New America Foundation
Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper
Al-Qaeda Central
An Assessment of the Threat Posed by the Terrorist Group
Headquartered on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border
Barbara Sude
February 2010
A U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in July 2007
assessed that al-Qaeda had “protected or regenerated key
elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a
safehaven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top
leadership.”1 It was not as comfortable for the group as
Taliban-controlled Afghanistan had been before the attacks
of September 11, 2001, and the group had lost many key
personnel over the years, but the Pakistan safe haven
allowed al-Qaeda to act with virtual impunity to plan, train
for, and mount attacks. In 2009, however, U.S. officials
frequently touted al-Qaeda’s unprecedented losses of mid-
level to senior commanders since the NIE—at mid-year, for
example, as many as “11 out of 20 of the Pentagon’s most
wanted-list”2—to concerted strikes by U.S. unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the FATA. The casualties also
have included prominent regional leaders who helped
facilitate al-Qaeda’s safe haven, such as Pakistani Taliban
commander Baitullah Mehsud, killed in August. Terrorism
specialists increasingly characterized al-Qaeda leader
Osama bin Laden as a mere figurehead, and at least before
September 2009, it appeared that al-Qaeda had been
unable to train operatives for attacks in Western countries
since mid-2008 or earlier.
Barbara Sude, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, is a former al-Qaeda analyst at the CIA. She has a doctorate from
Princeton University in Near Eastern Studies, specializing in Medieval Islam.
The arguments are compelling, but analysts have
pronounced al-Qaeda dead or dying several times since it
was driven from Afghanistan. In mid-2003, for example, it
looked as if the group would not recover from the arrest of
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the jailing of other senior
leaders in Iran, but it went on to support devastating attacks
in Saudi Arabia and Turkey that year, train operatives for
attacks elsewhere, and strengthen its overseas presence. If
we measure al-Qaeda’s condition today by the criteria in the
2007 NIE, we would have to say that concerted, multi-front
counterterrorist operations have had an impact and
probably weakened the group in its mid-to-senior ranks—
possibly the worst damage since 2001. It has failed to
mount an attack in a Western country since 2005, but we
cannot definitively say al-Qaeda now lacks the capacity to
mount an operation of some sort in the United States. The
top leadership—bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri—is still
functioning, even though little is publicly known about
them beyond their media presence. Although the capability
of the group’s operational lieutenants is unclear, al-Qaeda
continues to coordinate operations with allies such as the
Pakistani and Afghan Taliban, and it retains contacts in
other countries who may be able to act in its name. The
group certainly still benefits from the same safe haven in
the FATA and seems firmly entrenched there. Arrests this
year of suspected al-Qaeda operatives in Western countries,
including the United States, speak not only to the group’s This would include both “members” who swore allegiance
weaknesses, since its attacks were thwarted, but also to its to bin Laden and close associates who worked principally
persistence in its mission despite setbacks. for al-Qaeda, and probably still describes al-Qaeda in the
Pakistan-Afghanistan region today. This is not counting the
Still al-Qaeda “the Organization” volunteers it recruited and trained in unknown numbers
since 9/11 to take on terrorist roles overseas or the members
Al-Qaeda’s seclusion in the FATA makes it difficult to of sympathetic groups who may fight beside al-Qaeda in the
obtain specific information on the group’s overall strength Afghanistan-Pakistan region.
and the status of key personnel, particularly in light of the
frequent aerial strikes during 2009. Damage reports
complicate analysis by conflating al-Qaeda, the Pakistani
The obvious question now is whether the
and Afghan Taliban, and foreign extremists such as Uzbeks pace of UAV strikes has been intense enough
who are not all affiliated with al-Qaeda. We can, however,
develop a rough assessment based on the group’s past
to break up the organization—or at least to
practices, combined with what has become publicly known remove the most experienced people and
about the leadership.
disrupt planning.
As a starting point, al-Qaeda, meaning “the Base,” is first
an organization, a fact that has been obscured in the past
The obvious question now is whether the pace of UAV
few years by media and academic emphasis on “al-Qaeda
strikes has been intense enough to break up the
the Movement” and its ideology. Bin Laden and his
organization—or at least to remove the most experienced
associates early on developed bylaws, committee structures,
people and disrupt planning. Some reports say recruits
and—acknowledging that they risk death or capture—rules
have trouble staying in one location for fear of strikes,6 and
for succession.3 Although information is sparse on the
the Guardian estimated in September 2009 that the core
group’s current rulebook,4 past practice makes it likely that
senior leadership has been reduced to “six to eight” men.7
al-Qaeda’s leaders have candidates in mind to replace key
What we can verify in the past two years is successful
people. Just as Abu Hafs al-Masri (a.k.a.Mohammed Atef)
targeting of well-known figures, including senior
replaced bin Laden’s deputy Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri when
operational leader Abu Laith al-Libi and chemical and
he drowned in 1996, in 2005 Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, then
poison specialist Abu Khabab al-Masri. The tempo of drone
the finance chief, appears to have stepped in for Abu Faraj
strikes also has caught some less publicly known but
al-Libi following the latter’s arrest. Operations continued as
important al-Qaeda figures such as Pakistan operations
well. The London transit bombings went ahead without al-
chief Usama al-Kini (Fahid Msalam)8 and his lieutenant
Libi, and the U.K.-based plot to bomb airliners remained on
Ahmed Salim Swedan. Both men, suspects in the 1998
course despite the death of Hamza Rabia late the same
bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa, were killed in
year.
January 2009.

As a vanguard organization designed to support the

Daniel Byman, director of the Security Studies Program at
development of a wider global jihad, al-Qaeda was always
Georgetown University, has compared al-Qaeda to Hamas,
relatively small in core personnel strength, even when it
noting that targeted killings can effectively weaken terrorist
was headquartered in Afghanistan, with estimates running
groups as these groups reach down the ranks to less
at a few hundred people in the middle and senior ranks.5
capable replacements.9 The problem is that the known

New America Foundation – Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net page 2

people do not necessarily represent al-Qaeda’s total strength
or even all of its experienced people, because nobody
outside the group knows who they all are.10 U.S.
government “most-wanted” lists, which are limited to
certain important people for convenience, cannot include
people whom intelligence collection efforts have not yet
discovered. Several of the militants killed since 2001 were
little known until either a plot was detected or a captured
lower-level operative talked—and they were not always less
capable. Some of the relatively obscure people who moved
up since 9/11, like Khalid Habib, had long jihadist
experience. Newer recruits by definition would be less
experienced, but their strong point for al-Qaeda is that, fully
aware of the group’s history of attacks on civilians, they
probably have fewer qualms about killing or risking death
than many of al-Qaeda’s original members, some of whom
argued against 9/11.
The most important leaders remain at large—Osama bin
Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. According to al-Qaeda’s
original bylaws, they are the “commanders”—the amir and
deputy amir—of the organization, with a responsibility to
“represent al-Qaeda internally and externally and bear the
responsibility” and to “discuss and approve the ‘Annual
11
Plan,’” having the deciding vote in a command council.
Because the two leaders remain in the shadows, appearing
only in intermittent audio or video propaganda pieces
carefully orchestrated by al-Qaeda’s media arm, it is often
assumed that their principal roles, particularly in bin
Laden’s case, are as propaganda leaders or even mere
figureheads. In October 2009, however, Gen. David
Petraeus, head of the U.S. Central Command, told Brian
Williams of NBC News that bin Laden, in addition to
holding “enormous iconic importance,” also retains “a
degree of operational importance.”12 Indeed, speeches by
the two al-Qaeda leaders appear to corroborate that. For
example, following statements by bin Laden and al-
Zawahiri in March and April 2008, respectively,
threatening Denmark because a Danish newspaper in 2005
had published cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammad,
al-Qaeda bombed the Danish Embassy in Islamabad on
New America Foundation – Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net
June 2. Abu al-Yazid confirmed the group’s role in a July
2008 interview with Pakistan’s Geo TV.13
Whether or not the top two men involve themselves in daily
operational decision-making—and we cannot be certain
they do not—Abu al-Yazid, a.k.a. Sheikh Saeed al-Masri,
has over the past three years emerged in the public eye as
the probable number three. This is the chief operating
officer post that before 9/11 belonged to Abu Hafs al-
Masri.14 By 2007, al-Qaeda’s media organization al-Sahab
was calling Abu al-Yazid “leader of the al-Qaeda
15
organization in Afghanistan.” While this implies a mainly
regional role, his other title of “general official,” sometimes
translated as “general manager,”16 is the same that was
used by third-in-command Abu Faraj al-Libi.17 Abu al-Yazid
has not hesitated to assume a public presence that suggests
a broad range of responsibilities, such as appealing to the
Turkish people to support the global jihad,18 for example, in
addition to coordinating with Taliban leaders.19
Other surviving senior leaders thought to reside in the
border region include Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, a Libyan who
has been involved in coordination with al-Qaeda in Iraq,20
and another Libyan, Abu Yahya al-Libi, al-Qaeda’s
religious/legal chief, who has emerged in the past several
years as a key media face for the group. Jarret Brachman, a
former terrorism specialist at West Point, believes that Abu
Yahya appeals more to a younger generation in the global
jihadist movement than al-Zawahiri or even bin Laden.21
We also can count a number of middle-ranking people with
significant roles, such as American Adam Gadahn, or
spokesmen for particular causes, like Moroccan-born
German Bekkay Harrach, who in September 2009
threatened Germany in a video message.22
Trying for Business as Usual
Despite personnel losses, core al-Qaeda has maintained
many of the group’s Pakistan-based functions into 2009. It
is still attracting and probably training recruits. According
to the Washington Post, U.S. and European officials say the
page 3
flow of Western recruits traveling to Afghanistan and
Pakistan “has continued unabated,” although the reports do
not always distinguish between those going directly to
23
assist the Taliban and those going to al-Qaeda. Abu al-
Yazid claimed, without specifics, in a June 2009 interview
24
with Al-Jazeera television that training had been going on.
Although U.S. citizens Bryant Neal Vinas and suspected al-
Qaeda associate Najibullah Zazi trained in Pakistan in the
summer and fall of 2008, current training could happen
under the radar of security services if conducted inside
buildings or in secluded private compounds rather than in
established camps.
Al-Qaeda also has issued more than 50 media releases in
2009—similar to 2008’s numbers—including several
video statements by al-Zawahiri and audio recordings of bin
Laden. This activity likely requires an extensive chain of
transmission to protect the location of the leaders, starting
with a low-profile meeting to make the recording, then
hand-carrying of the media to another location or locations
for editing and dissemination.
The recent cases involving Western men or
targets suggest that al-Qaeda’s leadership still
maintains communications with overseas
associates.
The recent cases involving Western men or targets suggest
that al-Qaeda’s leadership still maintains communications
with overseas associates. U.S. terrorism suspect Najibullah
Zazi allegedly had contact with a senior al-Qaeda operative
via an intermediary, according to the Associated Press,
25
citing a U.S. intelligence official. In addition, although al-
Qaeda’s media warnings historically have not acted as
signals to operatives, they can presage attacks, as happened
in the Danish Embassy case. These cases indicate that
Pakistan-based al-Qaeda maintains enough contacts to
know operatives are in a target area. Countermeasures such
New America Foundation – Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net
as UAV strikes do not always stop communications. In
2008, Tunisian-born Moez Garsallaoui, suspected of close
contact with al-Qaeda leaders, was able to e-mail his Belgian
wife—who administered a pro-al-Qaeda propaganda Web
site—about his narrow escape from some type of missile
strike, according to media reports of European
26
investigations.
At Home in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas
Al-Qaeda’s sanctuary in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border
region is a critical element in the group’s ability to plan and
conduct attacks—it is al-Qaeda’s headquarters. In the eight
years since its ouster from Afghanistan, al-Qaeda has been
embedding itself in a broad network of contacts throughout
the tribal areas and elsewhere in Pakistan, especially in the
cities bordering the FATA, according to Pakistani and other
specialists. 27Although some al-Qaeda personnel still appear
to locals as foreign “Arabs,” others dress and live as locals
or have married Pakistani or Afghan women. Some al-
Qaeda fighters have family members in tow, a factor that
can help them blend in. Moreover, the group has become
more multi-ethnic over the years, with more Pakistani
members. Rooting out al-Qaeda from the Pakistani border
would be more complex than removing its relatively few
operatives in Somalia, a comparison made by Sen. Russell
Feingold during September 2009 Afghanistan strategy
discussions, referencing the ease of targeting an al-Qaeda
leader in East Africa.28
Al-Qaeda had arranged fallback locations at least within
Afghanistan before 9/11 in anticipation of retaliatory
strikes,29 even though it did not anticipate a near complete
departure from the country, and it might have tapped
contacts in Pakistan as well. Since then it has developed
redundant sources of protection and shelter that allow for
rapid regrouping after losses and which frustrate attempts
to uproot the organization. Although these protections are
far from guaranteed—especially against drone attacks—
they lend the group significant flexibility. Only the most
relentless counterterrorism campaigns have been effective
page 4
against al-Qaeda—and then only temporarily.
organization’s movements since 9/11 illustrate both its
resilience and the impact of counterterrorism measures.
2001 to mid-
mid-2002.
2002 In the face of U.S. assaults on
Afghanistan and its Taliban rulers, al-Qaeda moved its
personnel and their families from various locations in
Afghanistan to Pakistan in several waves from October
2001 to early 2002. Initially they encountered little
resistance at the border from Pakistani authorities.30
leaders settled in the FATA, while others moved to cities
such as Karachi, where they probably had prearranged safe
houses. In 2001, al-Qaeda was linked to attempted attacks
in Singapore. That same year it tried to down an airliner
over the Atlantic, and in 2002 it asserted responsibility for
blowing up a synagogue in Tunisia.
Late 2002 to 2003.
2003 While strong U.S. and Pakistani
counterterrorism work led to the capture of important al-
Qaeda figures such as Khalid Sheikh Muhammad and
Ramzi bin al-Shibh in the urban areas, others were
consolidating bases for training and planning in South
Waziristan, near Wana and Shakai, where they were
protected by local leaders like Ahmedzai Wazir Nek
Mohammed.31 Some senior al-Qaeda associates, possibly
including Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, took refuge in
Quetta, where the son of “blind sheikh” Omar Abdel-
Rahman was arrested in February 2003.32 Al-Qaeda
launched attacks in Yemen, Kenya, and Saudi Arabia, and
backed bombings in Indonesia and Turkey.
2004.
2004 Pakistani forces, after initial missteps and troop
losses, assaulted the South Waziristan safe haven with jets
and helicopter gunships, driving al-Qaeda from that area.
Nek Mohammed was reported killed by a U.S. missile.
Although al-Qaeda sympathizers conducted devastating
attacks on trains in Spain in March, the core organization
failed to mount any major operations that year. Its media
releases grew more sophisticated by the end of the year,
however, including the first bin Laden video appearance
since 2001.
New America Foundation – Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net
The
2005.
2005 After escaping South Waziristan, al-Qaeda spread out
in the FATA, creating new hubs in North Waziristan and
Bajaur.35 Protectors in the latter agency included Maulana
Faqir Mohammed, former leader of the militant Tanzim
Nifaz Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM).36 Terrorist planning
and training apparently resumed quickly after the move,
because al-Qaeda operatives successfully attacked
transportation targets in London in July 2005.
Some
2006 to 2007:
2007 With pressure on the group reduced after
Pakistani government officials negotiated several peace
deals with local leaders, al-Qaeda gradually drifted back
through both Waziristans,37 in part because of an alliance
with Baitullah Mehsud, whose territory spanned North and
South. British authorities, meanwhile, uncovered a major
al-Qaeda plot to bomb airliners en route to North America,
and U.S. intelligence assessments, notably the 2007 NIE,
stressed that the group appeared to have retained its
operational capabilities despite counterterrorism measures
since 2001 .
Al-Qaeda today appears to maintain a
presence in many of the same areas of the
FATA as it did in 2007, despite military
assaults and drone strikes.
Al-Qaeda today appears to maintain a presence in many of
the same areas of the FATA as it did in 2007, despite
military assaults and drone strikes. In mid-2008, a tribal
33
elder in South Waziristan told New York Times
34
correspondent Dexter Filkins that “important Arabs” who
rode “Arabian horses” were in the mountains of the agency,
while Arab fighters moved freely in the towns.38 During a
late 2008 Pakistani military assault in Bajaur, a military
spokesman noted that “foreign militants” had been
effectively targeted.39 While anecdotal reports often fail to
distinguish between foreign fighters such as Islamic
page 5
Movement of Uzbekistan members, who have had a
checkered relationship with al-Qaeda, and the fighters of al-
Qaeda itself, they can offer a partial picture. In October
2009, reporters from the U.K. Telegraph talked to an
experienced Chinese fighter in South Waziristan. It is likely
he was associated with the Turkistan Islamic Party, which
40
has been close to al-Qaeda. A September 2009 UAV
strike in North Waziristan targeted Ilyas Kashmiri, a senior
41
al-Qaeda commander who resurfaced alive in October.
Some press reports suggest that al-Qaeda associates have
42
been gravitating back to urban areas of Pakistan as well.
Maintaining Ties to Militants in and
Beyond the FATA
Al-Qaeda is able to hold on to its safe havens in the FATA
in part because of personal ties to certain tribes and
families. It is clear from the current conflict that al-Qaeda
has secured allies in Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, the
“Pakistani Taliban” or TTP, and other mainly Pashtun
groupings. While al-Qaeda has been particularly close to the
Mehsuds—including the late TTP leader Baitullah and his
successor Hakimullah—in the past three years, the
Haqqani network, with a presence in North Waziristan and
across the border in Khost, Afghanistan, was an important
protector even before 9/11. Pakistani journalist Ahmed
Rashid notes that Jalaluddin Haqqani, an associate of bin
Laden since the Afghan war against the Soviets, was a key
43
organizer of al-Qaeda’s escape into Waziristan in 2001.
Author Lawrence Wright mentions that al-Zawahiri’s wife
was taking refuge in a Haqqani-owned building on the
Afghan side of the border when she was killed by a U.S.
airstrike in late 2001.44 Al-Qaeda probably maintains ties to
Jalaluddin’s son Sirajuddin, also reportedly a leader in the
network. Other regional associates of al-Qaeda from the
Soviet war period include Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, although
he has denied current ties to the group.45
If al-Qaeda has to leave the FATA for other parts of
Pakistan, particularly cities such as Lahore46—it will be able
to turn to certain Punjab-based militant groups originally
New America Foundation – Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net
established to fight in Kashmir.47 One of these groups,
Harkat ul-Mujahedin (HUM),48 shared an al-Qaeda camp in
Afghanistan in the late 1990s; it suffered major losses from
U.S. cruise missile strikes in 1998 retaliating for the U.S.
embassy bombings in East Africa. A HUM offshoot, Jaish-
e-Mohammed (JeM), helped senior al-Qaeda personnel and
associates escape to the Punjab after 9/11.49 Senior al-Qaeda
official Ilyas Kashmiri, who also commanded the HUM-
related group Harkat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI), came out of
JeM, as did Rashid Rauf, implicated in the 2006 al-Qaeda
plot to blow up airliners.50 Another militant group, Lashkar-
i-Jhangvi, allegedly helped al-Qaeda personnel escape from
the Pakistani coast and smuggle out gold in 2001-02.51
According to Ahmed Rashid, JeM and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LT),
the group implicated in the 2008 terrorist attacks on
Mumbai, India, have channeled suicide volunteers and
other recruits to al-Qaeda, including British nationals.52
Al-Qaeda’s ties to Punjab-based militants are
likely to deepen as these groups become more
directly involved in fighting in the Afghan
border region.
Al-Qaeda’s ties to Punjab-based militants are likely to
deepen as these groups become more directly involved in
fighting in the Afghan border region. According to The
Times of London, citing intelligence sources, 5,000 to
8,000 militants from southern Punjab have been fighting
in Afghanistan and Waziristan.53 The Pakistani newspaper
Dawn in early October 2009 reported the assessments of
security specialists in the Pakistani heartland that Punjabi
militant groups would become more involved in terrorist
attacks there.54 A few days later a JeM member, an associate
of Ilyas Kashmiri, was apprehended during an assault by
TTP fighters on Pakistan’s army headquarters.55
page 6

Not Giving Up on Afghanistan
Al-Qaeda’s commitment to Afghanistan and the Afghan
Taliban should not be underestimated. The Afghan-Soviet
war, in which bin Laden claims major battlefield
accomplishments, gave him the inspiration to promote a
global jihad and establish al-Qaeda. He sees Afghanistan as
a home and has owned property near Jalalabad, according
56
to his son. Bin Laden swore allegiance to Taliban leader
Mullah Omar as the movement came to dominate
Afghanistan, and renewed that pledge in a public statement
in 2001. His loyalty to the country comes out in the words
he used in a 1997 interview with Pakistani journalist
Hamid Mir: “The pious caliphate will begin from
57
Afghanistan.” In May 2007, Abu al-Yazid pledged
allegiance to Mullah Omar again when al-Qaeda appointed
58
him Afghanistan commander, and his statements since
then imply that al-Qaeda is working to help regain
Afghanistan under the assumption that the Taliban would
again be willing to host the terrorist organization.
Despite the rift that developed between al-
Qaeda and the Taliban in the wake of 9/11,
they have become closer in recent years.
Despite the rift that developed between al-Qaeda and the
Taliban in the wake of 9/11, they have become closer in
recent years. In June 2009, Abu al-Yazid told an Al-Jazeera
interviewer that al-Qaeda and the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan were fighting “side-by-side” as “brothers.”59
Taliban fighters have recounted to Newsweek how al-Qaeda
urged embittered members of the Taliban to renew the
fight soon after the two groups found refuge in Pakistan.
They added that al-Qaeda trained Taliban fighters in
making improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and in suicide
tactics, although the Taliban now does its own training.60
The Taliban also has taken a leaf from al-Qaeda propaganda
in recent years, using human images in videos and
New America Foundation – Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net
employing rhetoric that emulates al-Qaeda’s global jihadist
message (tactics it had avoided before 9/11).61 Some Taliban
leaders also have closer personal ties to Arab jihadists.
According to Pashtun journalist Mukhtar Khan, Bajaur
commander Qari Ziaur Rahman, who represents the region
on Mullah Omar’s shura council, grew up in Arab
mujahedin camps.62
Being a small organization, al-Qaeda probably has few
personnel remaining inside Afghanistan, but the ease of
crossing the border63 means its people are almost certainly
there in some capacity. Indeed, in July 2008 a Pakistani
Geo TV reporter interviewed Abu al-Yazid somewhere in
the Khost area. In a June 2009 interview, Abu al-Yazid
asserted that al-Qaeda members and other foreign
associates were fighting in Afghanistan and had
participated in an attack on U.S. forces near Khost airfield
in 2008, although he avoided giving numbers.64 James
Jones, the White House national security adviser, estimated
in early October 2009 that al-Qaeda had fewer than 100
fighters in the country.65A hundred would not be
insignificant for the group, however, and recent terrorism
investigations have revealed that its recruits, such as
Belgian Moez Garsallaoui, often cross the border from
Pakistan to fight. 66
Still a Threat at Home and Abroad
Al-Qaeda’s involvement in attacks in Pakistan—and
probably in Afghanistan—does not mean the group has
given up on terrorist strikes in the United States and other
Western countries. Its leaders cling to a global vision of
jihad even when their plans fail. Having long ago defined
the United States and its allies as “Crusaders and Jews”
who are actively attacking Muslims, they seem
unconcerned whether a foe is a “near enemy” (i.e., Muslims
deemed apostate or heretical) or a “far enemy” (Americans
or other “non-believers”) and will attack both. Regardless of
whether its resources are tight, al-Qaeda continually seeks
opportunities to engage the enemy—even if preparations
take years, and even if the opportunities could jeopardize its
page 7
safe havens. “Core” al-Qaeda has returned time and again
to certain principal objectives:
The United States:
States Al-Qaeda has been assiduous since 9/11
in trying to identify, train, and place operatives in the
United States to conduct attacks—Vinas and Zazi may be
only the latest examples—and in attempting to send in
attackers from outside, as in the 2001 Richard Reid shoe
bomb plot or the 2006 aviation plot mounted from Britain.
This is in tandem with efforts to remove the U.S. presence
from Muslim lands, and al-Qaeda leaders have repeatedly
stated their belief that they can outlast the American
commitment to those countries.
Afghanistan:
Afghanistan Al-Qaeda looks for elimination of the foreign
presence, cross-border freedom of movement, and a
sympathetic government in power to allow its return.
Pakistan:
Pakistan Soon after 9/11, bin Laden called on the Pakistani
military to rise up against the Musharraf regime, and al-
Qaeda is assessed to have supported assassination attempts
in late 2003. Although the group has occasionally backed
off because of its safe haven needs—for example, when
tribal hosts made pacts with the government—its
consistent pattern has been to target the Pakistani
government for cooperating with United States.
U.S. coalition allies: A large part of al-Qaeda’s effort goes to
breaking the will of U.S. “crusader” partners. In addition to
conducting attacks in Britain, backing attacks that killed
Australians in Indonesia, and striking the Danish Embassy
in Pakistan, the group has threatened attacks in several
European countries, most recently Germany.
Arabian Peninsula: Al-Qaeda paid for its strategic error in
2003 of conducting attacks in Saudi Arabia—its operatives
were arrested or killed—but it constantly tries to regain a
foothold there. During 2009, al-Qaeda’s regional
organization consolidated its presence in Yemen, where it
also tries to target U.S. and Yemeni government interests.
New America Foundation – Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net
East Africa: Al-Qaeda developed ties in East Africa during
its residence in Sudan, when it had a training mission in
Somalia. Experienced operative Harun Fazul (Fazul
Abdullah Mohammed) redeployed there after 9/11, building
up a local presence that attacked Israeli targets in Kenya in
2002. Since then, al-Qaeda has been trying to influence
Islamic extremist groups such as al-Shabab in Somalia,
recently through the late Saleh Nabhan.
North Africa: Longtime Libyan, Moroccan, and Algerian
members of al-Qaeda may have influenced the senior
leaders to cement ties to Algerian extremists who became
the core of the group called al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb.
Al-Qaeda in a Tight Spot?
Since 2001, al-Qaeda has replaced some of its mid-ranking
to senior leaders several times, adroitly moved its locations
ahead of counterterrorism forces, and continued preparing
local and overseas attacks. The leadership in many ways has
created a more mobile and agile organization than it had in
Sudan or Afghanistan, while expanding its base of active
sympathizers. At the same time, it continues to need
relatively secure, but sometimes changing, locations to
house its personnel and their families, and to meet with
operatives. Pakistan’s tribal areas and nearby towns have
provided that safe haven. However, the combination of
targeted killings, Pakistani military activity, and changing
political dynamics within the Afghan Taliban may be
leaving al-Qaeda especially vulnerable to relentless, multi-
front pressure. The following are major variables in al-
Qaeda’s ability to survive:
• The accuracy of intelligence on the group’s
leadership actions and locations.
• The extent of Islamabad’s resolve to maintain an
offensive against militants in the FATA and
elsewhere in the Pakistan.
page 8
 • The ability of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and/or NATO
forces to seal border crossing routes favored by al- 2 Mary Louise Kelly, “Officials: Bin Laden Running Out Of Space To

Qaeda-linked fighters. Hide,” NPR Morning Edition, June 5, 2009, quoted in

• Al-Qaeda’s range of Pakistani supporters. Has it http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2009/june/jun52009.html

put too many resources into the TTP, particularly 3 “Al-Qaeda Bylaws,” Harmony Document AFGP-2002-600048,

allies of Baitullah and now Hakimullah Mehsud, translated April 18, 2002, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point,

now directly targeted in Islamabad’s current http://ctc.usma.edu/harmony/harmony_docs.asp

offensive? 4 The experience of Bryant Neal Vinas suggests the organization retains

• The extent to which al-Qaeda leaders attempt to bureaucratic impulses. Vinas was asked to fill out forms in triplicate before

leave Pakistan or shift to its urban areas, increasing an exam to test his suitability for a suicide attack, according to a Guardian

the risk of capture. report. Jason Burke and Ian Black, “Al-Qaida: Tales from Bin Laden’s

• The continued willingness of Afghan Taliban Volunteers,” Guardian.co.uk, September 10, 2009,

leaders to offer al-Qaeda a potential alternative safe http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/10/al-qaida-terrorism-bin-

haven there. laden

5 For example in comments by Saudi dissident Saad al-Fagih to Reuters.

Wherever al-Qaeda has maintained a refuge, three “ANALYSTS VIEW: The state of al-Qaeda,” March 11, 2009,

interdependent constants have enabled the group to survive http://www.reuters.com/article/pakistan/idUSTRE52A3QM20090311

under pressure and will be key to its resiliency in South 6 Nic Robertson and Paul Cruickshank, “Belgian ‘al-Qaeda cell’ linked to

Asia at this juncture. One is organization: al-Qaeda's 2006 airline plot,” CNN.com, February 13, 2009,

hierarchical structure has allowed the group to http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/02/10/belgium.terror/index.

systematically acquire and disburse its human and material html

resources for operational needs--and for rapid regrouping if 7 Ian Black and Richard Norton-Taylor, “Al-Qaida faces recruitment crisis,

necessary. Another is the vision and tenacity provided anti-terrorism experts say,” guardian.co.uk, September 10, 2009,

by Osama bin Laden. Even when bin Laden has appeared to http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/10/al-qaida-recruitment-

act in a "hands-off" manner, it usually has been because crisis

he has already personally selected mission leaders whom he 8 Zahid Hussain, “Usama al-Kini, head of al-Qaeda in Pakistan, killed by

trusts to act alone if necessary. A third is the US military,” timesonline, January 9, 2009,

leadership abilities and creativity of those subordinate http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5479455.ece

commanders, for example, a KSM or Abu Hafs. All three 9 Daniel Byman, “Kill or Be Killed,” Wall Street Journal, July 17, 2009,

elements are important in assessing the impact of http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204271104574294173544

counterterrorism measures. Although al- 620730.html

Qaeda's organizational structure might help hold the group 10 Compare the situation to 2003 when, the Washington Post has noted,

together for a time under a talented subordinate should bin CIA Director George Tenet told Congress that “more than one-third of the

Laden be removed, "core" al-Qaeda's longer term survival top al-Qaeda leadership identified before the [Afghanistan] war has been

as a major challenge to US interests would be by no means killed or captured.” President Bush later made that “about half.” Karen

assured without the third component of its founder's DeYoung and Walter Pincus, “Al-Qaeda's Gains Keep U.S. at Risk, Report

influence. Says,” Washington Post, July 18, 2007,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

1Director of National Intelligence, “National Intelligence Estimate: The dyn/content/article/2007/07/17/AR2007071700099.html

Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland,” July 2007, 11 “Al-Qaeda Bylaws”
http://www.dni.gov/reports.htm

New America Foundation – Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net page 9

12 Brian Williams video interview with Gen. David Petraeus, MSNBC,
October 1, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3032619/#33129908
13 M. Ilyas Khan, “Al-Qaeda leader in TV Interview,” BBC News, July 22,
2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7518763.stm; for text, see
www.nefafoundation.org, misdated as June 21, 2008.
14 Carol Grisanti and Robert Windrem, “Al-Qaida senior leader grants rare
TV interview,” NBC News Deep Background, July 21, 2008,
http://deepbackground.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2008/07/21/1212847.asp
x. Although the story of the interview is correct in characterizing the
number three position, it is incorrect in stating that Abu Ubaidah al-Masri
held that job. Abu Ubaidah probably was a notch lower in the hierarchy,
given his alleged direct involvement in the 2006 plot to bomb aircraft.
Mark Mazzetti, “Qaeda Is Seen as Restoring Leadership,” New York
Times, April 2, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/02/world/middleeast/02qaeda.html?_
r=2&hp=&pagewanted=all&oref=slogin
15 Open Source Center, October 1, 2009, summary of Mustafa Abu-al-
Yazid in a September 30, 2009, statement eulogizing Baitullah Mehsud
released by al-Sahab Establishment for Media Production.
16 “The U.S. Department of Defense Central Command issued the
following newsletter: Al-Jazirah Satellite Channel Television in Arabic at
1201 GMT on 24 May carries the following announcer-read report over
video: Al-Jazirah has obtained video footage of a person called Mustafa
Abu-al-Yazid, who presents himself as the general official [Al-Mas'ul al-
Amm] of the Al-Qa'ida Organization in Afghanistan,”
May 25, 2007, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-1285873421.html
17 http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/abu_faraj_al-libbi.htm
18 Mustafa Abu al-Yazid statement “Advice to the Turkish People,” Open
Source Center summary of audio message on jihadist Web sites, June 10,
2009.
19 Mullah Dadullah interview with Al-Jazeera: “He planned that operation
in details and guided us through it. The operation was a success.” “Taliban
leader says bin Laden alive,” Aljazeera.net, May 1, 2007,
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2007/04/200852514470668119.ht
ml
20 A 2006 captured letter from Atiyah to Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi
illustrates Atiyah’s prominent role in al-Qaeda: “Letter Exposes new Leader
in al-Qa`ida High Command,” Combating Terrorism Center at West
Point, September 25, 2006.
http://ctc.usma.edu/harmony/harmony_index.asp
New America Foundation – Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net
21 Jarret Brachman, “The Next Osama,” Foreign Policy, September 10,
2009,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/10/the_next_osama
22 Raffaelo Pantucci, “Bekkay Harrach: The Face of German Terror,”
Terrorism Monitor: 7, October 1, 2009,
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=3556
3&tx_ttnews[backPid]=26&cHash=7e18ae7224
23 Craig Whitlock, “Flow of terrorist recruits increasing,” Washington
Post, October 19, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/10/18/AR2009101802549.html
24 Ahmad Zaydan interview on Al-Jazeera Television, June 21, 2009,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rJHDhI5zaD8 (dated July 7, 2009)
25 “Correction: Terrorist Suspect Stories,” Associated Press, October 16,
2009, cited in http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=8848410
26 Intercepted e-mails to his wife in 2008. Nic Robertson and Paul
Cruickshank, “Belgian ‘al-Qaeda cell’ linked to 2006 airline plot,”
CNN.com, February 13, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/02/10/belgium.terror/index.
html
27 Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos (New York: Penguin Books, 2009),
268-272. Mukhtar A. Khan, “A Profile of Militant Groups in Bajaur Tribal
Agency,” in Hassan Abbas, ed., Pakistan’s Troubled Frontier (Washington,
DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 2009), 96. Sami Yousafzai and Ron
Moreau, “The Taliban in Their Own Words,” Newsweek, October 5, 2009,
36, 39.
28 Sen. Feingold (D-Wis.) suggested that the United States concentrate on
disrupting al-Qaeda in Pakistan rather than building up in Afghanistan in
order to deter a resurgence of the group. He cited as effective tactics the
U.S. operations in Yemen and Somalia, which included the targeting by
U.S. aircraft of al-Qaeda official Saleh Nabhan as he drove along the
Somali coast in September. Scott Wilson, “On War, Obama Could Turn to
GOP,” Washington Post, October 1, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/09/30/AR2009093005114.html
29 At Tora Bora, for example, al-Qaeda had “developed fortifications,
stockpiled with weapon systems, ammunition and food,” according to the
U.S. Special Operations Command’s history of Operation Enduring
Freedom. United States Special Operations Command History 1987-2007,
n.d., 93. http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/socom/2007history.pdf
page 10
Also, Bakr Atyani, a former Middle East Broadcasting Company bureau
chief in Pakistan, maintains that bin Laden deputy Abu Hafs al-Masri told
him in a June 2001 interview, “We are anticipating an American strike,
yes, but we are ready to evacuate our bases within 30 minutes.” Quoted in
Peter L. Bergen, The Osama Bin Laden I Know (New York: Free Press,
2006), 285.
30 A veteran Pashtun politician said that no Pakistani troops were
deployed at the Waziristan border at the time, allowing al-Qaeda to set up
in South Waziristan. Quoted in Rashid, Descent Into Chaos, 268.
31 Ibid., 270-271.
32 Ibid., n. 10, 449.
33 Abbas, ed., Pakistan’s Troubled Frontier, 5.
34 Rashid, Descent Into Chaos, 272.
35 Yousafzai and Moreau, “The Taliban in Their Own Words,” 36, 39.
36 Khan, “A Profile of Militant Groups in Bajaur Tribal Agency,” in Abbas,
ed., Pakistan’s Troubled Frontier, 96.
37 Arif Janjua and Nick Meo, “In the Pakistani mountains of Waziristan,
young jihadis wait for martyrdom,” Telegraph.co.uk, October 11, 2009,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/6292448/In-the-Pakistani-mountains-
of--Waziristan-young-jihadis-wait-for-martyrdom.html
38 Dexter Filkins, “Right At the Edge,” New York Times, September 5,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/magazine/07pakistan-
t.html?_r=1
39 Ayaz Gul, “Pakistan Says Al-Qaida Operative Killed in US Missile
Strike,” Voice of America, November 19, 2008,
http://www.51voa.com/VOA_Standard_English/VOA_Standard_English_2
6517.html
40 Janjua and Meo, “In the Pakistani mountains of Waziristan, young
jihadis wait for martyrdom,” and
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/etip.htm
41 “Ilyas Kashmiri alive, lays out future terror strategy, “ Daily Times,
October 15, 2009,
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\10\15\story_15-10-
2009_pg1_11. Munir Ahmad and Chris Brummit, “Pakistan: Al-Qaida
commander killed in US strike,” Associated Press, September 17, 2009,
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=8597954
42 Sara A. Carter and Raza Khan, “Al-Qaeda extends to Somalia, Yemen,”
Washington Times, September 10, 2009,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/sep/10/al-qaeda-extends-
reach
New America Foundation – Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net
43 Rashid, Descent Into Chaos, 268.
44 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11,
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 371.
45 “Hizb-i-Islami,”
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hizbi-islami.htm
46 Al-Qaeda probably has people in Lahore, since Vinas says he was
recruited for the group there in 2007. Michael Powell, “U.S. Recruit
Reveals How Qaeda Trains Foreigners,” New York Times, July 23, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/24/nyregion/24terror.html
47 Pakistan has banned most of these groups, but their members continue
to operate.
48 A longtime leader of Harkat ul-Mujahedin, originally Harkat ul-Ansar,
Fazlur Rehman Khalil, was a signatory of al-Qaeda’s February 1998
“fatwa” establishing the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews
and Crusaders.
49 Rashid, Descent Into Chaos, 224.
50 “Fears rise over militants in Punjab,” Dawn.com, Oct. 6, 2009,
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-
library/dawn/news/pakistan/provinces/04-fears-rise-over-militants-
punjab-qs-13
51 Rashid, Descent Into Chaos, 224.
52 Ibid., 281.
53 Zahid Hussain, “Punjabi militants form unholy alliance with Taleban
fighters in the west,” The Times, October 16, 2009,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6877108.ece
54 “Fears rise over militants in Punjab,” Dawn.com.
55 Hassan Abbas, “Deciphering the attack on Pakistan’s Army
headquarters,” The AfPak Channel, Foreign Policy, October 11, 2009,
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/blog/10119
56 A local notable in 1996 granted him a tract of land in Jalalabad and a
mountain in the Tora Bora area. Najwa bin Laden, Omar bin Laden, and
Jean Sasson, Growing Up bin Laden (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2009),
152
57 Interview conducted March 18, 1997, in Islamabad, Pakistan, and
translated from Urdu, www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ubl-fbis.pdf
58 Center for Defense Information, Afghanistan Update, May 24, 2007,
http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=3991
59 Zaydan interview on Al-Jazeera Television.
60 Yousafzai and Moreau, “The Taliban in Their Own Words,” 39, 42.
page 11
61 Tom Gjelten, “Intel: Al-Qaida Down, Taliban Rising,” NPR, October 22, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2010011262_apasafg

2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=114051510 hanalqaidasrole.html; The Geo TV reporter was Najib Ahmed, mentioned
62 Mukhtar A. Khan, “A Profile of Militant Groups in Bajaur Tribal in Khan, “Al-Qaeda leader in TV interview.”
Agency, “ Terrorism Monitor: 7, March 19, 2009, Jamestown Foundation, 66 Robertson and Cruickshank, “Belgian ‘al-Qaeda cell’ linked to 2006

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=3472 airline plot.”; It is impossible to confirm the Afghan defense minister’s

9&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=a3e8ad5b5f claims in 2009 that some 4,000 “foreign fighters” were in Afghanistan,
63 Bin Laden’s son Omar says his father would abruptly wake him up on a coming from Chechnya, North Africa, and—he adds, confusing the

whim to hike over the mountains from Tora Bora to Pakistan and back picture—Pakistan. Rahim Faiez and Heidi Vogt, “Foreign fighters join
when they lived in Afghanistan. Growing Up bin Laden, 173. insurgency, general says,” Associated Press, October 11, 2009,
64 Zaydan interview on Al-Jazeera Television. http://www.philly.com/inquirer/world_us/20091011_Foreign_fighters_joi

65 Robert H. Reid, “Al-Qaida showing smaller presence in Afghanistan,” n_insurgency__general_says.html

Associated Press, October 6, 2009,

New America Foundation – Counterterrorism.NewAmerica.net page 12

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