TERM PAPER

OF

MANAGERIAL
ECONOMICS
(TOPIC:- Is Dumping Illegal? Comment with authentic view points)

DATE OF ALLOTMENT:- 9-SEP-2010

DATE OF SUBMISSION:- 16-NOV-2010

SUBMITTED TO:- SUBMITTED BY:-

MR MANDEEP SINGH NITESH SHARMA

LECTURER OF MBA, 1 ST SEMESTER

MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS SECTION:- S1003

(LSM) ROLL NO:- 87

REG NO:- 11010179.

 ABSTRACT

This term paper is all about is dumping illegal or not

and what are the impacts of dumping on different
sectors and legal issues related with dumping,
agriculture support regarding dumping, impact of
dumping on WTO and research articles analysis and
what are the findings related with this topic that
dumping is illegal or not what are the authentic view
points regarding this concept.
INDEX:-

 INTRODUCTIONION

 DEFINITION AND EXTENT AND IMPACT ON

WTO

 LTERATURE REVIEW / ANALYSIS

 SECTORWISE APPLICABLE OF DUMPING

 IMPACT OF DUMPING ECONOMICALLY

 CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION OF DUMPING:-
In economics, "dumping" can refer to any kind of predatory pricing. However, the
word is now generally used only in the context of international trade law, where
dumping is defined as the act of a manufacturer in one country exporting a product
to another country at a price which is either below the price it charges in its home
market or is below its costs of production. The term has a negative connotation, but
advocates of free markets see "dumping" as beneficial for consumers and believe
that protectionism to prevent it would have net negative consequences. Advocates
for workers and laborers however, believe that safeguarding businesses against
predatory practices, such as dumping, help alleviate some of the harsher
consequences of free trade between economies at different stages of development
(see protectionism). The Bolkestein directive, for example, was accused in Europe of
being a form of "social dumping," as it favored competition between workers, as
exemplified by the Polish Plumber stereotype. While there are very few examples of
a national scale dumping that succeeded in producing a national-level monopoly,
there are several examples of dumping that produced a monopoly in regional
markets for certain industries. Ron Chenow points to the example of regional oil
monopolies in Titan : The Life of John D. Rockefeller, Sr. where Rockefeller receives
a message from Colonel Thompson outlining an approved strategy where oil in one
market, Cincinnati, would be sold at or below cost to drive competition's profits down
and force them to exit the market. In another area where other independent
businesses were already driven out, namely in Chicago, prices would be increased
by a quarter. [1]

A standard technical definition of dumping is the act of charging a lower price for a
good in a foreign market than one charges for the same good in a domestic market.
This is often referred to as selling at less than "fair value". Under the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement, dumping is condemned (but is not prohibited) if it
causes or threatens to cause material injury to a domestic industry in the importing
country. [2]

1. Persistent dumping

2. Sporadic dumping

3. Predatory dumping

DEFINITION AND EXTENTS AND IMPACT ON WTO:-

While permitted by the WTO, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
(Article VI) allows countries the option of taking action against dumping. The Anti-
Dumping Agreement clarifies and expands Article VI, and the two operate together.
They allow countries to act in a way that would normally break the GATT principles
of binding a tariff and not discriminating between trading partners—typically anti-
dumping action means charging extra import duty on the particular product from the
particular exporting country in order to bring its price closer to the “normal value” or
to remove the injury to domestic industry in the importing country.
There are many different ways of calculating whether a particular product is being
dumped heavily or only lightly. The agreement narrows down the range of possible
options. It provides three methods to calculate a product’s “normal value”. The main
one is based on the price in the exporter’s domestic market. When this cannot be
used, two alternatives are available—the price charged by the exporter in another
country, or a calculation based on the combination of the exporter’s production costs,
other expenses and normal profit margins. And the agreement also specifies how a
fair comparison can be made between the export price and what would be a normal
price.

Calculating the extent of dumping on a product is not enough. Anti-dumping

measures can only be applied if the dumping is hurting the industry in the importing
country. Therefore, a detailed investigation has to be conducted according to
specified rules first. The investigation must evaluate all relevant economic factors
that have a bearing on the state of the industry in question. If the investigation shows
dumping is taking place and domestic industry is being hurt, the exporting company
can undertake to raise its price to an agreed level in order to avoid anti-dumping imp
Legal issues

If a company exports a product at a price lower than the price it normally charges on
its own home market, it is said to be "dumping" the product. Opinions differ as to
whether or not this is unfair competition, but many governments take action against
dumping in order to defend their domestic industries. The WTO agreement does not
pass judgment. Its focus is on how governments can or cannot react to dumping—it
disciplines anti-dumping actions, and it is often called the "Anti-Dumping
Agreement". (This focuses only on the reaction to dumping contrasts with the
approach of the Subsidies & Countervailing Measures Agreement.)

The legal definitions are more precise, but broadly speaking the WTO agreement
allows governments to act against dumping where there is genuine ("material") injury
to the competing domestic industry. In order to do that the government has to be
able to show that dumping is taking place, calculate the extent of dumping (how
much lower the export price is compared to the exporter’s home market price), and
show that the dumping is causing injury or threatening to do sort duty.

Procedures in investigation and litigation

Detailed procedures are set out on how anti-dumping cases are to be initiated, how
the investigations are to be conducted, and the conditions for ensuring that all
interested parties are given an opportunity to present evidence. Anti-dumping
measures must expire five years after the date of imposition, unless a review shows
that ending the measure would lead to injury.
Anti-dumping investigations are to end immediately in cases where the authorities
determine that the margin of dumping is, de minimis, or insignificantly small (defined
as less than 2% of the export price of the product). Other conditions are also set. For
example, the investigations also have to end if the volume of dumped imports is
negligible (i.e., if the volume from one country is less than 3% of total imports of that
product—although investigations can proceed if several countries, each supplying
less than 3% of the imports, together account for 7% or more of total imports). The
agreement says member countries must inform the Committee on Anti-Dumping
Practices about all preliminary and final anti-dumping actions, promptly and in detail.
They must also report on all investigations twice a year. When differences arise,
members are encouraged to consult each other. They can also use the WTO’s
dispute settlement procedure.

Actions in the European Union

European Union anti-dumping is under the purview of the European Council. It is

governed by European Council regulation 384/96. However, implementation of anti-
dumping actions (trade defence actions) is taken after voting by various committees
with member state representation.

The bureaucratic entity responsible for advising member states on anti-dumping

actions is the Directorate General Trade (DG Trade), based in Brussels. Community
industry can apply to have an anti-dumping investigation begin. DG Trade first
investigates the standing of the complainants. If they are found to represent at least
25% of community industry, the investigation will probably begin. The process is
guided by quite specific guidance in the regulations. The DG Trade will make a
recommendation to a committee known as the Anti-Dumping Advisory Committee,
on which each member state has one vote. Member states abstaining will be treated
as if they voted in favour of industrial protection, a voting system which has come
under considerable criticism.

As is implied by the criterion for beginning an investigation, EU anti-dumping actions

are primarily considered part of a "trade defence" portfolio. Consumer interests and
non-industry related interests ("community interests") are not emphasized during an
investigation. An investigation typically looks for damage caused by dumping to
community producers, and the level of tariff set is based on the damage done to
community producers by dumping.

If consensus is not found, the decision goes to the European Council.

If imposed, duties last for five years theoretically. In practice they last at least a year
longer, because expiry reviews are usually initiated at the end of the five years, and
during the review process the status-quo is maintained.
Agricultural support
European Union and Common Agricultural Policy

The Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union has often been accused of
dumping though significant reforms were made as part of the Agreement on
Agriculture at the Uruguay round of GATT negotiations in 1992 and in subsequent
incremental reforms, notably the Luxembourg Agreement in 2003. Initially the CAP
sought to increase European agricultural production and provide support to
European farmers through a process of market intervention whereby a special fund -
the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) - would buy up
surplus agricultural produce if the price fell below a certain centrally determined level
(the intervention level). Through this measure European farmers were given a
'guaranteed' price for their produce when sold in the European community. In
addition to this internal measure a system of export reimbursements ensured that
European produce sold outside of the European community would sell at or below
world prices at no detriment to the European producer. This policy was heavily
criticised as distorting world trade and since 1992 the policy has moved away from
market intervention and towards direct payments to farmers regardless of production
(a process of "decoupling"). Furthermore the payments are generally dependent on
the farmer fulfilling certain environmental or animal welfare requirements so as to
encourage responsible, sustainable farming in what is termed 'multifunctional'
agricultural subsidies - that is, the social, environmental and other benefits from
subsidies that do not include a simple increase in production

LITERATURE REVIEW :-

The calculation of dumping margins is extremely complicated. Businesses are often

shocked to find that they have been accused of pricing unfairly. For example, many
businesses are aware that their export sales are profitable overall yet they do not
realise that there can still be problems of dumping. The structure of dumping
calculations is such that dumping can easily be occurring in such a situation. Great
care needs to be taken in making simple calculations to check if dumping is
occurring or not.

In order to achieve any element of certainty in avoiding dumped prices, professional

assistance is almost certainly required. However, several tips can be provided to
companies that are looking to avoid dumping when exporting to certain markets.
These tips are based standards set by the WTO anti-dumping agreement. This
means that they should be relevant to most export markets.
IMPACT OF DUMPING ON DIFFERNT SECTORS:-
Color TV Manufacturers

Perhaps the most publicized antidumping case against China in recent years is the
one involving color TV manufacturers. In 1991 a group of European TV makers led
by the Netherlands' firm Philips filed dumping charges to the European Union
claiming that Chinese companies were selling color TV below normal value in the
European market. Due to the lack of interest of Chinese companies to provide the
required information, the EU had not other option but to use Singapore as a third
country for comparison. The results have been very destructive. The EU imposed a
15.5 percent antidumping tax on color TV in 1991. This tax rate was increase in 1995
to 25.6 percent and in 1998 to 44.6 percent (China Daily, 2000). This tax on TV
imports from China has tremendously affected the industry. One company alone was
able to export 300,000 TV sets to the European Union in 1993. In 1999, all Chinese
TV makers combined only exported approximately 30,000 sets to the EU (China
Daily). Chinese enterprises blame the EU's ignorance of the TV industry in China. "In
China, domestically-made color TV's are well known for their low prices, the result of
several years of price wars among Chinese TV makers" (China Biz). They also claim
that it is unfair to use Singapore as the country for comparison since production and
labor costs are much lower in China. This recent increase in tax rate has awaken
Chinese companies and public statements condemning EU measures has risen in
the past two years. In August 2000, seven Chinese TV manufacturers (Amoisonic,
Changhong, TCL, Hisense, Skyworth, Panda, and Furi) joined forces to appeal the
case and do everything possible to alleviate the situation.

Steel Cable Producers

Another case that also attracted media attention was the one concerning Chinese
steel cable producers. In March 2000 the US Department of Commerce, after
concluding its investigation, levied antidumping duties ranging from 24 percent to
119 percent on Chinese steel cable imports. However, later in the year, the US
International Trade Commission decided to stop investigating the case without
adopting antidumping measures. The Commission did not find any evidence to
suggest that made-in-China steel cables had done substantial damage or posed
threat of damage to US steel cable industry (Elecmotor.com). According to China
Chamber of Commerce for Metals, Minerals, and Chemicals Importers and Exporters
(CCCMC), the initial dumping margin found by Commerce was based on much
higher prices charged by countries other than China. Commerce agreed to
reconsider the method of computation and accepted Chinese companies arguments.
However, it still maintains that Chinese companies had dumped steel cable in the US
market, although not at the rate initially calculated .
 Dumping selling goods at less than the normal price, usually as
exports in international trade. It may be done by a producer, a group of producers, or
a nation. Dumping is usually done to drive competitors off the market and secure a
monopoly, or to hinder foreign competition. To counterbalance international
dumping, nations often resort to flexible tariffs. In international trade, acute
competition from foreign producers often leads to charges of dumping. A policy of
dumping depends for its effectiveness on the possibility of maintaining separate
domestic and foreign markets, on monopolistic influences maintaining a high price in
the home market, on export bounties, or on low import duties in the foreign market.
Dumping disturbs those markets that receive dumped goods, and it may drive local
producers out of business. Governments may condone, or even sponsor, dumping in
other markets for either political reasons or to achieve a more favourable balance of
payments. In the late 19th cent., dumping became part of the trade policy of great
European cartels, especially German cartels. Britain, France, Japan, and the United
States also have practiced dumping. Antidumping legislation was first passed (1904)
by Canada. In the United States various tariff acts have been passed to deal with
different types of dumping; in particular the 1921 Emergency Tariff Act imposed
special duties on goods imported for sale at less than their fair value or cost of
production. It was amended by the Customs Simplification Act of 1954. The General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) prohibits dumping and provides for
increased import duties to combat the practice .

WTO VIEWS ABOUT DUMPING

Since the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established, China has made large-
scale efforts to shape its trade remedy system through legal and organizational
changes. Through these changes, China could clarify the meanings of WTO anti-
dumping provisions including the provision relating to the definition of domestic
industry. Moreover, procedural disciplines on reviews were fortified in Chinese anti-
dumping system. While the overall improvements to the trade remedy system of
China are evident, definitions of several key legal terms, including the concept of
“related producers”, the negligible import standard, and adjustment factors for a fair
comparison between normal values and export prices are still absent, and some
legal problems relating to price undertakings and the countermeasure system remain
to be solved. China should continue to proceed with the task of clarification and
improvement of its trade rules.

China has taken steps to reform and modernize its trade regulatory system in its bid
to enter the World Trade Organization (WTO), and as a result of pressure from its
trading partners. As China has accelerated its market liberalization process after the
establishment of the WTO, tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade have been
substantially relaxed. As a result, it has been necessary to protect some domestic
industries which are unable to compete with foreign exporters and to provide
remedies for injuries to domestic firms caused by unfair trade practices. Therefore,
China has made large-scale efforts to build its trade remedy system in its short
history of trade remedy regulation.

The principal law governing foreign trade relations of China is the “Foreign Trade
Law of the People's Republic of China”. This law comprises 11 chapters covering
general provisions, foreign trade dealers, import and export of goods and
technologies, international trade in services, protection of trade-related aspects of
intellectual property rights, foreign trade order, foreign trade investigations, foreign
trade remedies, foreign trade promotion, legal liabilities and supplementary
provisions. Anti-Dumping Regulations is included in the chapter on foreign trade
remedy measures.

In order to elaborate these rules on the trade remedies, the State Council of China
promulgated rules and procedures on anti-dumping and countervailing duties in
1997, which is the “Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Regulations of the People's
Republic of China” (often called the “old Regulations”). When the Regulations was
drafted, the only experience China had in regard to anti-dumping regulations was
defending its firms in anti-dumping investigations conducted by other WTO
members. It was not until the end of 1997 that China initiated its first anti-dumping
investigation in the newsprint case. Therefore, even though the regulations had been
drafted by referring to the WTO Anti-Dumping and Subsidy and Countervailing
Measures (SCM) Agreements, many of its provisions were rather general, offering
little guidance on how to apply the rules in practice. Moreover, several provisions
were different from those of the WTO agreements. During China's accession
negotiation to the WTO, some WTO Members raised concerns that as a result of
applying these provisions, trade remedy investigations by Chinese authorities would
be found to be inconsistent with WTO rules if China were a Member of the WTO.

As part of its accession package, China committed to make its trade laws and
regulations compatible with the WTO agreements. Thereafter, China repealed the
old regulations and enacted two new Regulations, i.e. the “Anti-Dumping
Regulations” and the “Anti-Subsidy Regulations” by separating anti-dumping issues
from subsidy-countervailing issues. These Regulations became effective on 1
January 2002, shortly after the National People's Congress of China ratified its
accession to the WTO. The new Anti-Dumping Regulations prescribes detailed and
comprehensive rules on anti-dumping with 59 articles over six chapters. These rules
were elaborated by many provisional rules promulgated by the then MOFTEC and
the State Economics and Trade Commission (SETC).

According to Article 71 of the Law on Legislations of China, for subject matters within
their spheres of authority, ministries, commissions and other subsidiary bodies under
the State Council may issue implementing rules pursuant to national laws,
administrative regulations and decisions and orders of the State Council. In practice,
these rules often take the form of provisional rules where there is no law or
administrative regulations currently in place, or where the National People's
Congress or the State Council is not yet ready to draft legislation for a specific
subject but there is an urgent need for the regulations. Provisional rules are intended
to be gradually replaced by definitive laws or administrative regulations.
This article will analyse the anti-dumping legal system of China focusing on its
procedural aspects. For this purpose, the Foreign Trade Law, the Pursuant to the
National People's Congress Decision on the Institutional Reform of the State Council
and State Council's Notice on Institutional Organization, the central government of
China went through a major restructuring in March 2003. As a result, the Ministry of
Commerce (MOFCOM) was established to take over parts of the responsibilities of
the MOFTEC and SETC, which include the role of regulating dumping and subsidy
practices. In light of this organizational change, the Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy
Regulations were revised in March 2004 and made effective on 1 June 2004. The
Anti-Dumping Regulations of 2004 covers a wide variety of subjects ranging from the
determination of dumping, calculation of margins, injury determinations, investigation
procedure, anti-dumping duty, price undertaking, sunset review and notifications. In
October 2003, MOFCOM promulgated the “Rules on Industry Injury of Anti-Dumping
Investigation” and the “Rules on Industry Injury of Anti-Subsidy Investigation.”

Anti-Dumping Regulations, the provisional rules and the MOFCOM rules will be
examined. Procedural rules under these laws and regulations will be compared with
those of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement in order to examine whether the
Chinese anti-dumping laws and regulations are consistent with the WTO rules.

Petition for investigation, and determination of the

scope of domestic industry

The Foreign Trade Law of China grants “the authority to conduct anti-dumping
investigations” to a State Council ministry responsible for foreign trade. According to
the National People's Congress Decision on the Institutional Reform of the State
Council and State Council's Notice on Institutional Organization, this authority is
currently exercised by MOFCOM, which may either initiate the investigations by itself
or upon receiving petitions from domestic industry. The Anti-Dumping Regulations of
China recognizes the right of petition by providing that “a domestic industry or a
natural person, legal person or relevant organization representing a domestic
industry may file a written application for an anti-dumping investigation to the
MOFCOM”.

The issue of standing to file petitions is prescribed in the Provisional Rules on

Initiation of Anti-Dumping Investigations. According to these rules, an application is
considered to have been made by or on behalf of the domestic industry and an anti-
dumping investigation may be initiated, if the application is supported by those
domestic producers whose collective output constitutes more than 50 per cent of the
total output of the like products produced by that portion of the domestic industry
expressing either support for or opposition to the application and such output
accounts for at least 25 per cent of total production of the like domestic product. If
the domestic industry is fragmented and involving a large number of producers,
MOFCOM may examine the standing of the applicant by using statistically valid
sampling methods.

According to the Chinese regulations and provisional rules, the term “domestic
industry” means the domestic producers as a whole of the like products within China
or those of them whose collective output of the product constitutes a “major
proportion” of the total production of those products, and “major proportion” means
“more than 50 per cent.” Certain domestic producers are excluded from the scope of
the domestic industry when the producers are “related” to the exporters or importers,
or are “themselves importers” of the dumped imports or like products.

In addition, the provisional rules include a “regional industry” concept. According to

this, the producers located in a certain area of the domestic market may be regarded
as a separate industry (regional industry), provided that they sell all or almost all of
their production of the like products in that market, and the demand for the like
products in that market is not to any substantial degree supplied by the producers
located elsewhere in China. When determining such a regional industry, sales
performance and demands for the product in the region must be taken into account.

Several aspects of these Chinese rules and regulations can be examined by

comparison with WTO jurisprudence. The first point of analysis is the concept of
domestic industry. How to define the concept of “domestic industry” is an issue
necessarily related to such matters as standing, injury determination, and the scope
of products subject to anti-dumping duties. According to the WTO Anti-Dumping
Agreement, the term ‘domestic industry’ refers to the domestic producers as a whole
of the like products or to those of them whose collective output of the products
constitutes “a major proportion” of the total domestic production of like
products.Because the term “a major proportion” is not defined in the WTO Anti-
Dumping Agreement, controversy may arise as to the interpretation of the term.

In Argentina-Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties, for example, Brazil as the complaining

party claimed that, because “a major proportion” means “the majority” (i.e., more
than 50 per cent), Argentina violated WTO rules by defining the domestic industry as
producers whose collective output constituted 46 per cent of the total domestic
production and collecting injury data as to those producers.

Against this claim, Argentina (the defending party) and the United States and EC
(third parties) argued that the use of the words “a major proportion”—different from
“the major proportion”—indicate that there could be more than one major proportion.
According to them, “a major proportion” means an “unusually important, serious or
significant” proportion, not necessarily the majority. As reasons for this interpretation
the United States and EC submitted that:

1. the fact that the drafters of the domestic industry clause did not explicitly state
“50 per cent” as opposed to the case of Article 5.4 (50 per cent standing
requirement) shows that they intended a different standard;

2. according to Article 5.4, an application may be considered to have been made

“on behalf of the domestic industry” even if the producers which support it
represent less than 50 per cent of the domestic production. With the same
token, “a major proportion” in Article 4.1 can be less than 50 per cent;

3. Article 4.1 merely contains a definition of “domestic industry”, and does not
impose any obligation on Members.
While denying the US claim that Article 4.1 is a mere definition clause, the panel
agreed with the United States and EC that it is permissible to define the “domestic
industry” in terms of domestic producers of an important, serious or significant
proportion of total domestic production.

This issue is also hotly debated in the current DDA negotiations on Rules. The Anti-
Dumping Friends Group, for example, has proposed the 50 per cent threshold rule.
According to the group, this clear threshold, if adopted, could enhance consistency
of injury determinations in anti-dumping investigation procedures. Regardless of
which approach is used, the Chinese Regulations seems to be consistent with WTO
rules because “more than 50 per cent” certainly qualifies as a “major” proportion.
This rule is a good example of clarification of the meaning of WTO provisions.

Second, the scope of producers excluded from the concept of domestic industry is
another point of analysis. The WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement enables its members
to exclude from the scope of domestic industry the so-called “related producers”, i.e.
domestic producers who are “related” to the exporters or importers or are
“themselves importers” of the allegedly dumped product. The Agreement has the
following definition clause for the word “related” which uses the relationship of
“control” as the major criterion. Producers shall be deemed to be related to exporters
or importers only if (a) one of them directly or indirectly controls the other; or (b) both
of them are directly or indirectly controlled by a third person; or (c) together they
directly or indirectly control a third person, provided that there are grounds for
believing or suspecting that the effect of the relationship is such as to cause the
producer concerned to behave differently from non-related producers. Under the
Chinese rules, investigating authorities may exclude domestic producers who are
“related” to the exporters or importers or are “themselves importers” of the allegedly
dumped product. A problem of inconsistency may arise, however, if an excessive
exclusion occurs. What is enabled by the WTO agreement is to exclude certain
related producers as defined by the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The Anti-Dumping
Agreement imposes two-fold conditions to qualify as “related producers”: (i)
existence of the relationship of “control”; and (ii) any grounds for suspecting that
effects of the relationship will cause the producer concerned to behave differently
from non-related producers. Given that they are substantive requirements for the
exclusion of related producers, the burden of proving whether these conditions are
met in a specific case must be borne by the side that is attempting to exclude certain
producers from the scope of domestic industry by the reason of alleged existence of
control relationship. That is, if an investigation authority tries to circumscribe a
domestic industry by excluding certain domestic producers, the authority is not only
required to establish that there is a control relationship between the producers and
exporters or importers, but also is required to present any grounds of suspicion that
the relationship will cause their different behaviour. Therefore, if the authority, when
making related producer determinations, omits examinations of either condition or
shifts its burden of proof to exporters or petitioners, WTO rules in this regard will be
violated.

It is possible that MOFCOM may define related producers in a broader sense than
as defined under the WTO agreement. This may happen, for example, when the
second condition is not examined, or in the case of the shift of the burden of proof. If
such broader interpretation occurs, any producers who are otherwise unrelated to
exporters or importers could be treated as related producers and excluded from the
scope of domestic industry. Given that there is no definition clause of the term
“related” under the Chinese law and regulations (as opposed to in the WTO
agreement), such possibility of excessive exclusion and WTO inconsistency is
always latent.

Third, it seems that the regional industry provision under the Chinese Regulations is
consistent with the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement in that both are stipulating the
same factors (i.e. sales performance and demands) as criteria to recognize a
separate domestic industry. Even though it has been rarely used, in practice, by the
MOFCOM, this provision is very useful to China given the great size of the Chinese
territory. According to WTO rules, once a regional industry is recognized, anti-
dumping duties should be levied in principle only on the products in question
consigned for final consumption to that specific region.This point must be kept in
mind by Chinese authorities in making decisions.

Determination of dumping margin

The margin of dumping is the amount by which the export price of an imported
product is less than its normal value. Therefore, how to compare the export price
with the normal value is an important issue in determining dumping margins.

According to Anti-Dumping Regulations of China, MOFCOM may choose two

methods of comparison: first, compare the weighted average normal value with the
weighted average prices in all comparable export transactions (“A-to-A comparison”);
second, compare the normal value with the export price on a transaction-to-
transaction basis (“T-to-T comparison”). Where the export prices differ significantly
among different purchasers, regions or time periods, and therefore it is difficult to
make comparison by using these methods, comparison may be made between the
weighted average normal value and prices of individual export transactions (“A-to-T
comparison”). These provisions resulted from efforts to elaborate and improve the
rules under the old Regulations, which had simply provided that export prices and
normal values should be compared according to “fair and reasonable means”.

According to the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, the investigating authorities may

use the A-to-T comparison method only in exceptional circumstances. If the method
is used, the authorities must “provide an explanation” as to why it is not appropriate
to take normal A-to-A or T-to-T comparison methods. This means that a burden of
showing an existence of the exceptional circumstances must be borne by the
investigating authorities.

Under Chinese Regulations, the authorities may adopt the A-to-T method in
exceptional circumstances, but there is no explicit obligation for the authority to
explain its reason. As a consequence, in many investigations, the burden of proving
exceptional circumstances might be shifted from the authority to the exporters or
producers subject to investigations. Moreover, under the WTO anti-dumping rules,
WTO panels may only determine whether the authorities' establishment of the facts
was proper and whether their evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective.
Hence, if a WTO dispute arises against MOFCOM's use of A-to-T methods, the
complaining party must not only prove that there were no special circumstances, but
also show that MOFCOM's evaluation of facts (i.e. MOFCOM's decision that there
exist special circumstances) was biased and not objective. This is a heavy burden
for the exporters or producers subject to anti-dumping investigations. If MOFCOM,
upon using the A-to-T method, does not explain why normal methods of comparison
cannot be used in light of a pattern of export prices which differ significantly among
different purchasers, regions or time periods, violation of WTO rules may occur.

Another problem in the Chinese legal system is that notwithstanding amendment of

the old Regulations, it has not specified what kinds of adjustment factors must be
considered in making a fair comparison between normal values and export prices.
For such consideration, the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement elaborates various
factors in terms of time and transaction level of comparison. The issues of
conversion of currencies and fluctuations in exchange rates are also addressed. By
comparison, Chinese Regulations have a simple clause of principle providing that “A
fair and reasonable comparison shall be made between the export price and the
normal value of an imported product, with due allowance for factors which affect
price comparability”. What are these factors and how to consider them are questions
that are totally left to the discretion of Chinese authorities. Such wide discretion
might be inconsistent with WTO rules.

Price undertakings 
During the period of an anti-dumping investigation, an exporter of the dumped
imports may offer MOFCOM an undertaking to revise its prices or to cease exporting
at dumped prices. This undertaking is called the “price undertaking”. Provisional
Rules on Price Undertaking of China defines it as follows: The term “Price
Undertakings” mentioned in these Rules refers to undertakings voluntarily offered to
[MOFCOM] by exporters and producers who have responded to an antidumping
investigation by way of revising prices or ceasing exports of the product under
investigation at dumped prices, and accepted by [MOFCOM], in order to suspend or
terminate the said investigation. MOFCOM may make price undertaking offers, but it
must not force exporters to accept the offers. The fact that exporters or producers do
not offer a price undertaking or do not accept a suggested price undertaking must in
no way prejudice the proper investigation and determination of dumping and
dumping margin If MOFCOM considers that price undertaking offers made by
exporters are acceptable, it may decide to suspend or terminate the anti-dumping
investigation without applying provisional anti-dumping measures or imposing anti-
dumping duties. The decision of suspension or termination must be published. If
MOFCOM does not accept a price undertaking offer, it must provide reasons for the
non-acceptance to the exporters concerned. Price undertakings must not be sought
or accepted unless the investigating authorities have made a preliminary affirmative
determination of dumping and injury.

Notwithstanding the suspension or termination of the investigation, MOFCOM may

still continue the investigation of dumping and injury upon the request of the
exporters or if itself deems necessary Upon the conclusion of such investigation, the
price undertaking will either automatically lapse if a negative determination is made
on dumping or injury, or remain in force if the determination is affirmative. 7MOFCOM
may require the exporter from whom an undertaking has been accepted to
periodically provide information and documentation relevant to the fulfillment of such
an undertaking, and verify such information and documentation. These powers of the
MOFCOM are necessary to monitor status of implementations of undertaking
agreements.

Other than these provisions, Chinese rules and regulations have many detailed
procedural provisions on price undertakings. Most of them do not conflict with the
WTO Agreement because they address procedural issues that are not covered in the
WTO Agreement.

However, two aspects of Chinese rules might be inconsistent with WTO rules. First,
the Provisional Rules on Price Undertakings provide that MOFCOM may accept only
undertaking proposals submitted by “exporters who have been sufficiently
cooperative during the investigation procedure”. According to the WTO Agreement,
undertakings offered need not be accepted if the authorities consider their
acceptance “impractical” or for reasons of “general policy”, and upon rejecting,
authorities should provide to the exporter the reasons of rejection and an opportunity
to make comments.

Absent a standard of determination of being “sufficiently cooperative” and without a

consistent application of the standard to actual cases, it will be difficult to see that
any rejection of undertaking offers by reason of lack of “sufficient cooperation” is
based on any reason consistent with WTO rules. In addition, if Chinese authorities
do not provide the exporter the reasons of rejection or an opportunity to make
comments, violation of WTO rules will arise. In its written reply to questions from
Mexico in the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, China explained that, if a
company does not cooperate during the investigation process, it would be difficult to
determine whether the company's observance of such price undertaking could be
effectively monitored. Thus, China deems that it is impractical to accept such offers.
This rationale is not persuasive, however, because there is no necessary correlation
between the behaviours of the companies during the investigation process and the
undertaking implementation process. Moreover, Article 8.6 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement has already provided the anti-dumping authorities with effective tools of
monitoring uncooperative exporters, i.e. the power to collect information from the
exporters and to apply provisional measures using the best information available in
the event of violation of an undertaking.

Secondly, according to the Chinese Anti-Dumping Regulations, if exporters breach

price undertaking arrangements, Chinese authorities may resume investigations
based on the best information available, and decide to apply provisional measures
and levy anti-dumping duties retroactively on the products imported within 90 days
prior to the application of such provisional anti-dumping measures, provided that the
products imported before the violation of the undertaking are not subject to such
retroactive duties. This rule of a “90 days retroactive application” has no problem of
inconsistency because basically it conforms to WTO rules.

The Provisional Rules on Price Undertakings further stipulates that if the definitive
anti-dumping duty established in the final determination is lower than the amount of
cash deposit established in the preliminary determination, the difference must be
refunded. This provision is compatible with the principle of refund under the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.

However, a serious problem of inconsistency with WTO rules arises from the
subsequent part of the rules stating that “if the definitive anti-dumping duty
established in the final determination is higher than the amount of cash deposit
established in the preliminary determination, the difference shall be levied”.

According to the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, in case of violation of an

undertaking, the authorities may take provisional measures using the best
information available. In such cases, definitive duties may be levied “in accordance
with this Agreement” on products entered for consumption not more than 90 days
before the application of such provisional measures. Another WTO provision
stipulates that “if the definitive anti-dumping duty is higher than the provisional duty
paid or payable, the difference shall not be collected”. This provision has no
exception clause that is applicable for the case of violation of price undertakings.

From these WTO rules, it can be concluded that any collection of the differences (if
the definitive anti-dumping duty is higher than the provisional duty paid or payable) in
the case of violation of undertakings cannot be qualified as levying definitive duties
“in accordance with this Agreement” within the meaning of WTO rules. Such
collection will lead to violation of the WTO Agreement.

Indeed, it is difficult to find any policy rationale to collect such differences from the
exporter or producer who had breached undertakings. It is not likely that exporters or
producers trying to breach undertakings will be discouraged from doing so because
of possible retroactive collection of differences. The exporters or producers are fully
aware that they will be subject to the disadvantage of the best information rule
available in the case of breach, and therefore, any possible retroactive collection is
not likely to further discourage them. In other words, as deterrence against breach of
undertakings, immediate imposition of provisional duties based on the best
information available will be sufficient. Additional punishment of the retroactive
collection of duties only upon exporters or producers who have breached
undertakings can hardly be justified.

The requirements of an anti-dumping complaint

The particular requirements of a complaint will be set out in the legislation of the
country concerned. However, as a minimum, complaints will have to contain the
information required by the WTO anti-dumping agreement .
• Identity of the complainant (either an individual company or an association of
producers) and the products produced by it which are affected by the
allegedly dumped imports.

• Volume and value of domestic production of product concerned accounted for

by complainants.

• Description of the allegedly dumped products.

 • The exporting countries concerned and the identity of all producers/exporters
who are known together with details of known importers.

• Information on prices at which product is sold, both domestically and when

exported to market of complainants.

• How these imports have affected the development of the domestic market and
led to injury to the domestic industry particularly in terms of trends in key
economic indicators such as market share, production and profitability.

CONCLUSION:-

China's modern legal system, dating from reforms begun in 1978, is barely over two
and a half decades old. Trade remedy regulations of China merely dates back to the
establishment of the WTO. During this short period of time, China made large-scale
efforts to shape its trade remedy system through legal and organizational changes.
While the overall improvements to the trade remedy system of China are evident,
definitions of several key legal terms are absent, and some legal problems and
issues remain to be solved and clarified. Of course, the silence in Chinese law and
regulations per se does not lead to violations of WTO obligations. In many parts of
the Chinese laws and regulations, such as Article 142 of the General Principles of
the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China and Article 9 of Rules on
Administrative Cases on International Trade, it is declared that the domestic laws of
China must be interpreted in a way that is most compatible with its international
obligations. In addition, the Chinese government has frequently indicated its
willingness to observe WTO rules when there are no corresponding provisions in its
domestic laws.118 Beyond this declaration of the principle of interpretation of domestic
laws and expression of political will, China should continue to proceed with the task
of clarification and improvement of its trade rules.

It seems that with the establishment of MOFCOM, organizational reforms in the

Chinese trade remedy system have been completed. The Ministry, as a new
organization in charge of trade remedy matters, will adopt many procedural rules
replacing temporary rules made by MOFTEC and SETC. In this process, such
problems and issues as identified in this article must be duly dealt with in order to
make the system more transparent and consistent with international norms.

Given the size of Chinese economy and the influence of Chinese trade remedy
policies, this issue is vital and pressing not only to Chinese domestic enterprises and
consumers, but also to most of the trading communities in the world.