Enchiridion (with a Selection from the Discourses)

ENCHIRIDION

(WITH A SELECTION FROM THE DISCOURSES)

By EPICTETUS

Translated By GEORGE LONG

Introduction by T. W. ROLLESTON

Enchiridion (with a Selection from the Discourses)

By Epictetus

Translated by George Long

Introduction by T. W. Rolleston

Print ISBN 13: 978-1-4209-7506-2

eBook ISBN 13: 978-1-4209-7673-1

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Cover Image: A detail of an engraved frontispiece from Edward Ivie’s Latin translation (or versification) of Epictetus’ Enchiridion, printed in Oxford in 1751. Colorization by Stephen Morrison. Colorization copyright 2016, Digireads.com Publishing.

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CONTENTS

LIFE OF EPICTETUS

INTRODUCTION

ENCHIRIDION

A SELECTION FROM THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

Life of Epictetus

Very little is known of the life of Epictetus. It is said that he was a native of Hierapolis in Phrygia, a town between the Maeander and a branch of the Maeander named the Lycus. Hierapolis is mentioned in the epistle of Paul to the people of Colossae (Coloss. iv., 13); from which it has been concluded that there was a Christian church in Hierapolis in the time of the apostle. The date of the birth of Epictetus is unknown. The only recorded fact of his early life is that he was a slave in Rome, and his master was Epaphroditus, a profligate freedman of the Emperor Nero. There is a story that the master broke his slave’s leg by torturing him; but it is better to trust to the evidence of Simplicius, the commentator on the Enchiridion, or Manual, who says that Epictetus was weak in body and lame from an early age. It is not said how he became a slave; but it has been asserted in modern times that the parents sold the child. I have not, however, found any authority for this statement.

It may be supposed that the young slave showed intelligence, for his master sent or permitted him to attend the lectures of C. Musonius Rufus, an eminent Stoic philosopher. It may seem strange that such a master should have wished to have his slave made into a philosopher; but Garnier, the author of a Memoire sur les Ouvrages d’Epictete, explains this matter very well in a communication to Schweighaeuser. Garnier says: Epictetus, born at Hierapolis of Phrygia of poor parents, was indebted apparently for the advantages of a good education to the whim, which was common at the end of the Republic and under the first emperors, among the great of Rome to reckon among their numerous slaves grammarians, poets, rhetoricians, and philosophers, in the same way as rich financiers in these later ages have been led to form at a great cost rich and numerous libraries. This supposition is the only one which can explain to us how a wretched child, born as poor as Irus, had received a good education, and how a rigid Stoic was the slave of Epaphroditus, one of the officers of the imperial guard. For we cannot suspect that it was through predilection for the Stoic doctrine, and for his own use, that the confidant and the minister of the debaucheries of Nero would have desired to possess such a slave.

Some writers assume that Epictetus was manumitted by his master, but I can find no evidence for this statement. Epaphroditus accompanied Nero when he fled from Rome before his enemies, and he aided the miserable tyrant in killing himself. Domitian (Sueton., Domit. 14), afterwards put Epaphroditus to death for this service to Nero. We may conclude that Epictetus in some way obtained his freedom, and that he began to teach at Rome; but after the expulsion of the philosophers from Rome by Domitian, A.D. 89, he retired to Nicopolis in Epirus, a city built by Augustus to commemorate the victory at Actium. Epictetus opened a school or lecture room at Nicopolis, where he taught till he was an old man. The time of his death is unknown. Epictetus was never married, as we learn from Lucian (Demonax, c. 55, torn, ii., ed. Hemsterh., p. 393). When Epictetus was finding fault with Demonax, and advising him to take a wife and beget children, for this also, as Epictetus said, was a philosopher’s duty, to leave in place of himself another in the universe, Demonax refuted the doctrine by answering: Give me then, Epictetus, one of your own daughters. Simplicius says (Comment., c. 46, p. 432, ed. Schweigh.) that Epictetus lived alone a long time. At last he took a woman into his house as a nurse for a child, which one of Epictetus’ friends was going to expose on account of his poverty, but Epictetus took the child and brought it up.

Epictetus wrote nothing; and all that we have under his name was written by an affectionate pupil, Arrian, afterwards the historian of Alexander the Great, who, as he tells us, took down in writing the philosopher’s discourses (Epistle of Arrian to Lucius Gellius, p. i). These Discourses formed eight books, but only four are extant under the title of Epichtaeton diatribai. Simplicius, in his commentary on the Enchiridion or Manual, states that this work also was put together by Arrian, who selected from the discourses of Epictetus what he considered to be most useful, and most necessary, and most adapted to move men’s minds. Simplicius also says that the contents of the Enchiridion are found nearly altogether and in the same words in various parts of the Discourses. Arrian also wrote a work on the life and death of Epictetus. The events of the philosopher’s studious life were probably not many nor remarkable; but we should have been glad if this work had been preserved, which told, as Simplicius says, what kind of man Epictetus was.

Photius (Biblioth., 58) mentions among Arrian’s works Conversations with Epictetus, in twelve books. Upton thinks that this work is only another name for the Discourses, and that Photius has made the mistake of taking the Conversations to be a different work from the Discourses. Yet Photius has enumerated eight books of the Discourses and twelve books of the Conversations. Schweighaeuser observes that Photius had not seen these works of Arrian on Epictetus, for so he concludes from the brief notice of these works by Photius. The fact is that Photius does not say that he had read these books, as he generally does when he is speaking of the books which he enumerates in his Bibliotheca. The conclusion is that we are not certain that there was a work of Arrian entitled The Conversations of Epictetus.

Upton remarks in a note on iii., 23 (p. 184, Trans.), that there are many passages in these dissertations which are ambiguous or rather confused on account of the small questions, and because the matter is not expanded by oratorical copiousness, not to mention other causes. The discourses of Epictetus, it is supposed, were spoken extempore, and so one thing after another would come into the thoughts of the speaker (Wolf). Schweighaeuser also observes in a note (ii., 336 of his edition) that the connection of the discourse is sometimes obscure through the omission of some words which are necessary to indicate the connection of the thoughts. The reader then will find that he cannot always understand Epictetus, if he does not read him very carefully, and some passages more than once. He must also think and reflect, or he will miss the meaning. I do not say that the book is worth all this trouble. Every man must judge for himself. But I should not have translated the book, if I had not thought it worth study; and I think that all books of this kind require careful reading, if they are worth reading at all.

GEORGE LONG

1877.

Introduction

But for the zeal and ability of one disciple, we should not now possess any trustworthy account of the philosophy of Epictetus. For, like many other sages, he wrote nothing; and for us he would now be little more than a name, had not Arrian, the future historian of Alexander, taken down a very full record of the oral teaching which he had from Epictetus’ own lips in Nicopolis. This record he afterwards published in eight books (of which we now possess four), called the Discourses of Epictetus, and out of these he drew most of the materials for compiling the little work, the Enchiridion.{1} Arrian also wrote a Life of Epictetus, now unfortunately lost. The few facts about him which we know with any approach to certainty are—that he was born at Hierapolis in Phrygia; that he became (how is unknown) slave to Epaphroditus, a freedman and favourite of Nero; that while in his master’s service he attended the philosophic lectures{2} of a Stoic, C. Musonius Rufus; that he somehow obtained his freedom, and was banished from Rome about the year 90 A.D., when the tyrant Domitian, by a public edict, ‘cleared Rome of what most shamed him,’ the teachers of philosophy; that he then settled in Nicopolis, a city of Epirus, where he taught publicly for many years. It is said that Epaphroditus treated him with much cruelty, and on one occasion even broke his leg, perhaps to see whether his philosophic slave was making satisfactory progress in Stoicism under C. Musonius Rufus. But this story rests on no good authority, and is probably a mere legend which grew up to account for the undoubted fact that Epictetus was in some way crippled or deformed. Simplicius tells us he was so from an early age. He never married; it is said, however, that he adopted and brought up a child whom a friend of his, led by a sense of the inconvenience of a large family, was about to expose: a practice not condemned in those days. The date of his death we cannot determine, but there is reason to believe that he lived to a venerable age.

Such is about all we know of the history of Epictetus. And it is much to be regretted that we have no fuller means of realising to ourselves somewhat of his outward life, appearance, manners, studies—all now shrouded in that veil which hides from us all but the outline of so many distinguished figures. For this crippled slave of Hierapolis had undoubtedly a brightness and energy of intellect, a buoyancy of spirit, an instinctive sense of what is excellent in action, an instinctive aversion for all facile and unreal thinking such as few of the world’s teachers before or after him have possessed. He has the rare and important characteristic that he deserves to be read as much for what is not in him as for what is. If, as seems clear, man can never arrive at a satisfactory relation towards the problems and mysteries of life except by following out the lines of Greek thought with its resolute logic combined with reverence for that which gives the data for logic—human experience, then Epictetus ought to be held of more account than he has ever yet been, even though there were periods when he was far more fully appreciated than he is now. For though the final triumph of Hellenism, the union of sane practice with sound theory which it was the mission of Hellenism to bring about, can hardly be said to be achieved in Epictetus, yet it is at least indicated there, and the promise of it made clearly visible to discerning eyes. He did not take formal and public possession of the citadel, but he showed for the first time how it was to be won.

When Arrian was putting forth his edition of the Discourses, he wrote a preface to the work in the form of a letter to a friend, Lucius Gellius, which indirectly throws some light on the origin of the Enchiridion. On account of its general interest for readers of Epictetus, I here translate it in full:—

I did not write the words of Epictetus in the manner in which a man might write such things. Neither have I put them forth among men, since, as I say, I did not even write them [in literary form]. But whatever I heard him speak, these things I endeavoured to set down in his very words, that having written them I might preserve to myself for future times a memorial of his thought and unstudied speech. Naturally, therefore, they are such things as one man might say to another on the impulse of the moment, not such as he would write in the idea of finding readers long afterwards. Such they are, and I know not how, without my will or knowledge, they fell among men. [There seems to have been a ‘pirated’ edition of Arrian’s private memorials brought out, which he would have been unwilling to let appear, could he have helped it, in their crude state.] But to me it matters little if I shall appear an incompetent writer, and to Epictetus not at all, if anyone shall despise his words. For when he was speaking them it was evident that he had only one aim—to stir the minds of his hearers towards the best things. And if, indeed, the words here written should do this, then they will do, I think, that which the words of philosophers ought to do. But if not, let those who read them know this, that when he himself spoke them it was impossible for the hearer to avoid feeling whatever Epictetus desired he should feel. And if his words, when they are merely words, have not this effect, perhaps it is that I am in fault, perhaps it could not have been otherwise.

The style of the Discourses answers very well to the above account of their origin and purpose. They are brightly and vividly written, containing passages of great interest, but are, as a whole, wanting in unity and coherent development. Moreover, there is a great deal of this unsystematic record of Epictetus’ daily conversation. The eight books must have made up a volume sufficiently bulky and expensive to prevent the slave-philosopher from being very widely read among the class for whom his teaching was intended. And it is particularly important to notice that it was by no means intended for aristocratic amateurs in Stoicism, but for men subject every day to the stress of life,{3} workers, to whom a philosopher must speak clearly and briefly if he would have a chance of being listened to. It seems likely, then, that it was considerations such as these which induced Arrian to put together the leading principles of his master’s teaching in that inestimable little work known as the Enchiridion, or Handbook, of Epictetus.

The result has shown how wisely Arrian judged of the means necessary to make Epictetus’ influence widely felt, and to give him a permanent hold upon the human mind. For the Enchiridion, as the saying is, took; offering, as it did, an easy means of approach to the mind of a great thinker and an excellent subject for commentators and translators who wished to spread his views.{4} With its richness in illustration and in practical application, together with its unfailing grasp of principles, it has the merits at once of an abstract, and of a detailed work, and may well be regarded as holding a central position with respect to everything else that goes under the name of Epictetus. The reasons for which Arrian first produced the Enchiridion are those which distinct separation from the larger volume of Epictetus’ Discourses and Fragments. Reading it for the first time a year ago, it appeared to me that it ought to exist in English in the form which its name denotes—that of a Handbook, and that in this form it might chance to reach and to serve many who are no students of philosophy, who would never care to purchase Epictetus in his entirety, but who might be glad, nevertheless, to have a guide to plain living and high thinking which can find room in a traveler’s knapsack or a sailor’s chest.

The value of the Enchiridion, like that of every book which contains a revelation and a doctrine, must be tested, to a large extent at least, by the proveable reality of the facts which it declares and on which it builds. If these facts, in the case of Stoicism, are, as many seem to think, mere philosophic fancies, incapable of being widely verified in common experience, then let not all the lives which it has influenced and ennobled persuade us to take Stoicism, as a system, into any serious consideration. But is this so? or is not rather the main thesis of Stoicism a genuine and profound discovery of capacities which really exist in average humanity, and of paths which it can naturally and happily follow?

Without here noticing what is limited or mistaken in the teaching of the Enchiridion, let me devote a few pages towards offering a mere suggestion of its basis and drift, as they appear to me.

In the first place it must be understood that Epictetus is not a philosopher in the sense in which that word is generally used now. About the origins and destinies of things he is strictly silent, no shadow of an explanation of any metaphysical problem is to be found in him. The end of his teaching is simply to take the sting from human misery by showing that man is not, as was believed, the plaything of Fortune—that there is a way in which he can set his well-being beyond the reach of all forces which he cannot control. Stoicism, as represented by Epictetus, makes no attempt to transcend the limits of what can be actually felt, now and here. It rests upon a profound appreciation of the distinction between what we may call a man’s real and permanent, and his transitory or phantasmal self. The first man who was ever consciously a Stoic (there have been and are many unconscious ones) was he who first looked upon the world and his own nature, and observed that the things wherein he was subject to fatality and chance, which he was unable to order at his own will, were just those which either did not affect him, his real self, at all; or affected him only as he desired they should. The question, then, about Stoicism, is this, is this distinction between the real and phantasmal self a valid one—is it founded upon natural truth? Now, let no friend of the Association philosophy imagine that in this ‘real self’ of Epictetus he is being confronted with his ancient enemy, the Ego. To say that there is a real self and that there is a phantasmal self need imply no more than this—that among all the things which give pleasure there are some which afford a deeper, fuller, more permanent enjoyment than others; an enjoyment of such a kind that he who has felt it knows it to be more worth having than anything else in the world. The real self, then, is simply the soul delighting in these things, and to pursue them is said to be, in the words of the old, yet never outworn formula, ‘to live according to Nature’—to follow the course suggested to the conscious mind by experience (its own or others’) of the facts of life. And what does this experience tell us? Universally it tells us that in Righteousness and Love lie the paths of our peace. That this is so every man must verify for himself. ‘The gods’ with Epictetus are the sources of this law, and, so