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ABSRACT

The CBTC, communications-based train control (CBTC) system under


development, is the key element of the integrated automatic train control network
in the Metros. It accomplishes vital functions providing safety of traffic movement.
The CBTC system performs automatic train speed regulation utilizing a radio channel
for train-to-wayside data communications. The integrated network is combined to
perform the safety critical Automatic Train Protection (ATP), as well as Automatic
Train Supervision (ATS) and Automatic Train Operation (ATO) functions. Each
function is provided by the additional fail-safe hardware which is installed
along with the appropriate software utilizing mutual data communications
architecture. This paper describes the configuration, design principles, operational
algorithms and the number of technical characteristics of the CBTC including the
radio communications subsystem.

The design and implementation rules are outlined and described in-
“Development of the communications-based train control system for Moscow
Metro”, Minin V.A, Shishliakov, V.A Holyoak, IEEE 2007
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE NO:

Figure list i

Table list ii

01. Introduction 1

02. Train control 2

2.1 Train Protection 2

2.2 Train Operation 2

2.3 Train Supervision 3

03. Train control block diagram 3

04. Existing systems vs CBTC 4

05. Signaling systems 4

5.1 block 5

5.2 train detection 7

5.3 Visual signaling 9

06. Interlocking 13

07. CBTC basic functional architecture 14

08. CBTC architecture 16

09. Working of CBTC 20

10. Communications channel architecture 22

11. Communications standards 23

12. Advantages & Disadvantages 23

13. Conclusion 24

13. References 25
FIGURE LIST

FIGURE NAME PAGE NO:

FIG. 1 Block diagram of train control 3

FIG. 2 Track divided into blocks 5

FIG. 3 Track with Block Unoccupied 7

FIG. 4 Track with Block occupied 8

FIG. 5 Track with counter 9

FIG. 6 Wayside signaling 10

FIG. 7 Cab signaling 11

FIG. 8 Cab signaling speed codes 11

FIG. 9 Train born equipments for cab 13

FIG. 10 Example for interlocking 14

FIG. 11 CBTC basic functional architecture 15

FIG. 12 CBTC architecture 16

FIG. 13 Train borne equipments 19

FIG. 14 Working of CBTC 20

FIG. 15 Communications channel 22

i
TABLE LIST

TABLE NAME PAGE NO:

TABLE 1 Wayside to train message format 20

TABLE 2 Train to wayside message format 21

ii
1. INTRODUCTION

In today’s railway industry, there are many different types of train control
systems. The principal intent of a train control system is to prevent collisions when
trains are traveling on the same track, either in the same direction (trains following
one another) or in the opposite direction (two trains moving toward each other). These
systems also permit safe movement of trains as they cross from one track to another.
Early train control systems were very simplistic in architecture. As train technology
and operation evolved over time, these control systems grew to have more and more
complex architectures. The latest architecture is known as CBTC. As will be
discussed, CBTC uses bidirectional radio frequency (RF) data communication
between the trains and control locations distributed along the tracks (wayside).

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2. TRAIN CONTROL

Train control is the process by which the movement of rail rapid transit
vehicles is regulated for the purposes of safety and efficiency. The process is carried
out by a combination of elements, some machine located on the train, along the track,
in stations, and at remote central facilities. These elements interact to form a
command and control system with three major functions:

1. Train Protection

2. Train Operation

3. Train Supervision

2.1 Train Protection


Train protection is a family of functions whose purpose is to assure the safety
of train movement by preventing collisions and derailments. The functions that make
up train protection are:

1. Train detection

2. Train separation

3. Route interlocking

4. Over speed protection

5. Train and track surveillance

2.2 Train Operation


Train operation consists of those functions necessary to move the train and to
stop it at stations. Train operation involves the following

1. Train starting

2. Train speed regulation

3. Train stopping

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2.3 Train Supervision

Train supervision involves monitoring the movement of individual trains in


relation to schedule and route assignments and overseeing the general disposition of
vehicles and flow of traffic for the system as a whole. The train supervision system
may thus be thought of as making strategic decisions which the train operation system
carries out actually, In addition, train supervision includes certain information
processing and recording activities not directly concerned with train safety and
movement but necessary to the general scheme of operations. Train supervision
functions are

• Schedule design and implementation

• Route assignment

• Performance monitoring

3. TRAIN CONTROL BLOCK DIAGRAM

Fig no: 1 Block diagram of train control

According to fig (1) train supervision do functions according to dispatcher


commands. Train operation cause controls through regulators. In between them train
protection occurs.

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4. EXISTING SYSTEMS Vs CBTC

Existing system can do automated train protection, Manual train operation,


and Manual train supervision. But CBTC can handle fully automated train protection,
automated train operation, automated train supervision. So ATS (automatic train
supervision) and ATC (automatic train control) systems rely on the relay of
information through audio-frequency (AF) current to transmit ATS or ATC related
information along the track circuit. This approach has some technical limitations.
First, the location of trains can only be determined to the resolution of the track
circuits. If any part of a track circuit is occupied, that entire track circuit must be
assumed as occupied. The track circuit’s length can be made shorter, but adding
additional track circuits requires additional wayside hardware. This imposes
additional costs, causing a practical and economical limit to the number of track
circuits that a railroad can install. Second, the information that can be provided to a
train through a track circuit is limited to a small number of wayside signal aspects or
speed data.

5. SIGNALING SYSTEMS
Signaling is one of the most important parts of the many which make up a
railway system. Train movement safety depends on it and the control and
management of trains depends on them. Over the years many signaling and train
control systems have been evolved so that today a highly technical and complex
industry has developed. Major function of signaling systems are

• Give visual display of track conditions

• Operate devices according to these signals

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Main parts of any signaling systems are,

5.1 Block
Railways are provided with signaling primarily to ensure that there is always
enough space between trains to allow one to stop before it hits the one in front. This
is achieved by dividing each track into sections or "blocks". Each block is protected
by a signal placed at its entrance. If the block is occupied by a train, the signal will
display a red "aspect" as we call it, to tell the train to stop. If the section is clear, the
signal can show a green or "precede" aspect. The simplified fig (2) shows the basic
principle of the block. The block occupied by Train 1 is protected by the red signal at
the entrance to the block. The block behind are clear of trains and a green signal will
allow Train 2 to enter this block. This enforces the basic rule or railway signaling that
says only one train is allowed onto one block at any one time.

Fig no: 2 Track divided into blocks

There are two types of blocks, they are

• Fixed block: block has fixed length.

• Moving block: computers calculate block distance so can increase track


capacity.

5.1.1 Fixed Block


Most blocks are "fixed", i.e. they include the section of track between two
fixed points. Blocks usually start and end at selected stations. The lengths of blocks
are designed to allow trains to operate as frequently as necessary. A lightly-used line

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might have blocks many kilometers long, but a busy commuter line might have blocks
a few hundred meters long.

A train is not permitted to enter a block until a signal indicates that the train
may proceed, a dispatcher or signalman instructs the driver accordingly, or the driver
takes possession of the appropriate token. In most cases, a train cannot enter the block
until not only the block itself is clear of trains, but there is also an empty section
beyond the end of the block for at least the distance required to stop the train. In
signaling-based systems with closely-space signals, this overlap could be as far as the
signal following the one at the end of the section, effectively enforcing a space
between trains of two blocks. When calculating the size of the blocks, and therefore
the spacing between the signals, the following have to be taken into account

• Line speed (the maximum permitted speed each train)

• Gradient (to compensate for longer or shorter braking distances)

• The braking characteristics of trains on that line

• Sighting (how far ahead a driver can see a signal)

• Reaction time (of the driver)

5.1.2 Moving Block


One disadvantage of having fixed blocks is that the faster trains are allowed to
run, the longer the stopping distance, and therefore the longer the blocks need to be,
thus decreasing the line's capacity. Under a moving block system, computers calculate
a 'safe zone' around each moving train that no other train is allowed to enter. The
system depends on knowledge of the precise location and speed and direction of each
train, which is determined by a combination of several sensors. With a moving block,
line side signals are unnecessary, and instructions are passed directly to the trains.
This has the advantage of increasing track capacity by allowing trains to run closer
together while maintaining the required safety margins.

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5.2 Train Detection
For train detection two methods are used they are,

1. Track circuits

2. Axle counters

5.2.1 Track circuits


Nowadays for signaling purposes, trains are monitored automatically by
means of "track circuits". Low voltage currents applied to the rails cause the signal,
via a series of relays (originally) or electronics (more recently) to show a "proceed"
aspect. The current flow will be interrupted by the presence of the wheels of a train.
Such interruption will cause the signal protecting that section to show a "stop"
command. Any other cause of current interruption will also cause a "stop" signal to
show. Such a system means that a failure gives a red aspect – a stop signal. The
system is sometimes referred to as "fail safe" or "vital". A "proceed" signal will only
be displayed if the current does flow. Most main lines with moderate or heavy traffic
are equipped with color light signals operated automatically or semi-automatically by
track circuits.

5.2.1 .1 Track Circuit - Block Unoccupied


Figure (3) shows how the track circuit is applied to a section or block of track.
A low voltage from a battery is applied to one of the running rails in the block and
returned via the other. A relay at the entrance to the section detects the voltage and
energizes to connect a separate supply to the green lamp of the signal.

Fig no: 3 Track with Block Unoccupied


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5.2.1.2 Track Circuit - Block Occupied
When a train enters the block (fig 4), the leading wheel set short circuits the
current, which causes the relay to de-energies and drop the contact so that the signal
lamp supply circuit now activates the red signal lamp. The system is "fail-safe", or
"vital" as it is sometimes called, because any break in the circuit will cause a danger
signal to be displayed. A block section is normally separated electrically from its
neighboring sections by insulated joints in the rails. However, more recent
installations use electronics to allow joint less track circuits. Also, some areas have
additional circuits which allow the signals to be manually held at red from a signal
box or control centre, even if the section is clear. These are known as semi-automatic
signals. Even more complexity is required at junctions.

Fig no: 4 Track with Block occupied

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5.2.2 Axle Counters
An alternative method of determining the occupied status of a block is using
devices located at its beginning and end that count the number of axles entering and
leaving. If the same number leaves the block as enter it, the block is assumed to be
clear. Figure (5) shows block diagram of axial counting technology.

Fig no: 5 Track with counter

5.3 Visual signaling


For giving visual identification of ahead track two signaling systems are mainly used
they are

• WAYSIDE SIGNALLING

• CAB SIGNALLING

5.3.1 Wayside signaling


When this was developed for track circuited signaling, the caution signal was
provided a block further back from the stop signal. Each signal would now show a
red, yellow or green aspect - a multi-aspect signal. When this was developed for track
circuited signaling, the caution signal was provided a block further back from the stop
signal. Each signal would now show a red, yellow or green aspect a multi-aspect
signal. Fig (6) shows a line with 3-aspect signals. The block occupied by Train 1 is
protected by the red signal at the entrance to the block. The block behind is clear of
trains but a yellow signal provides advanced warning of the red aspect ahead. This
block provides the safe braking distance for Train 2. The next block in rear is also
clear of trains and shows a green signal. The driver of Train 2 sees the green signal

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and knows he has at least two clear blocks ahead of him and can maintain the
maximum allowed speed over this line until he sees the yellow.

Fig no: 6 Wayside signaling

5.3.2 Cab signaling


Cab signaling is a system that communicates track status information to the
train cab (driving position), where the engineer or driver can see the information. The
simplest systems display the trackside signal aspect, while more sophisticated systems
also display allowable speed and dynamic information about the track ahead. In
modern systems, a train protection system is usually overlaid on top of the cab
signaling system to warn the driver of dangerous conditions, and to automatically
apply the brakes and bring the train to a stop if the driver ignores the dangerous
condition. Cab signaling systems range from simple coded track circuits to
transponders that communicate with the cab and communication based train control
systems.

ATP signaling codes contained in the track circuits are transmitted to the train.
They are detected by pick-up antennae (usually two) mounted on the leading end of
the train under the driving cab. This data is passed to an on-board decoding and safety
processor. The permitted speed is checked against the actual speed and, if the
permitted speed is exceeded, a brake application is initiated. In the more modern
systems, distance-to-go data will be transmitted to the train as well. The data is also
sent to a display in the cab which allows the driver of a manually driven train to
respond and drive the train within the permitted speed range.

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At the trackside, the signal aspects of the sections ahead are monitored and
passed to the code generator for each block. The code generator sends the appropriate
codes to the track circuit. The code is detected by the antennae on the train and
passed to the on-board computer. The computer will check the actual speed of the
train with the speed required by the code and will cause a brake application if the train
speed is too high. Figure (7) shows cab signaling system.

Fig no: 7 Cab signaling

A train on a line with a modern version of ATP (automatic train protection)


needs two pieces of information about the state of the line ahead, what speed it can do
in this block and what speed must it is doing by the time it enters the next block. This
speed data is picked up by antennae on the train. The data is coded by the electronic
equipment controlling the track circuitry and transmitted from the rails. The code data
consists of two parts, the authorized speed code for this block and the target speed
code for the next block. Fig (8) shows how this works.

Fig no: 8 cab signaling speed codes


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In this example (left), a train in Block A5 approaching Signal A4 will receive
a 40 over 40 codes to indicate a permitted speed of 40 km/h in this block and a target
speed of 40 km/h for the next. This is the normal speed data. However, when it
enters Block A4, the code will change to 25 because the target speed must be 25 km/h
when the train enters the next Block A3. When the train enters Block A3, the code
changes again to 25 because the next block (A2) are the overlap block and are
forbidden territory, so the speed must be zero by the time train reaches the end of
Block A3. If the train attempts to enter Block A2, the on-board equipment will detect
the zero speed code 0 and will cause an emergency brake application.

As mentioned above, Block A2 is acting as the overlap or safe braking


distance behind the train occupying Block A1.Transferring the display of information
from the wayside to the cab involves an alternate type of track circuit technology. To
operate cab signals, the current passing through the track circuit (usually ac. is not
steady, as for conventional wayside signals, but is pulsed (turned on and off) at
several different repetition rates in response to track occupancy. Each pulse rate is a
code to indicate allowable train speed. This pulsed dc Energy is passed through the
rails, picked up inductively by receiver (antenna) on the train, and decoded to retrieve
speed command information; this information is used to actuate the appropriate cab
signal display. Because the train is continuously receiving pulses of energy, a change
in the pulse rate of the coded track circuits indicating a change of conditions ahead of
the train is instantaneously received by car borne equipment and displayed by cab
signals regardless of where the train happens to be within a block. Fig (9) shows train
borne equipments for cab signaling.

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Fig no: 9 Train born equipments for cab signaling

Main advantages of cab signaling are,

• Clear display of track conditions

• Can used with CBTC

• Can used for high speed railway

• Free from fog, rain, and snow

6. INTERLOCKING

An interlocking is an arrangement of signals and signal appliances so


interconnected that functions must succeed each other in a predetermined sequence,
thus permitting safe train movements along a selected route without collision.

Fig (10) shows such a situation, in which train1 coming from track 1 and
train2 coming from track 2. Train 1 need to go to track 2. If priority given to train 1,

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interlocking devices connect track 1 with track 2 and associated signals should
operate to avoid collision.

Fig no: 10 examples for interlocking

There are many types of Interlocking

• Mechanical interlocking

• Electro-mechanical interlocking

• Electronic interlocking (used in CBTC)

7. CBTC BASIC FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE

CBTC systems are complex systems made up of distributed physical, but


closely coupled, functional subsystems. Their successful operation requires a well
orchestrated set of interactions. Understanding the basic CBTC Architecture, CBTC
functional requirements, and modes of operations assist in understanding a CBTC
system. All such CBTC systems are derivations of a single basic functional
architecture, with specific enhancements and modifications to both functions and
modes of operations to support the unique requirements and operational needs of the
individual railroad the system.

The basic functional architecture, illustrated in Figure (11) consists of three


major functional subsystems, wayside, mobile, and dispatch/control. The wayside
subsystem consists of elements such as highway grade crossing signals, switches and
interlocks or maintenance of way workers. The mobile subsystem consists of

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locomotives or other on rail equipment, with their onboard computer and location
systems. The dispatch/control unit is the main section that runs the railroad. Each
major functional subsystem consists of a collection of physical components
implemented using various databases, data communications systems, and information
processing equipment.

Fig no: 11 CBTC basic functional architecture

Link between wayside units –mobile units and central units-wayside units are RF
communication. Link between central units-mobile units are fiber optic
communication.

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8. CBTC BASIC FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE

Figure (12) shows CBTC basic functional architecture.

Fig no: 12 CBTC basic functional architecture

It consist of basic three sections they are,


• Wayside units
• Mobile units

• Control centers
Each section consist of following parts,

1. Mobile unit
Interrogator antenna (AI)
Antenna (A)
Train borne equipments

2. Wayside units
RF transmitting cables
Optical fiber cables
Inter locking and other control equipments

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2. Control centers
Base data radio (BDR)
User terminal (UT)
System controller (SC)

Communication controller (CC)


Communication equipments (CE)

The system hardware is installed at the System Control Center (SCC) location, at the
stations, On board the trains and along the track. The track coordinate is established
by the programmable transponder tag numbers. Transponder tags (T) are spaced
approximately 100 meters and installed on the ties. A distributed communications
system leaky feeder cable is installed in each tunnel along the track in order to
provide reliable radio coverage.

As the vehicle moves along the track the train borne equipment retrieves
the track coordinate from the tags through interrogator antenna (AI) and transmits
information to the system control center via the radio channel. The base data radio
(BDR) at the control center receives the transmitted data and transfers it to the
redundant local area network (LAN) via the communications controller (CC).

The information concerning switches, signals and track circuits at the stations
located within the constraints of the system is also supplied to the LAN by the CC.
Station interfaces obtain this data from the existing interlocking equipment and
transfer it to the CC via fiber- optic communications links. These links are made up of
the main data circuits (DCl), redundant data circuits (DC2), and redundant
communications equipment (CE). The system controller (SC) responsible for the
proper system algorithm implementation is connected to the LAN. Personal
computers, functioning as a user terminal (UT) and a technical terminal (TT), are also
linked to the LAN.

In order to comply with the safety standards, the station interface and the
communications controller are built upon two off-the-shelf processor assemblies.
System controller (SC) accommodates three processor assemblies to provide for the

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cross checked redundant architecture. The processor units perform data processing
independently to verify correspondence on any output. If there is a conflict between
the channels, the vital blocking unit (BU) halts the failed equipment and activates the
backup devices.

The SCC can be easily reconfigured to perform ATS and ATO functions
by linking controllers of the dispatcher terminals, the centralized traffic control
board and the ATO to LAN. By that time the SI must carry supplementary boards
for the centralized electrical control. The software needs to be modified to provide for
extra data streams in the communications system and LAN.

The structure and components of the system controller’s permanent


databases were determined according to the detailed knowledge of the system’s
physical constraints including grades, speed restriction, curvatures, switching and
interlocking location, station data, etc.The databases for the track sections contain
section numbers, track coordinates with the appropriate parameters, possible
direction data (forward, reverse), and data for transition to the subsequent
database including cases of varied switch positions. The track databases also
include the track section descriptive parameter (tunnel, above the ground, spur),
gradient of the track, restricted speed at the point of the planned obstacle, and the
ID of the base radio servicing the referenced track section.

8.1 Train borne Equipments


It consist of following components

• On board computers (OBC)

• Mobile data radio (MDR)

• Control unit(CU)

Figure (13) presents the train borne equipment configuration block diagram. The
information packet is received by the mobile radio (MDR) in the train within
the CBTC territory. This packet will be stored in the on-board computer (OBC)
memory only if the train number in the OBC’s database corresponds to the message

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address field N. If the train is just entering the system’s territory, the packet will be
stored in the OBC upon the agreement between the entrance point numbers received
by the interrogator I and the pertinent message field Xe. Dependent on the
acceptance of the data packet, the OBC determines safe speeds and builds, if
applicable, the braking command. The OBC transfers the information message to the
SCC via the MDR.VB, VC, RB, C are commands, these will explain later.

Fig no: 13 train borne equipments

9. WORKING OF CBTC

Fig no: 14 working of CBTC

When train enter the block it receive message from wayside about obstacle
speed, distance etc. according to these information it calculate safe braking distance
and other control parameters. Message formats given below.

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9.1 Wayside to Train Message Format

Table no: 1Wayside to train message format

N : train number
Nc : cab number
Xe : token number
Nr : BDR identification number

L : train length
Vob : obstacle speed
ES : emergency stop

9.2 Train to Wayside Message Format

Table no: 2 Train to wayside message format

N : train number
Nc : cab number
Xi : tag number
Xj : distance from tag
Lt : train length
Vt : train speed

M : mode of operation (acceleration, coasting and free running)


BR : brake state

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According to the information from the SC and breaking curves database stored
in the OBC’s memory, the OBC determines two permissible speeds Vps and Vp. The
first one Vps is established for the full service breaking mode. If the train’s actual
speed exceeds Vps he OBC issues the “RB” command (run break) to the on-board
control unit (CU) to stop acceleration and initiate the application of the electric brake.

The failure in the break control circuit is reported to the OBC by the
“VC” command (vital check) from the train’s check-over circuit CC. In response,
the OBC issues the command “VB”- vital break - to de-energize the electro pneumatic
relay (EPR). This action results in the emergency breaking using safe pneumatic
break. The commands “VC” and “VB”, and also some of the commands that are
entered from the train’s Control panel (CP) are vital and are transmitted via the vital
circuits designed according to safety standards. The command “RB” and other
control signals “C” are sent via non-vital circuits. Vital commands are never
transmitted over the radio link.

The speed Vp is determined for the service break mode and is less than
Vps. This mode is more comfortable for the passengers and the train itself. Vp is
displayed on the train display (D), as well as the actual speed Vt and the distance L
between the train and the obstacle. The train engineer can manually reduce the train
speed to reach the Vp value. If the OBC is outfitted with ATO software, the train
speed can be reduced automatically using RBC circuits. Upon detection of the MDR,
interrogator I or an axle generator failure the OBC will establish communications with
the OBC in the trail car.

10. COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL ARCHITETURE

The reliability of the CBTC system depends a great deal on the architecture
and characteristics of data communication channels. The data communications
architecture is effectively combined by the train-to-wayside communications system
and the wayside communications network. According to one of the design
approaches, the train-to-wayside communications channel will employ the Andrew

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Model 2400 data radios and RADIAX® leaky feeder cable. This system will provide
contactless two-way data communications between CBTC control center SCC and the
train borne OBC. The communications system components form the following
topology illustrated in Figure.

Fig no: 15 Communications channel

BDR is controlled by the CBTC system's communications controller (CC) and


interfaces directly with the CC via a standard EIA-530 serial interface. Similarly, the
MDR interfaces to the train borne OBC via an EIA- 530 interface. MDR is very
similar to the BDR except that it is ruggedized to operate in severe environments.
The MDR has complementary transmit and receive frequencies to the BDR.

Actual locations of the BDR are based on the physical architecture of the train
control system. The architecture is usually composed of a number of control regions.
These control regions are typically defined by system topological characteristics like
the configuration of tracks, stations, spurs, etc. Each region would include the BDR
using a region specific code to communicate with the trains in that region. (This
technique is often referred as Code Division Multiple Access CDMA).

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11. COMMUNICATIONS STANDARDS

Protocol using : high data link connection (HDLC)

Type of link : full duplex type

Digital modulation Methods : BFSK

Channel access method : CDMA

12. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

Main advantages and disadvantages of CBTC are

1. Increased rail capacity through closer train operation

2. Improved efficiency and flexibility of the rail network

3. Improved service reliability

4. Increased safety

5. Reduced operation and maintenance cost for the trackside infrastructure

Main disadvantages are

1. amount of data can transmit through channels is limited

2. Initial cost high

3. Need experienced workers

4. Complex system

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13. CONCLUSION

The described CBTC system is designed to ensure enhanced safety of traffic


movement in conjunction with headway minimization. The system can be
implemented either as an independent replacement or gradually as an overlay of
current systems, without disturbing the operation of the trains outfitted with the
existing hardware as well as with new technology equipment. The train-to-
wayside communications channel based on spread spectrum communications
techniques and leaky feeder cable technology offers many advantages in an
electrically noisy metro environment. This approach provides maximized
interference immunity and, therefore, high reliability and availability of the CBTC
system.

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13. REFERENCES

1. Hongli Zhao, Tianhua Xu, ‘Towards modeling and evaluation of availability


of communication based train control (CBTC) system’, IEEE 2009
2. Mirtchev, ‘Automatic restart for communication based train control systems’,
IEEE 2005

3. Morar s, ‘Evolution of Communication Based Train Control worldwide’ ,


,IEEE 2010
4. Rober d Pascoe and Thomas, ‘What is communication-based train control?’,
IEEE 2009
5. Site : http://www.railway-technical.com

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