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The design and implementation rules are outlined and described in-
“Development of the communications-based train control system for Moscow
Metro”, Minin V.A, Shishliakov, V.A Holyoak, IEEE 2007
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE NO:
Figure list i
Table list ii
01. Introduction 1
5.1 block 5
06. Interlocking 13
13. Conclusion 24
13. References 25
FIGURE LIST
i
TABLE LIST
ii
1. INTRODUCTION
In today’s railway industry, there are many different types of train control
systems. The principal intent of a train control system is to prevent collisions when
trains are traveling on the same track, either in the same direction (trains following
one another) or in the opposite direction (two trains moving toward each other). These
systems also permit safe movement of trains as they cross from one track to another.
Early train control systems were very simplistic in architecture. As train technology
and operation evolved over time, these control systems grew to have more and more
complex architectures. The latest architecture is known as CBTC. As will be
discussed, CBTC uses bidirectional radio frequency (RF) data communication
between the trains and control locations distributed along the tracks (wayside).
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2. TRAIN CONTROL
Train control is the process by which the movement of rail rapid transit
vehicles is regulated for the purposes of safety and efficiency. The process is carried
out by a combination of elements, some machine located on the train, along the track,
in stations, and at remote central facilities. These elements interact to form a
command and control system with three major functions:
1. Train Protection
2. Train Operation
3. Train Supervision
1. Train detection
2. Train separation
3. Route interlocking
1. Train starting
3. Train stopping
2
2.3 Train Supervision
• Route assignment
• Performance monitoring
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4. EXISTING SYSTEMS Vs CBTC
5. SIGNALING SYSTEMS
Signaling is one of the most important parts of the many which make up a
railway system. Train movement safety depends on it and the control and
management of trains depends on them. Over the years many signaling and train
control systems have been evolved so that today a highly technical and complex
industry has developed. Major function of signaling systems are
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Main parts of any signaling systems are,
5.1 Block
Railways are provided with signaling primarily to ensure that there is always
enough space between trains to allow one to stop before it hits the one in front. This
is achieved by dividing each track into sections or "blocks". Each block is protected
by a signal placed at its entrance. If the block is occupied by a train, the signal will
display a red "aspect" as we call it, to tell the train to stop. If the section is clear, the
signal can show a green or "precede" aspect. The simplified fig (2) shows the basic
principle of the block. The block occupied by Train 1 is protected by the red signal at
the entrance to the block. The block behind are clear of trains and a green signal will
allow Train 2 to enter this block. This enforces the basic rule or railway signaling that
says only one train is allowed onto one block at any one time.
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might have blocks many kilometers long, but a busy commuter line might have blocks
a few hundred meters long.
A train is not permitted to enter a block until a signal indicates that the train
may proceed, a dispatcher or signalman instructs the driver accordingly, or the driver
takes possession of the appropriate token. In most cases, a train cannot enter the block
until not only the block itself is clear of trains, but there is also an empty section
beyond the end of the block for at least the distance required to stop the train. In
signaling-based systems with closely-space signals, this overlap could be as far as the
signal following the one at the end of the section, effectively enforcing a space
between trains of two blocks. When calculating the size of the blocks, and therefore
the spacing between the signals, the following have to be taken into account
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5.2 Train Detection
For train detection two methods are used they are,
1. Track circuits
2. Axle counters
8
5.2.2 Axle Counters
An alternative method of determining the occupied status of a block is using
devices located at its beginning and end that count the number of axles entering and
leaving. If the same number leaves the block as enter it, the block is assumed to be
clear. Figure (5) shows block diagram of axial counting technology.
• WAYSIDE SIGNALLING
• CAB SIGNALLING
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and knows he has at least two clear blocks ahead of him and can maintain the
maximum allowed speed over this line until he sees the yellow.
ATP signaling codes contained in the track circuits are transmitted to the train.
They are detected by pick-up antennae (usually two) mounted on the leading end of
the train under the driving cab. This data is passed to an on-board decoding and safety
processor. The permitted speed is checked against the actual speed and, if the
permitted speed is exceeded, a brake application is initiated. In the more modern
systems, distance-to-go data will be transmitted to the train as well. The data is also
sent to a display in the cab which allows the driver of a manually driven train to
respond and drive the train within the permitted speed range.
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At the trackside, the signal aspects of the sections ahead are monitored and
passed to the code generator for each block. The code generator sends the appropriate
codes to the track circuit. The code is detected by the antennae on the train and
passed to the on-board computer. The computer will check the actual speed of the
train with the speed required by the code and will cause a brake application if the train
speed is too high. Figure (7) shows cab signaling system.
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Fig no: 9 Train born equipments for cab signaling
6. INTERLOCKING
Fig (10) shows such a situation, in which train1 coming from track 1 and
train2 coming from track 2. Train 1 need to go to track 2. If priority given to train 1,
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interlocking devices connect track 1 with track 2 and associated signals should
operate to avoid collision.
• Mechanical interlocking
• Electro-mechanical interlocking
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locomotives or other on rail equipment, with their onboard computer and location
systems. The dispatch/control unit is the main section that runs the railroad. Each
major functional subsystem consists of a collection of physical components
implemented using various databases, data communications systems, and information
processing equipment.
Link between wayside units –mobile units and central units-wayside units are RF
communication. Link between central units-mobile units are fiber optic
communication.
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8. CBTC BASIC FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE
• Control centers
Each section consist of following parts,
1. Mobile unit
Interrogator antenna (AI)
Antenna (A)
Train borne equipments
2. Wayside units
RF transmitting cables
Optical fiber cables
Inter locking and other control equipments
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2. Control centers
Base data radio (BDR)
User terminal (UT)
System controller (SC)
The system hardware is installed at the System Control Center (SCC) location, at the
stations, On board the trains and along the track. The track coordinate is established
by the programmable transponder tag numbers. Transponder tags (T) are spaced
approximately 100 meters and installed on the ties. A distributed communications
system leaky feeder cable is installed in each tunnel along the track in order to
provide reliable radio coverage.
As the vehicle moves along the track the train borne equipment retrieves
the track coordinate from the tags through interrogator antenna (AI) and transmits
information to the system control center via the radio channel. The base data radio
(BDR) at the control center receives the transmitted data and transfers it to the
redundant local area network (LAN) via the communications controller (CC).
The information concerning switches, signals and track circuits at the stations
located within the constraints of the system is also supplied to the LAN by the CC.
Station interfaces obtain this data from the existing interlocking equipment and
transfer it to the CC via fiber- optic communications links. These links are made up of
the main data circuits (DCl), redundant data circuits (DC2), and redundant
communications equipment (CE). The system controller (SC) responsible for the
proper system algorithm implementation is connected to the LAN. Personal
computers, functioning as a user terminal (UT) and a technical terminal (TT), are also
linked to the LAN.
In order to comply with the safety standards, the station interface and the
communications controller are built upon two off-the-shelf processor assemblies.
System controller (SC) accommodates three processor assemblies to provide for the
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cross checked redundant architecture. The processor units perform data processing
independently to verify correspondence on any output. If there is a conflict between
the channels, the vital blocking unit (BU) halts the failed equipment and activates the
backup devices.
The SCC can be easily reconfigured to perform ATS and ATO functions
by linking controllers of the dispatcher terminals, the centralized traffic control
board and the ATO to LAN. By that time the SI must carry supplementary boards
for the centralized electrical control. The software needs to be modified to provide for
extra data streams in the communications system and LAN.
• Control unit(CU)
Figure (13) presents the train borne equipment configuration block diagram. The
information packet is received by the mobile radio (MDR) in the train within
the CBTC territory. This packet will be stored in the on-board computer (OBC)
memory only if the train number in the OBC’s database corresponds to the message
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address field N. If the train is just entering the system’s territory, the packet will be
stored in the OBC upon the agreement between the entrance point numbers received
by the interrogator I and the pertinent message field Xe. Dependent on the
acceptance of the data packet, the OBC determines safe speeds and builds, if
applicable, the braking command. The OBC transfers the information message to the
SCC via the MDR.VB, VC, RB, C are commands, these will explain later.
9. WORKING OF CBTC
When train enter the block it receive message from wayside about obstacle
speed, distance etc. according to these information it calculate safe braking distance
and other control parameters. Message formats given below.
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9.1 Wayside to Train Message Format
N : train number
Nc : cab number
Xe : token number
Nr : BDR identification number
L : train length
Vob : obstacle speed
ES : emergency stop
N : train number
Nc : cab number
Xi : tag number
Xj : distance from tag
Lt : train length
Vt : train speed
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According to the information from the SC and breaking curves database stored
in the OBC’s memory, the OBC determines two permissible speeds Vps and Vp. The
first one Vps is established for the full service breaking mode. If the train’s actual
speed exceeds Vps he OBC issues the “RB” command (run break) to the on-board
control unit (CU) to stop acceleration and initiate the application of the electric brake.
The failure in the break control circuit is reported to the OBC by the
“VC” command (vital check) from the train’s check-over circuit CC. In response,
the OBC issues the command “VB”- vital break - to de-energize the electro pneumatic
relay (EPR). This action results in the emergency breaking using safe pneumatic
break. The commands “VC” and “VB”, and also some of the commands that are
entered from the train’s Control panel (CP) are vital and are transmitted via the vital
circuits designed according to safety standards. The command “RB” and other
control signals “C” are sent via non-vital circuits. Vital commands are never
transmitted over the radio link.
The speed Vp is determined for the service break mode and is less than
Vps. This mode is more comfortable for the passengers and the train itself. Vp is
displayed on the train display (D), as well as the actual speed Vt and the distance L
between the train and the obstacle. The train engineer can manually reduce the train
speed to reach the Vp value. If the OBC is outfitted with ATO software, the train
speed can be reduced automatically using RBC circuits. Upon detection of the MDR,
interrogator I or an axle generator failure the OBC will establish communications with
the OBC in the trail car.
The reliability of the CBTC system depends a great deal on the architecture
and characteristics of data communication channels. The data communications
architecture is effectively combined by the train-to-wayside communications system
and the wayside communications network. According to one of the design
approaches, the train-to-wayside communications channel will employ the Andrew
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Model 2400 data radios and RADIAX® leaky feeder cable. This system will provide
contactless two-way data communications between CBTC control center SCC and the
train borne OBC. The communications system components form the following
topology illustrated in Figure.
Actual locations of the BDR are based on the physical architecture of the train
control system. The architecture is usually composed of a number of control regions.
These control regions are typically defined by system topological characteristics like
the configuration of tracks, stations, spurs, etc. Each region would include the BDR
using a region specific code to communicate with the trains in that region. (This
technique is often referred as Code Division Multiple Access CDMA).
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11. COMMUNICATIONS STANDARDS
4. Increased safety
4. Complex system
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13. CONCLUSION
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13. REFERENCES
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