Additional Cases in Persons and Family Relations Digested

Partial List of Additional Cases in Persons and Family Relations (Please
disregard cases already digested)
So vs Valera GR 150677 June 5, 2009

Rumbaua vs. Rumbaua GR 166738 Aug. 14, 2009
Najera vs. Najera GR 164817 July 3, 2009
Buenaventura vs. CA GR 127358/127449 March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA
26
Enrico vs. Heirs of Medinaceli GR 173614 September 28, 2007 534 SCRA 419
Carlos vs. Sandoval GR 179922 December 16, 2008
Perez vs. CA GR 162580 January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 411
Domingo vs. CA et al 226 SCRA 572
People vs. Cobar, CA-GR 19344 November 10, 1997
Mercado vs. Mercado GR 137110 August 1, 2000 including dissenting opinion
of Justice Jose Vitug
Presumptive Death
Valdez vs. republic GR 180863 September 8, 2009
Republic vs. CA GR 159614 December 9, 2009; 477 SCRA 277
SSS vs. Jarque vda de Bailon 485 SCRA 376 March 24, 2006
Annulment:
Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals GR 132955 October 27, 2006 505,

SCRA 564
Alcazar vs. Alcazar GR 174451 October 13, 2009
Anaya vs. Palaroan 36 SCRA 97
Almelor vs. RTC GR 179620 August 26, 2008
Republic vs. Iyoy GR 152577 September 21, 2005
Republic vs. Cuison-Melgar GR 139676 March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA
177
Separation of Property
Maquilan vs. MAquilan GR 155409 June 8, 2007 524 SCRA 167
Custody of Children
Silva vs. Court of Appeals 275 SCRA 604
Legal Separation
Ong vs. Ong GR 153206 October 23, 2006, 505 SCRA 76

Sabalones vs. Court of Appeals GR 106169 February 14, 1994
P.S.: Ung fulltext po asa baba :)

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 150677 June 5, 2009
RENATO REYES SO, Petitioner,

vs.
LORNA VALERA, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
For our review is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by petitioner Renato Reyes So
(petitioner) against the Decision dated July 4, 20012 and the Resolution dated October 18, 20013 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 65273. The challenged decision reversed the
decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 143, Makati City declaring the marriage of the
petitioner and respondent Lorna Valera (respondent) null and void on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The assailed resolution denied the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The petitioner and the respondent first met at a party in 1973 after being introduced to each other by
a common friend. The petitioner at that time was a 17-year old high school student; the respondent
was a 21-year old college student. Their meeting led to courtship and to a 19-year common-law
relationship,5culminating in the exchange of marital vows at the Caloocan City Hall on December 10,
1991.6 They had three (3) children (Jeffrey, Renelee, and Loni)7 in their relationship and subsequent
marriage.
On May 14, 1996, the petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of the nullity of his
marriage with the respondent.8 The case was docketed as JDRC Case No. 96-674. He alleged that
their marriage was null and void for want of the essential and formal requisites. He also claimed that
the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage,
as shown by the following circumstances: the respondent failed and refused to cohabit and make
love with him; did not love and respect him; did not remain faithful to him; did not give him emotional,
spiritual, physical, and psychological help and support; failed and refused to have a family domicile;
and failed and refused to enter into a permanent union and establish conjugal and family life with
him.9
The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate his charges.
The petitioner testified that he and the respondent eloped two (2) months after meeting at a
party.10Thereafter, they lived at the house of his mother’s friend in Bulacan, and then transferred to
his parents’ house in Caloocan City. They stayed there for two (2) months before transferring to
Muntinlupa City.11
The petitioner likewise related that respondent asked him to sign a blank marriage application form
and marriage contract sometime in 1986. He signed these documents on the condition that these
documents would only be used if they decide to get married. He admitted not knowing what
happened to these documents, and maintained that no marriage ceremony took place in 1991.12 As
noted below, the petitioner, however, submitted a certified true copy of their marriage contract as
part of his documentary evidence.
The petitioner further alleged that the respondent did not want to practice her profession after
passing the dental board exam; and that she sold the dental equipment he bought for her.13 He also
claimed that when he started his own communication company, the respondent disagreed with many
of his business decisions; her interference eventually led to many failed transactions with
prospective clients.14
The petitioner narrated that he often slept in the car because the respondent locked him out of the
house when he came home late. He felt embarrassed when his employees would wake him up
inside the car. When he confronted the respondent the next morning, she simply ignored him. He
also claimed that respondent did not care for their children, and was very strict with clients.
Moreover, the respondent went out with his employees to gamble whenever there were no clients.
Lastly, he testified that sometime in 1990, he found all his things outside their house when he came
home late after closing a deal with a client. He left their house and stayed at a friend’s house for two
(2) months. He tried to go back to their house, but the respondent prevented him from entering. The
respondent also told him she did not love him anymore. He attempted to reconcile with her for the
sake of their children, but she refused to accept him back.15
Summons was served on the respondent on July 17, 1996, but she failed to file an answer. The RTC
ordered the public prosecutor to investigate if there had been collusion between the parties and to
intervene for the State to see to it that evidence was not fabricated. Prosecutor Andres N. Marcos
manifested that he was unable to make a ruling on the issue of collusion since the respondent failed
to appear before him. 16
Aside from his testimony, the petitioner also presented certified true copies of the birth certificate of
their three children;17 certified true copy of their marriage contract;18 and the testimony, original
curriculum vitae,19 and psychological report20 of clinical psychologist Dr. Cristina Rosello-Gates (Dr.
Gates).
In her Psychological Report, Dr. Gates noted as follows:
xxx
PARTICULARS
- Parties met in a party when Petitioner was 17 years and Respondent was 21 years old;
both were studying but Petitioner was also working in his father’s business;
- During the first time they met, Respondent hugged Petitioner and stayed close to him; she
also taught him how to smoke marijuana; after their first meeting, Respondent would fetch
petitioner from school, and they would go out together;
- Within the next two months, Respondent dropped out of school without informing her
parents; she applied for a job and was purportedly raped by her employer;
- When Respondent’s parents found out that she quit school, she sought petitioner’s help to
look for a place to stay; Renato brought her to his friend’s house in Bulacan but her hosts did
not like her frequent outings and parties; Respondent then asked Petitioner to live with her in
a rented apartment; she told him to execute an Affidavit of Loss so he can withdraw his
savings with a new bankbook without the knowledge of his father;
- Parties were fetched by Petitioner’s parents to live with them in Caloocan; petitioner sent
Respondent to school to wean her away from her friends; when she passed the Dentistry
Board Examinations, he put up a dental clinic for her; after 2 months, she quit her dental
practice and joined Petitioner in his communications business;
- Respondent had problems dealing with Petitioner’s clients; she interfered with his
decisions, and resented his dealings with clients which would, at times, last till late at night;
one incident in 1990, Respondent locked Petitioner out of house prompting the latter to sleep
in the car; other similar incidents followed where employees would wake up Petitioner when
they report for work; one night, Petitioner found all his things thrown out of the house by
Respondent;
- Respondent was not the one who took care of their children; the second child, for instance,
cries whenever said child sees Respondent as the latter is not familiar with the former;
- While parties lived together since 1973, they applied for a marriage license only in 1986;
Respondent asked Petitioner to sign both license and marriage contract without any public
appearance at City Hall; their marriage was registered in 1991 after the couple separated. 21
and concluded that:
An examination of the parties’ respective family background and upbringing, as well as the events
prior to their marriage point to psychological impairment on the part of Respondent Lorna Valera.
From a simple existence in the province, Lorna Valera was thrust in the big city for her college
education. It was in Sampaloc, Manila where she lived and groped, and eventually found herself in
bad company. Thus, her so-called "culture shock" was abated by pot sessions lasting several days
at a time – making her temporarily forget the harsh reality in the metropolis. Her escapist and
regressive tendencies stunted her psychological growth and prevented her from fully functioning as
a responsible adult.
Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM IV), the international standards of
psychological disorders, Respondent Lorna Valera is plagued with an Adjustment Disorder as
manifested in her impulsiveness, lack of restraint, lack of civility and a sense of decency in the
conduct of her life. Compulsive Behavior Patterns are also evident in her marijuana habit, gambling
and habitual squandering of Petitioner’s money. Lorna Valera’s Adjustment Disorder and
Compulsive Behavior Patterns were already existing prior to her marriage to Petitioner Renato So.
Continuing up to the present, the same appears to be irreversible.22
The RTC Ruling
The RTC nullified the marriage of petitioner and respondent in its decision of November 8, 1999. The
decision, a relatively short one at four (4) pages, single-spaced, including the heading and the
signature pages, made a short summary of the "testimonies of the witness" with the statements that
–
Petitioner and respondent became common law husband and wife from 1973 to 1991. Out of this
relationship were born three children, namely Jeffrey, Renelee and Lino all surnamed Varela.
Sometime in 1987 petitioner was induced by respondent to sign a blank Marriage Contract and a
blank application for marriage license. The petitioner freely signed the documents with the belief that
the documents will be signed only when they get married.23
Thereafter, the RTC decision wholly dwelt on the question of the respondent’s psychological
incapacity based on the testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Gates, his expert witness. The decision’s
concluding
paragraphs stated:
Based on the foregoing, the Court is convinced that respondent Lorna Valera is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligation of marriage, which incapacity existed at
the time of the celebration thereof (Art. 36 F.C.).
It should be borne in mind that marriage is a special contract of permanent union and the foundation
of the Family. The husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual help and
support (Art. 68 F.C.). It includes the giving of love and affection, advice and counsel,
companionship and understanding (Art. 230 F.C.). Respondent failed to observe all these things.24
The dispositive portion of the decision that immediately followed reads:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner and against respondent:
1. Declaring respondent psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital

obligations under Art. 36 of the Family Code;
2. Declaring the marriage contracted by Renato Reyes So and Lorna Valero on December
10, 1991, null and void ab initio;
3. Dissolving the conjugal partnership between the spouses in accordance with the pertinent
provisions of the Family Code;
4. Awarding the custody of the minor children to petitioner.
xxx
SO ORDERED.25
The CA Decision
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the
RTC decision to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 65273. The CA, in its Decision dated July 4,
2001, reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the petition for lack of merit.26
The CA ruled that the petitioner failed to prove the respondent’s psychological incapacity. According
to the CA, the respondent’s character, faults, and defects did not constitute psychological incapacity
warranting the nullity of the parties’ marriage. The CA reasoned out that "while respondent appears
to be a less than ideal mother to her children, and loving wife to her husband," these flaws were not
physical manifestations of psychological illness. The CA further added that although the
respondent’s condition was clinically identified by an expert witness to be an "Adjustment Disorder,"
it was not established that such disorder was the root cause of her incapacity to fulfill the essential
marital obligations. The prosecution also failed to establish that respondent’s disorder was incurable
and permanent in such a way as to disable and/or incapacitate respondent from complying with
obligations essential to marriage.
The CA likewise held that the respondent’s hostile attitude towards the petitioner when the latter
came home late was "a normal reaction of an ordinary housewife under a similar situation"; and her
subsequent refusal to cohabit with him was not due to any psychological condition, but due to the
fact that she no longer loved him.
Finally, the CA concluded that the declaration of nullity of a marriage was not proper when the
psychological disorder does not meet the guidelines set forth in the case of Molina.
The petitioner moved to reconsider the decision, but the CA denied his motion in its
resolution27 dated October 18, 2001.
The Petition and Issues
The petitioner argues in the present petition that the CA seriously erred28 –
1. in reversing the RTC decision without ruling on the trial court’s factual and conclusive
finding that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was null and void ab initio;
2. in departing from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings that factual
findings of the trial courts are entitled to great weight and respect and are not disturbed on
appeal; and
3. in totally disregarding the undisputed fact that respondent is psychologically incapacitated

to perform the essential marital obligations.29
The Republic, as intervenor-appellee, alleged in its comment that: (a) the trial court never made a
definitive ruling on the issue of the absence of the formal and essential requisites of the parties’
marriage; and (b) petitioner was not able to discharge the burden of evidence required in Molina.30
The petitioner filed a reply;31 thereafter, both parties filed their respective memoranda reiterating their
arguments. Other than the issue of the absence of the essential and formal requisites of marriage,
the basic issue before us is whether there exists sufficient ground to declare the marriage of
petitioner and respondent null and void.
THE COURT’S RULING

We deny the petition for lack of merit, and hold that no sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. No case of lack of essential and formal requisites of
marriage has been proven or validly ruled upon by the trial court.
1. The CA did not err in not ruling on the alleged lack
of the essential and formal requisites of marriage
The petitioner cites as ground for this appeal the position that the CA reversed and set aside the
RTC decision without touching on the trial court’s ruling that there was absence of the essential and
formal requisites of marriage.
We find this argument baseless and misplaced for three basic reasons.
First. The argument stems from the mistaken premise that the RTC definitively ruled that petitioner’s
marriage to respondent was null and void due to the absence of the essential and formal requisites
of marriage.
A careful examination of the RTC decision shows that the trial court did not discuss, much less rule
on, the absence of the formal and essential requisites of marriage; it simply recited the claim that
"[S]ometime in 1987 petitioner was induced by respondent to sign a blank Marriage Contract and a
blank application for marriage license. The petitioner freely signed the documents with the belief that
the documents will be signed only when they get married." The trial court did not even mention the
certified true copy of the Marriage Contract signed by the officiating minister and registered in the
Civil Registry of Kalookan City. The petitioner introduced and marked this copy as his Exhibit "D" to
prove that there is a marriage contract registered in the Civil Registry of Kalookan City between
petitioner and respondent.32
Out of this void came the dispositive portion "[D]eclaring the marriage contracted by Renato Reyes
So and Lorna Valera on December 10, 1991 null and void."33 Faced with an RTC decision of this
tenor, the CA could not have ruled on the validity of the marriage for essential and formal
deficiencies, since there was no evidence and no RTC ruling on this point to evaluate and rule upon
on appeal. Even if it had been a valid issue before the CA, the RTC’s declaration of nullity should be
void for violation of the constitutional rule that "[No] decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based."34
Second. The same examination of the RTC decision shows that it concerned itself wholly with the
declaration of the nullity of the marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. After its recital of
the "testimonies of witnesses," part of which are the facts relied upon to support the claimed
psychological incapacity, the decision dwelt on the evidence of Dr. Gates, the expert witness, and,
from there, proceeded to its conclusion that psychological incapacity existed. In this light, the
dispositive portion declaring "the marriage...on December 10, 1991, [is] null and void," must be
based on psychological incapacity as found by the trial court, not on the absence of the essential
and formal requisites of marriage.
Third. We note that the petitioner himself offered the Marriage Contract as evidence that it is
registered with the Civil Registry of Kalookan City.35 As a duly registered document, it is a public
document, and is prima facie evidence of the facts it contains, namely, the marriage of the petitioner
with the respondent. To contradict these facts and the presumption of regularity in the document’s
favor, the petitioner’s contrary evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely
preponderant.36 To be sure, a married couple cannot simply nullify their marriage through the non-
appearance of one spouse and the uncorroborated declaration by the other spouse that the
marriage did not really take place. If the biased and interested testimony of a witness is deemed
sufficient to overcome a public instrument, drawn up with all the formalities prescribed by the law,
then there will have been established a very dangerous doctrine that would throw the door wide
open to fraud.37 At the very least, the declaration that the marriage did not take place must be
supported by independent evidence showing a physical impossibility, a forgery, or the disavowal by
the supposed participants, to name a few possible reasons.
2. Petitioner failed to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity
As the CA did, we hold that the totality of evidence presented by petitioner failed to establish the
respondent’s psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations.
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which
provides that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." In Santos v.
Court of Appeals,38 the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." It must be confined
to "the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage."39
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals40 (the Molina case) as
follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts…
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,41 further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the
Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.42
The factual background of this case covers at least 18 years. The petitioner and the respondent first
met in 1973 and lived together as husband and wife, without the benefit of marriage, before they got
married in 1991. In the course of their relationship, they had three (3) children; established a
business, and even incurred indebtedness amounting to P4 million; had differences due to what the
CA described as "character faults and defects"; and had a well-described quarrel which the CA
observed to be the "common reaction of an ordinary housewife in a similar situation." Thus, unlike
the usual Article 36 cases this Court encountered in the past, where marriage, cohabitation, and
perception of psychological incapacity took place in that order, the present case poses a situation
where there had been a lengthy period of cohabitation before the marriage took place. To be sure,
this factual unique situation does not change the requirement that psychological incapacity must be
present at the time of the celebration of the marriage. It does, however, raise novel and unavoidable
questions because of the lapse of time the couple has been together and their intimate knowledge of
each other at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Specifically, how do these factors affect the
claim of psychological incapacity that should exist at the time of the marriage, considering that
marriage came near or at the end of the parties’ relationship?
Ideally, the best results in the determination of psychological incapacity are achieved if the
respondent herself is actually examined. This opportunity, however, did not arise in the present case
because the respondent simply failed to respond to the court summons and to cooperate in the
proceedings. Thus, only an indirect psychological examination took place through the transcript of
stenographic notes of the hearings and clinical interviews of the petitioner which lasted for about
three (3) hours.43 In light of the differences in the appreciation of the psychologist’s testimony and
conclusions between the trial court and the appellate court, we deem it necessary to examine the
records ourselves, as the factual allegations and the expert opinion vitally affect the issues submitted
for resolution.
Our own examination of the psychologist’s testimony and conclusions leads us to conclude that they
are not sufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological
incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage. In the first place, the facts on which the psychologist based her conclusions
were all derived from statements by the petitioner whose bias in favor of his cause cannot be
doubted. It does not appear to us that the psychologist read and interpreted the facts related to her
with the awareness that these facts could be slanted. In this sense, we say her reading may not at
all be completely fair in its assessment. We say this while fully aware that the psychologist appeared
at the petitioner’s bidding and the arrangement between them was not pro bono.44While this
circumstance does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her reading of the facts, her
testimony, and her conclusions must be read carefully with this circumstance and the source of the
facts in mind.
In examining the psychologist’s Report, we find the "Particulars" and the "Psychological
Conclusions" disproportionate with one another; the conclusions appear to be exaggerated
extrapolations, derived as they are from isolated incidents, rather than from continuing patterns. The
"particulars" are, as it were, snapshots, rather than a running account of the respondent’s life from
which her whole life is totally judged. Thus, we do not see her psychological assessment to be
comprehensive enough to be reliable.
For example, the psychologist’s statements about the parties’ sexual relationship appear to us to be
rash, given that no parallel examination of the petitioner’s own pattern of sexual behavior has been
made. Sex with a partner is a two-way affair and while one partner can be more aggressive than the
other, aggressiveness is not per se an aberrant behavior and may depend on the dynamics of the
partners’ relationship. To infer prior sexual experience because the respondent allegedly initiated
intimate behavior, and to cite an unverified incident of a previous rape to characterize the
respondent’s sexual behavior, are totally uncalled for. That the respondent did pass her Dental
Board Exam was glossed over and unverified unsavory incidents related to her exam were
highlighted. Her alleged failure to practice was stressed, without emphasizing, however, that "she
quit her dental practice and joined petitioner in his communications business."
The respondent’s business behavior is a matter that needed full inquiry, as there could be reasons
for her interference. With respect to employees, while the petitioner charged the respondent with
being strict, he, at the same time, alleged that she gambled with the employees when there were no
clients. The psychologist did not pursue these lines and, significantly, the petitioner’s testimonies on
this point are uncorroborated. The respondent’s reaction to her husband’s nights out was singled out
and slanted to indicate negative traits. It took the CA to observe that her hostile attitude when the
petitioner stayed out late at night "is merely a usual common reaction of an ordinary housewife in a
similar situation." To further quote the CA citing the transcripts, "[I]n fact, petitioner-appellee admitted
that the reason respondent got angry and threw his things outside is because he came home late
and drunk, which petitioner-appellee had done several times already on the pretext of closing
business deals, which sometimes included going out night-clubbing with clients."45 Why and how the
couple incurred indebtedness of about P4 million may be usual in the communications business, but
is certainly a matter that the psychologist should have further inquired into in relation with her alleged
strictness in business affairs.1avvphi1
As against the negatives in viewing the respondent, we note that she lived with the petitioner for 18
years and begot children with him born in 1975, 1978 and 1984 – developments that show a fair
level of stability in the relationship and a healthy degree of intimacy between the parties for some
eleven (11) years. She finished her Dentistry and joined her husband in the communications
business – traits that do not at all indicate an irresponsible attitude, especially when read with the
comment that she had been strict with employees and in business affairs. The petitioner’s
Memorandum46 itself is very revealing when, in arguing that the Marriage Contract was a sham, the
petitioner interestingly alleged that (referring to 1987) "[S]ince at that time, the relationship between
the petitioner and respondent was going well, and future marriage between the two was not an
impossibility, the petitioner signed these documents."
More than all these, the psychologist’s testimony itself glaringly failed to show that the respondent’s
behavioral disorder was medically or clinically permanent or incurable as established jurisprudence
requires. Neither did the psychologist testify that the disorder was grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. To directly quote from the
records:
ATTY. RODOLFO BRITANICO
Q: All right, what was basically your conclusion in your qualitative research with regards to
the psychological incapacity of the respondent to comply with the marital obligation?
DR. CRISTINA R. GATES
A: There is a strong indication that the respondent was not able to carry out her marital
obligation – her marital duties and responsibilities. And going through the TSN, it is evident
that in their conjugal relation, it was petitioner who was responsible, but he in fact gave her
opportunity to develop and to become responsible herself. [sic]
For instance, he sent her back to school to take Dentistry, he supported her during that time and
during the exam and after that he built her a clinic. In all these, the respondent proved to be
irresponsible. [sic]
When she was taking pre-dental, most of the time she was out of the house, and in one instance
petitioner discovered that respondent was having an extra-marital affair with her classmate. And in
her board exam she failed the first time. And even if it is questionable, petitioner approached one of
the commissioners and through his efforts the respondent was able to pass the second time around.
[sic]
And in the matter of dental clinic, after merely two months respondent refused to practice, she not
only refused and without the knowledge of the petitioner sold all the dental equipments at a loss.
[sic]
Q: How about their relationship?
A: From the start respondent is older, she had, like, prior sexual experience, and she was the
one who introduced to him the use of marijuana. x x x x
Q: How about respondent. How would the respondent compliment the responsibility?
A: There is no mutuality, because if she run away and asked for petitioner to rent an
apartment for them to live together, petitioner continued to work and study and went home to
her in the evening, but respondent on the other hand she quit schooling and she did push
through with working, and worst she allowed her friend to live with them, allegedly in that
apartment, and respondent and friend would engage in pot sessions. [sic]
Q: What did you find out with regards to the duty of respondent to live together with the
petitioner? [sic]
A: She was frequently out, in [sic] her friends. .
Q: How about love and respect?
A: Love is rather complicated. Because she made love to him in her own will. [sic]
Q: But did they show respect?
A: No, because she had extra-marital affair, and demanding lot of money.
Q: How about to render emotional, spiritual and physical help? How would respondent
comply?
A: She was not able to comply, except maybe for the sexual obligation, but in terms of
physical and emotional support she was not there for him. When she quit, she hang out with
him on their business, but instead of helping him, she would quarrel him, interfere in his
decisions, she would embarrass petitioner in front of his clients and employees, and if
petitioner would have a deal with his clients and sometimes would come home late, she
would refuse to listen to his explanation and would lock him out and shout at him. [sic]
Q: And in your Psychological findings, when did this [incapacity] of the respondent start, her
incapacity to comply with the marriage obligation?
A: In the testimony of the petitioner, I think he did mention that she came to Manila for her
studies, and during the interview I found out that upon arrival in Manila she was alone, by
herself, she had difficulty adjusting to city life, because all her life were spent in the province
with her parents and siblings, and she lived in Sampaloc where she got herself in the
company of bad friends like going into marijuana and frequent parties and pot sessions,
[which] would last for 3 to 4 days, and in effect disallowed her from going to school regularly.
Q: In clinical psychologist [sic], what is the effect?
A: It is traumatic for her, because there is a separation of her parents, and not only that she
was thrown to a situation of her being alone, at that time she had no guidance, it would
assume that she would just study…[sic]
Q: In your conclusion of your Psychological Report, you stated here and I quote: "Based on
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM IV), the international standards of psychological
disorders, Respondent Lorna is plagued with an Adjustment Disorder as manifested in her
impulsiveness, lack of restraint, lack of civility and a sense of decency in the conduct of her
life." Can you please explain to us.
A: Lorna Valera is like a person who is not in control of herself, impulsive. x x x
Q: How about lack of restraint?
A: Impulses. Like for example, when the husband comes home late, instead of looking
means and ways to rationalize, she would just shout and lock him out.
Q: And what about lack of civility, what is your basis?
A: She did not consider the welfare of her children, her frequent outings, like she would
conduct her extra marital affairs through phone calls. When they separated, I understand
that she was always out of the house, gambling at night. In fact, petitioner in one of his visits
to respondent and children intercepted the letter of a younger child asking for an
appointment to see the mother because the child’s report is that he hardly sees the mother.
xxxx
Q: You mentioned also in your psychological conclusion that Adjustment Disorder and
Compulsive Behavior of Lorna Valera existed prior and continuous up to the present, can
you please explain?
A: If Lorna Valera somewhere in her life changes all of a sudden, then the psychological
incapacity is not obtaining but in mal-adopting behavior, like you remove the stimulus of the
petitioner in her life. Then the same behavior pattern as I learned from the children, then the
incapacity is irreversible because it is there.47 [sic]
These statements, lopsided as they are as we observed above, merely testify to the respondent’s
impulsiveness, lack of restraint, and lack of civility and decency in the conduct of her life. The
psychologist, however, failed to sufficiently prove that all these emanated from a behavioral disorder
so grave and serious that the respondent would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in a marriage; that it was rooted in the respondent’s medical or psychological history before
her marriage; and that a cure was beyond the respondent’s capacity to achieve.
Speaking of the root of the alleged disorder, the psychologist could only trace this to the time the
respondent came to Manila; the psychologist concluded that the disorder was due to her separation
from her parents and lack of guidance. Will common human experience, available through the
thousands of students who over the years trooped from the provinces to Manila, accept the
conclusion that this experience alone can lead to a disorder that can affect their capacity to marry?
In terms of incurability, the psychologist could only cryptically say -
A. If Lorna Valera somewhere in her life changes all of a sudden, then the psychological incapacity
is not obtaining but in mal-adopting behavior, like you remove the stimulus of the petitioner in her
life. Then the same behavior pattern as I learned from the children, then the incapacity is irreversible
because it is there.48
Does this convoluted statement mean that Lorna Valera can still change, and that change can
happen if the "stimulus of the petitioner" is removed from her life? In other words, is the incapacity
relative and reversible?
In Molina, we ruled that "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as indicative of psychological incapacity. The illness must
be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, the root cause should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage." In the present
case, the psychologist simply narrated adverse "snapshots" of the respondent’s life showing her
alleged failure to meet her marital duties, but did not convincingly prove her permanent incapacity to
meet her marital duties and responsibilities; the root or psychological illness that gave rise to this
incapacity; and that this psychological illness and consequent incapacity existed at the time the
marriage was celebrated.
In light of the wide gaps in the facts the psychologist considered and of the patent deficiencies of her
testimony tested under the standards of established jurisprudence, we cannot accord full credence
and accept the psychologist’s Report as basis for the declaration of annulment of the parties’
marriage under Article 36. In the absence of any contradictory statements from the respondent, the
fairer approach is to read between the lines of this Report and discern what indeed happened
between the parties based on common human experience between married couples who have lived
together in the way the parties did. From this perspective, we have no problem in accepting the CA
decision as a fairer assessment of the respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, and for being a
more realistic appreciation of the evidence adduced in light of the requirements of Article 36:
Such character faults and defects, We believe, do not constitute psychological incapacity as a
ground for the declaration of marriage between petitioner-appellee and respondent. While she
appears to be less than ideal mother to her children and loving wife to her husband, herein
petitioner-appellee, the same are not physical manifestations of a psychological illness as described
in Molina. Although the expert witness had clinically identified respondent’s condition as "Adjustment
Disorder," allegedly resulting from respondent’s separation from her parents when she studied in
Manila before she met petitioner-appellee, it was not established that such disorder or illness
allegedly manifested in her carefree and outgoing behavior as a means of coping with her emotional
and psychological stresses, was the root cause of her incapacity to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. Moreover, such alleged disorder was not shown to be of a serious nature, "a
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effective incapacitates" the respondent from "really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage." The clinical findings on respondent’s alleged Adjustment Disorder
have not established such illness to be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. And, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, although
the Psychological Report stated that respondent’s condition "appears to be irreversible," the expert
witness did not substantiate her conclusion that respondent’s condition was indeed incurable or
permanent. Nowhere in the testimony of petitioner-appellee was it shown that respondent’s allegedly
carefree ways (and smoking of marijuana) while she was younger and had no children yet,
continued throughout their marriage until their separation in 1990. On the contrary, her strict attitude
towards the clients and employees is a clear indication that she takes their business concerns
seriously, such attitude being a reflection of a mature and responsible personality.49
Shorn of any reference to psychology, we conclude that we have a case here of parties who have
very human faults and frailties; who have been together for some time; and who are now tired of
each other. If in fact the respondent does not want to provide the support expected of a wife, the
cause is not necessarily a grave and incurable psychological malady whose effects go as far as to
affect her capacity to provide marital support promised and expected when the marital knot was tied.
To be tired and to give up on one’s situation and on one’s husband are not necessarily signs of
psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the remedy
for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go their separate ways. This simple remedy,
however, is not available to us under our laws. Ours is still a limited remedy that addresses only a
very specific situation – a relationship where no marriage could have validly been concluded
because the parties, or one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness
existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of marital life and,
thus, could not have validly entered into a marriage. Outside of this situation, this Court is powerless
to provide any permanent remedy. To use the words of Navales v. Navales:50 1avvphi1
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic
marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or
"ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological
illness that is contemplated by said rule.51 [Emphasis ours]
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated July 4, 2001 and October 18, 2001, respectively, in CA-
G.R. CV No. 65273. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA, G.R. No. 166738

Petitioner,
Present:
*
CARPIO-MORALES,
,
- versus - Acting
Chairperson,
**
CARPIO,
***
CHICO-
NAZARIO,
****
LEONARDO-DE
EDWARD RUMBAUA, CASTRO, and
Respondent. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 14,
2009
x - - - - - --------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Petitioner Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua (petitioner) challenges, through her
petition for review on certiorari,[1] the decision dated June 25, 2004[2] and the
cralaw cralaw
resolution dated January 18, 2005[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
cralaw
No. 75095. The challenged decision reversed the decision[4] of the Regional Trial cralaw
Court (RTC) declaring the marriage of the petitioner and respondent Edward
Rumbaua (respondent) null and void on the ground of the latter’s psychological
incapacity. The assailed resolution, on the other hand, denied the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The present petition traces its roots to the petitioner’s complaint for the
declaration of nullity of marriage against the respondent before the RTC, docketed
as Civil Case No. 767. The petitioner alleged that the respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as
shown by the following circumstances: the respondent reneged on his promise to
live with her under one roof after finding work; he failed to extend financial support
to her; he blamed her for his mother’s death; he represented himself as single in
his transactions; and he pretended to be working in Davao, although he was
cohabiting with another woman in Novaliches, Quezon City.
Summons was served on the respondent through substituted service, as

personal serviceproved futile.[5] The RTC ordered the provincial prosecutor to
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investigate if collusion existed between the parties and to ensure that no fabrication
or suppression of evidence would take place.[6] Prosecutor Melvin P. Tiongson’scralaw
report negated the presence of collusion between the parties.[7] cralaw
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), opposed the petition.[8] The OSG entered its appearance and
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deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Vizcaya to assist in all hearings of the
case.[9] cralaw
The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence to

substantiate her charges.
The petitioner related that she and the respondent were childhood neighbors
in Dupax del Norte, Nueva Vizcaya. Sometime in 1987, they met again and
became sweethearts but the respondent’s family did not approve of their
relationship. After graduation from college in 1991, the respondent promised to
marry the petitioner as soon as he found a job. The job came in 1993, when the
Philippine Air Lines (PAL) accepted the respondent as a computer engineer. The
respondent proposed to the petitioner that they first have a “secret marriage” in
order not to antagonize his parents. The petitioner agreed; they were married
in Manila on February 23, 1993. The petitioner and the respondent, however, never
lived together; the petitioner stayed with her sister in Fairview, Quezon City, while
the respondent lived with his parents in Novaliches.
The petitioner and respondent saw each other every day during the first six
months of their marriage. At that point, the respondent refused to live with the
petitioner for fear that public knowledge of their marriage would affect his
application for a PAL scholarship. Seven months into their marriage, the couple’s
daily meetings became occasional visits to the petitioner’s house inFairview; they
would have sexual trysts in motels. Later that year, the respondent enrolled
atFEATI University after he lost his employment with PAL.[10] cralaw
In 1994, the parties’ respective families discovered their secret

marriage. The respondent’s mother tried to convince him to go to the United
States, but he refused. To appease his mother, he continued living separately from
the petitioner. The respondent forgot to greet the petitioner during her birthday in
1992 and likewise failed to send her greeting cards on special occasions. The
respondent indicated as well in his visa application that he was single.
In April 1995, the respondent’s mother died. The respondent blamed the
petitioner, associating his mother’s death to the pain that the discovery of his
secret marriage brought. Pained by the respondent’s action, the petitioner severed
her relationship with the respondent. They eventually reconciled through the help of
the petitioner’s father, although they still lived separately.
In 1997, the respondent informed the petitioner that he had found a job
in Davao. A year later, the petitioner and her mother went to the respondent’s
house in Novaliches and found him cohabiting with one Cynthia Villanueva
(Cynthia). When she confronted the respondent about it, he denied having an
affair with Cynthia.[11] The petitioner apparently did not believe the respondents
cralaw
and moved to to Nueva Vizcaya to recover from the pain and anguish that her
discovery brought.[12] cralaw
The petitioner disclosed during her cross-examination that communication

between her and respondent had ceased. Aside from her oral testimony, the
petitioner also presented a certified true copy of their marriage contract;[13] and the cralaw
testimony, curriculum vitae,[14] and psychological report[15] of clinical psychologist

cralaw cralaw
Dr. Nedy Lorenzo Tayag (Dr. Tayag).

Dr. Tayag declared on the witness stand that she administered the following
tests on the petitioner: a Revised Beta Examination; a Bender Visual Motor Gestalt
Test; a Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test; a Draw a Person Test; a Sach’s Sentence
Completion Test; and MMPI.[16] She thereafter prepared a psychological report with
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the following findings:
TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION
Psychometric tests data reveal petitioner to operate in an

average intellectual level. Logic and reasoning remained intact.
She is seen to be the type of woman who adjusts fairly well into
most situations especially if it is within her interests. She is
pictured to be faithful to her commitments and had reservations
from negative criticisms such that she normally adheres to
social norms, behavior-wise. Her age speaks of maturity, both
intellectually and emotionally. Her one fault lies in her compliant
attitude which makes her a subject for manipulation and
deception such that of respondent. In all the years of their
relationship, she opted to endure his irresponsibility largely
because of the mere belief that someday things will be much
better for them. But upon the advent of her husband’s infidelity,
she gradually lost hope as well as the sense of self-respect, that
she has finally taken her tool to be assertive to the point of
being aggressive and very cautious at times – so as to fight with
the frustration and insecurity she had especially regarding her
failed marriage.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondent in this case, is revealed to operate in a

very self-centered manner as he believes that the world
revolves around him. His egocentrism made it so easy for
him to deceitfully use others for his own advancement
with an extreme air of confidence and dominance. He
would do actions without any remorse or guilt feelings
towards others especially to that of petitioner.
REMARKS
Love happens to everyone. It is dubbed to be boundless

as it goes beyond the expectations people tagged with it. In
love, “age does matter.” People love in order to be secure that
one will share his/her life with another and that he/she will not
die alone. Individuals who are in love had the power to let love
grow or let love die – it is a choice one had to face when love is
not the love he/she expected. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In the case presented by petitioner, it is very apparent

that love really happened for her towards the young respondent
– who used “love” as a disguise or deceptive tactic for exploiting
the confidence she extended towards him. He made her believe
that he is responsible, true, caring and thoughtful – only to
reveal himself contrary to what was mentioned. He lacked the
commitment, faithfulness, and remorse that he was able to
engage himself to promiscuous acts that made petitioner look
like an innocent fool. His character traits reveal him to suffer
Narcissistic Personality Disorder - declared to be grave, severe
and incurable.[17] [Emphasis supplied.]
cralaw
The RTC Ruling
The RTC nullified the parties’ marriage in its decision of April 19, 2002. The
trial court saw merit in the testimonies of the petitioner and Dr. Tayag, and
concluded as follows:
xxxx
Respondent was never solicitous of the welfare and wishes of his

wife. Respondent imposed limited or block [sic] out communication
with his wife, forgetting special occasions, like petitioner’s birthdays
and Valentine’s Day; going out only on occasions despite their living
separately and to go to a motel to have sexual intercourse. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry
It would appear that the foregoing narration are the attendant
facts in this case which show the psychological incapacity of
respondent, at the time of the celebration of the marriage of the
parties, to enter into lawful marriage and to discharge his marital
responsibilities (See Articles 68 to 71, Family Code). This incapacity is
“declared grave, severe and incurable.”
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the marriage between

petitioner Rowena Padilla Rumbaua and respondent Edwin Rumbaua is
hereby declared annulled. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.[18] cralaw
The CA Decision
The Republic, through the OSG, appealed the RTC decision to the CA.
[19]
The CA decision of June 25, 2004 reversed and set aside the RTC decision, and
cralaw
denied the nullification of the parties’ marriage.[20] cralaw
In its ruling, the CA observed that Dr. Tayag’s psychiatric report did not
mention the cause of the respondent’s so-called “narcissistic personality disorder;”
it did not discuss the respondent’s childhood and thus failed to give the court an
insight into the respondent’s developmental years. Dr. Tayag likewise failed to
explain why she came to the conclusion that the respondent’s incapacity was “deep-
seated” and “incurable.”
The CA held that Article 36 of the Family Code requires the incapacity to be
psychological, although its manifestations may be physical. Moreover, the evidence
presented must show that the incapacitated party was mentally or physically ill so
that he or she could not have known the marital obligations assumed, knowing
them, could not have assumed them. In other words, the illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect, or difficulty to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. In the present case, the petitioner suffered
because the respondent adamantly refused to live with her because of his parents’
objection to their marriage.
The petitioner moved to reconsider the decision, but the CA denied her
motion in its resolution of January 18, 2005. [21]
The Petition and the Issues
The petitioner argues in the present petition that –
1. the OSG certification requirement under Republic v.

Molina [22]
(the Molina case) cannot be dispensed with because A.M. No.
cralaw
02-11-10-SC, which relaxed the requirement, took effect only on March

15, 2003;
2. vacating the decision of the courts a quo and remanding the case to the
RTC to recall her expert witness and cure the defects in her testimony, as
well as to present additional evidence, would temper justice with mercy;
and
3. Dr. Tayag’s testimony in court cured the deficiencies in her psychiatric

report.
The petitioner prays that the RTC’s and the CA’s decisions be reversed and
set aside, and the case be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings; in the
event we cannot grant this prayer, that the CA’s decision be set aside and the RTC’s
decision be reinstated.
The Republic maintained in its comment that: (a) A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC was
applicable although it took effect after the promulgation of Molina; (b) invalidating
the trial court’s decision and remanding the case for further proceedings were not
proper; and (c) the petitioner failed to establish respondent’s psychological
incapacity.[23] cralaw
The parties simply reiterated their arguments in the memoranda they filed.
THE COURT’S RULING
We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable
In Molina, the Court emphasized the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the OSG; they are to appear as counsel for the State in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095. [Emphasis supplied.]
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC[24] -- which this Court promulgated on March 15,

cralaw
2003 and duly published -- is geared towards the relaxation of the OSG certification
that Molina required. Section 18 of this remedial regulation provides:
SEC. 18. Memoranda. – The court may require the parties and
the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor
General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their claims
within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require
the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the
case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers
may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period
herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision,
with or without the memoranda. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The petitioner argues that the RTC decision of April 19, 2002 should be
vacated for prematurity, as it was rendered despite the absence of the required
OSG certification specified inMolina. According to the petitioner, A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC, which took effect only on March 15, 2003, cannot overturn the requirements
of Molina that was promulgated as early as February 13, 1997.
The petitioner’s argument lacks merit.
The amendment introduced under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SCis procedural or

remedial in character; it does not create or remove any vested right, but only
operates as a remedy in aid of or confirmation of already existing rights. The
settled rule is that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect, [25] as we held cralaw
in De Los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat:[26] cralaw
Procedural Laws do not come within the legal conception of a

retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of
statues - they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch
as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure, removed the mandatory

nature of an OSG certification and may be applied retroactively to pending
matters. In effect, the measure cures in any pending matter any procedural lapse
on the certification prior to its promulgation. Our rulings in Antonio v.
Reyes[27] and Navales v. Navales[28] have since confirmed and clarified that A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC has dispensed with the Molina guideline on the matter of certification,
although Article 48 mandates the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal to ensure
that no collusion between the parties would take place. Thus, what is important is the
presence of the prosecutor in the case, not the remedial requirement that he be certified to
be present. From this perspective, the petitioner’s objection regarding the Molina guideline
on certification lacks merit. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Remand of the Case to the RTC is Improper
The petitioner maintains that vacating the lower courts’ decisions and the remand
of the case to the RTC for further reception of evidence are procedurally permissible. She
argues that the inadequacy of her evidence during the trial was the fault of her former
counsel, Atty. Richard Tabago, and asserts that remanding the case to the RTC would allow
her to cure the evidentiary insufficiencies. She posits in this regard that while mistakes of
counsel bind a party, the rule should be liberally construed in her favor to serve the ends of
justice. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We do not find her arguments convincing. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings amounts to the grant of a
new trial that is not procedurally proper at this stage. Section 1 of Rule 37 provides that an
aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside a judgment or final
order already rendered and to grant a new trial within the period for taking an
appeal. In addition, a motion for new trial may be filed only on the grounds of (1)
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that could not have been guarded
against by ordinary prudence, and by reason of which the aggrieved party’s rights
have probably been impaired; or (2) newly discovered evidence that, with
reasonable diligence, the aggrieved party could not have discovered and produced
at the trial, and that would probably alter the result if presented.
In the present case, the petitioner cites the inadequacy of the evidence
presented by her former counsel as basis for a remand. She did not, however,
specify the inadequacy. That the RTC granted the petition for declaration of
nullity prima facie shows that the petitioner’s counsel had not been negligent in
handling the case. Granting arguendo that the petitioner’s counsel had been
negligent, the negligence that would justify a new trial must be excusable, i.e. one
that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against. The
negligence that the petitioner apparently adverts to is that cited in Uy v. First Metro
Integrated Steel Corporation where we explained:[29] cralaw
Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings in the

trial court as a result of the ignorance, inexperience or incompetence
of counsel do not qualify as a ground for new trial. If such were to be
admitted as valid reasons for re-opening cases, there would never be
an end to litigation so long as a new counsel could be employed to
allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently
diligent, experienced or learned. This will put a premium on the willful
and intentional commission of errors by counsel, with a view to
securing new trials in the event of conviction, or an adverse decision,
as in the instant case.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Thus, we find no justifiable reason to grant the petitioner’s requested remand. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry
Petitioner failed to establish the

respondent’s psychological incapacity
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on

Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that “a marriage contracted by
any party who, at the time of its celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.” In Santos v.
Court of Appeals,[30] the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be cralaw
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The
defect should refer to “no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.” It must be confined to
“the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.”
We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application

of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic v. Court of Appeals where we said:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it “as
the foundation of the nation.” It decrees marriage as legally
“inviolable,” thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be “protected” by the
state.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage

and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must

be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that
the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as apsychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of

the celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do's.” The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but
the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or

clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore,
such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by

Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial

Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts…
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15)
days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
These Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established

in Santos. To reiterate,psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a)
gravity; (b)juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. [31]
These requisites must be cralaw
strictly complied with, as the grant of a petition for nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity must be confined only to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. Furthermore, since the Family Code
does not define “psychological incapacity,” fleshing out its terms is left to us to do
so on a case-to-case basis through jurisprudence.[32] We emphasized this approach cralaw
in the recent case of Ting v. Velez-Ting[33] when we explained: cralaw
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize

in Ngo Te that each case involving the application of Article 36 must be
treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant
facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
In the present case and using the above standards and approach, we find
the totality of the petitioner’s evidence insufficient to prove that the respondent is
psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband.
a. Petitioner’s testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and
incurability of respondent’s condition
The petitioner’s evidence merely showed that the respondent: (a)

reneged on his promise to cohabit with her; (b) visited her occasionally from 1993
to 1997; (c) forgot her birthday in 1992, and did not send her greeting cards during
special occasions; (d) represented himself as single in his visa application; (e)
blamed her for the death of his mother; and (f) told her he was working in Davao
when in fact he was cohabiting with another woman in 1997. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry
These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the “psychological
incapacity” that the law requires, and should be distinguished from the “difficulty,”
if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations
that characterize some marriages. In Bier v. Bier,[34] we ruled that it was not cralaw
enough that respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty

in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these
obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral
element in the respondent's personality structure that effectively incapacitated him
from complying with his essential marital obligations – had to be shown and was
not shown in this cited case.
In the present case, the respondent’s stubborn refusal to cohabit with the
petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never proven to be rooted in
some psychological illness. As the petitioner’s testimony
reveals, respondent merely refused to cohabit with her for fear of jeopardizing his
application for a scholarship, and later due to his fear of antagonizing his family.
The respondent’s failure to greet the petitioner on her birthday and to send her
cards during special occasions, as well as his acts of blaming petitioner for his
mother’s death and of representing himself as single in his visa application, could
only at best amount to forgetfulness, insensitivity or emotional immaturity, not
necessarily psychological incapacity. Likewise, the respondent’s act of living with
another woman four years into the marriage cannot automatically be equated with
a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that
promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. In fact,
petitioner herself admitted that respondent was caring and faithful when they were
going steady and for a time after their marriage; their problems only came in later.
To be sure, the respondent was far from perfect and had some character
flaws. The presence of these imperfections, however, does not necessarily warrant
a conclusion that he had a psychological malady at the time of the marriage that
rendered him incapable of fulfilling his duties and obligations. To use the words
of Navales v. Navales:[35] cralaw
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take

cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere “difficulty,”
“refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of marital obligations or “ill will” on
the part of the spouse is different from “incapacity” rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition or illness.Indeed, irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding
of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only
be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness
that is contemplated by said rule.
b. Dr. Tayag’s psychological report and court testimony
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about the respondent’s
psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only one side
– the petitioner – whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this
circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her
report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and
stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above.[36] For, effectively, cralaw
Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account;
she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have
reacted and responded to the doctor’s probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner’s narrations, and
on this basis characterized the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, and
unremorseful person who “believes that the world revolves around him”; and who
“used love as a…deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended
towards him.” Dr. Tayag then incorporated her own idea of “love”; made a
generalization that respondent was a person who “lacked commitment, faithfulness,
and remorse,” and who engaged “in promiscuous acts that made the petitioner look
like a fool”; and finally concluded that the respondent’s character traits reveal “him
to suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality
Disorder declared to be grave and incurable.”
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and

comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed
that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the respondent's narcissistic
personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage.
Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show
that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some
incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but
conclude that Dr. Tayag’s conclusion in her Report – i.e., that the respondent
suffered “Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality
Disorder declared to be grave and incurable” – is an unfounded statement, not a
necessary inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of the
respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner could have been
used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same
statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent’s condition. To make
conclusions and generalizations on the respondent’s psychological condition based
on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting
hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
Petitioner nonetheless contends that Dr. Tayag’s subsequent testimony in

court cured whatever deficiencies attended her psychological report.
We do not share this view.
A careful reading of Dr. Tayag’s testimony reveals that she failed to establish
the fact that at the time the parties were married, respondent was already suffering
from a psychological defect that deprived him of the ability to assume the essential
duties and responsibilities of marriage. Neither did she adequately explain how she
came to the conclusion that respondent’s condition was grave and incurable. To
directly quote from the records:
ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO:
Q: I would like to call your attention to the Report

already marked as Exh. “E-7”, there is a statement to the
effect that his character traits begin to suffer narcissistic
personality disorder with traces of antisocial personality
disorder. What do you mean? Can you please explain in
layman’s word, Madam Witness?
DR. NEDY LORENZO TAYAG:
A: Actually, in a layman’s term, narcissistic personality

disorder cannot accept that there is something wrong
with his own behavioral manifestation. [sic] They feel that
they can rule the world; they are eccentric; they are
exemplary, demanding financial and emotional support,
and this is clearly manifested by the fact that respondent
abused and used petitioner’s love. Along the line, a
narcissistic person cannot give empathy; cannot give love
simply because they love themselves more than anybody
else; and thirdly, narcissistic person cannot support his
own personal need and gratification without the help of
others and this is where the petitioner set in.chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry
Q: Can you please describe the personal [sic] disorder?
A: Clinically, considering that label, the respondent

behavioral manifestation under personality disorder [sic]
this is already considered grave, serious, and treatment
will be impossible [sic]. As I say this, a kind of
developmental disorder wherein it all started during the
early formative years and brought about by one familiar
relationship the way he was reared and cared by the
family. Environmental exposure is also part and parcel of
the child disorder. [sic]
Q: You mean to say, from the formative [years] up to

the present?
A: Actually, the respondent behavioral manner was
[present] long before he entered marriage.
[Un]fortunately, on the part of the petitioner, she never
realized that such behavioral manifestation of the
respondent connotes pathology. [sic]
xxxx
Q: So in the representation of the petitioner that the

respondent is now lying [sic] with somebody else, how
will you describe the character of this respondent who is
living with somebody else?
A: This is where the antisocial personality trait of the

respondent [sic] because an antisocial person is one who
indulge in philandering activities, who do not have any
feeling of guilt at the expense of another person, and this
[is] again a buy-product of deep seated psychological
incapacity.
Q: And this psychological incapacity based on this

particular deep seated [sic], how would you describe the
psychological incapacity? [sic]
A: As I said there is a deep seated psychological

dilemma, so I would say incurable in nature and at this
time and again [sic] the psychological pathology of the
respondent. One plays a major factor of not being able to
give meaning to a relationship in terms of sincerity and
endurance. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q: And if this psychological disorder exists before the

marriage of the respondent and the petitioner, Madam
Witness?
A: Clinically, any disorder are usually rooted from the

early formative years and so if it takes enough that such
psychological incapacity of respondent already existed
long before he entered marriage, because if you analyze
how he was reared by her parents particularly by the
mother, there is already an unhealthy symbiosis
developed between the two, and this creates a major
emotional havoc when he reached adult age. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q: How about the gravity?
A: This is already grave simply because from the very

start respondent never had an inkling that his behavioral
manifestation connotes pathology and second ground
[sic], respondent will never admit again that such
behavior of his connotes again pathology simply because
the disorder of the respondent is not detrimental to
himself but, more often than not, it is detrimental to
other party involved. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
xxxx
PROSECUTOR MELVIN TIONGSON:

Q: You were not able to personally examine the
respondent here?
DR. NEDY TAYAG:
A: Efforts were made by the psychologist but

unfortunately, the respondent never appeared at my
clinic.
Q: On the basis of those examinations conducted with

the petitioning wife to annul their marriage with her
husband in general, what can you say about the
respondent?
A: That from the very start respondent has no

emotional intent to give meaning to their relationship. If
you analyze their marital relationship they never lived
under one room. From the very start of the [marriage],
the respondent to have petitioner to engage in secret
marriage until that time their family knew of their
marriage [sic]. Respondent completely refused,
completely relinquished his marital obligation to the
petitioner. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
xxxx
COURT:
Q: Because you have interviewed or you have

questioned the petitioner, can you really enumerate the
specific traits of the respondent?
DR. NEDY TAYAG:
A: One is the happy-go-lucky attitude of the respondent

and the dependent attitude of the respondent. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry
Q: Even if he is already eligible for employment?
A: He remains to be at the mercy of his mother. He is a

happy-go-lucky simply because he never had a set of
responsibility. I think that he finished his education but he
never had a stable job because he completely relied on
the support of his mother. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry
Q: You give a more thorough interview so I am asking

you something specific?
A: The happy-go-lucky attitude; the overly dependent

attitude on the part of the mother merely because
respondent happened to be the only son. I said that there
is a unhealthy symbiosis relationship [sic] developed
between the son and the mother simply because the
mother always pampered completely, pampered to the
point that respondent failed to develop his own sense of
assertion or responsibility particularly during that stage
and there is also presence of the simple lying act
particularly his responsibility in terms of
handling emotional imbalance and it is clearly manifested
by the fact that respondent refused to build a home
together with the petitioner when in fact they are legally
married. Thirdly, respondent never felt or completely
ignored the feelings of the petitioner; he never felt guilty
hurting the petitioner because on the part of the
petitioner, knowing that respondent indulge with another
woman it is very, very traumatic on her part yet
respondent never had the guts to feel guilty or to atone
said act he committed in their relationship, and clinically
this falls under antisocial personality. [37]
In terms of incurability, Dr. Tayag’s answer was very vague and inconclusive, thus:
xxxx
ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO
Q: Can this personally be cured, madam witness?
DR. NEDY TAYAG
A: Clinically, if persons suffering from personality

disorder curable, up to this very moment, no scientific
could be upheld to alleviate their kind of personality
disorder; Secondly, again respondent or other person
suffering from any kind of disorder particularly narcissistic
personality will never admit that they are suffering from
this kind of disorder, and then again curability will
always be a question. [sic][38] cralaw
This testimony shows that while Dr. Tayag initially described the general
characteristics of a person suffering from a narcissistic personality disorder, she did
not really show how and to what extent the respondent exhibited these traits. She
mentioned the buzz words that jurisprudence requires for the nullity of a marriage
– namely, gravity, incurability, existence at the time of the marriage, psychological
incapacity relating to marriage – and in her own limited way, related these to the
medical condition she generally described. The testimony, together with her report,
however, suffers from very basic flaws.
First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the
respondent’s exact condition except in a very general way. In short, her testimony
and report were rich in generalities but disastrously short on particulars, most
notably on how the respondent can be said to be suffering from narcissistic
personality disorder; why and to what extent the disorder is grave and incurable;
how and why it was already present at the time of the marriage; and the effects of
the disorder on the respondent’s awareness of and his capability to undertake the
duties and responsibilities of marriage. All these are critical to the success of the
petitioner’s case.
Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it
was wholly based on what the petitioner related to her. As the doctor admitted to
the prosecutor, she did not at all examine the respondent, only the
petitioner. Neither the law nor jurisprudence requires, ofcourse, that the person
sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined
by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such
declaration.[39] If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent means,
cralaw
no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit.
[40]
No such independent evidence, however, appears on record to have been
cralaw
gathered in this case, particularly about the respondent’s early life and associations,
and about events on or about the time of the marriage and immediately
thereafter. Thus, the testimony and report appear to us to be no more than a
diagnosis that revolves around the one-sided and meager facts that the petitioner
related, and were all slanted to support the conclusion that a ground exists to
justify the nullification of the marriage. We say this because only the baser qualities
of the respondent’s life were examined and given focus; none of these qualities
were weighed and balanced with the better qualities, such as his focus on having a
job, his determination to improve himself through studies, his care and attention in
the first six months of the marriage, among others. The evidence fails to mention
also what character and qualities the petitioner brought into her marriage, for
example, why the respondent’s family opposed the marriage and what events led
the respondent to blame the petitioner for the death of his mother, if this allegation
is at all correct. To be sure, these are important because not a few marriages have
failed, not because of psychological incapacity of either or both of the spouses, but
because of basic incompatibilities and marital developments that do not amount to
psychological incapacity. The continued separation of the spouses likewise never
appeared to have been factored in. Not a few married couples have likewise
permanently separated simply because they have “fallen out of love,” or have
outgrown the attraction that drew them together in their younger years.
Thus, on the whole, we do not blame the petitioner for the move to secure a
remand of this case to the trial courts for the introduction of additional evidence;
the petitioner’s evidence in its present state is woefully insufficient to support the
conclusion that the petitioner’s marriage to the respondent should be nullified on
the ground of the respondent’s psychological incapacity.
The Court commiserates with the petitioner’s marital predicament. The

respondent may indeed be unwilling to discharge his marital obligations,
particularly the obligation to live with one’s spouse. Nonetheless, we cannot
presume psychological defect from the mere fact that respondent refuses to comply
with his marital duties. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a
spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is
essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological illness. The psychological illness that must afflict a party at
the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent
as to deprive the party of his or her awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was then about to
assume.[41] cralaw
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we DENY the petition
and AFFIRM the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 25,
2004 and January 18, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75095.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Acting
Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the that the conclusions
in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 164817 July 3, 2009
DIGNA A. NAJERA, Petitioner,

vs.
EDUARDO J. NAJERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated February 23, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68053 and its Resolution August 5, 2004, denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. The Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 68 (RTC), which found petitioner Digna A. Najera and
respondent Eduardo J. Najera entitled to legal separation, but not annulment of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
The facts are as follows:
On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for Designation as
Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains.1
Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is
presently living in the United States of America (U.S.A). They were married on January 31, 1988 by
Rev. Father Isidro Palinar, Jr. at the Saint Andrew the Apostle Church at Bugallon,
Pangasinan.2 They are childless.
Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity
became manifest only after marriage as shown by the following facts:
(a) At the time of their marriage, petitioner was already employed with the Special Services
Division of the Provincial Government of Pangasinan, while respondent was jobless. He did
not exert enough effort to find a job and was dependent on petitioner for support. Only with
the help of petitioner’s elder brother, who was a seaman, was respondent able to land a job
as a seaman in 1988 through the Intercrew Shipping Agency.
(b) While employed as a seaman, respondent did not give petitioner sufficient financial
support and she had to rely on her own efforts and the help of her parents in order to live.
(c) As a seaman, respondent was away from home from nine to ten months each year. In
May 1989, when he came home from his ship voyage, he started to quarrel with petitioner
and falsely accused her of having an affair with another man. He took to smoking marijuana
and tried to force petitioner into it. When she refused, he insulted her and uttered
"unprintable words" against her. He would go out of the house and when he arrived home,
he was always drunk.
(d) When respondent arrived home from his ship voyage in April 1994, as had been
happening every year, he quarreled with petitioner. He continued to be jealous, he arrived
home drunk and he smoked marijuana. On July 3, 1994, while he was quarreling with
petitioner, without provocation, he inflicted physical violence upon her and attempted to kill
her with a bolo. She was able to parry his attack with her left arm, yet she sustained physical
injuries on different parts of her body. She was treated by Dr. Padlan, and the incident was
reported at the Bugallon Police Station.
(e) Respondent left the family home, taking along all their personal belongings. He lived with
his mother at Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, and he abandoned petitioner.
Petitioner learned later that respondent jumped ship while it was anchored in Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A.
Petitioner prayed that upon filing of the petition, an Order be issued appointing her as the sole
administrator of their conjugal properties; and that after trial on the merits, judgment be rendered (1)
declaring their marriage void ab initio in accordance with Article 36 of the Family Code; (2) in the
alternative, decreeing legal separation of petitioner and respondent pursuant to Title II of the Family
Code; and (3) declaring the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of petitioner and respondent and
the forfeiture in
favor of petitioner of respondent’s share in the said properties pursuant to Articles 42 (2) and 63 (2)
of the Family Code; and (4) granting petitioner other just and equitable reliefs.
On March 7, 1997, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion of petitioner to effect service by
publication as provided under Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
On April 17, 1997, respondent filed his Answer3 wherein he denied the material allegations in the
petition and averred that petitioner was incurably immature, of dubious integrity, with very low
morality, and guilty of infidelity. He claimed that the subject house and lot were acquired through his
sole effort and money. As counterclaim, respondent prayed for the award of P200,000.00 as moral
damages, P45,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and P1,000.00 as appearance fee for every scheduled
hearing.
On July 18, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Notice of Appearance.
On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Order4 terminating the pre-trial conference after the parties
signed a Formal Manifestation/Motion, which stated that they had agreed to dissolve their conjugal
partnership of gains and divide equally their conjugal properties.
On August 3, 1998, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ely R. Reintar filed a Compliance manifesting
that after conducting an investigation, he found that no collusion existed between the parties.5 The
initial hearing of the case was held on November 23, 1998.
Petitioner testified in court and presented as witnesses the following: her mother, Celedonia Aldana;
psychologist Cristina R. Gates; and Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of
the Philippine National Police (PNP), Bugallon, Pangasinan.
Petitioner testified that she was a commerce graduate and was working as an accounting clerk in a
government agency in Manila. She and respondent married on January 31, 1988 as evidenced by
their marriage contract.6 At the time of their marriage, respondent was jobless, while petitioner was
employed as Clerk at the Special Services Division of the Provincial Government of Pangasinan with
a monthly salary ofP5,000.00. It was petitioner’s brother who helped respondent find a job as a
seaman at the Intercrew Shipping Agency in Manila. On July 30, 1988, respondent was employed as
a seaman, and he gave petitioner a monthly allotment of P1,600.00. After ten months at work, he
went home in 1989 and then returned to work after three months. Every time respondent was home,
he quarreled with petitioner and accused her of having an affair with another man. Petitioner noticed
that respondent also smoked marijuana and every time he went out of the house and returned
home, he was drunk. However, there was no record in their barangay that respondent was involved
in drugs.7
In 1990, petitioner and respondent were able to purchase a lot out of their earnings. In 1991, they
constructed a house on the lot.8
On July 3, 1994, petitioner and respondent were invited to a party by the boyfriend of petitioner’s
sister. Respondent, however, did not allow petitioner to go with him. When respondent arrived home
at around midnight, petitioner asked him about the party, the persons who attended it, and the ladies
he danced with, but he did not answer her. Instead, respondent went to the kitchen. She asked him
again about what happened at the party. Respondent quarreled with her and said that she was the
one having an affair and suddenly slapped and boxed her, causing her eyes to be bloodied. When
she opened her eyes, she saw respondent holding a bolo, and he attempted to kill her. However,
she was able to parry his attack with her left arm, causing her to sustain injuries on different parts of
her body. When respondent saw that she was bloodied, he got nervous and went out. After 10
minutes, he turned on the light in the kitchen, but he could not find her because she had gone out
and was hiding from him. When she heard respondent start the motorcycle, she left her hiding place
and proceeded to Gomez Street toward the highway. At the highway, she boarded a bus and asked
the conductor to stop at a clinic or hospital. She alighted in Mangatarem, Pangasinan and proceeded
to the clinic of one Dr. Padlan, who sutured her wounds. After a few hours, she went home. 9
When petitioner arrived home, the house was locked. She called for her parents who were residing
about 300 meters away. She then asked her brother to enter the house through the ceiling in order
to open the door. She found that their personal belongings were gone, including her Automated
Teller Machine card and jewelry.10
Thereafter, petitioner reported the incident at the police station of Bugallon, Pangasinan.11
Since then, respondent never returned home. He stayed with his mother in Banaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan. Petitioner learned that he went abroad again, but she no longer received any allotment
from him.12
Petitioner testified that her parents were happily married, while respondent’s parents were
separated. Respondent’s brothers were also separated from their respective wives.13
Petitioner disclosed that she also filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage with the
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Diocese of Alaminos, Pangasinan on the ground of psychological
incapacity of respondent.14
Psychologist Cristina R. Gates testified that she interviewed petitioner, but not respondent who was
abroad. She confirmed her Psychological Report, the conclusion of which reads:
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE INTERVIEWS:
It is clear from the interviews that Respondent is afflicted with psychological hang-ups which are
rooted in the kind of family background he has. His mother had an extramarital affair and separated
from Respondent’s father. This turn of events left an irreparable mark upon Respondent, gauging
from his alcoholic and marijuana habit. In time, he seemed steep in a kind of a double bind where he
both deeply loved and resented his mother.
His baseless accusation against his wife and his violent behavior towards her appears to be an
offshoot of deep-seated feelings and recurrent thoughts towards his own mother. Unable to resolve
his childhood conflicts and anger, he turned to his wife as the scapegoat for all his troubles.
Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM IV), Respondent is afflicted with a Borderline
Personality Disorder as marked by his pattern of instability in his interpersonal relationships, his
marred self-image and self-destructive tendencies, his uncontrollable impulses. Eduardo Najera’s
psychological impairment as traced to his parents’ separation, aggravated by the continued
meddling of his mother in his adult life, antedates his marriage to Petitioner Digna Aldana.
Furthermore, the ingestion of prohibited substances (alcohol and marijuana), known to cause
irreparable damage organically, and the manifest worsening of his violent and abusive behavior
across time render his impairment grave and irreversible. In the light of these findings, it is
recommended that parties’ marriage be annulled on grounds of psychological incapacity on the part
of Respondent Eduardo Najera to fully assume his marital duties and responsibilities to Digna
Aldana-Najera.15
Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that the chances of curability of respondent’s psychological
disorder were nil. Its curability depended on whether the established organic damage was minimal --
referring to the malfunction of the composites of the brain brought about by habitual drinking and
marijuana, which possibly afflicted respondent with borderline personality disorder and
uncontrollable impulses.16
Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan, testified that on July
3, 1994, he received a complaint from petitioner that respondent arrived at their house under the
influence of liquor and mauled petitioner without provocation on her part, and that respondent tried to
kill her. The complaint was entered in the police blotter.17
On March 31, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision that decreed only the legal separation of the
petitioner and respondent, but not the annulment of their marriage. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Decreeing legal separation of Petitioner/Plaintiff Digna Najera and respondent/defendant

Eduardo Najera;
2. Ordering the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of the petitioner/plaintiff and

respondent/defendant, and to divide the same equally between themselves pursuant to their
Joint Manifestation/Motion dated April 27, 1998.18
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution19 dated May 2, 2000.
Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision and Resolution to the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the RTC, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby DISMISSED and judgment of the Trial Court
is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.20
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated
August 5, 2004.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
1. The Court of Appeals failed to take into consideration the Decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, contrary to the guidelines decreed by the Supreme Court in
the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198.
2. The evidence of petitioner proved the root cause of the psychological incapacity of
respondent Eduardo Najera.
3. The factual basis of the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is
practically the same set of facts established by petitioner’s evidence submitted before the
trial court and therefore the same conclusion ought to be rendered by the Court.
4. Credence ought to be given to the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina R. Gates as an

expert in Psychology.21
The main issue is whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage
warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.22
Petitioner contends that her evidence established the root cause of the psychological incapacity of
respondent which is his dysfunctional family background. With such background, respondent could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, particularly the duty of complying with the
The Court is not persuaded.
Republic v. Court of Appeals23 laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article
36 of the Family Code, thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
xxxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but
may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.1avvphi1
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally -- subject to our law on evidence -- what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the State and the Church -- while remaining independent, separate and apart from each
other -- shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v.
Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."24 The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated.25 In fact, the root cause may be "medically
or clinically identified."26 What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish
the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.27
In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence submitted by
petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage. The root cause of respondent’s alleged psychological
incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable.
As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist Cristina Gates’ conclusion that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated was based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and was not based on
her personal knowledge and evaluation of respondent; thus, her finding is unscientific and
unreliable.28 Moreover, the trial court correctly found that petitioner failed to prove with certainty that
the alleged personality disorder of respondent was incurable as may be gleaned from Psychologist
Cristina Gates’ testimony:
Q You mentioned in your report that respondent is afflicted with a borderline personality
disorder. [D]id you find any organic cause?
A No, sir.
Q Do you think that this cause you mentioned existed at the time of the marriage of the
respondent?
A I believe so, sir. Physically, if you examined the [respondent’s family] background, there
was strong basis that respondent developed mal-adoptive pattern.
Q Did you interview the respondent’s family?
A No, sir , but on the disclosure of petitioner (sic).
xxxx
Q Have you [seen] the respondent?
A He is not in the country, sir.
Q Madam Witness, this disorder that you stated in your report which the respondent is
allegedly affected, is this curable?
A The chances are nil.

Q But it is curable?
A It depends actually if the established organic damage is minimal.
Q What is this organic damage?
A Composites of the brain is malfunctioning.
Q How did you find out the malfunctioning since you have not seen him (respondent)?
A His habitual drinking and marijuana habit possibly afflicted the respondent with borderline
personality disorder. This [is] based on his interpersonal relationships, his marred self-image
and self-destructive tendencies, and his uncontrollable impulses.
Q Did you interview the respondent in this regard?
A I take the words of the petitioner in this regard.29
The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by petitioner in regard to
the physical violence or grossly abusive conduct of respondent toward petitioner and respondent’s
abandonment of petitioner without justifiable cause for more than one year are grounds for legal
separation30 only and not for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the Decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal which her counsel sought to be admitted by the Court of Appeals on February
11, 2004, twelve days before the decision was promulgated on February 23, 2004. She contended
that the Court of Appeals failed to follow Guideline No. 7 in Republic v. Court of Appeals, thus:
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear
that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally – subject to our
law on evidence – what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church – while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other – shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the
inviolable base of the nation.
Petitioner’s argument is without merit.
In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals apparently did not have the
opportunity to consider the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it
is clear that the Court of Appeals considered the Matrimonial Tribunal’s decision in its Resolution
dated August 5, 2004 when it resolved petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In the said Resolution,
the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the very same issues now raised before this Court and
correctly held that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was devoid of merit. It stated:
The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated July 2, 2002, which was
forwarded to this Court only on February 11, 2004, reads as follows:
x x x The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-
law of Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before
the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and
lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that the
husband-respondent upon contracting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of
judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract: First, his family was dysfunctional in that
as a child, he saw the break-up of the marriage of his own parents; his own two siblings have broken
marriages; Second, he therefore grew up with a domineering mother with whom [he] identified and
on whom he depended for advice; Third, he was according to his friends, already into drugs and
alcohol before marriage; this affected his conduct of bipolar kind: he could be very quiet but later
very talkative, peaceful but later hotheaded even violent, he also was aware of the infidelity of his
mother who now lives with her paramour, also married and a policeman; Finally, into marriage, he
continued with his drugs and alcohol abuse until one time he came home very drunk and beat up his
wife and attacked her with a bolo that wounded her; this led to final separation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine
Name and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case
hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in
favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code
of Canon Law.
However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show that, other than herself, petitioner-
appellant offered the testimonies of the following persons only, to wit: Aldana Celedonia (petitioner-
appellant’s mother), Sonny de la Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R.
Gates (psychologist). Said witnesses testified, in particular, to the unfaithful night of July 1, 1994
wherein the respondent allegedly made an attempt on the life of the petitioner. But unlike the hearing
and finding before the Matrimonial Tribunal, petitioner-appellant’s sister-in-law and friends of the
opposing parties were never presented before said Court. As to the contents and veracity of the
latter’s testimonies, this Court is without any clue.
1avvphi1
True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al. (268 SCRA 198), the Supreme Court held
that the interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
However, the Highest Tribunal expounded as follows:
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally – subject to our
law on evidence – what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void x x x.
And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence states:
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which the
evidence is offered must be specified.
Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not expect us to give credence to the
Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently, it was made on a different
set of evidence of which We have no way of ascertaining their truthfulness.
Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments must be based on the evidence presented
before the court (Manzano vs. Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And based on the evidence on record,
We find no ample reason to reverse or modify the judgment of the Trial Court.31
Santos v. Santos32 cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision
Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family
Code. It stated that a part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the
Code of Canon Law, which reads:
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions
causes of a psychological nature, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those
who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and
obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portion of the decision of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reads:
The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of
Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the
Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead
this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that the husband-
respondent upon contacting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment,
thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract x x x.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine
Name and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case
hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in
favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code
of Canon Law. x x x
Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts established by petitioner before the trial court, the decision
of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by the
court a quo is not based on the psychological incapacity of respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred in
stating that the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding the psychological incapacity of
respondent is supported by the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
68053, dated February 23, 2004, and its Resolution dated August 5, 2004, are hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 127358 March 31, 2005
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
x-------------------x
G.R. No. 127449 March 31, 2005
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed by petitioner
Noel Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his
wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent filed her answer, petitioner,
with leave of court, amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed an
amended answer denying the allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated.1
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage entered into between plaintiff Noel A. Buenaventura
and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura on July 4, 1979, null and void ab initio;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in the amount of 2.5 million pesos
and exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest from the date of this decision
plus attorney’s fees of P100,000.00;
3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant expenses of litigation of P50,000.00, plus costs;
4) Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property[,] particularly the
plaintiff’s separation/retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank [and] Trust
Company[,] by ceding, giving and paying to her fifty percent (50%) of the net amount
of P3,675,335.79 or P1,837,667.89 together with 12% interest per annum from the date of
this decision and one-half (1/2) of his outstanding shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park
and Provident Group of Companies;
5) Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his son Javy Singh Buenaventura in the
amount of P15,000.00 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises;
6) Awarding the care and custody of the minor Javy Singh Buenaventura to his mother, the
herein defendant; and
7) Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert back to the use of her maiden family name
Singh.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the appropriate civil registry and registries of
properties.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the
appellate court, respondent filed a motion to increase theP15,000 monthly support pendente lite of
their son Javy Singh Buenaventura. Petitioner filed an opposition thereto, praying that it be denied or
that such incident be set for oral argument.3
On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution increasing the support pendente
lite to P20,000.4 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration questioning the said Resolution.5
On October 8, 1996, the appellate court promulgated a Decision dismissing petitioner’s appeal for
lack of merit and affirming in toto the trial court’s decision.6Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied. From the abovementioned Decision, petitioner filed the instant
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
On November 13, 1996, through another Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration of the September 2, 1996 Resolution, which increased the monthly support for
the son.7 Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari to question these two Resolutions.
On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review on Certiorari8 and the Petition for Certiorari9 were ordered
consolidated by this Court.10
In the Petition for Review on Certiorari petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals decided the case
not in accord with law and jurisprudence, thus:
1. WHEN IT AWARDED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT

OF P2.5 MILLION AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P1 MILLION, WITH 6% INTEREST
FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL AND MORAL BASIS;
2. WHEN IT AWARDED P100,000.00 ATTORNEY’S FEES AND P50,000.00 EXPENSES

OF LITIGATION, PLUS COSTS, TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, WITHOUT FACTUAL AND
LEGAL BASIS;
3. WHEN IT ORDERED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NOEL TO PAY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE

ONE-HALF OR P1,837,667.89 OUT OF HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM
THE FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO., WITH 12% INTEREST THEREON FROM THE
DATE OF ITS DECISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SAID RETIREMENT BENEFITS
ARE GRATUITOUS AND EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF NOEL, AND ALSO TO DELIVER TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OF HIS SHARES OF STOCK WITH THE MANILA
MEMORIAL PARK AND THE PROVIDENT GROUP OF COMPANIES, ALTHOUGH SAID
SHARES OF STOCK WERE ACQUIRED BY NOEL BEFORE HIS MARRIAGE TO
RESPONDENT ISABEL AND ARE, THEREFORE, AGAIN HIS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES;
AND
4. WHEN IT AWARDED EXCLUSIVE CARE AND CUSTODY OVER THE PARTIES’ MINOR
CHILD TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WITHOUT ASKING THE CHILD (WHO WAS
ALREADY 13 YEARS OLD AT THAT TIME) HIS CHOICE AS TO WHOM, BETWEEN HIS
TWO PARENTS, HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CUSTODY OVER HIS PERSON.11
In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances the following contentions:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED
TO SET RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR INCREASED SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES’
SON FOR HEARING.12
THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO INCREASE JAVY’S

MONTHLY SUPPORT OF P15,000.00 BEING GIVEN BY PETITIONER EVEN AT
PRESENT PRICES.13
IN RESOLVING RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR THE INCREASE OF JAVY’S SUPPORT,

THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE EXAMINED THE LIST OF EXPENSES
SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN THE LIGHT OF PETITIONER’S OBJECTIONS
THERETO, INSTEAD OF MERELY ASSUMING THAT JAVY IS ENTITLED TO A P5,000
INCREASE IN SUPPORT AS SAID AMOUNT IS "TOO MINIMAL."14
LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN PETITIONER AN

OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE HIS PRESENT INCOME TO SHOW THAT HE CANNOT
AFFORD TO INCREASE JAVY’S SUPPORT.15
With regard to the first issue in the main case, the Court of Appeals articulated:
On Assignment of Error C, the trial court, after findings of fact ascertained from the
testimonies not only of the parties particularly the defendant-appellee but likewise, those of
the two psychologists, awarded damages on the basis of Articles 21, 2217 and 2229 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
Thus, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant deceived the defendant-appellee into
marrying him by professing true love instead of revealing to her that he was under heavy
parental pressure to marry and that because of pride he married defendant-appellee; that he
was not ready to enter into marriage as in fact his career was and always would be his first
priority; that he was unable to relate not only to defendant-appellee as a husband but also to
his son, Javy, as a father; that he had no inclination to make the marriage work such that in
times of trouble, he chose the easiest way out, that of leaving defendant–appellee and their
son; that he had no desire to keep defendant-appellee and their son as proved by his
reluctance and later, refusal to reconcile after their separation; that the aforementioned
caused defendant-appellee to suffer mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation,
sleepless nights not only in those years the parties were together but also after and
throughout their separation.
Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial court’s decision on the ground that unlike those arising
from a breach in ordinary contracts, damages arising as a consequence of marriage may not
be awarded. While it is correct that there is, as yet, no decided case by the Supreme Court
where damages by reason of the performance or non-performance of marital obligations
were awarded, it does not follow that no such award for damages may be made.
Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer, specifically prayed for moral and exemplary
damages in the total amount of 7 million pesos. The lower court, in the exercise of its
discretion, found full justification of awarding at least half of what was originally prayed for.
We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court.16
The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on Articles 2217 and 21 of the Civil Code,
which read as follows:
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 221917 of the Civil Code enumerates the cases in
which moral damages may be recovered and it mentions Article 21 as one of the instances. It must
be noted that Article 21 states that the individual must willfully cause loss or injury to another. There
is a need that the act is willful and hence done in complete freedom. In granting moral damages,
therefore, the trial court and the Court of Appeals could not but have assumed that the acts on which
the moral damages were based were done willfully and freely, otherwise the grant of moral damages
would have no leg to stand on.
On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and void based on Article
36 of the Family Code, due to psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura. Article
36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus:
. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. . . .18
The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as
proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts considered these acts as willful
and hence as grounds for granting moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a
product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate
inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the
petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same
set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of
entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by
a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such
evidence appears to have been adduced in this case.
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that one must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes
the basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. If the
private respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner.
Therefore, the award of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact.
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of exemplary damages
cannot stand since the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.19
With respect to the grant of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation the trial court explained, thus:
Regarding Attorney’s fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code authorizes an award of attorney’s fees
and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, when as in this case the plaintiff’s act or
omission has compelled the defendant to litigate and to incur expenses of litigation to protect
her interest (par. 2), and where the Court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered. (par. 11)20
The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral and exemplary damages is fully justified,
the award of attorney’s fees and costs of litigation by the trial court is likewise fully justified.21
The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to deduce his psychological incapacity,
and his act in filing the complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be considered as unduly
compelling the private respondent to litigate, since both are grounded on petitioner’s psychological
incapacity, which as explained above is a mental incapacity causing an utter inability to comply with
the obligations of marriage. Hence, neither can be a ground for attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses. Furthermore, since the award of moral and exemplary damages is no longer justified, the
award of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation is left without basis.
Anent the retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank and Trust Co. and the shares of stock
in the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies, the trial court said:
The third issue that must be resolved by the Court is what to do with the assets of the
conjugal partnership in the event of declaration of annulment of the marriage. The Honorable
Supreme Court has held that the declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a
judgment for the liquidation of property (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
104818, Sept. 17, 1993, 226 SCRA, pp. 572 – 573, 586). Thus, speaking through Justice
Flerida Ruth P. Romero, it was ruled in this case:
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment
therein shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of
their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the
previous proceedings.
The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and therefore, all property acquired
during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or
registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the
contrary is proved (Art. 116, New Family Code; Art. 160, Civil Code). Art. 117 of the Family
Code enumerates what are conjugal partnership properties. Among others they are the
following:
1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the
spouses;
2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the
spouses;
3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the
common property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each
spouse. . . .
Applying the foregoing legal provisions, and without prejudice to requiring an inventory of
what are the parties’ conjugal properties and what are the exclusive properties of each
spouse, it was disclosed during the proceedings in this case that the plaintiff who worked first
as Branch Manager and later as Vice-President of Far East Bank & Trust Co. received
separation/retirement package from the said bank in the amount of P3,701,500.00 which
after certain deductions amounting to P26,164.21 gave him a net amount of P3,675,335.79
and actually paid to him on January 9, 1995 (Exhs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11). Not having shown
debts or obligations other than those deducted from the said retirement/separation pay,
under Art. 129 of the Family Code "The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties
shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless
a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlement or unless there
has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code." In this
particular case, however, there had been no marriage settlement between the parties, nor
had there been any voluntary waiver or valid forfeiture of the defendant wife’s share in the
conjugal partnership properties. The previous cession and transfer by the plaintiff of his one-
half (1/2) share in their residential house and lot covered by T.C.T. No. S-35680 of the
Registry of Deeds of Parañaque, Metro Manila, in favor of the defendant as stipulated in their
Compromise Agreement dated July 12, 1993, and approved by the Court in its Partial
Decision dated August 6, 1993, was actually intended to be in full settlement of any and all
demands for past support. In reality, the defendant wife had allowed some concession in
favor of the plaintiff husband, for were the law strictly to be followed, in the process of
liquidation of the conjugal assets, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated
shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom
their only child has chosen to remain (Art. 129, par. 9). Here, what was done was one-half
(1/2) portion of the house was ceded to defendant so that she will not claim anymore for past
unpaid support, while the other half was transferred to their only child as his presumptive
legitime.
Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the defendant wife by way of her share in the
conjugal properties, and it is but just, lawful and fair, that she be given one-half (1/2) share of
the separation/retirement benefits received by the plaintiff the same being part of their
conjugal partnership properties having been obtained or derived from the labor, industry,
work or profession of said defendant husband in accordance with Art. 117, par. 2 of the
Family Code. For the same reason, she is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the outstanding shares
of stock of the plaintiff husband with the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of
Companies.22
The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter as follows:
On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-appellant assails the order of the trial court for him to give
one-half of his separation/retirement benefits from Far East Bank & Trust Company and half
of his outstanding shares in Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies to the
defendant-appellee as the latter’s share in the conjugal partnership.
On August 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision approving the Compromise
Agreement entered into by the parties. In the same Compromise Agreement, the parties had
agreed that henceforth, their conjugal partnership is dissolved. Thereafter, no steps were
taken for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at least half of the separation/retirement

benefits which plaintiff-appellant received from Far East Bank & Trust Company upon his
retirement as Vice-President of said company for the reason that the benefits accrued from
plaintiff–appellant’s service for the bank for a number of years, most of which while he was
married to defendant-appellee, the trial court adjudicated the same. The same is true with
the outstanding shares of plaintiff-appellant in Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of
Companies. As these were acquired by the plaintiff-appellant at the time he was married to
defendant-appellee, the latter is entitled to one-half thereof as her share in the conjugal
partnership. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court.23
Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of
Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the
absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the
general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime
applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City,24 this Court expounded on the
consequences of a void marriage on the property relations of the spouses and specified the
applicable provisions of law:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof,
the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the
provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article
147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous
cases; it provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did
not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed
to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in
the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of
the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a
void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in
the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e.,
any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through

their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits
of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article
144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that —
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s] inter vivos [of] his or her share in co-
ownership property, without the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the
co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of
the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place
upon the termination of the cohabitation or declaration of nullity of the marriage.
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common
property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which had
jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with authority
to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling
that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property
in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property
owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles
50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail.
The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in
the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-
ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the
Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by its
explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to voidmarriages under Article 40 of
the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of
a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule
that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are
inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their
nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final
judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with
any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the
provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the Family Code, on the effects of
the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous
marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that
the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between
spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between
common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the
ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the
Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious,
that the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title
V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property
regime of the spouses.25
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be
covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have
been included or involved in said distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties owned in common by the parties herein as ordered by the court a quo should, therefore,
be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of
gains.
As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only child, Javy Singh Buenaventura, it is now
moot since he is about to turn twenty-five years of age on May 27, 200526 and has, therefore,
attained the age of majority.
With regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition for Certiorari, these would also now be
moot, owing to the fact that the son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, as previously stated, has attained
the age of majority.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 1996 and its Resolution dated
December 10, 1996 which are contested in the Petition for Review (G.R. No. 127449), are hereby
MODIFIED, in that the award of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, expenses of
litigation and costs are deleted. The order giving respondent one-half of the retirement benefits of
petitioner from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and one-half of petitioner’s shares of stock in Manila
Memorial Park and in the Provident Group of Companies is sustained but on the basis of the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains. The rest of said Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358) contesting the Court of Appeals’ Resolutions
of September 2, 1996 and November 13, 1996 which increased the support pendente lite in favor of
the parties’ son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, is now MOOT and ACADEMIC and is, accordingly,
DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
LOLITA D. ENRICO, G.R. No. 173614
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
- versus- Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA,and
HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. REYES, JJ.
MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD
CATLI-MEDINACELI, REPRESENTED
BY VILMA M. ARTICULO, Promulgated:
Respondents.
September 28, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
cralawTheinstant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure assails the Order,[1] dated 3 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. II-4057, granting reconsideration of
its Order,[2] dated 11 October 2005, and reinstating respondents Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
cralawOn17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli

(Eulogio) and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D.
Enrico.Substantially, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio
and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan.[3]They begot
seven children, herein respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane,
Haizel, Michelle and Joseph Lloyd.[4]On 1 May 2004, Trinidad died.[5]On 26 August
2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan.
[6]Six months later, or on 10 February 2005, Eulogio passed away.[7]
In impugning petitioners marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same

was entered into without the requisite marriage license.They argued that Article
34[8] of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been living
together for at least five years without any legal impediment from securing a
marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because they could
not have lived together under the circumstances required by said
provision.Respondents posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was
dissolved only upon the latters death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely three
months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner.Therefore, petitioner and
Eulogio could not have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.To
further their cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack of marriage
ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness which made its performance impossible.
cralawInher Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as
husband and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they
were exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. From their union were
born Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico, all surnamed Medinaceli, on 28 October
1988 and 30 October 1991, respectively.She further contended that the marriage
ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized
by the Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the
action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file
an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
cralawOn11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order,[9] granting the dismissal of the
Complaint for lack of cause of action.It cited A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,[10] dated 7
March 2003, promulgated by the Supreme Court En Banc as basis.The RTC
elucidated on its position in the following manner:
The Complaint should be dismissed.
1)Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the

Supreme Court which took effect on March 15, 2003 provides in
Section 2, par. (a)[11] that a petition for Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife.The language of this rule is plain and simple which states
that such a petition may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife.The rule is clear and unequivocal that only the husband or
the wife may file the petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of a Void Marriage.The reading of this Court is that the right to
bring such petition is exclusive and this right solely belongs to
them.Consequently, the heirs of the deceased spouse cannot
substitute their late father in bringing the action to declare the
marriage null and void.[12] (Emphasis supplied.)
cralawThe dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:
WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an affirmative defense

in the answer is hereby GRANTED.Accordingly, the Complaint filed by
the [respondents] is hereby DISMISSED with costs de officio. [13]
cralawRespondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof.Following the filing by

petitioner of her Comment to the said motion, the RTC rendered an
Order[14] dated 3 May 2006, reversing its Order of 11 October 2005.Hence, the
RTC reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed Order ignored
the ruling in Nial v. Bayadog,[15] which was on the authority for holding that the
heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a void marriage even after
the death of the latter.It held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC, which
provides that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife, applies only where both parties to a void
marriage are still living.[16]Where one or both parties are deceased, the RTC held
that the heirs may file a petition to declare the marriage void.The RTC expounded
on its stance, thus:
The questioned Order disregarded the case of Nial vs. Bayadog, 328
SCRA 122 (March 14, 2000) in which the Supreme Court, First
Division, held that the heirs of a deceased person may file a petition
for the declaration of his marriage after his death.The Order subject of
this motion for reconsideration held that the case of Nial vs. Bayadog
is now superseded by the new Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Marriages (hereinafter referred to as the Rule) because the
Supreme Court has rejected the case of Nial vs. Bayadog by approving
the Rule on Nullity of Void Marriages.The Order further held that it is
only the husband or the wife who is (sic) the only parties allowed to
file an action for declaration of nullity of their marriage and such right
is purely personal and is not transmissible upon the death of the
parties.
It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the case of

Nial vs. Bayadog and Section 2(a) of the Rule.In view of this, the Court
shall try to reconcile the case of Nial vs. Bayadog and the Rule.To
reconcile, the Court will have to determine [the] basic rights of the
parties.The rights of the legitimate heirs of a person who entered into
a void marriage will be prejudiced particularly with respect to their
successional rights.During the lifetime of the parent[,] the heirs have
only an inchoate right over the property of the said parents.Hence,
during the lifetime of the parent, it would be proper that it should
solely be the parent who should be allowed to file a petition to declare
his marriage void.However, upon the death of the parent his heirs
have already a vested right over whatever property left by the
parent.Such vested right should not be frustrated by any rules of
procedure such as the Rule.Rules of Procedure cannot repeal rights
granted by substantive law.The heirs, then, have a legal standing in
Court.
If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void marriage entered
by their parent, especially when the marriage is illegal and feloniously
entered into, it will give premium to such union because the guilty
parties will seldom, if ever at all, ask for the annulment of the
marriage.Such void marriage will be given a semblance of validity if
the heirs will not be allowed to file the petition after the death of the
parent.
For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the Rules on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage is applicable only when both
parties to a (sic) void marriage are still living.Upon the death of
anyone of the guilty party to the void marriage, his heirs may file a
petition to declare the the (sic) marriage void, but the Rule is not
applicable as it was not filed b the husband or the wife.It shall be the
ordinary rule of civil procedure which shall be applicable.[17]
Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006 states:
cralawInview of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for

reconsideration datedOctober 31, 2005 and reinstate this case.[18]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order;
however, on 1 June 2006, the RTC denied the said motion on the ground that no
new matter was raised therein.[19]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on
the sole question of whether the case law as embodied in Nial, or the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of the Supreme Court applies to
the case at bar.
cralawAt
the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated route to this Court,
countenancing the hierarchy of courts.
We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has the concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the RTCs (for writs enforceable within
their respective regions), to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, the
litigants are well advised against taking a direct recourse to this Court.[20] Instead,
they should initially seek the proper relief from the lower courts.As a court of last
resort, this Court should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in
the first instance. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is concurrently within
the competence of the Court of Appeals or the RTC, litigants must observe the
principle of hierarchy of courts. [21]However, it cannot be gainsaid that this Court
has the discretionary power to brush aside procedural lapses if compelling reasons,
or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise
of its jurisdiction.[22]Moreover, notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant
Petition for its failure to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, this Court
will proceed to entertain the case grounded as it is on a pure question of law.
Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the instant case.A
contrario, respondents posit that it is Nial which is applicable, whereby the heirs of
the deceased person were granted the right to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage after his death.
We grant the Petition.
In reinstating respondents Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the RTC

acted with grave abuse of discretion.
While it is true that Nial in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a
petition for the declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to therein respondent
after the death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason
that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code.The Court in Nial recognized that the applicable law to determine the
validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code, which was the law in
effect at the time of their celebration.[23]What we have before us belongs to a
different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was entered into
during the effectivity of the Family Code.As can be gleaned from the facts,
petitioners marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of

Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope, to
wit:
Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of

absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages under the Family Code of thePhilippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.(Emphasis supplied.)
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt.The
coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988.[24]
Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003, following its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, contrary to the opinion of
the RTC, there is no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with
the ruling in Nial, because they vary in scope and application.As has been
emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of
the Philippines, and is prospective in its application. The marriage of petitioner to
Eulogio was celebrated on 26 August 2004, and it squarely falls within the ambit of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
cralawHence,
in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, which provides:
cralawSection 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
cralaw(a)
Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife. (n) (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no ambiguity in the Rule.Absolute sententil expositore non indiget.When

the language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required.Section 2(a) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to
file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of

Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders
explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
1.Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment

of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages.Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.[Section 2; Section
3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for
annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages.Such petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the
State.The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a
legal right to file the petition.Compulsory or intestate heirs
have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their
predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts.On the other hand, the concern
of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.
[25] (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo.Nonetheless, all
is not lost for respondents.While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already
without any recourse under the law.They can still protect their successional right,
for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional
Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage
of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of
a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse
filed in the regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED
DISMISSED without prejudice to challenging the validity of the marriage of Lolita
D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the latter.No costs.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Manila
THIRD DIVISION
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, cralawG.R. No. 179922

cralawPetitioner,
Present:
- versus - cralawYNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson, cralaw
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also cralawcralawCHICO-NAZARIO,
known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. NACHURA, and
DE CARLOS or FELICIDADcralaw cralawREYES, JJ.
SANDOVAL CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA.cralaw
DE CARLOS, and TEOFILOcralaw Promulgated:
CARLOS II,
Respondents.cralaw cralawDecember 16, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages
solemnized during the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior
to March 15, 2003. The nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a
judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment.
We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the

[1]
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside the summary
judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage, status of a child, recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of money, and
damages.
The Facts
The events that led to the institution of the instant suit are unveiled as follows:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six
parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios
Carlos. The lots are particularly described as follows:
Parcel No. 1
Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137
of the Court of Land Registration.
Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is

specifically reserved.
Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.
Parcel No. 2
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in
the Bo. of Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x
containing an area of Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One
(13,441) square meters.
Parcel No. 3
A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903,

approved as a non-subd. project), being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC]
Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot
155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the
S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-
1 (Road widening) all of the subd. plan, containing an area
of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS, more or less.
PARCEL No. 4
A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a

portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in
the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the
NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE,
along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River; and on the West., along line
6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x containing an area
of ONETHUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.
PARCEL No. 5
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de

Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela
36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos
Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla
a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es
un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E.
que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un
extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS
CUADRADOS.
PARCEL No. 6
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De

Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con la parcela
37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos
Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla
at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que
es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina
E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una
extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS
CUADRADOS.[3]
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The
agreement was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in
turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal
heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the
name of Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No.
139061 issued by the Registry of Deeds ofMakati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued
by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered
by TCT No. 160401 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by

respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilos
death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and
co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are covered byTCT Nos.
219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before

the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case,
the parties submitted and caused the approval of a partial compromise
agreement. Under the compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective
shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. This
includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land.
On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition,

dividing theremaining land of the first parcel between them.
Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,[4] 2,331 square meters

of the second parcel of land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The
remaining 10,000-square meter portion was later divided between petitioner and
respondents.
The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed

on August 17, 1994, with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted
the supplemental compromise agreement, which was approved accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under
the contracts, the parties equally divided between them the third and fourth parcels
of land.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-
135, against respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of
action: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of
property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages. The complaint
was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.
In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother
Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required
marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the
natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with
respondent Felicidad with respect to the subject real properties. He also prayed for
the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He
argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums
received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.
Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary

damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.
On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the
material averments of petitioners complaint. Respondents contended that the
dearth of details regarding the requisite marriage license did not invalidate
Felicidads marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that TeofiloII was the
illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman.
On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial
court. They also asked that their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages,
as well as attorneys fees, be granted.
But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for
summary judgment.Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the
peace who solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted the Certificate of
Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and
respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.
On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the
ground of irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath,
petitioner lodged his own motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a
certification from the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there
is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.
Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the

testimony of respondent Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in Civil
Case No. 89-2384, entitledCarlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las
Pias. In her testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II
is her child with Teofilo.[5]
Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial
court its report and manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion between
the parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants (respondents) Motion

for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiffs (petitioners)
Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and
summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as follows:
1.cralawDeclaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval

and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962,
evidenced by the Marriage Certificate submitted in this case, null and
void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license;
2.cralawDeclaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not

the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo E.
Carlos;
3.cralawOrdering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the
sum ofP18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon at the legal
rate from date of filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;
4.cralawDeclaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel

of land, less the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
11975, covered by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati
City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to cancel said title and to
issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
5.cralawDeclaring the Contract, Annex K of complaint, between plaintiff

and defendant Sandoval null and void, and ordering the Register of
Deeds of Makati City to cancelTCT No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo
Carlos, and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
6.cralawDeclaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between

plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void;
7.cralawOrdering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of

defendant Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the
exclusive name of plaintiff herein;
8.cralawOrdering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of

defendant Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the
sole name of plaintiff herein.
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiffs evidence
on his claim for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees,
appearance fees, and litigation expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30
o'clock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents

argued, inter alia, that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
rendering summary judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad
and in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from

is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new
one is entered REMANDING the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment

by the court a quo contrary to law and public policy as ensconced in
the aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it was appellants who first
sought summary judgment from the trial court, did not justify the
grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an action to recover upon
a claim or to obtain a declaratory relief, the rule on summary
judgment apply (sic) to an action to annul a marriage. The mere
fact that no genuine issue was presented and the desire to expedite
the disposition of the case cannot justify a misinterpretation of the
rule. The first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil
Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a
marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. Yet,
the affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment
practically amount to these methods explicitly proscribed by the law.
We are not unmindful of appellees argument that the foregoing

safeguards have traditionally been applied to prevent collusion of
spouses in the matter of dissolution of marriages and that the death of
Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively dissolved the marriage
herein impugned. The fact, however, that appellees own brother and
appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as husband and wife for
thirty years and that the annulment of their marriage is the very
means by which the latter is sought to be deprived of her participation
in the estate left by the former call for a closer and more thorough
inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the case. Rather that the
summary nature by which the court a quo resolved the issues in the
case, the rule is to the effect that the material facts alleged in the
complaint for annulment of marriage should always be proved. Section
1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer

fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court
may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such
pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for
legal separation, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved. (Underscoring
supplied)
Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the

rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the
record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still
not be warranted. While it may be readily conceded that a valid
marriage license is among the formal requisites of marriage, the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to
reflect the serial number of the marriage license on the marriage
contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and appellant
Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee
represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the contrary,
appellant Felicidad Sandovals affirmation of the existence of said
marriage license is corroborated by the following statement in the
affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who
officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:
That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage

license issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis
of the said marriage contract executed by Teofilo Carlos
and Felicidad Sandoval, but the number of said marriage
license was inadvertently not placed in the marriage
contract for the reason that it was the Office Clerk who
filled up the blanks in the Marriage Contract who in turn,
may have overlooked the same.
Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of
the considered view that the veracity and credibility of the foregoing
statement as well as the motivations underlying the same should be
properly threshed out in a trial of the case on the merits.
If the non-presentation of the marriage contract the primary evidence

of marriage is not proof that a marriage did not take place, neither
should appellants non-presentation of the subject marriage license be
taken as proof that the same was not procured. The burden of proof to
show the nullity of the marriage, it must be emphasized, rests upon
the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of
the marriage.
Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who
disputes the legitimacy of a particular party, the same may be said of
the trial courts rejection of the relationship between appellant Teofilo
Carlos II and his putative father on the basis of the inconsistencies in
appellant Felicidad Sandovals statements. Although it had effectively
disavowed appellants prior claims regarding the legitimacy of appellant
Teofilo Carlos II, the averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate
son of appellees brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the
possibility of the said appellants illegitimate filiation, his right to prove
the same or, for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as
such.
Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find
appellees bare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely
purchased from an indigent couple by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on
the whole, insufficient to support what could well be a minors total
forfeiture of the rights arising from his putative filiation.Inconsistent
though it may be to her previous statements, appellant Felicidad
Sandovals declaration regarding the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo
Carlos II is more credible when considered in the light of the fact that,
during the last eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said
appellant the use of his name and the shelter of his household. The
least that the trial court could have done in the premises was to
conduct a trial on the merits in order to be able to thoroughly resolve
the issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos II.[8]
On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition
of the ponente,Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.
Issues
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:
1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment

under the Decision, Annex A hereof, and in denying petitioners Motion
for reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect
to the nullity of the impugned marriage, petitioner respectfully submits
that the Court of Appeals committed a grave reversibleerror in
applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact that the
circumstances of this case are different from that contemplated and
intended by law, or has otherwise decided a question of substance not
theretofore decided by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a
manner probably not in accord with law or with the applicable
decisions of this Honorable Court;
2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment

and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court
of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits
that the Court of Appeals committed a serious reversible error in
applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of
Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35
governing Summary Judgments;
3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment

and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court
of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits
that the Court of Appealscommitted grave abuse of discretion,
disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on ground of
speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise committed
misapplications of the laws and misapprehension of the facts.
[9]
(Underscoring supplied)
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared

void ab initiothrough a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and
without the benefit of a trial.But there are other procedural issues, including the
capacity of one who is not a spouse in bringing the action for nullity of marriage.
Our Ruling
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be

proved.Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is
allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19[10] of the Revised Rules of
Court, which provides:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to

tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the
adverse partys pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage
or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall
always be proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing
summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.
cralawPetitioner
is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the
provisions of the Rule on judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial
court, the CA likewise considered the provisions on summary judgments, to wit:
Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on

summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record
shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be
warranted. x x x[11]
But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the

CA was correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial
court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have
no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in
annulment of marriage.
cralawWith the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as Rule on Declaration of

Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the
question on the application of summary judgments or even judgment on the
pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been stamped with
clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which took effect
onMarch 15, 2003[12] is found in Section 17, viz.:
SEC. 17. Trial. (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the
trial of the case. No delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be
allowed except as to matters involving property relations of the
spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of

marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring
supplied)
Likewise instructive is the Courts pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.

[13]
In that case, We excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the
application of summary judgments.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of

marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal separation, summary
judgment is applicable to all kinds of actions.[14] (Underscoring
supplied)
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its
lawful right and duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not
terminated by the declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists
between the parties. The State should have been given the opportunity to present
controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.[15]
cralawBoth the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the
prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when
the public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of
evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence, the public
prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down before
the court is not fabricated.
cralawTo
further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public
prosecutor, viz.:
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. (a) x x x
cralaw(b)
x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public
prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to
prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring
supplied)
cralaw
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General
will ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in
proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or
suppression of evidence.[16]
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may

be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage
cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2)
Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and

Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it
exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring
supplied)
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to
file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of
the Rule is enlightening, viz.:
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment

of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate
heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief
that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or
intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their
predecessor, and,hence, can only question the validity of the marriage
of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve
marriage and not to seek its dissolution.[17] (Underscoring supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole
architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who
can decide when and how to build the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone
are the engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously the directors and
actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and should
decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a
demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into
during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.[18]
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks
the beginning ofthe end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a
nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended
to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriagemay be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean
that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They
can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules
on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the
validity of themarriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of
nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.[19]
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already
commenced beforeMarch 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the
coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective
on March 15, 2003[20] is prospective in its application.Thus, the Court held in Enrico
v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,[21] viz.:
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages

under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its
application.[22] (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent

Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14,
1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place.[23]
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
the applicable lawis the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration.[24] But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare
the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the
declaration of nullity of marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code

cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage
case. Such person must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
[25]
Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in
procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of
the real party-in-interest.[26]
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest
in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from
mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One
having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as
plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the realparty-in-interest, the case is
dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.[27]
Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,[28] where the Court
held:
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time
the respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no
specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of
marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate proper
interest can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage,
like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of
action. Thus, in Nial v. Badayog, the Court held that the children have
the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of
their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their
successional rights.
xxxx
In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the nullity

of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the
divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the
case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary
to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce
decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or
restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos remarriage,
then the trial court should declare respondents marriage as bigamous
and void ab initio but reduced the amount of moral damages
from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages
fromP200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is
proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which
allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the
instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that
petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the
same.[29] (Underscoring supplied)
III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is

a real-party-in-interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in
controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992,
his only surviving compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo
II. Under the law on succession, successional rights are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory heirs are called to succeed by
operation of law.[30]
cralawUpon Teofilos death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the
extent of the value of the inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory
heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving
spouse and child, respectively.
cralawArticle 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:
(1)cralawLegitimate children and descendants, with respect to their

legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2)cralawIn default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants,
with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3)cralawThe widow or widower;
(4)cralawAcknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal

fiction;
(5)cralawOther illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil

Code.[31]
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although
a collateral relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a
compulsory heir, he still has a right tosucceed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003
of the New Civil Code provide:
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with
the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other
half.
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate

children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles. (Underscoring supplied)
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children

excludes collateral relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The
presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the
deceased precludes succession by collateral relatives.[32] Conversely, if there are no
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent.[33]
If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the

legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then
have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother
with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral relatives, like a
brother and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent dies
without issue and without ascendants in the direct line.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no
other siblings butpetitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a
legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other
half of the estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow pursuant
to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-interest to
seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother
with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio,
petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring

the nullity of marriage case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is
not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son

of Teofilo, then petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage
of his deceased brother and respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that
he has no successional right to be protected, hence, does not have proper
interest. For although the marriage in controversy may be found to be void from
the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because the presence of
descendant, illegitimate,[34] or even an adopted child[35] excludes the collateral
relatives from inheriting from the decedent.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to
determine the validity or nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But
the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack
of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate,
illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother
of petitioner.
IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent

Teofilo II is proper and in order. There is a need to vacate the disposition
of the trial court as to the other causes of action before it.
cralawPetitioner
did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on
the remand of the case concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This
notwithstanding, We should not leave the matter hanging in limbo.
This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as
error by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just
resolution of the case.[36]
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the
case, petitioners bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an
indigent couple is insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his
putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to support its pronouncement that
the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent
Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such declaration
of respondent Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA of the
guaranty provided by Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status of
legitimacy of a child, to wit:
cralawARTICLE167. The child shall be considered legitimate although

the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress.(Underscoring supplied)
It is stressed that Felicidads declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is

the very act that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of
the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her
child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid
marriage.[37]
cralawFinally,
the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of
action concerning reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money must be
vacated. This has to be so, as said disposition was made on the basis of its finding
that the marriage in controversy was null and void ab initio.
cralaw
cralawWHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:
1.cralawThe case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard

to the action on the status and filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II
and the validity or nullity of marriage between respondent Felicidad
Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;
2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally

adopted son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is
strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action fornullity of marriage for
lack of cause of action;
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision

is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch
and to give this case priority in its calendar.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
ELMAR O. PEREZ,G.R. No. 162580

Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
cralaw- versus -cralawYnares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
COURT OF APPEALS, Fifth
Division, TRISTAN A. CATINDIGPromulgated:
and LILY GOMEZ-CATINDIG,
Respondents.January 27, 2006
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assails the July 25, 2003 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
74456 which set aside and declared as null and void the September 30, 2002
Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 84, granting petitioner's
motion for leave to file intervention and admitting the Complaint-in-
Intervention[3] in Civil Case No. Q-01-44847; and its January 23,
2004 Resolution[4] denying the motion for reconsideration.
Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig[5] twice on May
16, 1968. The first marriage ceremony was celebrated
at the Central Methodist Church at T.M. Kalaw Street,Ermita, Manila while the
second took place at the Lourdes Catholic Church in La Loma, QuezonCity. The
marriage produced four children.
Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems that they decided to
separate from each other.Upon advice of a mutual friend, they decided to obtain a
divorce from the Dominican Republic. Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily
executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge of the First Civil Court
of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a
divorce action under its laws.[6]
Thereafter, on April 30, 1984, the private respondents filed a joint petition for
dissolution of conjugal partnership with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. On June
12, 1984, the civil court in theDominican Republic ratified the divorce by mutual
consent of Tristan and Lily. Subsequently, onJune 23, 1984,
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, ordered the complete
separation of properties between Tristan and Lily.
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State
of Virginia in the United States[7] and both lived as husband and wife until October
2001. Their union produced one offspring.[8]
cralaw
During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the
court in theDominican Republic which 'dissolved the marriage between Tristan and
Lily was not recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was
deemed void under Philippine law. When she confronted Tristan about this, the
latter assured her that he would legalize their union after he obtains an annulment
of his marriage with Lily. Tristan further promised the petitioner that he would
adopt their son so that he would be entitled to an equal share in his estate as that
of each of his children with Lily.[9]
On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Lily with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as Case No.
Q-01-44847.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention [10] claiming
that she has a legal interest in the matter in litigation because she knows certain
information which might aid the trial court at a truthful, fair and just adjudication of
the annulment case, which the trial court granted on September 30,
2002.Petitioner's complaint-in-intervention was also ordered admitted.
Tristan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals
seeking to annul the order dated September 30, 2002 of the trial court. The Court
of Appeals granted the petition and declared as null and void the September 30,
2002 Order of the trial court granting the motion for leave to file intervention and
admitting the complaint-in-intervention.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition for certiorari
and prohibition filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.Petitioner contends that
the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in disregarding her legal interest
in the annulment case between Tristan and Lily.
The petition lacks merit.

Ordinarily, the proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a decision of the Court of
Appeals is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. However, if the error subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act
complained of was granted by a court with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, as alleged in this case, the proper remedy is a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules.[11] This is based on the premise that
in issuing the assailed decision and resolution, the Court of Appeals acted with
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of lack of jurisdiction and there is
no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.A remedy is
considered plain, speedy, and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from
the injurious effect of the judgment and the acts of the lower court.[12]
It is therefore incumbent upon the petitioner to establish that the Court of Appeals
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
when it promulgated the assailed decision and resolution.
We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower
court or tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence. By grave abuse of discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.[13]The word 'capricious, usually
used in tandem with the term 'arbitrary, conveys the notion of willful and
unreasoning action.Thus, when seeking the corrective hand of certiorari, a clear
showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is imperative.[14]
The Rules of Court laid down the parameters before a person, not a party to a case
can intervene, thus:
Who may intervene. ' A person who has a legal interest in the matter
in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court
or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to
intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights
may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.[15]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The requirements for intervention are: [a] legal interest in the matter in litigation;
and [b] consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of the original
parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the intervenor's rights may be
protected in a separate proceeding or not.[16]
Legal interest, which entitles a person to intervene, must be in the matter in
litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either
gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.[17] Such interest
must be actual, direct and material, and not simply contingent and expectant.[18]
Petitioner claims that her status as the wife and companion of Tristan for 17 years
vests her with the requisite legal interest required of a would-be intervenor under
the Rules of Court.
Petitioner's claim lacks merit. Under the law, petitioner was never the legal wife of
Tristan, hence her claim of legal interest has no basis.
When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan was still lawfully
married to Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from
the Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage bond between them.It is basic
that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.[19] Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will
be governed by Philippine laws with respect to his or her family rights and duties,
or to his or her status, condition and legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of
whether he or she was married here or abroad,initiates a petition abroadto obtain
an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting an
absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce.
[20]
When Tristan and Lily married on May 18, 1968, their marriage was governed by
the provisions of the Civil Code[21] which took effect on August 30, 1950.In the
case of Tenchavez v. Escano[22]we held:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and

decreed after theeffectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act No.
386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and
neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the
divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of
divorce, entitled to validity in the country. (Emphasis added)
Thus, petitioner's claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their marriage was
celebrated abroad lacks merit.Thus, petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a
wife upon which her motion for intervention is based.
Since petitioner's motion for leave to file intervention was bereft of the
indispensable requirement of legal interest, the issuance by the trial court of the
order granting the same and admitting the complaint-in-intervention was attended
with grave abuse of discretion. Consequently, the Court of Appeals correctly set
aside and declared as null and void the said order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated July 25,
2003 and Resolution dated January 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 74456 areAFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
ROBERTO DOMINGO, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA
represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA, Respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no grave abuse of discretion
in the lower court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage and separation of property.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against
petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J
alleged among others that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center
Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036
issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz
on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage
only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to
the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only when
she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer since 1983
up to the present, he has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and
subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties with a total
amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and administration of Roberto;
sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with
another woman; she further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties without
her knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises
R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the
possession and administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not
authorized to administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of their marriage. The petition
prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining
Roberto from exercising any act of administration and ownership over said properties; their marriage
be declared null and void and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be declared the sole and
exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void marriage and such properties be
placed under the proper management and administration of the attorney-in-
fact.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. The
marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous
and unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property which is in his
possession.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss for
lack of merit. She explained:
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a man with
another woman is illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145
SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void
marriage (citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v. Mendoza, 95
Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case there is no dispute that the second marriage
contracted by respondent with herein petitioner after a first marriage with another
woman is illegal and void. However, as to whether or not the second marriage should
first be judicially declared a nullity is not an issue in said case. In the case of Vda. de
Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed
that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab
initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting,
still there is need for judicial declaration of its nullity. (37 SCRA 316,
326) chanrobles virtual law library
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous
rulings of the Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of Aragon and
Mendoza.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no

property in his possession is an issue that may be determined only
after trial on the merits. 1
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application of Vda. de Consuegra
v. GSIS 2 and the absence of justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On September
11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the motion for reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days
from receipt within which to file his answer.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action
of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals 3 dismissed the petition. It explained that the case of Yap
v. CA 4 cited by petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have
relevance in the case at bar, there being no identity of facts because these cases dealt with the
successional rights of the second wife while the instant case prays for separation of property corollary
with the declaration of nullity of marriage. It observed that the separation and subsequent distribution
of the properties acquired during the union can be had only upon proper determination of the status of
the marital relationship between said parties, whether or not the validity of the first marriage is denied
by petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits, the declaration of
nullity of marriage may be invoked in this proceeding together with the partition and distribution of
the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the Family Code, it held that private
respondent's prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised together with
other incidents of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted that since
the Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss is merely one of
law for which the remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in
case of an adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied for lack of merit. 5 chanrobles virtual law library
Hence, this petition.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the
following.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the
affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
law library
chanrobles virtual
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain
real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon 6 and People v. Mendoza, 7 contends that SP. No.
1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private respondent
must be dismissed for being unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore, under his own interpretation
of Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage is required only for purposes of remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no
allegation of private respondent's intention to remarry, said petition should therefore, be
dismissed.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial declaration of the nullity of
their marriage, not for purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and
distribution of the properties acquired during coverture.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the
former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is
from the beginning. 8 Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage. 9 chanrobles virtual law library
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are cases where the
Court had earlier ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void,
bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex Reyes, however, dissented on these
occasions stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there would be
nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was
void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. . . . 10 chanrobles virtual law library
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent cases involving the same
issue. Thus, inGomez v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in
the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's order forfeiting the husband's share of
the disputed property acquired during the second marriage, the Court stated that "if the nullity, or
annulment of the marriage is the basis for the application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial
declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an action for that purpose." chanrobles virtual law library
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service
Insurance System, that "although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of
such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras, 12 however, the Court turned around and applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling
once again. In granting the prayer of the first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving
spouse and the correction of the death certificate of her deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he
second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is
null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a void marriage." chanrobles virtual law library
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court reverted to
the Consuegra case and held that there was "no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior
marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though
void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and
purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage
with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel." chanrobles virtual law library
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or
a ground for defense. 14 Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected
marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 15 chanrobles virtual law library
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee 16 which drafted what is
now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be
allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. This is borne out
by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees
where the present Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed.
B. Article 39. -
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of

a final judgment declaring the marriage void, except as provided in
Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only void but
also voidable marriages. He then suggested that the above provision be modified as
follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .

Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked

only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for himself
whether or not his marriage is valid and that a court action is needed. Justice Puno
accordingly proposed that the provision be modified to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final

judgment annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage void,
except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice Puno,

however, pointed out that, even if it is a judgment of annulment, they still have to
produce the judgment.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final

judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided in Article
41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid, does it include
the annulment of a marriage and the declaration that the marriage is void? Justice
Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit added that in some judgments, even if
the marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno suggested that this matter
be made clear in the provision.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first a
judicial declaration of a void marriage and not annullable marriages, with which the
other members concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable marriages are presumed
valid until a direct action is filed to annul it, which the other members affirmed. Justice
Puno remarked that if this is so, then the phrase "absolute nullity" can stand since it
might result in confusion if they change the phrase to "invalidity" if what they are
referring to in the provision is the declaration that the marriage is
void.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral defense as well
as collateral attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision is that
there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage void and a party should not
declare for himself whether or not the marriage is void, while the other members
affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are, therefore, trying to avoid a collateral
attack on that point. Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on
the assumption that the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they depriving one of
the right to raise the defense that he has no liability because the basis of the liability is
void? Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say that there will be no judgment on the
validity or invalidity of the marriage because it will be taken up in the same
proceeding. It will not be a unilateral declaration that, it is a void marriage. Justice
Caguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that they limit the provision to
remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be

invoked only on the basis of final judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for

purposes of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage only on
the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void,
except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:

For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage,
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in
Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not solve
the objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute

nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a
final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one enters into
a subsequent marriage without obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity of a
previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is void ab initio.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
library
chanrobles virtual law
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the original
wording of the provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for

purposes of remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article 41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of
the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged
with bigamy. 18 chanrobles virtual law library
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a necessity for a declaration of
absolute nullity of a prior subsisting marriage before contracting another in the recent case of Terre
v. Terre. 19 The Court, in turning down the defense of respondent Terre who was charged with grossly
immoral conduct consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other
than complainant while his prior marriage with the latter remained subsisting, said that "for purposes
of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration
that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential." chanrobles virtual law library
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, petitioner submits
that the same can be maintained only if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this
purpose, according to petitioner's theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of the word "solely." As
it is placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void." Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the
Committee members, the provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not state "The absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case
"solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been such,
the interpretation of petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the
clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." chanrobles virtual law library
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage.
Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation,
partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action
for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive
legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be
limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in
the instance where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires
to enter into another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the
previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for purposes of remarriage, why
should the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage, other
evidence is acceptable? chanrobles virtual law library
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is

the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State." 20 In more explicit terms,
the Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal, and family life." 21 So
crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a matter of
policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be
accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union is so
defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso
jure and with no legal effect - and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would
be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for
nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive.
For such a social significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and
nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public
declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same
would be easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a second sought to be
contracted by one of the parties may be gleaned from new information required in the Family Code to
be included in the application for a marriage license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and where
the previous marriage was dissolved and annulled." 23 chanrobles virtual law library
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is,
undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that private respondent's failure to state in the
petition that the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is
untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term "solely"
was in fact anticipated by the members of the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for purposes
of remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final judgment." Justice Puno
suggested that they say "on the basis only of a final judgment." Prof. Baviera
suggested that they use the legal term "solely" instead of "only," which the Committee
approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of marriage is unnecessary,
petitioner suggests that private respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery
of the properties alleged to have been acquired during their union. In such an eventuality, the lower
court would not be acting as a mere special court but would be clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the
issues of possession and ownership. In addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to
separate or partition as the petition admits that all the properties were acquired with private
respondent's money.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the prayer for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as
the separation of their properties." chanrobles virtual law library
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide
for "the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support
of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had
been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing therefrom, in
proper cases, are the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may
be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in
bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal
partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are
none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of
children, the innocent spouse; chanrobles virtual law library
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee
contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked
by operation of law; chanrobles virtual law library
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in
bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be
stipulated as irrevocable; and chanrobles virtual law library
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be
disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession.
(n) chanrobles virtual law library
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage
shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary
disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n) 26
library
chanrobles virtual law
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for separation of property will
simply be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary
civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the
effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to
the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom
the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the
incidental questions regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the respondent court committed
no reversible error in finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court dated February
7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
COULDN’T FIND CASE OF PEOPLE vs.

COBAR
(CA-GR 19344 November 10, 1997)
Republic of the Philipppines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000]
VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO, Petitioner, vs. CONSUELO

TAN, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be
legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statute as void.
The Case chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July 14, 1998 Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA)[1] in CA-GR CR No. 19830 and its January 4, 1999 Resolution denying reconsideration.
The assailed Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in Criminal
Case No. 13848, which convicted herein petitioner of bigamy as follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Dr. Vincent Paul G. Mercado a.k.a. Dr. Vincent G. Mercado of
the crime of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code to have been proven
beyond reasonable doubt, [the court hereby renders] judgment imposing upon him a prison term of
three (3) years, four (4) months and fifteen (15) days of prision correccional, as minimum of his
indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum,
plus accessory penalties provided by law. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Costs against accused.[2]
The Facts chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial courts judgment, as follows: From the
evidence adduced by the parties, there is no dispute that accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and
complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge
Gorgonio J. Ibaez [by reason of] which a Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by the
parties. As entered in said document, the status of accused was single. There is no dispute either that
at the time of the celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused was actually a married man,
having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10,
1976 by Judge Leonardo B. Caares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued in
connection therewith, which matrimony was further blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October
10, 1976 in religious rites at the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City. In the same manner, the civil
marriage between accused and complainant was confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29, 1991
officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City. Both marriages were
consummated when out of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children, while a
child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo
Tan. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the
City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case
before this Court against said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information
dated January 22, 1993. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutors
Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in
RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado
and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for having contracted a
second marriage with herein complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991 when at that time he
was previously united in lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City,
without said first marriage having been legally dissolved. As shown by the evidence and admitted by
accused, all the essential elements of the crime are present, namely: (a) that the offender has been
previously legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or in case the
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3)
that he contract[ed] a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent
marriage ha[d] all the essential requisites for validity. x x x chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused posited the defense that his
previous marriage ha[d] been judicially declared null and void and that the private complainant had
knowledge of the first marriage of accused. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into with Ma. Consuelo Tan on June
27, 1991, accuseds prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was subsisting, no judicial action having
yet been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage with Ma.
Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of the nullity of his first marriage ha[d] yet been made at the
time of his second marriage, it is clear that accused was a married man when he contracted such
second marriage with complainant on June 27, 1991. He was still at the time validly married to his
first wife.[3]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
But here, the final judgment declaring null and void accuseds previous marriage came not before the
celebration of the second marriage, but after, when the case for bigamy against accused was already
tried in court. And what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of any person who shall contract a
second subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved.
[4] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Hence, this Petition.[5]
The Issues chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to convict
petitioner. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
B chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
punishing bigamy, in relation to Articles 36 and 40 of the Family Code, negates the guilt of
C chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of reasonable doubt.[6]
The Courts Ruling chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Petition is not meritorious.
Main Issue:Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The elements of this crime are as follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. That the offender has been legally married; chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of bigamy were present. It is
undisputed that petitioner married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City. While that
marriage was still subsisting, he contracted a second marriage, this time with Respondent Ma.
Consuelo Tan who subsequently filed the Complaint for bigamy. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio. Unlike voidable marriages
which are considered valid until set aside by a competent court, he argues that a void marriage is
deemed never to have taken place at all.[8] Thus, he concludes that there is no first marriage to
speak of. Petitioner also quotes the commentaries[9] of former Justice Luis Reyes that it is now settled
that if the first marriage is void from the beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge. But if the first
marriage is voidable, it is not a defense. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage was declared null and void under Article
36 of the Family Code, but she points out that that declaration came only after the Information had
been filed. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. She argues that a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void previous marriage must be obtained before a person can marry for a
subsequent time. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We agree with the respondent. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous
marriage has been characterized as conflicting.[10] In People v. Mendoza,[11] a bigamy case
involving an accused who married three times, the Court ruled that there was no need for such
declaration. In that case, the accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of the
first. When the first wife died, he married for the third time. The second wife then charged him with
bigamy. Acquitting him, the Court held that the second marriage was void ab initio because it had
been contracted while the first marriage was still in effect. Since the second marriage was obviously
void and illegal, the Court ruled that there was no need for a judicial declaration of its nullity. Hence,
the accused did not commit bigamy when he married for the third time. This ruling was affirmed by
the Court in People v. Aragon,[12]which involved substantially the same facts. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
But in subsequent cases, the Court impressed the need for a judicial declaration of nullity. In Vda de
Consuegra v. GSIS,[13] Jose Consuegra married for the second time while the first marriage was still
subsisting. Upon his death, the Court awarded one half of the proceeds of his retirement benefits to
the first wife and the other half to the second wife and her children, notwithstanding the manifest
nullity of the second marriage. It held: And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court
observes that although the second marriage can be presumed to be voidab initio as it was celebrated
while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such
nullity. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Tolentino v. Paras,[14] however, the Court again held that judicial declaration of nullity of a void
marriage was not necessary. In that case, a man married twice. In his Death Certificate, his second
wife was named as his surviving spouse. The first wife then filed a Petition to correct the said entry in
the Death Certificate. The Court ruled in favor of the first wife, holding that the second marriage that
he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of the first spouse is null and void from the
beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a
void marriage. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy,[15] the Court stressed the need for such declaration. In that case, Karl
Heinz Wiegel filed an action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lilia Olivia Wiegel on the
ground that the latter had a prior existing marriage. After pretrial, Lilia asked that she be allowed to
present evidence to prove, among others, that her first husband had previously been married to
another woman. In holding that there was no need for such evidence, the Court ruled: x x x There is
likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the
time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs, according to this
Court, a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be
regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz
Wiegel; x x x. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Subsequently, in Yap v. CA,[16] the Court reverted to the ruling in People v. Mendoza, holding that
there was no need for such declaration of nullity. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Domingo v. CA,[17] the issue raised was whether a judicial declaration of nullity was still necessary
for the recovery and the separation of properties of erstwhile spouses. Ruling in the affirmative, the
Court declared: The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause
of action or a ground for defense; in fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a
marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and
void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person
who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.[18] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Unlike Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the other cases herein cited was not a criminal
prosecution for bigamy. Nonetheless, Domingo underscored the need for a judicial declaration of
nullity of a void marriage on the basis of a new provision of the Family Code, which came into effect
several years after the promulgation of Mendozaand Aragon. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law), which
provided: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Illegal marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse shall beillegal and void from its performance, unless: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, the marriage as contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void
by a competent court." chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Court held in those two cases that the said provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage
contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance,
and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable
marriages.[19] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article 83 of the 1950 Civil Code and
Article 41 of the Family Code. However, Article 40 of the Family Code, a new provision, expressly
requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage, as follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment declaring such marriage void was
necessary. Verily, the Family Code and Domingo affirm the earlier ruling in Wiegel. Thus, a Civil Law
authority and member of the Civil Code Revision Commitee has observed: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that the marriage of a person
may be null and void but there is need of a judicial declaration of such fact before that person can
marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug. 19/86, 143
SCRA 499, Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315). This provision changes the old rule that where
a marriage is illegal and void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its
validity (People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033).
In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and Aragon that there is no need for a
judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage -- has been cast aside by Article 40 of the Family
Code. Such declaration is now necessary before one can contract a second marriage. Absent that
declaration, we hold that one may be charged with and convicted of bigamy. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in Terre v. Terre,[21] which involved an
administrative Complaint against a lawyer for marrying twice. In rejecting the lawyers argument that
he was free to enter into a second marriage because the first one was void ab initio, the Court ruled:
for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. The Court further noted that
the said rule was cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the Family Code. Significantly, it observed
that the second marriage, contracted without a judicial declaration that the first marriage was void,
was bigamous and criminal in character. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose earlier work was cited by petitioner,
changed his view on the subject in view of Article 40 of the Family Code and wrote in 1993 that a
person must first obtain a judicial declaration of the nullity of a void marriage before contracting a
subsequent marriage:[22] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a
bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
marriage before contracting the second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that x x x. The
Code Commission believes that the parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their
marriage before they should be allowed to marry again. x x x. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage
declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By
contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial.
To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively
encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare
his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the
criminal case. We cannot allow that. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him.
Damages chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In her Memorandum, respondent prays that the Court set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals
insofar as it denied her claim of damages and attorneys fees.[23] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of the CA against her; hence, she cannot obtain
affirmative relief from this Court.[24] In any event, we find no reason to reverse or set aside the
pertinent ruling of the CA on this point, which we quote hereunder: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented in this case that Consuelo Tan is not the
innocent victim that she claims to be; she was well aware of the existence of the previous marriage
when she contracted matrimony with Dr. Mercado. The testimonies of the defense witnesses prove
this, and we find no reason to doubt said testimonies.
x x x x x x x x x chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of his previous marriage does not inspire
belief, especially as she had seen that Dr. Mercado had two (2) children with him. We are convinced
that she took the plunge anyway, relying on the fact that the first wife would no longer return to Dr.
Mercado, she being by then already living with another man. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case where she was fully conscious of the
consequences of her act. She should have known that she would suffer humiliation in the event the
truth [would] come out, as it did in this case, ironically because of her personal instigation. If there
are indeed damages caused to her reputation, they are of her own willful making.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
SO ORDERED. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Melo, (Chairman), Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Vitug, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
VITUG, J.: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
At the pith of the controversy is the defense of the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
in an indictment for bigamy. The majority opinion, penned by my esteemed brother, Mr.
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, enunciates that it is only a judicially decreed prior void
marriage which can constitute a defense against the criminal
charge. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The civil law rule stated in Article 40 of the Family Code is a given but I have strong
reservations on its application beyond what appears to be its expressed context. The
subject of the instant petition is a criminal prosecution, not a civil case, and
the ponencia affirms the conviction of petitioner Vincent Paul G. Mercado for
bigamy. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Article 40 of the Family code reads: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The phrase for purposes of remarriage is not at all insignificant. Void marriages, like void
contracts, are inexistent from the very beginning. It is only by way of exception that the
Family code requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage before a
subsequent marriage is contracted; without such declaration, the validity and the full legal
consequence of the subsequent marriage would itself be in similar jeopardy under Article
53, in relation to Article 52, of the Family Code. Parenthetically, I would daresay that the
necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage for the purpose of remarriage
should be held to refer merely to cases where it can be said that a marriage, at least
ostensibly, had taken place. No such judicial declaration of nullity, in my view, should still
be deemed essential when the marriage, for instance, is between persons of the same sex
or when either or both parties had not at all given consent to the marriage. Indeed, it is
likely that Article 40 of the Family Code has been meant and intended to refer only to
marriages declared void under the provisions of Articles 35, 36, 37, 38 and 53
thereof. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In fine, the Family Code, I respectfully submit, did not have the effect of overturning the
rule in criminal law and related jurisprudence. The Revised Penal Code
expresses: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Art. 349. Bigamy.---The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Surely, the foregoing provision contemplated an existing, not void, prior marriage. Covered
by article 349 would thus be, for instance, a voidable marriage, it obviously being valid and
subsisting until set aside by a competent court. As early as People vs. Aragon,1 this Court has
underscored: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxx Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had the rule enunciated in Spain
and in America requiring judicial declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages been
within the contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to that effect would or
should have been inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound by said rule of strict
interpretation.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Unlike a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled (and therefore not a
defense in bigamy if the second marriage were contracted prior to the decree
of annulment), the complete nullity, however, of a previously contracted marriage, being a
total nullity and inexistent, should be capable of being independently raised by way of a
defense in a criminal case for bigamy. I see no incongruence between this rule in criminal
law and that of the Family Code, and each may be applied within the respective spheres of
governance. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition.
PRESUMPTIVE DEATH
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
ANGELITA VALDEZ, G.R. No. 180863

Petitioner, chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Present:

chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary cralaw Chairperson,

chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary CHICO-NAZARIO,

- versus - chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary VELASCO, JR.,

chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary NACHURA, and

chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary PERALTA, JJ.

chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Promulgated:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary cralaw September 8, 2009

Respondent. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
cralaw x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac
dated November 12, 2007 dismissing petitioner Angelita Valdezs petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Sofio Polborosa (Sofio).
The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner married Sofio on January 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal. On December 13,
1971, petitioner gave birth to the spouses only child, Nancy. According to
petitioner, she and Sofio argued constantly because the latter was unemployed and
did not bring home any money. In March 1972, Sofio left their conjugal dwelling.
Petitioner and their child waited for him to return but, finally, in May 1972,
petitioner decided to go back to her parents home in Bancay 1st, Camiling, Tarlac.
Three years passed without any word from Sofio. In October 1975, Sofio showed up
at Bancay 1st. He and petitioner talked for several hours and they agreed to
separate. They executed a document to that effect. [1] That was the last time
petitioner saw him. After that, petitioner didnt hear any news of Sofio, his
whereabouts or even if he was alive or not.[2]
Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes on June 20,
1985.[3]Subsequently, however, Virgilios application for naturalization filed with the
United States Department of Homeland Security was denied because petitioners
marriage to Sofio was subsisting.[4] Hence, on March 29, 2007, petitioner filed a
Petition before the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac seeking the declaration of presumptive
death of Sofio.
The RTC rendered its Decision[5] on November 12, 2007, dismissing the Petition for
lack of merit. The RTC held that Angelita was not able to prove the well-grounded
belief that her husband Sofio Polborosa was already dead. It said that under Article
41 of the Family Code, the present spouse is burdened to prove that her spouse has
been absent and that she has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is
already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. This
belief, the RTC said, must be the result of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries
and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse.
The RTC found that, by petitioners own admission, she did not try to find her
husband anymore in light of their mutual agreement to live separately. Likewise,
petitioners daughter testified that her mother prevented her from looking for her
father. The RTC also said there is a strong possibility that Sofio is still alive,
considering that he would have been only 61 years old by then, and people who
have reached their 60s have not become increasingly low in health and spirits, and,
even assuming as true petitioners testimony that Sofio was a chain smoker and a
drunkard, there is no evidence that he continues to drink and smoke until now.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.[6] She argued that it is the Civil Code
that applies in this case and not the Family Code since petitioners marriage to Sofio
was celebrated on January 11, 1971, long before the Family Code took effect.
Petitioner further argued that she had acquired a vested right under the provisions
of the Civil Code and the stricter provisions of the Family Code should not be
applied against her because Title XIV of the Civil Code, where Articles 384 and 390
on declaration of absence and presumption of death, respectively, can be found,
was not expressly repealed by the Family Code. To apply the stricter provisions of
the Family Code will impair the rights petitioner had acquired under the Civil Code.
The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated December 10,
2007.[7]
Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of the RTC Decision
and Motion for Reconsideration.
In its Manifestation and Motion,[8] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
recommended that the Court set aside the assailed RTC Decision and grant the
Petition to declare Sofio presumptively dead. The OSG argues that the requirement
of well-founded belief under Article 41 of the Family Code is not applicable to the
instant case. It said that petitioner could not be expected to comply with this
requirement because it was not yet in existence during her marriage to Virgilio
Reyes in 1985. The OSG further argues that before the effectivity of the Family
Code, petitioner already acquired a vested right as to the validity of her marriage to
Virgilio Reyes based on the presumed death of Sofio under the Civil Code. This
vested right and the presumption of Sofios death, the OSG posits, could not be
affected by the obligations created under the Family Code.[9]
Next, the OSG contends that Article 390 of the Civil Code was not repealed by
Article 41 of the Family Code.[10] Title XIV of the Civil Code, the OSG said, was not
one of those expressly repealed by the Family Code. Moreover, Article 256 of the
Family Code provides that its provisions shall not be retroactively applied if they will
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights.[11]
The RTC Decision, insofar as it dismissed the Petition, is affirmed. However, we

must state that we are denying the Petition on grounds different from those cited in
the RTC Decision.
Initially, we discuss a procedural issue. Under the Rules of Court, a party may
directly appeal to this Court from a decision of the trial court only on pure questions
of law. A question of law lies, on one hand, when the doubt or difference arises as
to what the law is on a certain set of facts; on the other hand, a question of fact
exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged
facts. Here, the facts are not disputed; the controversy merely relates to the
correct application of the law or jurisprudence to the undisputed facts.[12]
The RTC erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code and holding that
petitioner needed to prove a well-founded belief that Sofio was already dead. The
RTC applied Article 41 of the Family Code, to wit:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a

previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration
of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the

preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance
of the absent spouse.
It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of petitioner to Sofio and Virgilio
on January 11, 1971 and June 20, 1985, respectively, were both celebrated under
the auspices of the Civil Code.
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during

the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other
than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at
the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having
news of the absentee being alive, of if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead
and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting
such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be
valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a
competent court.
Article 390 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown

whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for
all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of

opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he
disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five
years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
The Court, on several occasions, had interpreted the above-quoted provision in this
wise:
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have
the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of
absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has
for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions
for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the
celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the
former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know
his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is
generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the
time of the celebration of the marriage.[13]
Further, the Court explained that presumption of death cannot be the subject of
court proceedings independent of the settlement of the absentees estate.
In re Szatraw[14] is instructive. In that case, petitioner contracted marriage with a

Polish national in 1937. They lived together as husband and wife for three years.
Sometime in 1940, the husband, on the pretext of visiting some friends, left the
conjugal abode with their child and never returned. After inquiring from friends,
petitioner found that her husband went to Shanghai, China. However, friends who
came from Shanghai told her that the husband was not seen there. In 1948,
petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband
arguing that since the latter had been absent for more than seven years and she
had not heard any news from him and about her child, she believes that he is dead.
In deciding the case, the Court said:
The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai

Szatraw, because it does not appear that he possessed property
brought to the marriage and because he had acquired no property
during his married life with the petitioner. The rule invoked by the
latter is merely one of evidence which permits the court to presume
that a person is dead after the fact that such person had been unheard
from in seven years had been established. This presumption may arise
and be invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a special
proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a
competent court. Independently of such an action or special
proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor
can it be made the subject of an action or special proceeding. In
this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed
for by the petitioner against her absent husband. Neither is there a
prayer for the final determination of his right or status or for the
ascertainment of a particular fact (Hagans v. Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880),
for the petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's
husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be
presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years. If
there is any pretense at securing a declaration that the petitioner's
husband is dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because it is
unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration that the petitioner's
husband is presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if judicially
made, would not improve the petitioner's situation, because such a
presumption is already established by law. A judicial
pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory,
would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still
disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of
a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only
question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a
competent court has to pass. The latter must decide finally the
controversy between the parties, or determine finally the right or
status of a party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which
certain rights and obligations arise or may arise; and once such
controversy is decided by a final judgment, or such right or status
determined, or such particular fact established, by a final decree, then
the judgment on the subject of the controversy, or the decree upon
the right or status of a party or upon the existence of a particular fact,
becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few
rare instances especially provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that a
judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead,
because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof,
cannot reach the stage of finality or become final. Proof of actual
death of the person presumed dead because he had been unheard
from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to
have such particular fact finally determined. If a judicial decree
declaring a person presumptively dead, because he had not been
heard from in seven years, cannot become final and executory even
after the lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may
be taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains subject
to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless,
unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner.[15]
In Lukban v. Republic,[16] petitioner Lourdes G. Lukban contracted marriage with

Francisco Chuidian on December 10, 1933. A few days later, on December 27,
Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel. She did not hear from him after that
day. Her diligent search, inquiries from his parents and friends, and search in his
cralaw
last known address, proved futile. Believing her husband was already dead since he
had been absent for more than twenty years, petitioner filed a petition in 1956 for a
declaration that she is a widow of her husband who is presumed to be dead and has
no legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage. On the other hand, the
antecedents in Gue v. Republic[17] are similar to Szatraw. On January 5, 1946,
Angelina Gues husband left Manila where they were residing and went
to Shanghai, China. From that day on, he had not been heard of, had not written to
her, nor in anyway communicated with her as to his whereabouts. Despite her
efforts and diligence, she failed to locate him. After 11 years, she asked the court
for a declaration of the presumption of death of Willian Gue, pursuant to the
provisions of Article 390 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
In both cases, the Court reiterated its ruling in Szatraw. It held that a petition for
judicial declaration that petitioner's husband is presumed to be dead cannot be
entertained because it is not authorized by law.[18]
From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that, under the Civil Code, the presumption
of death is established by law[19] and no court declaration is needed for the
presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh
year of absence,[20] Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982.
Consequently, at the time of petitioners marriage to Virgilio, there existed no

impediment to petitioners capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under
paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.
Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of well-founded
belief is not required. Petitioner could not have been expected to comply with this
requirement since the Family Code was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage
to Virgilio. The enactment of the Family Code in 1988 does not change this
conclusion. The Family Code itself states:
Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws.
To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to

exhibit well-founded belief will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second
marriage, which was valid at the time it was celebrated. Such a situation would be
untenable and would go against the objectives that the Family Code wishes to
achieve.
In sum, we hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no decree on the
presumption of Sofios death can be granted under the Civil Code, the same
presumption having arisen by operation of law. However, we declare that petitioner
was capacitated to marry Virgilio at the time their marriage was celebrated in 1985
and, therefore, the said marriage is legal and valid.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,G.R. No. 159614

Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - PUNO, J., Chairman,
' AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF ' TINGA, and
APPEALS (TENTH DIVISION) CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
and ALAN B. ALEGRO,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
December 9, 2005
x-------------------------------------------------
-x'
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, for the declaration of presumptive death of his
wife, Rosalia (Lea) A. Julaton.
In an Order[1] dated April 16, 2001, the court set the petition for hearing on May
30, 2001 at 8:30 a.m. and directed that a copy of the said order be published once
a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in the Samar Reporter, a newspaper of
general circulation in the Province of Samar, and
that a copy be posted in the court's bulletin board for at least three weeks before
the next scheduled hearing. The court also directed that copies of the order be
served on the Solicitor General, the Provincial Prosecutor of Samar, and Alan,
through counsel, and that copies be sent to Lea by registered mail. Alan complied
with all the foregoing jurisdictional requirements.[2]
On May 28, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss[3] the petition, which was, however,
denied by the court for failure to comply with Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.[4]
At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on January
20, 1995 in Catbalogan, Samar.[5] He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea
arrived home late in the evening and he berated her for being always out of their
house. He told her that if she enjoyed the life of a single person, it would be better
for her to go back to her parents.[6] Lea did not reply. Alan narrated that, when he
reported for work the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived
home later in the day, Lea was nowhere to be found.[7] Alan thought that Lea
merely went to her parents' house in Bliss, Sto. Nio, Catbalogan, Samar.
[8] However, Lea did not return to their house anymore.
Alan further testified that, on February 14, 1995, after his work, he went to the
house of Lea's parents to see if she was there, but he was told that she was not
there. He also went to the house of Lea's friend, Janeth Bautista,
at Barangay Canlapwas, but he was informed by Janette's brother-in-law, Nelson
Abaenza, that Janeth had left for .[9] When Alan went back to the house of his
parents-in-law, he learned from his father-in-law that Lea had been to their house
but that she left without notice.[10] Alan sought the help of Barangay Captain Juan
Magat, who promised to help him locate his wife. He also inquired from his friends
of Lea's whereabouts but to no avail.[11]
Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to to look for Lea, but his mother asked
him to leave after the town fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home
for the fiesta. Alan agreed.[12] However, Lea did not show up. Alan then left for on
August 27, 1995. He went to a house in Navotas where Janeth, Lea's friend, was
staying. When asked where Lea was, Janeth told him that she had not seen her.
[13] He failed to find out Lea's whereabouts despite his repeated talks with Janeth.
Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver. On his free time, he would look for
Lea in the malls but still to no avail. He returned to Catbalogan in 1997 and again
looked for his wife but failed.[14]
On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Lea's disappearance to the local police station.
[15] The police authorities issued an Alarm Notice on July 4, 2001. [16] Alan also
reported Lea's disappearance to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on July
9, 2001.[17]
Barangay Captain Juan Magat corroborated the testimony of Alan. He declared that
on February 14, 1995, at 2:00 p.m., Alan inquired from him if Lea passed by his
house and he told Alan that she did not. Alan also told him that Lea had
disappeared. He had not seen Lea in the barangay ever since.[18] Lea's father, who
was his compadre and the owner of Radio DYMS, told him that he did not know
where Lea was.[19]
After Alan rested his case, neither the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor nor the
Solicitor General adduced evidence in opposition to the petition.
On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition. The fallo of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, petitioner's absent

spouse ROSALIA JULATON is hereby declared PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD
for the purpose of the petitioner's subsequent marriage under Article
41 of the Family Code of the Philippines, without prejudice to the effect
of reappearance of the said absent spouse.
SO ORDERED.[20]
The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) which rendered
judgment on August 4, 2003, affirming the decision of the RTC. [21] The CA cited
the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco.[22]
The OSG filed a petition for review on certiorari of the CA's decision alleging that
respondent Alan B. Alegro failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that Lea
was already dead.[23]It averred that the respondent failed to exercise reasonable
and diligent efforts to locate his wife. The respondent even admitted that Lea's
father told him on February 14, 1995 that Lea had been to their house but left
without notice. The OSG pointed out that the respondent reported his wife's
disappearance to the local police and also to the NBI only after the petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss the petition. The petitioner avers that, as gleaned from the
evidence, the respondent did not really want to find and locate Lea. Finally, the
petitioner averred:
In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the
Family Code for the declaration of presumptive death of one's spouse,
the degree of due diligence set by this Honorable Court in the above-
mentioned cases in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must
be strictly complied with. There have been times when Article 41 of the
Family Code had been resorted to by parties wishing to remarry
knowing fully well that their alleged missing spouses are alive and
well. It is even possible that those who cannot have their marriages x
x x declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code resort to
Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of the x x x summary
nature of its proceedings.
It is the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a

basic social institution. Marriage is the foundation of the family. Since
marriage is an inviolable social institution that the 1987 Constitution
seeks to protect from dissolution at the whim of the parties. For
respondent's 'failure to prove that he had a well-founded belief that his
wife is already dead and that he exerted the required amount of
diligence in searching for his missing wife, the petition for declaration
of presumptive death should have been denied by the trial court and
the Honorable Court of Appeals.[24]
The petition is meritorious.
Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines reads:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of
a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger under the circumstances set forth
in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the

preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance
of the absent spouse.[25]
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent
and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before
the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define
what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that 'es menester que
su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos racionales.[26]
Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It
may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even
in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably
founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits,
conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control the
conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to
explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions,
[27] competence evidence on the ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse
and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the
spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse
depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring
before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent
of the inquiries made by present spouse.[28]
Although testimonial evidence may suffice to prove the well-founded belief of the
present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, in Republic v. Nolasco,
[29] the Court warned against collusion between the parties when they find it
impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means. It is also the
maxim that 'men readily believe what they wish to be true.
In this case, the respondent failed to present a witness other

than Barangay Captain Juan Magat. The respondent even failed to present Janeth
Bautista or Nelson Abaenza or any other person from whom he allegedly made
inquiries about Lea to corroborate his testimony. On the other hand, the respondent
admitted that when he returned to the house of his parents-in-law on February 14,
1995, his father-in-law told him that Lea had just been there but that she left
without notice.
The respondent declared that Lea left their abode on February 7, 1995 after he
chided her for coming home late and for being always out of their house, and told
her that it would be better for her to go home to her parents if she enjoyed the life
of a single person. Lea, thus, left their conjugal abode and never returned. Neither
did she communicate with the respondent after leaving the conjugal abode because
of her resentment to the chastisement she received from him barely a month after
their marriage. What is so worrisome is that, the respondent failed to make
inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Lea's whereabouts before filing his
petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced the credibility of the respondent had he
made inquiries from his parents-in-law about Lea's whereabouts considering that
Lea's father was the owner of Radio DYMS.
The respondent did report and seek the help of the local police authorities and the
NBI to locate Lea, but it was only an afterthought. He did so only after the OSG
filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC.
In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that he
had a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition in the RTC, that his spouse
Rosalia (Lea) Julaton was already dead.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73749 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27,
is ORDERED to DISMISS the respondent's petition.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, G.R. No. 165545

Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, Chairperson,*
-versus- CARPIO, Acting Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES, and
TINGA, JJ.
TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE

BAILON, Promulgated:
Respondent.
March 24, 2006
x----------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Court of Appeals Decision[1] dated June 23, 2004[2] and Resolution
dated September 28, 2004[3] reversing the Resolution dated April 2, 2003[4] and
Order dated June 4, 2003[5] of the Social Security Commission (SSC) in SSC Case
No. 4-15149-01 are challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari.
On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice)
contracted marriage in Barcelona, Sorsogon.[6]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the then
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sorsogon a petition[7] to
declare Alice presumptively dead.
By Order of December 10, 1970,[8] the CFI granted the petition, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, there being no opposition filed against the petition

notwithstanding the publication of the Notice of Hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation in the country, Alice Diaz is hereby
declared to [sic] all legal intents and purposes, except for those of
succession, presumptively dead.
SO ORDERED.[9](Underscoring supplied)
Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead or
on August 8, 1983, Bailon contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent) in
Casiguran, Sorsogon.[10]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social Security
System (SSS) since 1960 and a retiree pensioner thereof effective July 1994, died.
[11]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits, and was

granted P12,000[12] by the SSS.
Respondent filed on March 11, 1998 an additional claim for death

benefits[13] which was also granted by the SSS on April 6, 1998.
Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one

Elisa Jayona (Elisa) contested before the SSS the release to respondent of the
death and funeral benefits.She claimed that Bailon contracted three marriages in
his lifetime, the first with Alice, the second with her mother Elisa, and the third with
respondent, all of whom are still alive; she, together with her siblings, paid for
Bailon's medical and funeral expenses; and all the documents submitted by
respondent to the SSS in support of her claims are spurious.
In support of her claim, Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon Chavez (Norma)
submitted an Affidavit dated February 13, 1999[15] averring that they are two of
nine children of Bailon and Elisa who cohabited as husband and wife as early as
1958;and they were reserving their right to file the necessary court action to
contest the marriage between Bailon and respondent as they personally know that
Alice is still very much alive.[16]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the meantime, on April 5, 1999, a certain Hermes P. Diaz, claiming to be

the brother and guardian of 'Aliz P. Diaz, filed before the SSS a claim for death
benefits accruing from Bailon's death,[17]he further attesting in a sworn
statement[18] that it was Norma who defrayed Bailon's funeral expenses.
Elisa and seven of her children[19] subsequently filed claims for death
benefits as Bailon's beneficiaries before the SSS.[20]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS Bicol Cluster, Naga
City recommended the cancellation of payment of death pension benefits to
respondent and the issuance of an order for the refund of the amount paid to her
from February 1998 to May 1999 representing such benefits;the denial of the claim
of Alice on the ground that she was not dependent upon Bailon for support during
his lifetime;and the payment of the balance of the five-year guaranteed pension
to Bailon's beneficiaries according to the order of preference provided under the
law, after the amount erroneously paid to respondent has been collected.The
pertinent portions of the Memorandum read:
1. Aliz [sic] Diaz never disappeared.The court must have been

misled by misrepresentation in declaring the first wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz,
as presumptively dead.
xxxx
x x x the Order of the court in the 'Petition to Declare Alice Diaz

Presumptively Dead, did not become final.The presence of Aliz [sic]
Diaz, is contrary proof that rendered it invalid.
cralawx x x x
3. It was the deceased member who abandoned his wife, Aliz

[sic] Diaz.He, being in bad faith, and is the deserting spouse, his
remarriage is void, being bigamous.
xxxx
In this case, it is the deceased member who was the deserting

spouse and who remarried, thus his marriage to Teresita Jarque, for
the second time was void as it was bigamous.To require affidavit of
reappearance to terminate the second marriage is not necessary as
there is no disappearance of Aliz [sic] Diaz, the first wife, and a
voidable marriage [sic], to speak of.[21](Underscoring supplied)
In the meantime, the SSS Sorsogon Branch, by letter of August 16, 2000,
[22] advised respondent that as Cecilia and Norma were the ones who defrayed
Bailon's funeral expenses, she should return the P12,000 paid to her.
In a separate letter dated September 7, 1999,[23] the SSS advised

respondent of the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits in view of
the opinion rendered by its legal department that her marriage with Bailon was void
as it was contracted while the latter's marriage with Alice was still subsisting;and
the December 10, 1970 CFI Order declaring Alice presumptively dead did not
become final, her 'presence being 'contrary proof against the validity of the order.It
thus requested respondent to return the amount of P24,000 representing the total
amount of monthly pension she had received from the SSS from February 1998 to
May 1999.
Respondent protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death

benefits by letter to the SSS dated October 12, 1999.[24]In a subsequent letter
dated November 27, 1999[25] to the SSC, she reiterated her request for the release
of her monthly pension, asserting that her marriage with Bailon was not declared
before any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful, hence, it remained valid and
subsisting for all legal intents and purposes as in fact Bailon designated her as his
beneficiary.
The SSS, however, by letter to respondent dated January 21, 2000,

[26] maintained the denial of her claim for and the discontinuance of payment of
monthly pension.It advised her, however, that she was not deprived of her right to
file a petition with the SSC.
Respondent thus filed a petition[27] against the SSS before the SSC for the
restoration to her of her entitlement to monthly pension.
In the meantime, respondent informed the SSS that she was returning,
under protest, the amount of P12,000 representing the funeral benefits she
received, she alleging that Norma and her siblings 'forcibly and coercively
prevented her from spending any amount during Bailon's wake.
After the SSS filed its Answer[29] to respondent's petition, and the parties
filed their respective Position Papers, one Alicia P. Diaz filed an Affidavit [30] dated
August 14, 2002 with the SSS Naga Branch attesting that she is the widow of
Bailon; she had only recently come to know of the petition filed by Bailon to declare
her presumptively dead; it is not true that she disappeared as Bailon could have
easily located her, she having stayed at her parents' residence in Barcelona,
Sorsogon after she found out that Bailon was having an extramarital affair; and
Bailon used to visit her even after their separation.
By Resolution of April 2, 2003, the SSC found that the marriage of

respondent to Bailon was void and, therefore, she was 'just a common-law-
wife.Accordingly it disposed as follows, quotedverbatim:
WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds, that

petitioner Teresita Jarque-Bailon is not the legitimate spouse and
primary beneficiary of SSS member Clemente Bailon.
Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby ordered to refund to the

SSS the amount of P24,000.00 representing the death benefit she
received therefrom for the period February 1998 until May 1999 as
well as P12,000.00 representing the funeral benefit.
The SSS is hereby ordered to pay Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz-

Bailon the appropriate death benefit arising from the demise of SSS
member Clemente Bailon in accordance with Section 8(e) and (k) as
well as Section 13 of the SS Law, as amended, and its prevailing rules
and regulations and to inform this Commission of its compliance
herewith.
SO ORDERED.[31](Underscoring supplied)
In so ruling against respondent, the SSC ratiocinated.
After a thorough examination of the evidence at hand, this

Commission comes to the inevitable conclusion that the petitioner is
not the legitimate wife of the deceased member.
xxxx
There is x x x ample evidence pointing to the fact that, contrary
to the declaration of the then CFI of Sorsogon (10th Judicial District),
the first wife never disappeared as the deceased member represented
in bad faith.This Commission accords credence to the findings of the
SSS contained in its Memorandum datedAugust 9, 1999,[32] revealing
that Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz never left Barcelona, Sorsogon, after her
separation from Clemente Bailon x x x.
As the declaration of presumptive death was extracted by the
deceased member using artifice and by exerting fraud upon the
unsuspecting court of law, x x xit never had the effect of giving the
deceased member the right to marry anew. x x x[I]t is clear that the
marriage to the petitioner is void, considering that the first marriage
on April 25, 1955 to Alice Diaz was not previously annulled,
invalidated or otherwise dissolved during the lifetime of the parties
thereto.x x x as determined through the investigation conducted by
the SSS, Clemente Bailon was the abandoning spouse, not Alice Diaz
Bailon.
xxxx
It having been established, by substantial evidence, that the

petitioner was just a common-law wife of the deceased member, it
necessarily follows that she is not entitled as a primary beneficiary, to
the latter's death benefit. x x x
xxxx
It having been determined that Teresita Jarque was not the

legitimate surviving spouse and primary beneficiary of Clemente
Bailon, it behooves her to refund the total amount of death benefit she
received from the SSS for the period from February 1998 until May
1999 pursuant to the principle of solutio indebiti x x x
Likewise, it appearing that she was not the one who actually
defrayed the cost of the wake and burial of Clemente Bailon, she
must return the amount ofP12,000.00 which was earlier given to her
by the SSS as funeral benefit.[33](Underscoring supplied)
Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration[34] having been denied by Order

of June 4, 2003, she filed a petition for review[35] before the Court of Appeals (CA).
By Decision of June 23, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the April 2,
2003 Resolution and June 4, 2003 Order of the SSC and thus ordered the SSS to
pay respondent all the pension benefits due her.Held the CA:
x x x [T]he paramount concern in this case transcends the issue

of whether or not the decision of the then CFI, now RTC, declaring
Alice Diaz presumptively dead has attained finality but, more
importantly, whether or not the respondents SSS and Commission can
validly re-evaluate the findings of the RTC, and on its own, declare the
latter's decision to be bereft of any basis.On similar import, can
respondents SSS and Commission validly declare the first marriage
subsisting and the second marriage null and void?
xxxx
x x x while it is true that a judgment declaring a person
presumptively dead never attains finality as the finding that 'the
person is unheard of in seven years is merely a presumption juris
tantum, the second marriage contracted by a person with an absent
spouse endures until annulled.It is only the competent court that
can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil
Code and upon the reappearance of the missing spouse, which action
for annulment may be filed.Nowhere does the law contemplates [sic]
the possibility that respondent SSS may validly declare the second
marriage null and void on the basis alone of its own investigation and
declare that the decision of the RTC declaring one to be presumptively
dead is without basis.
Respondent SSS cannot arrogate upon itself the authority

to review the decision of the regular courts under the pretext of
determining the actual and lawful beneficiaries of its
members.Notwithstanding its opinion as to the soundness of the
findings of the RTC, it should extend due credence to the decision of
the RTC absent of [sic] any judicial pronouncement to the
contrary. x x x
x x x [A]ssuming arguendo that respondent SSS actually

possesses the authority to declare the decision of the RTC to be
without basis, the procedure it followed was offensive to the principle
of fair play and thus its findings are of doubtful quality considering
that petitioner Teresita was not given ample opportunity to present
evidence for and her behalf.
xxxx
Respondent SSS is correct in stating that the filing of an

Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil Registry is no longer practical
under the premises.Indeed, there is no more first marriage to restore
as the marital bond between Alice Diaz and Clemente Bailon was
already terminated upon the latter's death.Neither is there a second
marriage to terminate because the second marriage was likewise
dissolved by the death of Clemente Bailon.
However, it is not correct to conclude that simply because the

filing of the Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil Registry where
parties to the subsequent marriage reside is already inutile, the
respondent SSS has now the authority to review the decision of the
RTC and consequently declare the second marriage null and void.[36]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The SSC and the SSS separately filed their Motions for
Reconsideration[37] which were both denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the SSS' present petition for review on certiorari [38] anchored on the
following grounds:
THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS

CONTRARY TO LAW.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.
The SSS faults the CA for failing to give due consideration to the findings of
facts of the SSC on the prior and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice; in
disregarding the authority of the SSC to determine to whom, between Alice and
respondent, the death benefits should be awarded pursuant to Section 5[40] of the
Social Security Law; and in declaring that the SSS did not give respondent due
process or ample opportunity to present evidence in her behalf.
The SSS submits that 'the observations and findings relative to the CFI
proceedings are of no moment to the present controversy, as the same may be
considered only as obiter dicta in view of the SSC's finding of the existence of a
prior and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice by virtue of which Alice has
a better right to the death benefits.[41]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The petition fails.
That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with respect to SSS
coverage, benefits and contributions, there is no doubt.In so exercising such power,
however, it cannot review, much less reverse, decisions rendered by courts of law
as it did in the case at bar when it declared that the December 10, 1970 CFI Order
was obtained through fraud and subsequently disregarded the same, making its
own findings with respect to the validity of Bailon and Alice's marriage on the one
hand and the invalidity of Bailon and respondent's marriage on the other.
In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the SSC virtually acted as
an appellate court.The law does not give the SSC unfettered discretion to trifle with
orders of regular courts in the exercise of its authority to determine the
beneficiaries of the SSS.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the
effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine
their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration.[42] cralaw
Article 83 of the Civil Code[43] provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person

during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person
other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present
having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he
has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as
dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed
dead according to Articles 390 and 391.The marriage so contracted
shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by
a competent court. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage

contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless
the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved or contracted under any of the
three exceptional circumstances.It bears noting that the marriage under any of
these exceptional cases is deemed valid 'until declared null and void by a
competent court.It follows that the onus probandi in these cases rests on the party
assailing the second marriage.[44]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15
consecutive years[45]when Bailon sought the declaration of her presumptive death,
which judicial declaration was not even a requirement then for purposes of
remarriage.[46]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Eminent jurist Arturo M. Tolentino (now deceased) commented:
Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a

presumption arises in favor of the validity of the second marriage, and
the burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second marriage
to prove that the first marriage had not been dissolved; it is not enough
to prove the first marriage, for it must also be shown that it had not
ended when the second marriage was contracted.The presumption in
favor of the innocence of the defendant from crime or wrong and of the
legality of his second marriage, will prevail over the presumption of the
continuance of life of the first spouse or of the continuance of the
marital relation with such first spouse.[47](Underscoring supplied)
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable,[48] it is

terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the absent
spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent

marriage is necessary.Thus Article 42 thereof provides:
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding

Article shall beautomatically terminated by the recording of the
affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a
judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of

reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of
the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any
interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the
subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of
reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by the

above-quoted provision of the Family Code does not preclude the filing of an action
in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of
dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.[49]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent

marriage, either by affidavit or by court action, such absentee's mere
reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in the subsequent marriage, will
not terminate such marriage.[50]Since the second marriage has been contracted
because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption
continues inspite of the spouse's physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or
she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is
terminated as provided by law.[51]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit

of reappearance or by judicial declaration but by death of either spouse as in the
case at bar, Tolentino submits:
x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the

death of either spouse, the effects of dissolution of valid marriages
shall arise.The good or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be
raised, because, as in annullable or voidablemarriages, the marriage
cannot be questioned except in a direct action for annulment.
[52] (Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, Lapuz v. Eufemio[53] instructs:
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been

void ab initio but onlyvoidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the
Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the
first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or
when she had been generally believed dead, still the action for
annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the three persons
involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code,
requiring that the action for annulment should be brought during
the lifetime of any one of the parties involved.And furthermore,
the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted
from such voidable marriage must be carried out 'in the testate or
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, as expressly provided in
Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment
proceeding.[54](Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally

except in a direct proceeding.Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after the death of either, in which case the
parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
[55]Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made
good ab initio.[56]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law,
Bailon's and respondent's marriage prior to the former's death in 1998, respondent
is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.
In light of the foregoing discussions, consideration of the other issues raised

has been rendered unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Annulment
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
ORLANDO VILLANUEVA,cralawcralawcralawG.R. No. 132955

Petitioner,
cralawcralawcralawPresent:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
cralaw- versus -cralawYnares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
LILIA CANALITA-VILLANUEVAcralawcralawPromulgated:
Respondents.
October 27, 2006

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
cralawThis petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January
26, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming
with modification the Decision[2] dated January 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court
of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 (a) dismissing
petitioner's petition for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent and (b)
ordering him to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs.Also
assailed is the March 5, 1998 Resolution[3] denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got

married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan.On November 17, 1992,
Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging
that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already
pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never
cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned that private
respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988.[4]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In her answer with compulsory counterclaim,[5] Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the
petition, arguing that petitioner freely and voluntarily married her; that petitioner
stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month after their marriage; that petitioner
wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during which private respondent
visited him personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress of her
pregnancy, which ended in their son being born prematurely. Private respondent
also prayed for the payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and
costs.
On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1)cralawDismissing the above-entitled case; and
2)cralawOrdering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral

damages in the amount of P100,000.00, exemplary
damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's
fees in the amount of P20,000.00, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[6]
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the petition and the
award of attorney's fees and costs, but reduced the award of moral and exemplary
damages to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively.The Court of Appeals denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, hence, the instant petition for review based
on the following assigned errors:
I.cralawTHE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING THE ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE THE CONSENT OF THE PETITIONER HAVING BEEN
OBTAINED BY FRAUD, INTIMIDATION AND UNDUE AND IMPROPER
PRESSURE AND INFLUENCE PLUS THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO
COHABITATION WHATSOEVER BETWEEN PETITIONER AND PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.
II.cralawTHE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS

ERROR IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS WELL AS
ATTORNEY'S FEES, SAID AWARDS NOT BEING THOSE ALLOWED BY
LAW.[7]
The issues for resolution are (a) whether the subject marriage may be annulled on
the ground of vitiated consent; and (b) whether petitioner should be liable for moral
and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees and costs.
cralawThe petition is partly granted.
cralawFactualfindings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of

the trial court, as in the instant case, are generally binding on this Court. [8]We
affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily
married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence
compelled him to do so, thus '
To begin with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance that

despite the alleged coerced consent which supposedly characterized
his marriage with Lilia on April 13, 1988, it was only on November 17,
1992 or after a span of not less than four (4) years and eight (8)
months when Orlando took serious step to have the same marriage
annulled.Unexplained, the prolonged inaction evidently finds basis in
Lilia's allegation that this annulment suit was filed by Orlando solely in
the hope that a favorable judgment thereon would bolster his defense,
if not altogether bring about his acquittal in the criminal case for
bigamy which was then already pending against him. Unfortunately,
however, let alone the fact that the criminal case was admittedly
decided ahead with a judgment of conviction against Orlando x x x
even the very outcome of the present case disappointed his
expectation.At this late, with his appeal in the bigamy case still
pending with this Court x x x Orlando must be hoping against hope
that with a decree of annulment ensuing from this Court, he may yet
secure an acquittal in the same bigamy charge.Viewed in this
perspective, the instant appeal is, therefore, understandable.
But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have to fall.
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on

the ground that he did not freely consent to be married to the
appellee.He cited several incidents that created on his mind a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger
to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from the
appellee and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at
the premises of the University of the East after his classes thereat, and
the threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of
the New People's Army whom appellant claimed to have been hired by
appellee and who accompanied him in going to her home province of
Palawan to marry her.
The Court is not convinced that appellant's apprehension of danger to

his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter
voluntarily to a contract of marriage.It is not disputed that at the time
he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard
in a bank.Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to
assume that appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the
very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm's way.For sure,
it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant,
what with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the security
personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities of those
who were threatening him.And neither did he inform the judge about
his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to

believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child when
they were married. Appellant's excuse that he could not have
impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during
their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst.The complaint
is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the
appellee.His counsel also conceded before the lower court that his
client had a sexual relationship with the appellee x x x.He also
narrated x x x that sometime in January 1988, he and the appellee
went to a hotel where 'the sexual act was consummated, with the
defendant on top x x x.
cralawInstead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying his

wife, appellant resorted to undermining the credibility of the latter by
citing her testimony that her child was born, and died, on August 29,
1989, a year off from August 29, 1988, the date of fetal death as
appearing in the registry of deaths of the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Puerto Princesa City x x x.
cralawTo Our mind, appellant cannot make capital of the lapse because
it is inconsequential, as there is no controversy regarding the date of
death of appellee's fetus. Nevertheless, during the continuation of the
cross-examination of the appellee, she declared that her child was
prematurely born on August 29, 1988, matching the date in the
certification of the Civil Registrar x x x.The Court is not prepared to
disbelieve the appellee and throw overboard her entire testimony
simply on account of her confusion as to the exact date of the death of
the fetus, especially when she herself had presented documentary
evidence that put August 29, 1988 as the date her fetus died.
cralawAppellant'spropensity to rely on his perceived weakness of the

appellee's evidence continues in his argument that if indeed there is
truth to her claim that she was impregnated sometime in December
1987, then she could not have a premature delivery on August 29,
1988, as she had testified during the trial, because the 35-week period
of pregnancy is complete by that time.Whether the appellee's
impression that she had delivered prematurely is correct or not will not
affect the fact that she had delivered a fetus on August 29, 1988.In
the light of appellant's admission that he had a sexual intercourse with
his wife in January 1988, and his failure to attribute the latter's
pregnancy to any other man, appellant cannot complain that he was
deceived by the appellee into marrying her.
cralawAppellant also puts in issue the lower court's appreciation of the

letters allegedly written by him to the appellee.During his cross-
examination, when confronted with thirteen (13) letters, appellant
identified the seven (7) letters that he sent to the appellee, but denied
the remaining six (6) x x x.The letters admitted by the appellant
contained expressions of love and concern for his wife, and hardly the
rantings of a man under duress.During the re-direct examination,
however, appellant suddenly changed mind and denied authorship of
those seven (7) letters, claiming that he was forced to admit them
because he was threatened with harm by the appellee.If he was
laboring under duress when he made the admission, where did he find
the temerity to deny his involvement with the remaining six (6)
letters?The recantation can only be motivated by a hindsight
realization by the appellant of the evidentiary weight of those letters
against his case.
cralawAsto the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that

his marriage should be annulled due to the absence of cohabitation
between him and his wife.Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground
to annul a marriage.Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend
upon the will of the spouses who can terminate the marital union by
refusing to cohabitate.The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it
arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for
annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity,
fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x.Since the appellant failed
to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of those
grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.[9]cralaw
cralaw
cralawWe also agree that private respondent is entitled to attorney's fees. Article
2208 (11) of the Civil Code provides that attorney's may be awarded where the
court deems it just and equitable under the circumstances, as in the instant case.
We, however, delete the award of moral and exemplary damages for lack of factual
and legal basis.There is nothing in the records or in the appealed decision that
would support an award of moral damages.In justifying the award, the Court of
Appeals merely said thus:
It is not difficult to imagine the suffering of the appellee from the

baseless portrayal of her by the appellant as the perpetrator of
fraudulent schemes to trap an unwilling mate. x x x[10]
However, the aforesaid finding is only a supposition as it has no reference to any

testimony of private respondent detailing her alleged physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury as would entitle her to moral damages.
cralawIn Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr.,[11] we held that:
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading

and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. While
respondent alleged in his complaint that he suffered mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock, he failed to prove
them during the trial. Indeed, respondent should have taken the
witness stand and should have testified on the mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and other emotional and mental suffering
he purportedly suffered to sustain his claim for moral damages.Mere
allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear
and convincing proof.No other person could have proven such
damages except the respondent himself as they were extremely
personal to him.
As private respondent is not entitled to moral damages, a fortiori, she is not

entitled to exemplary damages. This is clear in Article 2234 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be
proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate
or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question
of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded.In case
liquidated damages have been agreed upon, although no proof of loss
is necessary in order that such liquidated damages may be recovered,
nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of granting
exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must
show that he would be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory
damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages.
Hence, exemplary damages is allowed only in addition to moral damages such that
no exemplary damages can be awarded unless the claimant first establishes his
clear right to moral damages.[12]In the instant case, private respondent failed to
satisfactorily establish her claim for moral damages, thus she is not likewise
entitled to exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED.The January 26, 1998 Decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832 affirming with modification the
January 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 dismissing petitioner's petition for the
annulment of his marriage with private respondent, isAFFIRMED.However, the
award of moral and exemplary damages is DELETED for lack of basis.
cralawSO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
VERONICA CABACUNGAN G.R. No. 174451

ALCAZAR,
Petitioner, Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
REY C. ALCAZAR,
Respondent. October 13, 2009
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision[1] dated 24 May
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, affirming the Decision dated
9 June 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Branch 85, in Civil
Case No. 664-M-2002, which dismissed petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazars
Complaint for the annulment of her marriage to respondent Rey C. Alcazar.
The Complaint,[2] docketed as Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, was filed by petitioner
before the RTC on 22 August 2002. Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that she was
married to respondent on 11 October 2000 by Rev. Augusto G. Pabustan
(Pabustan), at the latters residence. After their wedding, petitioner and respondent
lived for five days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of respondents
parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds went back to Manila, but respondent did not
live with petitioner at the latters abode at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue,
Tondo, Manila. On 23 October 2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture shop. While working
in Riyadh, respondent did not communicate with petitioner by phone or by
letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five times but respondent never
answered. About a year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-teacher
informed petitioner that respondent was about to come home to
the Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why she was not advised by respondent of
his arrival.
Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in

the Philippines, the latter did not go home to petitioner at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos
Avenue, Tondo, Manila.Instead, respondent proceeded to his parents house in San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Upon learning that respondent was in San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, petitioner went to see her brother-in-law in Velasquez St.,
Tondo, Manila, who claimed that he was not aware of respondents
whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, where she was
informed that respondent had been living with his parents since his arrival in March
2002.
Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines,
he never contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically
incapable of consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for
annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code
of the Philippines (Family Code). There was also no more possibility of reconciliation
between petitioner and respondent.
Per the Sheriffs Return[3] dated 3 October 2002, a summons, together with a
copy of petitioners Complaint, was served upon respondent on 30 September 2002.
[4]
On 18 November 2002, petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion[5] to direct

the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation of the case pursuant to Article 48
of the Family Code.
As respondent did not file an Answer, the RTC issued on 27 November
2002 an Order[6]directing the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation to
ensure that no collusion existed between the parties; to submit a report thereon;
and to appear in all stages of the proceedings to see to it that evidence was not
fabricated or suppressed.
On 4 March 2003, Public Prosecutrix Veronica A.V. de Guzman (De Guzman)

submitted her Report manifesting that she had conducted an investigation of the
case of petitioner and respondent in January 2003, but respondent never
participated therein. Public Prosecutrix De Guzman also noted that no collusion took
place between the parties, and measures were taken to prevent suppression of
evidence between them. She then recommended that a full-blown trial be
conducted to determine whether petitioners Complaint was meritorious or not.
Pre-trial was held and terminated on 20 May 2003.
On 21 May 2003, the RTC received the Notice of Appearance of the Solicitor
General.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita Cabacungan

(Cabacungan), and clinical psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Tayag) as witnesses.
Petitioner first took the witness stand and elaborated on the allegations in
her Complaint.Cabacungan corroborated petitioners testimony.
Petitioners third witness, Tayag, presented the following psychological evaluation of

petitioner and respondent:
After meticulous scrutiny and careful analysis of the collected

data, petitioner is found to be free from any underlying personality
aberration neither (sic) of any serious psychopathological traits, which
may possibly impede her normal functioning (sic) of marriage. On the
other hand, the undersigned arrived to (sic) a firm opinion that the
sudden breakdown of marital life between petitioner and respondent
was clearly due to the diagnosed personality disorder that the
respondent is harboring, making him psychologically incapacitated to
properly assume and comply [with] essential roles (sic) of obligations
as a married man.
The pattern of behaviors displayed by the respondent satisfies

the diagnostic criteria of a disorder clinically classified as Narcissistic
Personality Disorder, a condition deemed to be grave, severe, long
lasting in proportion and incurable by any treatment.
People suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder are

known to have a pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or
behavior), need for admiration, and lack of empathy, beginning by
early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by
five (or more) of the following:
1. has a grandiose of self-importance (e.g. exaggerates
achievements and talents, expect to be recognized as superior without
commensurate achievements)
2. is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power,

brilliance, beauty or ideal love
3. believes that he or she is special and unique and can only be

understood by, or should associate with, other special or high status
people (institutions)
4. requires excessive admiration
5. has sense of entitlement, i.e., unreasonable expectations of

especially favorable treatment or automatic compliance with his or her
expectations
6. is interpersonally exploitative, i.e., takes advantage of others

to achieve his or her own ends
7. lacks empathy: is unwilling to recognize or identify with the

feelings and needs of others
8. is often envious of others or believes that others are envious

of him or her
9. shows arrogant, haughty behavior or attitudes.
The root cause of respondents personality disorder can be

attributed to his early childhood years with predisposing psychosocial
factors that influence[d] his development. It was recounted that
respondent is the first child of his mothers second family. Obviously,
unhealthy familial constellation composed his immediate environment
in his growing up years. Respondent had undergone a severe longing
for attention from his father who had been unfaithful to them and had
died early in life, that he was left alone to fend for the family needs.
More so that they were coping against poverty, his caregivers failed to
validate his needs, wishes or responses and overlooked the love and
attention he yearned which led to develop a pathological need for self-
object to help him maintain a cohesive sense of self-such so great that
everything other people offer is consumed. Hence, he is unable to
develop relationship with other (sic) beyond this need. There is no
capacity for empathy sharing, or loving others.
The psychological incapacity of the respondent is characterized

by juridical antecedence as it already existed long before he entered
into marriage. Since it already started early in life, it is deeply
engrained within his system and becomes a[n] integral part of his
personality structure, thereby rendering such to be permanent and
incurable.[7]
Tayag concluded in the end that:
As such, their marriage is already beyond repair, considering the

fact that it has long been (sic) ceased to exist and have their different
life priorities. Reconciliation between them is regarded to be (sic). The
essential obligations of love, trust, respect, fidelity, authentic
cohabitation as husband and wife, mutual help and support, and
commitment, did not and will no lon[g]er exist between them. With
due consideration of the above-mentioned findings, the undersigned
recommends, the declaration of nullity of marriage between petitioner
and respondent.[8]
On 18 February 2004, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of Evidence. Public

Prosecutrix Myrna S. Lagrosa (Lagrosa), who replaced Public Prosecutrix De
Guzman, interposed no objection to the admission of petitioners evidence and
manifested that she would no longer present evidence for the State.
On 9 June 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision denying petitioners Complaint
for annulment of her marriage to respondent, holding in substance that:
In the case at bar, the Court finds that the acts of the
respondent in not communicating with petitioner and not living with
the latter the moment he returned home from Saudi Arabia despite
their marriage do (sic) not lead to a conclusion of psychological
incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his defects
were already present at the inception of their marriage or that these
are incurable.
That being the case, the Court resolves to deny the instant
petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Annulment of

Marriage is hereby DENIED.[9]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[10] but it was denied by the RTC
in an Order[11] dated 19 August 2004.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as

CA-G.R. CV No. 84471. In a Decision[12] dated 24 May 2006, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC Decision dated 9 June 2004. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
RTC did not err in finding that petitioner failed to prove respondents psychological
incapacity. Other than petitioners bare allegations, no other evidence was
presented to prove respondents personality disorder that made him completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state. Citing Republic v.
Court of Appeals,[13] the appellate court ruled that the evidence should be able to
establish that at least one of the spouses was mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that said person could not have known the marital obligations to be
assumed; or knowing the marital obligations, could not have validly assumed the
same. At most, respondents abandonment of petitioner could be a ground for legal
separation under Article 5 of the Family Code.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in

a Resolution[14] dated 28 August 2008.
Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of:

WHETHER OR NOT, AS DEFINED BY THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE, RESPONDENT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED TO PERFORM THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATONS.
[15]
At the outset, it must be noted that the Complaint originally filed by petitioner
before the RTC was for annulment of marriage based on Article 45, paragraph
5 of the Family Code, which reads:
ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following

causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
xxxx
(5) That either party was physically incapable of

consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity
continues and appears to be incurable; x x x.
Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate.

[16]
Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the
spouses to perform the complete act of sexual intercourse.[17] Non-consummation of
a marriage may be on the part of the husband or of the wife and may be caused by
a physical or structural defect in the anatomy of one of the parties or it may be due
to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears arising in whole or in part from
psychophysical conditions. It may be caused by psychogenic causes, where such
mental block or disturbance has the result of making the spouse physically
incapable of performing the marriage act.[18]
No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that respondent

was in any way physically incapable to consummate his marriage with
petitioner. Petitioner even admitted during her cross-examination that she and
respondent had sexual intercourse after their wedding and before respondent left
for abroad. There obviously being no physical incapacity on respondents part, then,
there is no ground for annulling petitioners marriage to respondent. Petitioners
Complaint was, therefore, rightfully dismissed.
One curious thing, though, caught this Courts attention. As can be gleaned
from the evidence presented by petitioner and the observations of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner was actually seeking the declaration of
nullity of her marriage to respondent based on the latters psychological incapacity
to comply with his marital obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Petitioner attributes the filing of the erroneous Complaint before the RTC to
her formercounsels mistake or gross ignorance.[19] But even said reason cannot
save petitioners Complaint from dismissal. It is settled in this jurisdiction that the
client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of the counsel in the realm of procedural
technique.[20] Although this rule is not a hard and fast one and admits of exceptions,
such as where the mistake of counsel is so gross, palpable and inexcusable as to
result in the violation of his clients substantive rights,[21] petitioner failed to
convince us that such exceptional circumstances exist herein.
Assuming for the sake of argument that we can treat the Complaint as one for
declaration of nullity based on Article 36 of the Family Code, we will still dismiss the
Complaint for lack of merit, consistent with the evidence presented by petitioner
during the trial.
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of

the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Court declared that psychological

incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all
possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.[23]
The Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, in Republic v. Court of
Appeals,[24] to wit:

belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it
as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally
inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage

and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be a)

medically or clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c)
sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of

the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. The
the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations,
not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.

disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral

the text of the decision.

or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.
Being accordingly guided by the aforequoted pronouncements in Republic v.

Court of Appeals, we scrutinized the totality of evidence presented by petitioner and
found that the same was not enough to sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioners evidence, particularly her and her mothers testimonies, merely

established that respondent left petitioner soon after their wedding to work in Saudi
Arabia; that when respondent returned to the Philippines a year and a half later, he
directly went to live with his parents in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and not with
petitioner in Tondo, Manila; and that respondent also did not contact petitioner at
all since leaving for abroad. These testimonies though do not give us much insight
into respondents psychological state.
Tayags psychological report leaves much to be desired and hardly helps
petitioners cause. It must be noted that Tayag was not able to personally examine
respondent. Respondent did not appear for examination despite Tayags invitation.
[25]
Tayag, in evaluating respondents psychological state, had to rely on information
provided by petitioner. Hence, we expect Tayag to have been more prudent and
thorough in her evaluation of respondents psychological condition, since her source
of information, namely, petitioner, was hardly impartial.
Tayag concluded in her report that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder, traceable to the latters experiences during his childhood. Yet,
the report is totally bereft of the basis for the said conclusion. Tayag did not
particularly describe the pattern of behavior that showed that respondent indeed
had a Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Tayag likewise failed to explain how such a
personality disorder made respondent psychologically incapacitated to perform his
obligations as a husband. We emphasize that the burden falls upon petitioner, not
just to prove that respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that
such psychological disorder renders him truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage.[26] Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a
refusal, or a neglect in the performance of some marital obligations.
In this instance, we have been allowed, through the evidence adduced, to

peek into petitioners marital life and, as a result, we perceive a simple case of a
married couple being apart too long, becoming strangers to each other, with the
husband falling out of love and distancing or detaching himself as much as possible
from his wife.
To be tired and give up on ones situation and on ones spouse are not
necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so
labeled. When these happen, the remedy for some is to cut the marital knot to
allow the parties to go their separate ways. This simple remedy, however, is not
available to us under our laws. Ours is a limited remedy that addresses only a very
specific situation a relationship where no marriage could have validly been
concluded because the parties; or where one of them, by reason of a grave and
incurable psychological illness existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not
appreciate the obligations of marital life and, thus, could not have validly entered
into a marriage.[27]
An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. As we stated

in Marcos v. Marcos[28]:
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused

with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It
is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume. x x x.
Resultantly, we have held in the past that mere irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity.[29]
As a last-ditch effort to have her marriage to respondent declared null,

petitioner pleads abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent. In a
Manifestation and Motion[30] dated 21 August 2007 filed before us, petitioner claims
that she was informed by one Jacinto Fordonez, who is residing in the
same barangay as respondent in Occidental Mindoro, that respondent is living-in
with another woman named Sally.
Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity
within the contemplation of the Family Code. Again, petitioner must be able to
establish that respondents unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered
personality, which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state.[31]
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of
marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Hence,
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.[32] Presumption is always in favor of
the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.[33] In the case at bar,
petitioner failed to persuade us that respondents failure to communicate with
petitioner since leaving for Saudi Arabia to work, and to live with petitioner after
returning to the country, are grave psychological maladies that are keeping him
from knowing and/or complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
We are not downplaying petitioners frustration and misery in finding herself

shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is no longer working. Regrettably, there
are situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific
answers to every individual problem.[34]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The 24 May 2006 Decision and 28

August 2008Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, which
affirmed the 9 June 2004Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Branch
85, dismissing petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazars Complaint in Civil Case No.
664-M-2002, are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27930 November 26, 1970

AURORA A. ANAYA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FERNANDO O. PALAROAN, defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from an order of dismissal, issued motu proprio by the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court,
Manila, of a complaint for annulment of marriage, docketed therein as Civil Case No. E-00431, entitled
"Aurora A. Anaya, plaintiff vs. Fernando O. Palaroan, defendant." chanrobles virtual law library
The complaint in said Civil Case No. E-00431 alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff Aurora and defendant
Fernando were married on 4 December 1953; that defendant Fernando filed an action for annulment
of the marriage on 7 January 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and
intimidation, which action was docketed in the Court of First Instance of Manila as Civil Case No.
21589; that judgment was rendered therein on 23 September 1959 dismissing the complaint of
Fernando, upholding the validity of the marriage and granting Aurora's counterclaim; that (per
paragraph IV) while the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated "to settle the judgment,"
Fernando had divulged to Aurora that several months prior to their marriage he had pre-marital
relationship with a close relative of his; and that "the non-divulgement to her of the aforementioned
pre-marital secret on the part of defendant that definitely wrecked their marriage, which apparently
doomed to fail even before it had hardly commenced ... frank disclosure of which, certitude precisely
precluded her, the Plaintiff herein from going thru the marriage that was solemnized between them
constituted 'FRAUD', in obtaining her consent, within the contemplation of No. 4 of Article 85 of the
Civil Code" (sic) (Record on Appeal, page 3). She prayed for the annulment of the marriage and for
moral damages.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Defendant Fernando, in his answer, denied the allegation in paragraph IV of the complaint and denied
having had pre-marital relationship with a close relative; he averred that under no circumstance would
he live with Aurora, as he had escaped from her and from her relatives the day following their
marriage on 4 December 1953; that he denied having committed any fraud against her. He set up the
defenses of lack of cause of action and estoppel, for her having prayed in Civil Case No. 21589 for the
validity of the marriage and her having enjoyed the support that had been granted her. He
counterclaimed for damages for the malicious filing of the suit. Defendant Fernando did not pray for
the dismissal of the complaint but for its dismissal "with respect to the alleged moral damages." chanrobles virtual law library
Plaintiff Aurora filed a reply with answer to the counterclaim, wherein she alleged:
(1) that prior to their marriage on 4 December 1953, he paid court to her, and
pretended to shower her with love and affection not because he really felt so but
because she merely happened to be the first girl available to marry so he could evade
marrying the close relative of his whose immediate members of her family were
threatening him to force him to marry her (the close relative); chanrobles virtual law library
(2) that since he contracted the marriage for the reason intimated by him, and not
because he loved her, he secretly intended from the very beginning not to perform the
marital duties and obligations appurtenant thereto, and furthermore, he covertly made
up his mind not to live with her; chanrobles virtual law library
(3) that the foregoing clandestine intentions intimated by him were prematurely
concretized for him, when in order to placate and appease the immediate members of
the family of the first girl (referent being the close relative) and to convince them of
his intention not to live with plaintiff, carried on a courtship with a third girl with
whom, after gaining the latter's love cohabited and had several children during the
whole range of nine years that Civil Case No. 21589, had been litigated between them
(parties); (Record on Appeal, pages 10-11)
Failing in its attempt to have the parties reconciled, the court set the case for trial on 26 August 1966
but it was postponed. Thereafter, while reviewing the expendiente, the court realized that Aurora's
allegation of the fraud was legally insufficient to invalidate her marriage, and, on the authority
of Brown vs. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168, holding:
It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the
courts can take cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal
separation, or annulment of marriage, involve public interest, and it is the policy of our
law that no such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the
record. -chanrobles virtual law library
the court a quo required plaintiff to show cause why her complaint should not be
dismissed. Plaintiff Aurora submitted a memorandum in compliance therewith, but the
court found it inadequate and thereby issued an order, dated 7 October 1966, for the
dismissal of the complaint; it also denied reconsideration.
The main issue is whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital
relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We must agree with the lower court that it is not. For fraud as a vice of consent in marriage, which
may be a cause for its annulment, comes under Article 85, No. 4, of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the
time of the marriage: chanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited
with the other as her husband or his wife, as the case may be; chanrobles virtual law library
This fraud, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively by law to those kinds or species of
fraud enumerated in Article 86, as follows: chanrobles virtual law library
ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in
number 4 of the preceding article:
(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting

parties; chanrobles virtual law library
(2) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a

crime involving moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was
imprisonment for two years or more; chanrobles virtual law library
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the
marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall

constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.
The intention of Congress to confine the circumstances that can constitute fraud as ground for
annulment of marriage to the foregoing three cases may be deduced from the fact that, of all the
causes of nullity enumerated in Article 85, fraud is the only one given special treatment in a
subsequent article within the chapter on void and voidable marriages. If its intention were otherwise,
Congress would have stopped at Article 85, for, anyway, fraud in general is already mentioned therein
as a cause for annulment. But Article 86 was also enacted, expressly and specifically dealing with
"fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article," and proceeds by enumerating the specific
frauds (misrepresentation as to identity, non-disclosure of a previous conviction, and concealment of
pregnancy), making it clear that Congress intended to exclude all other frauds or deceits. To stress
further such intention, the enumeration of the specific frauds was followed by the interdiction: "No
other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud
as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." chanrobles virtual law library
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the
enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by
the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ...
chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-
disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the
marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for
upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is interested.
The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees
with the rule or not.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
But plaintiff-appellant Anaya emphasizes that not only has she alleged "non-divulgement" (the word
chosen by her) of the pre-marital relationship of her husband with another woman as her cause of
action, but that she has, likewise, alleged in her reply that defendant Fernando paid court to her
without any intention of complying with his marital duties and obligations and covertly made up his
mind not to live with her. Plaintiff-appellant contends that the lower court erred in ignoring these
allegations in her reply.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
This second set of averments which were made in the reply (pretended love and absence of intention
to perform duties of consortium) is an entirely new and additional "cause of action." According to the
plaintiff herself, the second set of allegations is "apart, distinct and separate from that earlier averred
in the Complaint ..." (Record on Appeal, page 76). Said allegations were, therefore, improperly alleged
in the reply, because if in a reply a party-plaintiff is not permitted to amend or change the cause of
action as set forth in his complaint (Calo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445), there is more reason not to allow
such party to allege a new and additional cause of action in the reply. Otherwise, the series of
pleadings of the parties could become interminable.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On the merits of this second fraud charge, it is enough to point out that any secret intention on the
husband's part not to perform his marital duties must have been discovered by the wife soon after the
marriage: hence her action for annulment based on that fraud should have been brought within four
years after the marriage. Since appellant's wedding was celebrated in December of 1953, and this
ground was only pleaded in 1966, it must be declared already barred.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed order is hereby affirmed. No costs.

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Manila
THIRD DIVISION
MANUEL G. ALMELOR, cralawG.R. No. 179620

Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL REYES, JJ.
COURT OF LAS PIAS CITY,
BRANCH 254, andcralaw Promulgated:
LEONIDA T. ALMELOR,
Respondent. cralawAugust 26, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
MARRIAGE, in its totality, involves the spouses right to the community of their
whole lives. It likewise involves a true intertwining of personalities.[1]
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) denying the petition for annulment of judgment and affirming in
toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Las Pias, Branch 254. The
CA dismissed outright the Rule 47 petition for being the wrong remedy.
The Facts
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida
Trinidad (Leonida) were married onJanuary 29, 1989 at the Manila Cathedral.
[3]
Their union bore three children: (1) Maria Paulina Corinne, born on October 20,
1989; (2) Napoleon Manuel, born on August 9, 1991; and (3) Manuel Homer,
born on July 4, 1994.[4] Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners, an
anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively.[5]
After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Pias
City to annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. The case, docketed as LP-00-
0132 was raffled off to Branch 254.
During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel in 1981 at the San
Lazaro Hospital where they worked as medical student clerks. At that time, she
regarded Manuel as a very thoughtful person who got along well with other
people. They soon became sweethearts. Three years after, they got married.[6]
Leonida averred that Manuels kind and gentle demeanor did not last long. In the
public eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband and father. This was not
the case in his private life. At home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh
disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered.Manuels unreasonable way
of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their frequent fights
as a couple.[7] Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to the alleged
lavish affection Manuel has for his mother. Manuels deep attachment to his mother
and his dependence on her decision-making were incomprehensible to Leonida.[8]
Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his homosexuality. Her
suspicions were first aroused when she noticed Manuels peculiar closeness to his
male companions. For instance,she caught him in an indiscreet telephone
conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller.[9]She also found several
pornographic homosexual materials in his possession.[10] Her worse fears were
confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The man was a
certain Dr. Nogales.[11] When she confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this
point, Leonida took her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel
stopped giving support to their children.[12]
Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to

prove Leonidas claim. Dr.del Fonso Garcia testified that she conducted evaluative
interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a one-time
interview with Manuel and face-to-face interviews with Ma. Paulina Corrinne (the
eldest child).[13] She concluded that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated.[14] Such
incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even before the marriageand
appeared to be incurable.
Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some petty arguments here
and there. He, however, maintained that their marital relationship was generally
harmonious. The petition for annulment filed by Leonida came as a surprise to him.
Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonidas hostility against him was
their professional rivalry. It began when he refused to heed the
memorandum [15]
released by Christ the KingHospital. The memorandum ordered
him to desist from converting his own lying-in clinic to a primary or secondary
hospital.[16] Leonidas family owns Christ the King Hospital which is situated in the
same subdivision as Manuels clinic and residence.[17] In other words, he and her
family havecompeting or rival hospitals in the same vicinity.
Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father

to their children. He denied maltreating them. At most, he only imposed the
necessary discipline on the children.
He also defended his show of affection for his mother. He said there was nothing
wrong for him to return the love and affection of the person who reared and looked
after him and his siblings. This is especially apt now that his mother is in her
twilight years.[18] Manuel pointed out that Leonida found fault in this otherwise
healthy relationship because of her very jealous and possessivenature.[19]
This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel to avoid the company of
female friends. He wanted to avoid any further misunderstanding with his wife. But,
Leonida instead conjured up stories about his sexual preference. She also
fabricated tales about pornographic materials found in his possession to cast doubt
on his masculinity.[20]
To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G.

Almelor. Jesus narrated that heusually stayed at Manuels house during his weekly
trips to Manila from Iriga City. He was a witness to the generally harmonious
relationship between his brother Manuel and sister-in-law, Leonida.True, they
had some quarrels typical of a husband and wife relationship. But there was nothing
similar to what Leonida described in her testimony.[21]
Jesus further testified that he was with his brother on the day Leonida allegedly saw
Manuel kissed another man. He denied that such an incident occurred. On that
particular date,[22] he and Manuel went straight home from a trip to Bicol. There was
no other person with them at that time, except their driver.[23]
Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso Garcias findings by
presenting his own expert witness. However, no psychiatrist was presented.
RTC Disposition
By decision dated November 25, 2005, the RTC granted the petition for annulment,
with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby

rendered:
1.cralawDeclaring the marriage contracted by herein parties
on 29 January 1989 and all its effects under the
law null and void from the beginning;
2.cralawDissolving the regime of community property

between the same parties with forfeiture of
defendants share thereon in favor of the same parties
children whose
legal custody is awarded to plaintiff with visitorial right
afforded to defendant;
3.cralawOrdering the defendant to give monthly financial

support to all the children; and
4.cralawPursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-

SC:
a.cralawDirecting the Branch Clerk of this Court to

enter this Judgment upon its finality in the
Book of Entry of Judgment and to issue an
Entry of Judgment in accordance thereto; and
b.cralawDirecting the Local Civil Registrars of Las

Pias City and ManilaCity to cause the
registration of the said Entry of Judgment in
their respective Books of Marriages.
Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be issued.
SO ORDERED.[24] (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45
of the Family Code. It ratiocinated:
x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the surrounding

circumstances of the allegations in the complaint and of the evidence
presented in support thereof (sic) reveals that in this case (sic) there
is more than meets the eyes (sic).
Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed, generally

incompatible with hetero sexual marriage. This is reason enough that
in this jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes marriage as a special
contract exclusively only between a man and a woman x x x and thus
when homosexuality has trespassed into marriage, the same law
provides ample remedies to correct the situation [Article 45(3) in
relation to Article 46(4) or Article 55, par. 6, Family Code]. This is of
course in recognition of the biological fact that no matter how a man
cheats himself that he is not a homosexual and forces himself to live a
normal heterosexual life, there will surely come a time when his true
sexual preference as a homosexual shall prevail in haunting him and
thus jeopardizing the solidity, honor, and welfare of his own family.[25]
Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied due

course. Undaunted, he filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA.[26]
Manuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in excess of the lower
courts jurisdiction; that it had no jurisdiction to dissolve the absolute community of
property and forfeit his conjugalshare in favor of his children.
CA Disposition
On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment is
hereby DENIED. The Court AFFIRMS in toto the Decision
(dated November 25, 2005) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 254),
in Las Pias City, in Civil Case No. LP-00-0132. No costs.[27]
The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by filing the extraordinary
remedy of petition for annulment of judgment. Said the appellate court:
It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning the propriety of the

decision rendered by the lower Court. But the remedy assuming there
was a mistake is not a Petition for Annulment of Judgment but an
ordinary appeal. An error of judgment may be reversed or corrected
only by appeal.
What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction,

which is properly the subject of an ordinary appeal.
In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of the lower court but he

claims excess in the exercise thereof. Excess assuming there was is
not covered by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rule
refers the lack of jurisdiction and not the exercise thereof.[28]
Issues
Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse via Rule 45, assigning to the CA the
following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TREATING THE
PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A PETITION FOR
REVIEW IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES
INVOLVED AND IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER
DECLARING THE MARRIAGE AS NULL ANDVOID ON THE GROUND OF
PETITIONERS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER TO
FORFEIT THE SHARE OF PETITIONER IN HIS SHARE OF THE
CONJUGAL ASSETS.[29]
Our Ruling
I.cralawThe stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve the

demands of substantial justice and in the Courts exercise of equity
jurisdiction.
Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA by the wrong or
inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.[30] This is to prevent the party from
benefiting from ones neglect andmistakes. However, like most rules, it
carries certain exceptions. After all, the ultimate purpose of all rules of
procedures is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.[31]
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a last remedy. It can not be resorted to if

the ordinary remedies are available or no longer available through no fault of
petitioner.[32] However, inBuenaflor v. Court of Appeals,[33] this Court clarified the
proper appreciation for technical rules of procedure, in this wise:
Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat,

substantial justice and, therefore, they should not be applied in
a very rigid and technical sense. The exception is that while the
Rules are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the
rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals are
strictly applied. As an exception to the exception, these rules
have sometimes been relaxed on equitable considerations. Also,
in some cases the Supreme Court has given due course to an appeal
perfected out of time where a stringent application of the rules would
have denied it, but only when to do so would serve the demands of
substantial justice and in the exercise of equity jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.[34] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
cralawForreasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed exceptions to the
stringent rules governing appeals.[35] It has, in the past, refused to sacrifice justice
for technicality.[36]
cralawAfterdiscovering the palpable error of his petition, Manuel seeks the indulgence
of this Court toconsider his petition before the CA instead as a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed grave abuse of
discretion to the lower court for annulling his marriage on account of his alleged
homosexuality. This is not the first time that this Court is faced with a similar
situation. In Nerves v. Civil Service Commission,[37] petitioner Delia R. Nerves
elevated to the CA a Civil Service Commission (CSC) decision suspending her for six
(6) months. The CSC ruled Nerves, a public school teacher, is deemed to have
already served her six-month suspension during the pendency of the
case. Nevertheless, she is ordered reinstated without back wages. On appeal,
Nerves stated in her petition, inter alia:
1. This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article IX-A,

Section 7 of the Constitution of the Philippines and under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court.
2. But per Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95

(Revised Circular No. 1-91) petitioner is filing the instant petition
with this Honorable Court instead of the Supreme Court.
[38]
(Underscoring supplied)
cralawThe CA dismissed Nerves petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy
or the inappropriate mode of appeal.[39] The CA opined that under the Supreme
Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 x x x appeals from judgments or
final orders or resolutions of CSC is by a petition for review.[40]
cralawThis
Court granted Nerves petition and held that she had substantially complied
with the Administrative Circular. The Court stated:
cralawThatit was erroneously labeled as a petition for certiorari under

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is only a minor procedural lapse, not fatal
to the appeal. x x x
cralawMore importantly, the appeal on its face appears to be impressed

with merit. Hence,the Court of Appeals should have overlooked the
insubstantial defects of the petition x x x in order to do justice to the
parties concerned. There is, indeed, nothing sacrosanct about
procedural rules, which should be liberally construed in order to
promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. As it has
been said, where the rigid application of the rules would frustrate
substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a legitimate grievance, the
courts are justified in exempting a particular case from the operation
of the rules.[41] (Underscoring supplied)
cralawSimilarly,in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,[42] petitioner Joy

G. Tan availed of a wrong remedy by filing a petition for review on certiorari instead
of a motion for new trial or an ordinary appeal. In the interest of justice, this Court
considered the petition, pro hac vice, as a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65.
This Court found that based on Tans allegations, the trial court prima
facie committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering a judgment by default. If
uncorrected, it will cause petitioner great injustice. The Court elucidated in this
wise:
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave

miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the
Rules, we will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of
substantial justice.[43] (Underscoring supplied)
cralawMeasured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better served by giving due
course to the present petition and treating petitioners CA petition as
one for certiorari under Rule 65, considering that what is at stake is the validity or
non-validity of a marriage.
cralawInSalazar v. Court of Appeals,[44] citing Labad v. University of Southeastern

Philippines, this Court reiterated:
x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned

upon. While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right,
nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts
should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to
appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from
the constraints of technicalities.[45]
cralawIndeed,it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a technical lapse
and afford the parties a review of the case on the merits to attain the ends of
justice.[46]
cralawFurthermore,it was the negligence and incompetence of Manuels

counsel that prejudiced his right to appeal. His counsel, Atty. Christine
Dugenio, repeatedly availed of inappropriate remedies. After the denial of her
notice of appeal, she failed to move for reconsideration or new trial at the first
instance. She also erroneously filed a petition for annulment of judgment rather
than pursue an ordinary appeal.
These manifest errors were clearly indicative of counsels incompetence. These

gravely worked to the detriment of Manuels appeal. True it is that the negligence of
counsel binds the client. Still, this Court has recognized certain exceptions: (1)
where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of
law; (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty
and property; or (3) where the interest of justice so require.[47]
cralawThe negligence of Manuels counsel falls under

the exceptions. Ultimately, the reckless or grossnegligence of petitioners former
counsel led to the loss of his right to appeal. He should not be made to suffer for his
counsels grave mistakes. Higher interests of justice and equity demand thathe be
allowed to ventilate his case in a higher court.
cralawIn Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[48] this Court explained thus:
It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based
on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his
general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. However,
where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of
duty, which resulted in the clients being held liable for damages in a
damage suit, the client is deprived of his day in court and the judgment
may be set aside on such ground. In the instant case, higher interests of
justice and equity demand that petitioners be allowed to present
evidence on their defense.Petitioners may not be made to suffer for the
lawyers mistakes. This Court will always be disposed to grant
relief to parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention
and downright incompetence of lawyers, which has the
consequence of depriving their clients, of their day in court.
[49]
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of
the rule whenever the demands of justice require it. With more
conviction should it wield such power in a case involving the sacrosanct institution
of marriage. This Court is guided with the thrust of giving a party the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of ones action.[50]
cralawThe client was likewise spared from counsels negligence
in Government Service Insurance System v. Bengson Commercial Buildings, Inc.
[51]
and Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon.[52] Said the Court inBengson:
But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper
office as an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief
enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to
prevent a miscarriage of justice. In other words, the court has the
power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule
whenever the purposes of justice require it.[53]
II.cralawConcealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a

marriage, not homosexuality per se.
cralawManuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his

marriage. Persistent in his quest, he fought back all the heavy accusations of
incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity thrown at him.
cralawThetrial court declared that Leonidas petition for nullity had no basis at all
because the supporting grounds relied upon can not legally make a case under
Article 36 of the Family Code. It went further by citing Republic v. Molina:[54]
Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable

differences, incessant quarrels and/or beatings, unpredictable mood
swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and difficulty, neglect, or
failure in the performance of some marital obligations do not suffice to
establish psychological incapacity.[55]
If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for not
meeting the guidelines set in Molina. What Leonida attempted to demonstrate were
Manuels homosexual tendencies by citing overt acts generally predominant among
homosexual individuals.[56] Shewanted to prove that the perceived
homosexuality rendered Manuel incapable of fulfilling theessential marital
obligations.
cralawButinstead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the marriage
between Manuel and Leonida on the ground of vitiated consent by virtue of
fraud. In support of its conclusion, the lower court reasoned out:
As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 December 2003), when

there is smoke surely there is fire. Although vehemently denied by
defendant, there is preponderant evidence enough to establish with
certainty that defendant is really a homosexual.This is the fact that
can be deduced from the totality of the marriage life scenario of
herein parties.
Before his marriage, defendant knew very well that people around him
even including his own close friends doubted his true sexual
preference (TSN, pp. 35-36, 13 December 2000; pp. 73-75, 15
December 2003). After receiving many forewarnings, plaintiff told
defendant about the rumor she heard but defendant did not do
anything to prove to the whole world once and for all the truth of all
his denials. Defendant threatened to sue those people but nothing
happened after that. There may have been more important matters to
attend to than to waste time and effort filing cases against and be
effected by these people and so, putting more premiums on
defendants denials, plaintiff just the same married him. Reasons upon
reasons may be advanced to either exculpate or nail to the cross
defendant for his act of initially concealing his homosexuality to
plaintiff, but in the end, only one thing is certain even during his
marriage with plaintiff, the smoke of doubt about his real preference
continued and even got thicker, reason why obviously defendant failed
to establish a happy and solid family; and in so failing, plaintiff and
their children became his innocent and unwilling victims.
Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, like herein defendant, he is

meticulous over even small details in the house (sic) like wrongly
folded bed sheets, etc. or if a man is more authoritative in knowing
what clothes or jewelry shall fit his wife (pp. 77-81, TSN, 15 December
2003); but these admissions of defendant taken in the light of
evidence presented apparently showing that he had extra fondness of
his male friends (sic) to the extent that twice on separate occasions
(pp. 4-7, TSN, 14 February 2001) he was allegedly seen by plaintiff
kissing another man lips-to-lips plus the homosexual magazines and
tapes likewise allegedly discovered underneath his bed (Exhibits L and
M), the doubt as to his real sex identity becomes stronger. The
accusation of plaintiff versus thereof of defendant may be the name of
the game in this case; but the simple reason of professional rivalry
advanced by the defendant is certainly not enough to justify and
obscure the question why plaintiff should accuse him of such a very
untoward infidelity at the expense and humiliation of their children and
family as a whole.[57]
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations

that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of
their marriage. The lower court considered the public perception of Manuels sexual
preference without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of
Manuels peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower

court cannot appreciate it as a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law
is clear a marriage may be annulled when the consent of either party was obtained
by fraud,[58] such as concealment of homosexuality.[59] Nowhere in the said decision
was it proven by preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the
onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife.[60] It is the
concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the
consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent
to defraud the other party in giving consent to the marriage.
cralawConsent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be
freely given by both parties. An allegation of vitiated consent must be proven by
preponderance of evidence. The Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list of
circumstances[61] constituting fraud.Homosexuality per se is not among those cited,
but its concealment.
cralawThis
distinction becomes more apparent when we go over the deliberations [62] of
the Committees on the Civil Code and Family Law, to wit:
Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground should be eliminated in the

provision on the grounds for legal separation. Dean Gupit, however,
pointed out that in Article 46, they are talking only of concealment,
while in the article on legal separation, there is actuality. Judge Diy
added that in legal separation, the ground existed after the marriage,
while in Article 46, the ground existed at the time of the
marriage. Justice Reyes suggested that, for clarity, they add the phrase
existing at the time of the marriage at the end of subparagraph (4). The
Committee approved the suggestion.[63]
To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is its

concealment that serves as a valid ground to annul a marriage. [64] Concealment in
this case is not simply a blanket denial, but one that is constitutive of fraud. It is
this fundamental element that respondent failed to prove.
In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a basis for divorce. It
indicates that questions of sexual identity strike so deeply at one of the basic
elements of marriage, which is the exclusive sexual bond between the spouses.
[65]
In Crutcher v. Crutcher,[66] the Court held:
Unnatural practices of the kind charged here are an infamous indignity

to the wife, and which would make the marriage relation so revolting to
her that it would become impossible for her to discharge the duties of a
wife, and would defeat the whole purpose of the relation. In the natural
course of things, they would cause mental suffering to the extent of
affecting her health.[67]
However, although there may be similar sentiments here in the Philippines, the
legal overtones are significantly different. Divorce is not recognized in the
country. Homosexuality and its alleged incompatibility to a healthy heterosexual life
are not sanctioned as grounds to sever the marriage bond in our jurisdiction. At
most, it is only a ground to separate from bed and board.
What was proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively blissful marital union
for more thaneleven (11) years, which produced three (3) children. The burden of
proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests on Leonida. Sadly, she failed to
discharge this onus.
The same failure to prove fraud which purportedly resulted to a vitiated

marital consent was found in Villanueva v. Court of Appeals.[68] In Villanueva,
instead of proving vitiation of consent, appellant resorted to baseless portrayals of
his wife as a perpetrator of fraudulent schemes. Said the Court:
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with

those of the trial court, as in the instant case, are generally binding on
this Court. We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that
petitioner freely and voluntarily married private respondent and that
no threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so,
thus
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on

the ground that he did not freely consent to be married to the
appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger
to his life and safety. x x x
The Court is not convinced that appellants apprehension of danger to

his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter
voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time
he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard
in a bank. Given the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least,
the proper way to keep himself out of harms way. x x x
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to

believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child when
they were married.Appellants excuse that he could not have
impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during
their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint
is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee.
xxx
xxxx
x x x The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a

result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the
marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud,
intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to
justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of these grounds,
the validity of his marriage must be upheld.[69]
Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, not only by solely
taking into account petitioners homosexuality per se and not its concealment, but
by declaring the marriage void from its existence.
cralawThis Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of
the family.[70] The State and the public have vital interest in the maintenance and
preservation of these social institutions against desecration by fabricated evidence.
[71]
Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of marriage.
III.cralawIn a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer and
enjoy their community or conjugal property.
Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute community
property, provides:
cralawArt.
96. The administration and enjoyment of the community
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement,
the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by
the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five
years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
cralawIn
the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable
to participate in the administration of the common properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
without the authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
A similar provision, Article 124[72] prescribes joint administration and enjoyment in a

regime of conjugal partnership. In a valid marriage, both spouses
exercise administration and enjoyment of the property regime, jointly.
In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the community property
of Manuel and Leonida. In the same breath, the trial court forfeited Manuels share
in favor of the children.Considering that the marriage is upheld valid and subsisting,
the dissolution and forfeiture of Manuels share in the property regime is
unwarranted. They remain the joint administrators of the community property.
WHEREFORE, the petition

is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
petition in the trial court to annul the marriage is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE G.R. No. 152577

PHILIPPINES, Present:
Petitioner,
PUNO,
Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
- versus- TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Promulgated:
September 21, 2005
CRASUS L. IYOY,
R e s p o n d e n t.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,[1] affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30
October 1998,[2] declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and
Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of
the Philippines.
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint [3] for
declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997.
According to the said Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December
1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their
union, they had five children ' Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos '
who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent
Crasus discovered that Fely was 'hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984,
Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their
five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent
Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a
letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded
the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters
sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she
eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her
American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did
not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the
sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several
times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for
the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons.
Fely continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been
openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the
U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which
she was named as 'Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus. At the time the Complaint was filed, it
had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was
no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally
alleged in his Complaint that Fely's acts brought danger and dishonor to the family,
and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing,
constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in
relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim[4] with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She
asserted therein that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was
now married to Stephen Micklus. While she admitted being previously married to
respondent Crasus and having five children with him, Fely refuted the other
allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that she
was no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had been
indignant at respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of the
latter's drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment
and to contribute to the maintenance of their household. She could not have
been extravagant since the family hardly had enough money for basic needs.
Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no
job and what she was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines
was insufficient to support their family. Although she left all of her children with
respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to them, as well
as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to
the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons.
While she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having herself
sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce
papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her
American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her
marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American
citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely
also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was presently living with
another woman who bore him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus of
misusing the amount of P90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the
brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also
prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void;
and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she
advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's
fees, and litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs,[5] the
RTC afforded both parties the opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner
Republic participated in the trial through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.[6]
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his
Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially
reiterated the allegations in his Complaint;[7] (2) the Certification, dated 13 April
1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage
Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such
marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961;[8] and (3) the invitation
to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her
American husband's surname, Micklus.[9]
Fely's counsel filed a Notice,[10] and, later on, a Motion,[11] to take the deposition
of witnesses, namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written
interrogatories, before the consular officers of the Philippines in New York and
California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders[12] and
Commissions[13] issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York and
California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon written
interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into
account that it had been over a year since respondent Crasus had presented his
evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC
issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998,[14]considering Fely to have waived her
right to present her evidence. The case was thus deemed submitted for decision.
Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring
the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis of
the following findings '
The ground bearing defendant's psychological incapacity deserves a

reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiff's testimony is
decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed
exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply
with her marital duties such as striving for family unity, observing
fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. From the evidence
presented, plaintiff adequately established that the defendant
practically abandoned him. She obtained a divorce decree in the
United States of America and married another man and has establish
[sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation,
wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to another man
in another country.
Defendant's intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest

before the marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the
annulment of the marriage provided that these were eventually
manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the case in this
instance.
Certainly defendant's posture being an irresponsible wife erringly

reveals her very low regard for that sacred and inviolable institution of
marriage which is the foundation of human society throughout the
civilized world. It is quite evident that the defendant is bereft of the
mind, will and heart to comply with her marital obligations, such
incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question is
shown by defendant's own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendant's

psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in
question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein case
establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy,
firmly.
Going over plaintiff's testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court

finds that the defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of
such psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations.
These are her excessive disposition to material things over and above
the marital stability. That such incapacity was already there at the
time of the marriage in question is shown by defendant's own attitude
towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal
ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and
defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.[15]
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was
contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed
Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error therein. It even offered additional
ratiocination for declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null
and void, to wit '
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has

remarried, and is now permanently residing in the United States.
Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons for
seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines

in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND

A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE
IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE
ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO
REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE
CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted

provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen
still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a
divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly
acquired her American husband's citizenship and thus has become an
alien as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26
aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse
eventually embraces another citizenship and thus becomes herself an
alien.
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances,

plaintiff would still be considered as married to defendant, given her
total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the former. To
condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in
fact does not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is
incapacitated to discharge essential marital covenants, is verily to
condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds
abhorrent and will not countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be
given relief by affirming the trial court's declaration of the nullity of the
marriage of the parties.[16]
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002,[17] denied its
Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before
this Court, based on the following arguments/grounds '

I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent's wife do
not per se constitute psychological incapacity.
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in

accord with law and jurisprudence considering that the Court of
Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26,
paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.[18]
In his Comment[19] to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Fely's
psychological incapacity was clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that
paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines was indeed
applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had
already become an American citizen. He further questioned the personality of
petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to
institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of the
Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial
court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and
jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.
The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support

the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family
Code of the Philippines, reads '
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a
series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines for determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the term psychological incapacity was defined,
thus '
'. . . [P]sychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental

(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated[21]
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by '
(a) Gravity ' It must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence ' It must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after
the marriage; and
(c) Incurability ' It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.[22]
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court
of Appeals and Molina,[23]which, although quite lengthy, by its significance,
deserves to be reproduced below '
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as
the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both
the family and marriage are to be 'protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so
as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the

celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's. The
the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically

permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts' cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral


or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts'
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[24]
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[25] further clarified that there is no requirement
that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a
physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity,
however, must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during the
trial.
Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this
Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed
miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely;
therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC
was his testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving,
in the absence of any other corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other
pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of
Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely, such
marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the
wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American
husband's surname. Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in
her Answer to respondent Crasus's Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is
not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that
prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines
contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.[26]Irreconcilable differences,
conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical
abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by

themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the
said Article.[27]
As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 'is not to
be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[28]
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and
embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper,
nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her
marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American family and her
American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to
comply with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was
not identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it
cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental defect that is
serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of
celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal
examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for
the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of
the Philippines, by virtue of this Court's ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,
[29] respondent Crasus must still have complied with the requirement laid down
in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina[30] that the root cause of the
incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its incapacitating
nature be fully explained.
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
[31] No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family.[32]
II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not
applicable to the case at bar.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one
of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the
time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the
said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and
his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still
a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself
admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after
which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she
alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed
for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still
bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal
capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and
even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses.
Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the
Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus
argued that only the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may
intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings for annulment or declaration of
nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no personality
to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides '
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of

marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar
him or his Office from intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of
nullity of marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law
officer and legal defender of the Government.[33] His Office is tasked to
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities
and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General shall
constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties
requiring the services of lawyers.[34]
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that
the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion
between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing
in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender
of the land, then his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and
contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to
bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines
once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals. [35] While it is
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the
State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before
the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated
to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for
taking the case to the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is
only reasonable and practical that even while the proceeding is still being held
before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise
supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
therein to better guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.

In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor
General in several cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages
that were appealed before it, summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v.
Ancheta[36]
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)],

this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or

fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
[Id., at 213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)]
reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.]
regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State[37]
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[38] which became
effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other doubts of respondent
Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on
behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to
intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts. The
pertinent provisions of the said Rule are reproduced below '
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. '
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of
the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the
City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing
and submit to the court proof of such service within the same period.
Sec. 18. Memoranda. ' The court may require the parties and the
public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor
General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their claims
within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require
the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the
case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers
may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period
herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision,
with or without the memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision. '
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public
prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision personally or by
registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to
appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be
published once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from
notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for
reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties,
the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
Sec. 20. Appeal. '
(2) Notice of Appeal. ' An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may
appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days
from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The
appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse
parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC
and the Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage
between respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Fely's abandonment, sexual
infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court
commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is
now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither
law nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual problem.[39]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of
the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October
1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid
and subsisting.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila

Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 139676

Petitioner,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, CJ., Chairperson,

- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR. and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Norma Cuison-Melgar Promulgated:

and Eulogio A. Melgar,
Respondents. March 31, 2006
x------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) is a petition for review

on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated August 11, 1999
in CA-G.R. CV No. 55538, which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 43, Dagupan City (RTC) nullifying the marriage of respondents
Norma Cuison-Melgar (Norma) and Eulogio A. Melgar[2] (Eulogio) pursuant to
Article 36[3] of the Family Code.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On March 27, 1965, Norma and Eulogio were married before the Catholic Church in
Dagupan City.Their union begot five children, namely, Arneldo, Fermin, Norman,
Marion Joy, and Eulogio III. On August 19, 1996, Norma filed for declaration of
nullity of her marriage on the ground of Eulogio's psychological incapacity to comply
with his essential marital obligations.[4] According to Norma, the manifestations of
Eulogio's psychological incapacity are his immaturity, habitual alcoholism,
unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional laziness, and abandonment of his
family since December 27, 1985.
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served by personal service
on Eulogio on October 21, 1996 by the sheriff.[5] Eulogio failed to file an answer or
to enter his appearance within the reglementary period.
On November 25, 1996, the RTC ordered the Public Prosecutor to conduct an
investigation on the case to determine whether or not there exists collusion
between the contending parties.[6]On December 18, 1996, Public Prosecutor Joven
M. Maramba submitted his Manifestation to the effect that no collusion existed
between the contending parties.[7]On December 19, 1996, the RTC set the
reception of evidence on January 8, 1997.[8]
On January 8, 1997, upon motion of Norma's counsel, the RTC allowed the
presentation of evidence before the Clerk of Court.[9]Norma testified that since the
birth of their firstborn, Eulogio has been a habitual alcoholic; when he is drunk he
(a) sometimes sleeps on the streets, (b) every so often, he goes to her office,
utters unwholesome remarks against her and drags her home, (c) he usually lays a
hand on her, (d) he often scolds their children without justifiable reason; his liquor
drinking habit has brought shame and embarrassment on their family; when she
would refuse to give him money for his compulsive drinking habit, he would beat
her up and threaten her; he has not been employed since he was dismissed from
work and he refuses to look for a job; she has been the one supporting the family,
providing for the education and the basic needs of their children out of her salary as
a government employee; on December 27, 1985, because of unbearable jealousy
to her male officemates, Eulogio went to her office, dragged her home and then
beat her up; her brothers saw this, came to her rescue and then told Eulogio to get
out of the house; and since then, Eulogio has not visited or communicated with his
family such that reconciliation is very unlikely.[10] The Public Prosecutor thereafter
conducted a brief cross-examination of Norma.[11]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Twelve days later, or on January 20, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision nullifying
the marriage of Norma and Eulogio. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the instant petition for being
impressed with merit.As such, pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code
of the Philippines, the marriage between Norma L. Cuison-Melgar and
Eulogio A. Melgar, Jr. is declared an ABSOLUTE NULLITY.
The Local Civil Registrar of Dagupan City is therefore ordered to cancel

the Marriage Contract of the parties bearing Registry No. 180 in the
Marriage Registry of said Office after payment of the required fees.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the following offices: The City
Prosecution Office, Dagupan City, the Solicitor General, and the Local
Civil Registrar of Dagupan City.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The RTC reasoned that:
With the testimony of the petitioner, the Court is convinced that

defendant has been incorrigible in his vices such as habitual
alcoholism, subjecting his family to physical maltreatment and many
times caused them to be scandalized, his being indolent by not at least
trying to look for a job so that he could also help his wife in supporting
his family, and also his uncalled for display of his jealousy.These are
clear manifestation of his psychological incapacity to perform his
marital obligation to his wife such as showing respect, understanding
and love to her.Defendant also became indifferent to the needs of his
own children who really longed for a father who is willing to make the
sacrifice in looking for a job so as to support them.Without any
communication to his family since 1985, certaining [sic] reconciliation
and love would be improbable.The attendant circumstances in this
case really point to the fact that defendant was unprepared to comply
with his responsibilities as a good and responsible husband to his wife
and a loving father to his children x x x.[13]
Petitioner, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an appeal
with the CA, contending that the evidence presented are not sufficient to declare
the marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code.[14]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On August 11, 1999, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the decision of the RTC.
[15] The CA, quoting extensively Norma's testimony, ratiocinated:
[I]t has been adequately established that the decree of annulment is

proper not simply because of defendant's habitual alcoholism but
likewise because of other causes amounting to psychological incapacity
as a result of which defendant has failed to perform his obligations
under Articles 68-72, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code x x x.
Contrary to the submission of the appellant Republic, the grant of

annulment is not based merely on defendant's habitual alcoholism but
also because of his inability to cope with his other essential marital
obligations foremost of which is his obligation to live together with his
wife, observe mutual love, respect, fidelity and render mutual help and
support.
For the whole duration of their marriage, that is, the period when they
actually lived together as husband and wide and even thereafter,
defendant has miserably failed to perform his obligations for which
reason the plaintiff should not be made to suffer any longer.The
contention of the Republic that plaintiff never showed that she exerted
effort to seek medical help for her husband is stretching the
obligations of the plaintiff beyond its limits.To our mind, it is
equivalent to saying that plaintiff deserves to be punished for all the
inabilities of defendant to perform his concomitant duties as a husband
and a father all of which inabilities in the first place are in no way
attributable to the herein plaintiff.[16]
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
In its Petition,[17] the OSG poses a sole issue for resolution:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF

RESPONDENT IS IN THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 36 OF
THE FAMILY CODE.[18]
The OSG contends that the law does not contemplate mere inability to perform the
essential marital obligations as equivalent to or evidence of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code; that such inability must be due to causes that
are psychological in nature; that no psychiatrist or psychologist testified during the
trial that a psychological disorder is the cause of Eulogio's inability to look for a job,
his resulting drunkenness, unbearable jealousy and other disagreeable behavior;
and that the decision failed to state the nature, gravity or seriousness, and
incurability of Eulogio's alleged psychological incapacity.
In her Comment,[19] Norma maintains that her testimony pointing to the facts and
circumstances of Eulogio's immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy,
maltreatment, constitutional laziness and indolence are more than enough proof of
Eulogio's psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations,
which justifies the dissolution of their marriage.
In its Reply,[20] the OSG submits that Norma's comments are irrelevant and not
responsive to the arguments in the petition. Nonetheless, the OSG reiterates that
Norma's evidence fell short of the requirements of the law since no competent
evidence was presented during the trial to prove that Eulogio's inability to look for a
job, his resulting drunkenness, jealousy and other disagreeable behavior are
manifestations of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as
the foundation of the family.[21]Our family law is based on the policy that marriage
is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally
interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy
families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence,
their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.
In this regard, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates:
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of

marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall

be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
(Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Section 6 of Rule 18 of the 1985 Rules of Court, [23] the rule then
applicable, provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal

separation. - If the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage
or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion
between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to
intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated. (Emphasis supplied)
In Republic v. Molina,[24] the Court emphasized the role of the prosecuting

attorney or fiscal, and the OSG to appear as counsel for the State in proceedings
for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages:
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[25] (Emphasis
supplied)
In this case, the State did not actively participate in the prosecution of the case at
the trial level.Other than the Public Prosecutor's Manifestation[26] that no collusion
existed between the contending parties and the brief cross-examination[27] which
had barely scratched the surface, no pleading, motion, or position paper was filed
by the Public Prosecutor or the OSG. The State should have been given the
opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.
[28] Truly, only the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the OSG will
ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between
the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence.[29]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Be that as it may, the totality of evidence presented by Norma is completely

insufficient to sustain a finding that Eulogio is psychologically incapacitated.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[30] the Court declared that psychological incapacity

must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
[31]It should refer to 'no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. [32] The intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.[33]
Subsequently, the Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Molina[34] the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to
wit:

belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of
the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation. It decrees
marriage as legally 'inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at
the whim of the parties.Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108),
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of

the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's . The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment,
or prior thereto.

clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in
a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.

disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, 'mildcharacteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts' cannot be accepted as root
causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the


or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.
[35] (Emphasis supplied)
Later, the Court clarified in Marcos v. Marcos[36] that there is no requirement that
the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must
be established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.[37]
In the present case, Norma alone testified in support of her complaint for
declaration of nullity of her marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.She failed
to establish the fact that at the time they were married, Eulogio was already
suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to
assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.In fact,
Norma admitted in her testimony that her marital woes and Eulogio's disagreeable
behavior started only after the birth of their firstborn and when Eulogio lost his job.
Further, no other evidence was presented to show that Eulogio was not cognizant of
the basic marital obligations as outlined in Articles 68 to 72, [39] 220,[40] 221,
[41] and 225[42] of the Family Code. It was not sufficiently proved that Eulogio was
really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological
nature, and not merely physical. The Court
cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact of Eulogio's immaturity,
habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional laziness, and
abandonment of his family. These circumstances by themselves cannot be equated
with psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.It must
be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which
make Eulogio completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital
state.[43]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
At best, the circumstances relied upon by Norma are grounds for legal separation
under Article 55[44] of the Family Code.As the Court ruled in Republic of the
Philippines v. Molina,[45] it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person, it is essential thathe must be shown to
be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.There was
no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person
from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
All told, in order that the allegation of psychological incapacity may not be
considered a mere fabrication, evidence other than Norma's lone testimony should
have been adduced. While an actual medical, psychiatric or psychological
examination is not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity,
[47] an expert witness would have strengthened Norma's claim ofEulogio's alleged
psychological incapacity. Norma's omission to present one is fatal to her
position.There can be no conclusion of psychological incapacity where there is
absolutely no showing that the defects' were already present at the inception of the
marriage or that they are incurable.[48]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Court commiserates with Norma's marital predicament, but as a court, even as
the highest one, it can only apply the letter and the spirit of the law; it cannot
reinvent or modify it. Unfortunately, law and jurisprudence are ranged against
Norma's stance. The Court has no choice but to apply them accordingly, if it must
be true to its mission under the rule of law. The Court's first and foremost duty is to
apply the law no matter how harsh it may be.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated August 11, 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55538, affirming the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Dagupan City in Civil Case No. CV-96-
01061-D, dated January 20, 1997, isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of
Norma Cuison-Melgar in Civil Case No. CV-96-01061-D is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
SEPARATION OF PROPERTY
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
VIRGILIO MAQUILAN,G.R. NO. 155409

Petitioner,
c r a l a w Present: c r a l a w
YNARES- SANTIAGO, J.,

c r a l a w Chairperson,
c r a l a w - versus -AUSTRIA- MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.
DITA MAQUILAN, Promulgated:
c r a l a w Respondent.June 8, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA- MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court assailing the Decision [1 ] dated August 30, 2002
promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69689,
which affirmed the Judgment on Compromise Agreement dated January
2, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
3,Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, and the RTC Orders dated January
21, 2002 and February 7, 2002 (ORDERS) in Civil Case No. 656.
The facts of the case, as found by the CA, are as follows:

c r a l a w Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are
spouses who once had a blissful married life and out of
which were blessed to have a son.However, their once sugar
coated romance turned bitter when petitioner discovered
that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with
her paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a
case of adultery against private respondent and the latters
paramour.Consequently, both the private respondent and
her paramour were convicted of the crime charged and were
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment ranging from one (1)
year, eight (8) months, minimum of prision correccional as
minimum penalty, to three (3) years, six (6) months and
twenty one (21) days, medium of prisioncorreccional as
maximum penalty.
c r a l a w Thereafter,
private respondent, through counsel, filed a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution
and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and
Damages on June 15, 2001 with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 3 of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, docketed as
Civil Case No. 656, imputing psychological incapacity on the
part of the petitioner.
c r a l a w During
the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and
private respondent entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
in the following terms, to wit:
1.In partial settlement of the conjugal

partnership of gains, the parties agree to
the following:
a. P 50 0 ,00 0 .0 0 o f the mo ne y de po site d in

the bank jo intly in the name o f the
spo use s shall be w ithdr aw n and de po site d
in favor and in tr ust o f the ir co mmo n
child , Ne il Maqui lan , w ith the de po sit in
the jo int acco unt o f the par tie s.
T he balance o f such de po sit, w hich
pr e se ntly stands at P 1 ,31 8 ,0 43 .3 6 , shall
be w ithdr aw n and divi de d e qually by the
par tie s;
b. T he sto r e that is no w be ing o ccupie d by

the plaint iff shall be allo tte d to her w hile
the bo de ga shall be for the de fe ndant .T he
de fe ndant shall be paid the sum
o fP 50 ,00 0 .0 0 as his shar e in the sto cks
o f the sto re in full se ttle me nt the re o f.
T he plaint iff shall be allo w e d to o ccupy

the bo de ga until the time the ow ne r o f
the lo t o n w hich it stands shall co nstr uct
a buildin g the r e o n;
c.T he mo to r cycle s shall be divide d be tw ee n

the m such that the Kaw asaki shall be
o w ne d by the plaint iff w hile the Ho nda
Dr e am shall be fo r the de fe ndant ;
d.T he passe nge r jee p shall be fo r the

plain tiff w ho shall pay the de fe ndant the
sum o f P 7 5,0 00 .0 0 as his share the r e o n
and in full se ttle me nt ther e o f;
e .T he ho use and lo t shall be to the co mmo n

child .
2.This settlement is only partial, i.e.,

without prejudice to the litigation of other
conjugal properties that have not been
mentioned;
x x x x
c r a l a w The
said Compromise Agreement was given judicial
imprimatur by the respondent judge in the
assailed Judgment On Compromise Agreement, which
was erroneously dated January 2, 2002. [2 ]
c r a l a w However,
petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion
dated January 15, 2002, praying for the repudiation of the
Compromise Agreement and the reconsideration of the
Judgment on Compromise Agreement by the respondent
judge on the grounds that his previous lawyer did not
intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the
consequential effects of the Compromise Agreement.
c r a l a w The
respondent Judge in the assailed Order
dated January 21, 2002, denied the aforementioned
Omnibus Motion.
c r a l a w Displeased,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the aforesaid Order, but the same was denied in the
assailed Order dated February 7, 2002. [3 ] (Emphasis
supplied)
c r a l a w The
petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court claiming that the RTC
committed grave error and abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction (1) in upholding the validity of the Compromise
Agreement dated January 11, 2002; (2) when it held in its Order dated
February 7, 2002 that the Compromise Agreement was made within the
cooling-off period; (3) when it denied petitioners Motion to Repudiate
Compromise Agreement and to Reconsider Its Judgment on
Compromise Agreement; and (4) when it conducted the proceedings
without the appearance and participation of the Office of the Solicitor
General and/or the Provincial Prosecutor. [4 ] c h a n r o b l e s v i r t u a l l a w l i b r a r y
c r a l a w On
August 30, 2002, the CA dismissed the Petition for lack of
merit.The CA held that the conviction of the respondent of the crime of
adultery does not ipso facto disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal
property, especially considering that she had only been sentenced with
the penalty of prision correccional, a penalty that does not carry the
accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the
rights to manage her property and to dispose of such
property inter vivos; that Articles 43 and 63 of the Family Code, which
pertain to the effects of a nullified marriage and the effects of legal
separation, respectively, do not apply, considering, too, that the
Petition for the Declaration of the Nullity of Marriage filed by the
respondent invoking Article 36 of the Family Code has yet to be
decided, and, hence, it is premature to apply Articles 43 and 63 of the
Family Code; that, although adultery is a ground for legal separation,
nonetheless, Article 63 finds no application in the instant case since no
petition to that effect was filed by the petitioner against the
respondent; that the spouses voluntarily separated their property
through their Compromise Agreement with court approval under Article
134 of the Family Code; that the Compromise Agreement, which
embodies the voluntary separation of property, is valid and binding in
all respects because it had been voluntarily entered into by the
parties; that, furthermore, even if it were true that the petitioner was
not duly informed by his previous counsel about the legal effects of the
Compromise Agreement, this point is untenable since the mistake or
negligence of the lawyer binds his client, unless such mistake or
negligence amounts to gross negligence or deprivation of due process
on the part of his client; that these exceptions are not present in the
instant case; that the Compromise Agreement was plainly worded and
written in simple language, which a person of ordinary intelligence can
discern the consequences thereof, hence, petitioners claim that his
consent was vitiated is highly incredible; that the Compromise
Agreement was made during the existence of the marriage of the
parties since it was submitted during the pendency of the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage; that the application of Article 2035
of the Civil Code is misplaced; that the cooling-off period under Article
58 of the Family Code has no bearing on the validity of the
Compromise Agreement; that the Compromise Agreement is not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, and public policy;
that this agreement may not be later disowned simply because of a
change of mind; that the presence of the Solicitor General or his
deputy is not indispensable to the execution and validity of the
Compromise Agreement, since the purpose of his presence is to curtail
any collusion between the parties and to see to it that evidence is not
fabricated, and, with this in mind, nothing in the Compromise
Agreement touches on the very merits of the case of declaration of
nullity of marriage for the court to be wary of any possible collusion;
and, finally, that the Compromise Agreement is merely an agreement
between the parties to separate their conjugal properties partially
without prejudice to the outcome of the pending case of declaration of
nullity of marriage.
c r a l a w Hence, herein Petition, purely on questions of law, raising the
following issues:
I.
WHETHER OF NOT A SPOUSE CONVICTED OF EITHER

CONCUBINAGE OR ADULTERY, CAN STILL SHARE IN THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP;
II
WHETHER OR NOT A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ENTERED

INTO BY SPOUSES, ONE OF WHOM WAS CONVICTED OF
ADULTERY, GIVING THE CONVICTED SPOUSE A SHARE IN
THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY, VALID AND LEGAL;
III
WHETHER OR NOT A JUDGMENT FOR ANNULMENT AND LEGAL

SEPARATION IS A PRE- REQUISITE BEFORE A SPOUSE
CONVICTED OF EITHER CONCUBINAGE OR ADULTERY, BE
DISQUALIFIED AND PROHIBITED FROM SHARING IN THE
CONJUGAL PROPERTY;
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE DISQUALIFICATION OF A CONVICTED

SPOUSE OF ADULTERY FROM SHARING IN A CONJUGAL
PROPERTY, CONSTITUTES CIVIL INTERDICTION. [5 ]
c r a l a w The
petitioner argues that the Compromise Agreement should
not have been given judicial imprimatur since it is against law
and public policy; that the proceedings where it was approved is
null and void, there being no appearance and participation of the
Solicitor General or the Provincial Prosecutor; that it was timely
repudiated; and that the respondent, having been convicted of
adultery, is therefore disqualified from sharing in the conjugal
property.
cralaw
c r a l a w The Petition must fail.
c r a l a w The essential question is whether the partial voluntary separation
of property made by the spouses pending the petition for declaration of

nullity of marriage is valid.
c r a l a w First. The
petitioner contends that the Compromise Agreement is
void because it circumvents the law that prohibits the guilty spouse,
who was convicted of either adultery or concubinage, from sharing in
the conjugal property.Since the respondent was convicted of adultery,
the petitioner argues that her share should be forfeited in favor of the
common child under Articles 43(2) [6 ] and 63 [7 ] of the Family Code.
c r a l a w To the petitioner, it is the clear intention of the law to disqualify

the spouse convicted of adultery from sharing in the conjugal property;
and because the Compromise Agreement is void, it never became final
and executory.
c r a l a w Moreover, the petitioner cites Article 2035 [8 ] of the Civil Code and
argues that since adultery is a ground for legal separation, the

Compromise Agreement is therefore void.
c r a l a w These
arguments are specious.The foregoing provisions of the law
are inapplicable to the instant case.
c r a l a w Article 43 of the Family Code refers to Article 42, to wit:
c r a l a w Article
42.The subsequent marriage referred to in the
preceding Article [9 ] shall be automatically terminated by the
recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent
spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous
marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
cralawAsworn statement of the fact and circumstances of

reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the
instance of any interested person, with due notice to the
spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice
to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in
case such fact is disputed.
where a subsequent marriage is terminated because of the

reappearance of an absent spouse; while Article 63 applies to the
effects of a decree of legal separation.The present case involves a
proceeding where the nullity of the marriage is sought to be declared
under the ground of psychological capacity. c r a l a w
c r a l a w Article
2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly inapplicable.The
Compromise Agreement partially divided the properties of the conjugal
partnership of gains between the parties and does not deal with the
validity of a marriage or legal separation.It is not among those that
are expressly prohibited by Article 2035.
c r a l a w Moreover,
the contention that the Compromise Agreement is
tantamount to a circumvention of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse
from sharing in the conjugal properties is misplaced.Existing law and
jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification.
c r a l a w Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may

be effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial
approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which was judicially
approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the
law.This conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the
declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending. However, the
Court must stress that this voluntary separation of property is
subject to the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership
of gains and other persons with pecuniary interest pursuant to
Article 136 of the Family Code.
c r a l a w Second. Petitioners claim that since the proceedings before the
RTC were void in the absence of the participation of the provincial

prosecutor or solicitor, the voluntary separation made during
the pendency of the case is also void.The proceedings pertaining to the
Compromise Agreement involved the conjugal properties of the
spouses. The settlement had no relation to the questions surrounding
the validity of their marriage.Nor did the settlement amount to a
collusion between the parties.
c r a l a w Article 48 of the Family Code states:
c r a l a w Art.
48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that the evidence
is not fabricated or suppressed. (Emphasis supplied)
cralaw
c r a l a w Section 3(e) of Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides:
c r a l a w SEC. 3. Default; declaration of.-x x x x

x x x x
(e) Where no defaults allowed .If the defending party in

action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or
for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order
the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not
a collusion between the parties exists if there is no
collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to
it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
(Emphasis supplied
c r a l a w Truly,
the purpose of the active participation of the Public
Prosecutor or the Solicitor General is to ensure that the interest of the
State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the
parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence. [1 0 ] While the
appearances of the Solicitor General and/or the Public Prosecutor are
mandatory, the failure of the RTC to require their appearance does
not per se nullify the Compromise Agreement. This Court fully concurs
with the findings of the CA:
cralawxx x. It bears emphasizing that the intendment of the

law in requiring the presence of the Solicitor General and/or
State prosecutor in all proceedings of legal separation and
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage is to curtail
or prevent any possibility of collusion between the parties
and to see to it that their evidence respecting the case is
not fabricated.In the instant case, there is no exigency for
the presence of the Solicitor General and/or the State
prosecutor because as already stated, nothing in the subject
compromise agreement touched into the very merits of the
case of declaration of nullity of marriage for the court to be
wary of any possible collusion between the parties.At the
risk of being repetiti[ve], the compromise agreement
pertains merely to an agreement between the petitioner and
the private respondent to separate their conjugal properties
partially without prejudice to the outcome of the pending
case of declaration of nullity of marriage. [1 1 ]
c r a l a w Third.The
conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of
civil interdiction.Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the
consequences of civil interdiction:
c r a l a w Art.
34.Civil Interdiction. Civil interdiction shall deprive
the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of
parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person
or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to
manage his property and of the right to dispose of such
property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery
is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.Article 333
should be read with Article 43 of the same Code.The latter provides:
c r a l a w Art.
43.Prision correccional Its accessory penalties. The
penalty of prisioncorreccional shall carry with it that of
suspension from public office, from the right to follow a
profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of
said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months.The
offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this
article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless
the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
c r a l a w It
is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the
crime of adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil
interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to manage her
property and to dispose of such property inter vivos.
c r a l a w Fourth.Neither
could it be said that the petitioner was not
intelligently and judiciously informed of the consequential effects of
the compromise agreement, and that, on this basis, he may repudiate
the Compromise Agreement.The argument of the petitioner that he was
not duly informed by his previous counsel about the legal effects of the
voluntary settlement is not convincing.Mistake or vitiation of consent,
as now claimed by the petitioner as his basis for repudiating the
settlement, could hardly be said to be evident. In Salonga v. Court of
Appeals, [1 2 ] this Court held:
c r a l a w [I]t
is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds
the client.This is based on the rule that any act performed
by a lawyer within the scope of his general or implied
authority is regarded as an act of his client. Consequently,
the mistake or negligence of petitioners' counsel may result
in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against them.
c r a l a w Exceptions
to the foregoing have been recognized by
the Court in cases where reckless or gross negligence of
counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when
its application "results in the outright deprivation of one's
property through a technicality. " x x x x [13 ]
c r a l a w None
of these exceptions has been sufficiently shown in the
present case.
c r a l a w WHEREFORE,
the Petition is DENIED . The Decision of the Court
of Appeals isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the subject
Compromise Agreement is VALIDwithout prejudice to the rights of all
creditors and other persons with pecuniary interest in the properties of
the conjugal partnership of gains.
c r a l a w SO ORDERED.
CUSTODY OF CHILDREN
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 114742. July 17, 1997]
CARLITOS E. SILVA, Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SUZANNE T.

GONZALES, Respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their children, see to
their proper upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare. This authority and responsibility
may not be unduly denied the parents; neither may it be renounced by them. Even when the parents
are estranged and their affection for each other is lost, the attachment and feeling for their offsprings
invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of
course, any real, grave and imminent threat to the well-being of the child.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The petition bears upon this concern.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local actress,
cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two children: Ramon Carlos and
Rica Natalia. Not very long after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It began, according to Silva,
when Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over his vigorous objections. The assertion was
quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed that she, in fact, had never stopped working throughout their
relationship. At any rate, the two eventually parted ways.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The instant controversy was spawned, in February 1986, by the refusal of Gonzales to allow Silva, in
apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have the children in his company on
weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 78, of Quezon City. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who averred that Silva often
engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and social values of
the children.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In an order, dated 07 April 1989, the trial court adjudged:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered directing respondent to allow herein

petitioner visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no case should he
take out the children without the written consent of the mother or respondent herein. No
pronouncement as to costs."[1]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Silva appeared somehow satisfied with the judgment for only Gonzales interposed an appeal from the
RTCs order to the Court of Appeals.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the meantime, Gonzales got married to a Dutch national. The newlyweds emigrated to Holland with
Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 23 September 1993, the appellate tribunal ruled in favor of Gonzales; it

held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"In all questions, regarding the care, custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall be
the paramount consideration' - not the welfare of the parents (Art. 8, PD 603). Under the predicament
and/or status of both petitioner-appellee and respondent-appellant, We find it more wholesome
morally and emotionally for the children if we put a stop to the rotation of custody of said children.
Allowing these children to stay with their mother on weekdays and then with their father and the
latter's live-in partner on weekends may not be conducive to a normal up-bringing of children of
tender age. There is no telling how this kind of set-up, no matter how temporary and/or remote,
would affect the moral and emotional conditions of the minor children. Knowing that they are
illegitimate is hard enough, but having to live with it, witnessing their father living with a woman not
their mother may have a more damaging effect upon them.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"Article 3 of PD 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, provides in
part:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"`Art. 3. Rights of the Child. - x x xchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
`(1) x x xchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
`(5) Every child has the right to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the
enrichment and the strengthening of his character.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
`(8) Every child has the right to protection against exploitation, improper influences, hazards and
other conditions or circumstances prejudicial to his physical, mental, emotional, social and moral
development.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
`x x x'chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"With Articles 3 and 8 of PD 603, in mind, We find it to the best interest of the minor children, to deny
visitorial and/or temporary custodial rights to the father, even at the expense of hurting said parent.
After all, if indeed his love for the children is genuine and more divine than the love for himself, a little
self-sacrifice and self-denial may bring more benefit to the children. While petitioner-appellee, as
father, may not intentionally prejudice the children by improper influence, what the children may
witness and hear while in their father's house may not be in keeping with the atmosphere of morality
and rectitude where they should be brought up.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"The children concerned are still in their early formative years of life. The molding of the character of
the child starts at home. A home with only one parent is more normal than two separate houses -
(one house where one parent lives and another house where the other parent with another
woman/man lives). After all, under Article 176 of the Family Code, illegitimate children are supposed
to use the surname of and shall be under the parental authority of their mother.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"The child is one of the most important assets of the nation. It is thus important we be careful in
rearing the children especially so if they are illegitimates, as in this case. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered giving due course to the
appeal. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City dated April 7, 1989 is hereby reversed.
Petitioner-appellee's petition for visitorial rights is hereby denied.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"SO ORDERED."[2]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Silva comes to this Court for relief. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The issue before us is not really a question of child custody; instead, the case merely concerns the
visitation right of a parent over his children which the trial court has adjudged in favor of petitioner by
holding that he shall have visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no
case (could) he take out the children without the written consent of the mother x x x." The visitation
right referred to is the right of access of a noncustodial parent to his or her child or children.
There is, despite a dearth of specific legal provisions, enough recognition on

the inherent and natural right of parents over their children. Article 150 of the Family Code
expresses that "(f)amily relations include those x x x (2) (b)etween parents and children; x x x."
Article 209, in relation to Article 220, of the Code states that it is the natural right and duty of
parents and those exercising parental authority to, among other things, keep children in their
company and to give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding.
The Constitution itself speaks in terms of the "natural and primary rights of parents in the rearing
of the youth.[4]There is nothing conclusive to indicate that these provisions are meant to solely
address themselves to legitimate relationships. Indeed, although in varying degrees, the laws on
support and successional rights, by way of examples, clearly go beyond the legitimate members of the
family and so explicitly encompass illegitimate relationships as well.[5] Then, too, and most
importantly, in the declaration of nullity of marriages, a situation that presupposes
a void or inexistent marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code provides for appropriate visitation rights to
parents who are not given custody of their children.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
There is no doubt that in all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare is always the paramount
consideration. The Court shares the view of the Solicitor General, who has recommended due course
to the petition, that a few hours spent by petitioner with the children, however, could not all be that
detrimental to the children. Similarly, what the trial court has observed is not entirely without merit;
thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"The allegations of respondent against the character of petitioner, even assuming as true, cannot be
taken as sufficient basis to render petitioner an unfit father. The fears expressed by respondent to the
effect that petitioner shall be able to corrupt and degrade their children once allowed to even
temporarily associate with petitioner is but the product of respondent's unfounded imagination, for no
man, bereft of all moral persuasions and goodness, would ever take the trouble and expense in
instituting a legal action for the purpose of seeing his illegitimate children. It can just be imagined the
deep sorrows of a father who is deprived of his children of tender ages."[6]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Court appreciates the apprehensions of private respondent and their well-meant concern for the
children; nevertheless, it seems unlikely that petitioner would have ulterior motives or undue designs
more than a parents natural desire to be able to call on, even if it were only on brief visits, his own
children. The trial court, in any case, has seen it fit to understandably provide this precautionary
measure, i.e., "in no case (can petitioner) take out the children without the written consent of the
mother."chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is REINSTATED, reversing thereby the judgment of the
appellate court which is hereby SET ASIDE. No costs.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
LEGAL SEPARATION
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a.cralawG.R. NO. 153206

WILLIAM ONG,
Petitioner,
cralawPresent:cralaw
cralawPANGANIBAN, C.J.
(Chairperson)
cralawYNARES-SANTIAGO,
cralaw- versus -cralawAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
cralawCALLEJO, SR., and
cralawCHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
LUCITA G. ONG,Promulgated:
Respondent.cralawcralawOctober 23, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
cralawBefore this Court is a Petition for Review seeking the reversal of the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV No. 59400 which
affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch
41, Dagupan City granting the petition for legal separation filed by herein
respondent, as well as the Resolution[2] of the CA dated April 26, 2002 which
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
cralawOng Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita)
were married onJuly 13, 1975 at the San Agustin Church in Manila.They have three
children: Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the age of
majority.[3]
cralawOnMarch 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Article
55 par. (1) of the Family Code[4] before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Dagupan City, Branch 41 alleging that her life with William was marked by
physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct.[5]
cralawLucitaclaimed that: soon after three years of marriage, she and William
quarreled almost every day, with physical violence being inflicted upon her; William
would shout invectives at her like 'putang ina mo', 'gago', 'tanga', and he would
slap her, kick her, pull her hair, bang her head against concrete wall and throw at
her whatever he could reach with his hand; the causes of these fights were petty
things regarding their children or their business; William would also scold and beat
the children at different parts of their bodies using the buckle of his belt; whenever
she tried to stop William from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her and
box her; on December 9, 1995, after she protested with William's decision to allow
their eldest son Kingston to go to Bacolod, William slapped her and said, 'it is none
of your business' ; on December 14, 1995, she asked William to bring Kingston
back from Bacolod; a violent quarrel ensued and William hit her on her head, left
cheek, eye, stomach, and arms; when William hit her on the stomach and she bent
down because of the pain, he hit her on the head then pointed a gun at her and
asked her to leave the house; she then went to her sister's house in Binondo where
she was fetched by her other siblings and brought to their parents house
in Dagupan; the following day, she went to her parent's doctor, Dr.
Vicente Elinzano for treatment of her injuries.[6]
William for his part denied that he ever inflicted physical harm on his wife, used
insulting language against her, or whipped the children with the buckle of his
belt.While he admits that he and Lucitaquarreled on December 9, 1995, at their
house in Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila, he claimed that he left the
same, stayed in their Greenhills condominium and only went back to
theirTondo house to work in their office below.In the afternoon of December 14,
1995, their laundrywoman told him that Lucita left the house.[7]
On January 5, 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision decreeing legal separation, thus:
cralawWHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

decreeing the legal separation of plaintiff and defendant, with all the
legal effects attendant thereto, particularly the dissolution and
liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties, for which purpose
the parties are hereby ordered to submit a complete inventory of said
properties so that the Court can make a just and proper division, such
division to be embodied in a supplemental decision.
SO ORDERED.[8] cralaw
cralawThe RTC found that:

It is indubitable that plaintiff (Lucita) and defendant (William) had
their frequent quarrels and misunderstanding which made both of their
lives miserable and hellish.This is even admitted by the defendant
when he said that there was no day that he did not quarrel with his
wife.Defendant had regarded the plaintiff negligent in the performance
of her wifely duties and had blamed her for not reporting to him about
the wrongdoings of their children. (citations omitted)
cralawThese quarrels were always punctuated by acts of physical
violence, threats and intimidation by the defendant against the plaintiff
and on the children.In the process, insulting words and language were
heaped upon her.The plaintiff suffered and endured the mental and
physical anguish of these marital fights until December 14, 1995 when
she had reached the limits of her endurance.The more than twenty
years of her marriage could not have been put to waste by the plaintiff
if the same had been lived in an atmosphere of love, harmony and
peace.Worst, their children are also suffering.As very well stated in
plaintiff's memorandum, 'it would be unthinkable for her to throw
away this twenty years of relationship, abandon the comforts of her
home and be separated from her children, whom she loves, if there
exists no cause, which is already beyond her endurance.[9]
cralaw
William appealed to the CA which affirmed in toto the RTC decision.In its Decision
dated October 8, 2001, the CA found that the testimonies for Lucita were
straightforward and credible and the ground for legal separation under Art. 55, par.
1 of the Family Code, i.e., physical violence and grossly abusive conduct directed
against Lucita, were adequately proven.[10]
cralawAs the CA explained:
cralawThe straightforward and candid testimonies of the witnesses

were uncontrovertedand credible.Dr. Elinzano's testimony was able to
show that the [Lucita] suffered several injuries inflicted by [William].It
is clear that on December 14, 1995, she sustained redness in her
cheek, black eye on her left eye, fist blow on the stomach, blood clot
and a blackish discoloration on both shoulders and a 'bump or
'bukol on her head.The presence of these injuries was established by
the testimonies of [Lucita] herself and her sister, Linda Lim.The
Memorandum/Medical Certificate also confirmed the evidence
presented and does not deviate from the doctor's main testimony ---
that [Lucita] suffered physical violence on [sic] the hands of her
husband, caused by physical trauma, slapping of the cheek, boxing
and fist blows.The effect of the so-called alterations in the
Memorandum/Medical Certificate questioned by [William] does not
depart from the main thrust of the testimony of the said doctor.
Also, the testimony of [Lucita] herself consistently and constantly

established that [William] inflicted repeated physical violence upon her
during their marriage and that she had been subjected to grossly
abusive conduct when he constantly hurled invectives at her even in
front of their customers and employees, shouting words like, 'gaga',
'putang ina mo, tanga, and 'you dont know anything.
These were further corroborated by several incidents narrated by Linda

Lim who lived in their conjugal home from 1989 to 1991.She saw her
sister after the December 14, 1995 incident when she (Lucita) was
fetched by the latter on the same date.She was a witness to the kind
of relationship her sister and [William] had during the three years she
lived with them.She observed that [William] has an
'explosive temper, easily gets angry and becomes very violent.She
cited several instances which proved that WilliamOng indeed treated
her wife shabbily and despicably, in words and deeds.
x x xcralaw
That the physical violence and grossly abusive conduct were brought
to bear upon [Lucita] by [William] have been duly established by
[Lucita] and her witnesses. These incidents were not explained
nor controverted by [William], except by making a general denial
thereof.Consequently, as between an affirmative assertion and a
general denial, weight must be accorded to the affirmative assertion.
The grossly abusive conduct is also apparent in the instances testified

to by [Lucita] and her sister.The injurious invectives hurled at [Lucita]
and his treatment of her, in its entirety, in front of their employees
and friends, are enough to constitute grossly abusive conduct.The
aggregate behavior of [William] warrants legal separation under
grossly abusive conduct.x x x[11]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
cralawWilliam filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA on April
26, 2002.[12]
cralawHence the present petition where William claims that:

I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN

DISREGARDING CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THE PETITION FOR LEGAL
SEPARATION WAS INSTITUTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR
THE SOLE PURPOSE OF REMOVING FROM PETITIONER THE CONTROL
AND OWNERSHIP OF THEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTIES AND TO
TRANSFER THE SAME TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S FAMILY.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN

DISREGARDING CLEAR EVIDENCE REPUDIATING PRIVATE
RESPONDENT'S CLAIM OF REPEATED PHYSICAL VIOLENCE AND
GROSSLY ABUSIVE CONDUCTON THE PART OF PETITIONER.
cralawWilliamargues that: the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the case is
to wrest control and ownership of properties belonging to the conjugal partnership;
these properties, which include real properties in Hong Kong, Metro
Manila, Baguio and Dagupan, were acquired during the marriage through his
(William's ) sole efforts; the only parties who will benefit from a decree of legal
separation are Lucita's parents and siblings while such decree would condemn him
as a violent and cruel person, a wife-beater and child abuser, and will taint his
reputation, especially among the Filipino-Chinese community; substantial facts and
circumstances have been overlooked which warrant an exception to the general rule
that factual findings of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal; the findings of
the trial court that he committed acts of repeated physical violence
against Lucita and their children were not sufficiently established; what took place
were disagreements regarding the manner of raising and disciplining the children
particularly Charleston,Lucita's favorite son; marriage being a social contract cannot
be impaired by mere verbal disagreements and the complaining party must adduce
clear and convincing evidence to justify legal separation;the CA erred in relying on
the testimonies of Lucita and her witnesses, her sister Linda Lim, and their parent's
doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzanzo, whose testimonies are tainted with relationship and
fraud; in the 20 years of their marriage, Lucita has not complained of any cruel
behavior on the part of William in relation to their marital and family life; William
expressed his willingness to receive respondent unconditionally however, it
is Lucita who abandoned the conjugal dwelling on December 14, 1995 and
instituted the complaint below in order to appropriate for herself and her relatives
the conjugal properties; the Constitution provides that marriage is aninviolable
social institution and shall be protected by the State, thus the rule is the
preservation of the marital union and not its infringement; only for grounds
enumerated in Art. 55 of the Family Code, which grounds should be clearly and
convincingly proven, can the courts decree a legal separation among the spouses.
[14]
cralawRespondent Lucita in her Comment, meanwhile, asserts that: the issues raised
in the present petition are factual; the findings of both lower courts rest on strong
and clear evidence borne by the records; this Court is not a trier of facts and factual
findings of the RTC when confirmed by the CA are final and conclusive and may not
be reviewed on appeal; the contention of William thatLucita filed the case for legal
separation in order to remove from William the control and ownership of their
conjugal properties and to transfer the same to Lucita's family is absurd; Lucita will
not just throw her marriage of 20 years and forego the companionship of William
and her children just to serve the interest of her family; Lucita left the conjugal
home because of the repeated physical violence and grossly abusive conduct of
petitioner.[15]
cralaw
cralawPetitionerfiled a Reply, reasserting his claims in his petition,[16] as well as a
Memorandum where he averred for the first time that since respondent is guilty of
abandonment, the petition for legal separation should be denied following Art. 56,
par. (4) of the Family Code.[17]Petitioner argues that since respondent herself has
given ground for legal separation by abandoning the family simply because of a
quarrel and refusing to return thereto unless the conjugal properties were placed in
the administration of petitioner's in-laws, no decree of legal separation should be
issued in her favor.[18]
Respondent likewise filed a Memorandum reiterating her earlier assertions.[19]
cralawWe resolve to deny the petition.

cralawIt is settled that questions of fact cannot be the subject of a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.The rule finds more stringent application where
the CA upholds the findings of fact of the trial court.In such instance, this Court is
generally bound to adopt the facts as determined by the lower courts.[20]
cralawThe only instances when this Court reviews findings of fact are:cralaw
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises

or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)when
the findings of facts are conflicting; (6)when in making its findings the
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7)when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8)when
the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9)when the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; (10)when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.[21]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
cralawAspetitioner failed to show that the instant case falls under any of the
exceptional circumstances, the general rule applies. cralaw
cralawIndeed,
this Court cannot review factual findings on appeal, especially when
they are borne out by the records or are based on substantial evidence.[22]In this
case, the findings of the RTC were affirmed by the CA and are adequately
supported by the records.
cralawAs
correctly observed by the trial court, William himself admitted that there
was no day that he did not quarrel with his wife, which made his life miserable, and
he blames her for being negligent of her wifely duties and for not reporting to him
the wrongdoings of their children.[23]
cralawLucitaand her sister, Linda Lim, also gave numerous accounts of the instances
when William displayed violent temper against Lucita and their children; such as:
when William threw a steel chair at Lucita;[24] threw chairs at their children;
[25] slapped Lucita and utter insulting words at her;[26]use the buckle of the belt in
whipping the children;[27] pinned Lucita against the wall with his strong arms
almost strangling her, and smashed the flower vase and brick rocks and moldings
leaving the bedroom in disarray;[28] shouted at Lucita and threw a directory at her,
in front of Linda and the employees of their business, because he could not find a
draft letter on his table;[29] got mad at Charleston for cooking steak
with vetchin prompting William to smash the plate with steak and hit Charleston,
then slapped Lucita and shouted at her
'putang ina mo, gago, wala kang pakialam,tarantado when she sided with
Charleston;[30] and the December 9 and December 14, 1995 incidents which
forced Lucita to leave the conjugal dwelling.[31]
cralawLucita
also explained that the injuries she received on December 14, 1995,
were not the first.As she related before the trial court:
q. You stated on cross examination that the injuries you

sustained onDecember 14, 1995 were the most serious?
a.cralawUnlike before I considered December 14, 1995 the very serious

because before it is only on the arm and black eye, but on this
December 14, I suffered bruises in all parts of my body, sir.
cralawTo
these, all William and his witnesses, could offer are denials and attempts to
downplay the said incidents.[33]
cralawAs between the detailed accounts given for Lucita and the general denial for
William, the Court gives more weight to those of the former.The Court also gives a
great amount of consideration to the assessment of the trial court regarding the
credibility of witnesses as trial court judges enjoy the unique opportunity of
observing the deportment of witnesses on the stand, a vantage point denied
appellate tribunals.[34]Indeed, it is settled that the assessment of the trial court of
the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect and weight having had the
opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying.
[35]
cralawIn this case, the RTC noted that:
cralaw[William]'sdenial and that of his witnesses of the imputation of

physical violence committed by him could not be given much credence
by the Court.Since the office secretary Ofelia Rosal and the family
laundrywoman Rosalino Morco are dependent upon defendant for their
livelihood, their testimonies may be tainted with bias and they could
not be considered as impartial and credible witnesses.So with
Kingston Ongwho lives with defendant and depends upon him for
support.[36]
cralawParenthetically,William claims that that the witnesses of Lucita are not credible
because of their relationship with her.We do not agree.Relationship alone is not
reason enough to discredit and label a witness's testimony as biased and unworthy
of credence[37] and a witness' relationship to one of the parties does not
automatically affect the veracity of his or her testimony.[38]Considering the
detailed and straightforward testimonies given by Linda Lim and Dr.
Vicente Elinzano, bolstered by the credence accorded them by the trial court, the
Court finds that their testimonies are not tainted with bias.
cralawWilliam also posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal
separation is in order for her side of the family to gain control of the conjugal
properties; that Lucita was willing to destroy his reputation by filing the legal
separation case just so her parents and her siblings could control the properties he
worked hard for.The Court finds such reasoning hard to believe.What benefit
would Lucita personally gain by pushing for her parents' and siblings' financial
interests at the expense of her marriage?What is more probable is that there truly
exists a ground for legal separation, a cause so strong, that Lucita had to seek
redress from the courts.As aptly stated by the RTC,
...it would be unthinkable for her to throw away this twenty years of
relationship, abandon the comforts of her home and be separated
from her children whom she loves, if there exists no cause, which is
already beyond her endurance.[39]
cralawThe
claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his reputation
and label him as a wife-beater and child-abuser also does not elicit sympathy from
this Court.If there would be such a smear on his reputation then it would not be
because of Lucita's decision to seek relief from the courts, but because he
gave Lucita reason to go to court in the first place.
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the
family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par.
(4) of the Family Code which provides that legal separation shall be denied when
both parties have given ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to
by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one
year.[40]As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct,
such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.
cralawAs a final note, we reiterate that our Constitution is committed to the policy of
strengthening the family as a basic social institution.[41] The Constitution itself
however does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage and the
family, as it remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of
marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it and put into
operation the constitutional provisions that protect the same.[42]With the
enactment of the Family Code, this has been accomplished as it defines marriage
and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations
that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration
of nullity and those for legal separation.[43] AsLucita has adequately proven the
presence of a ground for legal separation, the Court has no reason but to affirm the
findings of the RTC and the CA, and grant her the relief she is entitled to under the
law.
cralawWHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

cralawCosts against petitioner.
cralawSO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 106169 February 14, 1994
SAMSON T. SABALONES, Petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and REMEDIOS GAVIOLA-
SABALONES,Respondents.
CRUZ, J.: chanrobles virtual law library
The subject of this petition is the preliminary injunction issued by the respondent court pending
resolution of a case on appeal. We deal only with this matter and not the merits of the
case.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries during his successive tours of
duties, petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, herein respondent Remedios Gaviola-
Sabalones, the administration of some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen
years.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and
their children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot
located at
#17 Eisenhower St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, belonging to the conjugal partnership. He
claimed that he was sixty-eight years old, very sick and living alone without any income, and that his
share of the proceeds of the sale to defray the prohibitive cost of his hospitalization and medical
treatment.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In her answer, the private respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal
separation. She alleged that the house in Greenhills was being occupied by her and their six children
and that they were depending for their support on the rentals from another conjugal property, a
building and lot in Forbes Park which was on lease to Nobumichi Izumi. She also informed the court
that despite her husband's retirement, he had not returned to his legitimate family and was instead
maintaining a separate residence in Don Antonio Heights, Fairview, Quezon City, with Thelma
Cumareng and their three children.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order the liquidation of
their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share therein because of his adultery. She
also prayed that it enjoin the petitioner and his agents from a) disturbing the occupants of the Forbes
Park property and b) disposing of or encumbering any of the conjugal
properties.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After trial, Judge Mariano M. Umali, found that the petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous
marriage on October 5, 1981, with Thelma Cumareng, to whom he had returned upon his retirement
in 1985 at a separate residence. The court thus decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the
forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was not entitled
to support from his respondent wife. 1 chanrobles virtual law library
This decision was appealed to the respondent court. Pendente lite, the respondent wife filed a motion
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from interfering with the
administration of their properties in Greenhills and Forbes Park. She alleged inter alia that he had
harassed the tenant of the Forbes Park property by informing him that his lease would not be
renewed. She also complained that the petitioner had disposed of one of their valuable conjugal
properties in the United States in favor of his paramour, to the prejudice of his legitimate wife and
children.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner opposed this motion and filed his own motion to prevent his wife from entering into a
new contract of lease over the Forbes Park property with its present tenant, or with future tenants,
without his consent.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After hearing, the Court of Appeals, in an order dated April 7, 1992, granted the preliminary injunction
prayed for by his wife. 2chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner now assails this order, arguing that since the law provides for a joint administration of
the conjugal properties by the husband and wife, no injunctive relief can be issued against one or the
other because no right will be violated. In support of this contention, he cites Art. 124 of the Family
Code, reading as follows:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall
prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such
decision.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers
of the administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or the authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
He further notes that the respondent court failed to appoint an administrator of the conjugal assets as
mandated by Art. 61 of the Code, thus:
Art. 61 After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled
to live separately from each other.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate
either of them or a third person to administer the absolute community or conjugal
partnership property. The administrator appointed by the court shall have the same
powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court.
The Court has carefully considered the issues and the arguments of the parties and finds that the
petition has no merit.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We agree with the respondent court that pending the appointment of an administrator over the whole
mass of conjugal assets, the respondent court was justified in allowing the wife to continue with her
administration. It was also correct, taking into account the evidence adduced at the hearing, in
enjoining the petitioner from interfering with his wife's administration pending resolution of the
appeal.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal properties as clearly
provided in the above-cited Article 124 of the Family Code. However, Article 61, also above quoted,
states that after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the absence of a
written agreement between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third person to act as
the administrator.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such designation was
implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties
(and thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation was in effect approved by
the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction now
under challenge.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quo of the things
subject of the action or the relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the plaintiff
respecting these matters during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise, the defendant may, before final
judgment, do or continue doing the act which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain and thus make
ineffectual the final judgment that may be rendered afterwards in favor of the plaintiff. 3 chanrobles virtual law library
As observed by Francisco, "Injunction is primarily a preventive remedy. Its province is to afford relief
against future acts which are against equity and good conscience and to keep and preserve the thing
in the status quo, rather than to remedy what is past or to punish for wrongful acts already
committed. It may issue to prevent future wrongs although no right has yet been violated." 4 chanrobles virtual law library
The Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject properties for almost nineteen years
now, apparently without complaint on the part of the petitioner. He has not alleged, much less shown,
that her administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal partnership. What he merely suggests is
that the lease of the Forbes Park property could be renewed on better terms, or he should at least be
given his share of the rentals.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In her motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the respondent wife alleged that the
petitioner's harassment of their tenant at Forbes Park
would jeopardize the lease and deprive her and her children of the income therefrom on which they
depend for their subsistence. She also testified the numerous . . . including various dollar accounts,
two houses in Quezon City and Cebu City, and a Mercedes Benz. The private respondent also
complained that on June 10, 1991, the petitioner executed a quitclaim over their conjugal property in
Apple Valley, San Bernardino, California, U.S.A., in favor of Thelma Cumareng, to improve his
paramour's luxurious lifestyle to the prejudice of his legitimate family.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
These allegations, none of which was refuted by the husband, show that the injunction is necessary to
protect the interests of the private respondent and her children and prevent the dissipation of the
conjugal assets.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened
violation. 5Regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it cannot be denied that as the petitioner's
legitimate wife (and the complainant and injured spouse in the action for legal separation), the private
respondent has a right to a share (if not the whole) of the conjugal estate. There is also, in our view,
enough evidence to raise the apprehension that entrusting said estate to the petitioner may result in
its improvident disposition to the detriment of his wife and children. We agree that inasmuch as the
trial court had earlier declared the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, it
would be prudent not to allow him in the meantime to participate in its
management.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanently installed the respondent wife as the
administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to continue
administering the properties in the meantime without interference from the petitioner, pending the
express designation of the administrator in accordance with Article 61 of the Family
Code.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. It is so ordered.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ, concur.

Additional Cases in Persons and Family Relations Digested

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Additional Cases in Persons and Family Relations Digested

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Partial List of Additional Cases in Persons and Family Relations (Please

disregard cases already digested)

So vs Valera GR 150677 June 5, 2009

Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals GR 132955 October 27, 2006 505,

Ong vs. Ong GR 153206 October 23, 2006, 505 SCRA 76

P.S.: Ung fulltext po asa baba :)

G.R. No. 150677 June 5, 2009

RENATO REYES SO, Petitioner,

In her Psychological Report, Dr. Gates noted as follows:

and concluded that:

The RTC Ruling

The dispositive portion of the decision that immediately followed reads:

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner and against respondent:

1. Declaring respondent psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital

4. Awarding the custody of the minor children to petitioner.

The Petition and Issues

3. in totally disregarding the undisputed fact that respondent is psychologically incapacitated

THE COURT’S RULING

1. The CA did not err in not ruling on the alleged lack

of the essential and formal requisites of marriage

2. Petitioner failed to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity

ATTY. RODOLFO BRITANICO

DR. CRISTINA R. GATES

Q: How about their relationship?

A: She was frequently out, in [sic] her friends. .

Q: How about love and respect?

Q: But did they show respect?

Q: In clinical psychologist [sic], what is the effect?

A: Lorna Valera is like a person who is not in control of herself, impulsive. x x x

Q: How about lack of restraint?

Q: And what about lack of civility, what is your basis?

In terms of incurability, the psychologist could only cryptically say -

Republic of the Philippines

ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA, G.R. No. 166738

Summons was served on the respondent through substituted service, as

report negated the presence of collusion between the parties.[7] cralaw

The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence to

In 1994, the parties’ respective families discovered their secret

The petitioner disclosed during her cross-examination that communication

testimony, curriculum vitae,[14] and psychological report[15] of clinical psychologist

Dr. Nedy Lorenzo Tayag (Dr. Tayag).

the following findings:

TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION

Psychometric tests data reveal petitioner to operate in an

Respondent in this case, is revealed to operate in a

Love happens to everyone. It is dubbed to be boundless

In the case presented by petitioner, it is very apparent

The RTC Ruling

Respondent was never solicitous of the welfare and wishes of his

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the marriage between

denied the nullification of the parties’ marriage.[20] cralaw

The Petition and the Issues

The petitioner argues in the present petition that –

1. the OSG certification requirement under Republic v.

02-11-10-SC, which relaxed the requirement, took effect only on March

3. Dr. Tayag’s testimony in court cured the deficiencies in her psychiatric

THE COURT’S RULING

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC[24] -- which this Court promulgated on March 15,

The amendment introduced under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SCis procedural or

in De Los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat:[26] cralaw

Procedural Laws do not come within the legal conception of a

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure, removed the mandatory