A Simple Theory of Time Robert Nordberg No. 3 (Jul., 1953), 236-237. Philosophy of Science, Vol. Stable URL hitp:/flinks.jstor-org/sicisici=003 1-8248% 28 195307%2920%3A3% 3C236%3A ASTOT%3E2.0.CO%3B2- Philosophy of Science is currently published by The University of Chicago Press. Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at hup:/www,jstororglabout/terms.hml. ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at hupulwww.jstor.orgijournalsuepress html. ch copy of any part of'a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the sereen or printed page of such transmission, ISTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support @ jstor.org. hupulwww jstor.org/ Sat Sep 10 02:50:38 2005DISCUSSION A Siwpue Turory oF Trae, ROBERT NORDBERG Pericles called time “the wisest counsellor,” but it has never explained its nature clearly to men. Krwin Biser's article, Postilates for Physical Time nar- rowly misses an explicit statement of the fact that might at last clear up the mystery. As one might expect, itis a simple fact. In setting forth“ simple theory of time,” the writer would lke to explain that this theory takes for granted the existence of a world independent of our thought Aside from a great deal of intellectual hair-splitting, there have been basically ‘wo theories of time in the past. One may be called the “absolute” theory, which postulates that events “take place in time” (the phrase Mr. Biser used). Men observe that events have a temporal aspect. They turn thisintellectual fractiona- tion into a concrete reality, and time becomes something which could exist in the absence of space, matter or motion. Thus, time is eredited with various deeds, good and bad, such as “healing all wounds,” “marching on,” and robbing us of our illusions, ‘The second basie theory was stated by Immanuel Kant, whose reasoning may be summarized somewhat as follows: All perception involves certain ‘categories,’ such as time, space and causality. We cannot imagine events taking place except in time, space, ete. Therefore, it must be that these ‘categories’ are supplied by the mind, as ‘forms’ to which the ‘matter’ of experience must conform to be perceived by us. Modern physies has tended very much toward this supposit ‘Kant recognized two alternatives: Either time is real in its own right, 0 manufactured by the mind. He, like most others, was concerned with what “really is." Now, itis fairly well agreed upon that the mind operates by noting similarities, ie., by abstracting. For instance, an alarm clock, Big Ben, and a ‘wrist watch are all clasified as “time-pieces.” All differences among the three are ignored for the purpose of this particular abstraction. To ask what anything “really is” isto ask for an abstraction which will indicate how something would appear if it did not need to be represented by abstractions. Physicists still try to describe matter “as it really is,” failing to understand that. whatever we say about a thing is not the thing. Matter, space, time, and energy are abstractions from events. Experience has indicated that adequate descriptions of physical hap- penings can be made by utilizing these four concepts. It is the event whi “the given,” the reducible. ‘To avoid any unwarranted connotations, we may speak of the event as X. To ask what X “%s" is nonsense. To identify certain at- tributes of X (such as time) and ask what one of these attributes “really is,” is worse nonsense! Mr. Bisor says, “On our view itis displacement thats conceptually irreducible and ontologically fundamental.” Displacement of what? Of “systems.” Displace- ‘ment means approximately the same as ‘change.” While itis true that the concept 236DISCUSSION—THEORY OF TIME 237 of a ‘changing thing’ involves a contradiction, it is also true that change is only ‘one facot of nature. Perhaps the one term we have which does not ‘leave some- thing out? is ‘event.’ If we are interested in what an event ‘really is,’ we can come closest to an answer by silently watching it. When we begin to label it a ball rolling, a river flowing, a clock ticking, we have already begun to invoke certain abstrac- tions and a certain frame of reference. If, therefore, ‘displacement’ is the given fact, the irreducible, why try toreduce it? When you have pointed to that which eannot be reached by analysis, why try to reach it by analysis? Whatever we say about displacement is not displace- ment. Time is one thing we say about it, oF one general characteristic whieh it, “has.” In the view being presented, Kant was right in supposing that objective reality is not reached by analysis. He was wrong, however, in supposing that the ob- serving mind supplies reality with its basic characteristics. It is true that the mind comes to a given situation equipped with certain qualities which it ascribes ‘to what it is perceiving. These characteristics, however, have beer «lerived from experience. The error that we habitually make is to reify them into concrete realities, as is done in the “absolute” theory of time. ‘The mind, however, can synthesize as well as analyze. Tt can compose as well 1s dissect. The act of understanding is bexun by mentally dividing what is not divided in fact. ‘The act must be completed by putting the pieces of the puzzle back together. We can best understand X, the physical ultimate of this world, through a synthesis of the abstractions we have made from X, i.e., matter, time, space, and energy. X is the event. When, however, we attempt to deal with any ‘one of those concepts, we are quickly required to invoke the other three. Time, then, is reduced to a simple, annoyingly wi-mysterious definition It is a characteristic of events. This definition will not satisly the Platonie mind in its search for transcendental realities, nor yet. the Kantian mind in its denial of ‘even experienced realities. To the Platonists, it may be replied that. time was never experienced except in some place and under some material conditions. To the Kantians, it may be replied that, if time is always experienced in particu larized situations, still, itis experienced. We mast avoid alike the subjectivity of Korzybski and the naive realism of the earlier Newtonian concepts. Summary. The absolute theory of time is refuted by the facts of experience, in that time is always experienced in some context of matter, energy and space. ‘The Kantian theory is refuted in that our immediate experience is of time as an objective quality, and there is no reason to deny that experience, Mr. Biser's article did not explicitly state that any statements about time arc abstractions from ‘what is already an abstraction. Time is one aspect of the physical ultimate, which ‘we may call X, and which cannot be reached by analysis beeause whatever we say ‘about an event is not the event. ‘X” can best be understood by 2 synthesis of the factors arrived at in analyzing it.