Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Joshua Gans
Suppose that consumer utility for a particular item, i, (say, light bulbs) is given by:
u(q) − ci q − pi q where q is the amount purchased, pi is the purchase price per unit and ci
is the energy cost per unit paid for by the consumer. u(.) is assumed to be concave,
increasing and differentiable in q. (Unconstrained)1 consumer demand is then described
by a demand function, D( pi + ci ) ≡ arg max q u(q) − ci q − pi q . Note that D(.) is decreasing
in pi + ci . Let V ( pi , ci ) ≡ max q u(q) − ci q − pi q .
Suppose there are two items available. Item O is competitively supplied at a price of pO
with an energy cost of cO . Item N is supplied by a monopolist and has an energy cost of
cN < cO but otherwise costs the monopolist nothing to produce. Let pN be the price that
satisfies: V ( pN + cN ) = V ( pO + cO ) . If the solution to the monopolist’s problem --
max pN pN D( pN + cN ) -- is above pN then the monopolist sets pN = pN . Otherwise, the
monopolist sets a price such that the price elasticity of demand is equal to -1; i.e.,
p N D ′ ( p N + cN )
D( pN + cN ) = −1 . Notice that the
Question 2: Can an energy tax (t per unit of energy consumed) ensure that this does not
occur? The first thing to note is that pN is independent of the tax rate but pN chosen by
the monopolist is decreasing in t. Thus, a tax is more likely to generate the unconstrained
pricing case. Nonetheless, the tax can be adjusted to ensure that the unconstrained case
never arises (this might occur naturally if emissions were capped and so t adjusted to
ensure that emissions did not rise).
Question 3: Can putting in an energy tax encourage innovation in more efficient lighting?
It is easy to see that the monopolist’s profits are decreasing in t. Thus, the tax will not
encourage innovation in more efficient lighting.
1
That is, if there is only one item in existence.