Legislation that does not have a specific cost attached is often symbolic rather than practical. Congress has an incentive to pass such legislation to appear tough on crime even if it will not significantly impact criminal enforcement. These symbolic bills do not carry a federal price tag, allowing Congress to pass them without constraints around costs. As a result, largely symbolic legislation may continue to be introduced even when it has lost novelty or significance.
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a card responding to those who use normal means as their funding.
Legislation that does not have a specific cost attached is often symbolic rather than practical. Congress has an incentive to pass such legislation to appear tough on crime even if it will not significantly impact criminal enforcement. These symbolic bills do not carry a federal price tag, allowing Congress to pass them without constraints around costs. As a result, largely symbolic legislation may continue to be introduced even when it has lost novelty or significance.
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Legislation that does not have a specific cost attached is often symbolic rather than practical. Congress has an incentive to pass such legislation to appear tough on crime even if it will not significantly impact criminal enforcement. These symbolic bills do not carry a federal price tag, allowing Congress to pass them without constraints around costs. As a result, largely symbolic legislation may continue to be introduced even when it has lost novelty or significance.
Direitos autorais:
Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
Formatos disponíveis
Baixe no formato DOC, PDF, TXT ou leia online no Scribd
Boston University Law Review 01 – legislation that passes without a specific price
tag is largely symbolic
Sara Sun Beale, [she teaches first year criminal law and upper-class courses in criminal justice policy and federal criminal law], “Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool for Criminal Enforcement?”, Boston University Law Review, (80 B.U.L Rev. 1227), June 2001, <accessed January 5, 2011>, (ZV) “One might respond that this situation will generate its own limitations, since Congress will have no incentive to play the federal crime card so frequently that it loses its impact. The difficulty with this analysis is that there may be perverse incentives at work. There may be a political incentive to introduce anti-crime initiatives, even at the point when they have become so common that they have lost much of their novelty and significance, because a vote against such a proposal may leave a member of Congress vulnerable to the accusation that she is soft on crime. Additionally, when symbolic anti-crime legislation is proposed, the absence of constraints that affect many other types of legislative proposals will undoubtedly affect the political dynamic. Most legislation imposes costs on the federal government, and those costs constrain Congress to a lesser or greater degree. Congress has a tremendous incentive to enact federal legislation that does not carry a federal price tag, such as unfunded mandates and purely symbolic legislation, even if it is not otherwise the best means of achieving the goals in question.”