Barlin v Ramirez by Diana RELATION: Read in relation to Art. 44 .
which
Nov 24, 1906; P: Willard
FACTS:
1839: Priests of the Roman Catholic Church
resided in
Lagonoy
1869: Church and convent were burned
1870-1873: The said establishments were rebuilt
by
people of the pueblo
1901: Ramirez took possession of the church and
administered as its parish priest
1902: A new successor was appointed to replace
Ramirez but he refused to hand over the
church,
convent and cemetery; and other religious
items of the church
~He contended that he, together with the
people of the pueblo has chosen to severe ties
with the Pope at Rome and his representatives
1904: Barlin filed a case against Ramirez,
contending
that the Roman Catholic Church is the
rightful
owner of the said properties and items;
and that it should be restored to them.
*Lower Court- Ruled in favour of Barlin
** Ramirez brought the case to SC by bill of
exceptions
ISSUE: Does the Roman Catholic Church
have a juridical personality in the Philippine
Islands?
HELD: Yes.
- The Roman Catholic Church is recognized
as a juridical person in the Philippines. The
court mentioned Montero Rios’ statement
that the church has “gradually entered
upon the exercise of such rights as were
required for the acquisition, preservation,
and transmission of property the same as
any other juridical entity under the law of
the Empire” since the year 313 when
Constantine inaugurated an era of
protection for the church by the edict of
Milan.
- As a juridical entity, the properties of the
Roman Catholic Church are also under the
protection of the Constitution. They have
the same rights as individuals to own over
properties in the Philippine Islands.
Because of this distinct personality under
our laws, Ramirez et al have no right to
claim these as theirs.
DECISION: Judgment Affirmed.
states that:
The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities
for public interest or purpose, created by
law; their personality begins as soon as
they have been constituted according to
law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations
for
private interest or purpose to which
the law grants a juridical personality, separate
and distinct from that of each shareholder,
partner or member.
Camid v. Office of the President,
et,al.
(January 17,2005) by Bon
FACTS:
• This is a petition for Certiorari arguing the
existence of Municipality of Andong in
Lanao Del Sur
• This decision have noted the earlier
decision of Pelaez where the Executive
orders of Former President Macapagal
creating 33 Municipalities of Lanao Del Sur
was considerd null and void due to undue
delegation of legislative powers.
• Among the annulled executive orders is
EO107 creating Andong.
• The petitioner herein represents himself
as resident of Andong (as a private citizen
and taxpayer)
• Camid contends/argues the following:
o Municipality of Andong evolved into
a full blown municipality (since
there is a complete set of officials
appointed to handle essential tasks
and sevices, it has ist own high
school, Bureau of Post, DECS office
etc. and 17 baranggays with
chairman)
o He noted agencies and private
grous recognizing Andong and also
the CENRO and DENR Certification
of land area and population of
Andong
• In the Certification of DILG, there is an
enumeration of existing municipalties
 including 18 0f the 33 Municipalities regarding municipalities created by
invalidated in Pelaez Case. Camid finds executive orders. It says:
this as an abuse of discretion and unequal
treatment for Andong.  Municipalities existing as of
the date of the effectivity of
• Likewise, Camid insists the continuing of this Code shall continue to
EO107 arguing that in Municipality of San exist and operate as such.
Narciso v. Hon.Mendez, the court affirmed Existing municipal districts
in making San Andres a de facto municipal organized pursuant to
corporation. San Andres was created presidential issuances or
through an executive order. executive orders and which
have their respective set
• Thus this petition. of elective municipal
officials holding office at
ISSUE/S AND RULING: the time of the
effectivity of this Code
May the Municipality of Andong be shall henceforth be
recognized as a de facto municipal considered as regular
corporation? NO municipalities.
- Municipal corporations may exist by o The failure to appropriate funds for
prescription where it is shown that the
Andong and the absence of
community has claimed and exercised
elections in the municipality are
corporate functions, with the knowledge
eloquent indicia (indicators) that
and acquiescence of the legislature, and
the State does not recognize the
without interruption or objection for period
existence of the municipality.
long enough to afford title by prescription.
o The Ordinance appended in the
- Camid does not have shown factual
1987 Constitution (which
demonstration of the continuous exercise
apportioned seats for the House of
by the municipal corporation of its
Reps to the different legislative
corporation of its corporate powers as well
districts in the Philippines,
as acquiescence by the other
enumerates the various
instrumentalities of the state like charters
municipalities encompassed in the
or the legislature’s action.
various districts) did not include
May the any action on the Certification be Andong.
an appropriate solution to Camid’s prayer?
Is there an unequal treatment since 18 of the 33
- NO. The Certification has no power or it invalidated municipalities are now considered
does not bear any authority to create or existing?
revalidate a municipality.
- No there was none. The DILG Certification
Should the case of Andong be treated same and the Ordinance in the 1987
as the case of San Andres? Constitution validates them. The fact that
there existing organic statutes passed by
- No. for the following reasons: the legislation recreating these
municipalities is enough to accord a
o There are facts found in the San different treatment as that of the
Andres case that are not present in municipality of Andong.
the case at bar: (1) The Executive
SC DECISION: DISMISSED for lack of Merit.
Order creating San Andres was not
invalidated in Pelaez Case, (2) The RELEVANCE:
municipality existed for 30 years
before it was questioned and (3) Note the following Sections with regards to
The municipality was classified as a juridical personality of corporations in relation to
fifth class municipality and was the reasons why San Andres have a different
included in the legislative district in treatment with Andong:
the House of Representatives
apportionment. Batas Pambansa Blg. 8:
o Andong did not meet the requisites
set by LGC of 1991 Sec.442(d)
 Section 2. Corporation defined. - A
corporation is an artificial being created by
operation of law, having the right of
succession and the powers, attributes and
properties expressly authorized by law or
incident to its existence
Section 4. Corporations created by special
laws or charters. - Corporations created by
special laws or charters shall be governed
primarily by the provisions of the special law
or charter creating them or applicable to
them, supplemented by the provisions of this
Code, insofar as they are applicable.
Moreover, under Art.44 of the New Civil Code with
relation to Art. 45 of the New Civil Code, those
considered as juridical person includes the State
and its political subdivisions and Other
corporations, institutions and entities for public
interest or purpose, created by law; their
personality begins as soon as they have been
constituted according to law. These two are
governed by the law creating them.
Since Andong has no law recreating it and
that it is not a recognized political subdivision,
it is not also considered a juridical person.
Note:
What happened with the people from Andong?
- The constituent barrios of the voided town
returns to its original municipalities
(Lumbatan, Tubig and Tubaran) which are
recognized and still existing.
The solution to have Andong recognized is
through legislation and not judicial confirmation
of void title.
CATALAN VS BASA by bel
FACTS:
• Feliciano Catalan was discharged from
active military service because he was
unfit to render military service.
• This was due to the fact that he was
suffering from Schizophrenia
• On Sept. 28, 1949, he married Corazon
Cerezo
• On June 16, 1951, Feliciano allegedly
donated to his sister Mercedes Catalan
one-half of his real property. The
remaining half of the property remained
under Feliciano’s Name.
• The People’s Bank and Trust Company
(Presently known as BPI) was appointed
as the guardian of Feliciano due to his
incompetency
• On November 22, 1978. Feliciano and
Corazon donated Lots 1 and 3 of their
property to their son Eulogio Catalan.
• On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the
property in issue in favor of her children
Delia and Jesus Basa.
• On June 24, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon
donated Lot 2 to their children Alex an,
Librada and Zenaida Catalan and Feb. 14,
1983, they also donated Lot 4 to Eulogio
and Florida Catalan.
• BPI filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of
Documents, Recovery of Possession and
Ownership, as well as damages against
the respondents.
• BPO contends that Feliciano wasn’t in the
sound mind upon giving consent on the
donation given to Mercedes and therefore
it should be nullified.
• They also contend that Mercedes had no
right to sell the property to anyone.
• The petition of BPI was dismissed by the
trial court and the Court of Appeals
ISSUE:
• Is the donation made by Feliciano in
favor of Mercedes valid?
RULING:
• SC affirmed the ruling of the appellate
court
• What is crucial in a donation is the donor’s
capacity to give consent at the time of the
donation.
 • The evidence presented by the petitioners
was not sufficient to prove that Feliciano
was incompetent when he made the
donation
• A person suffering from Schizophrenia
does not necessarily lose his competence
to intelligibly dispose his property.
• The proof of Feliciano’s infirmity to give
consent was only established when the
Court of First Instance declared him an
incompetent on December 22, 1953. This
was years after he made the donation.
THE PETITION WAS DENIED
***PERSONS:
CIVIL PERSONALITY:
• Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the
fitness to be the subject of legal relations,
is inherent in every natural person and is
lost only through death. Capacity to act,
which is the power to do acts with legal
effect, is acquired and may be lost. (n)
• Art. 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the
state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and
civil interdiction are mere restrictions on
capacity to act, and do not exempt the
incapacitated person from certain
obligations, as when the latter arise from
his acts or from property relations, such as
easements. (32a)
• Art. 39. The following circumstances,
among others, modify or limit capacity to
act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of
being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality,
family relations, alienage, absence,
insolvency and trusteeship. The
consequences of these circumstances are
governed in this Code, other codes, the
Rules of Court, and in special laws.
Capacity to act is not limited on account of
religious belief or political opinion.
A married woman, twenty-one years of
age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil
life, except in cases specified by law. (n)
DOMINGO MERCADO and JOSEFA MERCADO
vs. JOSE ESPIRITU, administrator of the
estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu
(December 1, 1917)--NILO
FACTS:
1. In 1891 Lucas Espiritu obtained title by
composition with the State, to three
parcels of land, upon Lucas Espiritu's
death, his said lands passed by
inheritance to his four children who
include allotment to Luis and Margarita, in
equal shares.
2. Margarita Espiritu, married to Wenceslao
Mercado had by this husband five
children: Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz,
Domingo, Josefa, and Amalia (petitioners),
at the death of their mother in 1896 they
inherited one-half of the land inherited by
Margarita from her father.
3. On May 25, 1894, the plaintiffs' mother
conveyed by actual and absolute sale for
the sum of P2,000, to her brother Luis
Espiritu a portion of the land now on
litigation.
4. The original notorial document was in
possession of Luis but was loss on account
of the revolution and registers of public
documents of the Province of Bulacan
were burned.
5. On May 14, 1901, Wenceslao Mercado
pledged or mortgaged to Luis Espiritu for
P375 in exchange of the remaining part, or
an area of the land that belonged to his
deceased wife, in order to obtain funds "to
cover his children's needs."
6. In May 20, 1901, Wenceslao Mercado,
executed to the interested party Luis
Espiritu, the notarial instrument in his own
name and those of his minor children as a
proof that it was true that the sale of said
portion of land had been made by his wife
to Luis Espiritu in 1894.
7. On May 17, 1910, the plaintiffs Domingo
and Josefa Mercado, together with their
sisters Consejo and Paz, declared
themselves to be of legal age and in
possession of the required legal status
certified before a notary the sale of the
land by their deceased mother for the sum
of P2,600 and their father sold absolutely
to Luis Espiritu the land for the sum of
P400 "as an increase" of the previous
purchase price.
8. Petitioners now asked to declare the sale
of land null and void after they have
reached the legal age because Luis
Espiritu, by means of cajolery, induced,
and fraudulently succeeded in getting the
plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa Mercado
who were minors durig that time to sign a
deed of sale of the land left by their
mother, for the sum of P400.
ISSUE: Whether it is true that the plaintiffs
were then minors and therefore incapable
of selling their property to Luis Espiritu on
May 17, 1910? And if a person who is a
minor after reaching legal age can after the
execution of the deed ask for the
annulment of the instrument executed by
him, because of some defect that
invalidates the contract so that he can
obtain the sold land?
RULING: No, petitioners were not minors
because of lack of evidence, and the sale of real
estate by minors pretending to be of legal age is
valid because they will not be permitted to
excuse themselves of their obligations on account
of minority.
a. The sale of land by mother of the
petitioner was valid and the remaining
parcel of land sold to Luis by their father is
absolute sale since Luis has paid
Wenceslao P400 as an “increase” to the
remaining portions of land that was not
sold by the plaintiff’s mother.
b. The document executed on May 17, is
virtually an acknowledgment of the
contract of sale of the parcel or portion of
land. So, Luis Espiritu was, during his
lifetime, and now, after his death, his
testate or intestate estate is in lawful
possession of the parcel of land.
c. The trial does not show, that the
purchaser Luis Espiritu employed fraud,
deceit, violence, or intimidation, in order
to effect the sale executed on May 17,
1910. Thus, the plaintiff certified the sale
of land by their mother and increase of the
sale by their father to Luis Espiritu.
d. The plaintiffs have absolutely no right
whatever to recover said first parcel of
land, as its ownership was conveyed to
the purchaser by means of a singular title
of purchase and sale.
e. The principal defect that the petitioners
hold is that when they signed the
document, they were minors or has not
attained the required age of 21 but no
evidence appears in the record that the
plaintiffs Josefa and Domingo Mercado
were in fact minors, for no certified copies
were presented of their baptismal
certificates, nor did the plaintiffs adduce
any supplemental evidence whatever to
prove that Domingo was actually 19 and
Josefa 18 years of age when they signed
the document on May 17, 1910 and
testimonies of their sisters or brothers
does not constitute sufficient proof of the
dates of births of the said Domingo and
Josefa.
f. The plaintiffs who claim be minors when
they executed the notarial instrument on
May 17, 1910, have suffered positive and
actual losses and damages in their rights
and interests as a result of the execution
of said document because the sale was
effected by their mother and father to Luis
Espiritu which received the exact price of
land.
HELD: Petition denied.
PERSONS RELATION: The courts in its decision
have laid down the rule that the sale of real
estate, made by minors who pretend to be of
legal age, when in fact they are not, is valid, and
they will not be permitted to excuse themselves
from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted
by them, or to have them annulled.
BAMBALAN vs MARAMBA by JAYE
January 30, 1928
FACTS:
1. Bambalan’s parents Paula Prado &
Isidro Bambalan Y Calcotura received
a loan from Genoveva Muerong &
German Maramba.
2. The Father Isidro died, leaving the
young Bambalan, who’s minor, as the
sole heir on his whole estate.
3. Later on, Muerong and Maramba
forced Bambalan, to sell their land as
payment for the loan.
4. Bambalan signed, but said that he was
forced because they were threatening
his mother with imprisonment.
5. Muerong and Maramba bought
Bambalan’s first cedula to
acknowledge the document.
ISSUE:
Weather or not the sale made by
force, by Bambalan was validly executed.
SC DECISION:
NO. The sale made was NOT VALID
and THE CONTRACT is VOID, because:
1. The vendor was a minor.
2. His age was well known to the
purchaser. (Maramba bought plaintiff’s
cedula)
 3. Mercado vs Espiritu CANNOT be
applied: Plaintiff did not pretend to be of age
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS /
CIVIL CODE CONNECTION:
ART 38- MINORITY: VOID IN CONTRACTS
A person below the age of majority
has limited capacity to act. THE
UNEMANCIPATED MINOR CANNOT ENTER
INTO CONTRACTS.
SIA SUAN AND GAW CHIAO VS. RAMON
ALCANTARA by Martin
PARAS; MARCH 4, 1950
FACTS:
• Rufino Alcantara and sons (including
respondent Ramon) executed a deed of
sale dated August 3, 1931, conveying five
parcels of land to petitioner Sia Suan
• A few days later (within the month after
the sale of the parcels of land), Ramon’s
counsel wrote to Suan’s husband, Gaw
Chiao, disavowing the contract on the
ground that Ramon was a minor when the
signing took place
• After Gaw Chiao responded to the letter,
Ramon went to the office of Gaw Chiao’s
counsel to ratify the sale
• After ratification, Ramon received Php
500.00 from Gaw Chiao, as payment for
the sold parcels of land
• Meanwhile, Sia Suan sold the parcels of
land to Nicolas Azores; his son Antonio
inherited it
• NINE YEARS LATER, Ramon filed a case at
the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
praying that the deed of sale may be
annulled on the ground of his minority at
the time of its sale to Sia Suan and Gaw
Chiao; action was denied and Sia Suan,
Gaw Chiao, Ramon’s father and brother,
Nicolas and Antonio Azores were absolved
• Ramon brought case to the Court of
Appeals; CFI Decision reversed
o Deed of sale not binding against
Ramon due to his minority at the
time of the sale
o His counsel’s letter to Gaw Chiao is
an indication that the sale was not
affirmed; Ramon was thus shielded
from laches and estoppel
o Sia Suan and Gao Chiao was
negligent in protecting their
interests to the property since they
did nothing when they were
informed of Ramon’s minority
o Delay in filing action for annulment
filed by Ramon does not bar the
said action to prosper; may be
barred only when the time period
of filing prescribed by law has
expired
o CA refuses to use the doctrine in
Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu:
 Sale of real estate done by
minors is VALID
 Minors are NOT EXEMPT
from fulfilling the
obligations in the contract
 Minors are NOT ALLOWED to
annul the contract by
invoking that he/she was a
minor at the time of the
signing
o The only protection utilized by Sia
Suan and Gaw Chiao here is the
ratification done by Ramon
o The letter of Ramon’s counsel duly
informed them of his minority
• Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao files petition for
certiorari to the Supreme Court
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not Ramon Alcantara’s
execution of the deed of sale is valid,
despite being a minor at the time of its
execution
• Whether or not Ramon is bound by the
deed of sale, despite his minority at the
time of its execution
• Whether or not Ramon is allowed to annul
the deed of sale
HELD/RULING:
RELATED PROVISIONS:
Art. 1327, NCC: The following cannot give
consent to a contract:
Unemancipated minors;
Art. 1390, NCC: The following contracts are
voidable or annullable, even though there may
have been no damage to the contracting parties:
Those where one of the parties is incapable of
giving consent to a contract;
xxx
These contracts are binding, unless they are
annulled by a proper action in court. They are
susceptible of ratification.
Art. 1403, NCC: The following contracts are
unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
xxx
(3) Those where both parties are incapable of
giving consent to a contract.
Art. 1399, NCC: When the defect of the contract
consists in the incapacity of one of the parties,
the incapacitated person is not obliged to make
any restitution except insofar as he has been
benefited by the thing or price received by him.
• Ramon may not be allowed to execute
deed of sale, but due to his act of
ratification, the contract was given its
binding effect
• The deed of sale is binding on Ramon,
because he ratified it
• Ramon is not allowed to annul such deed,
because he already ratified it
• Mercado doctrine is applicable in this case
• Ramon may have executed his acts in bad
faith; he earned money from Gaw Chiao as
a result of the sale and its ratification, yet
he summons the courts to annul the sale
because he executed it while still a minor
• “…previous misinterpretation has already
estopped him from disavowing the
contract”
• The Court of Appeals said that Ramon may
not be stopped because of the letter, yet
the Supreme Court holds that he is
already stopped by his misrepresentation
in the deed of sale, due to his minority
• The Supreme Court is of the opinion that
Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao is hereby
absolved, without incurring any costs on
their part
Court of Appeals Decision REVERSED. Costs
AGAINST Ramon Alcantara.
Braganza vs Abrille - mickey
Facts:
• During the Japanese occupation of the
Philippines, Mrs. Braganza and her 2 sons
loaned 70,000 in war notes with a promise
in writing to pay 10,000 in legal currency
when the hostilities end and the Int’l
exchange re-established, including a 2%
per annum.
• They were sued on later for non-payment.
• In their defense they claimed to have
received only 40,000 and alleged that the
two sons were minor aged 16 and 18.
• CA ruled that the mother and her two sons
are all liable because they did not allege
their minority to their creditor. Since they
pretended to be of legal age they could
not excuse themselves from the fulfillment
of their obligation.
Issue: Are the two sons liable to their share
of the debt?
Held: Yes. Their non-disclosure of minority does
not mean that they will not be permitted to assert
it.
Ruling:
• The fraud as to pretending to be of legal
age must be actual and not constructive
• The Mercado ruling used by the
respondent/creditor is different beause the
minor was guilty of active
misrepresentation while there is none in
this case.
• Thus being minors they could not be
legally bound
• OBITER: Respondents argument that it
was too late to invoke age of majority
because it has been 4 years since they
have reached majority as provided for by
Art. 1301 of the Civil code: an action to
annul a contract by reason of minority
must be filed within 4 years after reaching
age of majority. But based upon the
record of birth of Rodolfo the four years
have not elapsed. But this could not
applied since the minors are not asking for
positive relief or annulment but an excuse
from liability.
• But according t Art. 1340 they could not
be entirely absolved as they should make
restitution to the amount they have
benefitted which was used for their
support during the Japanese occupation.
• The value of the money they 2/3 of
70,000, which is 46,666.66 divided by 40,
which is the value of the Japanese notes at
40:1 to the peso. Equivalent to P1,166.67
plus 6% interest beginning when the
complaint was filed. But they could not be
held liable to the Php10,000 as they are
minors incapable of binding themselves.
U.S. v. Vaquilar SHAR
March 13, 1914 • Accused Policarpio Rafanan and his
family lives with his mother
FACTS • On march 16 1976 in the evening , after
dinner, Estelita was sent to help the
• Convicted of 2 counts of parricide (killed accused in the store
wife and daughter). • At 11pm, the accused called Estelita to
help him close the door of the store and
• Sentenced to life imprisonment + he suddenly pulled her inside and said “
come, let us have sexual intercourse” in
damages + accessory penalties/case.
which Estelita said she don’t like.
• Despite the struggle of Estelita, Policarpio
• He also wounded other people with a bolo.
was able to rape her and told her not to
tell anyone or else he would kill her.
Witness Testimony
• But somehow , the family of the accused
Martin “According to my own eyes as he
was able to find out which made Estelita
Agustin looked at me he was crazy because
leave the house
(Nephew) if he was not crazy he would not
have killed his family – his wife an • Estelita was crying on her home and told
child” her mother about what happened
Diego “He looked like a madman; crazy • During trial, the accused pleaded not
Agustin because he woul cut everybody at guilty but in the end he was convicted.
(Nephew) random w/o paying attention to • He then appeal to the court.
who it was”
Alejandra “He must have been crazy because Issue:
Vaquilar he cut me” Whether or not the accused was
(Sister) insane during the commission of the crime?
Estanislao “Every other night he, the
Canaria appellant, cries aloud saying, ”what Held:
(Prison kind of people are you to me, what Schizophrenia is not an exempting
mate) are you doing to me, you are beast circumstance. If there was impairment of the
”” mental faculties , such impairments was not so
Health Did not see if the defendant was complete as to deprive the accused of
Officer mentally deranged or not intelligence or the consciousness of his acts.
The testimonies negates complete
destruction of intelligence at the time of the
commission of the crime. The fact that the
ISSUE: WON the Vaquilar is insane?
appellant threatened Estelita with death reveals
to the court that the accused was aware of his
HELD: No, being insane and frenzy of anger are
act.
different. The law presumes every man to be sane . A
person accused of a crime has the burden of
• Crazy and insane are different. proving his affirmative allegation of insanity and
the accused was not able to prove it.
• The testimonies of Martin, Diego, Although it is not a exempting
Alegandra are the typical definitions of circumstance under art 12 of RPC, it is a
crazy which are acts that a person would mitigating circumstances under the art 13 of RPC.
not usually do. They use the word “crazy”
as an “unusual” act of the defendant. Minor issue: WON the court was wrong in basing
its decision solely on the testimony of the
complainant and the mother.
• The testimony of Estanislao, the defendant
Held: The inconsistent statement made by the
saying those things an acting like that is complainant were made clarifired by her cross-
normal for showing remorse. examination. In any cases, the inconsistencies
related to minor and inconsequential details
which do not touch upon the manner in which the
crime had been committed and therefore did not
People vs Rafanan by mike in any way impair the credibility of the
complainant.
• Estelita Ronaya was only 14 yrs old and
was hired as a housekeeper by the Persons relation:
mother of the accused Article 12 of the revised penal code
Standard Oil by diana
Hernandez v. San Juan-Santos
August 07, 2009
(Bon)
Facts:
1. Maria Lourdez San Juan (Lulu) is the
daughter of Felix Hernandez and Maria
San Juan Hernandez.
2. Maria died due to birth. Felix left Lulu to
his maternal uncle Sotero San Juan.
3. Felix then married again to Natividad Cruz
where he had three children (the
petitioners): Cecilio, Ma.Victoria and
Teresa. LuluLulu on the otherhand
inherited valuable real properties from the
San Juan family.
4. Later (1957), Lulu went to live with her
father and the children. Lulu did not finish
schooling due to her violent personality.
5. When she reached the majority age, Lulu
had the full control of her properties.
However, due to not having formal
education, Felix took control of it until his
death where the petitioners took over.
6. During the time of Felix control of the
property, he was engaged in various
projects involving Lulu’s properties : e.g.
the Marilou Subdivision. The other children
were also involved like Ma.Victori fooling
Lulu an making her sign for the selling of
her property, Cecilio leasing her property.
7. When she learned the dissipation of her
properties, Lulu sought assistance to
Jovita her cousin.
8. Lulu was overweight, unkempt and
smelled of urine since she was just in
basement occupying small room and she
doesn’t even have proper toilet resulting
to several ailments she
acquired.Respondent demanded for the
account f Lulu’s property but it was
ignored.
9. Respondent filed a petition
guardianship. The following are
contentions:
10. Petitioners (siblings):
• Lulu was literate enough to know
consequences of what she is
signing.
• Issue of Lulu’s competency was
settled when court ordered her
legal guardian to deliver to her the
properties for her to manage.
11. Respondents say that Lulu is incompetent
because of her weak mind. This was
backed up by medical specialist opining
that Lulu has a below average intelligence
and fragile mental state aside from
suffering diabetes and obesity.
12. RTC granted the petition. This was also
affirmed by CA.
13. Lulu after moving to Marikina was
abducted by the siblings. Thus respondent
petition for habeas corpus which was
granted by CA ruling that Jovita should be
her legal guardian.
14. Thus this petition for review assailing the
CA decision.
Issue/s and Ruling:
Is Lulu considered incompetent requiring a
judicial guardian over her person and property?
YES.
- Sec.50 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
(SCRA copy was wrong, it’s not RULE 103)
Opinion of ordinary witnesses.
—The opinion of a witness for
which proper basis is given,
may be received in evidence
regarding—
(a) The identity of a
person about whom he has
adequate knowledge;
(b) A handwriting with
which he has sufficient
familiarity; and
(c) The mental sanity of
a person with whom he is
sufficiently acquainted.
The witness may also testify on
for
his impressions of the motion,
the
behavior, condition or
appearance of a person.(44a)
 - Thus, the contention of petitioners that
attending physician’s opinion should not
be weighted since they are not psychiatry
specialist. These physicians were able to
talk to Lulu and thus observe her
behavior. Their opinions are admissible
evidence.
- Where sanity of person is at issue, expert
opinion is not necessary. The observation
of the trial judge coupled with evidence
would suffice.
- Sec. 2, Rule 92 explains why Lulu is in
need of guardianship or explains that Lulu
is qualified for guardianship due to
Incompetency.
Meaning of word "incompetent."—Under
this rule, the word "incompetent" includes
persons suffering the penalty of civil
interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers,
prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable
to read and write, those who are of
unsound mind, even though they have
lucid intervals, and persons not being
of unsound mind, but by reason of
age, disease, weak mind, and other
similar causes, cannot, without
outside aid, take care of themselves
and manage their property, becoming
thereby an easy prey for deceit and
exploitation.
- Appointment of Jovita as guardian was
proper adopting the facts presented in the
RTC and CA. Thus the writ of habeas
corpus was also valid.
Decision: DENIED. The petitioners were ordered
to produce an account of Lulu’s properties
dissipated unlawfully appropriated.
Relevance:
• Incompetence is defined in Rule 92
Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court.
• Insanity/Incompetence is ground for
guardianship.
• Incompetence/ Insanity is among the
restriction to the capacity to act of a
person. Insane person or incompetent
person has no civil capacity and the
answer to not having one is the
provision or appointment of a
guardian. The appointment is
governed by Rules of Court.
• Guardianship entails taking care of
both person and property of the
individual being guided.
CORDORA VS COMELEC by BEL
FACTS:
• Cordora accused Tambunting of an
election offense for violating Sec 74 in
relation to Sec 262 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
• He accuses Tambunting of making false
assertion regarding his citizenship and
residency as part of the requirements for
candidacy on during elections.
Petitioner’s Arguments:
o There’s a certification from the Bureau of
Immigration stating that, in two instances,
private respondent claimed that he is an
American.
o Travel dates confirmed that Tambunting
acquired American citizenship through
naturalization in Honolulu
Private Respondent’s Arguments:
o Presented a copy of his birth certificate
which shows he was born of a Filipino
mother and an American Father.
o His father’s petition through INS Form I-
130 merely confirmed his citizenship
which he acquired at birth. That wasn’t a
process of naturalization
o He took an oath of allegiance on pursuant
to Republic Act No. 9225
o He resided in the Philippines since birth,
imbibed the Filipino Culture, spoken the
language and has been educated in
Filipino Schools
o Residency requirement not the same as
citizenship
• COMELEC dismissed the case because
Cordora failed to support his accusation
against Tambutning.
ISSUE:
 • Was there an error in the COMELEC’s
decision?
RULING:
• NO –There’s no probable cause to prove
that Tambunting committed a violation of
Sec 74 in relation to Sec 262 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
• citizenship who seeks public office
• Tambunting has dual citizenship.
 His trips showed that he is both
American and Filipino.
 (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is
possible for the following classes of
citizens of the Philippines to
possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers
and/or mothers in foreign
countries which
(2) Those born in the Philippines of
Filipino mothers and alien fathers if
by the laws of their fathers’ country
such children are citizens of that
country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by
the laws of the latter’s country the
former are considered citizens,
unless by their act or omission they
are deemed to have renounced
Philippine citizenship.
• Dual Citizenship is not a ground for
disqualification from running from
any elective local position.
 The case is in consonance with the
rulings in Mercado v Manzano,
Valles v COMELEC, and AASJS v
Datumanong.
• Dual Citizenship is different from
Dual Allegiance
 Dual citizenship is involuntary and
arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the
different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said
states.
 This means that a person who has
dual citizenship already acquired
both citizenships since birth. No act
done to acquire the citizenship
 Like any other natural-born Filipino,
it is enough for a person with dual
to file his certificate of candidacy
and swear to the oath of allegiance
contained therein.
 Dual allegiance is brought about
by the individual’s active
participation in the naturalization
process.
• Tambunting did not fail to meet the
residency requirement
 The residency requirement is not
dependent upon citizenship
CASE DISMISSED
PERSONS:
Art. 39. The following circumstances, among
others, modify or limit capacity to act: age,
insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-
mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations,
alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship.
The consequences of these circumstances are
governed in this Code, other codes, the Rules of
Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is not
limited on account of religious belief or political
opinion.
A married woman, twenty-one years of age or
over, is qualified for all acts of civil life, except in
cases specified by law.
ALIENAGE OR CITIZENSHIP – may affect the
right of persons in matters where the State may
validly discriminate between aliens and citizens
for reasons of public policy, without violating the
equal protection of the laws.
VILLANUEVA vs CA, CENTRAL BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ILDEFONSO C. ONG, and
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK
May 26, 1995 - niLo
FACTS:

1. The disputed lots were originally owned by
the spouses Celestino Villanueva and
Miguela Villanueva.
2. Miguela Villanueva executed deed of sale
of her lands in Muntinlupa to obtain loan
from PVB branch in Makati but she never
got the loan and learned that new titles
over her land were already issued in the
name of PVB.
3. The lots were about to be sold at auction
despite negotiations of Villanueva.
4. In October 1984, Ong offered to purchase
two pieces of Land that had been acquired
by PVB through foreclosure. He deposited
the sum of P10,000.00.
5. The PVB was placed under
receivership/insolvency pursuant to
Monetary Board (MB) Resolution No. 334
dated 3 April 1985 and later, under
liquidation pursuant to MB Resolution
No. 612 dated 7 June 1985.
6. In 23 November 1984, PVB approved
Ong’s offer subject offer under Board
Resolution and with the condition that
"The purchase price shall be P110,000.00
(Less deposit of P10,000.00) payable in
cash within fifteen (15) days from receipt
of approval of the offer." On 26 May 1987,
he paid the remaining balance of P100,
000.
7. Ong asked for the conveyance of the deed
of sale but PVB didn’t respond.
8. Villanueva and Ong filed a petition to the
trial court which allowed Villanueva to
purchase the lots only if only to restore
their status as conjugal properties. Ong
cannot allow to purchase the lot because
the 15 day period has already lapsed.
9. Ong moved the petition to Court of
Appeals where it declared that Ong's
failure to pay the balance within the
prescribed period was excusable because
the PVB neither notified him of the
approval of his bid nor answered his
letters manifesting his readiness to pay
the balance, for which reason he could not
have known when to reckon the 15-day
period prescribed under its resolution. It
went further to suggest that the Central
Bank was in estoppel because it accepted
Ong's late-payment of the balance.
10. Villanueva now filed petition for review.
11. PVB was no longer under receivership or
liquidation and that the PVB has been
back in operation since august 3, 1992.
ISSUE: Do petitioners (Villanueva) have a better
right than private respondent Ildefonso Ong to
purchase from the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB)
the two parcels of land situated at Muntinglupa,
Metro Manila?
RULING:
a. Villanueva has better right because under
Article 1323 of the Civil Code, an offer
becomes ineffective upon the death, civil
interdiction, insanity, or insolvency of
either party before acceptance is
conveyed. It states that:
[T]he contract is not perfected except by
the concurrence of two wills which exist and continue
until the moment that they occur. The contract is not
yet perfected at any time before acceptance is
conveyed; hence, the disappearance of either party
or his loss of capacity before perfection prevents the
contractual tie from being formed.
b. When the bank is insolvent, a receiver is
appointed. The assets of the bank is now
in control and possession of the receiver
whose duty it is to administer the assets
for the benefit of the creditors of the bank.
The appointment of a receiver operates to
suspend the authority of the bank and its
directors and officers over its property and
effects which restrain the bank officers
from intermeddling with the property of
the bank to any third party or in any way.
c. Applying Article 1323 of the Civil Code,
Ong’s offer for purchase of lots became
ineffective because the PVB became
insolvent. When PVB accepted his offer
and payment, the PVB was still under
liquidation which he didn’t know. The
contract of sale between PVB and Ong did
not reach the stage of perfection. Ong
cannot invoke the resolution of the bank
approving his bid as basis for his alleged
right to buy the disputed properties
originally belonging to Villanueva.
d. Respondent Philippine Veterans Bank is
further directed to return to private
respondent Ildefonso C. Ong the amount
of P100,000.00.
PERSONS RELATION: When a corporation/bank
is insolvent, it cannot operate its ordinary
business.
OSMENA VS. OSMENA AND HEIRS by Martin
CORONA; JANUARY 26, 2010
FACTS:
• This case involves the properties (an
ancestral home and two lots) included in
 the last will and testament of the
deceased Chiong Tan Sy
• Petitioner is the daughter of the deceased,
while respondents are the grandchildren
of the deceased
• The lots were placed under the name of
petitioner’s brother and respondents’
father Ignacio, since Chiong Tan Sy is a
foreign national and thus not allowed to
own any property in the Philippines; the
ownership of the ancestral home was
transferred to Ignacio from petitioner via a
deed of sale issued by the latter
• Court of Appeals gave credit to the deed
of sale for the ancestral home and held
that respondent heirs are the owners of
the two lots
• Petitioner contests the said ruling, saying
that the lots were part of the properties
she and her siblings received from their
deceased mother, hence affirming her
right to the lots
• Petitioner further contests the said ruling,
saying that the ownership of the ancestral
home was just transferred to her brother
under the “guise of a simulated contract”
so that her estranged husband may not be
able to place any claims on it; she justifies
co-ownership on the ground that Ignacio,
her brother, never made her pay any rent
during her stay in the house
ISSUE:
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred
in their decision
HELD/RULING:
• NO. The Court affirmed the Decision of
the Court of Appeals
• The deed of sale for the ancestral home,
dated April 26, 1982, is a legal and
binding document, it being notarized; such
is considered as a prima facie evidence of
the facts that transpired
• There is no evidence or testimony to
justify that such sale by the petitioner is
fictitious
• The lots are inherited by the respondents
from their father upon his death
* Wala naming provision na nakalagay sa
outline na related dito, parang
introductory case yata ito for Family
Relations.
ATIENZA v BRILLANTES JR. by JAYE
March 29,1995
FACTS:
1. This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for
gross Immorality & Appearance of
impropriety against Judge Francisco
Brillantes Jr., MTC, Branch 20-Manila.
2. Atienza has 2 children with Yolanda De
Castro, they live together in the house he
bought & stays in that house whenever
he’s in Manila.
3. In 1991 he saw Brillantes sleeping on his
bed. He asked the house boy and found
out that Brillantes has been cohabiting
with De Castro.
4. After that, Brillantes prevented Atienza
from visiting his children & even alienated
that affection of his children for him, also
he said that Brillantes caused his arrest
after a heated argument with De Castro in
her office.
ATIENZA’S CLAIMS---
Atienza claims that Brillantes is married to
Zenaida Ongkiko, with 5 children with her.
BRILLANTES’ CLAIMS---
- Brillantes on the other hand said
that Atienza was not married to De
Castro, he denied causing the
arrest of the complainant & also
denied being married to Zenaida
Ongkiko although he admitted to
have 5 children with her.
- Brillantes said that in 1965 he &
Ongkiko went thorugh a marriage
ceremony before the Nueva Ecija
town mayor but it was not a valid
marriage due to the lack of a
marriage license, upon the request
of Ongkiko’s parents they went
through another marriage, but yet
again, neither applied to a
marriage license.
- Ongkiko abandoned Brillantes 19
years ago leaving their children to
his custody.
- Brillantes married De Castro in civil
rights in California and he believed
in good faith that he was single
because his first marriage was
solemnized without a marriage
license, so to him he thought it was
void
- He claims that Art 40 of the family
code cannot be applied to him
because, his first marriage was
under the civil code & his second
was the one under the family code.
ISSUE:
 Is Judge Brillantes Correct in his
arguments?
SC DECISION:
NO. The arguments were not correct. The
court said:
1. Art 40 of the family code is
applicable to remarriages entered
into after the effectivity of the
family code regardless of the date
of the first marriage.
2. Brillantes cannot invoke good faith,
because he should have known
that he needed to secure a
marriage license because at the
time that he was married to
Ongkiko, twice, he was already a
lawyer. It clearly shows his neglect
and bad faith in not doing what
was supposed to be done.
3. It’s evident that Brillantes failed to
meet the standard of Moral fitness
for membership in the legal
profession. His immoral acts of
cohabiting with De Castro
happened when he was already in
the Judiciary.
4. In the code of judicial ethics, such
actions are clearly not permissible
7 falls under grossly immoral acts.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS / CIVIL CODE
CONNECTION:
EFFECT & RETROACTIVITY
Art 256 of the Family Code is given “retroactive
effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
civil code or other laws”
Art 40 of the family code is applicable to
remarriages entered into after the effectivity of
the family code regardless of the date of the first
marriage.
• Brillantes wasn’t able to show that there
would be impaired rights upon the
application of the Art 40 of the family code
so it should be applied to him.
Article of 40 is a rule of procedure, the fact
that procedural statutes may somehow affect the
litigant’s rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions.
The retroactive application of procedural laws
is not violative of any right of a person who may
feel that he is adversely affected because as a
general rule, NO VESTED RIGHT MAY ATTACH TO,
NOR ARISE FROM PROCEDURAL LAWS.
Bernabe v Alejo by mike
Facts:
• Fiscal Bernabe fathered a son with his
secretary and was named Adrian
• On Aug. 13 1993 Fiscal Bernabe died while
his wife died on dec 3 on the same year
leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving
heir
• On may 16 1994 , Carolina Alejo( mother
of Adrian) filed a case praying that Adrian
be declared an acknowledged illegitimate
son of the fiscal and such be given his
share in Fiscal’s estate.
• The Trial Court dismissed the petition
citing art 175 of the family code because
the deat of the father barred the action
• However the Court of Appeals ruled that
the boy should be recognize because his
rights are governed by article 285 of the
civil code
• Ernestina the appealed in this court
contending that the family code should be
given retroactive effect,since no vested
right would be impaired
Issue: WON Adrian right to file an action for
recognition had already vested prior to the
enactment of the family code.
Held: petition denied
• Yes, Article 285 of the CC is a substantive
law, as it gives Adrian a right to file his
petition for recognition within four years
from attaining majority age. Therefore ,
the family code cannot impair or take
Adrian’s right for recognition, because
that right had already vested prior to its
enactment.
• Vested rights- one which is absolute,
complete and unconditional, to the
exercise of which is immediate and
perfect in itself and not dependent upon a
contingency.
• It is not limited to natural child only. Thus
under the Civil Code,natural children have
superior successional rights over spurious
ones. However, in the Rovira case, they
treat them the same with respect to other
rights,including the right to recognition
granted by Art 285.
Persons relation:
Article 255 of the Family code: This Code shall
have retroactive effect insofar as is it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the civil code or other laws.

Estrada v Escritor by Diana
Aug 4, 2003; P: Puno
FACTS:
This case deals about the case of Soledad
Escritor, a court interpreter in Branch 253 of Las
Piñas RTC; and a member of Jehovah’s Witness
and the Watchtower and Bible Tract Society.
1981: Her husband started living with another
woman. So, she also started living with another
man, Quilapio, who is also separated from his
wife.
1991: She and her partner executed a
Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness, an accepted
practice under her religion for partners who are
legally incapacitated to marry. This is made in
order to make their relationship “valid” in the
eyes of God. This is considered valid throughout
the Jehovah’s Witness Congregations.
1998: Soledad’s husband died
1999: Soledad entered the judiciary
2000: Estrada, a complete stranger, wrote a
letter to Judge Caoibes of the said RTC branch to
investigate on Soledad’s act of living together
and having a child with a man who is not his
husband. He states that this is an immoral act
which tarnishes the image of the court.
ISSUE: Soledad got “married” to his partner
under the “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness”
of their religion.
(1) Is Soledad exempted from administrative
liability for having a live-in relationship
with a married man? Does religion exempt
her from this?
HELD: It all depends if it passes (1) the
Benevolent Neutrality Test and (2) the
Compelling State Interest Test.
RULING:
(1) Benevolent Neutrality Test:
a. Is her religious freedom burdened?
YES
- Her employment is now at stake
because of her relationship with
Quilapio.
b. Is she sincere in her religious
belief? YES
- The Declaration was acquired 10
years after living with Quilapio and
10 years before she entered the
judiciary.
- The Declaration was made in
order to make their “union”
“honorable before God and men”
- She is said to be a member of
good standing in the congregation
(2) Compelling State Interest Test:
-This test cannot be used yet since the
case is of first impression. The burden to prove
lies on the government to prove that there is
compelling state interest that would not allow
such religious exception.
- The Free Exercise Clause protects each
individual’s right to freedom of religion. Her rights
would be encroached if the state would just fire
her from her job just because what she did is only
acceptable under her religious belief; and not
similar with the majority.
DECISION: Case is Remanded to the Office of
Court Administrator. OSG is ordered to intervene
in the case.
Relation to Topic: Concept of Marriage
Family Code
Art.1- Marriage is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered into
in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation,
except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the
limits provided by this code (52a)
Art. 149. The family being the foundation of the
nation, is the basic social institution which public
policy* cherishes and protects. Consequently,
family relations are governed by law and no
custom, practice or agreement destructive of the
family shall be given effect.
~ The question lies on whether a live-in
relationship can be acceptable under the
Philippine laws. Under the civil code, this case
definitely does not fall under the term of
marriage. However, what if it acceptable under a
certain religious belief? Does it make things
different?
Update- 2006 Decision:
After the OSG took part in the case, the SC made
a voting decision of 9-5 in favor of Escritor.
They said that she could not be dismissed
from the government service for
“disgraceful and immoral conduct” on the
basis of a valid exercise of her freedom of
religion.
This has become a very controversial
decision because it meant that couples living
together without marrying are not immoral if
their religion allows it.
Goitia v. Campos Rueda
September 2, 1916
(Bon)
Facts:
• Parties are legally married in Manila and
immediately established their residence at
155 Calle San Marcelino.
• One month after Campos Rueda
(defendant/appellee) contracted marriage
with Goitia (plaintiff/appellant),
demanded her to perform unchaste and
lascivious acts on his genital organs. The
plaintiff reject the demand refusing to do
other acts aside from legal and valid
cohabitation.
• The defendant continuously made similar
lewd and indecorous demands to his wife
and with the wife’s refusal, she suffered
maltreatment both in words and deeds.
She was physically injured.
• Thus, Goitia resorted to leave their house
(conjugal abode) and take refuge to her
parent’s house.
• Goitia filed an action against his husband
demanding for support.
• It was urged in the first instance that the
defendant cannot be compelled to support
the plaintiff except in his own house,
unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree
granting her divorce or separation from
the defendant. (CFI ruled in favor of
Campos Rueda)
• Thus this appeal seeking the reversal of
the action of Court of First Instance.
Issue/s and Ruling:
May the husband relieve himself from the duty to
support his wife imposed by law on the ground
that they are not anymore living in same domicile
and that the wife herself was the one who
voluntarily left the conjugal abode?
NO.
• OLD Civil Code which is applicable in the
Philippines states that:
o Art. 149. The person obliged to
support may, at his option, satisfy
it, either by paying the pension
may be fixed or by receiving or
maintaining in his own home the
person having the right to do the
same.
o Art.152 gives the instances when
the obligation to give support shall
cease
o Note that the failure of the wife to
live with the husband is not one of
the grounds for termination of the
obligation to give support.
he
• Precedents show that the nature of duty of
affording mutual support is compatible
and enforceable in all situations. Such
obligation is only terminated upon a
decree of divorce.
o For divorce, the only ground is
adultery.
• The power to grant support in a separate
action is not dependent to the power to
 grant divorce. This can be reasoned by the
nature of marital obligation.
o Marriage creates obligation of the
husband to the wife.
o The obligation is founded on the
natural and legal duty of the
husband.
o The enforcement of the obligation
is a vital concern to the state itself.
o A judgment for separate
maintenance is a calling for
performance of duty made specific
by the mandate of the sovereign, it
is not a penalty nor a debt in the
strict legal sense.
• In the separate Concurring opinion of
Justice Moreland:
o It was his own wrongful act that
drove the wife out of their domicile.
o In the law, the wife still remains an
inmate of the conjugal domicile.
o He cannot take advantage of the
departure of the wife to abrogate
the law applicable on marital
relations and deny his duties as
stated in the law.
SC Decision: JUDGEMENT OF THE FIRST
INSTANCE IS REVERSED. (see CFI judgment in
the facts)
Relevance:
In marriage, it is not mainly between the two
parties. It is deemed legal and the state has
something to do with it. (regulation and control)
Family Code of the Philippines states that:
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It
is the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code.
This can be explained noting how Justice Trent
made description of marriage as follows:
- It is not merely a contract but rather new
relation, the rights, duties and obligations
of the which rests not upon the agreement
of the parties but rather upon the general
law which defines and prescribes those
duties, rights and obligations.
- The public is purely interested in the
maintenance of marriage as an institution.
- It cannot be terminated at any shorter
period by virtue of any contract made by
the two parties.
- When the legal existence of two parties
are merged into one through marriage,
the new relation is controlled and
regulated by the state or government
upon the principles of public policy for the
benefit of both the society and the
concerned parties.
SERMONIA VS CA bel
FACTS:
• Petitioner was charged with bigamy for
having contracted a marriage with Ma.
Lourdes Unson while his prior marriage
with Virginia Nievera was still valid
Petitioner contends that:
• His criminal liability for bigamy has been
extinguished by prescription
• The prescription commenced to run on the
day the marriage contract between him
and Unson was registered.
• The registration of the marriage makes it
a public record and therefore he doesn’t
show any motive in concealing the said
marriage.
Respondent contends that:
• The prescription period begins at the time
of discovery of the crime by the
complainant not from the commission of
the crime.
ISSUE:
• Is the criminal liability of Sermonia
extinguished because of prescription?
HELD: NO
 • Constructive notice in Civil Cases may be
applied in criminal action but not in the
crime of bigamy.
o If prescription will be counted at
the time of registration then it
would be like absolving the
offender from any liability
• There was concealment of the second
marriage
o Even if the ceremony was open to
all then why would he put single in
the marriage contract?
o He could have just told his first wife
about the 2nd marriage if it was not
his intention to conceal it
o He knew that no priest would
authorized a bigamous marriage
CASE DISMISSED
PERSONS:
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
• Unlike any other contract, the law
provides penal and civil sanctions for
breach of the obligations of marriage such
as prosecution for adultery or
concubinage, and proceedings for legal
separation.
PERIDO vs PERIDO
March 12, 1975 - niLo
FACTS:
1. Lucio Perido married twice during his
lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong,
with whom he begot three (3) children:
Felix, Ismael, and Margarita. After Benita
died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat,
with whom he had five (5) children:
Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and
Gonzalo.
2. On August 15, 1960 the children and
grandchildren of the first and second
marriages of Lucio Perido executed a
document denominated as "Declaration of
Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition,"
where they partitioned among themselves
lots inherited by them from Lucio Perido.
3. The children belonging to the first
marriage of Lucio Perido filed a complaint
in the Court of First Instance against the
children of the second marriage, to annul
the "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-
Judicial Partition".
4. Petitioners alleged that the children
belonging to the second marriage were
illegitimate.
5. The trial court held that the 5 children of
Perido were all legitimate and it annulled
the "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-
Judicial Partition".
6. The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of
Appeals, alleging that the trial court erred
(1) in declaring that the 5 children were
and (2) in declaring that Lucio Perido was
the exclusive owner of Lots because the
said lots were the conjugal partnership
property of Lucio Perido and his first wife,
Benita Talorong.
7. The court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the lower court. Now, the instant
petition.
ISSUE/s and RULING:
1. Are the 5 children of Lucio Perido to
Marcelina Baliguat legitimate? YES because:
a. there was sufficient evidence that Lucio’s
first wife died before he married Marcelina
and the presumption that persons living
together husband and wife are married to
each other specially where legitimacy of
the issue is involved, and may overcome
only by convincing proof on the part
alleging that it is illegitimate.
PERSONS RELATION: Presumption of
Marriage especially in legitimacy of children
because:
- The basis of human society throughout the
civilized world is that of marriage.
- Marriage is a new relation, an institution in
the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested.
- Every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony.
- Because if they are not married, they
would he living in the constant violation of
decency and of law.
- A presumption established by our Code of
Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife
 have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage."
b. The petitioner’s witness’s failed to prove
the illegitimacy of second marriage.
2. WON the lots in litigation are the
exclusive properties of Lucio Perido and not
conjugal properties?
a. The lands were all declared in the name of
Lucio Perido which he inherited from his
grandmother except Lot no. 459 which he
bought during his second marriage.
b. By fiat of law said Properties should be
divided accordingly among his legal heirs.
People v Malabago Chip
Facts: Pedro Malabago hacked his wife
Letecia with a bolo after an argument
about money and his jealousy (naks). His
son, Allandel and Letecia's mother,
Guillerma saw what happened. He went
to his Dodong Opulentisima's house to tell
him what happened and the later called
the police. Then he was convicted by the
lower court of parricide and sentenced
him to death, his appeal followed after
that. Pedro claims that he should not be
convicted because their marriage cannot
be proven (there being no marriage
certificate).
Issue: Can he be convicted?
Held: Yes. The key element in parricide is
the relationship between the accused and
the deceased.
In a case like this the best proof of
relationship is the marriage certificate.
But if there is no such certificate, oral
evidence may be considered if it is not
objected to. The testimony to prove Pedro
and Letecia's marriage was corroborated
by Pedro himself, which is not only an
absence of objection but is also a kind of
support. Semper Praesumitur Matrimonio
or the presumption should always for the
validity of the marriage.
The other errors that were assigned were
also passed on by the court and some
modifications were made to the sentence.
Death was reduced to reclusion perpetua
because there was no treachery and his
surrender was appreciated.
GO vs COURT OF APPEALS. by JAYE
May 9,1997
FACTS:
1. Ong Spouses were married in 1981 and
the Go spouses were the one who was to
provide the video coverage of their
wedding for 1,650php.
2. The newlyweds tried to claim their paid
video 3 times but to no avail, they were
going to US to spend their honeymoon &
show the video to family members.
3. They left for US without the video, with the
promise by the go spouses that the video
will be ready when they get back.
4. Upon return, they found out that the video
was erased by the Go Spouses and could
no longer be delivered.
5. Furios, the Ong spouses filed a complaint
for specific performance and damages
against the Go spouses in the RTC, and
the RTC rendered its judgement in favour
of the Ong spouses declaring the Go
spouses severely liable for huge sums of
moral, exemplary, civil etc damages.
6. Go spouses elevated the case to Court of
appeals but it affirmed the decision of
RTC, hence this petition.
7. Go spouses said that the evidence they
presented to show that they are only
agents of Pablo Lim must be given credit,
and that they should not be held liable,
and that the erasure of the tape was not
done in bad faith, they also questioned the
granting of damages to the Ong spouses.
ISSUE:
Is the petition meritorious?
SC DECISION:
NO. Petition is without merit. The court
said:
1. The video equipment used was not the
object of the contract entered into by the
parties in this case, therefore, it cannot be
said that with Lim being the owner of the
video equipment was the one who had a
contract with the Ong spouses, rather, the
contract was one of service and that was
the wedding coverage, the contract was
 clearly entered into by the Go & Ong
Spouses. Lim was not even presented to
corroborate their claim, therefore such is
not useful for them.
2. With regards to the award, it can be said
that the erasure of the video was done in
bad faith because, contrary to their claim
that since the tape was not claimed after
the lapse of 30 days, they had to erase it
to minimize losses, the ong spouses
actually tried to get the video several
times and was promised that such would
be ready when they get back, it’s clear
that the petitioners were guilty of neglect
and actionable delay, thus the erasure of
the tape was unjustified.
3. The Go spouses are clearly liable for
damages because they failed to provide
the Ong spouses with the tape that was
the object of their contract, therefore,
they are guilty of contravening their
obligation to the newly wed.
4. However, Alex Go, in the finding of the
trial court that he is jointly liable with his
wife Nancy Go, the SC said that only the
wife is liable for under the Art 117 of the
civil code, not Art 73 of the Family Code,
the wife may exercise any profession,
occupation or engage in business without
the consent of the husband. And in this
case only Nanvy go entered into a
contract with the Ong spouses.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS / CIVIL CODE
CONNECTION:
NATURE OF MARRIAGE IN PHILIPPINE LAW
MARRIAGES- in our society, the importance of
a wedding ceremony cannot be
underestimated as it is the matrix of the family
and, therefore, an occasion worth reliving in the
succeeding years.
Trinidad v CA by martin
De Jacob vs CA mickey
Facts:
• Tomasa de Jacob married Dr. Alfredo
Jacob on Sept. 16, 1975. Alfredo has died
and she is assigned as the special
administrator to his spouse’s estate.
• Pedro Pilapil alleges that he is the legally
adopted son of Alfredo asserting his share
of the estate and questioning the validity
of the marriage of Tomasa and Alfredo.
• The trial court ruled in favor of Pedro
Pilapil, that he is the sole heir of the
decesased for two reasons: First, the copy
of the marriage contract couldn’t not be
established with the reconstructed
Marriage Contract having irregularities,
thus marriage was held as non-existent
and second the authenticity of the petition
for adoption being held as valid despite
the conflicting reports on the signature of
Judge Moya.
• The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision
in favor of Pilapil in accordance with Art.6,
par.1 of the Family Code which dictates
that the marriage shall be set forth in an
instrument signed by the parties,
witnesses and the solemnizing officer and
in the absence of which sec.5, rule 130 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides that
the due execution of the document and its
subsequent loss should be proven before
secondary evidence could be used. Also
they affirmed the validity of the signature
of the Judge Moya in the petition for
adoption, stating that “in the absence of
clear and convincing proof to the contrary,
he acted in the performance of his duties.”
• Hence, the petition for review by Tomasa.
Issue:
1. Whether the marriage of Tomasa and
Alfredo is valid?
2. Whether Pedro Pilapil was legally
adopted by the
Deceased?
Held: The Marriage was valid and Pedro
Pilapil’s adoption as not valid.
Ruling:
• The respondent (Pilapil) contention that
the marriage was void ab initio is
misplaced as the petitioner and the
deceased have lived together as husband
and wife for 5 years with an affidavit
executed by them.
• Their marriage does not require a
marriage license as it is governed by Art.
76 of the Civil Code, because the
questioned marriage took effect
 before the effectivity of the Family
Code.
• Jurisprudence provides that when the
original writing is lost, destroyed or cannot
be produced in court upon proof of its
execution, loss, destruction or
unavailability it can be proved by a recital
of its contents in some authentic
document or by witness’ recollection.
• The CA committed reversible error when
they did not admit the various secondary
evidences: a) wedding photos, b) letter of
the Msgr. Attesting the marriage, c)
subsequent authorization of the
Archbishop, d) the affidavit of the Msgr.
On the loss of the marriage certificate and
e) other testimonies( Adela Pilapi’s, the
petitioners, the priest).
• The Civil Code furthermore favors the
presumption of marriage and is based on
prima facie presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.
• On the issue of validity of adoption, the
court took an exception and reviewed the
evidence on the authenticity of the
signature of Judge Moya in the petition for
adoption. They ruled that it was not valid
as the signature’s and the document’s
validity could not be established. Also his
adoption could not be proven by his acts
and as he was not treated as an adopeted
child by the deceased. No other document
from the civil registry was presented as
proof.
• With the burden of proof being on the
person trying to establish such
relationship, the adoption was a sham and
non-existent. The petition is granted and
decision of CA reversed.
Rommel Silverio vs. Republic of the
Philippines
niLo
Facts:
1. The petitioner’s name was registered as
“Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio” in his
birth certificate and his sex was
registered as “male.”
2. He underwent “sex reassignment
surgery” and became a male
transsexual but lived as a female and
engaged to be married.
3. He sought to have his name in birth
certificate change to “Mely” and his sex
from “male” to “female.”
4. He filed the petition to a Trial Court and
was granted on the ground of principles
of social justice and equity, and no
harm or prejudice will be caused to
anybody in the community.
5. The Republic of the Philippines (RP)
through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals with
the alleged that there is no law allowing
the change of entries in the birth
certificate by reason of sex alteration.
The CA granted the petition of RP.
6. The Petitioner moved for
reconsideration in the Supreme Court.
Issue/s and Ruling:
1. Whether or Not (1) A change of name, and (2)
Sex in birth certificate is allowed under the Civil
Register law on the ground of sex reassignment?
- No. RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law) does not
sanction a change of first name on the
ground of sex reassignment. The change
of petitioner’s first name may only create
grave complications in the civil registry
and the public interest. A change of name
cannot alter one’s legal capacity or civil
status as prayed by the petitioner to make
his name compatible with the sex
transformed through surgery. He also
failed to show, or even allege, any
prejudice that he might suffer as a result
of using his true and official name.
2. Whether or Not a change of sex in birth
certificate is allowed under the Civil Register law
on the ground of sex reassignment?
- No law allows the change of entry in the
birth certificate as to sex on the ground of
sex reassignment. Under RA 9048, a
correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere typographical
or clerical error. The birth certificate of
petitioner contained no error including his
first name and sex thus, no correction is
necessary. Sex reassignment was not also
mentioned in Art. 407 of the Civil Code
which authorizes the entry in the civil
registry of certain acts such as births,
 marriages, and deaths. Under the Civil
Register law, the determination of a
person’s sex made at the time of his or
her birth, if not attended by error is
immutable. The term “sex” is not alterable
through surgery or post-operative or that
transsexual to be included in the category
“female.” Thus, there is no legal basis for
the petition for the correction of change of
entries in his birth certificate. Lastly, a
change of sex sought by the petitioner will
have a wide legal effect on laws of
marriage and family relations and special
laws provided for women.
Persons Relation:
Meaning of “marriage” - marriage, one of the
most sacred social institutions, is a special
contract of permanent union between a man and
a woman. One of its essential requisites is the
legal capacity of the contracting parties who
must be a male and a female.
Meaning of “sex” – must be understood in their
common and ordinary usage. It is defined as "the
sum of
peculiarities of structure and function that
distinguish a male from a female" or "the
distinction between male and female." Female is
"the sex that produces ova or bears young" and
male is "the sex that has organs to produce
spermatozoa for fertilizing ova.” Thus, the words
"male" and "female" in everyday understanding
do not include persons who have undergone sex
reassignment.The sex of a person is determined
at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by examining the genitals
of the infant.
People v Dela Cruz by Diana
February 11, 2010; P: Nachura
FACTS:
Aug 18, 2002: Joel Dela Cruz went home
intoxicated. He killed his wife, Anna Liza Caparas-
dela Cruz, with a fatal stab wound.
Aug 15, 2005: Lower Court ruled that Joel is
guilty of Parricide and sentenced him to the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is ordered to
pay for the civil liability (P 60,000), moral
damages (P50,000), and exemplary damages
(P30,000).
Oct 31, 2008: He appealed to the CA but the
court affirmed the decision and modified civil
liability to P 50,000.
He went to SC for an appeal. He contended that
his offense should be mitigated by (1) not
intending to commit so grave a wrong and (2)
being intoxicated.
ISSUE: Was the CA decision correct?
HELD: Yes. The intention to commit so grave a
wrong was supported by the injuries Anna
received and the course of events that took
place. No prior evidence was presented to prove
that intoxication affected his thinking at that
time. HOWEVER, the exemplary damages should
be reduced to P 30,000. This is because
relationship is a qualifying circumstance
under the crime of parricide.
Relation to Topic: Nature of marriages in the
Philippine Law
~Marital Relationship can be used in determining
crimes. It can affect the application of penal laws.
Panganiban v Borromeo
- Mike
Facts:
• Alejandro and Juana Mapala subscribe
a contract before notary public Elias
Borromeo.
• Respondent cooperated the in
execution of the document although
he may not fully understand the
content of the document.
• The substance of the document
permits the husband and the wife to
live in a adulterous relationship
without any opposition.
Issue and Holding
• WON the contract sanctioned an illicit and
immoral practice
Court –yes, the contract contained
provisions which is contrary to law, morals
and public order and as a consequence
not judicially recognizable.
- In his instance, if the spouse should retain
their present frame of mind, no
prosecution of either one by the other
could be expected. Nevertheless, it is far
from the purpose of the Legislature to bar
to legalize adultery and concubinage
• .WON the lawyer may be disciplined for
misconduct.
Court- Yes, the court has the right to
discipline an attorney who has been guilty
of misconduct
- A member of the bar who performs an act
as a notary and public of a disgraceful or
immoral act character may be held to
account by the court even to the extent of
disbarment.
Persons relation: The agreement between
Alejandro and Juana prior to marriage were
contrary to law, morals and public order, as
consequence not judicially recognizable
In re: Atty. Santiago
June 21, 1940
(Bon)
Facts:
• Ernesto Baniquit who was living separately
from his wife for some nine consecutive
years sought legal advice from Atty.
Roque Santiago (a practicing lawyer and
notary public).
• Atty. Santiago, upon hearing the side of
Banquit assured him that he could secure
separation from his wife thus he asked
him to bring Soledad Colares, that same
afternoon.
• He prepared a document stipulating
among others that the two parties
authorizes each other to marry again.
• The said document was executed and
Atty. Santiago assured the parties that the
document would be void.
• Thus this action (administrative) was
initiated through the complaint of the
Solicitor General against Atty. Santiago
with a charge of malpractice and a prayer
for disciplinary action against him.
Issue/s and Ruling:
Was the action of Atty. Santiago constitute
malpractice which justifies disbarment from
practice of law?
YES.
Thus, this also means that the preparation and
execution of the contract separating the two
parties is considered void.
It should be noted even Atty. Santiago admitted
that he realized he made a mistake and thus,
after the execution, he sent for the contracting
parties to come to his office and they signed the
deed of cancellation.
SC Decision: ATTY. SANTIAGO ROQUE WAS
FOUND GUILTY. He was suspended for one year
from practicing law.
Relevance:
Marriage cannot be terminated by virtue of any
contract made by the two parties.
Family Code of the Philippines Article 1 should be
read with reference to New Civil Code Article 221
which states that:
Art. 221. The following shall be void and of
no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation
between husband and wife;
(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during
marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains or of the absolute
community of property between husband and
wife;
(3) Every collusion to obtain a decree of legal
separation, or of annulment of marriage;
(4) Any simulated alienation of property with
intent to deprive the compulsory heirs of their
legitime.
SELANOVA VS. MENDOZA bel
FACTS:
• Petitioner filed an action against Judge
Alejandro Mendoza.
• Respondent judge prepared and ratified a
document extrajudicially liquidating the
conjugal partnership of complainant
Saturnino Selanova and his wife, Avelina
Ceniza.
• The said contract divided the two pieces of
conjugal assets of the spouses between
them.
• Moreover, it licensed both of them to
commit any of infidelity; and withdraw the
complaint for adultery or concubinage
that the spouses filed against each other.
• Petitioner contends that the act of
ratification by the respondent judge
constitutes gross ignorance of the law
ISSUE:
• Does the extrajudicial agreement between
the spouses dissolve their marriage?
• Was the action of the respondent judge
Valid
HELD:
NO, the agreement between the spouses is void
• The extrajudicial agreement is in violation
of Art. 221 of the civil code
(***PERSONS)
o the following shall be void and of
no effect: (1) any contract for
 personal separation between
husband and wife; (2) every
extrajudicial agreement, during
marriage, for the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains or of
the absolute community of
property between husband and
wife.
o Extra judicial dissolution of the
conjugal partnership without
judicial approval was void even
before the approval of the Civil
Code
• Since the respondent judge acted in good
faith and was not aware of the prohibition
under article 221 of the Civil Code, he was
severely censured.
SYLVIA LICHAUCO DE LEON vs. C.A.,
MACARIA DE LEON AND JOSE VICENTE DE
LEON
June 6, 1990 - niLo
FACTS:
1. On October 18, 1969, private respondent
Jose Vicente De Leon and petitioner Sylvia
Lichauco De Leon were united in wedlock
before the Municipal Mayor of Binangonan,
Rizal.
2. In October, 1972, a de facto separation
between the spouses occured due to
irreconcilable marital differences
3. On November 23, 1973, Sylvia filed with
the Superior Court of California, County of
San Francisco, a petition for dissolution of
marriage and filed for distribution of
marriage but Jose Vicente was a Filipino
Resident.
4. On March 16, 1977, Sylvia succeeded in
entering into a Letter-Agreement with her
mother-in-law, private respondent Macaria
De Leon. Said agreement contained the
payment sum of P100, 000 and transfer of
lots conveyed to her who Macaria did.
5. On March 30, 1977, Sylvia and Jose
Vicente filed before the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal a joint petition for judicial
approval of dissolution of their conjugal
partnership.
6. Macaria intervened that the properties in
distribution which she paid was her
properties and assailed that the purpose
of validity and legality of the Letter-
Agreement is the termination of marital
relationship between Sylvia and Jose
Vicente which states:
In consideration for a peaceful and amicable
termination of relations between the
undersigned and her lawfully wedded
husband, Jose Vicente De Leon, your son,
the following are agreed upon:
7. The trial court declared the nullity of
Letter agreement and the conjugal
partnership dissolved.
8. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Letter-
Agreement is valid? No because:
RULING:
a. The use of the word "relations" in the
letter agreement is ambiguous and
subject to interpretation since Macaria
believed it to be dissolution of marriage
but for Sylvia it is only dissolution of
property relations and that Sylvia and Jose
both filed in the court for the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership.
b. Also, under Article 221 of the New Civil
Code:
The following shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between
husband and wife;
(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage,
for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains or of the absolute community of property
between husband and wife;
c. The letter agreement is an extra-judicial
agreement prepared during marriage by
Sylvia so it is void and agreement must be
entered by the spouse and not to a third
party.
d. The threat of Sylvia to Macaria for the
latter to agree to the letter agreement is
not a threat for in order that intimidation
may vitiate consent and render the
contract invalid, the following requisites
must concur:
(1) that the intimidation must be the
determining cause of the contract
(2) that the threatened act be unjust
or unlawful;
(3) that the threat be real and serious,
and
(4) that it produces a reasonable and
well-grounded fear from the fact
that the person from whom it
comes has the necessary means or
ability to inflict the threatened
injury.
PERSONS RELATIONS:
 a. But marriage is not a mere contract but a
sacred social institution.
b. Thus, Art. 52 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 52. Marriage is not a mere contract
but an inviolable social institution. Its
nature, consequences and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to
stipulations...
c. Art. 1306. The contracting parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms,
and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy.
Domalagan v Bolifer chip
Facts: Jorge Domalagan and Carlos Bolifer
entered into a verbal contract wherein the former
was to pay defendant the of P500 upon the
marriage of the former's son Cipriano Domalagan
with the defendant's daughter, Bonifacia.
Jorge Domalagan paid the sum of P500 plus P16
as hansel or token of future marraige. However,
Bonifacia married Laureano Sisi.
Upon learning of the marriage, Domalagan
demanded return of the P516 plus interest and
damages arising from the fact that he exerted
effort to sell property in Bohol to come up with
the sum.
Defendant denied complaint and alleged that it
did not constitute a cause of action.
RTC: No evidence to show that plaintiff suffered
any additional damages. But the ruling was still in
favor of the plaintiff, making the defendant pay
P516 plus interest from Dec 17, 1910 plus costs.
Issue: WON Domalagan can demand his P516
since no marriage took place.
Held: YES. The amount constitutes DPN
(Donation Propter Nuptias) since it fulfills all the
requirements, thus it may be revoked. Verbal
contracts are valid even if it is not clothed in the
necessary form.
CABAGUE vs AUXILIO by JAYE
November 26, 1952
FACTS:
1. Felipe Cabague & his son Geromino sued
Matias Auxilio & his daughter Socorro
to recover damages resulting from
defendant’s resulal to carry out the
agreed marriage between Soccorro &
Geromino.
2. It was said that Socorro promised to marry
Geronimo provided that the latter
would improve their house and spend
for the wedding feast and needs of the
bride.
3. The plaintiffs complied and spent 700php,
but then the defendants later on
refused to honor their pledged word.
4. The defendants moved to dismiss and said
that such is just an oral agreement and
there’s no written agreement that was
executed.
5. Under the new rules of court, the
defendant may now present a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the
contract was not in writing and such
may be proved.
ISSUE:
Can Felipe Cabague & his son Geronimo
recover damages and sue Soccorro and his father
for “Breech of a mutal promise to marry”?
SC DECISION:
YES & NO. There are 2 kinds of
agreements involved in this case. One is the
agreement between Felipe Cabague & the
defendant in consideration of the marriage of
soccorro & Geronimo, the second one is between
the two lovers, as a “mutual promise to marry”.
The court said:
1. YES. For the breach of the mutual
promise to marry, Geronimo may sue
Soccorro for damages.
2. NO. However for the case of Felipe
Cabague’s action, such may not
prosper because it is to enforce an
agreement in consideration of
marriage, such cannot be maintain
under the theory of “mutual promise to
marry”. Neither can Felipe cause an
action against Soccoro for failure to
marry his son.
3. However, yet again the court declares that
Geromino may continue his suit
against Socorro for damages as may
have resulted from her failure to carry
out their mutual matrimonial promises.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS / CIVIL
CODE CONNECTION:
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY
 A breach of promise to marry does not
automatically entitle the offended party to an
award of damages.
Article 21 of family Code provides that any
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage.
Hermosisima v CA by martin
Wassmer v. Velez SHAR
December 26, 1964
FACTS:
• V promised to marry.
• W but two days before the wedding V
wrote a letter to W saying that they should
postpone the wedding because his mother
opposed it.
• The next day he again wrote a letter that
he will be back soon, but he never
returned
September 2, Wrote 1st letter postponing the
1954 wedding.
September 3, Wrote the 2nd letter saying that
1954 he will return but never did.
September 4, Supposedly the date of the
1954 wedding.
April 29, 1955 W sued V.
V did not answer.
V declared at default.
W won an Vto pay W 2k actual
damages; 25k exemplary
damages; 2.5k attorney’s fees
an cost
ISSUE: WON V should pay W the damages
despite the fact that the mere breach of promise
to marry is not an actionable wrong.
Held: YES, V should still pay W for damages.
Even though there is no provision in the civil coe
authorizing an action for the breach of promise to
marry. There is a provision in the civil code that
must not be disregarded.
Art. 21  any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to the another in a manner that contrary to
morals, goo customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
V backing out on the last minute an promised W
that he would return an never did. W incurred a
lot of damages (gastos) an must be compensated
for like the dresses, invitations, matrimonial be
an etc.
TANJANCO vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS
December 17, 1966 - niLo
FACTS:
a. On December, 1957, Apolonio Tanjanco,
courted defendant Araceli Santos.
b. He made a “promise of marriage” which
Araceli consented and acceded to
defendant's pleas for carnal knowledge
regularly until December 1959.
c. She became pregnant, resigned her job
and because plaintiff refused to marry her,
she suffered mental anguish, social
humiliation, and unable to support her
child.
d. She filed a petition to the trial court for the
support of her child but the case was
dismissed for failure to state a cause of
action.
e. But the Court of Appeals decreed that the
complaint did state a cause of action for
damages, premised on Article 21 of the
Civil Code and directing the court of origin
to proceed with the case:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
f. Tanjanco now appealed, pleading that
actions for breach of a promise to marry
are not permissible in this jurisdiction, and
invoking the rulings of this Court in
Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals correctly
ruled of the cause of action of the
defendant upon the ground of Art. 21 of the
Civil Code?
a. No. Since The Court of Appeals seems to
have overlooked that the example set
forth in the Code Commission's
memorandum refers to a tort upon a
minor who has been seduced.
PERSONS RELATION:
The essential feature is seduction that in law is
more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach
of a promise of marriage. To constitute seduction
there must in all cases be:
- some sufficient promise or inducement
and
- the woman must yield because of the
promise or other inducement.
 - If she consents merely from carnal lust
and the intercourse is from mutual desire,
there is no seduction She must be induced
to depart from the path of virtue by the
use of some species of arts, persuasions
and wiles, which are calculated to have
and do have that effect, and which result
in her ultimately submitting her person to
the sexual embraces of her seducer .
b. The facts stand out that for one whole
year 1958- 1959, the defendant (Araceli)
maintained intimate sexual relations with
appellant, with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible
with the idea of seduction for there is
voluntariness and mutual passion.
c. If Araceli had been deceived because of
the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of
the Apolonio, she would not yield
repetedly to the petitioner’s embrace and
she would cut short all sexual relations
upon knowing for one year almost that
Apolonio cannot fulfill his promise to
marry her. Hence, Art. 21 cannot be
invoked.
Gashem Shookat Baksh v. Court of
Appeals and Marilou T. Gonzales
February 19, 1993
(Bon)
Facts:
• Basic description of the parties:
o Baksh: 29 year old Iranian; 2nd year
Med student; resides at Dagupan
City; a Muslim
o Gonzales: 21 yrs. old Filipina;
Highschool graduate; waitress at
Mabuhay Luncheonette
o They learned about each other
though the introduction of
Mabuhay’s manager Rabino. He
introduced Gonzales to Baksh.
• Petitioner courted Gonzales and the latter
accepted the professed love with the
condition that Baksh will marry her.
• They agreed to get married after the end
of the school semester (October, 1987).
• The petitioner visited the parents of
Gonzales to secure their approval of the
marriage.
• (Aug.20, 1987) Private respondent was
forced by Baksh to live with him in his
apartment. She was virgin before she lived
with him. Thus, she was only deflowered
then after he live with him.
• After a week, she was maltreated and
Baksh repudiated their marriage
agreement and asked her not to live with
him anymore.
• It was learned that petitioner was also
married to someone in Bacolod City.
• Marilou Gonzales thus prayed for
damages.
• Baksh averring that she was not
maltreated and he did not commit any
wrongful act contended this. Moreover, he
argued that breach of promise to marry is
not actionable. He also asked for
damages.
• The trial court decided in favor of
Gonzales saying that:
o The petitioner and respondent
were lovers. If not of the
petitioner’s deceit and false
pretenses and promise of marriage,
she would not have allowed herself
to be deflowered.
o The parents of Gonzales already
made some preparations for the
wedding.
o He made abuses of Filipino
hospitality offending customs,
culture and traditions of the
country.
o The court gave full credit to the
private respondent’s testimony
because she would not have the
courage to expose her honor to
public scrutiny if such is false.
• The petitioner appealed to the Court of
appeals but it also ruled in favor of
Gonzales.
• Thus this petition seeking the reversal of
the decision raising a single issue.
Issue/s and Ruling:
1. Can this case pursue even if the existing rule
is that breach of promise to marry is not
actionable?
YES
• Indeed, breach of promise to marry is not
actionable as this chapter was eliminated
from the draft of the New Civil Code.
However, the New Civil Code have Article
21 which states that:
Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage.
o It is designed to expand the
concept of torts or quasi-delict in
this jurisdiction by granting legal
remedy for moral wrongs which
are impossible for human foresight
to specifically enumerate and
punish in the statute books.
o There are certain cases of
negligent acts which will be beyond
redress considering Art.2176 of
NCC and RPC if Article 21 is absent.
o Article 21 fills in the gaps of the
stated provisions. Thus , laws on
civil wrongs ecomes more supple
and adaptable that the Anglo-
American law on torts.
2. Is Article 21 applicable to this case? (this is
the single issue raised by Baksh in this
petition)
YES
• A man’s promise to marry is the proximate
cause of the woman’s acceptance of his
professed love and is also the proximate
cause why she surrendered her
womanhood and live with him. Such
fraudulent deception shows that the
woman surrendered her virginity [a
cherished possession] not because of lust
but of moral seduction.
• The award of damages pursuant to Article
21 is not because of the promise to marry
but rather to the fraud and deceit behind
it resulting to injury of her honor and
reputation.
• According to Tolentino, so long as there is
fraud, there is an action even if this is not
punishable under the criminal law. The
court just have to weigh the degree of
fraud as it varies depending to certain
cases as in different ages of women.
• The statement of Baksh reveals his true
intentions. His statements are
summarized as follows:
o Gonzales is only interested to him
because he will soon be a doctor
and the private respondent is
merely a waitress, highschool
graduate and is in need of
economic security. Thus this
predicament prompted her to
accept the petitioner’s offer.
Marrying with a woman so circumstances
could have not even remotely occurred to
him. He was really determined to deceive
Gonzales. His was nothing but pure lust
which he wanted to be satisfied.
• The actions of Baksh defied the traditional
respect Filipinos have for their women.
Moreover, he defied Article 19 of the New
Civil code which states that:
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
Note:
• On the petitioner’s argument that facts
were overlooked, the SC is not a trial of
facts as it has been established.
• On petitioner’s argument of the existence
of Pari Delicto, it does not apply to this
case since the woman was moved not out
of lust but of moral seduction. She was
even had qualms of her conscience upon
learning that he would not marry her and
left the place of Baksh.
SC Decision: DENIED. There was no reversible
error in the challenged decision.
Relevance:
• Although breach of promise of marriage is
not enforceable, Article 21 applied with
Articles 19 and 20 provides adequate
remedy for moral wrongs which are not
 punished by criminal laws or even civil
laws on quasi-delict.

• According to Justice Paras, in breach of

promise to marry where there had been
carnal knowledge, damages may be
recovered when there is criminal or moral
seduction but not if the intercourse was
due to mutual lust. (this may include
actual damages for wedding preparations)

• Even noting Muslim Code, damages can

also be sought as it states in Article 22:

o Art. 22. Breach of contract. — Any

person who has entered into a
contract to marry but subsequently
refuses without reasonable ground
to marry the other party who is
willing to perform the same shall
pay the latter the expenses
incurred for the preparation of the
marriage and such damages as
may be granted by the court.