THE FACTORS OF SPACE, TIME, AND FORCE Strategy is the art of making use of time and space. I am less in charge of the latter than the former. Space we can recover, lost time never. Napoleon I Space, time, and force are closely and dynamically interrelated. An operational commander must often take high risks in emphasizing one of these operational factors over another. Overcoming space always entails costs in time and force: conversely, giving up space can save time and force. Hence, balancing the operational factors in combination is an extremely complicated problem. Space—Force: Physical space is the area in which one’s and enemy forces are engaged in combat. Overcoming the factor of space involves movement of forces, effects of fires, and transmittal of messages and orders.’ Technological advances have provided better and more effective means to overcome the factor of space. Yet, if the defender has the same or similar forces, then the time the attacker needs to overcome the factor of space will be much longer.’ In 1812, it took Napoleon I eighty-three days to reach Moscow, or 8.5 miles per day. Overcoming that distance with internal combustion engines proved to be false expectation in Russia in 1941. Heat, dust, poor roads, marshy terrain, and too few stops for repairs wreaked much havoc with German armor and motorized equipment. The German army equipment was much too heavy for warfare in Russian terrain. The Germans needed 167 days to reach the outskirts of Moscow, or a rate of advance of 4.6 miles per day. In contrast, the Germans fought their way from the Ardennes to the English Channel—over 230 miles—in just twelve days, or nineteen miles per day.’ The factor of space must be controlled with the given forces to such a degree that the operation’s objectives are accomplished.’ The more distant the physical strategic objective in space, the larger will be the combat and noncombat sources of national power required to accomplish it, While a gain or loss of space, in and of itself is not inherently a disadvantage or advantage, often it is the relationship between space and force that proves most decisive in determining the success of a military effort.’ The factors of space and force have become increasingly intertwined with each other in the evolution of warfare.° History abundantly shows how important the relationship is between the size of the employment area and the strength of one’s forces operating there—and here “strength” is less a matter of numbers than it is available combat potential or combat power. A sound force-to-space ratio is one of the most critical factors in planning a major operation or campaign. This relationship becomes increasingly more important the longer the hostilities last, the greater the expanse of space involved, and the more stringent the limitations on resources.’ The force-to-space ratio is changeable and is highly dependent on, among other things: the quality of the leaders; training of one’s forces; the quality of weapons, equipment, and docirine; air superiority; the characteristics of the terrain; and security in the rear operating area."Space available for operations may be too wide, too deep, or too high for the organized forces; then the space must be divided into smaller areas. Proper spatial division of the theater of operations is envisaged when the large space is organized so the distant effect of one’s forces on the theater will have a direct influence on another. The smaller the forces, the smaller the space that will be selected and the smaller the physical objectives to be accomplished.” In the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, the initial exterior geostrategic position was highly advantageous for the Germans. The theater of operations was in the form of an irregular triangle extending some 310 miles along the north-south axis, potentially allowing the Germans to conduct a series of enveloping concentric operations. However, the entire space was too wide for the German forces used in the campaign. Because of the relatively large distances, the tactical actions in a given location would not necessarily have the desired synchronized effect on the events in other areas of the theater. The Germans divided the available space between the two army groups totaling five armies. The rapid advance of the Tenth Army from Silesia toward Warsaw in only eight days split the theater into two parts. The panzer and motorized infantry divisions of the Fourth Army moving from Pomerania reached the Vistula River at Graudenz [Grudziadz] in a few days. The purpose of this thrust was to cut off the corridor areas from the “Congress Poland” (the Kingdom of Poland established in 1815) and to further divide the theater into several areas of operations, The swift division of the theater prevented the Polish forces—some fifteen divisions in Posen [Poznan’|—from avoiding encirclement and withdrawing to the east. The shallow depth of the Polish territory prevented the remaining Polish forces from withdrawing too far because Soviet troops had been deployed on Poland’s eastern borders to advance as anticipated by the secret clauses of the Soviet-Nazi Pact of August 1939. The Germans also carried out the second envelopment in which one panzer group of the Third Army in Eastern Prussia advanced southeast to meet the Fourteenth Army on the Vistula River near Cracow (Krakow). Thus, the German forces advancing from the south to north isolated the Polish capital of Warsaw from the east and sealed its fate.'” Terrain, climate, and weather all considerably affect the movement, combat employment, support, and protection of large forces involved in major operations and campaigns.'" A movement of forces cannot be based on a simple computation of space and distance to be traversed. The effect of the peculiar characteristics of terrain or water surface over which they move must be evaluated as well. Each must be considered individually and in combination. Terrain also considerably affects the size of force required to accomplish a given objective. In general, the more difficult the terrain, the larger the attacking force that is required. Conversely, difficult terrain facilitates the defender’s task. In the Winter War of 1939-1940 the Russo-Finnish border stretched for about 1,000 miles. The biggest stretch, from the Lake Ladoga’s northern shore to the ‘Arctic Ocean was quite impenetrable, except for a few roads. This allowed the Finns to concentrate their strongest forces on the Karelian Isthmus and in the area immediately north of Ladoga to prevent the outflanking of the Mannerheim Line.” In land warfare, the space-to-force ratio in a given theater can be determined by: the number of one’s forces in the particular theater, the number of combat troops deployed along the frontline, the troop density or the number of tanks or guns per mile or kilometer of the front, and the ratio of combat to noncombat troops. The Navy and Air Force face increasing challenges of assessment ratios because of the very differentcharacteristics of forces and platforms and the way they project their combat power. Mechanically applying the ratio of forces to space and comparing them against the enemy’s can result in serious misjudgments. The factor of force is inherently difficult to calculate precisely because so many unmeasurable factors—such as morale, training, and leadership—fall within its scope. However, large numbers of troops or other forces always have their own qualities and should not be dismissed outright. In general, the size of forces should be roughly in proportion to the space they must control or obtain, A mismatch between size of physical space and strength of forces is almost always fatal. A given space must be controlled so that the principal purpose of a major operation or campaign is accomplished. The successful campaign or major operation always results in enlarging the existing space for subsequent operations. Most often the greater the force-to-space ratio, the smaller the space available to an enemy for recovery after combat action, However, sometimes, a small but highly mobile foree with high combat potential can operate in a large space and defeat a numerically superior force. In the ancient era, small and mobile armies operated successfully over large spaces and eventually controlled larger territories. Alexander the Great had fewer than 40,000 men in his campaign against Persia in 334 B.C. Hannibal at Cannae in 216 B.C had approximately 50,000 men in the field. Frederick the Great deployed an army of about 100,000 men. Tt was not until the nineteenth century that 500,000-man armies operated in a theater.’ In the past few decades, the trend has been toward steadily smaller armies. Likewise, the navies and the air forces are much smaller today than they were in World War II and in the first two decades after 1945, Napoleon I’s campaign in Russia in 1812 is a classic example of a mismatch between the size of the space and available forces."* At the beginning of the campaign in June, some 443,000 French troops, 182,000 horses, and some 1,370 guns crossed the Niemen River and began to advance into Russian territory. The Russian forces, totaling 420,000 men, were dispersed over such a large territory that only 180,000 troops were in direct opposition to the French army.'° The disparity between the French forces available for combat and those required for protection of supplies and territorial gains grew as Napoleon I advanced deeper into Russia. In six weeks he advanced about 235 miles, and extended his frontline about 620 miles from Riga via Vitebsk to the Rokitno Marshes Napoleon I's losses from combat and lack of food amounted to about one third of his initial strength. After three and a half months of fighting, Napoleon I's main force numbered 115,000 men. Meanwhile, the troops assigned to protect the single line of communications totaled 118,000 men.'* Napoleon I seized control of 100,400 square miles of Russia’s territory, an area too small to endanger the Russian Empire but too large to be controlled by his own forces. By September, the French had to defend a 560- mile supply line from Russian attack on all sides. Only 30,000 French troops were available in Riga and on the upper Dvina to protect the 550- to 620-mile-long flanks. These troops faced 98,000 men under General Count Ludwig Adolf Wittgenstein in the north and the 48,000 men of General Karl Philip Schwarzenberg in the south." After the bloody battle of Borodino on 7 September, Napoleon I had only 95,000 men left in his army. Despite his victory, the state of his troops did not allow him to resume fighting, and he ordered a general withdrawal from Russia on 18 October. By 26-28 November when Napoleon I crossed the Berezina River (in Belarus) he had only 37,000 exhaustedmen facing 144,000 Russians.'* By early December, when he reached Vilnius, he had only 4,300 men in his army!! The Soviets in their war with Finland in 1939-1940 wrongly believed that they had a favorable space-to-force ratio. The 920-mile-long Russo-Finnish border wae defended by only nine Finnish divisions, with 175,000 men and sixty obsolescent tanks ‘The Soviets massed four armies, with twenty-six to twenty-cight divisions of 1.0 million men (of the fully mobilized Leningrad Military District) and about 1,000 tanks. They also had 800 aircraft versus only 150 Finnish aircraft.”° The first phase of war, in the winter of 1939, was nonetheless a colossal failure for the Soviets due to, among other things, extremely difficult Finnish terrain, bad leadership, insufficient mobility of their forces, and unsuitable tactics and equipment for combat in woods and in winter conditions”! Neither did the Japanese fully consider the factor of space in planning their invasion of China in 1937. They erroneously viewed China as encompassing only the area from Peking (Beijing) to the Yellow River and from Shanghai to Nanking, instead of the entire Chinese territory. The Japanese objective was to seize control of the five Provinees in northern China through the employment of fifteen divisions, each of about 20,000 men. Initially committing too few forces for the task at hand, they could not achieve a quick and decisive victory despite eventually deploying twice that number of forces into China.”* The result was that Japan was drawn into a war of attrition with no end in sight. If the Japanese had properly calculated the factor of space and planned their forces correspondingly, the war in China would have probably taken a more favorable turn for them, Historically, the force-to-space ratio in land warfare has undergone many changes. In the first three years of the American Civil War, a nominal number of 12,000 fighting men were used to hold a Confederate defensive position around Richmond. As methods of defense improved, this figure dropped to about 5,000 men holding a mile of front against an enemy with double that strength. In World War 1, because of greatly improved methods of defense, the force-to-space ratio was still lower. The Germans in 1915 had a nominal ratio of one division for every five miles of front (or 3,500 men to a mile), while along the main part of the front the ratio was about 6,000 men to a mile. By 1916 the Allies had deployed 160 divisions along the Western Front, while the Germans had 120; a year later, the ratio was 180 to 140 divisions, respectively. Nevertheless, all attempts by the Allies to penetrate the German lines failed and resulted in great Allied losses, In World War Il, the force-to-space ratio varied from theater to theater. In May 1940 the Allies defended some 400 miles of front in France with 111 divisions, or approximately one division to three and a half miles of front. The Germans had an extremely favorable space-to-force ratio where it counted most, in the sector of main effort and the selected point of main attack—the area between Sedan and Dinant, In the German sector of main effort, the French deployed twenty-nine divisions to hold nearly one hundred miles of front, while the Germans deployed forty-two divisions of their crack Army Group A.”* In the Second Battle of El Alamein in November 1942, Field Marshal Rommel defended some forty miles of front with 27,000 German and 50,000 Italian soldiers, or a ratio of 2,000 men to a mile. General Montgomery attacked this force with a superiority of eight-to-one. Despite this enormous superiority, it took Allied troops some thirteentys of heavy fighting to break through the Axis lines. In the process, the Allies lost three les as many tanks as the defending Germans.2> In the battle for Normandy in the summer of 1944, the Germans stopped the lied advance despite their huge inferiority in numbers. On the ten-mile front of the U.S ‘out at Avranches, the Germans had deployed only one depleted division. For most f the time during this defensive fighting, the Germans held the eighty-mile stretch of formandy with the equivalent of only one division to each eight miles of the front, The USS. forces made a breakout in late July after eight weeks of heavy fighting.”° A highly unfavorable force-to-space ratio probably doomed the German campaign in Russia from its very beginning. The German high command never did an estimate of the situation for the entire German armed forces, nor did they seriously consider the factors of space, time, and force in their long-range planning.”’ In June 1941, the Germans deployed 130 divisions with about 1,300,000 men, 600,000 vehicles of all Kinds, and a similar number of horses, along 435 miles of front. The Germans accepted these disadvantages, despite the fact that the risk was bound to increase as the space they Progressively filled became larger and the number of troops was reduced. By the end of IDA. the German forces had advanced more than 620 miles into the depth of the enemy femitory, increasing the frontage to about 1,120 miles. By then the Germans had suffered humerous combat casualties, with no significant replacements forthcoming, Their _ Nerage infantry division was down to sixty-five percent of its original strength; the _ infantry strength of a panzer division was down to fifty percent, with losses in materiel between sixty-five and seventy-five percent. The German overall strength was about tighty-three division-equivatents—a reduction of forty-seven divisions from. the beginning of the campaign.”* This huge difference between space and forces was one of the main reasons behind the German failure to regain the initiative in the summer of 1542. This problem was compounded by Hitler’s tendency to waste away the German advantages in forces by trying to seize or hold too large an area. Hitler's directive in the summer of 1942—to seize the Caucasian oilfields and Stalingrad—resulted in changing the shape of the frontline in the south from a 375- to 435-mile-long line to a 1,245-mile forvard-protruding salient.” The German problem of force-space was further complicated because their Italian, Romanian, and Hungarian allies were poorly equipped and trained for combat on the Eastern Front.” {In both world conflicts, the principal characteristic of the war on the Eastem Front was the enormous size of the area in which combat was conducted. In their invasion of Russia in 1941, the Germans faced the problem of the enormous distances to be scized and controlled. The distance from the German starting positions on the Bug River to the Orsha Corridor (some sixty-eight miles southwest of Smolensk) was about 300 miles, while to the Volga it was about 1,100 miles." From the fall of 1941 to the fall of 1943, the German front was never less than 2,400 miles long, and for a time in 1942, it reached 3045 miles.”* After 1943, the Germans tried to resolve the problem of space-forve in Soviet Russia by improving their defensive methods and techniques. However, this Proved insufficient to counterbalance the growing space-to-force disparity, By 1944, the frontage of a German infantry division has increased to thirty miles, or one defender for every thirty yards. The terrain features and a succession of river obstacles favored the Germans during their withdrawal from Russia in 1943-1944, However, the Germans were unable to use these advantages because the ratio of troops to space became toounfavorable.”* The longer the war lasted and the casualties mounted, the fewer well- trained, professional soldiers the German army could deploy on the Eastern Front. The mismatch between the factors of space and force were exacerbated for the Germans in World War I because they had to deploy forces along almost the entire rim of the European continent, from northern Norway to Greece against possible Allied invasion or large-scale raids. Before the Allied Normandy invasion in June 1944, the Germans had in the West only sixty divisions of varied quality.’ The “Atlantic Wall” defenses extended from the eastern tip of the Netherlands about 1,245 miles to the Pyrenees; thus the German defense line in the West extended for some 3,050 miles (not including the 1,245 miles of Norwegian coastline and 250 miles of Danish coast)."* The Allies had an overall unfavorable space-force ratio during their campaign in Italy in 1943-1945. The Italian theater of operations extended for about 745 miles along its north-south axis and the Allies employed, at most, fifteen to twenty divisions, while the Germans used only sixteen divisions (another ten divisions were tied to the Balkans). The Germans offered stubbom resistance until the very end of the war. The combination of the high quality of the German troops and unfavorable terrain for offensive operations denied the Allies a quick and decisive victory in Italy. Given commitments elsewhere, the Allies never assigned enough forces to the Italian theater to ensure a speedy victory.*° Another element in calculating the force-to-space ratio is the ratio between combat and noncombat troops. The smaller this ratio is, the more unfavorable the situation in a given space. At the beginning of the German campaign against Russia in June 1941, there were three noncombatants to ten fighting men. By October 1942 this ratio had changed within each armored or infantry division to one to one.’ As the war continued, the ratio of fighters to noncombatants became progressively more unfavorable for the Germans.™* Even if the attacker succeeds in seizing an entire space and neutralizing the defending army, it is questionable whether the additional space can be fully controlled. The subjugated population might resort to widespread acts of civil disobedience, thereby complicating the attacker's problem in controlling the newly acquired space. On the other hand, the defender must calculate how much space he can safely give up without jeopardizing the inner stability. Moreover, the enemy populace might rise up against the occupier and conduct protracted guerrilla war.” This has happened to many occupying armies, as, for example, the French in Spain in 1808-1814 and the Austro-Hungarian army afier its occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878. The German Wehrmacht found itself involved in extensive actions against the insurgents in the Balkans and in Poland, and against “partisans” (guerrillas) in Sovict Russia. Likewise, the Japanese forces, after occupying a fairly large part of China after 1937, had continual difficulty in controlling the space because of widespread guerrilla activities. In World War II, control of the rear became even more critical, because of the need to protect airfields, air facilities, and installations, Additionally, the greatly increased consumption of ammunition, fuel, and other means of support required full operational control of rear areas. The German problems in their invasion of Soviet Russia in 1941-1944 were more severe because of the much larger disconnect between the factors of force and space. The large occupied area of the European Russia required additional German forces to ensure a secure link between the front and the homeland fiom the attacks of the Soviet “partisans.” The occupied area required administration andmonitoring, and agricultural and industrial sources had to be secured."® The Germans assigned only a few poor-quality forces for rear area security in Soviet Russia. This was especially surprising given the size of the operational area and the multiplicity of duties. A single security division [Sicherung Division covered 250 miles of the main railroad in White Russia. Most of the duties for rear security were assigned security divisions and the units of SS and police.*' Initially, the Germans faced the threat of perhaps 30,000 Soviet “partisans” in their rear zone and the Germans were generally successful in maintaining rear area security in Soviet Russia. The number steadily grew and by 1943 there were an estimated 400,000 to 500,000 “partisans,” or two to four percent of the total Soviet manpower. Compare this to the 200,000 to 250,000 troops the Germans employed on security duties (and of that total only half were German troops)."? German Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, CINC of Army Group South, faced a severe crisis in southern Russia in February 1943, because of a massive Soviet offensive in the aftermath of the German defeat at Stalingrad. The Soviet advance toward the Sea of Azov threatened all German forces deployed in southern Russia and the Caucasus. Von Manstein realized the mismatch between his objectives and available forces, and decided to trade space for force. First, he shortened the front of his Army Group by some 125 miles by ordering a gradual withdrawal of German forces to the sector on the Mius~ Lower Donets Rivers. He also created a new mobile and powerful 4th Panzer Army to be used as operational reserve in his subsequently highly successful counteroffensive against the Soviet forces threatening to cut off his lines of retreat, The 4th Panzer Army was redeployed in a “leap-frogging” movement [Rochade] from Rostov to the Lower Donets River, Space-Time: The commanders should evaluate the theater in terms of space and the time necessary to defeat the enemy force and accomplish the assigned objective. The factor of time is related to the battlefield area and is a first consideration so commanders can direct their reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition resources to identify targets and threats.“* The factors of space and time form another framework within which the commander directs the movement of his forces,** Any military action consists of deployment and then maneuver of forces into a space. Combat itself ends when the enemy is destroyed or neutralized in a given area. The movement of forces in space is either free or forced by the opponent and takes place within a longer or shorter time.*° While space and time must be in harmony with the objectives, space and time are not always subject to the commander's will.” Despite advances in technology, space and time factors remain today as valid as they were in the past. For the attacker, the objective is to gain space as quickly as possible, while the defender tries to keep control over space and delay or deny the attacker's objective. Therefore, any gain of time is to the advantage of the defender, because the attacker’s combat power will likely diminish over time. For a small country, giving up space would not bring any advantage, However, any gain in space would be equal to a gain in time.* Napoleon I's difficulties in his invasion of Russia in 1812 were largely due to an extremely unfavorable space-time ratio. In Russia, the influence of the factor of time was felt through the influence of climate and seasons on the time required to complete a campaign. Shortly after the start of the invasion, the rainy period transformed the land into a morass, portending slow advances.” The problems of timely coordination of troopsover long distances were felt shortly after the start of the campaign in Russia, Napoleon I’s orders took several days to arrive. He never really knew where his subordinates were, and he could not influence them directly. After Russian Generals Pyotr Bagration and Barclay de Tolly combined their efforts, a large part of the French operations plan was doomed to failure.*” Physical and climatological characteristics of space, combined with time significantly affect the employment of forces on both sides (for details see the chapter “Theater Physical Features”). A winter environment significantly increases the time required for all tasks, from constructing defensive positions and obstacles, movement of forces, and maintenance and repair. The movement of units on foot in severe cold can take five times the normal time.”! A large armored or mechanized force requires less time to transit a given space in a dry and open terrain than in mountainous terrain. Several days or heavy rain or heavy snowfall also reduces the trafficability. Drainage and soil characteristics all affect mobility of one’s forces. A well-established road and railroad network generally facilitates the movement of large forces and, therefore, decreases the factor of time, The factors of time and surprise are critically important for the attacker; the less time available for the defender’s mobilization, deployment, and concentration, the more likely the attacker is to catch the defender unprepared, Another advantage of starting early is that by seizing or controlling a certain area, one can steadily reduce the defender’s area of operations and his freedom of maneuver—and thereby control the environment.** Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, Sr. repeatedly demonstrated his superior appreciation of the space-to-time factors, The timely concentration of the Prussian armies in the attack directed from Upper Silesia to Vienna was the most decisive element in the Prussian success against the Austrians in July 1866.°> Von Moltke, Sr. believed that the Prussian deployment into Upper Silesia would take so long that the ‘Austrians would complete their movements in Bohemia, removing any chance of Prussian success. His solution was to mobilize the entire Prussian army at the beginning of the conflict. He divided his forces into three field armies that marched separately, but were concentrated on the battlefield. In land warfare, moving forces carly is usually fraught with danger. If both sides start to move troops simultaneously, or nearly simultaneously, as far forward as possible just before or after the start of the hostilities, there will not be enough space left between them. Thus, it would be difficult to concentrate forces to initiate a campaign or major operation. If both sides are approximately equally prepared for war, and their transportation system is similar, mobilization and concentration will be affected at an approximately equal rate. Therefore, an advantage may turn into a disadvantage for forces less favorably concentrated. The enemy force should be attacked before it completes its preparations. However, these advantages only weigh as such if the concentration of one’s forces have been completed.* Any movement in space requires time, as discussed. The longer the distance, the more time is required to overcome the factor of space. Also, the greater the speed and mobility, the shorter the transit time. This is especially true with regard to the effect of climate and weather in conjunction with the terrain. In his invasion of Russia in 1812, Napoleon I did not reach his objectives before the onset of a harsh continental winter. The average advance per day of the French troops in Russia was twelve and a half miles.The distance from Vilnius to the Russian border was sixty-two miles and some 340 miles separated Vilnius from Smolensk. To traverse that distance the French required about two months. An orderly retreat required the same or even more time. By late October the troops had to go into winter quarters, which meant that Napoleon I had to accomplish his operational objectives before reaching Smolensk.” Likewise, the Germans failed to reach their principal operational objectives in the fall of 1941 in Russia before the onset of the muddy season, followed by extremely harsh winter. The distance between Germany’s border and the Dnepr (Dnieper) River was about 310 miles and to Smolensk another 300 miles. The direct result of this combination of events was the failure of the German offensive against Moscow in December 1941. The early victories in 1941-1942 gave the Germans control over a huge territory in Russia. Afier the tum of the tide in the winter of 1942-1943, Hitler still had an enormous amount of space to trade for time. However, for economic, political, and psychological reasons, he opted to hold the ground at any cost. This resulted in devastating German defeats at the operational and, ultimately, the strategic level.” ‘Time-Force: Among other things, the attributes that affect the timely availability of forces include the type and size of forces and their organization, the distance to the employment area, the transportation mode, and the infrastructure in the employment area.” Sometimes the factor of distance and time available makes it impossible for a numerically stronger belligerent to concentrate superior masses in time to prevent defeat, as happened to the Imperial Russian army in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. A force defending a large space can trade space for time. Normally, the time factor will not be an advantage for the attacker, but it will benefit the defender who gives up space. If the defender is not decisively beaten, he may retain sufficient space to withstand the cnemy’s attack until the attacking force reaches its culminating point.” That is what the Russians did in their defense against Napoleon I’s invasion in 1812, and again in the German invasion in 1941. The defender must also calculate how much space he can safely give up without jeopardizing internal stability and thereby undermining one’s will to fight. In general, trading space for time does not offer a significant advantage for a small country on the defensive, such as Denmark confronting a German invasion in 1940." For Napoleon I, available time and means determined the limit of his campaign to Smolensk and Minsk in terms of the strategic objectives. Afterward, the campaign in Russia overshot its culmination point. The lack of means and underestimation of the factor of time led to the defeat of the Grande Armée.” In another example, the Austrians in June 1866 operated in a confined space that prevented them from conducting a deployment and forced them to accept battle in a place the Prussians had chosen. The Prussian First Army and the Elbe Army, by starting their movement early, penetrated Bohemia without being disturbed and thereby found sufficient space to concentrate on the battlefield. Space-Time-Force: The most complex relationship to assess, especially at the national and theater-strategic levels is that of space-time-force, which is the essence of operational art, A clear understanding of available means and their relationship to time and space is key in determining strategic objectives."° In modern times, the factor of forces has gained in significance while the factors of space and time have become relatively less important,