Instructor’s Manual

CASE TEACHING NOTES

Restructuring Sony

Vivek Gupta and Konakanchi Prashanth

1. Introduction
The case discusses the organizational restructuring carried out by the Japanese
electronics and communication giant Sony Corporation (Sony) between 1994 and 2003.
Sony’s business operations were restructured five times within nine years. The case
describes each of the five restructuring exercises in detail and examines their
implications for Sony. It also discusses the impact of these structural changes on the
financial performance of Sony.

2. Position of the case

This case focuses on the issue of structure, the main subject of Chapter 8. However, the
continuous change involved makes it also relevant to issues of change (Chapter 10) and
Sony’s diversified and international scope make it interesting in relation to Chapter 6.

3. Learning objectives
The case is designed to help students:

• Understand the rationale behind the restructuring initiatives of large multinational

corporations (MNCs) in the consumer electronics industry.

• Evaluate the costs and the consequences of the frequent restructuring (often
accompanied by changes in top management) of large MNCs.

• Examine whether frequent changes in an organization’s structure in response to

changes in the business environment can help improve its performance and
profitability.

• Study the attempts of MNCs in the consumer electronics industry to adjust to

increasing competition and changing business opportunities and challenges.

4. Teaching scheme
The case can be used effectively, both in classroom discussions as well as for distance
learning programs. The moderator could initiate discussion through some short
questions:

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• Do you think the top management at Sony was right in implementing frequent
restructuring changes?

• What could be the best approach for Sony to overcome its problems in the early 21st
century?

Students can be asked to conduct a role-playing exercise, with one group speaking in
favor of Sony’s reorganization and the other opposing it. The moderator can provide
inputs regarding the organizational structure of other multinational companies like ABB
and HP and facilitate a comparative study of the various types of organizational
structures.

5. Questions for discussion

1. During the first half of the 1990s, Sony’s financial performance was not satisfactory.
In 1994, in an attempt to improve Sony’s financial performance, Ohga decided to
restructure Sony’s electronics business. Discuss in detail the restructuring exercise
undertaken by Ohga. Do you think the restructuring yielded the desired results?
Also explain the reasons behind the 1996 restructuring of Sony and its impact on
Sony.

2. Analysts felt that frequent restructuring at Sony had a negative impact on the
company’s financial performance. Do you think there was a need to restructure
Sony so frequently? Critically analyze Sony’s restructuring efforts since 1999 and
discuss the efficacy of each of them. Clearly explain the positive and negative
implications of each exercise.

3. In the light of the tough competitive environment following its dismal financial
results in 2002–03, explain the recent moves made by Sony to help revive its
business.

6. Case analysis

6.1 Early Links between Restructuring and Performance

By the mid-1990s, Sony was a fairly diversified conglomerate, with operations in

several countries. Prior to the 1994 restructuring of its electronics business, it was
divided into four product groups – video equipment, audio equipment, televisions and
others. Each product group in turn produced a number of products, both small and large.
It became very difficult to manage the operations of the entire product portfolio. In
order to effectively manage the entire product portfolio, the product groups had to be
grouped into companies with clearly defined product categories and customer bases.
This was the main reason for the 1994 restructuring.

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Another reason for the restructuring was the deteriorating financial performance of
maturing businesses like audio equipment and video equipment while few new
businesses were showing promising results. It was noticed that during 1990 and 1994, in
the electronics business, the revenues of the video and audio equipment businesses were
coming down or were at best stagnant, while the television and ‘Others’ group were
showing signs of improvement. The ‘Others’ group, which consisted of technology
intensive products such as computer products, video games, semiconductors and
telecom equipment, was performing very well and had a growth rate of nearly 40%. In
order to focus on the high-growth businesses, Sony announced major changes in the
structure of its electronics business in April 1994.

With the objective of enhancing the performance of the existing businesses while
placing more emphasis on emerging businesses, Sony created an eight-company
structure. Each company targeted specific product categories and customer bases. The
companies enjoyed reasonable functional and operational autonomy and had clearly
defined objectives and were made accountable for their financial performance. The
objective of the entire exercise was to enable quicker decision making.

While the idea of the divisional company structure was right, Sony needed a proper
corporate hierarchy to effectively supervise the operations of the divisional companies.
This probably explained the development in 1995, when Sony created a new
management framework. Sony was to be led by a team of executives at the top
management level. The team included the Chairman & CEO, Vice-chairman, President
& Chief Operating Officer (COO), Chief Officers and the presidents of divisional
companies. This development marked the beginning of the mid-1990s streamlining
efforts of Sony.

The Sony reshuffle in 1996 resulted in the creation of a 10–company structure. This
involved regrouping companies with related business operations (excluding combining
the Infocom Products company and Mobile Electronics company to form Personal and
Mobile Communications Company) and creating new companies that made IT-intensive
products (excluding the recording media and energy company). The negative financial
performance of Sony in 1995 was not due to poor organizational structure
implementation. Sony was also affected by macro economic factors such as recession in
Japan.

From 1995 to 1999, Sony’s electronics business (on which the restructuring efforts were
focused) grew at a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 8.55%. The music
business had a CAGR of 10.5% while the pictures business had a CAGR of 17%.
Significant gains were, however, recorded by the games business and the insurance
business. The games business registered a CAGR of 215%, while the insurance business
registered a CAGR of 31%. The games business was boosted primarily by the
PlayStation video games console, Sony’s all time best selling product.

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6.2 Later Links between Restructuring and Performance

In the competitive business environment in the late 1990s, Sony faced several
challenges. These challenges included:

• To effectively compete with cash rich companies like Microsoft (Microsoft was
planning to launch the Xbox games console to compete with Sony’s PlayStation)
and other leading companies which had already realized the significance of the
Internet revolution.

• To maintain its leadership in the games business, with its star product – the
PlayStation video games console. Even though the PlayStation was still making
waves in Western countries, it reached a near maturity stage in Japan. Sony’s
increasing reliance on the games business might negatively affect the company in
the long run.

• During the late 1990s, Sony’s profit margins declined significantly due to the
economic recession in Japan and the Southeast Asian economic crisis. Sony, along
with several leading Japanese companies, was severely affected by the recession.

• Sony had to catch up with the digital revolution. The mantra of the time was
convergence – developing complementary products and distributing them through
common sources (Microsoft distributed its products like Windows, Internet
Explorer, MS Office, etc., along with its PCs). Sony had to do a similar act –
distribute its content (music, movies and games) through its diverse products like
TVs, audio systems, movie theatres, PCs, etc. Through this, it could create further
demand for its already mature businesses like the audio and video business.

To effectively face the challenges, a major restructuring was required, emphasizing not
only autonomy, but also cost cutting. This was what prompted the 1999 restructuring.

Sony’s first task was to become leaner and more centralized, so that effective control
could be achieved in the operations. For this, the 10-company structure was dismantled
and four autonomous units were created. Each unit received funding for its R&D
activities and was made accountable for its financial performance. The head count at the
headquarters was drastically reduced. The staff of Sony across the world was cut by
10%, with a number of factories being closed.

Sony converted Sony Computer Entertainment, which was jointly owned by Sony and
Sony Music Entertainment (Japan), into a wholly owned subsidiary of Sony. The
purpose behind this was to cut down on overhead and communication time, as the
company was at an advanced stage in the development of the next generation
PlayStation video games console, PS2. It wanted to speed up the development process,
as Microsoft’s Xbox rollout was also on the cards.

To strengthen the management capability, Sony clearly demarcated the roles of

headquarters and the newly created network companies. The role of the headquarters
was restricted to supervise the various company units and look towards attracting

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investments, instead of managing the units. Accordingly, a distinction was made

between the strategic and support functions. Sony’s headquarters was split into two
separate units – Group Headquarters and Business Unit Support. The role of Group
Headquarters was to oversee group operations and expedite the allocation of resources
within the group. The support functions, such as accounting, human resources and
general affairs, were handled by the network companies so that they could enjoy more
autonomy in their operations. Significant long-term R&D projects were directly
supervised by the headquarters, while the immediate and short-term R&D projects were
transferred to the network companies concerned.

While Sony’s efforts at convergence of content with its distribution setup were
commendable, several analysts were skeptical about the entire exercise. The main
reason was that Sony was not a really strong competitor (like Yahoo) on the content
side, with marginal performance in the music business and movies business (Sony’s
Columbia Pictures), with the exception of the games business. On the distribution side,
though it still had very good products to boast of, with hundreds of products to
distribute, its distribution system was not as thoroughly developed as companies with
lesser products, like Dell Computers and Microsoft. Given the scenario, the idea to
merge content with distribution, seen as the main logic behind the restructuring
exercise, was viewed with much skepticism.

Sony’s efforts over the next couple of years indicated that it was very serious about its
move. It launched new products while at the same time making its existing products
web-compatible. Sony’s electronic products like PCs and digital cameras had sockets
which could be connected to the Internet. Through www.sony.net, the consumers could
participate in online versions of noted game shows, download songs from Sony Music
albums and also posters of popular Sony Music stars. Through the new Sony Walkman,
consumers could listen to songs downloaded over the Internet. Sony even purchased a
major share in Sky Perfect TV in 1999, believed to be Japan’s third largest Internet
Service Provider, with a subscriber base of around 900,000. This was Sony’s biggest bet
at cashing in on the Internet and e-commerce boom in the late 1990s.

Sony’s restructuring efforts in 1999 were well received by investors. Following the
announcement of the restructuring program, Sony’s stock prices nearly tripled. This
positive trend continued even in 2000. By March 2000, its stock prices were at a high of
$152. Having already offered its PlayStation game console on the Internet, Sony
successfully launched its PlayStation 2 (PS2) video game console in Japan in March
2000. The PS2 sold 980,000 units within the first three days of its launch. However,
Sony still faced problems since its other businesses, including electronics, movies,
personal computers, and mobile telecommunications, were not performing well.
Analysts felt that the low Internet penetration rate in Japan (estimated to be 13% in
1999) was proving to be a major hurdle for Sony.

Consequently, Sony’s financial performance deteriorated by the end of 1990s. For fiscal
1999–2000, Sony’s net income fell to ¥121.83 bn compared to ¥179 bn in fiscal 1998–
99. This resulted in a major fall in its stock prices. By May 2000, Sony’s stock prices
fell by 40% to $89. Analysts were quick to criticize Sony’s efforts towards transforming

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itself into a web-enabled company. They commented that the company had created
more hype rather than taking significant steps in this regard.

In response to these financial problems, Sony announced another reshuffle in its top
management. Idei became the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Sony. Ando,
who headed Sony’s PC division, was made the President, while Tokunaka, who
previously headed the PlayStation unit, was made the Chief Financial Officer of Sony.
Analysts criticized this move as a mere show-off exercise.

Sony also undertook a massive cost-cutting exercise. Its global manufacturing facilities
were reduced from 70 in 1999 to 65 in 2001. While implementing these measures, the
company had to deal with severe resistance from employee unions and local
governments (in areas where jobs would be eliminated).

Despite the above measures, Sony’s financial condition did not show any significant
improvement in 2001. The company was severely affected by the slowdown in the IT
industry during 2000–01, which led to a decline in the demand for its computer-related
products. As a result, in spite of a 9.4% increase in revenues in fiscal 2000–01 (mainly
due to the improved sales of the PlayStation games console), Sony’s net income
dropped significantly from ¥121.83 bn in fiscal 1999–2000 to ¥16.75 bn in fiscal 2000–
01. Analysts commented that Sony required a new business model. The company had to
immediately take concrete measures to increase its net income.

The terrorist attacks in the US in September 2001 severely affected Sony’s sales of its
video games, movies and music albums in the US and European countries. This was
something which couldn’t be controlled by Sony. However, back home in Japan, there
were several issues which Sony should have controlled had the company acted
judiciously. For instance, in recession-hit Japan, where labor costs were high, Sony was
still manufacturing a number of low-margin products like PC monitors and hard disk
drives. Instead, it should have either outsourced the production of these products to
contract manufacturers in neighboring countries like China or could have even divested
them. In 2000 and 2001, Sony started to outsource production of Walkmans and PCs
from China, a move which it should have made much earlier. Further, in an era of
declining product cycles, Sony was involved in far too many businesses than could be
effectively managed, ranging from semiconductors to financial services. Sony didn’t
possess the management capability of large business conglomerates like GE and IBM,
which managed numerous businesses effectively, even during tough times.

Sony’s management also felt that with the emergence of net-compatible devices like
cellular phones, audio and video gadgets and laptops, PCs were losing their charm. It
felt that in the emerging age of ‘broadband.’ the demand for the above products was
likely to increase in future. Sony’s management felt that in order to boost profitability
and exploit the opportunities offered by the broadband era, there was need for yet
another organizational restructuring.

To meet the demands of the broadband era, Sony announced an organizational

restructuring in March 2001. The company aimed at transforming itself into a Personal

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Broadband Network Solutions company by launching a wide range of broadband

products and services for its customers across the world.

Under the new structural framework, Sony’s headquarters was revamped into a Global
Hub centered on five key businesses – electronics, entertainment, games, financial
services and Internet/communication service. The primary role of the Global Hub
(headed by the top management) was to devise the overall management strategy of the
company.

Sony’s management decided to integrate all the electronics business related activities
under the newly created Electronic Headquarters (Electronics HQ). In order to achieve
the convergence of Audio Video Products with IT (AV/IT convergence), Sony devised
a unique strategy called ‘4 Network Gateway.’ Under this strategy, the games and
Internet/communication service businesses were combined with the electronics
hardware business so that innovative products could be developed and offered for the
broadband market. The three businesses were under the supervision of Ando.

In order to provide support services for the entire group, a management platform was
created, which consisted of key support functions in diverse fields such as accounting,
finance, legal, intellectual copyrights, human resources, information systems, public
relations, external affairs and design. The management platform was later split into the
Engineering, Management and Customer Service (EMCS) Company and the Sales
Platform (which comprised the regional sales companies and region-based Internet
direct marketing functions). The management platform was headed by the Chief
Administrative Officer, a newly created position.

Again, several analysts were skeptical about Sony’s new found obsession – broadband.
Sony’s launch in 2000 and 2001 of innovative products like Internet mobile phones
proved to be major failures. In April 2003, Sony announced another major restructuring
exercise (to be carried out in the next three years) in order to strengthen its corporate
value. Following this announcement, Sony was reorganized into seven business entities
– four network companies and three business groups. These business entities were given
the authority to frame short-term and long-term strategies.

Sony’s financial performance did not improve in spite of the frequent restructuring by
Sony’s management. For the financial year 2001–02, Sony’s operating income fell by a
significant 40.3% while its revenues registered a marginal increase of 3.6%. Moreover,
according to a BusinessWeek report, sales of Sony’s most profitable products – the
PlayStation and the PS2 game consoles – were likely to fall.

In the end, Sony’s continuous emphasis on restructuring exercises, rather than

concentrating on cutting down on unnecessary product lines, and its continual focus on
the consumer electronics business at a time when the industry itself was going through a
slump period, could be cited as the primary reasons for its continual dismal
performance.

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6.3 Sony’s Recent Moves

Despite announcing a major restructuring exercise in 1999, followed by another

restructuring initiative in 2001, Sony reported dismal performance in fiscal 2002–03,
especially in its consumer electronics business. Sony announced another round of major
restructuring in October 2003. The initiative was termed by Sony as ‘Transformation
60,’ which outlined a series of fundamental reforms which the company contemplated
over the next four years.

The key elements of Transformation 60 included:

Clarifying the company’s operational structure and implementing growth

strategy

Sony aims to achieve this through the convergence of the electronics business,
convergence of the entertainment business and convergence of the finance business. The
convergence of the electronics business would be achieved by designating the home
electronics sector, mobile electronics sector and semiconductor technology sector as
core sectors. Convergence of the entertainment business would be achieved by
combining assets in pictures, music and games, with the aim of becoming a global
media content company. Convergence of the finance business would be achieved by
establishing a financial holding company which consisted of three companies: Sony
Life Insurance Company Ltd, Sony Assurance Inc. and Sony Bank Inc.

Fundamentally reforming operational profit structure

In Phase II of the new round of restructuring, Sony aims to implement structural

reforms covering electronics, entertainment and other major sectors, with the primary
objective of improving its profit structure significantly. This would require it to
drastically cut down on fixed costs to the tune of ¥330 bn by the end of fiscal 2006. For
this, Sony plans to reduce the head count by 20,000 (of which 7000 would be from
Japan), close plants and outsource several products from neighboring countries like
China.

Through these changes, Sony aims to secure a consolidated operating profit margin of at
least 10% (excluding financial business) by the end of FY06. Sony also believes that
these changes will lay the foundation for the creation of new value and significant
growth from FY06 onwards.

Over the next three years, Sony plans to spend approximately ¥335 bn (¥300 bn in
electronics) to achieve annualized fixed cost reductions of approximately ¥200 bn (¥160
bn in electronics) in FY06 compared to FY02. In addition, cost reductions in non-
production materials will help to achieve overall total annualized fixed cost reductions
of approximately ¥330 bn (¥300 bn in electronics) in FY06 compared to FY02. For
FY03, Sony projects restructuring costs of approximately ¥140 bn (electronics ¥130 bn)
resulting in annualized savings of approximately ¥78 bn (electronics ¥68 bn) from
FY04.

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Sony’s contemplated latest round of restructuring initiatives only confirm its obsession
with restructuring, the results of which would be interesting to watch.

Additional reading & references

1. Sony Sets Roadmap for Technological Revival, Electronic News, July 24, 1995.
2. Flick, Larry; Newman, Melinda, Sony to Eliminate at Least 50 Jobs: New Hires
Expected, Billboard, August 5, 1995.
3. Sony Announces a New Corporate Structure, www.sony.net, January 16, 1996.
4. Sony Implements Changes in Top Management, www.sony.net, January 27,
1998.
5. Sony Establishes Corporate IS Solutions, www.sony.net, March 30 1998.
6. Sony Announces Executive-Level Changes in Management, www.sony.net, May
7, 1998.
7. Sony Announces Key Top Management Appointments, www.sony.net,
December 10, 1998.
8. Sony Plans Reorganization, www.money.cnn.com, March 8, 1999.
9. Sony Cuts Back to Move Forward, www.news.bbc.co.uk, March 9, 1999.
10. Kunii, Irene M., Sony’s Shake Up, BusinessWeek, March 22, 1999.
11. Sony Announces Executive-Level Changes in Management, www.sony.net,
March 29, 1999.
12. Sony Announces Organizational Structure for New Network Companies,
www.sony.net, March 29, 1999.
13. Segal, Philip, Slick Sony Is Not What It Appears to Be, www.iht.com, 1999.
14. Sony Announces New Group Architecture for Network-Centric Era,
www.sony.net, March 9, 1999.
15. Notice on Going Private of Three Listed Subsidiaries of Sony Corporation,
www.sony.net, March 9, 1999.
16. Tanikawa Miki, Restructuring Craze Sweeps Japan, www.iht.com, April 10,
1999.
17. Drexler, Michael and Guth, Rob, Sony Chairman Upbeat on Japanese Economy,
www.idg.net, May 17, 1999.
18. Teresco, John, Latest Moves: The Stunning New PlayStation II And A
Continuing Corporate Restructuring, Industry Week, June 7, 1999.
19. Sony Appoints New Members to the Board and New Corporate Executive
Officers, www.sony.net, June 29, 1999.
20. Madden, Andrew, Slimming Down, www.redherring.com, October 1999.
21. Sony Corp Net Profits Drop 25%, www.atimes.com, October 29, 1999.
22. Kunii, Irene M., Here Comes the Sony Net Man, BusinessWeek, November 1,
1999.
23. Sony Corporation, Tokyu Corporation and Toyota Motor Corporation Create
an [Advanced Internet Integration Planning Company (temp. name)] to plan
network related services for broadband networks, www.sony.net, March 9,
2000.
24. Davis, Jim, Sony Shifts Gears to Tap Convergence Trend, www.news.com.com,
March 16, 2000.

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25. Accelerating Reform to Meet the Needs of the Broadband Era, www.sony.net,
March 30, 2000.
26. Sony Corporation’s Business Strategy for FY 2000, www.sony.net, March 30,
2000.
27. Schlender, Brent, Sony Plays to Win, Fortune, May 2000.
28. Profile: Sony Corp., www.e-insite.net, May 2, 2000.
29. Sony Strengthens its Management Team to Further Enhance Corporate Value,
www.sony.net, May 8, 2000.
30. Sony Corporation, www.vcl.vaio.sony.co.jp, May 12, 2000.
31. Ostrom Douglas, Recent Restructuring Initiatives, www.jei.org, May 19, 2000.
32. Brady, Rose, Capital Wrap up, BusinessWeek, May 22, 2000.
33. Kunii Irene M., The Slump at Sony, BusinessWeek, June 5, 2000.
34. Kunii, Irene M.; Grover, Ron, Sony Slides into a Slump, BusinessWeek, June 5,
2000.
35. Sony Computer Entertainment America Redefines the Entertainment Lifestyle
with Introduction of New Playstation Model in September 2000,
www.twingalaxies.com, June 8, 2000.
36. Crowell, Todd; Mutsuko Murakami, Sony Hits the Button, www.asiaweek.com,
July 7, 2000.
37. Sony Appoints New Members to the Board, New Corporate Executive Officers
and Corporate Research Fellows, www.sony.net, June 29, 2000.
38. Sony Restructuring Leads to Layoff in Canada, www.chartattack.com, July 18,
2000.
39. Sony Establishes a New Network Company for Semiconductor Business
“Semiconductor Network Company (SNC)”, www.sony.net, July 26, 2000.
40. Beamish, Paul W., Sony’s Nakamura on Structure and Decision Making, Ivey
Business Journal, July/August 2000.
41. Sony Broadband Creates Venture Unit for Digital Media,
www.digitalmediawire.com, October 4, 2000.
42. Malester, Jeff, Sony Sales, Profits Climb in Fiscal Q2, www.twice.com,
November 6, 2000.
43. Weisman, Dan, 500 Sony Employees to Be Laid Off, www.nctimes.com, 2001.
44. A New Group Structure for the Next Stage of Integrated, Decentralized
Management, www.sony.net, March 29, 2001.
45. Sony Appoints New Executive Officers, www.sony.net, March 29, 2001.
46. Sony Announces Executive-Level Changes in Management, www.sony.net, April
27, 2001.
47. Sony to Launch Broadband Service in Hong Kong, www.internetnews.com, May
31, 2001.
48. Olavsrud, Thor, Sony Eyes Net Appliance Market, www.internetnews.com, June
15, 2001.
49. Li, Kenneth; Learmonth, Michael, Yahoo, Sony in Marketing Pact,
www.thestandard.com, July 31, 2001.
50. Sony Entertainment Team Ready for New Media Push, www.studio-
systems.com, July/August 2001.
51. Sony and AOL Consider Merger of TV Assets, www.satnewsasia.com, August 1,
2001.

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52. Dog Days at Sony, www.asiaweek.com, August 10, 2001.

53. Hiroshi Suzuki; Kyoko Suzuki, Sony Cuts in Ahead of the Game,
www.theage.com, September 4, 2001.
54. Kunii, Irene M., Sony: Losing the Magic Touch? BusinessWeek Online, October 5,
2001.
55. Sony Reveals Initiatives to Create a “Ubiquitous Value Network,”
www.sony.net, November 12, 2001.
56. Sony to Post Growth, Matsushita Downbeat, www.cnn.com, February 19, 2002.
57. Accelerating Structural Reform of the Sony Group’s Electronics Business,
www.sony.net, February 28, 2002.
58. Kunii, Irene M., Edwards, Cliff, Greene, Jay, Can Sony Regain the Magic?
BusinessWeek, March 11, 2002.
59. Sony Profits Fall 9 Per Cent, www.smh.com.au, April 26, 2002.
60. Levy, Mitchell, Sony Analyzed Via the Value Framework, www.ecmgt.com,
October 2002.
61. How Sony Could Sharpen Its Picture, BusinessWeek, October 2002.
62. Sony Sees Sales Slowdown, Higher FY Restructuring Costs in Electronics – CFO,
www.ananova.com, October 28, 2002.
63. Update – Sony Profits Up Though Sales Remain Flat, www.idg.net, October 28,
2002.
64. Market Talk/JP: Sony has Room to Rise on Restructuring,
www.asia.news.yahoo.com, October 29, 2002.
65. Minister Threatens to Boycott Sony, N.A. Jakarta Post, December 4, 2002.
66. Guerin, Bill, Sony Pullout Plan Rocks Indonesia, www.atimes.com, December 7,
2002.
67. Reforming the Sony Group Management Structure to Strengthen Corporate
Governance, www.sony.net, January 28, 2003.
68. Tokyo Stocks Seen Edging Up, Sony Earnings Eyed, Forbes, January 28, 2003.
69. Zuan, Todd, Sony to Cut 17,000 Jobs by 2003, www.transnationale.org, March 8,
2003.
70. Sony Announces Executive Appointments and Organizational Reforms
Effective as of April 1, 2003, www.sony.net, March 31, 2003.
71. Christman, Ed; Spahr, Wolfgang, Sony Restructuring Plan Begins with Layoffs,
Billboard, April 5, 2003.
72. Sony Undergoes Restructuring, Says It Won’t Affect Handset Biz, RCR
Wireless News, April 7, 2003.
73. Christman, Ed, Ienner Ascends at Restructured Sony, Billboard, April 26, 2003.
74. Dismal Results at Japan’s Top Electronics Firm Have Stunned Investors, The
Economist, May 3, 2003.
75. Christman, Ed, Sony Restructures Sales, Distribution Functions, Billboard, May
24, 2003.
76. Sony Group Corporate Strategy for Fiscal Year 2003 (April 2003–March 2004)
Confirming Sony’s Position as a Leading Global Brand, www.sony.net, May 28,
2003.
77. Sagging Profits at Sony, www.news.bbc.co.uk.
78. The Scoop, www1.excite.com.
79. Emotion and Innovation in the Broadband Era, www.bssc.sel.sony.com.

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80. Transformation 60 – Confirming Sony’s position as a Leading Consumer

Brand in the 21st Century, www.sony.net, October 28, 2003.
81. Annual Reports, 1995–2003, www.sony.net.
82. www.sony.net.
83. www.biz.yahoo.com.
84. www.wired.com.
85. www.550dmv.com.
86. www.extratv.warnerbros.com.
87. www.iwon.com.

Related case studies

1. Reorganizing ABB – From Matrix to Customer-Centric Organization Structure (A),

Reference No. 303–156–1.
2. Reorganizing ABB – From Matrix to Customer-Centric Organization Structure (B),
Reference No. 303–157–1.
3. Reorganizing HP, Reference No. 402–026–1.
4. Restructuring P&G, Reference No. 303–191–1.

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