Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Chapter 4
Emotion Expressions
The first important gift for which we have film to thank was in a certain sense the
rediscovery of the human face. Film has revealed to us the human face with unexampled
clarity in its tragic as well as grotesque, threatening as well as blessed expression.
The second gift is that of visual empathy: in the purest sense the expressionistic
representation of thought processes. No longer will we take part purely externally in the
workings of the soul of the characters in film. We will no longer limit ourselves to
seeing the effects of feelings, but will experience them in our own souls, from the instant
of their inception on, from the first flash of thought through to the logical last conclusion
of the idea.
Fritz Lang1
Character Emotions
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Many cognitive film theorists have argued that film and emotion are closely connected,
yet they tend to be interested more in spectator emotions than in character emotions, or to
be more precise, their analysis of character emotions is focused on their role in generating
spectator emotions.2 As a device of character construction, emotion expressions
(principally of the voice and face) are another versatile tool that demand to be considered
in their own right. And like typing and mindreading, emotion expressions can be shaped
toward aesthetic ends. In this chapter I argue that expressions of basic emotions such as
anger and fear are universally produced and recognized, and implicit in this discussion is
the notion that one appeal of cinema is its ability to represent these expressions that
transcend time and culture. But I also argue, more importantly, that emotion expressions
can be understood only in a social or narrative context, and that filmmakers can
manipulate both the context and the expressions to generate interest in character. It
follows, naturally, that one feature of many films with an interest in character, such as
American independent films, is their interest in exploiting emotion expressions in relation
to narrative situations. As I argue in relation to Welcome to the Dollhouse and Hard
Eight, carrying over the discussion from Chapter 3, one especially significant technique is
the withholding of conventional expressions of emotion or of reliable contextual cues
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necessary for the recognition of clear character emotions. As with those films’ efforts to
frustrate mindreading and attribution processes, the careful frustration of our attempts at
emotion recognition also produces effects of complexity and depth and demands a more
active engagement with the construction of character. It also functions within the basic
viewing strategies outlined in Chapter 1, demanding the exploration of identity, making
narrative form playfully engaging, and offering a contrast with the comparative simplicity
of mainstream cinema’s characters. So as with the other aspects of social cognition I have
introduced, emotion expressions are natural processes that are exploited by a cultural
form.
The Face
The human face has always been a key feature of cinema’s appeal to filmmakers and
spectators alike, one source of its special powers. This is hardly surprising, given the
face’s significance as the emblem of our very identities. If you ask to see a picture of
someone, you typically aren’t interested in an image of their teeth, knees, or liver. When
you look at a picture of your face, you say, “That’s me!” The face is the only part of a
person that can be abstracted in this way from the rest of the body; it is the best
synecdoche we have for ourselves.
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Scholars have long recognized the communicative power of faces. Study in this
field dates to the enormous interest in physiognomy in ancient Greece and “facereading”
even before that in China and the Near East.3 The study of physiognomy, which the
Oxford English Dictionary defines as “the art of judging character and disposition from
features of the face,” has long been recognized as pseudoscience, but interest in the face
as an index of mental states has never abated. The Darwinian study of facial expressions
as a product of evolution long ago filled the place once held by physiognomy and face
reading, though more recently research has shown that social perceivers agree about links
between facial features and character traits, which may sometimes even have some
validity.4
From a Darwinian perspective, interest in faces is not as the outward expressions
of “character” but as a primary means, along with our bodies and voices, of expressing
emotions. Indeed, from such a perspective, emotions and facial expressions have a close
evolutionary connection.5 Many of the emotionexpressions that are universally
recognized, such as baring teeth to show anger and opening the mouth to show surprise,
have a functional purpose that precedes the communication of emotional states. Baring
teeth threatens an enemy, while opening the mouth is part of taking in breath. Each of
these actions is practical given the situation in which one feels either angry (because one
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has been wronged and will have to defend oneself) or surprised (breathing in will
facilitate alertness to the cause of the surprise and readiness in response to it).
Darwin theorized that emotions preceded the universally recognizable facial
expressions that express them. Emotions themselves have adaptive value: it pays to be
afraid of things that could harm you, to be angry at those who wrong you, to be disgusted
by things that could make you sick. The facial expressions that accompanied these
emotions, which originally had only practical functions, became habituated over time to
the point that they took on the significant communicative role they have always since had.
The ability to communicate our emotional states in turn is greatly beneficial to any
species that requires the extensive social organizations characteristic of primate societies.
Being able to communicate your feelings to your conspecifics gives you a definite
advantage.
One of Darwin’s arguments in his classic work on this topic, The Expression of
the Emotions in Man and Animals, concerns the universality of emotions. There has long
been debate over whether specific emotions themselves, and also whether the facial
expressions of those emotions, vary from culture to culture, or whether they are universal
or pancultural. As an evolutionary theory, Darwin’s argues for the universality of
emotions. More recent research has basically confirmed this position, identifying several
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basic emotions and facial expressions of them that are recognized panculturally, even by
members of preliterate tribes who have had very little or no exposure to Western culture
and media. The seven emotions, as Paul Ekman and his fellow researchers proposed to
name them, are happiness, surprise, fear, sadness, anger, disgust/contempt, and interest.6
Ekman and his colleagues went farther than just ascertaining whether and how
many facial expression are universal. They set about to code the muscles of the face to
better understand how each facial expression is produced anatomically. They found that
the muscles can be divided into action units (AU’s), of which we have 43, and identified
about 3,000 meaningful combinations of these 43 action units. The catalogue of all of
these facial actions and their combinations is called the Facial Action Coding System, or
FACS. The few hundred people who can read the face using FACS report that their
interpersonal experience is completely transformed.7 And apparently, animators at Pixar
and Dreamworks use FACS to create facial expressions for characters in feature films.8
What about cultural specificity? What accounts for differences among cultures in
the expression of emotion? The standard account in the facial expression literature holds
that what varies is not the experience of emotion itself, nor the facial expressions
corresponding to basic emotions in different cultures. It’s not as though a smile of joy for
Westerners means terror in some other culture. What does vary is customs for who may
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display emotions and in what situations. These are called display rules.9 People often try
to display an expression for an emotion they are not experiencing, or to mask one emotion
with another. For example, if you are trying to tell a lie or to smile for a picture you
might feel one emotion but display—or attempt to display—another.10
To test this hypothesis, Ekman ran an experiment using Japanese and American
subjects.11 It is widely believed that in Japanese society, there are cultural expectations
regarding the facial display of negative emotions (which are also gender and age
specific). In particular, Japanese are known to mask negative emotions with smiles, and
as a result the smile means something different in Japanese culture than it does in the
West, because Japanese expect many smiles to be less than genuine.12 In the Ekman
experiment, a “stress” film is shown to two groups of students, one a group of American
students in California and one a group of Japanese students in Tokyo. This is a film made
up of things that are difficult to watch and that leave ordinary viewers pretty shocked.
They showed each film to the students twice: once with the student alone in a room (but
observed through a hidden camera), and once with the student observed by a technician
(of their own culture) in a white coat and carrying a clipboard. Ekman found that when
alone in the room, the American and Japanese students reacted with the same facial
expressions. But when another person was present, the Japanese subjects attempted to
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mask their emotions with smiles. The display rule in Japanese society is to hide or mask
emotions when in the presence of authority figures, but this is not the rule in America.
However, the Japanese subjects were betrayed by their faces, as many people find it
impossible to effectively hide strong emotions of disgust or fear and Ekman, using the
FACS, could even detect indications of emotions under the masking.
Indeed, people are typically fairly proficient at distinguishing real emotional
expressions from sham emotional expressions. If we were more proficient, we would be
better detectors of lying and cheating, but in general we are able to distinguish a true (or
“Duchenne”) smile, produced by genuine amusement, from an affected one, put on when
asked to pose for a picture. A Duchenne smile combines a movement of muscles around
the mouth (called a “simple smile”) with a movement of muscles around the eyes. A
simple smile is easily recognized as nongenuine.13
More recent research has identified a more finetuned sense of cultural variability
of emotional expression. The overwhelming majority of studies of emotional universality
find that subjects identify emotions displayed by someone of a different culture at a rate
greater than chance, making the case for some degree of universalism incontrovertible.
Yet they also find that ingroup subjects identify each other’s emotion expressions at a
higher rate than those of outgroup members. Outgroup expressions are more accurate
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when the different cultures are closely connected (e.g., by sharing a national border).
Within a given culture, minority subjects judge majority members’ expressions more
accurately than the reverse. Indeed, minorities judge majority expressions more
accurately than majorities judge each other! This makes sense intuitively: the success of
minority members is increased as they are better able to interact with majority members.14
So this suggests that rather than absolute, the recognition of facial expressions of emotion
is modestly universal. Different societies do not possess totally different systems, but
neither are they identical.
The Voice
The representation of the voice is another cinematic narrative technique with functions
and possibilities similar to those of the face, yet historically the voice has been given less
attention by film critics, theorists, and historians. This lesser emphasis may be explained
by two factors. First, cinema existed for three decades before sound recording and sound
image synchronization became standard, so the representation of the voice did not seem
“cinematic” enough to warrant substantial attention as a means of storytelling. Second,
the voice is not uniquely cinematic; music, literature, and drama used voices for
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thousands of years before cinema was invented. So paying attention to the storytelling
possibilities of vocal expression in cinema did not help differentiate cinema from its rival
arts at a time when this kind of differentiation was a paramount interest of film critics.15
Like the face, the voice is an emblem and index of an individual’s identity. Like
the face, the voice is a means communication that facilitates social organization, and like
the face, some vocal expressions of emotion are recognized crossculturally.16 The most
commonly identified emotions recognized vocally across cultures include anger, fear,
sadness, and joy.17 There is evidence that the physiological and environmental
components of emotional experiences have a causal relation to vocal characteristics:
increases in rates of breathing and blood flow when a subject is taken by surprise affect
the voice. Yet cultural specificity also has its part in this story. The display rules that
apply in explaining the cultural variability of facial expressions affect vocal expressions in
more or less the same way in the same circumstances. A person smiling to mask her fear
would also try to speak in even, measured tones and not in a breathless fit of anguish.18
The evolution of vocal expressions of emotion runs parallel to the evolution of
facial expressions of emotion. Darwin considered facial and vocal expressions to be
equally significant. Vocal expressions of emotion, like facial ones, are products of natural
selection. Many species communicate vocally in ways we might consider simplistic by
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comparison with our own species’ vocal abilities, yet, as Darwin argued, our nonverbal
vocal expressions evolved from these ancestors of our species. Some of the sounds
produced by the human vocal apparatus, such as shrieks of pain, are produced the same
way in many other species. But only human beings have the control over the acoustic
properties of their vocalizations necessary to be able to sing and to communicate using
language.
We often say that when someone is experiencing a given emotion, regardless of
what they may say or how they may look we can “hear it in their voice.” Research
confirms that this is indeed the case: the human voice functions to express emotions
regardless of which words are spoken. Listeners can detect basic vocal emotions when
produced by actors, with some exceptions.19
We express emotions vocally (nonverbally) by varying our voice’s acoustic
properties; as with facial expressions, we are able to recognize crosscultural vocal
expressions of basic emotions such as anger and sadness. Researchers into nonverbal
communication of emotion have coded the acoustic properties of some vocal emotion
expressions much in the same way as FACS correlated facial musculature to emotion
expressions. The most important acoustic aspects of the voice for emotional expression
are loudness (intensity, measured in decibels), pitch (fundamental frequency, measured in
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hertz), and time, which includes both rate of speech and pauses between words.20 Each of
these can be further broken down into components, and each may vary to greater or lesser
extents. For example, anger is generally characterized by a quick rate and a high
frequency, and by high variability in both of these qualities. Sadness is generally
characterized by a slow rate, low frequency, low intensity, and little variability of these
qualities.21 For joy, sadness, and anger, recognition of vocal expressions is four or five
times greater than chance.22 Yet some emotions are more difficult to isolate in discrete
vocal expressions: disgust is recognized at a rate scarcely better than chance. However,
disgust may be a special case, as it is less likely than other emotions to be expressed in
ordinary conversational speech. Disgust typically comes out in very brief “affect bursts,”
which combine vocal and facial expressions. A typical case would be making a face and
exclaiming a monosyllabic expression of displeasure.23
Still more modes of expression exist. Gesture or body language is another means
of emotional display that psychologists have studied, though to a lesser degree than voices
and faces. Of course, the body is a significant tool in the actor’s kit. Yet more and more,
the mainstream film conventions of framing and cutting emphasize faces at the expense
of bodies.24 If John Wayne were acting today, his cowboy gait would be less prominent,
yet we would see more of his friendly smile and his angry glare. Bodily expressions of
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emotion are a significant form of cinematic narration and characterization but the
literature on this topic is rather thin, and I leave further discussion of it for future
research.
Emotion Expressions : A Closer Look
There are three basic claims arising out of this discussion of research on expressions of
emotion. The first is that the basic emotions themselves are universal: no matter the
cultural or historical specificity of a person’s background, she still experiences the same
happiness, fear, disgust, etc., as any other person. There are no remote tribes in which
happiness itself is unknown, or in which they have a different basic emotion, distinct from
happiness, unknown to Westerners.
The second claim is that basic expressions of happiness (smiling), fear (furrowing
the brow), disgust (pursing the lips), etc., are also crosscultural. There are also no
remote tribes in which no one ever smiles, or in which everyone uses some expression we
have never seen to communicate happiness. Indeed, the notion of display rules suggests
that not only are expressions of emotion universal, but that people know how to produce
many of them independent of experiencing the emotions that they communicate. If
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asked, you could make a happy, fearful, or disgusted face without having to think much
about how to do it. Both of these universality claims have significant implications for
understanding how characterization works in cinema, as we shall see. 25
A third, implicit, claim of this research is more basic yet. The face may or may
not be an accurate index of a person’s character or disposition, as physiognomists thought,
but it is a reliable source of information about a person’s emotions. This is the kind of
information people seek when they scan the faces of others. By looking at someone’s
face, it’s hard to tell with much certainty whether or not they are virtuous or illhumored.
You can generally tell their age, ethnicity, and sex (though not always). But what you are
generally looking for in a face, within the parameters of a given context, is information
not only about personality traits and the intentional states, but also about affect states such
as emotions and moods. These are what faces are best at communicating. This is also a
universality claim: in all cultures, people treat faces as emotionindicators and scan faces
for feelings. And most significantly, it follows that the ability to read emotions in faces
must universal, just like the ability to express them. Both the sending and receiving of
facial emotion information is a product of natural selection.26
The same claim applies in a slightly modified form to vocal expressions. The
voice is used to communicate more than just emotion; the words chosen may convey
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many kinds of meaning. So too the face may communicate several kinds of information
(a wink might mean “yes,” a wince might say “that hurt” or “this is embarrassing”). But,
among other things, the nonverbal aspect of speech functions as an index of emotions.
In this way it is similar to music; both voices and music communicate emotion even
without the meaning conveyed by words. The Beatles’s “Help!” is a cheerful song in
spite of its desperate lyrics. There is also evidence that the acoustic properties
corresponding to particular emotional meanings in music are the same as those applying
to vocal expressions (i.e., the high pitch and intensity characteristic of fearful speech is
understood in music to be fearful—think of Bernard Herrmann’s Psycho violins).27
These claims have significant implications for the study of cinematic narrative in
its specificity as a distinct storytelling medium.28 Unlike literature, movingimage media
such as cinema use images of faces as a primary narrative technique. While there are, of
course, many films that contain no closeup images of faces, rare is the narrative feature
film that eschews the face. To make such a film would be to engage in a kind of avant
garde practice, an experimental effort to break the rules and see what happens. There is
also a distinction here to be made between movingimage media such as film, television,
and video games on one hand, and theater on the other. Since the introduction of moving
pictures, the liveness and immediacy of theater have been its selling points. But what
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cinema lacks in these qualities, it makes up for in its ability to represent faces on a large
scale.
Filmmakers rely heavily on images of the face to communicate emotion
information, and to generate emotional response in spectators.29 The universality claims
above explain, to a large extent, the power of movies to appeal across cultures and
historical periods. Spectators approach the image of the face primed to recognize the
same emotions, in the same expressions, regardless of their background. Of course,
literary narrative creates emotions for characters too, but by other means. The immediacy
and directness of the face make for vivid and direct characterizations and allow the
audience to connect with the characters’ interior states in a powerful way. However, the
literary comparison illustrates well that there are other means of representing a
character’s emotional experience, such as verbal description (much more common in
literature than film or television) and folkpsychology inference. Movingimage media
make use of these techniques too, but the availability of images of the face make them
secondary.
Like facial expressions, vocal expressions are a more direct and vivid means of
characterization than is available in literature. Yet there is no argument from medium
specificity to be made regarding the voice. The silent era produced many masterpieces
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that relied on an aesthetic of voiceless performance. Since then, however, the aesthetic
has changed to the point that a narrative feature film without voices would be highly
unusual.30 The contemporary aesthetic, which is the basis of cinematic characterization,
places the face and voice at the top of all stylistic hierarchies. Faces (and by extension,
bodies) are the most important component of mise en scene and are the paramount
concern of cinematography, especially in terms of framing. Voices are the most
important sound component, taking precedence over music and “noise.” In the vast
majority of scenes, filmmakers cut to follow both facial and vocal cues above all other
forms of narrative information.
Problems in Expression Recognition
Underlying the above discussion are several assumptions about expressions of emotion
that must be qualified to understand how such expressions function both in real life and in
fictional representations. One assumption is that each expression, whether facial or vocal,
conveys or displays one and only one emotion. Most research in this field follows just
this logic, asking subjects to identify emotions expressed in a static image of a face or in a
brief recording (a few seconds long) of a person speaking. The examples are typically
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chosen to be typical expressions of a single emotion which the researcher predicts the
subjects will recognize clearly. The subjects are often given a fixed set of choices from a
list of basic emotions. Thus the results of the research show that subjects identify single
emotions for each display.31 Yet in actual settings, it is common for subjects to
experience more than one emotion, and it would follow that they also may express more
than one. When subjects were asked to describe another person’s emotional expressions,
they generally used more than one term for each emotional episode, e.g., they described
someone being angry and jealous, or sad and grieving.32 There is typically far more
nuance and complexity to any instance of emotional experience and expression than the
division of facial and vocal expressions into seven basic categories would suggest.
Second, implicit in this discussion has been the suggestion that all instances of
expressions of emotion are equally recognizable. That is, either you are expressing anger
in your voice or face, or you are not. Similarly, it has been implicit that all of the various
different emotion expressions are equally recognizable. I made an exception for vocal
expressions of disgust, but in general the various affect states were not shown to vary in
strength. Yet some emotions are more easily and universally recognized than others.33 In
practice, there is a threshold of recognition for emotional expressions, and varying
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degrees of intensity. It is often difficult to discern another person’s affect states, whether
because of their efforts to mask them or because of other factors. We often speculate
about what someone else is feeling—we even speculate about our own emotions. It is not
always easy to put your finger on what a given pattern of behavior really means. Some of
the most interesting filmic representations of emotion, such as European art films of the
1960s, show a character’s face and voice to be, to some extent, inscrutable. Sometimes
it’s obvious that a person is afraid; but often it’s hard to say what a face means.
Bergman’s Persona and Resnais’s Last Year at Marienbad are good examples of films in
which faces function as mysteries.
In one study of particular relevance to the question of how emotion expressions
function in film, psychologists James Carroll and James Russell analyzed facial
expressions of emotion in four Hollywood films, Dead Poets Society, Terms of
Endearment, Kramer vs. Kramer, and Ordinary People, all of which had been praised by
Leonard Maltin for their realism, acting, or general quality. They identified more than
100 episodes in which viewers (psychology students) agreed that a character was
experiencing one of the basic emotions, and agreed on which emotion. They found that,
with the exception of happiness, the basic emotions were rarely coupled with the facial
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expressions Ekman’s influential theory would predict. Most of the time, no prototype
emotion was displayed, yet some action units, such as a brow raise, were consistently seen
for some emotions (surprise, in this case).
This point underlies Carroll and Russell’s theory that facial expressions generally
function at the level of the AUs, and that the seven basic expressions are rarely—if ever—
seen in everyday life. They suggest that the seven expressions of basic emotions are
prototypes combining many of the different AUs that one would display for a given
emotion. They are mental prototypes used in miming emotions or in acting guides, but
are really idealizations of expressions and are ecologically rare or nonexistent.34
This experiment shows that in cinema as well as in real life, emotions may be
expressed in subtle or partial ways that do not involve the classic facial patterns we think
of as an “angry face” or a “surprised face.” Yet with happiness, the Duchenne smile was
commonly observed. This is clearly the most recognizable, unambiguous, and universal
of all facial expressions. It is produced in instances of genuine happiness or amusement
but not the other contexts in which one might smile, as in polite smiles, miserable smiles,
smiles of fear or contempt, and supercilious “Chaplin” smiles.35
Third, this discussion has assumed that emotions may be detected from brief,
discreet expressions of an isolated face or voice. But in ecological settings a person’s
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emotional experience is expressed in multiple modes. One does not ordinarily use an
angry voice absent an angry face, angry body language, angry words, and a context
producing anger. While facial expressions are often seen to offer the best evidence of
emotional experience, in practice people are receptive to all of the modes of interpersonal
communication. When asked to describe another person’s emotional experience, those
same subjects discussed context in narrative terms (they told a story about the person’s
situation), and referred to various vocal and bodily expressions.36 This demonstrates that
emotion expressions, and the understanding we have of them, are a product of many cues;
some of them may even be contradictory. Contradictory cues may coexist just in the
vocal channel, as one’s words and one’s voice might express different feelings. While
there are emotional qualities that people express purely nonverbally, in practice vocal
expressions occur in combination with language. It may often be the case that subjects
must discern someone’s emotions when their words do not make them explicit. Indeed,
when asked to describe emotional episodes they observed, subjects would rarely refer to
explicit descriptions such as ,“I’m so angry!”37 Yet it would be foolish to doubt that the
verbal component of vocal expression is negligible. Words are one part of the multi
channel array that is emotional expression.
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This leads to a fourth point, which is that people’s understandings of each other’s
emotional expressions may be influenced to a large extent by context.38 The methods of
studying expression recognition typically use still pictures of faces abstracted from any
situation. Yet contexts can make a big difference in determining what a face means. For
example, athletes often express the joy of victory with faces that Ekman would code as
angry (accompanied by shouting and aggressive gestures such as fistpumping) or sad
(crying). No one who is watching the game—or even highlights of it that make clear that
these are winners’ faces—would mistake the players’ affect states. Expressions of
emotion always occur in context and the judgments people make of other people’s
emotions are based on a combination of information about the person and the situation.
Indeed one of the defining features of emotion is appraisal: one generally becomes afraid
only in the presence of something to be feared. Ecologically, it would be highly unusual
to encounter emotionally expressive faces absent any context. Even if we grant that clear
facial expressions of basic emotions exist, which the above example might cast some
doubt on, they have meaning only within the realm of the social.
This means that vocal and facial expressions are not the only way that spectators
have of understanding a character’s emotions. Inferences based on narrative context (i.e.,
folk psychology) and causal attributions are also possible means of establishing emotion,
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as are the direct techniques of narration such as voiceover. The claim of this section is,
rather, that faces and voices are primarily emotionexpressers, and that narrative feature
films make extensive use of them for this purpose. Yet because of the interaction of
modes of characterization, the emotional content of a character cannot be split off from
the other information we have about him. A person’s environment (i.e., a narrative
situation) is fundamental to this and every aspect of characterization.
Fifth, this discussion has assumed that the most significant, if not the only,
function of faces is as emotion expressers. But although the majority of research into
facial expressions is concerned with emotion expressions, there are obviously other
functions of facial expressions. Faces and voices may be analyzed on a scale of arousal,
from minimally aroused to neutral to highly aroused.39 Arousal can be associated with
emotion expressions (surprised faces show high arousal, sad faces low arousal) or they
may not. Someone may just look or sound sleepy or hyper. Given specific contexts, faces
and voices can be indices of many nonemotion states, such as alertness, hunger, physical
or mental health, or boredom. A facial expression may have nonemotional referential
meaning about intentional rather than affect states. Rolling the eyes can communicate
doubt or derision; furrowing the brow can communicate skepticism; licking the lips can
communicate pleasure; opening the eyes wide can communicate eagerness to learn more;
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and smiling and nodding can communicate agreement. Facial expressions can also have
clearly coded meanings within a given culture or subculture. Exaggerated winking can be
a silly way of saying, “I mean this ironically.” Ordinary winking can convey a variety of
meanings.
Finally, although there is strong evidence supporting modest universality claims,
there are still significant differences of degree of recognition among subjects of different
backgrounds. Some of the difficulty in identifying an emotional expression as such may
be a function of cultural difference.40 Recognition follows a pattern of gradation, and not
all subjects’ responses fall on the same point of the scale. So while cinema’s universal,
crosscultural appeal might be explained in part by the scientific research I have
described, the preference of Americans for American cinema might also be explained by
it, since each culture is better at recognizing its own expressions of emotions than it is at
recognizing those of other cultures.
To summarize these clarifications, the existence of universal emotions and
universal expressions of them does not mean that there is no room for ambiguity and
nuance in our understanding of how expressions function ecologically, and by extension,
in representations of human experience. Emotions may be expressed in combination with
each other and may be easy or difficult to recognize. Emotion expressions are a multi
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channel phenomenon, not simply vocal or facial displays, and they are understood and
interpreted in a social context. They are combined with other facial and vocal
communication which may not contain emotion content, and which may be culturally
variable. And emotion expressions themselves are to some extent culturally variable and
thus not absolutely universal. Not all subjects are able with 100% accuracy to understand
all other subjects’ emotion expressions. There are degrees of fallibility. All of these
qualifications offer direction for the application of theories of emotional expression to the
analysis of cinematic narrative.
Emotion Expressions in Film
The main obstacle to applying these ideas about expressions of emotion to film is that a
film is a representation of human actions, not the actions themselves. An actor portrays a
character who is sad or afraid because of events in her world. One might think that unless
she is a hardcore method actor, however, she is simulating the emotion. So how do
actors convey emotions so impressively that they hold audiences captivated? This is not
the topic of this project, which is concerned primarily with the spectator’s
comprehension.41 However, in the case of emotions it is impossible to divorce
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comprehension from other levels of involvement, since one way that people ordinarily
respond to the emotional expressions of others is by feeling what they feel. This
phenomenon is known as emotional contagion. When you are around a cheerful person,
you become cheerful, but a depressed person makes you feel down it the dumps.42 This is
true of films as well: an angry character, such as Peter Finch’s madashell newscaster in
Network, causes the audience to feel his anger. Obviously, not all film characters’
emotions are duplicated in spectators; unsympathetic characters are less likely to generate
this effect. Granting that, how do actors express emotions so convincingly that they are
able to infect the audience with them?
Emotional contagion depends on facial, vocal, and postural mimicry. Darwin
recognized that many species mimic facial expressions seemingly automatically, and there
is substantial evidence showing that infants mimic their parents’ facial and vocal
expressions and vice versa. Facial expressions are caused, among other things, by
autonomic nervous system (ANS) activity, and it would seem that the causation runs both
ways. When you smile in mimicry of someone else’s genuine happy smile, your ANS
activity is that of a smiling, happy person. In experiments, researchers had subjects form
facial expressions without telling them to display a particular emotion, by giving them
instructions about which muscles to move, and measured their ANS activity. They found
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that even without any context in which to feel particular emotions, the subjects showed
the ANS patterns of someone experiencing them. Film spectators mimic facial
expressions of film characters and “catch” their feelings in the process.
A new conception of acting, and in particular of method acting, is suggested by
the idea of emotional contagion. One standard simplified description of method acting is
that an actor uses a memory of an emotional experience to produce a performance of a
character going through the same emotion.43 This is supposed to produce a more
authentic rendering than mimicking a character’s outward appearance or pretending to be
that person. Emotion memory is an actor’s way of getting into the part and has become a
standard notion in American film acting, to the point that even if the technique is not
being used the idea of the actor taking on the character’s interiority is commonplace. Yet
mimicry is an effective means of producing an emotional experience, as emotional
contagion demonstrates. Facial and vocal expressions are both causes and effects of
emotional experience. They are all part of the same process, not the endpoint results
from a stimulus. It may sound odd, but by pretending to be happy, it is possible to
become happy.
Still, aren’t there differences between acted expressions of emotion and genuine
ones? Undoubtedly there are, but it would take a specialist in the coding of facial and
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vocal expressions to detail them insofar as they constitute variations in how facial action
units or vocal acoustic parameters are utilized. On a more general level, though, we
might assume that representations of expressions function roughly in the same way as
other aspects of representation. This is essentially a matter of realism. I contend that
expressions of emotion derive from and refer to phenomenal reality, especially from
social intelligence, but in what way do representations of emotion expressions seem real
and in what ways do they seem notreal? When they seem notreal, is this an aesthetic
effect or a failure of realism?
In general, representations are realist or stylized in varying degrees and fashions.
That is to say that they necessarily bear some relation to reality, but that this relation has
many permutations and combinations. It would be a gross simplification to say that any
representation is more or less realistic than any other. (Is Rules of the Game more
realistic than On the Waterfront? According to what terms? In what ways? By whose
conception of what is real or stylized? Compared to which other films?) Specific
representations function by appealing to realism in certain ways and by applying the
stylization or abstraction of reality in certain ways. In cinema, emotion expressions may
often be exaggerated or understated, and they may be intentionally incongruous or
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frustrating. There also may be variations in quality of acting technique that make some
performances more or less realistic or stylized, obvious or subtle, clear or obscure. These
variations are all historically and culturally specific, as realism at one point in film history
will later seem laughable, and realism in one national cinema may look contrived against
examples from another.44 But the basic materials of emotion expression are the same
facial and vocal features that express emotions in reality. This is because we know of no
basic emotion terms or descriptions of facial or vocal activity that are specific to artistic
representation. There is no genre of film in which one observes emotion x and
corresponding facial expression x, which is specific to the genre or more generally to
cinema and is never observed in the real world. Like the other aspects of characterization
I have discussed, it is assumed that the same processes used in understanding people in
everyday life are those used in understanding cinematic narrative. This is the simplest
explanation I can think of; the burden of proof is on those who support a notion of
cinemaspecific processes to show first that they exist and then that they explain our
engagement with cinema better than the processes I have described.
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Facial Expressions in the Construction of Character: Welcome to the Dollhouse and
Hard Eight
Spectators attribute emotions to characters in various ways. Characterization creates an
emotion profile on the basis of multichannel cues. Each character is the product of this
ongoing process combining information about narrative situations with visual and aural
input. Dawn in Welcome to the Dollhouse is a good example because her emotional
experience is defined by simple situations and clear, basic emotions. Welcome to the
Dollhouse is a film in which understanding the character’s emotions are of central
concern to the spectator, as we are invited to empathize with her plight as an awkward
social misfit. Dawn’s mental states are generally unambiguous and sympathetic. At
various points in the narrative, she experiences humiliation (shame), anger, fear, and even
happiness. Emotions are generally brief, and each one Dawn experiences is a response to
a welldefined situation.
In the first scene, Dawn is humiliated by being unable to find a place to sit in the
cafeteria. She is humiliated quite frequently in subsequent scenes, as when she is
forced to watch her siblings eat her cake, when Steve implies that she is
“retarded,” and when her family laughs at the video of her being pushed into the
pool.
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At the assembly, Dawn is angered when she is showered with spitballs by the
bullies. She is also angered quite frequently, as when she calls her friend Ralpie a
“faggot,” when she calls her sister “Lesbo,” and when her brother, Mark, orders
her out of his room. Her anger also arises whenever she feels she has been treated
unfairly, e.g., when she is given a detention and when she is forced to dismantle
her clubhouse.
The best example of Dawn’s fear comes when Brandon threatens to rape her. She
is also made to fear Lolita, Brandon’s friend, who forces Dawn to go to the
bathroom with the stall door open and speaks to her in menacing tones.
Dawn’s happiness is generally connected to Steve, her brother’s bandmate whom
she has a crush on. She is happy when she watches him sing, when she dreams
about him, and when she entertains him with Hawaiian Punch and leftover fish
sticks and plays piano (badly) for him.
We can also identify blends of emotion, i.e., episodes in which more than one
emotion can be identified. When she is brought before the principal for returning
spitball fire and injuring a teacher, Dawn sits next to her parents and is questioned
about her social life. Over the principal’s shoulder, we see the bullies through the
window mocking and taunting Dawn. She can see them, but the others cannot.
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Like so many other scenes in the film, the overriding appraisal that the spectator
makes is that Dawn is a victim of unfairness. But her emotions are harder to pin
down: we might believe that she is shamed by being told she has no friends,
angered by being the one who got in trouble when the instigators got off, afraid of
being punished, and remorseful about having caused her teacher harm.
Note first that all of these emotion episodes are contextdependent. These emotions are
clear from these descriptions of them, whatever their representations. They are
represented in a multichannel fashion, as the theories discussed above would predict.
Her voice rises and quickens when she pleads her case to her teacher and her parents.
Her facial expressions soften with smiles and wideopened eyes when she is around
Steve.
In general, though, Dawn’s emotions are hardly evident at all her in facial
expressions. Heather Matarozzo rarely uses any classic basic emotion faces, as described
by Ekman. Her expressions are much more often just blank. This is not Solondz’s
general style; indeed most of the other characters are facially very expressive. Dawn’s
mother displays many clear, even exaggerated expressions of happiness, disappointment,
anger, and fear. Brandon displays menacing, aggressive expressions to Dawn and
plaintive, supplicating ones to Cookie, the popular girl who snubs him. Missy is
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frequently seen with smiles of happiness and Dawn’s teacher typically sneers with
contempt. Yet Dawn’s face is typically inexpressive. By deemphasizing Dawn’s face as
an expressive technique, Solondz underscores Dawn’s difference from the other
characters and her alienation from her family and schoolmates.
This technique calls on us to activate assumptions about display rules: her
stoicism in the opening scenes as well as later ones is likely a product of the suppression
of affect states such as sadness, anger, fear, and frustration. This in turn leads back into
assumptions and inferences about intentionality and dispositions. We might figure that an
awkward misfit might suppress the display of negative emotions as a means of easing her
social experiences, or as an attempt to overcome the negative emotions. This might
suggest a resilient or defiant personality, which squares with Dawn’s stubborn actions, or
a denial of serious problems, which squares with her lack of selfawareness. The facial
display is itself a multidimensional cue, and by virtue of its inexpressiveness Dawn’s face
becomes a site of ambiguity, upping the interest in Dawn’s character and, by contrast,
making the others seem flatter.
To add to that, the film’s style underemphasizes her facial expressions by
underlining her emotional experience using other means. Matarozzo’s voice modulates
frequently, from quiet and endearing to loud and whiny. She mimics the bullies’ firm
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tones of voice when speaking to Missy or Marc, but she speaks in a hush when threatened
by Lolita and Brandon. Her humiliation when reciting her essay on “dignity” is conveyed
by her unsure posture and her weak, hesitant voice. This is duplicated in the assembly
scene when she addresses the school and is, again, humiliated.
Other stylistic means deemphasize Dawn’s face. Solondz cuts to long or extreme
long shots at moments of heightened feeling to detract from Dawn’s face as an expressive
device. For example, when Dawn runs away from Brandon, in the scene in which he has
said he is going to rape her, she races to a chain link fence, where we are shown her in an
extreme long shot. Similarly, her humiliation at being pushed into the pool is a long shot
seen on a (TV) screen within the screen. Solondz also uses a musical cue, with distorted,
rhythmic electric guitar, uptempo bass, and tom drums in scene transitions. This cue
becomes a shorthand for Dawn’s frustration, anger and humiliation, a refrain to sum up
each episode of her troubled adolescence.
Murray Smith has discussed how Takeshi Kitano, Robert Bresson, and Wong Kar
wai, all encourage a style of acting that is intentionally facially inexpressive or enigmatic,
each fitting this approach to the face into a larger aesthetic system, achieving specific
effects. He contrasts this with the clear basic expressions in films by Hitchcock.45 I
would suggest that facially inexpressive acting is one baseline technique of modern
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independent and art cinema, which may function to involve the spectator in constructing
the character’s interiority, to increase narrative ambiguity, and to make the characters
seem complicated and interesting. Dawn’s emotions are fairly clear from her situation;
but there is something intriguing about the stoicism with which she faces her
circumstances. This sets her apart from characters in more conventional dramas about
adolescence. It makes her experience seem highly specific and individuated, but it also
makes adolescence seem especially hellish.
What makes Welcome to the Dollhouse distinct as an independent film about
adolescence is its unflinching portrayal of unfairness as a basic condition. By restraining
Dawn’s facial expressions, Solondz suggests an acceptance of this unfairness, of her
routine humiliation, and an almost nihilistic expectation that it will continue unchecked
for as long as Dawn is a child, and in many other children after her. He suggests that this
is a natural state for adolescents and that their best chance at surviving it is by accepting it
as a fact of life. In the film’s final scene, Dawn sings the Hummingbird theme song on
the bus to Disney World, with the saddest happy face one can imagine, which underscores
both the pathos of her character and the extent to which situations determine our
attribution of character emotions. Extracted from the film, this scene would have little
emotional impact, but in context it is powerfully pathetic. Ultimately, the effect of the
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characterization of Dawn in Welcome to the Dollhouse is one of futility, of condemnation
to suffering which bespeaks the incompatibility of adolescence and individuality. It is
typical of both the film’s director and of independent cinema more generally to
characterize adolescence differently from the Hollywood mainstream.
For much of Hard Eight, the character emotions are much less evident, largely
because of the enigmatic nature of the exposition. There are virtually no unambiguous
basic emotion episodes at all in the first third of the film, which include the scenes of
Sydney and John’s meeting and the development of their friendship, the episodes
introducing Jimmy and Clementine (Gwyneth Paltrow), and the development of the
relationship of Clementine’s relationship with Sydney and John. In terms of affect
generated by the film in these scenes we do best to speak of mood rather than emotion.
Moods are more generalized and longer lasting than emotions.46 Those moments that
seem like they might build into genuine emotion moments tend not to. For example, John
seems to get angry at Syd for suggesting that they return to Las Vegas together, because
he is wary that Syd might have a sexual interest in him. But Syd assures him that this is
not the case and John’s feelings are defused. Similarly, in the scene in which John
introduces Syd to Jimmy, it seems that Syd is angry with Jimmy for making sexually
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explicit comments about the cocktail waitresses, but their discussion of it never builds
into a genuinely angry dispute. In the scene in which Syd observes the cocktail waitress
Clementine emerging from a customer’s room, clearly indicating that she was having sex
with him for money, it is suggested that Clementine might feel shame. Yet her words
might contradict this inference, as she insists that she doesn’t do anything she doesn’t
want to. It could be that she feels mixed emotions: perhaps she is proud to earn money
but ashamed do it by debasing herself. Moreover, in all of these moments, no facial or
vocal expressions clearly display the classic basic emotion expressions.
What the first scenes of the film do have in significant quantity are smiling faces.
Especially in the encounters in the cocktail lounge, the characters smile at one another
frequently but never, it seems, from genuine happiness or amusement. These social
smiles actually signify apprehension as much as positive emotion. Clementine and
Sydney smile at each other even though Sydney tells her of his disapproval of her
behavior. Jimmy and Sydney smile at each other even though they clearly have some
mutual dislike. In these cases, facial expressions serve to obscure rather than illuminate
the characters’ interior states, and spectators’ inferences about other aspects of
characterization are necessary to establish the character’ emotions or lack of them.
In Hard Eight, the tone shifts dramatically in the scene beginning with Sydney’s
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appearance outside a motel room. Inside, he discovers that John and Clementine have
kidnapped a man who hired Clementine as a prostitute and then refused to pay. The man
is lying unconscious, with his face in a bloody pillow and his hands cuffed to the
headboard. In this scene, the characters express their emotions boldly using every
available channel. They bare their teeth in anger, cry in sadness, raise their voices in fear.
They shout at each other and pace back and forth. Clementine covers her face in shame
and cowers on the floor. As the situation is made clear, the narrative context supports
these responses. Clementine and John have committed several felonies and are at risk of
being discovered by the police. By asking Sydney to come, they have involved him as an
accessory. They also say that they have contacted Jimmy, so that he too is involved and
could potentially affect their effort to escape without getting into trouble with the law.
We are suspicious of Jimmy not only because of a snap judgment based on his character
type (slick casino security consultant, which is made to sound somewhat euphemistic) but
because Sydney tells John that he doesn’t like Jimmy. We are inclined to trust Sydney,
who takes on a protective, fatherly concern for John. The situation prompts our
interpretation that the characters are angry, afraid, and anguished. As is so often the case
in cinematic narrative, a variety of redundant cues support the same meanings.47
In the final third of the film, Clementine and John have fled to Niagara Falls, and
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the story turns to a drawnout confrontation between Jimmy and Sydney. Jimmy tries to
shake Sydney down, blackmailing him by threatening to reveal Syd’s secret to John. This
is when the narrative’s revelation is made: Sydney acts as he does toward John because
Sydney killed John’s father. Sydney seeks, in effect, to take the place of John’s father
without letting John know who he really is. What is remarkable about this last part of the
film is the extent to which Sydney maintains his stoical, generally expressionless
demeanor. With the exception of a single short scene, in which Jimmy threatens him with
a gun, Sydney’s face is a blank screen. This is in contrast to images of Clementine
laughing in the wedding video that Sydney views, of Jimmy shouting and showing anger
and excitement, and John’s soft sobs and sad expression when Sydney tells him, over the
phone, that he loves John as though he were his own son. Sydney typically stares straight
ahead. At times, Anderson deemphasizes the face, as Solondz does in Welcome to the
Dollhouse, by cutting to long shots, by framing unconventionally as in a scene in a car
with the camera set up behind Jimmy and Sydney’s heads, and by cutting away to
seemingly irrelevant objects such as Sydney’s waist and a coffee cup on a table. But
these techniques are brief and function more as punctuation or pause than as a dominant
aesthetic.
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The effectiveness of the narrative depends on the fascination Anderson finds in
Philip Baker Hall’s face. As Sydney, Hall makes the most of his face’s craggy lines,
deepset eyes with multiple bags under them, and distinguished, angular features. The
audience studies Hall’s face to try to get insight into Sydney’s emotion. This is not unlike
Solondz’s use of Matarozzo’s face in Welcome to the Dollhouse, and in each case the face
seems to suggest an underlying default stance or attitude. Dawn’s face is an index of her
suffering, even when she is not shown to suffer, because her character is defined most of
all by this quality. Sydney’s face, on the other hand, is constantly purposeful. Sydney is
always thinking, it seems, but never lays out his thought processes in words. He feels no
less than the others, but his love for John and his hatred for Jimmy are almost always kept
to himself, as are his anger and his fear. This is a classic toughguy image from gangster
pictures and films noirs. The stoical thinking man never shows his cards until it is most
advantageous to him. Like Welcome to the Dollhouse, the protagonist’s face functions in
contrast to all of the other faces, which are more conventionally expressive. But in Hard
Eight, as in Welcome to the Dollhouse, there are key moments in the narrative in which
the character’s shell is cracked and Sydney’s passion is displayed. When Jimmy threatens
him with a gun, Sydney looks and sounds afraid, just as in the hotel room he looks and
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sounds angry. These bursts humanize him and establish that he does feel as strongly as
the others. They underline the significance of these scenes in the narrative, as they are
rare expressions from Sydney.
Hard Eight is a film of shifting emotional tones, and of shifting narrative
approaches. It begins by raising many more questions than it answers, in a rather
mysterious fashion. It is not at all clear why the characters are behaving as they do. This
is the case of largescale narrative developments, such as Sydney’s taking John on as his
protégée. It is also the case of smallerscale details, such as Sydney’s habit of passing
many hours in a casino hotel cocktail lounge playing keno. It is typical of independent
film narration to create enigmatic characters based on genre or social types; the work of
spectatorship becomes the effort to decipher the clues leading to an interpretation of the
character’s identity. Thus they are able to combine their most basic appeals: on the level
of the fascinating individual who stands for a particular social experience (in Syd’s case,
an old man, a father, a Vegas hustler, a mentor); on the level of formal play (uncovering
the mysteries of the character as a game we play with the narrative); and on opposing
Hollywood conventions of more straightforward emotional characterization.
Midway through the film, the emotion tone shifts from being cool and
contemplative to being more straightforwardly melodramatic, arousing pathos and fear on
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behalf of the central characters who are caught in a bad situation. We still do not know
enough about their backstories at this point to feel the full emotional weight of the
relationships they have with each other. In the end, what is most fascinating about Hard
Eight is Sydney, who is capable of acts of selfless love for John at the same time that he is
capable of vicious cruelty toward Jimmy, who is foolish enough to think he can outtough
a tough guy. The contradiction in Sydney’s emotional makeup is developed in a perfectly
modulated performance, breaking through the internal norm of restrained stoicism with
flashes of full emotion, and relying on modulations in narrative situation to further sketch
out the character’s psychological states. The clarity of the other characters’ emotional
expressions makes Sydney’s inexpressiveness all the more interesting.
Conclusion: Combining Appeals
Spectators understand character psychology in various ways. They categorize characters,
which focuses attention on some traits and not others, and guides attention and interest.
They are given explicit information through dialogue and subjective techniques. They
infer intentionality from narrative scenarios and observed actions using folk psychology.
They attribute the causality of narrative events to character dispositions and thereby
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create a sense of the character’s personality. And they read emotions in characters’
expressions or attribute emotions in spite of those expressions on the basis of other cues
and inferences. All of these processes are mutually reinforcing. Information about any
one aspect of characterization impacts upon the others. For example, a sense of the
character’s personality may bear upon any understanding of their emotional states. A
deceitful character may be more likely to mask his or her true emotion. Knowledge about
the character’s intentions may also affect emotion assessments. A character who is trying
to pull off a swindle will be expected to display different emotions from a character who
is the victim of the crime. All of the techniques of characterization can tilt our
understanding of character, which affects spectators’ use of all of the techniques. The
importance of narrative context cannot be overstated, yet each technique is part of the
process that creates a narrative context.
Connecting all of these dimensions of characterpsychologyconstruction is an
overarching goal of narrative comprehension: the data of the narrative must be made to
cohere as best they can. We prefer that all the parts of the social puzzle fit together, so
that my inferences about your behavior, your intentional states, your emotions, and your
traits and types are not mutually contradictory, and that explanations of some of these are
helpful in explaining other parts. As we have seen in considering stereotypes, we tend to
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see what we are looking for, so narrative contexts direct our expectations and make
coherence more attainable. This is why exposition has come up so often in these
discussions: the design features of narrative demand that beginnings clarify a context—at
least minimally—so that social cognition processes can function efficiently and
coherence can be achieved.
Maximum coherence is the spectator’s goal, but not always the filmmaker’s. Most
narratives challenge our abilities to make character psychology inferences and judgments
cohere in a modest fashion by making traits and actions inconsistent with each other, by
frustrating typing, by creating ambiguous or contradictory situations and emotion
expressions, and by withholding information for purposes of suspense or surprise.
Characterfocused narrative traditions such as American independent cinema challenge
our coherence goal more than modestly, making character comprehension a more
involved and extensive process, but also potentially a more satisfying one. Of course,
narratives can go too far into incoherence or can fail to cohere because they are badly
made, and there is little satisfaction in that. But the best independent films pose
interesting and welldeveloped challenges of coherence that seek to maximize our interest
in engaging with the process of figuring out character psychology.
.
1
Fritz Lang,, “The Future of the Feature Film in Germany” in Anton Kaes, Martin Jay and Edward
Dimendberg (eds.), The Weimar Republic Sourcebook (Berkeley: U of California P, 1994), 623.
2
Carroll, Philosophy of Horror and A Philosophy of Mass Art; Tan, Greg M. Smith.
3
Alan J. Fridlund, Human Facial Expression: An Evolutionary View (San Diego: Academic P, 1994), 2.
4
Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (New York: Oxford, 1998). On
physiognomy, see Leslie A. Zebrowitz, Reading Faces: Window to the Soul? (Boulder: Westview P,
1997).
5
Ibid; see also Fridlund; Ross Buck, The Communication of Emotion (New York: Guilford P, 1984);
Richard S. Lazarus, Emotion and Adaptation (New York: Oxford UP, 1991); Robert Plutchick,
Emotion: A Psychoevolutionary Synthesis (New York: Harper & Row, 1980); Jonathan H. Turner, On
the Origins of Human Emotions: A Sociological Inquiry into the Evolution of Human Affect (Stanford:
Stanford UP, 2000). Paul Ekman (ed.), Darwin and Facial Expression: A Century of Research in
Review (New York: Academic P, 1973); and Paul Ekman, Joseph J. Campos, et al. (eds.), Emotions
Inside Out: 130 Years After Darwin’s The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (New York:
The New York Academy of Sciences, 2003).
6
Paul Ekman, Emotion in the Human Face vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1982). 43.
7
Ibid; see also Paul Ekman and Erika Rosenberg (eds.), What the Face Reveals: Basic and Applied
Studies of Spontaneous Expression Using the Facial Action Coding System (FACS) (New York: Oxford
UP, 1997).
8
Malcolm Gladwell, “The Naked Face” The New Yorker (5 August 2002), available online at
http://www.gladwell.com/2002/2002_08_05_a_face.htm.
9
Paul Ekman, “Expression and the Nature of Emotion” in Klaus R. Scherer and Paul Ekman (eds.),
Approaches to Emotion (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1984), 319343.
On facial expressions and lying, see Paul Ekman, Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace,
10
Politics, and Marriage (New York: Norton, 2001).
11
This experiment is described in Ekman, “Expression and the Nature of Emotion.”
12
Daniel MacNeill, The Face (Boston: Little, Brown, 1998), 242243.
13
Antonio Damasio describes the neurophysiology of this distinction between two kinds of smiles and
applies it to distinguishing between method acting and its alternatives: Damasio, Descartes’ Error:
Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Quill, 1994); for a detailed discussion of smiles,
see Mark G. Frank, Paul Ekman, and Wallace V. Friesen, “Behavioral Markers and Recognizability of
the Smile of Enjoyment,” in Ekman and Rosenberg, 217242; and Millicent H. Abel (ed.), An Empirical
Reflection on the Smile (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen P, 2002).
14
Hillary Anger Elfenbein and Nalini Ambady, “On the Universality and Cultural Specificity of
Emotion Recognition: A MetaAnalysis” Psychological Bulletin 128 (2002), 203235.
15
One influential—and typical—example of this position is Rudolph Arnheim, Film as Art (Berkeley:
U of California P, 1957).
16
Klaus R. Scherer, “Vocal Affect Expression: A Review and a Model for Future Research”
Psychological Bulletin 99 (1986), 143165.
17
Tom Johnstone and Klaus R. Scherer, “Vocal Communication of Emotion” in Michael Lewis and
Jeannette M. HavilandJones, Handbook of Emotions 2nd ed. (New York: Guilford P, 2000), 220235.
18
Ekman, Telling Lies, 9298.
19
Johnstone and Scherer.
20
Ibid.
21
Patrik N. Juslin and Petri Laukka, “Communication of Emotions in Vocal Expression and Music
Performance: Different Channels, Same Code?” Psychological Bulletin 129 (2003), 770814.
22
Johnstone and Scherer.
23
Klaus R. Scherer, “Affect Bursts” in Stephanie H.M. Van Goozen, Nanne E. Van de Poll, and Joseph
A. Sergeant (eds.), Emotions: Essays in Emotion Theory (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1994), 161193.
David Bordwell, “Intensified Continuity: Visual Style in Contemporary American Film” Film
24
Quarterly 55.3 (2002), 1628.
25
The existence of basic emotions and universally recognized expressions of them is a matter of debate
among experts in the field. See James A. Russell, “Is There Universal Recognition of Emotion from
Facial Expressions? A Review of CrossCultural Studies” Psychological Bulletin 115 (1994),10241;
Paul Ekman, “Strong Evidence for Universals in Facial Expressions: A Reply to Russell's Mistaken
Critique” Psychological Bulletin 115 (1994), 26887; Carroll E. Izard, “Innate and Universal Facial
Expressions: Evidence From Developmental and CrossCultural Research” Psychological Bulletin 115
(1994), 28899; and James A. Russell, “Facial Expressions of Emotion: What Lies Beyond Minimal
Universality?” Psychological Bulletin 118 (1995), 37999. However, no one denies that some emotions
are recognized crossculturally at a rate of better than chance; the questions motivating these debates
refer to the extent of recognition.
26
Buck.
27
Juslin and Laukka.
28
One application of facial expression research to film narrative theory is Murray Smith, “Darwin and
the Directors: Film, Emotion and the Face in the Age of Evolution,” Times Literary Supplement 7
February 2003, 1314.
29
Smith, Engaging Characters; Carl Plantinga, “The Scene of Empathy and the Human Face on Film,”
in Carl Plantinga and Greg M. Smith (eds.), Passionate Views: Film, Cognition, and Emotion
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1999), 239255.
30
Unusual but not unheard of: in the “Hush” episode of Buffy the Vamire Slayer originally aired 14
January 1999, a demon’s spell leaves everyone in Sunnydale literally speechless.
31
James A. Russell and José Miguel FernándezDols, “What Does a Facial Expression Mean?” in
James A. Russell and José Miguel FernándezDols (eds.), The Psychology of Facial Expression
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997), 330; James A. Russell, JoAnne Bachorowski, and José Miguel
FernándezDols, “Facial and Vocal Expressions of Emotion” Annual Review of Psychology 54
(February 2003), 329349.
32
Sally Planalp, “Communicating Emotion in Everyday Life: Cues, Channels, and Processes” in Peter
A. Andersen and Laura K. Guerrero (eds.), Handbook of Communication and Emotion: Research,
Theory, Applications, and Contexts (San Diego: Academic P, 1998), 2948.
33
Elfenbein and Ambady.
34
James A. Carroll and James A. Russell, “Facial Expressions in Hollywood’s Portrayal of Emotion,”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 72.1 (1997), 164176.
35
Ekman, Telling Lies, 150160.
36
Planalp; Ursula Hess, Arvid Kappas, and Klaus R. Scherer, “Multichannel Communication of
Emotion: Synthetic Signal Production” in Klaus R. Scherer (ed.), Facets of Emotion: Recent Research
(Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1988), 161182.
37
Planalp.
38
José Miguel FernándezDols and James M. Carroll, “Is the Meaning Perceived in Facial Expressions
Independent of its Context?” in Russell and FernándezDols (eds.), 275294.
39
James A. Russell, “Reading Emotions From and Into Faces: Ressurecting a DimensionalContextual
Perspective” in Russell and FernándezDols (eds.), 295320.
40
Elfenbein and Ambady.
41
The emotional response of spectators is a topic addressed in many cognitivist film theories, e.g.,
Carroll; Smith, Engaging Characters; Plantinga and Smith; Greg M. Smith; Tan; and Torben Grodal,
Moving Pictures: A New Theory of Film, Genres, Feeling, and Cognition (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997).
42
Elaine Hatfield, John T. Cacioppo, and Richard L. Rapson, Emotional Contagion (Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 1994).
43
The idea of “emotion memory” comes from Constanin Stanislavski, An Actor Prepares, trans.
Elizabeth Reynodls Hapgood (New York: Theater Arts, 1936).
44
Kristin Thompson, Breaking the Glass Armor: Neoformalist Film Analysis (Princeton: Princeton UP,
1988).
45
Smith, “Darwin and the Directors.”
46
Greg M Smith.
47
Bordwell, Staiger and Thompson 31.