Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
[MP],
Employee,
May 1, 2008
this case under the Alabama Fair Dismissal Act (“FDA”), Ala Code §§ 36-26-
Employee counsel served the Employee’s Motion to Reinstate Pay for Bishop’s
2008, the hearing officer issued the Opinion of the Hearing Officer on
simply “OEEM”).1
The hearing officer granted the Employee Motion in part and denied it in
part, summarizing his orders and setting the schedule for the case as follows:
(I) The Employer forthwith shall put the Employee back on its payroll
with benefits and give her back pay for the period during which
her pay has been suspended.
(II) Within fifteen (15) days of the date of this opinion, the Employer
shall serve upon the Employee’s counsel and the hearing officer a
revised statement of the facts showing that the termination is taken
for one or more of the reasons listed in Section 36-26-102.
1
Proceedings were, therefore, commenced “no less than 30 days and no more than 60 days following the
appointment of the hearing officer,” as required by Ala Code § 36-26-104(a).
2
(III) Within fifteen (15) days of the date of this opinion, the Employee
shall serve upon the Employer and the hearing officer an itemized
list of her claims for reimbursement, and the parties then are to
attempt to negotiate a settlement of those claims.
(IV) The hearing is scheduled for June 2, 2008, unless the parties agree
otherwise.
(V) Unless the parties agree otherwise, on or before May 1, 2008, the
parties shall submit to the hearing officer, with a copy to the
opposing party, documents supportive of, or in contravention to,
the action, as well as a list of witnesses to be called at such
hearing. OEEM @ 22-23.
Motion”), contending that the College’s “short and plain statement of the facts”,
College also contends that it cannot be required to reimburse the Employee for
the benefits that she has lost as a result of the suspension of her pay. The
College has yet to put the Employee back on the payroll or pay her back pay, as
3
April 29, 2008, without exhibits. A revised version with exhibits (“Employee
Response”) was served May 1, 2008; the exhibits are cataloged infra.
employee’s “trial” on the charges set forth in the notice. The only statutorily
in support of its position, despite the facts that the “short and plain” language of
the FDA is taken directly from the pleading standards of ARCP 8(a)(1), which
in turn is taken from FRCP 8(a)(2), and numerous cases have been decided
under those rules. OEEM @ 11. The same language is found also in § 16-24-
9(a) of the Teacher Tenure Act, Ala Code §§ 16-24-1 et seq., which parallels the
FDA, yet the College cites not a single court decision to buttresses its argument.
Because the College offers no compelling reason why the OEEM should be
4
II. What The Constitution Requires
27 IER Cas (BNA) 228; 2007 WL 3238718, the Alabama Supreme Court held
that a hearing officer in a Teacher Tenure Act case “must apply Alabama law as
set forth in the new Act and court decisions interpreting the new Act and
provisions of the old Act that remain unchanged by the 2004 amendments.”
While the instant case arises under the Fair Dismissal Act,
To interpret the Fair Dismissal Act, the courts have referred to the
Teacher Tenure Act and to decisions applying that Act, in an effort to
define and clarify the provisions of the Fair Dismissal Act. See e.g.,
Ledbetter v. Jackson County Bd. of Educ., 508 So. 2d 244 (Ala. 1987);
Ike v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, supra; Uwakolam v.
Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 554 So. 2d 1036 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989);
Hughes v. Britnell, 554 So. 2d 1041 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989).
Athens State College v Ruth, 795 So 2d 703, 706 (Ala Civ App 1999). The
hearing officer therefore looks to Alabama law, including cases decided under
the Teacher Tenure Act. The US Constitution is, of course, an integral part of
Frizzell v Autauga County Board of Education, 972 F Supp 564 (MD Ala
1997), was a due process case brought under 42 USC § 1983 and is cited by the
College in Employer Response @ 10. There the federal district court stated:
Defendants do not dispute that under the Alabama Teacher Tenure Act,
Ala. Code § 16-24 et seq., plaintiff has a property interest in his continued
5
employment. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 33 L. Ed.
2d 548, 92 S. Ct. 2701 (1972) (holding that state law determines
existence of property interest). In Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
470 U.S. 532, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985) the Supreme
Court held that an employee's property interest in continued employment
cannot be deprived without appropriate procedural safeguards. Id. at 541.
972 F Supp @ 565. In the instant case, the College does not dispute that the
Employee has a property interest in her continued pay and employment. Ala
Code § 36-26-102.
Constitution is Wells v Dallas Independent School District, 793 F2d 679, 682
Thus the threshold test is whether the College’s notice to the Employee, issued
pursuant to the “short and plain statement of the facts” requirement of Ala Code
6
§ 36-26-103(a), satisfies the notice requirements of the US Constitution. The
There is ample case law describing what notice is and is not sufficient. In
OEEM @ 12, the hearing officer observed that “if the alleged misconduct is
The single underlined statement clearly explained what the alleged act was
School”), when it was committed (“on July 19, 1988”), and why it was wrong
(“in violation of School Board Policy # 3131”). The College’s notice omits
Wells v Dallas Independent School District, 793 F2d 679 (5th Cir 1986),
7
At the hearing the Administration will present evidence with
regard to the following matters and charges forming the basis of
your termination:
In the instant case, the College’s notice contains none of the specificity found
8
charges 2 and 3 in Wells.
Kennedy, 868 So 2d 1123, 1125-1126 (Ala Civ App 2003), a case involving the
"Under the rules of the Alabama State Board of Education, you are
entitled, subject to the terms and conditions of the Fair Dismissal Act,
to appeal my decision should I determine that your termination … will
be imposed or confirmed. If you intend to appeal the termination, if
imposed or confirmed, you must notify me in writing within fifteen
(15) days of your receipt of this letter, of your intent to contest the
termination, if imposed or confirmed. If you do not intend to appeal
the termination, [if] imposed or confirmed, you need not respond to
this letter."
The notice stated the charge, the policy violated, the dates of violation, and the
9
evidence against the employee. In the instant case, the College’s notice is short
on evidentiary facts.
In City of Orange Beach v Duggan, 788 So 2d 146, 152 (Ala 2000), the
The College’s notice to the Employee was devoid of any mention of its
In the Employer Response @ 10, the College quotes two cases which
Acoff, 868 So 2d 1105 (Ala Civ App 2003), quoted from Wells v Dallas Indep
The College’s notice to the Employee said nothing about the evidence on which
Similarly, in Frizzell v Autauga County, 972 F Supp 564, 565 (MD Ala
1997), Employer Response @ 10, the employee was informed of the charges
10
and evidence against him:
Here, the record is clear that Plaintiff received notice of the charges
against him, the names of the witnesses the board expected to call and
copies of the documents which the board intended to rely upon to support
its proposed cancellation. This is all the process Plaintiff is due under the
Federal Constitution. (Emphasis supplied; footnote omitted.)
Here the College neither provided the Employee with any documentation nor
described its evidence against her so that she and her attorney could prepare for
An employee and her attorney are entitled to know the evidence that they have
to counter, else they will be unable to prepare their defense. In the instant case,
the College did not notify the Employee or her counsel of the charges in
11
why the Employer is convinced of her culpability. The Employer’s
Response provides little additional information about events.
At the hearing, the State’s witness testified that Ms. [P] was being
charged with theft by deception for $1,450 in Pell Grant funds in the
Spring of 2005 and for $3,500 in Pell Grant funds in the 2005/2006
academic year. Specifically, the State’s witness testified that Ms. [P]
took a sociology class, SOC247, in Spring 2005 and received an
incomplete grade. After receiving this incomplete grade, she would
have been required to refund the Pell Grant funds but she did not do
so. Instead, she changed her grade from an incomplete to an “A.” As a
result, she was able to keep the Pell Grant funds. With respect to the
funds received in the 2005/2006 academic year, Ms. [P] represented to
Bishop State that she had a stepdaughter named Shevonda Archible
and that Ms. Archible was one of her dependents. Dependents of
Bishop State employees are eligible for tuition waivers. However, it
turns out that Ms. Archible is not Ms. [P]’s stepdaughter, and they are
not related at all. This ultimately allowed Ms. Archible to improperly
receive a Pell Grant award in 2005/2006 in the amount of
approximately $3,500.
This is precisely the type of factual information that the College was
confuse “a short and plain statement of the facts” with “a short and plain
The College urges that the Employee and her counsel had ample
2
The hearing officer passes no judgment as to the truth or falsity of the “facts” stated; they await proof.
12
knowledge of the facts:
Further, Ms. [P] and her counsel were informed at the pre-termination
due process conference on August 29, 2007, that the specific facts
supporting the decision to terminate Ms. [P]’s employment and her
compensation on the basis of moral turpitude are the same as the facts
involved in her parallel criminal case. Prior to the pre-termination due
process conference, Ms. [P]’s preliminary hearing in her criminal case
was held on August 8, 2007. Ms. [P] and her counsel were present at
that hearing, and her counsel cross-examined the State’s witness
thoroughly. A copy of the transcript from Ms. [P]’s preliminary
criminal hearing is attached hereto as Exhibit “M.” Employer Motion
@ 6; footnotes omitted.
Unfortunately for the College, this is not what the Constitution and the
FDA require. It undoubtedly is true that a person who commits a crime has
actual knowledge of all aspects of the crime, but the accused’s own
employee or her attorney “to speak to the board on matters relevant to such
termination.”
Employee or her counsel ever were told “that the specific facts supporting
the decision to terminate Ms. [P]’s employment and her compensation on the
basis of moral turpitude are the same as the facts involved in her parallel
13
criminal case.”
proceeding. In the Employer Motion, the College makes no effort to rebut the
term. In Employee Response @ 6, counsel point out that the College itself used
Employer Response, Exhibits B & C. The College also uses that same broader
814 (Ala 2007), decided under the Teacher Tenure Act, is instructive as to the
An ore tenus hearing was held on April 7, 2005. On April 30, 2005, the
hearing officer rendered his written decision. The hearing officer found
14
beyond question "that the Board ha[d] reasonably and substantially
proven that Dunn engaged in serious misconduct, as set forth in the five
charges made in the superintendent's recommendations to the Board."
However, the hearing officer did not cancel Dunn's employment contract.
Instead, he ordered that Dunn be barred from any coaching position for
four years, that he be suspended without pay for 30 days, and that he
apologize to his players orally and to each of their parents or guardians in
writing. Dunn's employment as a science teacher was not terminated.
962 So 2d @ 815-816; footnote omitted.
Civ App 1993), a suit brought by an employee covered by the FDA, the court
15
compensation of $469.99 for uninsured medical expenses following
his shoulder injury.
In the present case, the Board concedes that Coaker negotiated for
light duty assignments as part of the settlement. He accepted a
settlement agreement containing a provision that he receive only light
duty, but he did not receive light duty. As a result, he not only lost the
opportunity to sue the Board for its failure to hold a hearing before
transferring him to a job with lower pay, but he also had to endure
heavier duty assignments. It is undisputed that these assignments
caused Coaker to suffer further injuries.
to which [the employee] may be entitled” are not mentioned in the FDA, the
The hearing officer repeats his admonition in OEEM @ 19, that the
claims, she very well may bring a due process suit under 42 USC § 1983,
against the College and its officials. According to Young v McLeod, 841 So 2d
16
245 (Ala Civ App 2001), the College officials would not have immunity, even if
In its first opinion, this court dealt with the appeals of two instructors at
Wallace State Community College, John McLeod and Barbara Dinkins,
who had both sued the college and its then president, Dr. Larry Beaty.
Ms. Dinkins settled her claim with the college and is now deceased. The
college has a new president, Dr. Linda Young, who has been substituted
for former President Beaty. 841 So 2d @ 247, fn 1.
"In general, § 14 prohibits the State and its agencies from being made
defendants in any court. Alabama State Docks v. Saxon, 631 So. 2d 943
(Ala. 1994). This protection from suit also applies to officers or agents of
the State who are sued in their official capacities or individually, when
the action is, in effect, one against the State. Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So. 2d
801 (Ala. 1992); Phillips v. Thomas, 555 So. 2d 81 (Ala. 1989).
However, the immunity from suit conferred by § 14 is not absolute. A
state officer is not immune from suit when he or she has acted under a
mistaken interpretation of the law, when the lawsuit is to compel the
performance of a legal duty or ministerial act, or where the lawsuit is
brought under the Declaratory Judgment Acts." 841 So 2d @ 248;
emphasis supplied.
addition to actual damages, and a jury trial is available for the asking. The
hearing officer is of the opinion that it is better for both parties to settle all
terminate the Employee’s pay under the FDA but for the Employee to be unable
to obtain compensation for wrongful termination, under that same statute. The
17
termination” within the meaning of FDA § 36-26-103(a).
refers to the proceeding before the hearing officer. Employer Motion @ 7-8. In
Wilson v Madison County Board of Education, 2007 Ala LEXIS 236, *10; 27
IER Cas (BNA) 228; 2007 WL 3238718, the Alabama Supreme Court wrote in
dicta:
Wilson objects to the Court of Civil Appeals' use of the word "appeal"
with reference to a teacher's right to "contest the board's decision" at a
hearing before a hearing officer. Although the word "contest" might be
more precise, the action taken is an "appeal" in the general sense of
subjecting the board's decision to review by the hearing officer. Further,
the Court of Civil Appeals recognized that the hearing was de novo when
it used the language "after receiving ore tenus and documentary
evidence" in its opinion. ___ So. 2d at ___, 2006 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS
496 at *2.
The court did not have before it the precise meaning of “appeal”, as does the
hearing officer.
The hearing officer shall determine which of the following actions should
be taken relative to the employee: Termination of the employee, a
suspension of the employee, with or without pay, a reprimand, other
disciplinary action, or no action against the employee.
alleged moral turpitude, the hearing officer nevertheless may determine that the
18
employee’s lost pay as punishment, much as a criminal court utilizes time
served.
Under the FDA, the Court of Appeals’ only authority is to review the
hearing officer’s decision under an arbitrary and capricious standard and order a
then the FDA provides that “pay shall be reinstated.” Ala Code § 36-26-103(b).
For these reasons, the hearing officer does not accept the College’s argument.
The Employee’s claims for reimbursement beg for settlement. If they are
not resolved before the hearing, it will be protracted, as the claims will have to
be analyzed in light of the medical insurance contract, which may call for
settlements with service providers for the amounts that the providers would
have received under the insurance contract, which may be substantially less than
the Employee was charged. Therefore, the hearing officer reiterates his directive
for the parties to meet and attempt to achieve a settlement. If he finds that either
party has failed to negotiate in good faith, then that fact will be factored heavily
The FDA is silent on the burden (the risk of non-persuasion) and standard
19
(beyond a reasonable doubt, clear and convincing, or more probable than not) of
proof to be applied in these cases. Both of these issues are presented in the
The United States Supreme Court has never indicated that procedural due
process requires a particular allocation of the burden of proof among
parties in a civil matter. The Supreme Court has, however, addressed the
determination of the appropriate standard of proof, recognizing that the
determination of an appropriate standard of proof must reflect the value
society places on the individual interest sought to be protected. Santosky,
455 U.S. at 754-55, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 607. The Santosky Court utilized the
Mathews-Eldridge balancing test to determine the appropriate standard of
proof in a case involving the termination of parental rights, reaffirming
the Mathews-Eldridge test as the benchmark for procedural due process
compliance. Id.
20
the affirmative, in substance rather than form; and (2) the burden rests on
the party with peculiar knowledge of the facts and circumstances. Id. The
North Carolina courts have generally allocated the burden of proof in any
dispute on the party attempting to show the existence of a claim or cause
of action, and if proof of his claim includes proof of negative allegations,
it is incumbent on him to do so. Johnson v. Johnson, 229 N.C. 541, 544,
50 S.E.2d 569, 572 (1948).
Applying these general principles to the case sub judice, it is clear that an
employee terminated pursuant to the "just cause" provision of N.C.G.S. §
126-35 should bear the burden of proof in an action contesting the
validity of that termination. Petitioner, the terminated employee, is the
party attempting to alter the status quo. The burden should appropriately
rest upon the employee who brings the action, even if the proof of that
position requires the demonstration of the absence of certain events or
causes. Neither party in a "just cause" termination dispute has peculiar
knowledge not available to the opposing party. A terminated employee
may readily utilize the procedures outlined in chapter 126 and section
1A-1 of the North Carolina General Statutes, as well as title 26 of the
North Carolina Administrative Code, to obtain any and all necessary
information to establish and advocate his or her position.
although more detailed than the FDA, still does not shed much light on the
2007 Ala LEXIS 236; 27 IER Cas (BNA) 228; 2007 WL 3238718, that the
The new Act gives guidance as to the issues for decision by the hearing
officer. Issues that may be considered include, but are not limited to: (1)
Whether the evidence proves a ground or grounds asserted for
cancellation of the teacher's contract; (2) Whether there are any improper
21
motives for cancellation5 under § 16-24-8, Ala Code 1975, such as
political or personal reasons; and (3) Whether cancellation of the
teacher's employment contract or one of the other alternatives under § 16-
24-10(a) is the appropriate penalty based upon the law and the facts.
5 The existence of an improper motive for termination, a political or personal reason, is in the nature of a
defense. The teacher asserting such a motive must place the motive "at issue" by specifically pleading the
facts alleged to establish an improper motive.
Issue (1) is the type of issue in which the burden of proof devolves upon
(ABA/BNA 6th ed 2003) @ 349, 949; Hill & Sinicropi, Evidence in Arbitration
County v Dunn, 962 So 2d 814, 815 (Ala 2007), decided under the Teacher
Tenure Act, the hearing officer found “‘that the Board ha[d] reasonably and
the employer is required to provide reasons for its actions under the FDA, it is
germane to the instant case. In Employer Motion @ 8, the College asserts that
the Employee could have continued her insurance coverage by paying the
22
failure to mitigate damages. Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works
proof should be on the employer, the party asserting the defense. In the instant
case, the College must prove that the Employee had a duty and the financial
capacity to pay the insurance premiums despite having her pay suspended.3
More difficult than the burden of proof is the issue of the proper standard
of proof. At least four times in the Employer Motion, the College accuses the
Employee of fraud:
(1) The undersigned is counsel for Bishop State in numerous of these FDA
cases, many of which arise out of the same massive financial aid,
scholarship, and academic fraud scheme out of which this case arises.
Employer Motion @ 1; emphasis supplied.
(2) We included as Exhibits “E” and “F” orders from two different hearing
officers in separate, though very similar termination cases. While these
cases do not arise from the fraud scheme out of which the others,
including the case against Ms. [P], arise, we included these orders here to
highlight the fact that there has been virtually no arbitral consistency in
these termination cases. Employer Motion @ 4, fn 3; emphasis supplied.
3
But see Alabama Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation v Alabama State Personnel
Department, 863 So 2d 1118 (2003). Query, whether there is a duty to mitigate under Alabama law.
23
(4) The purpose of the preliminary hearing was to determine whether
there was probable cause for the case to be presented to the grand
jury. The Judge determined that probable cause existed and bound the
case over to the grand jury. We understand that the District Attorney’s
office is preparing this and several other cases related to the fraud
scheme at Bishop State for presentation to the grand jury at this time.
Employer Motion @ 6, fn 4; emphasis supplied.
charging the Employee with being part of a “fraud scheme”, then it is incumbent
upon the College to state facts that support the charge. To date, the College has
stated none regarding any such scheme. Furthermore, the hearing officer also
pointed out that, to the extent that ARCP and FRCP 9(b) provide guidance,
Subdivision (b). This subdivision is identical with federal Rule 9(b) and
similar state rules. It is a qualification of the generalized pleading
permitted by Rule 8(a). But this special requirement as to fraud and
mistake does not require every element in such actions to be stated with
particularity. It simply commands the pleader to use more than
generalized or conclusory statements to set out the fraud complained of.
The pleading must show time, place and the contents or substance of the
false representations, the fact misrepresented, and an identification of
what has been obtained.
23 Michie’s Alabama Code (2003 Replacement Volume) @ 73. See also Case
24
of fraud or other criminal misconduct or conduct involving moral turpitude. Hill
& Sinicropi, Evidence in Arbitration (BNA 2nd ed 1987) @ 33-36; Elkouri &
Historically, the hearing officer has applied a clear and convincing evidence
standard in such cases. See, e.g., IBT Local 391 and Johnson Controls, 03-1
material, primarily from other cases before hearing officers; the sequence below
A. Pre-Hearing Order, dated July 15, 2007, from Bishop State Community
College and Charlotte Powe, FMCS No. 07-01405 (Potter, Hrg Off)
B. Order, issued June 11, 2007, from Bishop State Community College and
Emma Perkins, FMCS No. 07-01406 (Gutman, Hrg Off)4
C. Order, dated June 12, 2007, from Bishop State Community College and
Marlene A. French, FMCS No. 07-01051 (Goldie, Hrg Off)
D. Decision on Employee’s Motion to Dismiss Termination or in the
Alternative to Reinstate Pay, dated August 17, 2007, from Bishop State
4
In footnote 1 on page 3 of his Order, Mr. Gutman explains, without citation to authority, the apparent
discrepancy between the language of FDA § 36-26-103, which calls for a determination by “the employing
board”, and the practice of leaving all decision-making to the college president in a case involving a junior
college, an issue not addressed by either party in the instant case. Presumably the practice arises under Ala
Code § 16-60-111.7, which make the president the employing official:
The president of each junior college and trade school shall appoint the faculty and staff of each
junior college and trade school according to qualifications prescribed by the board and such other
regulations which may be adopted by the board in accordance with Section 16-60-111.4.
25
Community College and Elston Turner, FMCS No. 07-02606
(Bendixsen, Hrg Off)
E. Order Denying Employee’s Motion to Reinstate Compensation Pending
the Hearing and Decision in This Matter, dated January 28, 2008, from
Bishop State Community College and Henry R. Douglas, FMCS No. 08-
00835 (Odom, Hrg Off)
F. Opinion and Award on Motion to Reinstate Pay, dated January 28, 2008,
from Bishop State Community College and Herman Packer, FMCS No.
08-00834 (Feinstein, Hrg Off)
G. Letter order, dated January 9, 2008, from Bishop State Community
College and Jacqueline Williams, FMCS No. 07-00953 (Donovan, Hrg
Off)
H. Letter, dated August 1, 2007, to Jacqueline Williams, from James Lowe,
Jr.
I. Letter re Motion To Reconsider, dated March 30, 2008, from Bishop
State Community College and Zulieka Boykin Frazier, FMCS No. 08-
00951 (Tanksley, Hrg Off)
J. Letter, dated August 1, 2007, to Zulieka Boykin Frazier, from James
Lowe, Jr.
K. Grant of appeal and stay, dated February 26, 2008, in Alabama Court of
Civil Appeals No. 2070379, from Bishop State Community College and
Angelo Archible, FMCS No. 07-04797 (Serda, Hrg Off)
L. Letter brief, dated January 25, 2008, to Clerk of Alabama Court of Civil
Appeals, from Jeffrey G. Miller, from Bishop State Community College
and Angelo Archible, FMCS No. 07-04797 (Serda, Hrg Off)
M. Pages 1-3, 223-274 & 298 of transcript made August 8, 2007, from State
of Alabama v [MP], Mobile County District Court No. 07-4913
(McMaken, J)
26
D. Opinion and Order of Officer, dated December 19, 2007, from Bishop
State Community College v Elma Thomas, FMCS No. 07-04798
(Shriftman, Hrg Off)
E. Ruling – On Grievant’s Motion to Reinstate His Pay, dated January 4,
2008, from Bishop State Community College and Angelo Archible,
FMCS No. 07-04797 (Serda, Hrg Off)
F. Order, issued June 11, 2007, from Bishop State Community College and
Emma Perkins, FMCS No. 07-01406 (Gutman, Hrg Off)
G. Ruling on Employee’s Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative to
Reinstate Pay, dated March 25, 2008, from Bishop State Community
College and Alabama Education Association / James Soleyn, FMCS No.
08-01166 (Williams, Hrg Off)
The hearing officer did read all of the materials submitted to him but sees little
value in critiquing them, inasmuch as he has detailed his reasons for his rulings
Mrs. [P]’s case arises out of the political shenanigans of the Republican
Governor of Alabama, Richard Riley; a then Republican State Senator,
and now Chancellor of the Junior College System, Bradley Byrne, whom
the Governor would like to succeed him; and a determined effort to
embarrass and remove a twenty year veteran Democratic State
Representative, Yvonne Kennedy, who served as the President of the
College some two decades and is the Chair of a powerful committee in
the legislature. These efforts were also part of an attempt to wrest control
of the Democratic dominated legislature. These politicians were joined
by a John Tyson, conservative Democrat, and the District Attorney of
Mobile County, who had just lost a close and heated campaign for
Attorney General. The Republican he lost to just happened to be the guest
of honor at $500.00 a person fundraiser at the home of the Dean of
Academic Affairs at the College, who was also a principle target of the
investigation.
27
The hearing officer is weary of politics—the interminable presidential
Michigan and County of Leelanau, Michigan and Its Sheriff, 07-2 ARB ¶ 3926
(Arb 2007), supplemental opinion, 07-2 ARB ¶ 3927; the assignations and
prevarications of Detroit’s mayor, about whom Jay Leno quipped, “He’s scored
more times than the Detroit Tigers.”—and does not wish hear any more. The
hearing will be restricted to evidence about the Employee’s actions and the
VII. Conclusion
(b) Unless the parties agree otherwise, if, within seven (7) days of the date of
this Opinion, the College has not complied with paragraphs (I) and (II) on
Motion to Reinstate Pay, dated March 31, 2008, the hearing officer will
facts.
(c) In all other respects, the Opinion of the Hearing Officer on Employee’s
28
Motion To Reinstate Pay, dated March 31, 2008, remains in full force
and effect.
The hearing officer’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are embodied in
29