Research Methods for International Relations Studies:

Assembling an Effective Toolkit

Gregory J. Moore (莫歌 )

Assistant Professor of Political Science & East Asian Studies
Eckerd College, St. Petersburg, Florida
mooregj@eckerd.edu

A Chapter in the Forthcoming:

An Analysis of the Field of International Relations; a part of the series, A Collection of
Critiques and Analyses of the Latest Developments in Western Research in the Humanities and
Social Sciences (国系分析 ; 西方人文社科研究前沿展析
Guoji Guanxi Fenxi; Xifang Renwen Sheke Yanjiu Qianyan Fazhan Pingxi Congshu)
Peking University Press
Wang Jianwei, Editor

Presented at the
48th Annual International Studies Association Conference
Chicago, Illinois, February 28 – March 3, 2007
 What are the defining research methods, the main methodological issues researchers
grapple with, and the latest methodological developments in studies of international relations?
These are the questions this chapter sets out to address. In the humanities and social sciences
there are research methods common to all fields therein, whether political science, sociology,
economics, psychology, anthropology, or a number of others. International relations is a subfield
of political science, along with comparative politics, political theory, and perhaps public policy
and particular national studies of politics such as American government. Yet within international
relations (referred to as IR hereafter) there are particularities and literatures common only to IR
that even the field of which it is a part, political science, does not share, let alone other fields and
subfields in the humanities and the social sciences such as economics and anthropology.
International relations is an area of study that considers as its subject the relations
between nations, and with this subject matter comes certain methodological proclivities that
make IR research methods unique, though not completely unlike other fields/areas in the
humanities and social sciences.1 For example, IR theories such as Political Realism (or Realism)
are meant to describe relations between nations and foreign policy behavior, and because of the
particularities of its subject matter do not cross over into other subfields in political science such
as comparative politics, or into other fields like economics and sociology. The levels of analysis
issue2 creates further particularities within IR, for certain methods may be better suited for or
more commonly used in studies at the first level of analysis (that of the individual policymaker),
than might be the case at the second level of analysis (the state, or foreign policy-making level),
or the third level of analysis (the global or systemic level). The discussion below will make
distinctions where necessary in regard to the levels of analysis issue, but can otherwise generally
be assumed to pertain to all three levels of analysis.
Before getting started, a brief roadmap will be helpful. This chapter will begin with a
discussion of the IR scholar’s toolkit, including the distinction between methods, theories and
approaches, the pros and cons of quantitative and qualitative approaches, the levels of analysis
issue, the agent-structure debate, and the case study method. This will be followed by a
discussion of ontology, because it is chronologically and conceptually prior to the next step,
epistemology. Ontology will be considered in two forms, foundationalism and anti-
foundationalism. Epistemology will then be considered in terms of three primary positions
which flow out of one’s ontological stance: positivism, scientific realism, and interpretivism.
Within these three epistemological positions there are a large variety of methods, theories and
approaches, including behavioralism, rational choice, game theory, Realisms, democratic peace
theory, and neo-liberal institutionalism within the realm of positivism; the English School,
Marxism, World Systems/Dependency Theories, critical theory, Alexander Wendt’s social
theory of international politics, and social constructivism (generally speaking) within what is
called scientific realism; and normative approaches, classical Idealism, feminism, and post-
modernism/post-structuralism within interpretivism.

I. Considering One’s Toolkit and the Nuts and Bolts of IR Research Methods

1
International Political Economy is another important part of international relations work, but with the exception of
its consideration under Marxian approaches it will not be considered in this study for lack of space, given its
potential to add additional layers of complexity to each level of epistemology and methods/theories/approaches
described in this chapter.
2
Originally analyzed by Kenneth Waltz (肯尼思 沃) in Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1959), and later developed by John D. Singer (“The Levels of Analysis Problem in International Relations,”
in Klaus Knorr and Sydney Verba, eds., The International System: Theoretical Essays [Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1961]: 77-92) and others.

2
 In approaching IR research methodology, one might consider various methods,
approaches and theories as tools in one’s toolkit. The toolkit metaphor is apt for the IR
researcher for several reasons. Research is a quest for answers to research questions, and as
research is therefore a job the researcher is engaged in, some tools are better for certain jobs than
others. If one is trying to fasten a hex-head nut on a bolt, a wrench (whether open-end, crescent
or socket) will be one’s best bet to do the job. If one is trying to install a car stereo and in the
process cut a wire, a wire cutter will be necessary. If one wants to hammer a nail into a wall, one
will need a hammer. Tools are generally appropriate only for the jobs they were created for. So
it is with research methods, approaches and theories. If one wants to understand how geography
or regime type or gross national product is correlated with the likelihood a nation will initiate a
war of aggression, quantitative methods might prove quite useful, as the Correlates of War
(COW) project has shown.3 This is because geography, regime type, GNP and wars of
aggression are more easily observable and/or measurable than other variables, and consequently
lend themselves to quantitative studies such as COW. However, if one is interested in how
national identity affects a nation’s foreign policy, one will likely find constructivism a better
tool, given identity’s non-material, non-observable nature and constructivism’s potential to aid
understanding of the roles of identity and social factors.4 The method, approach or theory one
employs should be matched to the research question being tackled just as the tool is matched to
the job. Moreover, many tools work well together. Just as a tape measure and then a pencil
might be needed to mark the spot on the wall where the nail will be positioned prior to the
hammer actually being used to pound the nail into the wall, historical approaches work nicely
with institutional approaches, game theory, feminist approaches and others, by buttressing the
explanations or understandings arrived at, or explaining aspects of a case that the accompanying
approach or theory cannot. Yet there are some philosophical and conceptual reasons certain
tools should not be paired, as well as practical ones (just as a plug-in, corded electric drill should
not be used to undo the screws on the drain at the bottom of a filled swimming pool lest one get
electrocuted!). This point will be discussed further under sections on ontology and
epistemology.
First of all, some terms need to be defined and concepts clarified. In this brief study, the
terms “methods,” “approaches” and “theories” are used in a distinct and deliberate way.
Methods are the various means by which researchers research, analyze and ultimately answer
research questions.5 Different methods can be used with different approaches and theories, but
some methods are incongruent with some approaches or theories for ontological and/or
epistemological reasons, as might be exemplified by the pairing of statistical methods with a
post-modernist approach. This will be discussed in greater detail below. Theories are generally
highly specified, and “theories explain laws”6 that we cannot observe directly (for if we could,
we could establish laws). Theories attempt to explain causal relationships, for example, that A
3
See J.D. Singer, and M. Small, “National military capabilities data (Version 3.0: 1816-2001),” Correlates of War
Project (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1995); or M. Small and J.D. Singer, Resort to Arms: International and
Civil Wars, 1816-1980 (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1982).
4
For examples, see Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities & Foreign Policies, Moscow,
1955 and 1999 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell, 2002); or Patricia Goff and Kevin Dunn, eds., Identity and Global
Politics: Theoretical and Empirical Elaborations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
5
Several excellent guides to research methods for political science and IR are: Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and
Beth A. Simmons, eds., Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage, 2002); David Marsh and Jerry Stoker,
eds., Theory and Methods in Political Science, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Detlef F. Sprinz and
Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, eds., Models, Numbers and Cases: Methods of Studying International Relations (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004); and Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political
Science (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997).
6
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1979): 4.

3
(independent variable) causes B (dependent variable), and under what conditions. IR is not rife
with theories, but Waltz’ structural Realism, Wendt’s social theory of international politics
(based on constructivist methodology/approaches), and the democratic peace theory are
examples of important theories of IR, and rational choice and game theory are broader theories
that have enjoyed popularity among IR scholars as well.7 Approaches are less-specified
orientations or ways in which to tackle a research question or problem. They are generally not as
specified as theories and don’t aspire to explain causal relationships, but are best conceived of as
an orientation which comes in a package entailing beliefs, expectations and sometimes
worldviews which shape the researcher’s choice of research questions. Feminism is an
approach, as is the normative approach, for example, because while both have a particular
orientation, neither is a theory in the sense of expecting to find a causal explanation of specific
phenomenon. In the taxonomies presented below, methods, theories and approaches will be
distinguished carefully.

Quantitative and Qualitative Methods

One of the most basic distinctions between research methods in IR or in any of the social
sciences or humanities is that between quantitative and qualitative methods. This was the crux of
the “second debate” in IR between methodological traditionalists like Hedley Bull and a number
of behavioralist IR scholars like Morton Kaplan and John D. Singer in the 1960s as behaviorism
swept through the social sciences.8 Qualitative methods, or the traditional approach to social
science research, has its origins in sociology and anthropology, and is particularly useful “where
the goal of research is to explore people’s subjective experiences and the meanings they attach to
those experiences,”9 putting such experiences and meanings in their proper social, chronological,
historical and biographical contexts. Qualitative approaches generally rely on small-N10
approaches that go deep with each subject/case, employing what Clifford Geertz has called
“thick description.”11 Thick description entails attempting to explain or understand not only the
behavior of subjects, but the context in which it occurs, and the meaning ascribed to the behavior
by the actor and by others in the context in which it takes place, and by those observing or
otherwise considering the action. For example, rather than simply observing a Japanese woman
bowing, one investigates the context and meanings associated with the bow. The case study
method (discussed below) is most often used with qualitative, small N approaches, and Ted
Hopf’s work on Soviet identity and foreign policy is an effective example.12 Participant
observation is one qualitative method, involving researcher immersion in the social context
under study, sometimes involving long term relationships with the subjects, and dialogues
between researcher and subjects. Intensive interviewing techniques might also be attractive,
entailing in-depth unstructured or semi-structured interviews, or guided conversations. Focus
7
See Waltz (1979); Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1999); Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace
(Boston: MIT Press, 1996); and Detlef F. Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, eds., Models, Numbers & Cases:
Methods for Studying. International Relations (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004).
8
Hedley Bull, “International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach,” World Politics, 18/3 (1966): 361-77;
Morton Kaplan, “The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations,” World Politics,
19.1 (1966): 1-20; and J. David Singer, “The Incompleat Theorist: Insight without Evidence,” Klaus Knorr and
James N. Rosenau, eds., Contending Approaches to International Politics (Princeton, 1969).
9
Fiona Devine, “Qualitative Methods,” in Marsh and Stoker (2002): 199.
10
Small N means “small number” of cases, subjects, participants, etc., in a study.
11
For more, see Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture,” The Interpretation
of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973): 3-30
12
Ted Hopf, The Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 &
1999 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).

4
group interviews are another technique, one used by politicians as well as researchers, involving
intensive, normally guided discussions about the topics of study with a small, select group of
persons (perhaps ten to twelve). Content analysis is another qualitative method a researcher
might use, entailing the study of the content of newspaper editorial pages or the contents of
speeches of the US president over a period of time, etc. An example here might be, “how often
did President George W. Bush refer to September 11 in his public speeches on foreign policy in
2006?’ “Has the amount of 911 references decreased from 2005 or 2004?” “What does all of
this mean?” Another example might be in comparing US and European media sources in their
coverage of the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah – did the US media present a biased,
pro-Israeli view of the conflict when compared to European media sources? Historical
approaches13 are another important part of qualitative analysis, though quantitative approaches
rely on them as well. Alastair Iain Johnston’s work on China’s ancient strategic culture, for
example, relies heavily on Johnston’s area studies expertise and historical archive research, in
which he finds that Chinese security behavior has been in the realpolitik tradition for centuries,
and long before Westphalia or the advent of modern political Realism.14
Quantitative methods, on the other hand, “rest on the observation and measurement of
repeated incidences of political15 phenomenon, such as voting for a political party, an allocation
of resources by a government agency or citizen attitudes towards taxation and public
spending.”16 It “permits the researcher to draw inferences about reality based on the data at hand
and the laws of probability.”17 With its positivist epistemological underpinnings it strives for
natural science-like rigor and certitude within the social sciences and humanities, and often
involves the reduction of concepts, variables and/or situations into quantitative forms because of
its desire for scientific measurement, increased rigor and consistency. Quantitative approaches
seek to discover causal relationships by using “large N” studies,18 descriptive and inferential
statistical methods, survey instruments, and other tools. Examples of quantitative studies will
follow below, in the section on behavioralism.
To contrast qualitative and quantitative methods, an example might be useful. If one
wants to know public opinion about a phenomenon like the war in Iraq, one might conduct a
large N survey of the American populace with an N of perhaps 10,000. Then, using probability
sampling, one might administer five or ten or even dozens of questions, including the personal
and demographic information of respondents. Using a small margin of error and a confidence
level of .01 or so to ensure accuracy, one might then enter the data into SPSS statistical software
and do a series of correlations or regressions to find out what variables are correlated with,
“cause” or in other ways affect other variables of interest to the researcher. A qualitative
approach would, on the other hand, more likely employ a small N approach, perhaps conducting
a long, open-ended unstructured interview of persons, wherein the researcher has a conversation
with respondents, and the questions posed can be elaborated upon and the respondent has the
freedom to fill in blanks and explain their views in greater detail than a survey would allow. Or
perhaps a focus group might be formed, in which participants discuss their views of the war, or

13
In other words, approaches entailing archival work, studies of past events, historical documents, etc. One example
might be comparing US policy in Iraq in 2006 to US policy in Vietnam, 1973-75.
14
Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1998).
15
…[or other]…GJM
16
Peter John, “Quantitative Methods,” in Marsh and Stoker (2002): 218.
17
Bear F. Braumoeller and Anne E. Sartori, “The Promise and Perils of Statistics in International Relations,” in
Detlef F. Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, eds., Models, Numbers & Cases: Methods for Studying. International
Relations (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004): 129.
18
In other words, having a large number (large N) of subjects or cases in the study.

5
perhaps a content analysis of speeches by Congress-persons, or newspaper editorials to see if the
tide of opinion is changing, or a comparison of cases involving people from different regions of
the US, or with different religious beliefs, or income brackets, etc.
The approach taken in this chapter is that, within the logical and practical limitations
placed on the researcher by their ontological and epistemological groundings, methodological
eclecticism is best as much as the project at hand allows. This is true because just as the owner
of a greater number and variety of tools can potentially tackle a greater number and diversity of
jobs, so in IR this methodological eclecticism makes more tools available to the researcher and
greater methodological variety generally means more creativity and accuracy in trying to arrive
at the best conclusions. Despite the epistemological battles that take place in IR and other fields
of study, more and more scholars have recognized that the pairing of quantitative and qualitative
methodologies is bearing the most fruit in terms of research, including rational choice guru
James Fearon and constructivist rock star Alexander Wendt in a jointly authored piece.19 There
is now even a journal dedicated exclusively to the subject.20 This approach is common sense to
the scientific realist for epistemological reasons, as will be discussed below, and is accepted by
many positivists as well, given the use by many positivists of qualitative methods in addition to
quantitative methods. It is not the norm for all positivists,21 and for many interpretivists,
however, given their suspicion of foundationalism (explained below) and any attempt to
“positivize” an approach to knowledge or knowledge generation, though it is conceivable that it
could be used with the normative approach, Classical Idealism and Feminists, if they step out of
their ontological and epistemological comfort zones as Fearon and Wendt and others encourage
researchers to do.22 Below are the methods, theories and approaches considered in this chapter,
and how they tend to rely on qualitative and/or quantitative approaches.

Quantitative vs. Qualitative Methods, and Various IR Methods, Theories and Approaches*
Behavioralism - Predominantly Quantitative
Rational Choice – Both, but Predominantly Quantitative
Game theory – Predominantly Quantitative
Structural Realism – Both
Neo-Classical Realism – Predominantly Qualitative
Classical Realism – Predominantly Qualitative
Democratic Peace Theory – Both
Neo-Liberal Institutionalism – Both
English School – Predominantly Qualitative
Marxism - Both
World Systems Theory – Both
19
James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, “Rationalism and Constructivism: A Skeptical View,” in Walter Carlsnaes,
Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, eds., Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage, 2002). See also,
Detlef F. Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, “Introduction: Methodology in International Relations Research,” in
Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias (2004); or Melvyn Read and David Marsh, “Combining Quantitative and Qualitative
Methods,” in Marsh and Stoker (2002).
20
See the inaugural issue of the Journal of Mixed Methods Research (January, 2007), particularly Abbas Tashakkori
and John W. Creswell, “Editorial: The New Era of Mixed Methods,” and David L. Morgan, “Paradigms Lost and
Pragmatism Regained: Methodological Implications of Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Methods” (At time
of writing, the inaugural issue was feely accessible online at http://mmr.sagepub.com/current.dtl).
21
It is noteworthy that the otherwise excellent volume by Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias (2004) does not include or
address the insights of scientific realist and interpretivist methods, saying only, “During the 1980s and 1990s,
constructivist, poststructuralist, and postmodern approaches to international relations also emerged, although it
remains debatable whether these approaches actually developed a methodology of their own.” (2004: 5)
22
They stress “ontological pluralism.” Fearon and Wendt (2002): 53.

6
Critical Theory – Both, but Predominantly Qualitative
Social Theory of Wendt – Qualitative
Constructivism – Both
Normative Approach – Qualitative
Classical Idealism - Qualitative
Feminism – Both
Post-Modernism - Qualitative
Institutionalism – Both

*Compiled by the author, this list is based on a combination of the conceptual parameters set by
each method, theory or approach (the primary consideration), and the author’s own
interpretation of and interaction with the literature over the years (the secondary consideration).
The assessments here will become clear after ontology and epistemology have been addressed
below.

Levels of Analysis
It has been well established in IR circles since at least Kenneth Waltz’ (肯尼思 沃) 1959
classic, Man, the State and War,23 that IR research must take levels of analysis into account.
Man, the state and war, in Waltz’ terminology are the three levels of analysis, man being the first
or individual level of analysis; the state being the second or foreign policy level of analysis; and
war here referring to the third or international system (or structural) level of analysis. John D.
Singer wrote a very influential article about the importance of a researcher’s distinguishing
between the levels of analysis in their research,24 where he argued, for example, that one cannot
use a second level approach to address a third level problem, and vice versa. Psychological or
biographical approaches can be helpful in addressing the individual particularities of individual
leaders, particularly leaders of authoritarian or totalitarian states. Leaders like Nazi Germany’s
Adolf Hitler, the Soviet Union’s Joseph Stalin, China’s Mao Zedong, or North Korea’s Kim
Jong-il are/were so dominant in their policy-making that an approach to the foreign policies of
these countries that did not take into account the very personal (first level) attributes of these
leaders would be missing a great deal. Likewise, much has been written in recent years on the
influence of individual ideological factors on President George W. Bush and his shaping of US
foreign policy given his very personal and less pluralistic way of making US foreign policy than
most of his predecessors. Decision-making theories are handy in assessing foreign policy
behavior at the second or state level of analysis. Perhaps the best, most classic example of a
study of decision-making is Graham T. Allison’s, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban
Missile Crisis.25 Structure-driven theories only function at the third or international systemic
level of analysis. Both structural Realist Kenneth Waltz26 and constructivist Alexander Wendt
(1999) use systemic or third level theories to analyze international relations. Waltz’ structural
Realism (a third level theory) is not equipped to assess George W. Bush’ ideology and how it
might affect US foreign policy (a first level issue), just as democratic peace theory, which is
about regime types (and operates at the second level as an attribute of the state), is not equipped
to deal with the importance of bipolarity or multipolarity in the international system (a third level
issue). This is to say that while classical political Realism can operate at all three levels of

23
(New York: Columbia University Press)
24
“The Levels of Analysis Problem in International Relations,” in Klaus Knorr and Sydney Verba, eds., The
International System: Theoretical Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961): 77-92
25
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971).
26
(Theory of International Politics [Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1979]).

7
analysis,27 theories of international relations like structural Realism, operating at the third level,
and foreign policy analysis approaches such as realpolitik,28 operating at the first and second
levels, can be separated conceptually and theoretically because of their different foci deriving
from their respective levels of analysis. Subsequently, IR theory and foreign policy analysis,
while having much in common, are considered two different realms of study given their scope
and the levels of analysis in which they function.29

The Agent-Structure Issue

Another important methodological issue in IR theory is the agent-structure debate.
Perhaps best articulated by Alexander Wendt,30 the debate arose because of the seeming
preeminence at the time of structural theories of IR like Kenneth Waltz’ structural Realism, and
Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-system theory.31 Both theories view state behavior as subject (or
dependent variable) to system-level, structural factors (independent variables), Waltz stressing
the distribution of capabilities and polarity as being factors driving state behavior, Wallerstein
emphasizing the global capitalist economy as being the structural factor that drives state
behavior. What occurred with the preeminence of such system-level theories was that the agent
was being left out. For instance when a mouse in a maze in a university psychology department
lab turns left, is it because of something in the agent (the mouse - perhaps his nose telling him
that cheese was in that direction), or in the structure (the shape of the maze - perhaps the wall
that blocked the mouse from continuing on)? If the mouse turned left in a place in the maze
where his only choice was to turn left, a structural explanation of his left turn is probably most
plausible. On the other hand, if he turned left at the equivalent of a four-way intersection in the
maze, structural explanations might be less useful, and agent-level explanation might be more
important. This is of course related to the levels of analysis issue in IR, for first and second level
studies naturally tend to focus on agent-driven factors like dictator personalities, decision-
making theories, bureaucratic politics, etc., whereas third level studies naturally favor
structural/system-level explanations. Wendt’s conclusion was that neither agent nor system-
level theories/approaches are necessarily preferable, but rather what he (or Anthony Giddens
originally) called “structuration” is what really occurs between agent and structure. In other
words, while avoiding the chicken/egg issue, Wendt argues that structures shape (or even
determine) agents, and these same agents shape (or even determine) structures, and so on and so
on. In other words, in a moment in time, one might argue that one or the other (agent or
structure) is acting as an independent variable, but in the end, agents and structures are not
independent of each other as it regards IR, but mutually constitute each other over time. While
Wendt settled it for some scholars, some continue to make agent-level arguments explaining
facets of IR, while others continue to make system-level arguments.

The Case Study Method

27
Realist Reinhold Niebuhr’s emphasis on the role of human nature in foreign policy making plays out at the first
and second levels, the security dilemma could be considered at the second level of analysis, and the balance of
power is usually considered at the third level of analysis.
28
Realpolitik is best conceived of as a foreign policy behavior or orientation, not a theory, per se.
29
The International Studies Association recently launched a journal focusing exclusively on second level research,
titled Foreign Policy Analysis. See Valerie M. Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the
Ground of International Relations,” Foreign Policy Analysis, 1/1 (March, 2005).
30
Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International Organization
41/3 (Summer, 1987): 335-370.
31
See Waltz (1979), and Wallerstein, “The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for
Comparative Analysis,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 16 (September, 1974): 387-415.

8
 A last nuts and bolts methodological matter is the case study method. It can be used with
either qualitative or quantitative methods, but is probably more commonly used with qualitative
methods given the small N proclivities of qualitative methods. In a helpful discussion of the case
study method, Stephen Van Evera argues that there are four ways case studies help with theory
testing, for example.32 First is controlled comparison, in which John Stuart Mill’s “method of
difference” and “method of agreement are employed. With the method of difference the
researcher chooses cases with a difference in the study variable, but similarity in backgrounds or
environments so as to hold these issues constant. For example, if studying the role of culture on
democratization, one might choose the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China as
two culturally similar political entities, to focus on the difference in the study variable,
democracy (i.e., the PRC lacks it [at least above the village level], while the ROC has it). With
Mill’s method of agreement one would seek cases with a dissimilar environment or background
(in this case, perhaps the U.S., Japan, and India, which have very different cultures), and
similarities in the study variable (all are democracies). The second way case studies help test
theories is congruence procedures, wherein the researcher selects cases with extreme values for
the study variable so as to bring out strong cases, which helps rule out misreadings because of
error or a third variable. Here one can also focus on a single case and, manipulating the
environment, look for changes in the independent and dependent variables. The third way case
studies help test theories is by process tracing, which is more of a traditional historical-
qualitative approach, where the researcher studies the chain of events or decision-making process
leading to the outcomes in the case, while looking for cause-effect flows and links. The fourth
way case studies help test theories is called the Delphi Method, wherein the researcher
interviews people who were participants in the events under study or were observers with special
knowledge thereof, seeking their opinions regarding possible explanatory hypotheses.
Van Evera maintains that as a method of testing theories and generally answering
research questions, while it is true that sometimes case studies do make it hard to control for
third variables and case studies can’t always be generalized because of the small N problem, case
studies are quite viable as a research method for at least the following reasons. First, the
researcher can choose cases with extreme (high or low) values on the study variable and in this
way the extremes lessen the likelihood of other variables affecting the process, as mentioned
above. Second, the selection process of cases usually means case conditions are similar in some
way(s) (as Mill would have it, above), and the uniform case conditions are not unlike the
controlled environment experiments strive for, all of which enhances rigor. Third, theories can
be applied to specific cases (or actors) and tested in specific ways that large N studies cannot,
because the researcher can test predictions to see if the specific actor/case fits the theory. Lastly,
if the researcher is trying to see how an independent variable affects a dependent variable, case
studies are often better than large N studies because one can do process tracing, going deep as
Geertz’ “thick description” alludes.33 Van Evera argues that while large N studies tell the
researcher more about whether or not hypotheses hold, case studies can tell researchers why they
hold, and that in the end, experiments, large N quantitative studies, and case studies are all
effective methods depending on the question at hand.34 This aligns well with the argument put
forward here that the researcher should have as many tools as possible in his or her toolkit. Yet
again, one must remain cognizant of the ontological and epistemological assumptions inherent in
the use of a particular research tool, and a discussion of these issues is the next order of business.

32
Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University
Press, 1997): 55-70.
33
Van Evera (1997): 50-55.
34
Van Evera (1997): 55.

9
II. Ontology: Foundationalism vs. Anti-Foundationalism.

Prior to the arrival of post-modernist, post-structuralist, critical theory, constructivist and

other non-positivist approaches to IR, aside from those well-versed in philosophy or the
philosophy of science the term “ontology” was not exactly rolling off of the lips of many (any?)
IR scholars. Today, however, it has become an important and increasingly common part of IR
discourse, as it deserves to be. Ontology is concerned with the nature of being. It is about what
is. It is logically and, I argue here, chronologically prior to epistemology, to be discussed below.
The key question ontology poses is, “whether there is a ‘real’ world ‘out there’ that is
independent of our knowledge of it.”35 If the answer is yes, one takes a foundationalist position
ontologically, that as it regards the social world there is a foundation of reality that exists
independently of the observer. If the answer is no, one takes an anti-foundationalist position
ontologically, which is to say no, there is not a foundation of reality that exists independently of
the observer, but rather the social milieu is entirely socially constructed. The realm we are
considering here is of course social science, not natural science, so bumping my leg against a
table and proving therefore there is a table there that exists independently of me is not what is at
issue here. Rather, what is at issue here is the social milieu, and whether natural science and
social science are analogous or not. Foundationalist ontology concludes yes, they are, whereas
anti-foundationalism concludes no, they are not. The implications for epistemological and
methodological choices are, consequently, profound.
While Steve Smith, Colin Wight and others have argued that ontology is not prior to
epistemology chronologically or logically,36 but equal to, or co-constituting it, this seems to be a
miscalculation.37 If we determine there is a real world which exists independently of our
knowledge of it, we can observe it in some measure, taking us to epistemological positivism.
We can also assume that because it exists independently of us, that our observation of it does not
constitute it or influence it to some inordinate degree, and we can consider a number of methods,
theories and approaches that flow out of these assumptions. However, if we conclude there is
not a real social world out there that exists independently of our knowledge of it, then we would
not expect to be able to observe it, we would not consider positivist methods, theories or
approaches, and in fact we could not be sure of much more than Descartes’ original premise,
“cogito ergo sum,” or “I think, therefore I am.” Either ontological position has obvious
implications for epistemology and for the methods, theories and/or approaches one might accept
or reject. Determining what “is” and what “is not” ontologically is imperative prior to
considering the three possible epistemological positions the researcher might take, for one’s
epistemological position can only be determined after one has drawn a conclusion about the kind
of social world that exists, hence the importance of ontological considerations prior to
considerations of epistemology. Trying to choose an epistemological position simply begs the
ontological question – if one is a positivist, one has, a priori, assumed an ontologically
foundationalist social world. Likewise, if one chooses epistemological interpretivism, one has, a
priori, ruled out foundationalism, taking an anti-foundationalist stance. The table that follows
35
David Marsh and Paul Furlong, “A Skin, not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science,” in
Marsh and Stoker (2002): 18. The treatment of ontology and epistemology presented here is heavily indebted to
Marsh and Furlong.
36
Steve Smith, “Positivism and Beyond,” in Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski, eds., International
Theory: Positivism and Beyond (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 18; Colin Wight, “Philosophy of
Social Science and International Relations,” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, eds.,
Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage, 2002): 30.
37
Wendt agrees that “ontology [is] before epistemology.” Wendt (1999): 47.

10
outlines a conceptual flow from one’s intellectual starting point - a blank slate for heuristic
purposes - to ontology, then epistemology, and then to the various methods, theories and
approaches one might include in one’s intellectual toolkit that accord with one’s ontological and
epistemological positions. I have concluded that these items have first, a particular logical
chronology from ontological to epistemological to methodological, theoretical and/or approach-
based commitments; second, certain logical limitations because of these commitments; and third
can consequently reasonably be placed in such a taxonomical flow chart.

INSERT TABLE “THE ONTOLOGIES, EPISTEMOLOGIES, METHODOLOGIES,

THEORIES, AND APPROACHES OF IR”ABOUT HERE

III. Epistemology

Epistemology is “a theory of knowledge,” in other words, what is knowable about the

social world and how we know what we know.38 A consideration of epistemology begs two
important questions. First, “Can an observer identify ‘real’ or ‘objective’ relations between
social phenomena?”39 One’s response to the ontological question regarding the existence of a
“real” social world beyond one’s own subjectivity, leads to two possible answers here.
Foundationalists will answer, yes, one can observe “real” or “objective” relations in the social
world because they have already established at the ontological level that there is indeed a “real”
world beyond our own subjectivity. Anti-foundationalists will answer, no, however, because of
their rejection of the notion of a “real” world beyond our own subjectivity, for how could one
observe such a world if it does not in fact exist? Yet for those who’ve answer yes, a second
question must be posed. If yes, then “to the extent that we can establish ‘real’ relationships
between social phenomena, can we do this simply through direct observation, or are there some
relationships which ‘exist’ but are not directly observable?”40 Some (i.e., positivists) would
respond, yes, we can establish real relationships between social phenomena via direct
observation, and no, there are no extant relationships which are not directly observable. Others
(i.e., scientific realists) would say yes, we can establish real relationships between social
phenomena via direct observation, but yes, indeed there are some which “exist” but are not
directly observable.
Epistemologically speaking, these two questions elicit a tripartite taxonomy, three general
positions one might logically take epistemologically: positivism, scientific realism, and
interpretivism. Positivism emphasizes explanation of social phenomena and identifying
causality, whereas interpretivism seeks understanding of social phenomena and the meanings
actions have for actors. Scientific realism, again a philosophy of science not to be confused in
any way with political Realism, seeks explanation of observable phenomena, and yet
understanding of non-observable phenomena. Assuming objectivism, positivism emphasizes
quantitative analysis and empirical assumptions; interpretivism assumes subjectivism and
emphasizes qualitative analysis; and scientific realism assumes objectivism for observables,
subjectivism for non-observables, and employs both quantitative and qualitative methods. What
follows is a discussion of each of the three epistemological positions and the methods, theories
and approaches that hold to these epistemological positions.

III.A. Positivism and Associated Methods, Theories and Approaches

38
Marsh and Furlong (2002): 19.
39
Marsh and Furlong (2002): 19.
40
Marsh and Furlong (2002): 19.

11
 Positivism is depicted here as an epistemological position flowing from ontological
foundationalism wherein there not only is a “real” world out there independent of our knowledge
of it, but we can observe “real” and “objective” relationships between social phenomena in that
world. This orientation shapes the positivist approach to research. Steve Smith argues that there
are four basic characteristics of positivism.41 First is a “unified view of science,” of which there
is a strong and weak version. The strong version is that the natural sciences and social sciences
are fundamentally the same in terms of how a researcher approaches them. The weaker version,
and the one that is more prevalent in IR circles, is that while recognizing the differences between
natural and social science, the basic tools of observation and assumptions employed in
researching the natural world are also applicable to researching the social world. Second is the
fact/values distinction, or the notion that “facts” are value neutral, and that the researcher can be
both impartial and can avoid any imputation of him/herself into his/her research that might affect
the outcomes of that research. Third, positivism expects to find regularities in the social world
such that theories and laws are in play, just as is the case in the natural world. Fourth, positivism
places a heavy reliance on validation and falsification as the sign of true social inquiry.42
A family of broad social science and specifically IR-housed theories and approaches fall
into the category of positivism, broadly defined. Another chapter in this volume will delve deep
into the various IR theories and so little space will be devoted to them here in this chapter, except

41
Steve Smith, “Positivism and Beyond,” in Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski, eds., International
Theory: Positivism and Beyond (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 16.
42
While Smith (1996: 16) concludes that empiricism is an epistemology and positivism is an approach therein, this
study concludes with Marsh and Furlong (2002) that positivism is an epistemology based on empiricist assumptions.

12
Ontology and Epistemology: A Summary

Ontology = “a theory of being;” it’s about what is

Key question = “whether there is a ‘real’ world out there that is independent of our
knowledge of it…”
“Yes” - foundationalists
“No” - anti-foundationalists
Epistemology = “a theory of knowledge;” it’s about what we can know about the world and how
we can know it
Key questions =
A. “Can an observer identify ‘real or ‘objective’ relations between social phenomena?”
“Yes” – foundationalists (positivists and scientific realists)
“No” – anti-foundationalists (interpretivists)
B. If yes to A., “To the extent that we can establish ‘real’ relationships between social
phenomena, can we do this simply through direct observation, or are there some
relationships which ‘exist’ but are not directly observable?”
“yes, and no there aren’t” – positivists
“sometimes, and yes there are” – scientific realists

There are three ways to handle epistemological questions in social science.

1. Positivism (foundationalist) – seeks causal relationships between social phenomena for
explanation and prediction
2. Scientific Realism (foundationalist) – there are some deep social structures and social
phenomena that exist but can’t be directly observed (sexism, racism), but other social
phenomena can be directly observed
3. Interpretivism (anti-foundationalist) – social phenomena are socially constructed, and only
exist in the minds of actors and observers

1. seeks explanation of social phenomena and causality

3. seeks understanding of social phenomena, the meanings actions have for actors
2. seeks explanation of observable phenomena, and understanding of non-observable phenomena

1. puts more emphasis on quantitative analysis and empirical assumptions (assumes objectivism)
3. puts more emphasis on qualitative analysis (assumes subjectivism)
2. uses both (assumes objectivism for observables, subjectivism for non-observables)

Compiled by the author. Quotes and conceptualizations derived from David Marsh and Paul
Furlong, “A Skin, not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science,” in David
Marsh and Jerry Stoker, eds., Theory and Methods in Political Science, 2nd ed. (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

to briefly introduce them and present them in the context of the various epistemologies in which
they are found.

13
 Behavioralism is one positivist approach to social science that has had a broad impact on
IR, beginning primarily in the 1960s.43 The “second debate” in IR was really a discussion about
“science” in IR scholarship. Behavioralism-influenced IR scholars like Singer and Kaplan44
argued that IR was lax in its approach to scholarship, that IR lacked scientific rigor and new
behavioral approaches brought greater scientific rigor to IR and should be adopted by IR
scholars. IR traditionalists like Hedley Bull defended the traditional, qualitative approach to
IR.45 Behavioralism asks why people behave the way they do, and focuses on seeking to explain
human behavior by observation with an eye to explanatory clarity, replicability, objectivity,
general scientific rigor, and a partiality toward quantitative methods. One of the most notable
examples of the positivist/behavioral approach in IR is the Correlates of War (COW) Project,
founded by J.D. Singer in 1963. Over the years, Singer, his colleagues, and other scholars have
created vast data sets for inter-, intra, and extra-state wars,46 militarized inter-state disputes,
national material capabilities data, and other data sets, with which they searched for correlations
between war and various independent variables, indicators of shifting national material
capabilities, and other things.
Rational choice is a theory of human behavior and decision-making that flows directly
out of the behavioral tradition and should be considered a subset of behavioralism. Rational
choice has had a profound impact on IR theorizing. The basic assumption of rational choice is
that “when faced with several courses of action, people usually do what they believe is likely to
achieve the best overall outcome.”47 Borrowing from econometrics, rational choice black-boxes
personal particularisms and normative, ideological and other factors from the analysis, creating a
aspirationally universalistic model of human behavior and decision-making that lends itself to
quantitative methodologies. The human actor (or state, when states are actors, as in structural
Realism) is assumed to be a rational maximizer.
Game theory (with prisoner’s dilemma, zero-sum and non-zero-sum games, etc.) has
been the dominant rational choice-based approach in IR and should in turn be considered a
subset of rational choice. Other technical, behavioral approaches being used in IR theorizing,
but still generally a part of the rational choice/game theory universe, are bargaining theory48 and
approaches using formal modeling.49 “Game theory is becoming more influential in the study of
international politics although articles using formal methods still constitute a relatively small
portion of IR publications (on par with case study analysis).”50 Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahamias
43
See Colin Wight, “Philosophy of Social Science and International Relations,” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse,
and Beth A. Simmons, eds., Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage, 2002).
44
See Morton Kaplan, “The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations,” World
Politics, 19.1 (1966): 1-20; and J. David Singer, “The Incompleat Theorist: Insight without Evidence,” Klaus Knorr
and James N. Rosenau, eds., Contending Approaches to International Politics (Princeton, 1969).
45
See Hedley Bull, “International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach,” World Politics, 18/3 (1966): 361-77;
46
Inter-state refers to wars between states, intra-states refer to wars within states, and extra-state conflict is conflict
between states and non-state actors. See the Correlates of War website (http://www.correlatesofwar.org/) or works
by Singer and Small and others. J.D. Singer, and M. Small, “National military capabilities data (Version 3.0: 1816-
2001),” Correlates of War Project (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1995); or M. Small and J.D. Singer, Resort
to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980 (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1982).
47
John Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989): 22.
48
Classic examples are Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963);
and Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision-Making, and System
Structure in International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).
49
See Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). Another example is Peter Turchin, Historical Dynamics: Why States
Rise and Fall (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
50
Detlef F. Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, “Introduction: Methodology in International Relations Research,”
in Detlef F. Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, eds., Models, Numbers & Cases: Methods for Studying .

14
have assembled a remarkable edited volume presenting and analyzing the latest research methods
(from a positivist perspective) in IR, and include a number of excellent studies and overviews of
statistical approaches, game theory and modeling.51 In his essay in the volume, Duncan Snidal
discusses the Richardson Arms Race Model, one of the first formal models ever in IR, dating
from 1960.52 The verbalization of Richardson’s theory is, “States increase armaments because of
grievances against and fear of other states, but these increases are inhibited by the fatigue of
maintaining greater armament levels.”53 He was able to reduce this verbal form of the theory
into the following: “Rate of weapons acquisition = grievance + fear – fatigue,” which in
mathematical form looked like this: “dx/dt = g + by – cx.”54 The model opened many doors for
further modeling in IR. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman have produced another
well-known formal model based on game theory/rational choice assumptions in the context of
statistical analysis and case studies.55 Using a data set that includes over 700 European state
dyads between 1815 and 1970, their dyadic model has a place for two states (A and B), and eight
possible outcomes of interaction: status quo, negotiation, capitulation by A, capitulation by B,
war begun by A, war begun by B, acquiescence by A, and acquiescence by B. Each of these is
coded and the information is plugged into the model, enabling the authors to draw conclusions
about when states are likely to negotiate, capitulate, and go to war. The model is impressive in
its breadth and depth. Peter Turchin has also developed a formal model to tackle the issue of
territorial dynamics, or the reasons polities at expand during some periods and contract during
others.56 More specifically, his work strives to explain the breakdown of states in Europe, and
finds that the growth of ethno-nationalist expansionism is likely where divides centered on
religion exist at the borders of the expanding state. While not without criticism,57 such models
offer great promise for studies of IR and foreign policy, particularly as databases like the
Correlates of War grow in content and models and statistical tools develop in sophistication and
accuracy.
Realism in its three forms – classical Realism (approach), structural Realism (theory),
and neo-classical Realism (approach) – remains the most widely believed, widely employed, and
widely criticized theory and/or approach to IR.58 Classical Realism is the Realism of Hans
Morgenthau, George Kennan and Reinhold Niebuhr, and while the balance of power and other
aspects of classical Realism do lend themselves to quantitative studies, most of classical Realist
studies have been qualitative in nature. They function at each of the three levels of analysis,
from human nature, to foreign policy-making, to balance of power at the third level. Realpolitik
is a subset of classical Realism, but operates primarily at the second level of analysis and
describes foreign policy behavior, not IR, per se. Structural Realism, a theory of international

International Relations (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004): 7.

51
Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias (2004).
52
Lewis F. Richardson, Arms and Insecurity (Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press, 1960).
53
Duncan Snidal, “Formal Models of International Politics,” in Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias (2002): 241.
54
Snidal says, “dx/dt is calculus notation for ‘the rate at which nation X changes its level of armaments (x) over time
(t),’ g stands for grievance, y is the other state’s level of arms that induce the fear, b is a coefficient that indexes how
strong the fear is, and c is an index of the cost of maintaining each unit of the current level of armaments (x).” Snidal
(2002): 242.
55
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives (New
haven, Connecticutt: Yale University Press, 1994).
56
Peter Turchin, Historical Dynamics: Why States Rise and Fall (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
2003).
57
See Stephen M. Walt, “Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies,” International Security
(Spring, 1999): 5-48. See also the discussion the article evoked in the Fall 1999 issue of International Security.
58
Realism (as is the case with Idealism in this study) is capitalized to distinguish the IR theory form from other
forms of realism, such as simply “being realistic,” scientific realism, etc.

15
politics with rational choice bases, works well with the quantitative approaches discussed above,
but it can be used in qualitative fashion with effect as well, as is exemplified by the work of
Kenneth Waltz himself and John Mearsheimer.59 As mentioned above, Waltz’ theory of
international politics (a.k.a. neo-Realism) functions only at the third/system level of analysis.
Mearsheimer’s version (called “offensive Realism” by Mearsheimer, as opposed to Waltz’ and
others’ “defensive Realism”) works at the third level, but might also be said to work at what one
might call the second-and-a-half level. Mearsheimer argues that states can seek regional
hegemony as well as global hegemony and that regional power dynamics (which operate at what
might be called the second-and-a-half level of analysis) shape state behavior as well as power
dynamics and capability distributions at the third/international systemic level.60 Neo-classical
Realism,61 while embracing the basics of Waltzian Realism, posit that systemic variables alone
cannot explain state/system behavior, but that intervening variables at the unit/state level must be
examined to understand trends in IR, hence a nuanced renewal and/or fusion of classical and
structural Realism, with an ambitious research agenda.62
The Democratic Peace theory is another way to cut into IR, a theory that has assumed
almost law-like status in IR theory circles, and in US foreign policy circles. It operates primarily
at the second level of analysis, but could be said to affect perceptions of policy-makers at the
first level as well. It has spawned traditional, historical qualitative studies as well as empirical
studies.63 It is a theory and not an approach because it sets up specific expectations about state
behavior for democratic states in dyads with other democratic states (i.e., they don’t fight). It has
been attacked and it has been celebrated, but whatever view one takes of it, it has been extremely
influential and has produced some very interesting research.64
Neo-Liberal Institutionalism (NLI) is an approach to IR that morphed from older versions
of Idealism65 to take on more positivist, Realism-like ontology, epistemology and assumptions in
the 1980s at the hands primarily of Robert Keohane, but also of Joseph Nye and Stephen
Krasner.66 Despite similarities to Realisms, NLI reads as more optimistic about the likelihood
and ability of states to cooperate under anarchy, and gives a higher place to the role of
institutions than Realisms do. It also aligns closely with neo-liberal economic assumptions and
the role that economic interdependence plays in constraining inter-state conflict. It operates
potentially at all three levels of analysis, and it employs both quantitative and qualitative
methods, including game theory and modeling. Tucked within NLI work, but some leaning
toward normative and what is here called classical Idealist or constructivist approaches is a
59
Waltz (1979); John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).
60
Mearsheimer (2001): 138.
61
For an overview of neo-classical Realism, see Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign
Policy," World Politics, 51/1 (1998): 144-172; or see Randall L. Schweller, "The Progressiveness of Neoclassical
Realism," in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., Progress in International Relations Theory (Cambridge,
Massachussetts.: MIT Press, 2003).
62
Noteworthy figures in neo-classical Realism are Thomas Christensen, Aaron Friedberg, Randall Schweller,
William Wohlforth and Fareed Zakaria.
63
For an overview of the democratic peace literature, see Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E.
Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Boston: MIT Press, 1996).
64
For more on the democratic peace, see works listed here and others by Michael Doyle, Christopher Layne, John
Owen, Bruce Russett, and David Spiro.
65
More on Idealism below under interpretivism.
66
See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston:
Little Brown, 1977); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political
Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Robert O. Keohane, “Neoliberal Institutionalism: A
Perspective in World Politics,” in Robert O. Keohane, ed. International Institutions and State Power: Essays in
International Theory (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989); and Stephen D. Krasner, ed. International
Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).

16
literature on regimes, international organizations and epistemic communities. All focusing on
the roles or affects of institutions on state and/or policy-maker behavior, these three approaches,
while diverse, all tend to accept the basic tenets of Realism to some degree (anarchy, self-help,
etc.), but each is more optimistic about the potential for cooperation and intersubjective
understanding because of the roles of regimes, international organizations, and epistemic
communities, respectively. Like NLI, these approaches run the gamut in terms of methodologies
and levels of analysis.67

III.B. Scientific Realism and Associated Methods, Theories and Approaches

Scientific realism is a term that IR thinkers have borrowed from philosophy of science in
recent years, and which is an extremely helpful notion when considering IR’s epistemological
debates. Scientific realism is here conceived of as an epistemology in the social sciences, and as
some social phenomena can be directly observed, thus all the methods, theories and approaches
in the positivist’s toolkit are available for the scientific realist as well. Yet, closer to the position
of the interpretivist, the scientific realist concludes that there are some deep social structures and
social phenomena that “exist” (here they sometimes differ from interpretivists) but can’t
necessarily be directly observed (e.g., sexism, racism, identities, class structure, Gramscian
hegemony68), and so the scientific realist potentially has at his or her disposal the various
insights, approaches and methods of the various forms of interpretivism as well. For this reason,
Alexander Wendt rightly calls scientific realism a “via media” between positivism and
interpretivism.69 Within the scientific realist epistemological position are a number of well-
known IR methods, theories and approaches.
The English School of IR70 represents perhaps IR theory’s first foray into what we today
call scientific realism or even constructivism, with Hedley Bull’s classic text, The Anarchical
Society.71 In it Bull argues that while the international system is characterized as anarchic, it is
nonetheless a society of states. The English School stands at the cusp of the positivist/scientific
realist epistemological divide, sharing many assumptions with political Realism, but recognizing
the importance of social structures and the possibility of transcendence of the negative
externalities of the anarchical international system and the security dilemmas Realism
emphasizes via the construction of international society. The English School includes Hedley
Bull (though he was actually Australian), Martin Wight, and Herbert Butterfield, and more
recently one could add Barry Buzan, Tim Dunne, Andrew Linklater and others.

67
For a look at regimes, international organizations and epistemic communities in IR, the following are
recommended: Krasner (1983); Martha Finnemore, “International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: the United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy,” International Organization
(Autumn, 1993): 565-597; Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons, International Institutions: An International
Organization Reader (Boston: MIT Press, 2001); Emanuel Adler, “The Emergence of Cooperation: National
Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control,” International
Organization (Winter 1992): 101-145; and Peter M. Haas, “Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and
Mediterranean Pollution Control,” International Organization (Summer, 1989): 377-403.
68
See Robert Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Methods,” in Stephen Gill, ed.,
Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations (Newcastle upon Tyne: Athenaeum/Cambridge
University Press, 1993).
69
Though he prefers to refer to what is here called interpretivism as “post-positivism.” Wendt (1999): 91.
70
For a helpful overview, see Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, The English School of International
Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); or Barry Buzan, From
International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004).
71
Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

17
 Marxism and any approaches evolving from it is/are scientific realist in epistemological
orientation. Marsh and Furlong note that scientific realism owes much to Marx. “Marxism is the
archetypal classical [scientific] realism” and “classical Marxism…argued that there was a
difference between ‘real’ interests, which reflect material reality, and perceived interests, which
might be manipulated by the powerful forces in society.”72 The “deep structures” in this case are
those exploitive illusions Marxists believe the capitalist class thrusts upon the proletariat.
Antonio Gramsci has inspired a fair amount of IR work in his concept of “hegemony,” and this
hegemony captures nicely this Marxian notion of invisible structures that are quite “real” and yet
are not observable as a positivist would like to observe them, for the most part,73 and Gramscian
approaches to IR are clearly in the epistemological tradition of scientific realism.74 Colin Wight
and others agree that the Frankfurt School of critical theory75 is also scientific realist, flowing
from the Marxian tradition. “…A critical theory approach to social science will incorporate
elements of positivism as well as hermeneutics [or interpretivism, GJM], but attempt to go
beyond them in terms of emancipatory potential.”76 The Frankfurt School critical theorists, like
Gramsci/Cox, reject the structural determinism of classical Marxism’s historical materialism and
are therefore called “post-structural,” though in this case not post-positivist (or interpretivist) as
are post-structuralists like Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault. V.I. Lenin’s Imperialism the
Highest Stage of Capitalism, Immanuel Wallerstein’s World Systems Theory, as well as any of
the dependency theory writers that address international affairs,77 are all in this Marxian-inspired
scientific realist tradition as well.
Constructivism (also known as “social constructivism”) is also best thought of as
epistemologically scientific realist and should not be considered interpretivist because of what
Giddens and Wendt have called “structuration,” or the co-constitution of agents and structures,
the material and ideational (or natural and social) worlds.78 It has been common in the IR
literature to put what I prefer to call post-modernist writers (e.g., Richard Ashley, David
Campbell, James Der Derian, Spike Peterson, R.B.J. Walker, etc.) together with what are
commonly referred to as constructivist scholars (e.g., Alexander Wendt, John Ruggie, Emmanuel
Adler, Martha Finnemore, etc.), referring to the former as “post-modernist constructivists” or
“radical constructivists.”79 However, it seems appropriate here to conceive of them separately.
72
Marsh and Furlong (2002): 30-31.
73
Cox (1993).
74
Stephen Gill, “Epistemology, Ontology and the ‘Italian School,’” in Stephen Gill, ed., Gramsci, Historical
Materialism and International Relations (Newcastle upon Tyne: Athenaeum/Cambridge University Press, 1993):
22.
75
See works by Theodor Adorno, Jurgen Habermas, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, and others, or see Stephen
Bronner and Douglas Kellner, eds., Critical Theory and Society: A Reader (New York: Routledge, 1989).
76
Colin Wight, “Philosophy of Social Science and International Relations,” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and
Beth A. Simmons, eds., Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage, 2002): 33. See also Steve Smith,
“Positivism and Beyond,” in Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski, eds., International Theory: Positivism
and Beyond (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 28.
77
V.I. Lenin, Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism (New York: International Publishing, 1969); Immanuel
Wallerstein, “The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis,”
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 16 (September, 1974): 387-415; Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and
Underdeveloment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil (New York: Monthly Review, 1967).
78
Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1986); Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,”
International Organization 41/3 (Summer, 1987): 335-370; and Wendt (1999, chapter 2).
79
Each of the following three writers/works refer to post-modern approaches as a subset of constructivism: John G.
Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (New York: Routledge, 1998):
35; Emmanuel Adler, “Constructivism and International Relations,” in Carlsnaes, Risse and Simmons (2002): 98;
and Wendt (1999): 31-32. Ruggie refers to post-modern writers as “post-modern constructivists,” Adler refers to
them as “radical constructivists,” and Wendt refers to them simply as “post-modernists.”

18
The reason for this is the different ontologies they maintain. The post-modernist writers and
their works clearly share an anti-foundationalist ontology, and hence an interpretivist
epistemology, whereas the constructivists listed work in the scientific realist tradition and view
positivist methods as effective, though not adequate in and of themselves. There certainly are
historical, sociological and intellectual commonalities between constructivists and post-
modernists in IR, given the similar timing of their arrival on the IR theory scene (the late 1980s
and early 1990s), the language they use (“discourse,” “socially constructed,” “identity,” etc.),
and their common critiques of positivist and especially structural Realist assumptions and
research programs. However, constructivists, as scientific realists, do not reject the language and
the tools of science as post-modernists do.80 The ontologies and epistemologies of
constructivists and post-modernists are different. Consequently, despite the historical,
sociological and intellectual commonalities they share, it makes little sense to put them together
in either ontological or epistemological terms.81
Constructivism in general has often been misrepresented as theory.82 Constructivism is
an approach to issues in the social sciences, which came to IR from other social sciences like
anthropology, sociology and literary criticism in the late 1980s with Wendt’s (1987), Onuf’s
(1989) and others’ work, though some would credit Ernest Haas and Karl Deutsch as being the
true founders of constructivism in IR, though not by that name.83 If we take the term theory, as
was discussed at the outset, to mean highly specified explanations of causal relationships (in
other words, that A causes B, and under what conditions), it is clear that constructivism, even as
it pertains more specifically to IR (Wendt aside, see below), is not a theory, but rather an
approach. Constructivism does not purport to explain in a causal fashion any specific behaviors
of states, or of international organizational dynamics, or even of identity formation. It simply
guides a researcher in terms of orientation, in terms of what the researcher will look for and what
they think is salient in a social situation, and holds to a scientific realist epistemology so it can
take advantage of both the insights of positivism and of interpretivism.
Alexander Wendt’s social theory of international politics, from his book of the same
name (1999), is a different animal and deserves different treatment in this discussion of
constructivism. It is a theory, for it does make specific statements about the way the world of IR
works and it could be used to try to predict state behavior at some level. It is also constructivist,
and while Wendt’s social theory is constructivist, Wendt would agree that constructivism is not
reducible to Wendt’s social theory. Constructivism informs Wendt’s theory. Another
particularity that distinguishes constructivism in general with Wendt’s social theory in particular
is that constructivism in general has no expectations about which level of analysis it might
operate at, or which theory is appropriate in IR, which state identity is important, why states
might balance, etc. Wendt’s theory, however, operates specifically at the third level of analysis
(the system level), it sees states as the key actors, it sees a particular kind of relationship between
state agents and the international system, it envisions a particular role for ideas, it has
conceptualized three cultures of anarchy within which the international system might organize,

80
See Wendt (1999): 90-91.
81
Perhaps more difficult is what one might do with the work of Nicholas Onuf or Friedrich Kratochwil, who while
less “radical” than the post-modernists, are not scientific realists and ontologically are interpretivists. Calling them
“modernist linguistic constructivists,” Adler puts them appropriately in a space between what are here called
constructivists and post-modernists (which he calls “modernist constructivists” and “radical constructivists,”
respectively). Adler (2002): 98.
82
Jack Snyder has done so, and has also conflated constructivism with Idealism, also problematic, though they share
some things in common, such as the importance of values, ideas, etc. Jack Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,”
Foreign Policy (November/December, 2004): 52-62.
83
Adler (2002): 99. IR scholar Paul Viotti also made this case to me as a student when constructivist first emerged.

19
and makes other assumptions about the nature of the international system, and of individual state
behavior. Constructivism as an approach cannot really be compared to Waltz’ theory of
international politics in an theoretical showdown because this would pit apples with green beans
(not even oranges!). Wendt’s theory, however, can be compared with Waltz’ because A. they
are both theories of international politics, and B. they both operate at the third level of analysis.

III.C. Interpretivism and Associated Methods, Theories and Approaches

Interpretivism is a term not uncommon in the IR literature, and can be considered a

(rough) substitute for other terms in the literature like reflectivism, post-positivism, or
hermeneutics.84 Interpretivism starts from an ontological position of rejecting the notion that
there is a “real” world out there beyond our knowledge of it, and it concludes that there is no
way, therefore, to observe or measure a “world” that does not exist except in our own subjective
understanding of it. Interpretivists conclude that social phenomena are socially constructed
through discourse, and only exist in the minds of actors and observers. Thus they conclude that
since the social world is of a different kind than the social world, explaining social phenomena is
not possible, so they reject quantitative methods and focus instead on seeking to understand
social phenomena and the meanings social phenomena have for people. Interpretivist methods
are qualitative, seeking to unpack the relevant meanings and approach an understanding of the
deep structures at work and how discourse surrounding social phenomena socially constructs
“truth.” Interpretivist approaches to understanding require a more anthropological, Geertzian
“thick description”85 approach, which could include a number of different methods in the
qualitative tradition, including discourse analysis, content analysis, the case study method, and
the traditional historical and descriptive methods.
Moving to a discussion of specific IR methods, theories and approaches, and moving just
across the epistemological divide from scientific realism to interpretivism is the normative
approach. While norms can have positivist undertones in how they are defined, established and
conceived, it is difficult to imagine them ultimately in any other terms than those of
interpretivism, for norms are not observable, measurable, nor purely objective. Kenneth
Thompson, a pioneering advocate of the place for normative approaches in IR theorizing, makes
it clear that his own normative approach is not positivist and cannot be captured by “science,”
rejecting any monist sense of moral universality, favoring instead a pluralist sense of morality,
which is consistent with interpretivist understandings.86 With the return of culture and identity to
IR theory with the third debate in IR,87 constructivists, post-modernists and post-structuralists, as
well as the Neo-Liberal Institutionalists, brought norms (along with identity, culture, and other

84
For reflectivism, see Robert Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” International Studies
Quarterly (December, 1988): 379-396; for post-positivism, see Wendt (1999): 47, 90-91; and for hermeneutics see
Colin Wight (2002): 33. Interpretivism is not really an exact synonym for post-positivism, however. Post-
positivism is a bit narrower, more specific. Yet the way in which post-positivism is used as an epistemological
orientation brings it quite close to the way in which the term interpretivism is used, as Wendt’s use of the term
illustrates. Still, the breadth of the term interpretivism seems preferable, given the inclusion of the normative
approach and Classical Idealism on the interpretivist side here.
85
Geertz (1973).
86
Kenneth W. Thompson, Morality and Foreign Policy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980), 4,
15-16, 21-28.
87
Yoself Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds., The Return of Culture and Identity in International Relations Theory
(Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner, 1996); Yosef Lapid, “The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International
Theory in a Post-positivist Era,” International Studies Quarterly, 33/3 (1989): 235-254.

20
ideational and social variables) back to a prominent place in IR discourse after having lost their
prominence under the dominance of political Realism for so long.88
Likewise, Idealism in IR, or what I prefer to call Classical Idealism (capturing the
Kantian, Wilsonian, “first debate” sense of the term), is another interpretivist approach that
stands just beyond the scientific realist/interpretivist divide and it too has had a resurgence in the
last two decades as a response to the rise of Waltzian/structural realism and rational choice/game
theoretic studies of IR. Many who have used Classical Idealism would not have considered
themselves interpretivists, per se, but there can be no doubt that as it regards Idealism and the
ideas, beliefs, values and other ideational factors that are its mainstay, ontologically there is no
way to argue that these things are “real” beyond the discourse in which they are socially
constructed, nor is there any way to truly observe or measure them as positivism would demand.
Idealism is a term often associated with democratic peace theory or neo-liberal institutionalism,
but as this study has shown, that isn’t entirely logical when the ontological and epistemological
realities of these theories/approaches are presented. Idealism is most often associated with
former US President Woodrow Wilson, and his promotion of self-determination and the
importance of international law and organization as in the League of Nations, which he was
instrumental in erecting after the First World War. Idealism is about the power of an ideal or
idea, and the role of that ideal/idea in foreign policy, as well as the role of international law and
international institutions, and is often (sometimes fairly, usually unfairly) associated with
“voluntarism,” or the notion that by the power of the will or the idea, anything can be
accomplished. After the Second World War and the discrediting of Idealism and the rise of
political Realism, Idealism went into retreat to return in various forms, first of all in a positivist
(albeit largely qualitative form) of positivism in what could be called liberal IR theory, or neo-
liberal institutionalism (as discussed above) in the 1970s and 1980s.89 NLI accepted many of the
terms of Realism, so much so that John Ruggie concluded that it actually made more sense to
consider neo-liberal institutionalism and neo-Realism as one entity which he labeled neo-
utilitarianism.90 With the end of the Cold War and the rise of post-modernist, post-structuralist,
constructivist, and other approaches, the power of ideals and ideational factors got new life in a
purer form, and this is how it exists today, hence the term “classical Idealism,” for today’s
idealism as it is currently being used by post-modernist, feminists, normative scholars,
constructivists, and in studies such as the power of the ideas associated with Islamic Jihadism, is
a true idealism, based on the power of ideational factors, and used in various kinds of studies,
with various methods.91
Feminism, as was discussed above, is not properly conceived of as a theory, per se, but
“is more appropriately viewed as a kind of developing dialogue around a common but evolving

88
For an excellent discussion of norms, see the essays in Peter Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); or Andrew Hurrell, “Norms and Ethics in International Relations,”
in Carlsnaes, Risse and Simmons (2002): 137-154.
89
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence : World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little
Brown, 1977); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Robert O. Keohane, “Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective in
World Politics,” in Robert O. Keohane, ed. International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International
Theory (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989).
90
John G. Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (New York:
Routledge, 1998): 9.
91
Note that the idealism that Wendt discusses is not the Idealism of IR, but the idealism of social theory, or the
notion that what constitutes society is ideas not, material forces (Wendt, 1999: 24-29). Again, Snyder’s (2004)
conflation of idealism and constructivism is problematic.

21
agenda,”92 or an approach, as it has been defined here.93 Feminists work at all three levels of
epistemology,94 but more of the IR feminists tend to be found in the interpretivist camp,95 at least
in part because “feminist theories are based on an ontology of social relations,”96 they are
interested in the difficult-to-observe deep social structures of societies, they often employ
discourse analysis as a method of inquiry, and they have an interest in how gendered
understandings of war and peace, as well as of national and international social and gender
hierarchies, are constructed. Moreover, there is a strong skepticism among many feminists about
the ability of positivist approaches to capture the realities of sexism, for feminists are the ones
who have and should “continue to emphasize the ways in which the privileging of [statistics-
based] knowledge, under the guise of objective, value-free science, has worked to hide
oppressive hierarchies of power and strategies designed to overcome them.”97 One could
convincingly make an argument that women have an entirely different ontology than men as a
separate gender under existing social structures, and this is how Nancy Hartsock’s standpoint
feminism can be read.98 As it regards IR methods, theories and approaches, however, with the
exception that feminists alone have made the vital contribution of gendering the questions IR
scholars consider, feminist work does fall into the three epistemological traditions and the
methods, theories and approaches above, and so feminism in IR is best thought of as an
independent approach working within, above and/or alongside of these other ontologies,
epistemologies, methods, theories and approaches.
Representing some of the methodological diversity of today’s feminist scholarship are
Carol Cohn, Lyn Kathlene and Spike Peterson. Carol Cohn’s work addresses the impact of
gender and gendered representations of war and its costs in the US defense community. Using
discourse analysis and ethnography, she discovers that one will not be taken seriously in the US
defense community without tough, “masculinized” rhetoric, and that one must eschew any
“feminized” notions of the emotional and destructive costs of war in favor of the firm,
unwavering, non-compromising stance of a “masculinized” approach to war.99 Another
interesting example of feminist scholarship that might have important implications for second-
level foreign policy analysis, coming from the more general political science literature, is Lyn
Kathlene’s work on gender and politics in the 1989 Colorado state legislature.100 Using content
analysis, she studied the speeches and interactions on the lower house floor and in committee
meetings. She found that when women chaired committee meetings, male participants were
more outspoken and aggressive than when men chaired committee meetings, and that women
92
Vicky Randall, “Feminism,” in Marsh and Stoker (2002): 108.
93
For perhaps the best brief overview of feminist approaches to IR available, see J. Ann Tickner, “Feminist
Perspectives on International Relations,” in Carlsnaes, Risse, and Simmons (2002). For an exceptional overview of
feminism and methodological issues in IR, see Brooke A. Ackerly, Maria Stern, and Jacqui True, eds., Feminist
Methodologies for International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
94
See Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1986).
95
J. Ann Tickner, “Feminism Meets International Relations: Some Methodological Issues,” in Ackerly, Stern and
True (2006).
96
J. Ann Tickner, “Feminist Perspectives on International Relations,” in Carlsnaes, Risse, and Simmons (2002):
276.
97
Tickner (2006): 40.
98
Nancy Hartsock, “Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical
Materialism,” in Sandra Harding and Merrill Hintikka, eds., Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on
Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel): 283-310.
99
Carol Cohn, “Wars, Wimps and Women: Talking gender and thinking War,” in Miriam Cooke and Angela
Wollacott, eds., Gendering War Talk (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
100
Lyn Kathlene, “Position Power vs. Gender Power: Who Holds the Floor?” in G. Duerst-Hahti and R.M. Kelly
eds., Gender Power, Leadership and Governance (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995); as presented in
Randall (2002): 126.

22
chairs were interrupted more often by their male counterparts than male chairs were. Women
participants were also more often called by their first names rather than by their titles, whereas
men tended to be called by their titles (Mr. Y, Dr. Z), all illustrating the gender dynamics in
political decision-making environments. Using a post-positivist lens to consider national and
international security, another important work by feminist scholars has been provided by Spike
Peterson, who argues that “national security” is a contradictory term as it regards the security of
women. She notes that security is both a domestic and an international concern, in other words,
that wars affect both national security and women’s personal security.
Structural insecurities internal to states—constituted by gendered (and other)
divisions of labor, resources, and identities—as well as androcratic politics
generally must be recognized and critically examined. We must understand how
extensive and systemic current insecurities are and how particular identities
produce, and are produced by, this structural violence; we can understand neither
without attention to gender.101
Feminist scholarship in IR has been truly important toward that end.102
Finally, the discussion turns to post-modernism, or as it is also known, radical
interpretivism or post-structuralism.103 Consistent with its ontology, post-modernism disavows
any notion that there is a “real” social world out there that is separate from us, and consistent
with its epistemological commitments, post-modernism maintains that no, researchers cannot
observe “real” or “objective” relationships between social phenomena. Consequently, post-
modernists reject quantitative research methods, except perhaps occasionally to use descriptive
statistics to buttress a point they are trying to make, but do embrace discourse analysis and other
qualitative methods. The third debate in the late 1980s104 brought post-modernist and post-
structuralist attacks on classical and positivist structural Realism, with charges that sovereignty,
anarchy, the state, and the academic discourse surrounding these things had been socially
constructed and all was not as it seemed. As it regarded the study of international relations,
positivism was to blame for the problems in the IR field and in the practice of IR as well.
According to Richard Ashley, post-modernism (or poststructuralism as he calls it), provides
“sustained integrity of intellectual intellect” and “’detachment’” which is the “ground” on which
the post-modernist/post-structuralist theorist works, though that “ground” is
…never guaranteed, never secure, never a pure presence already in place. It is a
“ground” that, like the notion of “detachment,” must always be written in
quotation marks because it is always in doubt, under erasure, in the process of
being made and undermined all at once. It is a ‘ground’ that gives way beneath
the theorist’s feet at the very moment that she fails to take seriously her precarious
situation in the face of the radical undecidability of history.105
While post-modernists and post-structuralists prefer this shaky, uncertain, though “truthful”
ground, positivists have protested in their response to the post-positivist onslaught, some with

101
V. Spike Peterson, “Security and Sovereign States: What is at Stake in Taking Feminism Seriously,” in V. Spike
Peterson, ed., Gendered States: (Re) Visions of International Relations Theory (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner,
1995): 32.
102
For more on feminist approaches to IR, consult the works of Cynthia Enloe, Jean Elshtain, Sandra Harding,
Nancy Hartsock, Spike Peterson, Christine Sylvester, J. Ann Tickner, or any of the texts referenced here.
103
As was noted above, there is a difference between post-modernism and post-structuralism, but they are treated
together here because of all they share.
104
Lapid (1989).
105
Richard K. Ashley, "Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War," in James Der Derian and
Michael Shapiro, eds., International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics (Lexington,
MA: Lexington Books, 1989): 279.

23
grace and some with vitriol, for in their eyes their critics seek to undo all that positivists find
meaningful in IR research methodology.106 A dilemma for post-modern approaches remains –
arriving at a research agenda while rejecting the notion of progress in our understanding of IR –
and yet ironically the post-modern onslaught has raised the bar for science for positivists and
scientific realists because of its disclosure of so many of positivism’s weaknesses, and has
opened up doors of dialogue and methodological pluralism that have truly benefited the field.107

IV. Conclusions: Assembling the Toolkit

Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias have conducted an instructive study of scholarly work in

IR that highlights the growing recognition among IR scholars of the importance of
methodological considerations. In an attempt to discern what particular methods were regularly
being employed in IR scholarship, they surveyed all articles published in six scholarly journals
“in the field” between 1975 and 2000.108 These journals included the American Political Science
Review, International Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, the
Journal of Conflict Resolution, and World Politics. While it would have been helpful to have
separated out the heavily quantitative American Political Science Review, particularly since it is
not actually a journal of IR studies, the study is still instructive, for Sprinz and Wolinsky-
Nahmias find that the articles could be classified into five categories: “descriptive analysis, case
studies, quantitative (statistical) analysis, formal modeling, and cross-methods studies.”109 They
noted a decline in the number of articles using descriptive-historical approaches across the period
of study (in journals other than the APSR too, they point out), noting for example that in the late
1970s, over 70% of the articles published in World Politics used this approach, but less than 30%
did by the late 1990s. They found that the number of studies using the case study method had
remained fairly constant over the years, about 14% in the late 1990s; the number of studies using
formal modeling/game theory had increased to about the same amount, 14%; quantitative studies
accounted for about 43% of studies in the late 1990s; and studies using two or more methods
increased slightly to about 4% by the late 1990s.110 Their findings lead them to this conclusion:
While in the late 1970s about half of all articles published in these journals lacked
any methodological component, in the late 1990s less than one-third of the
articles surveyed could be classified as such. This trend reflects an important
development in the way IR scholars conduct their research, and it supports the
notion that international relations as a field has become more methods-oriented
than before.111
In fact, viewed against the discussion presented here in this chapter, all three of IR’s great
debates could be viewed as methodological in nature. The first, between Idealists and Realists,
was at least in part about the epistemological divide between interpretivist Idealism and positivist
Realism. The second, between methodological traditionalists and methodological behavioralists,
106
For a firm but not vitriolic rebuttal of post-modernism, see Pauline Rosenau, “Once Again into the Fray:
International Relations Confronts the Humanities,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies (March, 1990).
107
For more on post-modernist/post-structuralist/post-positivist approaches, please consult the work of the following
authors: Richard Ashley, David Campbell, James Der Derian, Timothy Luke, Spike Peterson, and/or R.B.J. Walker.
108
Detlef F. Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, “Introduction: Methodology in International Relations Research,”
in Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias (2004).
109
Detlef F. Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, “Introduction: Methodology in International Relations Research,”
in Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias (2004): 5-6.
110
Detlef F. Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, “Introduction: Methodology in International Relations Research,”
in Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias (2004): 7-8.
111
Detlef F. Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, “Introduction: Methodology in International Relations Research,”
in Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias (2004): 8.

24
is more traditionally thought of as being a debate about methodology. The third, between
positivist and interpretivist or post-positivist approaches to IR, is also clearly methodological in
nature. The ontological and epistemological questions that methodological considerations
invoke make it clear that methodology is no less important to IR studies than theory.
This chapter has been a study of the prevailing IR research methods, the main
methodological issues IR researchers grapple with, and the latest methodological developments
in studies of IR. While there has never been any agreement on how IR methods, theories and
approaches should be conceptualized, they have here been presented in terms of two forms of
ontology (foundationalism and anti-foundationalism) and three forms of epistemology
(positivism, scientific realism, and interpretivism). Within these ontologies and epistemologies
are the many different methods, theories and approaches of IR studies, and it is hoped that the
taxonomy provided here will bring clarity to a sometimes unkempt field of study. It is also
hoped that this study has underlined the importance of methodological considerations in any
approach to IR, and the importance of methodological pluralism where possible, for the more
tools one has in one’s toolkit, the greater the number of research “jobs” one can manage, always
keeping in mind of course the realities of one’s ontological and epistemological commitments.

25
 THE ONTOLOGIES, EPISTEMOLOGIES, METHODOLOGIES, THEORIES, AND APPROACHES OF IR*

ONTOLOGY EPISTEMOLOGY METHODS, THEORIES, APPROACHES

Positivism Behavioralism (method)

- Rational Choice (theory)
- Game Theory (theory)
Realisms [Structural, Neo-Classical, Classical]
Foundationalism (theory, approach)
Democratic Peace (theory)
Neo-Liberal Institutionalism (approach)

Scientific Realism English School (approach)

Marxism [most] (approach)
Start World Systems, Dependency Theories (theory)
Critical Theory [Frankfurt School, Cox, etc.]
(theory, approach)
Social Theory of Wendt (theory)
Constructivism [most, though some interpretive]
(approach)

Anti-Foundationalism Interpretivism Normative (approach)

Classical Idealism (approach)
Feminism [most, though some positivism
or Scientific Realism] (approach)
Post-Modernism/Post-Structuralism (method, approach)

*Credit for ontology/epistemology structure to Marsh and Furlong (2002). Compiled, expanded, and adapted to IR by the author.

Note: The flow implied here is from left to right, as one makes ontological, then epistemological, and finally methodological,
theoretical and/or approach-based commitments. From top to bottom, the methods, theories and approaches are arranged roughly
from most positivist to most interpretivist, constructivism being closer to interpretivism than Realism, but Realism being less positivist
than game theory. Note also that scientific realism (epistemology) and political Realism (theory, approach) are not the same thing.