31 Kaigun Gunsembi (pt. 1): The Navy’s Armaments Program (pt. 1): Up to November 1941. (1969)
32 Defeat on Burma Front and Defense of Indo-China Peninsula. (1969)
33 Industrial Mobilization of War Supply Production (pt. 2): Execution. (1970)
34 The Army Air Force’s Drive to South Pacific Area. (1970)
35 Conduct of Army Operations by Imperial HQ (pt. 3): To August 1942. (1970)
36 Army Air Operations in Okinawa, Formosa and Iwo-Jima. (1970)
37 Kaigun Sho-Go sakusen (pt. 1): Taiwan oki kokusen made: Naval Sho-Go Operations (pt. 1): Up to Air Battle
off Taiwan. (1970)
38 Chuubu taiheiyoo hoomen kaigun sakusen (pt. 1): Central Pacific Naval Operations (pt. 1): Before May 1942.
(1970)
39 Daihonei kaigunbu - rengoo kantai (pt. 4): Imperial General Headquarters - Combined Fleet (pt. 4). (1970).
40 Minami Taiheiyo rikugun sakusen: Munda Saramoa (pt. 3): Army Operations in the South Pacific: Munda
Salamaua (pt. 3). (1970)
41 Shogo rikugun sakusen: Reite kessen (pt. 1): Sho-go Ground Operations: The Decisive Battle of Leyte (1).
(1971)
42 Operations by China Expeditionary HQ in 1945 (1): To March 1945. (1971)
43 Midooei kaisen: Midway Sea Battle. (1971)
44 Operations in the Northern Pacific (2): Kuriles, Sakhalin and Hokkaido. (1971)
45 Conduct of Navy Operations by Imperial HQ and Combined Fleet HQ (1): Before Outbreak of Pacific War.
(1971)
46 Kaijo boei sen: Surface Defensive Actions. (1971)
Also translated as The Maritime Protection War, and Naval Operations for Convoy Escort.
47 Assault on Hong Kong and Chang Sha (1941). (1971)
48 Sho-go Army Air Operations in Philippines. (1971)
49 Nantoo hoomen kaigun sakusen: Southeast Area Naval Actions Until Guadalcanal Reinforcement. (1971)
50 Hokushi no chiansen: (??? English translation not known – see Vol. 18).
51 Plan and Preparation for Defense of Japan’s Homeland (1): Defense of Kanto District. (1971)
52 Armament and Employment of Army Air Force (1): To the Initial Phase of 1934. (1971)
53 Army Air Operations in Manchuria. (1972)
54 Nansei homen kaigun sakusen: Dai Ni-Dan sakusen irai: Southwestern Area Naval Operations: From Second
Phase Operations Onwards. (1972)
55 Operations by China Expeditionary HQ in 1942 and 1943. (1972)
56 Kaigun Sho-go sakusen Fuirippin oki kaisen (1): SHO-Go Naval Operations: The Naval Battle of the
Philippine Sea (1). (1970)
57 Hondo kessen jumbi: Kyushu no boei (2): Preparations for the Decisive Battle of the Homeland: Defense of
Kyushu (2). (1972)
58 Minami Taiheiyo rikugun sakusen: Fuinshehaahen-Tsurubu-Tarokina (4): Army Operations in South Pacific:
Finschhafen-Tsurubu-Tarokina (4). (1973)
59 Conduct of Army Operations by Imperial HQ (4): To August 1942. (1972)
60 Sho-go rikugun sakusen: Ruson kessen (2): Sho-Go ground operations: The Decisive Battle of Luzon (2).
(1972)
61 Offensive of Third Army Air Force in Burma and Dutch East Indies. (1972)
62 Chuubu taiheiyoo hoomen kaigun sakusen (2): Central Pacific Area Naval Operations (2) (after June 1942).
1973)
63 Conduct of Army Operations by Imperial HQ (5): August to December 1942. (1973)
64 Operations by China Expeditionary HQ in 1945 (2): March 1945 to the End of the War. (1973)
65 Army Branch of IGHQ: Circumstances Surrounding the Outbreak of Greater East Asian War (1). (1973)
66 Daihonei rikugunbu (6): Conduct of Army Operations by Imperial Headquarters (6): Before June 1943.
(1973)
67 Daihonei rikugunbu (7): Conduct of Army Operations by Imperial Headquarters (7): From December 1943 to
July 1944. (1973)
68 Army Branch of IGHQ: Circumstances Surrounding the Outbreak of Greater East Asian War (2). (1973)
69 Army Branch of IGHQ: Circumstances Surrounding the Outbreak of Greater East Asian War (3). (1973)
70 Army Branch of IGHQ: Circumstances Surrounding the Outbreak of Greater East Asian War (4). (1974)
71 Conduct of Navy Operations by Imperial HQ and Combined Fleet HQ (5): Middle Part of Third Phase
Operation. (1974)
72 Naval Operations in China Area (1): Before April 1938. (1974)
73 Kwantung Army (2): Prewar Preparation Against USSR and Defense at End of War. (1974)
74 Offensive Operations of Army Air Force in China. (1974)
75 Daihon’ei rikugunbu: Showa 19 nen 7 gatsu made (8): Imperial General HQ: to July 1944 (8). (1974)
76 Army Branch of IGHQ: Circumstances Surrounding the Outbreak of Greater East Asian War (5). (1974)
77 Conduct of Navy Operations by Imperial HQ and Combined Fleet HQ (3): Before February 1943. (1974)
78 Armament and Employment of Army Air Force (2): 1934 to Beginning of 1942. (1974)
79 Naval Operations in China Area (2): After 1938. (1975)
80 Conduct of Navy Operations by Imperial HQ and Combined Fleet HQ (2): Before June 1942, (1975)
81 Conduct of Army Operations by Imperial HQ (9): Before January 1945. (1975)
82 Conduct of Army Operations by Imperial Headquarters (10): Before August 1945. (1975)
83 Nantoo hoomen kaigun sakusen: Southeast Area Naval Operations Until Guadalcanal Evacuation. (1975)
84 Minami Taiheiyo rikugun sakusen: Aitape-Puriaka-Rabaaru (5): Army Operations in the South Pacific:
Aitape-Empress Augusta Bay-Rabaul (5). (1973)
85 Hondo homen kaigun sakusen: Homeland Area Naval Operations. (1975)
86 Army Operations in the China Incident (1): Before January 1938. (1975)
87 Development, Production, and Supply of Army Aviation Weapons. (1975)
88 War Preparations of Imperial Navy (2): After Outbreak of Pacific War. (1975)
89 Army Operations in the China Incident (2): Before September 1939. (1976)
90 Army Operations in the China Incident (3): Before December 1941. (1975)
(Note: volume number in question).
91 Conduct of Navy Operations by Imperial HQ and Combined Fleet HQ (6): Final Part of Third Phase
Operation. (1975)
92 Army Operations in Southern Theater: Defense of Malaya and Dutch East Indies. (1976)
93 Conduct of Navy Operations by Imperial HQ and Combined Fleet HQ (7): Ending the Pacific War. (1976)
94 Armament and Employment of Army Air Force (3): 1942 Until the End of the War. (1974)
95 History of the Naval Aviation Corps. (1976)
96 Nanto homen kaigun sakusen (3): Gato Tesshu-Go: Southeastern Area Naval Operations (3): After
Withdrawal from Guadalcanal. (1976)
97 Construction and Use of Bases for the Army Air Force’s Operations. (1979)
98 Sensuikan shi: History of Submarines. (1979)
99 The Army’s Armaments and War Preparations. (1979)
100 Daihonei Kaigumbu: Daitoa Senso Kaisen Keii (1): Imperial General HQ, Naval Section: Circumstances of
the Outbreak of the Greater East Asian War (1). (1979)
101 Daihonei Kaigumbu: Daitoa Senso Kaisen Keii (2): Imperial General HQ, Naval Section: Circumstances of
the Outbreak of the Greater East Asian War (2). (1979)
102 A Chronological Table of the Army and Navy. (1979)

“History Program, Japanese Air Force”

World War II in the Pacific, An Encyclopedia, (2001), pp. 228-229.

History Program, Japanese Air Force

In 1955, the Japanese government established the Office of Military History (OMH) within
the Japanese Ministry of Defense, and systematically collected all official documents relating
to the Asia-Pacific war. It now possesses more than 83,000 documents relating to the army
and 33,000 documents relating the navy. By the early 1970s, the OMH had published 102
volumes of Senshi sosho (The Official Military History), of which fourteen volumes were
devoted to air force strategies and operations: volume 7, Military Air Force Operations in
Eastern New Guinea; volume 19, Japanese Mainland Antiaircraft Operations; volume 22,
Military Air Force Operations in Western New Guinea; volume 34, Military Air Force
Operations in Southern Strategy, volume 36, Military Air Force Operations in Okinawa,
Taiwan, and Iwo Jima; volume 48, Military Air Force Operations in the Philippines; volume
52, Armament and Management in the Military Air Force (part 1); volume 53, Military Air
Force Operations in Manchuria; volume 61, The Third Air Force Fleet Operations in Burma
and Dutch Indonesia; volume 78, Armament and Management in the Military Air Force (part
2); volume 87, Development, Production, & Supply of Military Air Force Weaponry; volume
94, Armament and Management in the Military Air Force (part 4); volume 95, General
History of Navy Air Force; and volume 97, Construction & Basic Resource Management of
the Military Air Force.
The volumes of Senshi sosho demonstrate that the weakness of Japan’s air force was one
of the decisive factors in the nation’s defeat. According to Senshi sosho, the Japanese air force
had several critical defects. First, the military established its air force on the assumption that it
would be used to fight against the Soviet Union in Manchuria. Because the Russian air force
would always be larger than the Japanese air force, the latter primarily prepared itself for air-
to-air battles. In October 1941, however, general headquarters decided to use the military air
force in Southeast Asia. The military air force did not have enough time to adjust itself to the
rapid strategic changes. The primary aim of the new southern strategy was to assault the
Philippines and Malaya (now Malaysia) simultaneously; to destroy the main bases of the
United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands; and to occupy strategically important areas.
Under such an ambitious plan, the air force had to cover a large area, which necessitated an
extremely long supply line.
Second, Japan’s relatively lower productivity, outdated technology, shortage of natural
resources, and lack of manpower were responsible for the weakness of the Japanese air force.
The Allied powers, using more efficient construction machinery, for example, were able to
build an air base in a week or so, whereas Japan, depending primarily on manpower, needed
several months to do the same job. Japanese air force radar, communication systems, and
weaponry were quite inferior to those of the Allies. The use of kamikaze suicide squads was a
result of Japan’s desperate need to conserve fuel and weapons. Neither the military nor the
navy provided air force personnel with appropriate training based on any kind of long-term,
systematic program.
Third, even though both the military and the navy recognized the importance of the air
force, they paid only secondary attention to the need to strengthen it. The military considered
its ground force strategy to be the main thrust of its operations, and the navy believed that a
frontal assault using battleships was its primary focus. Since the 1920s, there had been some
in the military who had called for Japan to have an independent air force. In December 1938,
the military established the Military Air Force Bureau and appointed Lieutenant General Tojo
Hideki, War Department vice minister, as its head. Top members of the military, such as
Lieutenant General Yamashita Tomoyuki and General Kawabe Shozo, later became heads of
the Military Air Force Bureau, but the idea of establishing an independent air force and giving
it top priority made no headway at general headquarters, where the prevailing thought was
still firmly rooted in traditional strategy.
Fourth, general headquarters could not coordinate the operations of the military and the
navy air forces. Since one of the key factors in securing victory in the Asia-Pacific war was a
successful military-navy-air force joint operation to acquire air bases in the Pacific region,
this lack of coordination eventually proved fatal for Japan.
The volumes of Senshi sosho repeatedly insist that general headquarters failed to
understand the critical importance of the air force in the Asia-Pacific war. They suggest that
successful air force operations would have required greater productive power; better
coordination among the military, the navy, and the air force; a smoother flow of natural
resources; more advanced technology; and a more appropriate level of manpower. As it was,
the great success of the Japanese air force in the opening weeks of the Pacific war blinded that
service to the imperative need for modernization and doomed it to defeat. Individual weapons,
such as the Zero fighter, were fully the equal, and more, of anything in the Allied air arsenal,
but by 1943 even this splendid warplane was outclassed by U.S. fighters. The interservice
rivalries that afflicted the Japanese army and navy also crippled the Japanese air force.
Yone Sugita